•  BATTLES  AND 
LEADERS  OF  THE 
CIVIL  WAR 

VOLUME    ONE 


THE    BUGLE    CALL. 

FROM    THE    PAINTING    BY    WILLIAM    M.    HUNT. 


BATTLES  AND 
LEADERS  OF  THE 
CIVIL  WAR 


IVOl  [IMF  | 


BEING  FOR  THE  MOST  PART  CONTRIBUTIONS 
BY  UNION  AND  CONFEDERATE  OFFICERS. 
BASED  UPON  "THE  CENTURY  WAR  SERIES." 
EDITED  BY  ROBERT  UNDERWOOD  JOHNSON 
AND  CLARENCE  CLOUGH  BUEL,OF  THE  EDI 
TORIAL  STAFF  OF  "THE  CENTURYMAGAZINE'.' 


NEW-YORK 

Centurp  Co. 


• 


Copyright,  1887, 


THE  DE  VINNE  PRESS. 


C*MP    GOSSIP.        FROM    A     PHOTOGRAPH. 


PREFACE. 


WITH  the  main  purpose  in  its  origin  of  interesting  veterans  in  their  own 
memories  and  of  instructing  the  generation  which  has  grown  up  since 
the  War  for  the  Union,  the  "  Century  War  Series,"  through  peculiar  circum 
stances,  has  exerted  an  influence  in  bringing  about  a  better  understanding 
between  the  soldiers  who  were  opposed  in  that  conflict.  This  influence,  of 
which  substantial  evidence  has  been  given,  North  and  South,  lends  additional 
historical  interest  to  the  present  work.  Many  commanders  and  subordinates 
have  here  contributed  to  the  history  of  the  heroic  deeds  of  which  they  were  a 
part.  General  Grant,  who,  in  accord  with  the  well-known  purpose  of  President 
Lincoln,  began  at  Appomattox  the  work  of  reconciliation,  contributed  to  the 
War  Series  four  papers  on  his  greatest  campaigns,  and  these  are  here  included. 
They  were  written  before  his  severe  illness,  and  became  the  foundation  of 
his  "  Personal  Memoirs."  The  narrative  of  his  battles,  continued  under  the 
tragic  circumstances  of  the  last  year  of  his  life,  retrieved  his  fortunes  and 
added  a  new  laurel  to  his  fame.  The  good  temper  and  the  unpartisan  char 
acter  of  his  articles,  and  of  the  papers  by  the  leading  writers  on  both  sides, 
are  the  most  significant  signs  in  these  pages.  For  the  most  part,  each  side 
has  confined  controversy  to  its  own  ranks,  and  both  have  emphasized  the 
benefit  as  well  as  the  glory  of  the  issue.  Coincident  with  the  progress  of  the 
series  during  the  past  three  years,  may  be  noted  a  marked  increase  in  the 
number  of  fraternal  meetings  between  Union  and  Confederate  veterans, 
enforcing  the  conviction  that  the  nation  is  restored  in  spirit  as  in  fact,  and 
that  each  side  is  contributing  its  share  to  the  new  heritage  of  manhood  and 
peace. 

On  the  17th  of  July,  1883,  Mr.  Buel,  Assistant-Editor  of  "  The  Century" 
magazine,  proposed  in  detail  a  magazine  series  by  prominent  generals  of 


x  PREFACE. 

both  sides.  The  original  suggestion  (based  upon  the  success  of  two  articles 
from  different  points  of  view  on  the  John  Brown  raid,  in  "  The  Century  "  for 
that  month)  was  of  eight  or  ten  articles  on  the  decisive  battles  of  the  war, 
and  included  in  the  main  the  features  of  the  expanded  series.  Mr.  R.  W. 
Gilder,  the  Editor-in-Chief,  at  once  cordially  adopted  the  suggestion,  com 
mitting  the  charge  of  its  execution  to  Mr.  Johnson,  the  Associate-Editor, 
assisted  by  Mr.  Buel ;  from  the  start  Mr.  Gilder  has  aided  the  work  by  his 
counsel,  and  by  the  support  of  his  confidence  in  its  success  and  public  use 
fulness —  ends  which  could  not  have  been  attained  except  for  the  liberal  and 
continued  support  of  Roswell  Smith,  Esq.,  President  of  The  Century  Co.  The 
elaboration  of  the  first  plan,  the  securing  of  the  contributions,  and  the 
shaping  and  editing  of  the  series  were  shared  by  Mr.  Johnson  and  Mr.  Buel, 
the  former  devoting  the  more  time  to  the  work  during  the  months  of  organ 
ization,  and  the  latter  having  entire  charge  of  the  editing  for  nearly  the  whole 
of  the  second  year.  The  course  of  the  series  in  magazine  form  was  from 
November,  1884,  to  November,  1887. 

That  the  plan  and  the  time  of  the  enterprise  were  alike  fortunate,  may  be 
estimated  from  the  unprecedented  success  of  the  articles.  Within  six  months 
from  the  appearance  of  the  first  battle  paper,  the  circulation  of  "  The  Century  " 
advanced  from  127,000  to  225,000  copies,  or  to  a  reading  audience  estimated 
at  two  millions.  A  part  of  this  gain  was  the  natural  growth  of  the  periodical. 
The  still  further  increase  of  the  regular  monthly  issue  during  the  first  year 
of  the  serial  publication  of  Messrs.  Nicolay  and  Hay's  Life  of  Lincoln  (1886-87) 
has  proved  the  permanent  character  of  the  interest  in  important  contribu 
tions  to  the  history  of  the  Civil  War. 

The  present  work  is  a  natural  sequence  of  the  magazine  series,  and  was 
provided  for  before  the  publication  of  the  first  paper.  Both  the  series  and  this 
expansion  of  it  in  book  form  are,  in  idea  as  well  as  in  execution,  an  outgrowth 
of  the  methods  and  convictions  belonging  to  the  editorial  habit  of  "  The  Cen 
tury"  magazine.  The  chief  motive  has  been  strict  fairness  to  the  testimony  of 
both  sides,  and  the  chief  endeavors  have  been  to  prove  every  important  state 
ment  by  the  "  Official  Records  "  and  other  trustworthy  documents,  and  to  spare 
no  pains  in  the  interest  of  elucidation  and  accuracy.  These  ends  could  not  have 
been  attained  without  the  cordial  cooperation  as  writers,  and  assistance  as 
interested  actors,  of  the  soldiers  of  both  sides;  in  these  respects  the  aid 
rendered  by  veterans,  from  the  highest  rank  to  the  lowest,  has  been  unstinted, 
and  would  be  deserving  of  particular  mention  if  such  were  possible  within 
the  bounds  of  an  ordinary  preface.  Nearly  every  writer  in  the  work,  and 
very  many  others  whose  names  do  not  appear,  have  been  willing  sources 
of  suggestion  and  information.  Special  aid  has  been  received  from  General 
James  B.  Fry,  from  the  late  Colonel  Robert  N.  Scott,  who  was  the  editorial 
head  of  the  "  War  Records "  office,  and  from  his  successor,  Colonel  H.  M. 
Lazelle;  and  thanks  are  due  to  General  Adam  Badeau,  George  E.  Pond, 
Colonel  John  P.  Nicholson,  Colonel  G.  C.  Kniifin,  and  to  General  Marcus 
J.  Wright,  Agent  of  the  War  Department  for  the  Collection  of  Confederate 
Records. 


PREFACE. 


XI 


Material  for  the  illustrations,  which  form  a  most  striking  and  not  the  least 
important  feature  of  the  work,  has  been  received  from  all  sides,  as  will  be 
noted  in  the  table  of  contents.  Special  acknowledgment  is  due  to  the  Massa 
chusetts  Cornmandery  of  the  Loyal  Legion,  to  whose  complete  set  of  the 
Gardner  and  the  Brady  photographs,  as  well  as  to  other  material,  access  has 
been  had  from  the  beginning  of  the  series.  Colonel  Arnold  A.  Rand,  Re 
corder  of  the  Massachusetts  Commandery,  and  General  Albert  Ordway  have 
rendered  valuable  aid  in  connection  with  the  Brady  and  the  Gardner  photo 
graphs  and  in  other  ways.  The  importance  of  accuracy  has  been  kept  con 
stantly  in  view  in  the  preparation  of  the  illustrations — a  laborious  work 
which  has  been  executed  under  the  direction  of  Mr.  Alexander  W.  Drake, 
Superintendent,  and  Mr.  W.  Lewis  Fraser,  Manager,  of  the  Art  Department 
of  The  Century  Co. 


THE  EDITORS. 


NEW  YORK,  November,  1887. 


CORRECTIONS   IN   VOLUME  I. 


Most  of  the  errors  here  noted  appear  only  in  part  of  the  edition. 


Page  xiii.  of  Contents,  and  page  37.  For  "  Colonel  Daniel 
H.  Vinton,"  "read  Colonel  David  H.  Vinton." 

Page  5.  For  "Admiral  Charles  A.Davis"  (so  printed 
in  part  of  the  edition),  read  "Admiral  Charles  H. 
Davis." 

Page  6  and  page  108.  For  "Charles  G.  Memminger," 
read  "Christopher  G.  Memminger." 

Page  41.  "From  Moultrie  to  Sumter,"  by  General 
Doubleday.  Concerning  the  statement  that  Major 
Robert  Anderson,  of  Kentucky,  "  was  a  regular 
officer  and  owner  of  a  slave  plantation  in  Georgia," 
Major  Anderson's  widow  writes  to  the  Editors  that 
he  never  owned  a  plantation  anywhere,  and  that  he 
never  resided  in  Georgia.  She  adds,  "  He  inherited 
slaves  in  Kentucky  from  his  father,  Colonel  Richard 
Clough  Anderson,  and  these  he  liberated  immedi 
ately  on  coming  into  possession  of  them,  which  was 
a  few  years  after  he  was  graduated  at  the  Military 
Academy  of  West  Point."  General  Doubleday  will 
modify  the  statement  for  other  editions. 

Page  81.  For  "  Lieutenant  James  A.  Yates"  (so  printed 
in  part  of  the  edition),  read  "Lieutenant  Joseph  A. 
Yates." 

Same.    For  "John  Mitchell,"  read  "  John  C.  Mitchel." 

Same.  "  Lieutenant  Flemming  "  should  be  "  Lieutenant 
D.  G.  Fleming." 

Same.  "  Lieutenant  J.  A.  Hugueuin,"  read  "  Lieutenant 
T.  A.  Huguenin." 

Page  117, 10th  line.  For  "  Alfred  Barbour,"  read  "Alfred 
M.  Barbour." 

Page  147,  5th  line  from  bottom.  For  "  October  2d,"  read 
"October  3d." 

Page  160.  For  "execution  of  John  Brown  at  Harper's 
Ferry,"  read  "execution  of  John  Brown  at  Charles- 
town." 

Page  174.  For  "  toward  Vienna,  June  9th,"  read  "  toward 
Vienna,  June  7th." 

Page  175,  note.  For  "  McRea's  regiment,"  read  "  McRae's 
regiment." 

Page  179.  "Uniform  of  the  llth  New  York  (Fire  Zou 
aves),  at  Bull  Run."  According  to  William  Murray, 
Superintendent  in  1888  of  the  Police  Department, 
New  York  City,  this  regiment,  to  which  he  belonged, 
wore  a  "red  fez"  at  the  first  Bull  Run. 

Page  236.  For  "  Sergeant  Thomas  Shumate  "  (so  printed 
in  part  of  the  edition),  read  "Sergeant  Joseph 
Shumate." 

Page  239,  14th  line  from  the  top,  also  page  261.  For 
"Lieutenant-Colonel  Robert  B.  Lee,"  read  "Lieu 
tenant-Colonel  Richard  B.  Lee." 


Same.  For  "  Secretary  of  War,  Mr.  Benjamin  on  the 
other,"  read  "the  officials  of  the  War  Department 
on  the  other." 

Page  259.  General  Johnston  wrote  "Two  letters  from 
General  Lee  and  Mr.  Walker,  Secretary  of  War,  are 
stated  as  evidence  that  General  Beauregard  coin- 
mauded.  Those  gentlemen  were  not  in  a  position  to 
know  if  I  relinquished  the  command."  The  omission 
of  the  word  "  not "  made  the  writer  state  the  contrary . 

Page  317,  8th  line  from  the  bottom.  For  "Major  Meza- 
ros,"  read  "  Major  Meszaros." 

Page  323,  2d  column,  15th  line.  For  "  8th  Iowa  Battery," 
read  "  3d  Iowa  Battery." 

Page  325,  16th  line  (large  type)  from  the  last.  For  "  Ma 
jor  Heinrich,"  read  "  Major  Heinrichs." 

Page  332,  foot-note.  For  "  Colonel  B.  W.  Share,  3d  Texas 
Cavalry,"  read  "  Colonel  B.  W.  Stone,  6th  Texas  Cav 
alry." 

Page  337,  2d  column,  McCulloch's  Division.  For  "  Colo 
nel  J.  T.  Churchill,"  read  "  Colonel  T.  J.  Churchill." 

Page  393,  6th  line  from  bottom.  For  "  Colonel  John  H. 
Trigg,"  read  "  Colonel  Robert  C.  Trigg." 

Page  420,  2d  line  from  bottom.  For  "Colonel  John  A. 
Thayer,"  read  "  Colonel  John  M.  Thayer." 

Page  429, 1st  column,  6th  line.  Capt.  Dresser's  battery 
was  "  D,  2d  111.  Lt.  Artillery,"  instead  of  "A,  111.  Lt. 
Artillery." 

Page  438,  in  the  foot-note.  For  "  General  George  W. 
Cullom"  (so  printed  in  part  of  the  edition),  read 
"General  George  W.  Cullum." 

Page  576,  "The  Campaign  of  Shiloh,"  by  General  G.  T. 
Beauregard,  27th  line.  For  "  the  13th  of  February," 
read  "  the  13th  of  March." 

Page  590,  9th  line.  For  "Captain  Wicliffe,"  read  "Cap 
tain  Wickliffe." 

Page  609,  2d  column,  20th  line  (large  type).    For  "John 

A.  Strickland,"  read  "  Silas  A.  Strickland." 

Same,  2d  column,  first  extract.  For  "  Major  Hays,"  read 
"  Major  Hayes." 

Page  637,  7th  line  from  the  bottom,  also  page  638.  For 
"  the  8th  Georgia,"  read  "the  3d  Georgia." 

Page  669,  title  to  portrait.  For  "  Colonel  Zebulon  B. 
Vance,"  read  "  Brigadier-General  Robert  B.  Vance." 

Page  677,  19th  line.  For  "  C.  A.  Boutelle,"  read  "  C.  O. 
Boutelle." 

Page  695.    For  "Dinwiddie  Phillips,"  read  "Diiiwiddie 

B.  Phillips." 

Same.  For  "  Captain  Kevil  commanding  detachment," 
read  "  Captain  Thomas  Kevill,  detachment." 


xii 


CONTENTS. OF  VOLUME  ONE. 

PAGE 

FRONTISPIECE,  "THE  BUGLE  CALL."   From  the  lithograph  by  D.  C.  Fabronius  of  the  painting 

by  William  M.  Hunt   ^ 

PREFACE IX 

ILLUSTRATIONS:  Camp  Gossip,  from  Gardner  photo. ;  and  Confederate  Wooden  Canteen  (W.  Taber). 
LIST    OF    MAPS    . 


LIST    OF   ARTISTS  ^r  .......................................................  XXTTT 


LIST  OF  DRAUGHTSMEN 


XXTTT 


LIST  OF    ENGRAVERS  .................  XXTTT 


INTRODUCTION. 

PRELIMINARY    EVENTS.     From  the  Charleston  Convention  to  the  first  Bull  Run 1 

ILLUSTRATION:  The  Reveille  (TT.  Taber). 


ORGANIZATION    OF   THE  TWO  GOVERNMENTS 


The  United  States  Government :  The  Buchanan  Administration ;  The  Lincoln  Administra 
tion  ;  The  United  States  War  Department ;  The  United  States  Navy  Department. 

The  Confederate  States  Government :  Provisional  Organization ;  Eeorganization  ;  Confed 
erate  States  War  Department  ;  Confederate  States  Navy  Department. 

Governors  of  the  States  during  the  War. 


SIGNS  OF  WAR. 

WASHINGTON  ON  THE  EVE  OF  THE  WAR GENERAL  CHARLES  P.  STONE 7 

ILLUSTRATIONS  :  Rotunda  of  the  Capitol  in  1861,  from  photo,  lent  by  General  M.  C.  Meigs  (E.  J.  Meeker)  — 
Map  of  the  United  States  in  1861,  showing  Military  Posts  occupied  by  United  States  Troops  January  1, 
1861,  and  Approximate  Limit  of  Territory  controlled  by  the  United  States  Forces  July,  1861  (Jacob 
Wells)  — Uniform  of  the  National  Rifles ;  Uniform  of  the  Potomac  Light  Infantry  (H.  A.  Ogden)  — Brevet 
Lieut.-General  Winfield  Scott,  from  Brady  photo.— Headquarters  of  General  Scott  (Tlieo.  R.  Davis)  — 
Washington  Arsenal,  from  Russell  photo. (E.  J.  Meeker)— The  Columbian  Armory  (T.  R.  Davis) — Joseph 
Holt,  Secretary  of  War,  from  Brady  photo.  —  President  Buchanan,  from  Brady  photo.—  General  Charles 
P.  Stone,  from  Brady  photo. — President  Lincoln,  from  ambrotype  taken  May  20,  1860 — Vice-President 
Hamlin,  from  Brady  photo.  —  South  or  Garden  Side  of  the  White  House  (F.  H.  Cocks)  —  The  White  House 
at  Night  (Joseph  Pennell)  —  Inauguration  of  President  Lincoln,  from  photo,  lent  by  General  M.  C.  Meigs. 

WITH  SLEMMER  IN   PENSACOLA  HARBOR COLONEL  J.  H.  OILMAN 26 

ILLUSTRATIONS:  Pensacola  Harbor  from  the  Bar  (Theo.  R.  Davis)  — The  Man  who  refused  to  haul 
down  the  Union  Flag  (William  Waud)  —  Map  of  Pensacola  Bay,  redrawn  from  "Frank  Leslie's"  (Fred. 
E.  Sitts)—  Confederate  Water-battery,  from  photo,  lent  by  Loyall  Farragut  (TT.  Taber)  —  Lieutenant 
Adam  J.  Slemmer,  from  Brady  photo. 

RECOLLECTIONS  OF  THE  TWIGGS  SURRENDER.  .  .MRS.   CAROLINE  BALDWIN  D  ARROW.    33 

ILLUSTRATIONS:  A  Texan  Ranger,  from  ambrotype  (A.  C.  Redwood)  —  The  Alamo,  San  Antonio 
(Abram  Hosier)  —  Colonel  David  H.  Vinton,  from  photo. 

&  In  order  to  save  much  repetition,  particular  credit  is  here  given  to  tlie  Massachusetts  Commandery  of  the  Loyal  Legion,  to 
Colonel  Arnold  A.  Rand,  General  Albert  Ordway,  Cliarles  B.  Hall,  and  W.  H.  Whiton,  for  tlie  use  of  photographs  and  drawings. 

War-time  photographers  whose  work  is  of  the  greatest  historical  value,  and  lias  been  freely  drawn  upon  in  the  preparation 
of  the  illustrations,  are  M.  B.  Brady,  Alexander  Gardner,  and  Captain  A.  J.  Russell  in  the  North ;  and  D.  H.  Anderson  of 
Richmond,  Va.,  and  George  s.  Cook  of  Charleston,  S.  C.—  the  latter  since  the  war  having  succeeded  to  the  ownership  of  the 
Andersen  negatives. 

xlii 


xiv  CONTENTS  OF  VOLUME  ONE. 

FORT  SUMTER. 

PAGE 

FROM  MOULTRIE  TO  SUMTER GENERAL  ABNER  DOUBLED  AY 40 

ILLUSTRATIONS  :  View  of  Charleston  from  Castle  Pinckuey  (T.  B.  Davis)  —  Major  Robert  Anderson, 
from  Brady  photo.— Major  Anderson  and  his  Officers,  from  Cook  photo.— The  Sea-battery  at  Fort  Moul- 
trie,  from  photo.  —Map  of  Charleston  Harbor  (Jacob  Wells)  —  The  Hot-shot  Furnace,  Fort  Moultrie,  from 
photo.—  Major  Anderson's  Men  Crossing  to  Fort  Sumter  (Theo.  K.  Davis). 

INSIDE   SUMTER  IN  '61 CAPTAIN  JAMES  CHESTER 50 

ILLUSTRATIONS  :  South-west  or  Gorge  Front  of  Fort  Sumter,  from  photo,  lent  by  the  Washington  Light 
Infantry,  Charleston,  S.  C.  (W.  Taber)—  The  Sally-port  of  Fort  Sumter,  from  photo.— Ground  Plan  of 
Fort  Sumter  (F.  E.  Sitts)  —  Interior  of  Fort  Sumter  after  the  Surrender,  from  photo.  (W.  Taber)  — 
Interior  of  Fort  Sumter  after  the  Bombardment,  showing  the  Gate  and  the  Gorge  Wall,  from  photo.— 
Interior  of  Fort  Sumter,  showing  the  10-inch  Columbiad  bearing  on  Charleston,  from  photo,  lent  by  G.  L. 
G.  Cook  (  W.  Taber)  —  Effect  of  the  Bombardment  on  the  Barbette  Guns,  from  photo,  lent  by  the  Rev.  John 
Johnson  (E.  J.  Meeker)  —  The  Sumter  Garrison  Watching  the  Firing  on  the  "  Star  of  the  West "  (T.  B. 
Davis)  —  Confederate  Floating  Battery  in  Action  (T.  K.  Davis) — Plan  of  the  Floating  Battery,  from  a 
Sketch  by  Colonel  Joseph  A.  Yates  —  Sergeant  Carmody  Firing  the  Barbette  Guns  of  Sumter  (T.  It.  Davis) 
—A  Casemate  Gun  during  the  Conflagration  (T.  R.  Davis)  —  Ruins  of  the  Casemates  and  of  the  Barbette 
Tier  of  Guns,  from  photo's. 

THE  FIRST  STEP  IN  THE  WAR GENERAL  STEPHEN  D.  LEE 74 

ILLUSTRATIONS  :  Bursting  of  the  Signal-shell  from  Fort  Johnson  over  Fort  Sumter  (T.  R.  Davis)  — 
Governor  Francis  W.  Pickens,  from  photo,  lent  by  Louis  Manigault  —  Confederate  Mortar-battery  on 
Morris  Island,  from  photo.— General  G.  T.  Beauregard,  from  Anderson-Cook  photo.— Secession  Hall, 
Charleston,  from  Cook  photo.  (E.  J.  Meeker)  —  Fort  Sumter  at  the  close  of  the  Bombardment  (T.  R.  Davis) 
—  Jefferson  Davis,  from  Brady  photo.— View  of  Curnming's  Point  (T.  R.  Davis). 

NOTES  ON  THE  SURRENDER  OF  FORT  SUMTER.  .  .COLONEL  A.  R.  CHISOLM..        .  82 


ORGANIZING  FOR  THE  CONFLICT. 

WAR  PREPARATIONS  IN  THE  NORTH GENERAL  JACOB  D.   COX 84 

ILLUSTRATIONS  :  The  Awkward  Squad  ( W.  Taber)  —  Life-mask  of  Stephen  A.  Douglas,  from  photo.— 
Portrait  of  Stephen  A.  Douglas,  from  daguerreotype  taken  in  1852  —  Major-General  George  B.  McClellan, 
from  photo,  by  R.  W.  Addis  —  Major-General  Gordon  Granger,  from  Brady  photo.— Camp  Dennison, 
near  Cincinnati,  based  upon  photo.  (W.  Taber). 

THE  CONFEDERATE  GOVERNMENT  AT  MONT-  ^ 

GOMERY.     By  the  Editor  of  the  Charleston  >../?.  BARNIVELL  RHETT 99 

"  Mercury"  in  1860-2 ) 

ILLUSTRATIONS:  Montgomery,  Alabama,  in  1861,  .showing  the  Confederate  Capitol  (T.  R.  Davis)  — 
Alexander  H.  Stephens,  from  Brady  photo. —  William  L.  Yancey,  from  Cook  photo. —  Robert  Toombs, 
from  photo.— Leroy  Pope  Walker,  from  Brady  photo.— R.  Barnwell  Rhett,  from  Cook  photo.— Howell 
Cobb,  from  photo,  lent  by  General  Marcus  J.  Wright  —  Stephen  R.  Mallory,  from  daguerreotype  — 
Judah  P.  Benjamin,  from  photo,  lent  by  James  Blair  —  Charles  G.  Memminger  and  John  H.  Reagan, 
from  photos. 


FIRST  OPERATIONS  IN  VIRGINIA. 

JACKSON  AT  HARPER'S  FERRY  IN    1861 GENERAL  JOHN  D.  /MBODEN 

ILLUSTRATIONS  :  Richmond,  Va.,  in  1861  (Theo.  R.  Davis)  —  Palmetto  Regiment  parading  in  Charleston, 
S.  C.,  en  route  for  Richmond  (Theo.  R.  Davis)  —  Map  of  Virginia,  West  Virginia,  and  Maryland  (Jacob 
Wells)  — Court-house,  Charleston,  Va.,  where  John  Brown  and  his  Associates  were  Tried  and  Sentenced, 
from  photo,  by  W.  G.  Reed  (Harry  Venn)  —  Map  of  Harper's  Ferry  (G.  H.  Brown)  —Portrait  of  John 
Brown,  from  photo,  by  J.  W.  Black  &  Co.  (with  Autograph)  —  Engine-house,  Harper's  Ferry  (Joseph 
Pennell)  —Portrait  of  Colonel  Robert  E.  Lee,  from  photo,  taken  before  the  War,  lent  by  General  G.  W. 
C.  Lee  — View  of  Harper's  Ferry  looking  down  the  Potomac,  from  photo.  (W.  Taber)  —  Harper's  Ferry 
from  the  Maryland  side,  from  photo.  (W.  Taber)  —  Lieut.-General  Thomas  J.  ("Stonewall")  Jackson, 
C.  8.  A.,  from  photo,  by  Tanner  &  Van  Ness  — General  Jackson  in  1861,  from  pen  sketch  lent  by  Mrs. 
Harriet  Coxe.Bledaoe  (A.  J.  Volck)  —  Colonel  Roger  Jones,  from  Brady  photo. 


CONTENTS  OF  VOLUME  ONE.  xv 

PAGE 

McCLELLAN  IN  WEST  VIRGINIA GENERAL  JACOB  D.  COX 126 

ILLUSTRATIONS:  An  Affair  of  Outposts  (W.  Taber)  —  Major-General  Lew  Wallace,  from  Brady 
photo.—  Map  of  Campaigns  in  West  Virginia  (Jacob  Wells)  —  Brig.-General  T.  A.  Morris,  from  Brady 
photo.— Plan  of  Combat  at  Rich  Mountain  (J.  Wells)  —Brig.-General  John  Pegram,  C.  S.  A.,  from 
Anderson-Cook  photo.— Brig.-General  R.  S.  Garnett,  C.  S.  A.,  from  photo.—  Major-General  W.  S.'ROSC- 
crans,  from  photo,  by  Bogardu.s  —  Brig.-General  H.  A.  Wise,  C.  8.  A.,  from  Brady  photo.— Brig.-Geueral 
J.  B.  Floyd,  C.  S.  A.,  from  photo.—  Post-hospital  and  Wagon-shop  at  Kanawha  Falls,  from  photo,  lent 
by  General  J.  D.  Cox  (Harry  Fenn)  —  Plan  of  Gauley  Bridge  and  Vicinity  (Jacob  Wells) —View  of 
Gauley  Bridge  and  New  River  Cliffs,  from  photo's  lent  by  General  J.  D.  Cox  (Harry  Fenn)  —  Plan  of 
Affair  at  Carnifex  Ferry  (Jacob  Wells)  —  Floyd's  Command  Recrossing  the  Gauley  River,  and  Preparing 
to  Shell  Rosecrans's  Camp  at  Gauley  Bridge,  from  sketches  by  W.  D.  Washington  owned  by  J.  F. 
Gibson  (W,  L,  Sheppard)  —View  of  Romney,  Va.  (A.  R,  Waud), 


FIRESIDE  AND  FIELD  OF  BATTLE. 

GOING  TO  THE  FRONT  (Recollections  of  a  Private— 1) .  IVARREN   LEE    GOSS 149 

ILLUSTRATIONS:  Fac-simile  of  the  Conclusion  of  General  Dix's  "American  Flag "  Dispatch,  from  the 
original  lent  by  the  Rev.  Morgan  Dix,  D.  D.— Arrival  of  the  New  York  7th  at  Annapolis  (Theo.  R. 
Davis)  —  Uniform  of  the  6th  Massachusetts  (H.  A.  Ogden)  —  "And  the  Corporal  did  "  (E.  W.  Kemble)  —  A 
Mother's  Parting  Gift  (E.  W.  Kemble)  —  Militia  Uniform  of  '61,  from  photo,  of  the  statue  by  J.  Q.  A. 
Ward  —  The  New  York  7th  Marching  down  Broadway  ( W.  Taber)  —  Federal  Hill,  Baltimore  (F.  H. 
Schell)  —  Pennsylvania  Avenue,  Washington,  in  '61  (Theo.  If.  Davis)  —  The  New  York  7th  at  Camp  Cam 
eron,  Washington  (M.  J.  Burns). 

VIRGINIA  SCENES  IN  '61    MRS.  BURTON  HARRISON 1 60 

ILLUSTRATIONS  :  Confederate  Battle-flag,  from  original  flag  lent  by  Mrs.  Harrison  (E.  J.  Meeker)—  A 
Virginia  Homestead,  from  sketch  lent  by  Mrs.  Harrison  (E.  J.  Meeker)  —  Confederates  on  the  Way  to 
Manassas  (E.  W.  Kemble)  —  Listening  for  the  First  Gun  (E.  W.  Kemble)  —  Fac-eimile  of  Autographic 
Copy  of  the  First  Stanza  of  "  My  Maryland." 


CAMPAIGN  OF  THE  FIRST  BULL  RUN. 

McDOWELL'S  ADVANCE  TO  BULL  RUN GENERAL  JAMES   B.   FRY 167 

ILLUSTRATIONS:  Scrutinizing  a  Pass  at  the  Long  Bridge,  based  on  photo.  (W.  H.  Shelton)  —  Uniform 
of  the  14th  New  York  at  Bull  Run  ( W.  Taber)  —  Simon  Cameron,  Secretary  of  War,  from  Brady  photo. 
—  Uniform  of  the  1st  Massachusetts  at  Bull  Run  (H.  A.  Ogden)  —  General  Irvin  McDowell,  from  photo, 
by  Fredericks  —  Uniform  of  the  2d  Ohio  at  Bull  Run  (H.  A.  Ogden)  — Map  of  the  Defenses  of  Washing 
ton,  July,  1861  (Jacob  Wells)  —  Fac-simile  of  a  Washington  Pass  of  186-1  (obverse  and  reverse),  lent  by 
Murat  Halstead — View  of  Washington  from  the  Signal  Camp,  two  cuts  (Theo.  B.  Dams)  — The  Stone 
Church,  Centreville,  from  Gardner  photo.  (Harry  Fenn)  —  Uniform  of  the  llth  New  York  (Fire  Zouaves) 
at  Bull  Run  (H.  A.  Ogden)  —Outline  Map  of  the  Battle-field  of  Bull  Run  (Jacob  Wells)  — Sudley  Springs 
Hotel  (Joseph  Pennell)  —  Sudley  Springs  Ford  in  1884  (Joseph  Pennell)—  Sudley  Springs  Ford,  from 
Gardner  photo.  (Harry  Fenn) — The  Stone  Bridge  over  Bull  Run  (Joseph  Pennell)  —  Fatigue  Uniform 
and  Kilts  of  the  79th  New  York  (H.  A.  Ogden)— The  Sudley  Springs  Road,  from  photo,  by  Captain  J.  E. 
Barr  (J.  D.  Woodward)  —Major-General  Charles  Griffin,  and  Major-General  James  B.  Ricketts,  from 
photo's  lent  by  General  James  B.  Fry  —  The  Contest  for  the  Henry  Hill  (  W.  Taber)  —  Uniform  of  the 
Garibaldi  Guards  (H.  A.  Ogden)  —  Uniform  of  Blenker's  8th  New  York  Volunteers  (H.  A.  Ogden)  — 
Brig.-General  Louis  Blenker,  from  Brady  photo. 

THE    OPPOSING    ARMIES    AT    THE    FIRST  BULL    RUN.      Table  of  Strength,  Composition, 

and  Losses 194 

THE  FIRST  BATTLE  OF  BULL    RUN GENERAL    G.    T.  BEAUREGARD 196 

ILLUSTRATIONS  :  A  Louisiana  "Tiger"  (A.  C.  Redwood)  —Arlington,  the  Home  of  General  Robert  E. 
Lee  (J.  H.  Cocks)  —  Map  of  the  Bull  Run  Campaign  (Jacob  Wells)  —  The  McLean  House,  General  Beaure- 
gard's  Headquarters,  near  Manassas,  from  Gardner  photo.  (W.  Taber)  —  Topographical  Map  of  the  Bull 
Run  Battle-field  (Jacob  Wells)  —  Rallying  the  Troops  of  Bee,  Bartow,  and  Evans  behind  the  Robinson 
House  (T.  deThulstrup)  —A  Louisiana  "Pelican"  (A.  C.  Redwood)  —  The  Robinson  House,  from  Gardner 
photo.  (J.  D.  Woodward)  —  The  Main  Battle-ground,  two  views,  from  photo's  (Harry  Fenn)  —  Colonel 
F.  S.  Bartow,  from  photo,  lent  by  Georgia  Historical  Society  —  Fairfax  Court-house,  from  Gardner 
photo.  (W.  Tafter;  —Ruins  of  the  Stone  Bridge,  looking  along  the  Warrenton  Turnpike  toward  the  Battle 
field,  from  Gardner  photo.—  Confederate  Quaker  Guns,  from  Gardner  photo.  (A.  C.  Redwood)  —  Generals 
R.  E.  Lee  and  J.  E.  Johnston,  from  photo,  by  D.  J.  Ryan  (with  Autographs). 


xvi  CONTENTS    OF  VOLUME  ONE. 

PAGE 

INCIDENTS  OF  THE  FIRST  BULL  RUN GENERAL  JOHN  D.    IMBODEN 229 

ILLUSTRATIONS:  The  New  Henry  House  and  the  Monument  of  the  First  Battle,  from  photo.  (W. 
Taber)  —  Confederate  Fortifications  about  Manassas  Junction,  and  the  Stone  House  on  the  Warreiiton 
Turnpike,  from  Gardner  photo's  (Harry  Fenn)  —  Plan  of  the  Bull  Run  Battle-Held  (Jacob  Wells)—  Briga 
dier-General  Barnard  E.  Bee,  from  photo,  by  Tucker  &  Perkins. 

RESPONSIBILITIES  OF  THE  FIRST  BULL  RUN GENERAL  JOSEPH  E.  JOHNSTON 240 

ILLUSTRATIONS:  Quaker  Gun  found  in  the  Confederate  Works  at  Mauassas,  from  Gardner  photo. 
(W.  Taber)  —  General  Samuel  Cooper,  from  photo,  by  Davis  lent  by  General  Marcus  J.  Wright— Lieuteu- 
ant-General  Richard  S.  Ewell,  from  Anderson-Cook  photo.— "Stonewall"  Jackson  as  First-Lieutenant 
of  Artillery,  from  daguerreotype  lent  by  his  niece,  Miss  Alice  E.  Underwood. 

GENERAL    EWELL  AT  BULL    RUN MAJOR  CAMPBELL  BROWN 259 

THE  CONFEDERATE  COMMISSARIAT  AT  MANASSAS..    ..COLONEL  L.  B.   NORTHROP..    ..261 


WILSON'S  CREEK,  LEXINGTON,  AND  PEA  RIDGE. 

THE  FIRST  YEAR  OF  THE  WAR  IN  MISSOURI COLONEL  THOMAS  L.   SNEAD 262 

ILLUSTRATIONS  :  A  Very  Raw  Recruit  (E.  W.  Kemble)  —  Map  of  Operations  in  Missouri,  1861  (Jacob 
Wells)  —  Governor  Claiborne  F.  Jackson,  from  phototype  lent  by  General  Marcus  J.  Wright — Brigadier- 
General  D.  M.  Frost,  from  photo,  by  Scholtcn  —  Fac-similo  of  Missouri  War  Scrip,  lent  by  R.  I.  IIol- 
combe  —  Major-General  Sterling  Price,  from  Anderson-Cook  photo. —  Major-General  David  Hunter,  from 
Brady  photo. —  Major-General  Henry  W.  Halleck,  from  photo. 

IN  COMMAND  IN  MISSOURI GENERAL  JOHN  C.   FREMONT 278 

ILLUSTRATIONS  :  Off  to  the  War  (W.  Taber)  —  Major-General  F.  P.  Blair,  Jr.,  from  Brady  photo.— Brig.  - 
General  Nathaniel  Lyon,  from  Brady  photo. —  Major-General  Franz  Sigel,  from  photo. —  Major-General 
John  C.  Fremont,  from  steel  portrait  lent  by  Mrs.  Fremont. 

WILSON'S  CREEK,  AND  THE  DEATH  OF  LYON GENERAL  WILLIAM  M.  WHERRY 289 

ILLUSTRATIONS:  Cavalryman  of  the  United  States  Regulars  in  1861  (H.  A.  Ogden)  —  Map  of  Wilson's 
Creek,  or  Oak  Hills  (Jacob  Wells)  —  Major-General  John  M.  Schotield,  from  Brady  photo.— Battle-Held 
of  Wilson's  Creek  from  behind  Pearce's  Camp,  from  photo's  (E.  J.  Meeker)  —  Brigadier-General  N.  B. 
Pearce,  C.  S.  A.,  from  Brady  photo. 

ARKANSAS  TROOPS  IN  THE  BATTLE  ) 

OF  WILSON'S  CREEK } GENERAL  N.  B.  PEARCE 298 

ILLUSTRATIONS:  Bloody  Hill  from  the  East,  from  photo,  by  Sittlcr  lent  by  R.  I.  Holcombe  (W. 
Taber) — Major-General  Ben.  McCulloch,  C.  S.  A.,  from  photo. —  Brigadier-General  W.  Y.  Slack,  C.  S.  A., 
from  Brady  photo. 

THE  FLANKING  COLUMN  AT  WILSON'S  CREEK.  .  .    GENERAL  FRANZ  SIGEL 1504 

THE  OPPOSING  FORCES  AT  WILSON'S  CREEK,   MO.    Composition,  Strength,  and  Losses 306 

THE  SIEGE  OF  LEXINGTON COLONEL  JAMES  A.  MULLIGAN 307 

ILLUSTRATIONS:  Confederates  Fighting  behind  Hemp-bales  (W.  Taber)  —  Map  of  the  Siege  of  Lexing 
ton  (Jacob  Wells)  —  Battle  of  Lexington,  as  seen  from  Parsous's  position,  after  sketch  by  F.  B.  Wilkie  in 
"  Frank  Leslie's  "  (F.  H.  Schell)  —  Colonel  James  A.  Mulligan,  from  photo.  (Sidney  L.  Smith). 

THE   PEA  RIDGE  CAMPAIGN GENERAL  FRANZ  SIGEL 314 

ILLUSTRATIONS:  Uniform  of  the  United  States  Regulars  in  1861,  from  photo.  (H.  A.  Oyden)  —  Major- 
General  Samuel  R.  Curtis,  from  photo.—  Major-General  Earl  Van  Dorn,  C.  S.  A.,  from  photo,  by  Earle  & 
Son  (with  Autograph)  —Map  of  the  Battle-field  of  Pea  Ridge,  or  Elkhorn  Tavern  (Jacob  Wells)  —  Major- 
General  Peter  J.  Osterhaus,  from  photo,  by  Fredericks  —  Major-General  Eugene  A.  Carr,  from  Brady 
photo.—  Brigadier-General  James  Mclntosh,  C.  S.  A.,  from  photo.— The  Union  Right  under  General  Carr 
at  Pratt's  Store,  Second  Day  of  the  Battle  —  and  Last  Hour  of  the  Battle  of  Pea  Ridge,  from  paintings  by 
Hunt  P.  Wilson  owned  by  Southern  Historical  Society  of  St.  Louis  (Schell  and  Hogan)  —  Brigadier- 
General  Albert  Pike,  C.  S.  A.,  from  photo,  by  Scholl,  and  Brigadier-General  Stand  Waitie,  C.  S.  A.,  from 
photo's  lent  by  General  Marcus  J.  Wright. 


CONTENTS   OF    VOLUME    ONE.  xvii 

UNION     AND    CONFEDERATE    INDIANS   )  PAGE 

IN   THE  CIVIL  WAR / mLEY  BRITTON  .  .  .335 

ILLUSTRATION:  Elkhorn  Tavern,  Pea  Ridge,  from  photo.  (TT.  Tabcr). 

THE  OPPOSING  FORCES  AT  PEA    RIDGE.     Composition,  Strength,  and  Losses  ..  ..337 


BELMONT  AND  FORT  HENRY. 

RECOLLECTIONS  OF  FOOTE  AND  THE  GUN-BOATS .  .  C  APT  AM  JAMES  B.   EADS 338 

ILLUSTRATIONS  :  Building  the  Eads  Gun-boats  at  Caroudelet  (Theo.  B.  Davis)  —  The  "  De  Kalb,"  for 
merly  the  "St.  Louis"  (Type  of  the  " Carondelet,"  "Cincinnati,"  "  Louisville,"  "  Mound  City,"  "  Cairo," 
and  "Pittsburgh"),  from  photo,  lent  by  Captain  Eads  — Captain  James  B.  Eads,  from  photo.— The 
"Osage"  (Twin  of  the  " Neosho ")  —  and  the  "Chickasaw"  (Type  of  the  "Milwaukee,"  "  Winnebago," 
and  "  Kickapoo  "),  from  photo's  lent  by  Captain  Eads  (E.  J.  Meeker)  —  Rear- Admiral  Andrew  Hull  Foote, 
from  photo,  by  E.  Anthony  —  Rear-Admiral  Henry  Walke,  from  ambrotype. 

NOTES  ON  THE  LIFE  OF  ADMIRAL  FOOTE.  ) 

ByhisBrother J  JOHN  A.  FOOTE..  ..347 

GENERAL  POLK  AND  THE  BATTLE  OF  BELMONT.  \ 

By  Ms  Son  }  CAPTAIN  WILLIAM  M.  POLK 348 

[From  the  MS.  of  the  "Life  of  Leonidas  Polk"  (unpublished).] 

ILLUSTRATIONS  :  Portraits  of  Confederate  Privates  of  the  West,  from  ambrotypes  (H.  A.  Ogden)—  Map 
of  the  Battle-field  near  Belmont,  Mo.  (J.  S.  Kemp)  —  Lieutenaut-Geueral  Leouidas  Polk,  Bishop  of 
Louisiana,  from  photo,  by  Morse  —  Brigadier-General  U.  S.  Grant  (1861),  from  photo,  lent  by  O.  Hufeland 

—  The  Gun-boats  "Tyler"  and  "Lexington"  fighting  the  Columbus  Batteries  during  the  Battle  of 
Belmont,  from  drawing  by  Rear- Admiral  Walke  (F.  H.  Schell  and  T.  Tloyan)  —  Confederate  Fortifica 
tions  at  Columbus,  Ky.,  from  sketch  made  for  "  Frank  Leslie's  "  and  lent  by  G.  N.  Putnam  (J.  D. 
Woodward)  —  Captain  John  A.  Rawlins  (1861),  from  photo,  lent  by  O.   Hufeland  —  Reembarkation  of 
Grant's  Troops  after  the  Battle,  from  drawing  by  Rear- Admiral  Walke  (F.  H.  Schell  and  T.  Hogan). 

THE  GUN-BOATS  AT  BELMONT  AND  FORT  HENRY    .REAR-ADMIRAL  HENRY  IVALKE 358 

ILLUSTRATIONS  :  Army  Transports  at  the  Cairo  Levee  (Theo.  R.  Davis)  —  Flag-Offlcer  Foote  in  the 
Wheel-house  of  the  "Cincinnati"  at  Fort  Henry  ( W.  Tabcr)  —  Wharf-boat  at  Cairo,  from  photo,  lent 
by  Major  J.  H.  Benton  (W.  Goater)  —The  Gun-boats  "  Tyler  "  and  "  Lexington"  engaging  the  Batteries 
of  Columbus,  from  sketch  by  Rear- Admiral  Walke  (Harry  Fenn)  —  Map  of  the  Region  of  Foote's  Opera 
tions  (Jacob  Wells)  —United  States  Gun-boat  "  Tyler,"  from  drawing  by  Rear- Admiral  Walke—  Map  of 
Fort  Henry  (Jacob  Wells)  —  Cross-section  of  a  Confederate  Torpedo  found  in  the  Tennessee  River  (E. 
J.  Meeker)  —  Between  Decks :  Serving  the  Guns,  from  drawing  by  Rear-Admiral  Walke  (A.  C.  Redwood) 

—  General  Lloyd  Tilghman,  from  photo. 

THE  DEFENSE  OF  FORT  HENRY CAPTAIN  JESSE  TA  YLOR 368 

ILLUSTRATION  :  The  Attack  upon  Fort  Henry,  from  drawing  by  Rear-Admiral  Walke. 


MILL  SPRINGS,  THE   BIG  SANDY,  AND  FORT  DONELSON. 

HOLDING  KENTUCKY  FOR  THE   UNION COLONEL  R.   M.  KELLY 373 

ILLUSTRATIONS  :  Military  Water-sled  (Frank  H.  Schell)  —  Rev.  Robert  J.  Breckinridge,  D.  D.,  from 
steel  portrait  —  Major-General  William  .Nelson,  from  Brady  photo.  —  Major-Geueral  John  C.  Breckin 
ridge,  C.  S.  A.,  from  daguerreotype  lent  by  Alison  Maltby—  Map  of  Kentucky  and  Tennessee  (Jacob  Wells) 
—  John  C.  Crittenden,  from  daguerreotype  —  Camp  Dick  Robinson  —  The  Farm-house,  from  sketch  lent 
by  Mrs.  M.  B.  Robinson  — Major-General  Lovell  H.  Rousseau,  from  Brady  photo.— Major-General 
George  B.  Crittenden,  C.  S.  A.,  from  photo. —Major-General  D.  C.  Buell,  from  photo,  lent  by  General 
James  B.  Fry— Map  of  the  Battle  of  Logan's  Cross  Roads,  or  Mill  Springs,  Ky.  (Jacob  Wells)  —  Brigadier- 
General  Felix  K.  Zollicoffer,  C.  S.  A.,  from  photo.  —  Brigadier-General  Speed  S.  Fry,  from  photo,  taken 
in  1862  —  .National  Cemetery  at  Logan's  Cross  Roads,  from  photo.  (E.  J.  Meeker)  —  View  on  the  Battle 
field  of  Logan's  Cross  Roads,  from  photo.  (E.  J.  Meeker). 


xviii  CONTENTS  OF  VOLUME  ONE. 

PAGE 

THE  OPPOSING  FORCES  AT  LOGAN'S  CROSS  ROADS,  KY.   (MILL  SPRINGS  OR  FISHING 

CREEK).    Composition,  Strength,  and  Losses   ........................................  392 


ILLUSTRATIONS:  Confederate  Private,  from  ambrotype  (Frank  Day)  —  Map  of  Big  Sandy  River  and 
Middle  Creek  Battle-field  (Jacob  Wells)  —  Brigadier-General  James  A.  Garfteld,  from  Brady  photo.  — 
Brigadier-General  Humphrey  Marshall,  C.  S.  A.,  from  photo. 

THE  CAPTURE  OF  FORT  DONELSON  ..............  GENERAL  LEW  WALLACE  ...........  398 

ILLUSTRATIONS:  Headquarters  in  the  Field  (R.  F.  Zogbaum)  —  the  Town  of  Dover  from  Robinson's 
Hill,  from  photo.  (W.  H.  Drake)  —  Map  of  Fort  Donelson  as  Invested  by  General  Grant  (Jacob  Wells)  — 
Glimpse  of  the  Cumberland  River  where  the  Gun-boats  first  appeared,  from  photo.  (Harry  Fenn)  — 
Major-General  John  A.  McClernand,  from  photo.  —  Major-General  Simon  B.  Buckuer,  C.  S.  A.,  from 
photo,  by  Anthony—  Dover  Tavern,  General  Buckiier's  Headquarters  and  the  Scene  of  the  Surrender, 
from  photo.  (Harry  Fenn)  —Major-General  Morgan  L.  Smith,  from  photo,  lent  by  Miss  D.  Morgan  Smith 
—  Major-General  C.  F.  Smith,  from  Brady  photo.—  The  Crisp  Farm  —  General  Grant's  Headquarters  — 
Front  View  of  Mrs.  Crisp's  House,  from  photo's  (W.  H.  Drake)  —  The  Position  of  the  Gun-boats  and 
the  West  Bank,  from  photo's  (Harry  Fenn)  —  The  Bivouac  in  the  Snow  on  the  Line  of  Battle  (R.  F. 
Zogbaum)  —Branch  of  Hickman's  Creek  near  James  Crisp's  House,  the  Left  of  General  C.  F.  Smith's 
Line,  from  photo.  (Harry  Fenn)  —  McAllister's  Battery  in  Action  (W.  Taber)—  View  on  the  Line  of 
Pillow's  Defenses  in  front  of  McClernand,  showing  Water  in  the  Old  Trenches,  from  photo.  (Harry 
Fenn)—  Major-General  Gideon  J.  Pillow,  C.  S.  A.,  from  Anderson-Cook  photo.—  Rowlett's  Mill,  from 
photo.  (W.  Taber)—  Fac-simile  of  the  original  "Unconditional  Surrender  "  Dispatch  —  View  from  the 
National  Cemetery,  from  photo.  (C.  H.  Stephens). 

THE  OPPOSING  FORCES  AT  FORT  DONELSON,  TENN.     Composition,  Strength,  and  Losses..  .429 


THE  RIVER  GUN-BOATS  FROM  FORT  DONELSON  TO 

NEW  MADRID. 

THE    WESTERN     FLOTILLA    AT     FORT    } 

DONELSON,   ISLAND  NUMBER  TEN,     > REAR-ADMIRAL  HENRY  WALKE 430 

FORT    PILLOW,  AND  MEMPHIS.  ...     ) 

ILLUSTRATIONS  :  The  "  Carondelet "  Fighting  Fort  Donelson,  from  sketch  by  Rear-Admiral  Walke 
(F.  H.  Schell  and  I.  Hogan)  —  Explosion  of  a  Gun  on  board  the  "  Carondelet "  during  the  Attack  on 
Fort  Donelson,  from  sketch  by  Rear-Admiral  Walke  (M.  J.  Burns)  —  The  Gun-boats  at  Fort  Donelson— 
The  Land  Attack  in  the  Distance,  from  sketch  by  Rear- Admiral  Walke  (Harry  Fenn)  —  Map  of  the 
Region  of  the  Flotilla  Operations  (Jacob  Wells)—  Map  of  Military  and  Naval  Operations  about  Island 
Number  Ten  (Jacob  Wells)  —  The  Mortar-boats  at  Island  Number  Ten  (E.  J.  Meeker)  —The  "Caron 
delet  "  Running  the  Confederate  Batteries  at  Island  Number  Ten,  from  sketch  by  Rear-Admiral  Walke 
(Harry  Fenn) —The  Levee  at  New  Madrid  (A.  R.  Waud)  —Major-General  John  Pope,  from  Brady 
photo.— Brigadier-General  W.  W.  Mackall,  C.  S.  A.,  from  photo,  by  G.  W.  Davis  — The  "Carondelet" 
and  "  Pittsburgh  "  Capturing  the  Confederate  Batteries  below  New  Madrid,  from  drawing  by  Rear- 
Admiral  Walke  (F.  H.  Schell  and  I.  Hogan)  —  Flag-Officer  Charles  Henry  Davis,  from  Brady  photo.—  Fort 
Pillow  and  the  Water-battery,  and  the  Battle  of  Fort  Pillow,  from  sketches  by  Rear-Admiral  Walke  (F.  H. 
Schell  and  T.  Hogan)—The  Battle  of  Memphis  (looking  South),  from  drawing  by  Rear-Admiral  Walke 
(Frank  H.  Schell)  —  Brigadier-General  M.  Jeff.  Thompson,  C.  S.  A.,  from  photo. 

ELLET  AND  HIS  STEAM-RAMS  AT  MEMPHIS GENERAL  ALFRED  W.  ELLET 453 

ILLUSTRATIONS  :  The  Battle  of  Memphis  (looking  North)  —  Retreat  of  the  Confederate  Fleet,  from  draw 
ing  by  Rear-Admiral  Walke  (F.  H.  Schell  and  T.  Hogan)  —  Colonel  Charles  Ellet,  Jr.,  from  photo,  by  Rehn 
&  Hum  —  Close  of  the  Battle  of  Memphis,  from  drawing  by  Rear-Admiral  Walke  ( F.  H.  Schell  and  T. 
Hogan)  — Practicing  on  a  River  Picket  (W.  Taber). 


\  ....  COLONEL  J.   W.  BISSELL 460 


SAWING  OUT  THE  CHANNEL  ABOVE  ISLAND 
NUMBER    TEN 

ILLUSTRATIONS  :  Method  of  Cutting  the  Channel  (W.  Taber)  —  Map  of  the  Corrected  Line  of  the  Channel 
above  Island  Number  Ten,  cut  by  the  Engineer  Regiment  (Jacob  Wells). 

COMMENT  ON  COLONEL  BISSELL'S  PAPER GENERAL  SCHUYLER  HAMILTON  .  .  .  .462 

THE  OPPOSING  FORCES  AT  NEW  MADRID  (ISLAND   NUMBER  TEN),   FORT    PILLOW,  AND 

MEMPHIS      Composition,  Strength,  and  Losses 463 


CONTENTS  OF  VOLUME  ONE.  xix 

SHILOH. 

PAGE 

THE  BATTLE  OF  SHILOH  ....  .    GENERAL  ULYSSES  S.  GRANT 465 

ILLUSTRATIONS:  General  U.  S.  Grant,  from  photo,  (with  Autograph)  —  Ou  the  Skirmish  Line  (W.  Taber) 

—  Outline  Map  of  the  Shiloh  Campaign  (Jacob  Wells)  —  Mrs.  Crump's  House  and  the  Landing  below  the 
House,  from  photo's  (George  Gibson)  —New  Shiloh  Church  and  Shiloh  Spring,  in  the  Ravine  South  of  the 
Chapel,  from  photo's  (W.  H.  Drake)  —Map  of  the  Field  of  Shiloh,  from  General  Grant's  "Memoirs"— 
First  Position  of  Waterhouse's  Battery,  from  sketch  by  E.  W.  Andrews,  M.  D.  (E.  J.  Meeker)  —  Con 
federate  Charge  upon  Prentiss's  Camp  on  Sunday  Morning  (A.  C.  Redwood)  —  Checking  the  Confederate 
Advance  on  the  Evening  of  the  First  Day  (Edwin  Forbes)  —  Present  Aspect  of  the  Old  Hamburg  Road 
which  led  up  to  the  "Hornets'  Nest,"  from  photo.  (Fred.  B.  Schell)  —  Major-General  B.  M.  Prentiss, 
from  Brady  photo.  —  Brigadier-General  W.  H.  L.  Wallace,  from  photo.— Ford  where  the  Hamburg  Road 
Crosses  Lick  Creek,  from  photo.  (Fred.  B.  Schell)  —  Bridge  over  Snake  Creek  by  which  General  Lew 
Wallace's  Troops  reached  the  Field,  from  photo.  (Fred.  B.  Schell)  —  Bivouac  of  the  Federal  Troops  (T. 
de  Thulstrup)  —  Wounded  and  Stragglers  on  the  Way  to  the  Landing  (T.  de  Thulstrup)  —Above  the 
Landing:  The  Store,  and  a  part  of  the  National  Cemetery,  from  photo,  lent  by  Captain  A.  T.  Andreas 
(E.  J.  Meeker). 

SHILOH   REVIEWED GENERAL  DON  CARLOS  BUELL 487 

ILLUSTRATIONS  :  Battery  Forward !  ( W.  Taber)  —  Pittsburg  Landing,  viewed  from  the  Ferry  Lauding 
on  the  opposite  Shore,  from  photo,  lent  by  Captain  A.  T.  Andreas  (E.  J.  Meeker)  —Pittsburg  Landing, 
from  photo,  lent  by  W.  H.  Chamberlin  (J.  O.  Davidson)  —The  Landing  at  Savannah,  from  photo.  (F.  B. 
Schell)  —  Major-General  Alexander  McD.  McCook,  from  Brady  photo.—  Pittsburg  Landing  in  the 
Summer  of  1884,  'from  photo.  (F.  B.  Schell)  —  Map  Showing  the  Union  Camps  at  Shiloh,  fae-simile  of 
original— Map  of  the  Field  of  Shiloh,  revised  and  amended  by  General  Buell  (Jacob  Wells)—  The 
"  Hornets' Nest ":  Prentiss's  Troops  and  Hickenlooper's  Battery  repulsing  Hardee's  Troops,  and  Gib 
son's  Brigade  charging  Hurlbut's  Troops  in  the  "  Hornets'  Nest,"  from  the  Cyclorama  of  Shiloh  at 
Chicago  (H.  A.  Oyden)  —  The  Official,  or  Thorn,  Map  of  the  Battle  of  Shiloh  (Jacob  Wells)  — In  the 
"  Hornets  Nest  "  (two  views  on  W.  H.  L.  Wallace's  Line),  from  the  Cyclorama  at  Chicago  (H.  C.  Edwards) 

—  The  Siege-battery,  above  the  Landing,  from  photo,  lent  by  W.  H.  Chamberlin  (W.  Taber) — Buell's 
Troops  debarking  at  Pittsburg  Landing  (T.  de  Thulstrup)  —  Major-General  Thomas  J.  Wood,  from  steel 
portrait,  by  permission  of  D.  Van  Nostrand—  Major  General  Thomas  L.  Critteiiden,  from  Brady  photo. 

—  Capture  of  a  Confederate  Battery  (T.  de  Thulstrup)  —  Scene  in  a  Union  Field-hospital  (A.  C.  Redwood). 

SKIRMISHING  IN  SHERMAN'S  FRONT ROBERT  W.  MEDKIRK 537 

THE  OPPOSING  FORCES  AT  SHILOH.     Composition,  Strength,  and  Losses 537 

ALBERT    SIDNEY   JOHNSTON    AT    SHILOH.  1  .  .COL.  WILLIAM  PRESTON  JOHNSTON.  .540 

By  his  Son J 

ILLUSTRATIONS  :  Albert  Sidney  Johnston  at  the  Age  of  Thirty-five,  from  miniature  —  General  Albert 
Sidney  Johnston  at  the  Age  of  Fifty-seven,  from  photo. —  Fac-simile  of  Autograph  found  inside  the  Cover 
of  General  Johnston's  Pocket-map  of  Tennessee  —  Birthplace  of  Albert  Sidney  Johnston,  Washington, 
Ky.,  from  photo.  (C.  A.  Vanderhoof)  — Fort  Anderson,  Paducah,  in  April,  1862,  after  lithograph  from 
sketch  by  A.  E.  Mathews  (H.  C.  Edwards)  —  Camp  Burgess,  Bowling  Green,  after  lithograph  from 
sketch  by  A.  E.  Mathews  (E.  J.  Meeker)  —  Map  of  Kentucky  and  Tennessee  (Jacob  Wells)  —  Battle  of 
Logan's  Cross  Roads,  or  Mill  Springs,  after  lithograph  from  drawing  by  A.  E.  Mathews  (  W.  Taber)  —  Col 
onel  Schoepf's  Troops  crossing  Fishing  Creek  on  the  way  to  join  General  Thomas,  after  lithograph  from 
sketch  by  A.  E.  Mathews  (E.  J.  Meeker)  —Confederate  Types  of  1862  (A.  C.  Redwood)  —  Map  used  by  the 
Confederate  Generals  at  Shiloh,  by  permission  of  D.  Appleton  &  Co.—  Lieutenant-General  W.  J.  Hardee, 
C.  S.  A.,  from  photo,  lent  by  Colonel  Charles  C.  Jones,  Jr.— Map  of  Battle  of  Shiloh  (Part  I.)  and  Map  of 
Battle  of  Shiloh  (Part  II.),  by  permission  of  D.  Appleton  &  Co.— Vicinity  of  the  "  Hornets'  Nest,"  from 
photo's  lent  by  Captain  A.  T.  Andreas  (W.  L.  Lalhrop)  —  Scene  of  General  Albert  Sidney  Johnston's 
Death,  from  photo.  (W.  Taber) —Map  of  Battle  of  Shiloh  (Part  III.),  by  permission  of  D.  Apple- 
ton  &  Co. 

THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  SHILOH GENERAL  G.    T.  BEAUREGARD 569 

ILLUSTRATIONS  :  Preaching  at  the  Union  Camp  Dick  Robinson,  Kentucky,  after  lithograph  from  sketch 
by  A.  E.  Mathews  (E.  J.  Meeker)  —  Lieutenant-General  John  C.  Breckinridge,  C.  S.  A.,  from  Anderson- 
Cook  photo.— Slaves  Laboring  at  Night  on  the  Confederate  Earth-works  at  Corinth  (W.  L.  Sheppard)  — 
Five  Corinth  Dwellings,  from  photo's  (TT.  J.  Fenn)  —  Major-General  Bushrod  R.  Johnson,  C.  S.  A.,  from 
Anderson-Cook  photo.— The  "Hornets'  Nest,"  from  photo,  lent  by  Captain  A.  T.  Andreas  (E.  J.  Meeker) 

—  The  Union  Gun-boats  at  Shiloh  on  the  Evening  of  the  First  Day,  after  lithograph  from  sketch  by  A.  E. 
Mathews  (H.  M.  Eaton). 


|    ...  GENERAL    THOMAS  JORDAN 594 


NOTES    OF  A  CONFEDERATE   STAFF-OFFICER 

AT  SHILOH 

ILLUSTRATIONS:  A  Confederate  Private  of  the  West,  from  ambrotype— A  Union  Battery  taken  by 
Surprise  (R.  F.  Zogbaitm)—The  Last  Stand  made  by  the  Confederate  Line  (R.  F.  Zogbaum,. 


xx  CONTENTS  OF  VOLUME  ONE. 

PAGE 

SURPRISE  AND  WITHDRAWAL  AT  SHILOH COLONEL  5.   H.  LOCKETT 604 

ILLUSTRATION:  Initial  (R.  F.  Zogbaum). 

THE    SHILOH    BATTLE    ORDER    AND   THE  » 

WITHDRAWAL  SUNDAY  EVENING .  .  }  '  COWNEL  A~  R'   CH*°LM  '  '  ' 

THE  MARCH  OF  LEW  WALLACE'S  DIVISION  TO  SHILOH, 
With  Documents  submitted  by  General  Lew  Wallace 
Map  of  the  Routes  by  which  General  Grant  was  reenforced  (Jacob  Wells). 


NAVAL  PREPARATIONS. 

THE   UNION  AND  CONFEDERATE   NAVIES PROFESSOR  J.   R.   SOLEY.  .  ...  .611 

ILLUSTRATIONS:  A  Frigate  of  the  Olden  Time:  the  "  Independence,"  built  in  1814,  from  photo.  (Gran- 
ville  Perkins)  —  Roman  War  Galley  —  Line-of-battle  Ship  of  the  17th  Century  — The  U.  8.  Frigate  "Mer- 
rimac  "  before  and  after  Conversion  into  an  Iron-clad  (J.  O.  Davidson)  —The  Navy  Yard,  Washington,  in 
1861,  from  war-time  sketch  (A.  R.  Waud)  —  The  Old  Navy  Department  Building,  Washington,  from  photo. 
(W.  Taber)  —  Launch  of  the  "  Dictator,"  from  photo,  lent  by  Delamater  <fe  Co.  (W.  rafter; —Monitor 
"Weehawken"  in  a  Storm  (Granville  Perkins)  —  Gideon  Welles,  Secretary  of  the  U.  8.  Navy,  from 
Brady  photo.—  Gustavus  V.  Fox,  Assistant-Secretary  of  the  U.  S.  Navy,  from  photo.  — William  Faxon, 
Chief  Clerk  of  the  U.  8.  Navy  Department  during  the  War,  from  photo,  by  Prescott  &  White. 


COAST  OPERATIONS  IN  THE  CAROLINAS. 

EARLY  COAST  OPERATIONS  IN  NORTH  CAROLINA  .  .  GENERAL  RUSH  C.  HAWKINS (532 

(Including  Capture  and  Defense  of  Hatteras  Island,  Land  and  Water  Fighting  at  Roanoke 
Island,  the  Two  Squadrons  at  Elizabeth  City,  Battle  of  New  Berne,  Siege  of  Fort  Macon,  Battle 
of  South  Mills,  and  other  Operations.) 

ILLUSTRATIONS:  Uniform  of  Hawkins's  Zouaves,  from  photo.  (H.  A.  Oyden) — Rear- Admiral  Silas  H. 
Stringham,  from  Brady  photo. —  Map  of  Early  Coast  Operations  in  North  Carolina  (Jacob  Wells)  —  Forts 
Hatteras  and  Clark,  from  war-time  sketch  (A.  K.  Waud)— The  "  Cumberland  "  Sailing  into  Action,  and 
Union  Fleet  Bombarding  Forts  Hatteras  and  Clark,  from  war-time  sketches  (F.  H.  Schell  and  Thomas 
Hogan)  —  Retreat  of  the  Confederates  to  their  Boats  after  their  Attack  upon  Hatteras  (W.  Taber)  —  Land 
ing  of  the  Union  Troops  at  Hatteras,  from  war-time  sketch  (A.  R.  Waud)  —  Map  of  the  Operations 
at  Roanoke  Island,  from  Official  Records — Map  of  the  Battle-Held  of  Roanoke  Island,  from  Official 
Records  —  Union  Assault  upon  the  Three-gun  Battery,  Roanoke  Island,  from  war-time  sketch  (F.  H. 
Schell)  —  Vice- Admiral  S.  C.  Rowan,  from  Brady  photo.— Brigadier-General  L.  O'B.  Branch,  from 
photo.— Bombardment  of  Fort  Thompson  during  the  Battle  of  New  Berne,  from  war-time  sketch  (F.  H. 
Schell) — Major-General  John  G.  Foster,  from  Brady  photo. —  Map  of  Operations  in  the  Battle  of  New 
Berne  (Jacob  Wells)  —  Assault  of  Union  Troops  upon  Fort  Thompson,  from  war-time  sketch  (F.  H.  Schell) 

—  Fort  Macon  after  its  Capture  by  the  Union  Forces,  from  war-time  sketch  by  F.  H.  Schell  (Thomas 
Hogan)— Map  of  the  Engagement  at  South  Mills  (Fred.  E.  Silts)  —  Passage  of  the  Union  Boats  through 
the  Dismal  Swamp  Canal,  from  war-time  sketch  by  Horatio  L.  Wait  (K.  J.  Meclcer). 

THE  BURNS1DE  EXPEDITION GENERAL   A.  E.  BURNSIDE 660 

ILLUSTRATIONS  :  Union  Lookout,  Hatteras  Beach,  from  war-time  sketch  (A.  R.  Waud)  —Uniform  of  the 
First  Rhode  Island  (H.  A.  Ogden)  —  Brevet  Brigadier-General  Rush  C.  Hawkins,  from  Brady  photo. — 
Rear-Admiral  L.  M.  Goldsborough,  from  photo,  lent  by  Henry  Carey  Baird — General  Burnside's  Head 
quarters,  Roanoke  Island,  from  war-time  sketch  by  F.  H.  Schell  (Thomas  Hogan)  —  General  Burnside  at 
the  Confederate  Cotton  Battery,  New  Berne,  from  war-time  sketch  by  F.  H.  Schell  (Thomas  Hogan)  — 
Brigadier-General  Robert  B.  Vance,  from  tintype. 

THE  OPPOSING  FORCES  AT  ROANOKE  ISLAND  AND  NEW  BERNE,  NORTH  CAROLINA 670 

DU   PONT  AND  THE  PORT  ROYAL  EXPEDITION REAR-ADMIRAL  DANIEL  AMMEN.  .  .  .  671 

ILLUSTRATIONS  :  General  View  of  Hilton  Head  after  its  Capture  by  the  Union  Forces  and  View  of  Post- 
Office,  Hilton  Head,  from  war-time  sketches  (Xanthus  Smith)  —  Brevet  Major-General  Thomas  W.  Sher 
man,  from  Brady  photo. — Map  of  the  Coast  of  South  Carolina  and  part  of  North  Carolina  (Jacob  Wells) 

—  Rear- Admiral  Samuel  F.  Du  Pont,  from  photo,  lent  by  Horatio  L.  Wait  —  Gun-boat  "  Seneca  "  and 
Sloop  of  War  "  Vandalia,"  from  war-time  sketches  (Xanthus  Smith)—  Map  of  Naval  Attack  at  Hilton 


CONTENTS  OF  VOLUME  ONE.  xxi 

PAGE 

Head,  Nov.  7,  1861  —  United  States  Gun-boat  "Mohawk,"  the  Guard-ship  at  Port  Royal  — Attack  of  the 
Union  Fleet  at  Hilton  Head— Ten-inch  Shell-gun  which  threw  the  Opening  Shot  from  the  Flag-ship 
"Wabash"— Bay  Point  and  Fort  Beauregard  after  Capture,  and  Rifle-gun  at  Fort  Beauregard,  five 
pictures  from  war-time  sketches  (Xanthus  Smith)  —  Battle  of  the  Union  Fleet  with  Forts  Beauregard 
and  Walker,  and  Hoisting  the  Stars  and  Stripes  over  Fort  Walker,  from  war-time  sketches  (Frank  H. 
Schell)  —Brigadier-General  Thomas  F.  Drayton,  C.  8.  A.,  from  Brady  photo.— Captain  Percival  Drayton, 
U.  S.  N.,  from  Brady  photo.  —  Old  Headquarters,  Hilton  Head,  and  Pope's  House,  Hilton  Head,  used  by 
the  Union  Army  as  Signal  Station,  from  wartime  sketches  (Xanthus  Smith)  —  Union  Signal  Station, 
Beaufort,  8.  C.,  House  of  J.  G.  Barnwell  and  Fuller's  House,  Beaufort,  S.  C.,  from  Gardner  photo's 
(T.  F.  Hoessner). 

THE  OPPOSING  FORCES  AT  PORT  ROYAL.    Composition  and  Losses..  ..691 


k>  MONITOR"  AND  kl  MERRIMAC." 

THE  FIRST  FIGHT  OF  IRON-GLADS COLONEL  JOHN  JA  YLOR  WOOD.  ...  692 

ILLUSTRATIONS:  Head-piece  ( TT.  H.  Drake)  —  Burning  of  Frigate  "Merrimac"  and  of  Gosport  Navy 
Yard,  and  Remodeling  "Merrimac  "  at  Gosport  Navy  Yard  (J.  O.  Davidson)  —  Fac-simile  of  sketch  of 
"Merrimac"  made  the  day  before  the  fight  by  Lieutenant  B.  L.  Blackford— Lieutenant  Catesby  ap  R. 
Jones,  from  photo,  by  Courret  Hermans,  Lima,  Peru — Admiral  Franklin  Buchanan,  C.  S.  N.,  and 
Commodore  Josiah  Tattnall,  C.  8.  N.,  from  photo,  by  D.  J.  Ryan  — Colonel  John  Taylor  Wood,  from  oil- 
portrait  by  Gait  —Map  of  Hampton  Roads  and  Adjacent  Shores  (Jacob  Wells)—  The  "Merrimac  "  ramming 
the  "Cumberland"  (J.  O.  Davidson)—  Lieutenant  George  U.  Morris,  from  photo. —The  "Merrimac" 
driving  the  "Congress"  from  her  anchorage  (J.  O.  Davidson)— Escape  of  part  of  the  Crew  of  the  "Con 
gress"  (J.  O.  Davidson) — Explosion  on  the  burning  "Congress"  (J.  O.  Davidson) — Lieutenant  Joseph 
B.  Smith,  from  photo,  by  Black  and  Batchelder — Encounter  between  the  "Monitor"  and  the  "Merri 
mac"  at  short  range  (J.  O.  Davidson)  — Captain  G.  J.  Van  Brunt,  from  photo.— The  "Monitor"  in 
Battle-trim,  from  tracing  lent  by  Commander  8.  D.  Greene. 

WATCHING  THE   "  MERRIMAC" GENERAL   R.    E.   COLSTON 712 

ILLUSTRATION  :  The  "Merrimac"  passing  the  Confederate  Battery  on  Craney  Island  (J.  O.  Davidson). 

HOW  THE  GUN-BOAT  "ZOUAVE"  AIDED  THE       | 

"CONGRESS"  i   ACTING  MASTER  HENRY  REANEY.    .714 

THE     PLAN     AND     CONSTRUCT.ON     OF     THE      ^OMMANDER  JOHN  M.  SKOOKF. 715 

"MERRIMAC"  .  $  CONSTRUCTOR  JOHN    L.    PORTER.    .716 

ILLUSTRATION  :  Cross-section  of  the  "  Merrimac,"  from  a  drawing  by  John  L.  Porter. 

NOTES  ON  THE  "MONITOR "-"MERRIMAC"  FIGHT.  .  SURGEON  DINU/IDDIE   B.   PHILLIPS.  .  .718 

IN  THE   "MONITOR"  TURRET COMMANDER  S.  DANA  GREENE 719 

ILLUSTRATIONS:  Arrival  of  the  "Monitor"  at  Hampton  Roads  (J.  O.  Davidson)  —  Rear- Admiral 
John  L.  Worden,  from  photo.  —  Side  Elevation  and  Deck-plan  of  the  "  Monitor,"  lent  by  Captain  John 
Ericsson  —  Bird's-eye  view  of  "  Monitor  "-"  Merrimac  "  Fight  (J.  O.  Davidson)  —Part  of  the  Crew  of  the 
"  Monitor,"  from  Gardner  photo.— Commander  Samuel  Dana  Greene,  from  photo,  by  Halleck. 

THE  BUILDING  OF  THE   "MONITOR" CAPTAIN  JOHN  ERICSSON 730 

ILLUSTRATIONS  :  Captain  John  Ericsson,  from  Brady  photo.—  Longitudinal  Plan  through  Center  Line 
of  Original  Monitor :  1,  aft  section ;  2,  central  section ;  3,  forward  section  —  Plan  of  Berth-deck  of 
Original  Monitor  —  and  Transverse  Section  of  Hull  of  Original  Monitor,  from  drawings  lent  by  Captain 
Ericsson  —  View  showing  Effect  of  Shot  on  the  "Monitor"  Turret,  from  Gardner  photo.— Side  Eleva 
tion  of  Floating  Revolving  Circular  Tower,  published  by  Abraham  Bloodgood  in  1807  —  Floating 
Circular  Citadel  submitted  to  French  Directory  in  1798,  from  "Engineering"  (W.  Taber)  —  Si&e  Eleva 
tion  and  Transverse  Section  of  Iron-clad  Steam  Battery  proposed  by  Captain  Ericsson  to  Napoleon 
III.  in  1854,  lent  by  Captain  Ericsson  —  Engineer  Isaac  Newton,  from  medallion  portrait  by  Launt 
Thompson— Transverse  section  of  the  "Monitor"  through  the  center  of  the  turret,  lent  by  Captain 
Ericsson  —  Sinking  of  the  "  Monitor,"  December  22,  1862  (J.  O.  Davidson). 

THE  LOSS  OF  THE   "  MONITOR'' FRANCIS  B.   BUTTS.  . 

NEGOTIATIONS   FOR  THE  BUILDING  OF    THE    "MONITOR". 

(Including  Letters  from  C.  S.  Bushnell,  Captain  John  Ericsson,  and  Secretary  Gideon  S.  Welles.) 
ILLUSTRATION:  Union  Soldier's  Candlestick  (W.  Taber). 


xxii  CONTENTS  OF  VOLUME  ONE. 

MAPS. 

PAGE 

TWR  UMiTpn  <;TATF<;  I  Showing  Posts  occupied  by  U.  S.  troops  Jan.  1,  1861;    limit  of  ter- 
\      ritory  controlled  by  U.  S. forces  July,  1861  ;  and  blockade  stations.  . 

PENSACOLA  HARBOR,  FLORIDA,  MAY  27,  1861 28 

CHARLESTON  HARBOR  AND  VICINITY,  SOUTH  CAROLINA 44 

EASTERN  VIRGINIA  AND  MARYLAND 113 

HARPER'S  FERRY,  VIRGINIA 115 

CAMPAIGNS  IN  WEST  VIRGINIA,  1861 129 

COMBAT  AT  RICH  MOUNTAIN,  WEST  VIRGINIA 131 

GAULEY  BRIDGE  AND  VICINITY,  WEST  VIRGINIA 142 

AFFAIR  AT  CARNIFEX  FERRY,  WEST  VIRGINIA .  .  145 

DEFENSES  OF  WASHINGTON,  D.  C,  JULY,  1861 .  ...  172 

OUTLINE  MAP  OF  THE  FIRST  BULL  RUN  BATTLE-FIELD 180 

THE  FIRST  BULL  RUN  CAMPAIGN 190 

TOPOGRAPHICAL  MAP  OF  THE  FIRST  BULL  RUN  BATTLE-FIELD 204 

.  PLAN  OF  THE  FIRST  BULL  RUN  BATTLE-FIELD 233 

OPERATIONS  IN  MISSOURI,  1 86 1  263 

BATTLE  OF  WILSON'S  CREEK,  OR  OAK  HILLS,  MISSOURI 290 

SIEGE  OF  LEXINGTON,  MISSOURI 309 

' BATTLE  OF  PEA  RIDGE,  OR  ELKHORN  TAVERN,  ARKANSAS 322 

BATTLE-FIELD  NEAR  BELMONT,  MISSOURI 350 

REGION  OF  FOOTE'S  OPERATIONS 361 

FORT  HENRY,  TENNESSEE  363 

KENTUCKY  AND  TENNESSEE 378 

BATTLE  OF  LOGAN'S  CROSS  ROADS,  OR  MILL  SPRINGS,  KENTUCKY 388 

BIG  SANDY  RIVER  AND  MIDDLE-CREEK  BATTLE-FIELD,  KENTUCKY 394 

FORT  DONELSON,  TENNESSEE 402 

REGION  OF  THE  OPERATIONS  OF  THE  WESTERN  FLOTILLA 436 

MILITARY  AND  NAVAL  OPERATIONS  ABOUT  ISLAND  NUMBER  TEN,  MISSISSIPPI  RIVER,  437 

CORRECTED  LINE  OF  THE  CHANNEL  ABOVE  ISLAND  NUMBER  TEN 461 

OUTLINE  MAP  OF  THE  SHILOH  CAMPAIGN,  WEST  TENNESSEE 466 

THE  FIELD  OF  SHILOH.  From  General  Grant's  "  Personal  Memoirs." 470 

LOCATION  OF  THE  UNION  CAMPS  AT  SHILOH  496—497 

THE  FIELD  OF  SHILOH.  From  the  Official  Map,  revised  and  amended  by  Gen.  D.  C.  Buell,  502—503 

OFFICIAL,  OR  THOM,  MAP  OF  SHILOH 508 

KENTUCKY  AND  TENNESSEE 545 

MAP  USED  BY  THE  CONFEDERATE  GENERALS  AT  SHILOH 551 

BATTLE  OF    SHILOH.     PART  I.     From  Col.  W.  P.  Johnston's  "Life  of  Gen.  A.  S.  Johnston."  556 

"                "      II.                   "                        "                               '•'                      "  560 

"     III.                  "                                                          "  566 

ROUTES  BY  WHICH  GENERAL  GRANT  WAS  REENFORCED  AT  PITTSBURG  LANDING  .  .  .  608 

EARLY  COAST  OPERATIONS  IN  NORTH  CAROLINA 634 

OPERATIONS  AT  ROANOKE  ISLAND,  NORTH  CAROLINA 641 

BATTLE-FIELD  OF  ROANOKE  ISLAND 643 

BATTLE  OF  NEW  BERNE,  NORTH  CAROLINA 651 


CONTENTS  OF  VOLUME  ONE. 


XXlll 


ENGAGEMENT  AT  SOUTH  MILLS,  NORTH    CAROLINA 656 

COAST  OF  NORTH  AND  SOUTH  CAROLINA 673 

NAVAL  ATTACK  AT  HILTON  HEAD,  SOUTH    CAROLINA 678 

HAMPTON  ROADS,  VIRGINIA,  AND  ADJACENT  SHORES  .  699 


ARTISTS. 


BRIDWELL,  H.   L. 
BURNS,  M.  J. 
COCKS,  J.  H. 
DAVIDSON,  J.   O. 
DAVIS,   THEO.  R. 
DAY,  FRANK 
DRAKE,   WILL.  H. 
EATON,  HUGH  M. 
EDWARDS,  G.   W. 
EDWARDS,  H.  C. 
FENN,   HARRY 


FENN,    WAL  TER  J. 
FORBES,  EDWIN 
GIBSON,   GEORGE 
GOATER,  WALTER  H. 
HOGAN,    THOMAS 
HOSIER,  ABRAM 
HUNT,    WILLIAM  M. 
KEMBLE,  E.   W. 
LATHROP,  W.  L. 
MEEKER,  EDWIN  J. 
MOESSNER,    T.  F. 


OGDEN,  HENRY  A. 
PENNELL,  JOSEPH 
PERKINS,   GRANVILLE 
REDWOOD,  ALLEN  C. 
SCHELL,  FRANK  H. 
SCHELL,  FRED.  B. 
SH ELTON,   W.  H. 
SHEPPARD,   W.   L. 
SMITH,   SIDNEY  L. 
SMITH,  X A  NTH  US 
STEPHENS,  C.  H. 


TABER,   WALTON 
THULSTRUP,    T.  DE 
VANDERHOOF,  C.  A. 
VOLCK,  A.  J. 
WALKE,     HENR  Y, 

U.   S.  N 

WAUD,  ALFRED  R. 
WAUD,  WILLIAM 
WOODWARD,  J.  D. 
ZOGBAUM,  RUFUS  F. 


DRAUGHTSMEN. 

BROWN,   G.   H.  KEMP,  J.   S.  SITTS,  FRED.  E. 


WELLS,  JACOB 


ENGRAVERS. 


AITKEN,  PETER 
ANDREWS,  JOHN 
ATWOOD,  K.  C. 
BABCOCK,  H.  E. 
BARTLE,  G.  P. 
BOGERT,  J.  A. 
BUTLER,   T.  A. 
CLEMENT,  E. 
CLEMENT,  J. 
COLE,    TIMOTHY 
COLLINS,  R.   C. 
DANA,    W.  J. 
DAVIDSON,  H. 
DAVIS,  SAMUEL 
ERTZ,  EDWARD 


EVANS,  J.    W. 
FAY,  G  ASTON 
FILLEBROWN,  F.  E. 
GARDNER,  E.   D. 
HAY  MAN,  ARTHUR 
HEARD,   T.  H. 
HEINEMANN,  E. 
HELD,  E.    C. 
HIRSCHMANN,   W.  A. 
HO  SKINS,  ROBERT 
IRWIN,  ALLEN 
JOHNSON,  THOMAS 
JUNG  LING,  J.   F. 
KARST,  JOHN 
KILBURN,  S.   S. 


KINGS  LEY,  ELB  RIDGE 
KLASEN,  W. 
KRUELL,  G. 
LINDSAY,  A. 
LOCKHARDT,  A. 
MOLLIER,   WILLIAM 
MORSE,   WILLIAM  H. 
MULLER,  R.  A. 
NAYLOR,  JESSIE 
NEGRI,  A. 
NICHOLS,  DAVID 
OWENS,  MARY  L. 
PECK  WELL,  H.   W. 
POWELL,   C.  A. 
REED,   C.  H. 


ROBERTS,  W. 
SCHUSSLER,    T. 
SCHWAR  TZBURGER,  C. 
SPIEGLE,  CHARLES 
STATE,  CHARLES 
SYLVESTER,  H.  E. 
TICHENOR,  E.  R. 
TIETZE,  R.   G. 
TYNAN,  JAMES 
VELTEN,  H. 
WHITNEY,  J.   H.   E. 
WILLIAMS,   G.  P. 
WINHAM,  E.   A. 
WOLF,  HENRY 
WRIGHT,  C. 


PRELIMINARY    EVENTS. 

FROM    THE    CHARLESTON    CONVENTION    TO  THE    FIRST    BATTLE    OF    BULL    RUN. 


1860. 


APRIL  23.  The  National  Convention  of  the 
Democratic  Party  assembled  at  Charleston, 
S.  C.  Dissensions  arising  in  regard  to  the 
question  of  congressional  protection  of  slavery 
in  the  territories,  the  Southern  delegates  with 
drew,  organized  another  convention  in  Charles 
ton,  and  adjourned  May  4th,  to  meet  in  Rich 
mond,  Va.,  June  llth. 

May  3.  The  Douglas,  or  Northern,  wing  of  the 
Convention  adjourned,  to  reassemble  at  Balti 
more,  Md.,  June  18th. 

May  9.  The  Convention  of  the  Constitutional 
Union  Party  (formerly  the  American,  or  "Know- 
Nothing,"  Party),  held  at  Baltimore,  Md.,  nomi 
nated  John  Bell,  of  Tennessee,  for  President, 
and  Edward  Everett,  of  Massachusetts,  for  Vice- 
President,  and  adopted  a  platform  evading  the 
slavery  issue. 

May  18.  The  National  Convention  of  the  Repub 
lican  Party,  held  at  Chicago,  nominated  Abraham 
Lincoln,  of  Illinois,  for  President,  and  Hannibal 
Hamlin,  of  Maine,  for  Yice-President,  and  pro 
nounced  in  favor  of  congressional  prohibition  of 
slavery  in  the  territories. 

June  23.  The  Northern  '•  Democratic  National 
Convention,"  at  Baltimore,  nominated  Stephen 
A.  Douglas,  of  Illinois,  for  President,  and  Ben 
jamin  Fitzpatrick,  for  Vice-President.  (The 
latter  declined,  and  the  National  Committee 
substituted  Herschel  V.  Johnson,  of  Georgia.) 
The  convention  declared  in  favor  of  leaving  the 
question  of  slavery  in  the  territories  to  the 
people  of  the  territories,  or  to  the  Supreme 
Court  of  the  United  States. 

June  28.  The  Southern  "  Democratic  National 
Convention"  (adjourned  from  Richmond)  nomi 
nated,  at  Baltimore,  Md.,  John  C.  Breckinridge, 
of  Kentucky,  for  President,  and  Joseph  Lane, 
of  Oregon,  for  Vice-President.  The  conven 
tion  declared  that  neither  Congress  nor  a  ter 
ritorial  legislature  had  the  right  to  prohibit 
slavery  in  a  territory,  and  that  it  was  the  duty 
of  the  Federal  Government,  in  all  its  depart 


ments,  to  protect  slavery  in  the  territories  when 
necessary. 
November  6.  Presidential  election,  resulting  as 


1UUUV>  S  . 

Electoral 

Popular 

States. 

Votes. 

Tote. 

Lincoln  

...     17 

180     

.     1,866,352 

Breckinridge  .  . 

11     . 

72     

845,763 

Douglas  

2 

12 

1,375,157 

Bell... 

3     . 

39     . 

589.581 

Decembers.  Meeting  of  Congress.  Message  from 
President  Buchanan  arguing  against  the  right  of 
secession,  but  expressing  doubt  as  to  the  con 
stitutional  power  of  Congress  to  make  war  upon 
a  State. 

December  6.  Select  Committee  of  Thirty-three 
appointed  by  the  House  of  Representatives  to 
take  measures  for  the  perpetuity  of  the  Union. 
(See  "  February  28.") 

December  10.  Resignation  of  Howell  Cobb,  of 
Georgia,  Secretary  of  the  Treasury. 

December  12.  Arrival  of  General  Winfield  Scott 
in  Washington,  to  advise  with  the  President. 

December  14.  Resignation  of  Lewis  Cass,  of 
Michigan,  Secretary  of  State. 

December  20.  Ordinance  of  secession  adopted  in 
South  Carolina  by  a  convention  called  by  the 
Legislature  of  the  State. 

December  26.  United  States  troops,  under  Major 
Robert  Anderson,  transferred  from  Fort  Moul- 
trie  to  Fort  Sumter,  S.  C. 

December  27.  Castle  Pinckney  and  Fort  Moul- 
trie,  Charleston  Harbor,  seized  by  the  South 
Carolina  authorities. 

December  27.  Surrender  of  the  United  States 
Revenue  cutter  William  Ail-en  to  the  authori 
ties  of  South  Carolina. 

December  27.  Arrival  in  Washington  of  Messrs. 
Barnwell,  Orr,  and  Adams,  Commissioners  from 
South  Carolina,  to  treat  with  the  administration. 

December  29.  Resignation  of  John  B.  Floyd,  of 
Virginia,  Secretary  of  War. 

December  30.  United  States  Arsenal,  at  Charles 
ton,  S.  C.,  seized  by  the  State  authorities. 


PRELIMINARY    EVENTS. 


1861. 


January  2.  Fort  Johnson,  Charleston  Harbor, 
seized  by  State  authorities. 

January  3.  Port  Pulaski,  Ga.,  seized  by  State 
authorities. 

January  4.  United  States  Arsenal,  at  Mt.  Vernon, 
Ala.,  seized  by  State  authorities. 

January  5.  Forts  Morgan  and  Gaines,  Mobile  Bay, 
Ala.,  seized  by  State  authorities. 

January  5.  Departure  of  first  expedition  for  re 
lief  of  Fort  Surater,  S.  C.,  from  N.  Y.  Harbor. 

January  6.  United  States  Arsenal,  at  Apalachi- 
cola,  Fla.,  seized  by  State  authorities. 

January  7.  Fort  Marion,  St.  Augustine,  Fla., 
seized  by  State  authorities. 

January  8.  Resignation  of  Jacob  Thompson,  of 
Mississippi,  Secretary  of  the  Interior. 

January  9.  Ordinance  of  secession  adopted  in 
Mississippi. 

January  9.  Fort  Johnston,  N.  C.,  seized  by  citi 
zens  of  Smithville. 

January  9.  The  Star  of  the  West,  conveying  relief 
to  Fort  Sumter,  fired  upon  at  the  entrance  to 
Charleston  Harbor  and  driven  back. 

January  10.  Fort  Caswell,  N.  C.,  seized  by  citi 
zens  of  Smithville  and  Wilmington. 

January  10.  Ordinance  of  secession  adopted  in 
Florida. 

January  10.  United  States  troops,  under  Lieut. 
Adam  J.  Slemmer,  transferred  from  Barrancas 
Barracks  to  Fort  Pickens,  Pensacola,  Fla. 

January  10.  Reenforcements  for  the  troops  at 
Pensacola  sailed  from  Boston,  Mass. 

January  10.  United  States  Arsenal  and  Barracks 
at  Baton  Rouge,  La.,  seized  by  State  authorities. 

January  11.  Ordinance  of  secession  adopted  in 
Alabama. 

January  11.  Surrender  of  Fort  Sumter,  S.  C., 
demanded  by  Governor  Pickens,  of  South  Caro 
lina,  and  refused  by  Major  Anderson. 

January  11.  Forts  Jackson  and  St.  Philip,  La., 
seized  by  State  authorities. 

January  11.  United  States  Marine  Hospital,  near 
New  Orleans,  La.,  seized  by  State  authorities. 

January  12.  Barrancas  Barracks,  Forts  Barran 
cas  and  McRee,  and  the  Navy  Yard  at  Pensa 
cola,  Fla.,  seized  by  State  authorities. 

January  12.  Surrender  of  Fort  Pickens,  Fla., 
demanded  by  the  Governors  of  Florida  and  Ala 
bama  and  refused  by  Lieutenant  Slemmer. 

January  14.  Fort  Taylor,  Key  West,  Fla.,  gar 
risoned  by  United  States  troops. 

January  14.  Fort  Pike,  La.,  seized  by  State 
authorities. 

January  15.  United  States  Coast  Survey  steamer 
Dana  seized  at  St.  Augustine,  Fla. 

January  15.  Second  demand  for  the  surrender  of 
Fort  Pickens,  Fla. 

January  18.  Third  demand  for  the  surrender  of 
Fort  Pickens,  Fla. 

January  19.  Ordinance  of  secession  adopted  in 
Georgia. 

January  20.  Fort  on  Ship  Island,  Miss.,  seized 
by  State  authorities. 

January  24.  Reenforcements  for  Fort  Pickeus, 
Fla.,  sailed  from  Fort  Monroe,  Va. 


January  24.  United  States  Arsenal,  at  Augusta, 
Ga.,  seized  by  State  authorities. 

January  26.  Oglethorpe  Barracks  and  Fort  Jack 
son,  Ga.,  seized  by  State  authorities. 

January  26.  Ordinance  of  secession  adopted  in 
Louisiana. 

January  28.  Fort  Macomb,  La.,  seized  by  State 
authorities. 

January  28.  United  States  property  in  hands  of 
army  officers  seized  at  New  Orleans,  La. 

February  1.  Ordinance  of  secession  adopted  in 
Texas. 

February  1.  United  States  Mint  and  Custom 
House,  at  New  Orleans,  La.,  seized  by  State 
authorities. 

February  4.  Meeting  at  Washington  of  a  Peace 
Conference,  representing  13  Free  and  7  Border 
States,  called  at  the  request  of  the  Virginia 
Legislature.  (See  "  February  28.") 

February  4.  Convention  of  seceded  States  met 
at  Montgomery,  Ala. 

February  6.  The  Brooklyn  arrived  off  Pensacola 
with  reinforcements  for  Fort  Pickens,  Fla. 

February  7.  The  Choctaw  Nation  of  Indians  de 
clared  its  adherence  to  the  Southern  States. 

February  8.  United  States  Arsenal,  at  Little 
Rock,  Ark.,  seized  by  State  authorities. 

Februarys.  A  "  Constitution  for  the  Provisional 
Government  of  the  Confederate  States  of  Amer 
ica"  adopted  at  Montgomery,  Ala.,  by  deputies 
from  the  States  of  Alabama,  Florida,  Georgia, 
Louisiana,  Mississippi,  and  South  Carolina. 

February  9.  Jeffersoii  Davis,  of  Mississippi, 
elected  President,  and  Alexander  H.  Stephens, 
of  Georgia,  Vice-President,  of  "  the  Confederate 
States  of  America,"  by  the  Montgomery  Con 
vention,  or  Provisional  Congress. 

February  13.  Abraham  Lincoln  and  Hannibal 
Hamlin  officially  declared  elected  President  and 
Vice-President  of  the  United  States. 

February  15.  Resolution  passed  by  Confederate 
Congress  for  appointment  of  Commissioners 
to  the  Government  of  the  United  States. 

February  16.  United  States  Arsenal  and  Bar 
racks  at  San  Antonio,  Tex.,  seized  by  State 
authorities. 

February  18.  All  United  States  military  posts  in 
Texas  surrendered  to  the  State  authorities  by 
General  David  E.  Twiggs,  U.  S.  Army. 

February  18.  Jefferson  Davis  and  Alexander  H. 
Stephens  inaugurated  at  Montgomery,  Ala. 

February  20.  Act  passed  by  Confederate  Con 
gress  to  provide  munitions  of  war. 

February  21.  Camp  Cooper,  Texas,  abandoned 
by  United  States  troops.  (During  the  next  six 
months  other  United  States  military  posts  in 
Texas  and  New  Mexico  were  abandoned. —  See 
map,  page  8.) 

February  23.  Abraham  Lincoln  arrived  in  Wash 
ington. 

February  26.  Act  passed  by  Confederate  Con 
gress  to  organize  a  general  staff  for  the  army. 

February  28.  Adoption  by  the  United  States 
House  of  Representatives  of  the  amendment 
offered  by  the  Committee  of  Thirty-three,  for- 


PRELIMINARY   EVENTS. 


bidding  any  interference  by  Congress  with 
slavery  in  the  States.  (This  amendment  was 
adopted  by  the  Senate  March  2,  but  was  never 
adopted  by  the  necessary  number  of  States.) 

February  28.  Act  passed  by  Confederate  Con 
gress  to  raise  provisional  forces. 

March  1.  The  President  of  the  Confederate  States 
assumed  control  of  military  affairs  in  the  States 
of  Alabama,  Florida,  Georgia,  Louisiana,  Mis 
sissippi,  South  Carolina,  and  Texas. 

March  2.  United  States  Revenue  cutter  Dodge 
seized  at  G-alveston,  Tex.,  by  State  authorities. 

March  2.  Texas  admitted  as  a  member  of  the 
Confederate  States  of  America. 

March  3.  Brig.-General  G.  T.  Beauregard,  C.  S. 
Army,  assumed  command  at  Charleston,  S.  C. 

March  4.  Abraham  Lincoln  inaugurated  as  Presi 
dent  of  the  United  States. 

March  6.  Confederate  Congress  passed  act  for 
the  establishment  of  an  army,  not  to  exceed 
100,000  men,  for  12  months'  service. 

March  7.  Ringgold  Barracks,  Tex.,  abandoned. 

March  7.  Camp  Verde,  Tex.,  abandoned. 

March  11.  Brig.-General  Braxton  Bragg  assumed 
command  of  the  Confederate  forces  in  Florida. 

March  11.  Adoption  of  the  "Constitution  of  the 
Confederate  States  of  America,"  at  Montgomery, 
Ala.,  following  in  general  the  Constitution  of 
the  United  States,  but  prohibiting  the  passage 
of  any  "  law  denying  or  impairing  the  right  of 
property  in  negro  slaves"  ;  prohibiting  "  the  im 
portation  of  negroes  of  the  African  race  from 
any  foreign  country  other  than  the  slave-holding 
States  and  territories  of  the  United  States  of 
America,"  and  giving  to  the  Confederate  Con 
gress  "power  to  prohibit  the  introduction  of 
slaves  from  any  State  not  a  member  of,  or  terri 
tory  not  belonging  to,"  the  Confederacy.  The 
preamble  included  a  declaration  of  the  "sover 
eign  and  independent  character"  of  each  State. 

March  15.  Confederate  Congress  passed  act  au 
thorizing  the  construction  or  purchase  of  ten 
gun-boats. 

April  7.  Reinforcements  for  Fort  Pickens  sailed 
from  New  York. 

April  10.  Second  expedition  for  the  relief  of  Fort 
Sumter  sailed  from  New  York. 

April  11.  Evacuation  of  Fort  Sumter  demanded 
by  General  Beauregard. 

April  12.  Reinforcements  from  Fort  Monroe, 
Va.,  landed  at  Fort  Pickens,  Fla. 

April  12.  Bombardment  of  Fort  Sumter  com 
menced. 

April  13.  Fort  Sumter  surrendered. 

April  14.  Fort  Sumter  evacuated  by  its  garrison 
and  occupied  by  Confederate  troops. 

April  15.  President  Lincoln  issued  a  call  for 
75,000  militia  for  3  months'  service,  and  a 
summons  to  Congress  to  assemble  on  July  4th. 

April  15.  Fort  Macon,  N.  C.,  seized  by  State 
authorities. 

April  16.  FortsCaswell  and  Johnston, N.C.,  seized 
by  State  aiithorities. 

April  17.  Reinforcements  from  New  York  landed 
at  Fort  Pickens,  Fla. 

April  17.  Confederate  President  called  for  32,000 


troops,  and  offered  letters  of  marque  against 
United  States  commerce. 

April  17.  Ordinance  of  secession  adopted  in  Vir 
ginia  by  Convention,  subject  to  popular  vote. 

April  18.  United  States  Armory  at  Harper's  Ferry 
abandoned  and  burned. 

April  19.  President  Lincoln  announced  the 
blockade  of  Southern  ports,  from  South  Carolina 
to  Texas  inclusive. 

April  19.  Conflict  between  U.  S.  troops  and  mob 
in  Baltimore,  Md. 

April  19.  Major-General  Robert  Patterson,  Penn 
sylvania  Militia,  assigned  to  command  over  the 
States  of  Delaware,  Pennsylvania,  and  Maryland, 
and  the  District  of  Columbia. 

April  20.  Expedition  from  Fort  Monroe  to  destroy 
dry-dock  at  Norfolk,  Va. 

April  20.  United  States  Arsenal  at  Liberty,  Mo., 
seized  by  armed  secessionists. 

April  21 .  United  States  Branch  Mint  at  Charlotte, 
N.  C.,  seized  by  State  authorities. 

April  21.  Colonel  Earl  Van  Dorn,  C.  S.  Army, 
assumed  command  in  Texas. 

April  22.  United  States  Arsenal  at  Fayetteville, 
N.  C.,  seized  by  State  authorities. 

April  23.  Fort  Smith,  Ark.,  seized  by  State  au 
thorities. 

April  23.  United  States  army  officers  at  San  An 
tonio,  Tex.,  seized  as  prisoners  of  war. 

April  23.  Company  of  8th  U.  S.  Infantry  (Lee's) 
captured  near  San  Antonio,  Tex. 

April  23.  Captain  Nathaniel  Lyon,  U.  S.  Army, 
assumed  temporary  command  of  the  Department 
of  the  West. 

April  23.  Major-General  Robert  E.  Lee  assigned 
to  the  command  of  the  forces  of  Virginia. 

April  26.  Major-General  Joseph  E.  Johnston,  Vir 
ginia  Volunteers,  assigned  to  command  of  the 
State  forces  in  and  about  Richmond,  Va. 

April  27.  Blockade  of  Virginia  and  North  Caro 
lina  ports  announced. 

April  27.  Major-General  Robert  Patterson,  Penn 
sylvania  Militia,  assigned  to  command  of  the 
Department  of  Pennsylvania. 

April  27.  Brig.-General  B.  F.  Butler,  Massachu 
setts  Militia,  assigned  to  command  of  the 
Department  of  Annapolis. 

April  27.  Colonel  J.  K.  F.  Mansfield,  U.  S.  Army, 
assigned  to  command  of  the  Department  of 
Washington. 

April  27.  Colonel  T.  J.  Jackson,  Virginia  Volun 
teers,  assigned  to  command  at  Harper's  Ferry. 

May  1.  Volunteer  forces  called  for  by  the  Gov 
ernor  of  Virginia. 

May  3.  Additional  forces  called  for  in  Virginia. 

May  3.  President  Lincoln  issued  call  for  volun 
teers  to  serve  three  years  ;  ordered  the  regular 
army  to  be  increased,  and  directed  the  enlist 
ment  of  additional  seamen. 

May  4.  Colonel  G.  A.  Porterfield,  Virginia  Vols., 
assigned  to  command  in  Northwestern  Virginia. 

May  6.  Ordinance  of  secession  adopted  in  Ar 
kansas. 

May  6.  Confederate  Congress  passed  act  "rec 
ognizing  the  existence  of  war  between  the 
United  States  and  the  Confederate  States,  and 


PRELIMINARY   EYENTS. 


concerning  letters  of  marque,  prizes,  and  prize 
goods." 

May  7.  Tennessee  entered  into  military  league 
with  the  Confederate  States. 

May  7.  Arlington  Heights,  Va.,  occupied  by  Vir 
ginia  troops. 

May  7.  Virginia  admitted  as  a  member  of  the 
Confederate  States  of  America. 

May  9.  Exchange  of  shots  between  U.  S.  steamer 
Yankee  and  the  batteries  at  Gloucester  Point,  Va. 

May  10.  Major-General  Robert  E.  Lee  assigned 
to  command  of  Confederate  forces  in  Virginia. 

May  10.  Camp  Jackson,  St.  Louis,  Mo.,  captured 
by  U.  S.  forces  under  Captain  Nathaniel  Lyon. 

May  11.  Riot  in  St.  Louis,  Mo. 

May  11.  Brig.-General  W.  S.  Harney,  U.  S.  Army, 
resumed  command  of  the  Department  of  the  West. 

May  13.  Brig.-General  Ben.  McCulloch,C.  S.Army, 
assigned  to  command  in  the  Indian  Territory. 

May  13.  Baltimore  occupied  by  General  Butler. 

May  13.  Major-General  G.  B.  McClellan,  U.  S. 
Army,  assigned  to  command  of  the  Department  of 
Ohio,  including  a  portion  of  West  Virginia. 

May  15.  Brig.-General  J.  E.  Johnston,  C.  S.  Army, 
assigned  to  command  near  Harper's  Ferry.  Va. 

May  15.  Brevet  Major-General  George  Cadwal- 
ader,  Pennsylvania  Militia,  superseded  General 
Butler  in  the  Department  of  Annapolis. 

May  17.  Acts  passed  by  Confederate  Congress 
providing,  upon  certain  conditions,  for  the  ad 
mission  of  North  Carolina  and  Tennessee  as 
members  of  the  Confederate  States  of  America. 

May  18.  Naval  attack  on  batteries  at  Se well's 
Point,  Va. 

May  20.  Ordinance  of  secession  adopted  in  North 
Carolina. 

May  21.  Brig.-General  M.  L.  Bonham,  C.  S. 
Army,  assigned  to  command  on  the  "Alex 
andria  Line,"  Va. 

May  21.  Colonel  J.  B.Magruder,  Provisional  Army 
of  Virginia,  assigned  to  command  at  Yorktown. 

May  21.  Convention  between  General  Harney, 
U.  S.  Army,  and  General  Sterling  Price,  Mis 
souri  State  Guard,  with  a  view  to  the  preserva 
tion  of  order  in  the  State. 

May  22.  Brig.-General  B.  F.  Butler  assigned  to 
command  at  Fort  Monroe,  Va. 

May  23.  Demonstration  against  Hampton,  Va. 

May  23.  Brig.-General  Benj.  Huger,  Virginia  Vol 
unteers,  assigned  to  command  at  Norfolk,  Va. 

May  24.  Resolutions  of  mediation  and  neutrality 
adopted  in  Kentucky. 

May  24.  Union  troops  advanced  into  Virginia  and 
occupied  Arlington  Heights  and  Alexandria. 

May  26-30.  Union  troops  advanced  from  the 
Ohio  River  and  occupied  Grafton,  West  Virginia. 

May  27-29.  Union  troops  advanced  from  Fort 
Monroe  and  occupied  Newport  News,  Va. 

May  28.  Brig.-General  Irvin  McDowell,  U.  S. 
Array,  assumed  command  of  the  Department  of 
Northeastern  Virginia. 

May  31.  Brig.-General  Nathaniel  Lyon  super 
seded  General  W.  S.  Harney  in  command  of  the 
Department  of  the  West. 

May  31.  Naval  attack  on  batteries  at  Aquia 
Creek,  Va. 


June  1.  Skirmishes  at  Arlington  Mills  and  Fair 
fax  Court  House,  Va. 

June  2.  Brig.-General  Beauregard  superseded  Gen 
eral  Bonham  in  command  on  the  "Alexandria 
Line." 

June  3.  Action  at  Philippi,  W.  Va. 

June  5.  Naval  attack  on  batteries  at  Pig  Point,  Va. 

June  6.  Brig.-Geueral  Henry  A.  Wise,  C.  S.  Army, 
ordered  to  command  in  the  Kanawha  Valley, 
W.  Va. 

June  6.  Virginia  State  military  and  naval  forces 
transferred  to  the  Confederate  States. 

June  7.  Confederate  reconnoissance  from  York- 
town  to  Newport  News,  Va. 

June  8.  Brig.-General  R.  S.  Garnett,  C.  S.  Army, 
assigned  to  command  in  Northwestern  Va. 

June  10.  Engagement  at  Big  Bethel,  or  Bethel 
Church,  Va. 

June  10.  Brig.-General  Beauregard  in  command 
of  all  Confederate  forces  in  Prince  William,  Fair 
fax,  and  Loudoun  counties,  Va. 

June  11.  Maj. -General  Cadwalader  superseded 
by  Maj. -General  Banks  in  Department  of  An 
napolis. 

June  13.  Descent  of  Union  troops  upon  Romney, 
W.  Va. 

June  15.  Harper's  Ferry,  Va.,  evacuated  by  Con 
federate  forces. 

Jxine  17.  Engagement  at  Booneville,  Mo. 

June  17.  Action  at  Camp  Cole,  Mo. 

June  17.  Action  at  Vienna,  Va. 

July  2.  General  Patterson's  command  crossed  the 
Potomac  at  Williamsport. 

July  2.  Advance  of  General  George  H.  Thomas's 
command,  and  engagement  at  Falling  Waters,  Va. 

July  5.  Engagement  near  Carthage,  Mo. 

July  8.  Brig^-General  Henry  H.  Sibley,  C.  S. 
Army,  ordered  to  Texas  to  expel  Union  forces 
from  New  Mexico. 

July  9.  Skirmish  at  Vienna,  Va. 

July  10.  Skirmish  at  Laurel  Hill,  W.  Va. 

July  11.  Engagement  at  Rich  Mountain,  W.  Va. 

July  13.  Major-General  Leonidas Polk,  C.  S.  Army, 
assumed  command  of  Department  No.  2,  with 
headquarters  at  Memphis. 

July  13.  Action  at  Carrick's  Ford,  W.  Va. 

July  13.  Surrender  of  Pegram's  Confederate  forces 
in  Western  Virginia. 

July  14.  Brig.-General  H.  R.  Jackson  ordered  to 
command  of  Confederate  forces  in  Western  Va. 

July  15.  Military  forces,  stores,  etc.,  of  Arkansas 
transferred  to  the  Confederate  States. 

July  16.  Union  advance  toward  Manassas,  Va. 

July  17.  Confederate  army  retired  to  the  line  of 
Bull  Run,  Va. 

July  17.  Skirmish  at  Fairfax  Court  House,  Va. 

July  18.  Skirmish  at  Mitchell's  Ford,  Va. 

July  18.  Action  at  Blackburn's  Ford,  Va. 

July  18-21.  Confederate  forces  from  the  Shenan- 
doah  Valley,  under  General  Joseph  E.  Johnston, 
reenforced  the  army  of  General  Beauregard  at 
Manassas,  Va. 

July  20.  Brig.-General  William  W.  Loring,  C.  S. 
Army,  assigned  to  command  of  "Northwestern 
Army"  (Western  Virginia). 

July  21.  Battle  of  Bull  Run,  or  Manassas,  Va. 


ORGANIZATION    OF   THE   TWO   GOVERNMENTS. 


THE    UNITED    STATES    GOVERNMENT. 
I.  THE   BUCHANAN   ADMINISTRATION.      II.   THE   LINCOLN  ADMINISTRATION. 


(1857-1861.) 

President:  JAMES  BUCHANAN*  (Pa.) 
Tice-President :  JOHN  C.  BRECKINRIDGE*  (Ky.) 
Secretary  of  State :  LEWIS  CASS  (Mich.);  JEREMIAH  S. 

BLACK  (Pa.),  appointed  Dec.  17,  i860. 
Secretary  of  War :  JOHN   B.  FLOYD  *  ( Va.) ;  JOSEPH 

HOLT  (Ky.)  fad  interim},  Dec.  31,  1860 ;   regularly  ap 
pointed  Jan.  18,  1861. 

Secretary  of  the  Xary :  ISAAC  TOUCEY  (Conn.) 
Secretary  of  the  Treasury:  HOWELL  COBB*  (Georgia): 

PHILIP  F.  THOMAS  (Md.),  appointed  Dec.  12,  i860;  JOHN 

A.  Dix  (N.  Y.),  appointed  Jan.  11,  1861. 
Attorney-General:  JEREMIAH  S.  BLACK;  EDWIN  M. 

STAXTON  (Pa.),  appointed  Dec.  20,  i860. 
Secretary  of  the  Interior :  JACOB  THOMPSON*  (Miss.) 
Postmaster- General ' :  AARON  V.  BROWN  (Tenn.),  died 

Mar.  8, 1859 ;  JOSEPH  HOLT  (Ky.),  appointed  Mar.  14, 1859 ; 

HORATIO  KING  (Maine;,  appointed  Feb.  12, 1861. 


(1861-1865.) 

President:  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN  (111.) 

Tice-President:  HANNIBAL  HAMLIN  (Maine). 

Secretary  of  State :  WILLIAM  H.  SEWARD  (New  York). 

Secretary  of  War:  SIMON  CAMERON  (Pa.j;  EDWIN  M. 
STANTON  iPa.i,  appointed  Jan.  15, 1S62. 

Secretary  of  the  Xary:  GIDEON  WELLES  (Conn.) 

Secretary  of  the  Treasury :  SALMON  P.  CHASE  (Oliio) ; 
W.  P.  FESSENDEN  (Maine i,  appointed  July  l,  1864 ;  HUGH 
MCCULLOCH  find.),  appointed  March  7, 1865. 

Secretary  of  the  Interior:  CALEB  B.  SMITH  (Ind.) ; 
JOHN  P.  USHER  (Ind.),  appointed  January  8, 1863. 

Attorney-General :  EDWARD  BATES  (Mo.) ;  JAMES  SPEED 
(Ky.),  appointed  Dec.  2,  1864. 

Postmaster-General:  MONTGOMERY  BLAIR  (Md.) ; 
WILLIAM  DENNISOX  (Ohio),  appointed  September  24, 
1864. 


THE   UNITED   STATES  WAR   DEPARTMENT. 


Secretary  of  War :  JOSEPH  HOLT  (appointed  Jan.  18, 
1861) ;  SIMON  CAMERON  (appointed  March  5, 1861) ;  EDWIN 
M.  STANTON  (appointed  January  15,  1862). 

Assistant  Secretaries  of  War:  THOMAS  A.  SCOTT  (ap 
pointed  Aug.  3,  1861 ;  PETER  H.  WATSON  (appointed  Jan. 
24, 1862):  JOHN  TUCKER  (appointed  Jan.  29, 1862i ;  CHRIS 
TOPHER  P.  WOLCOTT  (appointed  June  12,  1862 ;  resigned 
Jan.  23,  1863);  CHARLES  A.  DANA  (appointed  August, 
1863).  (Colonel  Scott  was  regular!}-  commissioned 
under  the  act  of  August  3,  1861,  authorizing  the  ap 
pointment  of  one  assistant  secretary  of  war.  Sub 
sequently  three  assistant  secretaries  were  authorized 
by  law.) 

Adjutant-General's  Department :  Colonel  SAMUEL 
COOPER*  (resigned  March  7,  1861) ;  Brig.-Gen.  LORENZO 
THOMAS  (assigned  to  other  duty  March  23, 1863) ;  Colonel 
EDWARD  D.  TOWNSEND. 

Quartermaster's  Department :  Brig.-Gen.  JOSEPH  E. 
JOHNSTON*  (resigned  April  22,  1861);  Brig.-Gen.  MONT 
GOMERY  C.  MEIGS. 

Subsistence  Department :  Colonel  GEORGE  GIBSON 
(died  Sept.  29,  1861) ;  Brig.-Gen.  JOSEPH  P.  TAYLOR  (died 
Jan.  29. 1864) ;  Brig.-Gen.  AMOS  B.  EATON. 

Medical  Department:  Colonel  THOMAS  LAWSON  (died 
May  15, 1861) ;  Colonel  CLEMENT  A.  FINLEY  (retired  April 


14, 1862) ;  Brig.-Gen.  WILLIAM  A.  HAMMOND  ;  Brig.-Gen. 
JOSEPH  K.  BARNES  (appointed  Aug.  22, 1864). 

Pay  Department :  Colonel  BENJAMIN  F.  LARNED  (died 
Sept.  6,  1862);  Colonel  TIMOTHY  P.  ANDREWS  (retired 
Xov.  29, 1864) ;  Brig.-Gen.  BENJAMIN  W.  BRICE. 

Corps  of  Topographical  Engineers:  Colonel  JOHN  J. 
ABERT  (retired  Sept.  9, 1861) ;  Colonel  STEPHEN  H.  LONG. 
(This  corps  was  consolidated  with  the  "  Corps  of  En 
gineers,"  under  act  of  March  3, 1863.) 

Corps  of  Engineers :  Brig.-Gen.  JOSEPH  G.  TOTTEN 
(died  April  22,  1864) ;  Brig.-Gen.  RICHARD  DELAFIELD. 

Ordnance  Department:  Colonel  HENRY  K.  CRAIG 
(until  April  23,  1861) ;  Brig.-Gen.  JAMES  W.  RIPLEY  (re 
tired  Sept.  15,  1863);  Brig.-Gen.  GEORGE  D.  RAMSAY 
(retired  Sept.  12,  1864) ;  Brig.-Gen.  ALEXANDER  B.  DYER. 

Bureau  of  Military  Justice:  Major  JOHN  F.  LEE  (re 
signed  Sept.  4,  1862);  Brig.-Gen.  JOSEPH  HOLT. 

Bureau  of  the  Prorost  Marshal  General  (created  by 
act  of  March  3, 1863)  :  Brig.-Gen.  JAMES  B.  FRY. 

General  Officers  of  the  United  States  Army,  January  1, 
1861 :  Brevet  Lieut.-Gen.  WINFIELD  SCOTT  (General-in- 
chiet) ;  Brig.-Generals :  JOHN  E.  WOOL,  DAVID  E. 
TWIGGS,*  WILLIAM  S.  HARNEY.  <NOTE.—  E.  V.  Suinner 
was  promoted  Brigadier-General  March  16,  1861,  vice 
David  E.  Twiggs,  dismissed  March  1, 1861.) 


THE    UNITED    STATES  NAVY   DEPARTMENT. 


-  Secretary  of  the  Naty :  GIDEON  WELLES. 

Assistant  Secretary :  GUSTAVUS  V.  Fox. 

Yards  and  Docks :  Rear-Admiral  JOSEPH  SMITH. 

Ordnance  and  Hydrography :  Captain  GEORGE  A.  MA- 
GRUDER  (dismissed  April  22, 1861 1 ;  Captain  ANDREW  A. 
HARWOOD  (relieved  July  22, 1862) ;  Rear-Admiral  JOHN  A. 
DAHLGREN  (relieved  June  24, 1863) ;  Commander  HENRY 
A.  WISE.  (By  act  of  Congress  of  July  5,  1802,  "  Hydrog 
raphy  "  was  transferred  to  the  Bureau  of  Navigation.) 

Navigation  (established  by  act  of  July  5, 1862) :  Rear- 
Admiral  CHARLES  H.  DAVIS. 

Equipment  and  Recruiting  (established  by  act  of  July 


5,  1862) :  Rear-Admiral  ANDREW  H.  FOOTE  (relieved 
June  3, 1863) ;  Commauder  ALBERT  X.  SMITH. 

Construction,  Equipment,  and  Repair:  Chief  Naval 
Constructor  JOHN  LENTHAI.L.  (By  act  of  July  5,  1862, 
the  "  Equipment  and  Recruiting  "  Bureau  was  organ 
ized,  and  thereafter  the  old  bureau  was  designated  as 
"  Construction  and  Repair.") 

Provisions  and  Clothing :  Pay  Director  HORATIO 
BRIDGE. 

Medicine  and  Surgery :  Surgeon  WILLIAM  WHELAN. 

Steam-Engineerinff  (established  by  act  of  July  5, 1862) : 
Engineer-in-Chief  BENJAMIN  F.  ISHERWOOD. 


Afterward  in  the  Confederate  service. 
5 


ORGANIZATION   OF    THE   TWO   GOVERNMENTS. 


THE    CONFEDERATE    STATES    GOVERNMENT. 

President:  JEFFERSON  DAVIS  (Miss.)    Vice-President:  ALEXANDER  II.  STEPHENS  (Ga.) 


I.   PROVISIONAL   ORGANIZATION. 

(Feb.  8,  1861.) 

Secretary  of  State:  ROBERT  TOO.MBS  (Ga.),  Feb.  21, 
1861 ;  R.  M.  T.  HUNTER,  (Va.)  July  24, 1861. 

Secretary  of  War:  LEROY  P.  WALKER  (Ala.),  Feb.  21, 
1861;  JUDAH  P.  BENJAMIN  (La.),  Sept.  17, 18C1. 

Secretary  of  the  Navy :  STEPHEN  R.  MALLORY  (Fla.), 
Feb.  25, 18(51. 

Secretary  of  the  Treasury :  CHRISTOPHER  G.  MEM- 
MINGER  (S.  C.),  Feb.  21, 1861. 

Attorney-General :  JUDAH  P.  BENJAMIN,  Feb.  25,  1861 ; 
THOMAS  BRAGG,  (Ala.),  Sept.  17, 1861. 

Postmaster-General:  3.  H.  REAGAN  (Texas),  March  6, 
1861. 


II.   REORGANIZATION. 

(Feb.  22,  1862,  to  April,  1865.) 

Secretary  of  State :  R.  M.  T.  HUNTER,  July  24,  1861 ; 
JUDAH  P.  BENJAMIN,  March  17,  1862. 

Secretary  of  War:  JUDAH  P.  BENJAMIN,  Sept.  17,  1861; 
GEORGE  W.  RANDOLPH,  March  17,  1862;  GUSTAVUS  W. 
SMITH,  acting,  Nov.  17,  1862;  JAMES  A.  SEDDON,  Nov. 

20,  1862;  JOHN  C.  BllECKINRIDGE,  Jan.  28,  1865. 

Secretary  of  the  Navy  :  STEPHEN  R.  MALLORY. 

Secretary  of  (he  Treasury:  C.  G.  MEMMINGEK;  GEORGE 
A.  TRENHOLM,  June,  1864. 

Attorney-General :  THOMAS  BRAGG;  THOMAS  II.  WATTS 
(Ala),  March  17, 1862;  GEORGE  DAVIS  (N.  C.),  1864-5. 

Postmaster-General :  JOHN  II.  REAGAN. 


THE    CONFEDERATE    STATES    WAR    DEPARTMENT. 


Secretary  of  War :  (see  above). 

Assistant  Secretary  of  War:  ALBERT  T.  BLEDSOE 
(April  l,  1862) ;  JOHN  A.  CAMPBELL  (October  20, 1862). 

Atljt.  and  Insp.-Gen's  Deju't:  General  SAMUEL  COOPER. 

Quarter  master- General's  Dep't:  Colonel  ABRAM  C. 
MYERS  (March  15, 1861);  Brig.-Gen.  A.  R.  LAWTON  (Aug. 
10,  1863). 

Commissary-General's  Dcp't:  Colonel  Lucius  B  NOR 
THROP  (March  16, 1861) ;  Brig.-Gen.  I.  M.  ST.  JOHN  (Feb 
ruary  16,  1865). 


Ordnance  Dep't :  Brig.-Gen.  JOSIAH  GORG.VS. 

Engineer  Bureau  :  Maj.-Gen.  JEREMY  F.  GILMER. 

Medical  Dep't :  Brig.-Geu.  SAMUEL  P.  MOORE. 

Nitre  and  Mining  Bureau  :  Brig.-Gen.  I.  M.  ST.  JOHN; 
Colonel  RICHARD  MORTON  (Feb.  16, 1865). 

Conscription  'Bureau :  Brig.-Geu.  JOHN  S.  PRESTON, 
Chief ;  Col.  T.  P.  AUGUST,  Supt. 

Prison  Camps:  Brig.-Gen.  JOHN  II.  WINDER. 

Exchange  of  Prisoners :  Col  ROBERT  OULD,  Chief. 

Commissioner  of  Patents:  RUFUS  R.  RHODES. 


THE    CONFEDERATE    STATES    NAVY    DEPARTMENT. 


Secretary  of  the  Navy:  STEPHEN  R.  MALLORY. 

Orders  and  Detail:  Captain  FRENCH  FORREST;  Com 
mander  JOHN  K.  MITCHELL. 

Ordnance  and  Hydrography :  Commander  GEORGE 
MINOR;  Commander  JOHN  M.BROOKE. 


Provisions  and  Clothiny:  Assis't  Surgeon  JOHN  DE 
BREE. 

Medicine  and  Surgery :  Surgeon  W.  A.  W.  SPOTS- 
WOOD. 


GOVERNORS  OF  THE  STATES  DURING  THE  WAR. 


UNION  STATES:  California,  JOHN  G.  DOWNEY 
(1860-1),  LELAND  STANFORD  (1861-3),  FREDERICK  F.  Low 
(1863-8);  Connecticut,  WILLIAM  A.  BUCKINGHAM  (1858-66); 
Delaware,  WILLIAM  BURTON  (1859-63),  WILLIAM  CANNON 
(1863-7) ;  Illinois,  RICHARD  YATES  (1861-5) ;  Indiana, 
OLIVER  P.  MORTON  (1861-7) ;  Iowa,  SAMUEL  J.  KIKKWOOD 
(1860-4),  WILLIAM  M.  STONE  (1864-8);  Kansas,  CHARLES 
ROBINSON  (1861-3),  THOMAS  CARNEY  (1863-5);  Maine,  IS 
RAEL  WASHBURN,  JR.  (1861-3),  ABNER  COBURN  (1863-4), 
SAMUEL  CONY  (1864-7) ;  Massachusetts,  JOHN  A.  ANDREW 
(1861-6) ;  Michigan,  AUSTIN  BLAIR  (1861-4),  HENRY  H. 
CRAPO  (1865-9) ;  Minnesota,  ALEXANDER  RAMSEY  (1859-63), 
STEPHEN  MILLER  (1863-6) ;  Nevada  (State  admitted  1864), 
HENHY  G.  BLASDELL  (1864-71) ;  New  Hampshire,  ICHA- 
BOD  GOODWIN  (1859-61),  NATHANIEL  S.  BERRY  (1861-3), 
JOSEPH  A.  GILMORE  (1863-5) ;  New  Jersey,  CHARLES  S. 
OLDEN  (1860-3),  JOEL  PARKER  (18C3-6) ;  New  Tori;,  EDWIN 
D.  MORGAN  (1859-63),  HORATIO  SEYMOUR  (1863-5),  REU 
BEN  E.  FENTON  (1865-9) ;  Ohio,  WILLIAM  DENNISON 
(18CO-2),  DAVID  TOD  (1862-4),  JOHN  BROUGH  (1864-5) ; 
Oregon,  JOHN  WHITTAKER  (1859-62),  ADDISON  C.  GIBBS 
(1862-6) ;  Pennsylvania,  ANDREW  G.  CURTIN  (1861-7) ; 
Rhode  Island,  WILLIAM  SPUAGUE  (1860-1),  JOHN  R.  BART- 
LETT,  acting  (1861-2),  WILLIAM  C.  COZZENS,  acting  (1863). 
JAMES  Y.  SMITH  (1863-5);  Vermont,  ERASTUS  FAIRBANKS 
(1860-1),  FREDERIC  HOLBROOK  (1861-3),  J.  GREGORY 
SMITH  (1863-5)  ;  West  Virginia  (admitted  1863),  Provi 
sional  Governor,  FRANCIS  H.  PEIRPOINT  (1861-3),  AR 


THUR  I.  BOREMAN  (1863-9) ;  Wisconsin,  ALEXANDER  W. 
RANDALL  (1857-61),  Louis  P.  HARVEY  (1861-2),  EDWARD 
SALOMON  (1862-3),  JAMES  T.  LEWIS  (1863-6). 

CONFEDERATE  STATES:  Alabama,  ANDREW  B. 
MOORE  (1857-61),  JOHN  GILL  SHORTER  (1861-3),  THOMAS 
H.  WATTS  (1863-5) ;  Arkansas,  HENRY  M.  RECTOR  (1860-3), 
HARRIS  FLANAGIN  (1863-4),  ISAAC  MURPHY  (1864-8); 
Florida,  MADISON  S.  PERRY  (1857-61),  JOHN  MILTON 
(1861-5);  Georgia,  JOSEPH  E.  BROWN  (1857-65) ;  Louisiana, 
THOMAS  O.  MOORE  (1860-4),  HENRY  W.  ALLEN  (1864-5); 
Union  Military  Governors,  GEORGE  F.  SHEPLEY  (1862-4), 
MICHAEL  HAHN  (1864-5) ;  Mississippi,  JOHN  J.  PKTTUS 
(1860-2),  CHARLES  CLARKE  (1863),  JACOB  THOMPSON 
(1863-4) ;  North  Carolina,  JOHN  W.  ELLIS  (1859-61),  H.  T. 
CLARK,  acting  (1861-2),  ZEBULONB.  VANCE  (1862-5);  South 
Carolina,  FRANCIS  W.  PICKENS  (1860-2),  M.  L.  BONHAM 
(1862-4),  A.  G.  MAGRATH  (1864-5);  Tennessee,  ISHAM  G. 
HARRIS  (1857-65),  ANDREW  JOHNSON,  Union  Military 
Governor  (1862-5);  Texas,  SAMUEL  HOUSTON  (1859-61), 
EDWARD  CLARK,  acting  (1861),  FRANCIS  R.  LUBBOCK 
1861-3),  PENDLETON  HURRAH  (1863-5) ;  Virginia,  JOHN 
LETCHER  (1860-4),  WILLIAM  SMITH,  (1864-5). 

BORDER  STATES :  Kentucky,  BERIAH  MAGOFFIN 
(1859-62),  JAMES  F.  ROBINSON  (1862-3) ;  THOMAS  E.  BRAM- 
LETTE  (1863-7) ;  Maryland,  THOMAS  H.  HICKS  (1857-61), 
A.  W.  BRADFORD  (1861-5) ;  Missouri,  C.  F.  JACKSON  (1861) ; 
Union,  H.  R.  GAMBLE  (1861-4),  T.  C.  FLETCHER  (1864-8). 


N.  B. —  The  Confederate  Government  of  Kentucky  was  provisional  in  its  character.  George  W.  Johnson  was 
elected  Governor  by  the  Russellville  Convention  in  November,  1861.  He  served  until  he  was  killed  in  action  at 
the  battle  of  Shiloh.  Richard  Hawes  was  elected  by  the  Provisional  Council  of  Kentucky  to  succeed  him,  and 
acted  as  the  Confederate  Provisional  Governor  of  Kentucky  from  1862  until  the  close  of  the  war.— In  Missouri 
Thomas  C.  Reynolds  was  the  Confederate  Governor  from  1862  to  1865 ;  but  after  1861  a  Confederate  Governor  of 
Missouri  was  little  more  than  a  name.— In  Tennessee,  Governor  Harris  being  ineligible  to  a  fourth  term,  Robert 
L.  Caruthers  was  elected  Governor  in  August,  1863.  Tennessee  and  her  capital  being  then  occupied  by  the  United 
States  forces,  Mr.  Caruthers  was  never  inaugurated,  and  Governor  Harris  held  over  under  the  law. 


UIU7B11SIT7 


THE    CAPITOL 


WASHINGTON    ON  THE    EVE   OF  THE   WAR. 

BY    CHARLES    P.    STONE,    BRIGADIER-GEXEKAL,  U.  S.  V. 

who  knew  Washington  in  the  days  of  December, 
1860,  know  what  thoughts  reigned  in  the  minds  of 
thinking  men.  Whatever  their  daily  occupations,  they 
went  about  them  with  their  thoughts  always  bent  on 
the  possible  disasters  of  the  near  future.  The  country 
was  in  a  curious  and  alarming  condition  :  South  Caro 
lina  had  already  passed  an  ordinance  of  secession,  and 
other  States  were  preparing  to  follow  her  lead.  The 
only  regular  troops  near  the  capital  of  the  country  were 
300  or  400  marines  at  the  marine  barracks,  and  3  offi 
cers  and  53  men  of  ordnance  at  the  Washington  arsenal. 
The  old  militia  system  had  been  abandoned  (without  being  legally  abolished), 
and  Congress  had  passed  no  law  establishing  a  new  one.  The  only  armed  vol 
unteer  organizations  in  the  District  of  Columbia  were  :  The  Potomac  Light 
Infantry,  1  company,  at  Georgetown;  the  National  Rifles,  1  company,  in 
Washington  ;  the  Washington  Light  Infantry,  of  about  160  men,  and  another 
small  organization  called  the  National  Guard  Battalion.  It  had  been  evident 
for  months  that,  on  assembling  in  December,  Congress  would  have  far  dif 
ferent  work  to  consider  than  the  organization  of  the  District  of  Columbia 
militia.  Nor  in  the  delicate  position  of  affairs  would  it  be  the  policy  of  Presi 
dent  Buchanan,  at  the  outset  of  the  session,  to  propose  the  military  organiza 
tion  of  the  Federal  District.  It  was  also  evident  that,  should  he  be  so  disposed, 
the  senators  and  representatives  of  the  Southern  States  would  oppose  and 
denounce  the  project. 

WTiat  force,  then,  would  the  Government  have  at  its  disposal  in  the  Federal 
District  for  the  simple  maintenance  of  order  in  case  of  need  ?  Evidently  but  a 
handful  ;  and  as  to  calling  thither  promptly  any  regular  troops,  that  was  out 
of  the  question,  since  they  had  already  all  been  distributed  by  the  Southern 
sympathizers  to  the  distant  frontiers  of  the  Indian  country,  —  Texas,  L^tah, 
New  Mexico,  Oregon,  and  Washington  Territory.  •&  Months  would  have  been 

ber  31,  1860,  some  changes  of  stations  occurred, 
by  which  the  Department  of  the  East  gained  3  com 
panies  (2  of  artillery  and  1  of  engineers),  so  that 
at  the  end  of  1860  there  were  18  companies  of 
artillery  and  1  of  engineers  serving  east  of  the 
Mississippi  River.  There  were  no  troops  in  the 
neighborhood  of  Washington  during  the  whole  of 
Secretary  Floyd's  term  of  office.  In  the  spring  and 
summer  of  1860  the  force  in  Utah  was  reduced  to 
3  companies  of  dragoons,  3  companies  of  artillery, 
and  4  companies  of  infantry.  The  remainder  (13 
companies  of  infantry  and  2  of  dragoons)  were  sent 
to  New  Mexico,  relieving  1  regiment  of  infantry  al- 
readv  there,  which  thereupon  proceeded  to  Texas. 
Xo  other  changes  of  importance  were  made  during 
the  period  in  question."—  EDITORS. 


•fr  In  December,  1860,  the  military  forces  of  the 
United  States  consisted  of  1108  officers  and  15,- 
259  men  of  the  regular  army;  total,  16,367. 
The  distribution  of  the  army  may  be  inferred 
from  the  map  printed  on  page  8,  and  from  the 
following  "memorandum"  (made  on  the  6th  of 
December,  1875),  by  Adjutant-General  E.  D. 
Townsend,  exhibiting  "  certain  changes  in  the  sta 
tions  of  troops  made  under  the  orders  of  the  Sec 
retary  of  War,  John  B.  Floyd,  during  the  years 
1858-60": 

"  After  the  removal  of  the  troops  to  Kansas 
and  Utah  at  the  close  of  Indian  hostilities  in 
Florida,  in  June,  1858,  there  were  left  in  the  coun 
try  east  of  the  Mississippi  River  10  companies  of 
artillery.  From  that  time  (June,  1858)  till  Decem- 


WASHINGTON  ON  THE  EVE  OF   THE  WAR. 


necessary  to  concentrate  at  Washington,  in  that  season,  a  force  of  three 
thousand  regular  troops.  Even  had  President  Buchanan  been  desirous  of  bring 
ing  troops  to  the  capital,  the  feverish  condition  of  the  public  mind  would,  as 
the  executive  believed,  have  been  badly  affected  by  any 
movement  of  the  kind,  and  the  approaching  crisis  might 
have  been  precipitated.  I  saw  at  once  that  the  only  force 
which  could  be  readily  made  of  service  was  a  volunteer 
force  raised  from  among  the  well-disposed  men  of  the  Dis 
trict,  and  that  this  must  be  organized,  if  at  aU,  under  the 
old  law  of  1799.  By  consultation  with  gentlemen  well 
acquainted  with  the  various  classes  of  Washington  society, 
I  endeavored  to  learn  what  proportion  of  the  able-bodied 
population  could  be  counted  on  to  sustain  the  Government 
should  it  need  support  from  the  armed  and  organized 
citizens. 

On  the  31st  of  December,  1860,  Lieutenant-General 
Scott,  General-in-Chief  of  the  army  (who  had  his  head 
quarters  in  New  York),  was  in  Washington.  The  Presi 
dent,  at  last  thoroughly  alarmed  at  the  results  of  continued 
concessions  to  secession,  had  summoned  him  for  consulta 
tion.  On  the  evening  of  that  day  I  went  to  pay  my  respects 
to  my  old  commander,  and  was  received  by  him  at  Worm- 
ley's  hotel.  He  chatted  pleasantly  with  me  for  a  few 
minutes,  recalling  past  service  in  the  Mexican  war,  etc. ; 
and  when  the  occasion  presented  itself,  I  remarked  that 
I  was  glad  to  see  him  in  good  spirits,  for  that  proved  to 
me  that  he  took  a  more  cheerful  view  of  the  state  of  public 
affairs  than  he  had  on  his  arrival  —  more  cheerful  than  we 
of  Washington  had  dared  to  take  during  the  past  few  days. 
"  Yes,  my  young  friend,"  said  the  general,  "  I  feel  more 
cheerful  about  the  affairs  of  the  country  than  I  did  this 
morning ;  for  I  believe  that  a  safer  policy  than  has  hith 
erto  been  followed  will  now  be  adopted.  The  policy  of 
entire  conciliation,  which  has  so  far  been  pursued,  would 
soon  have  led  to  ruin.  We  are  now  in  such  a  state  that  a 
policy  of  pure  force  would  precipitate  a  crisis  for  which  we 
are  not  prepared.  A  mixed  policy  of  force  and  concilia 
tion  is  now  necessary,  and  I  believe  it  will  be  adopted  and 
carried  out."  He  then  looked  at  his  watch,  rose,  and  said : 
'"  I  must  be  with  the  President  in  a  quarter  of  an  hour," 
and  ordered  his  carriage.  He  walked  up  and  down  the 
dining-room,  but  suddenly  stopped  and  faced  me,  saying : 
"  How  is  the  feeling  in  the  District  of  Columbia  f  What 
proportion  of  the  population  would  sustain  the  Govern 
ment  by  force,  if  necessary  ? " 

u  It  is  my  belief,  General,"  I  replied,  "  that  two-thirds  of 


UNIFORM    OF   THE    NATIONAL 
RIFLES.    FROM  A  PHOTOGRAPH. 


UNIFORM    OF    THE    POTOMAC 

LIGHT    INFANTRY. 
FROM    A    PHOTOGRAPH. 


IO 


WASHINGTON  ON  THE  EI/E  OF  THE  WAR. 


WINFIELD    SCOTT,    BREVET    LIEUTENANT-GENERAL,    U.  8.  A.       FROM   A   PHOTOGRAPH. 

General  Scott  was  General-in-Chief  of  the  army  until  November  1, 1861,  when  he  was  placed  upon  the 

retired  list  on  his  own  application,  and  was  succeeded  Ity  Major-General  George  B.  McClellau. 

He  died  at  West  Point  in  May,  1866,  in  his  eightieth  year. 

the  fighting;  stock  of  this  population  would  sustain  the  Government  in  defend 
ing  itself,  if  called  upon.  But  they  are  uncertain  as  to  what  can  be  done  or 
what  the  Grovernment  desires  to  have  done,  and  they  have  no  rallying-point." 
The  general  walked  the  room  again  in  silence.  The  carriage  came  to  the 
door,  and  I  accompanied  him  toward  it.  As  he  was  leaving,  he  turned  sud 
denly,  looked  me  in  the  face,  placed  his  hand  on  my  shoulder,  and  said : 


WASHINGTON  ON  THE  EVE  OF  THE  WAR. 


1 1 


"These  people  have  no  rallying -point.  Make  yourself  that  rallying  - 
point ! " 

The  next  day  I  was  commissioned  by  the  President  colonel  in  the  staff  and 
Inspector-General  of  the  District  of  Columbia.  I  was  mustered  into  the  service 
of  the  United  States  from  the  2d  day  of  January,  1861,  on  the  special  requisi 
tion  of  the  General-in-Chief,  and  thus  was  the  first  of  two  and  a  half  millions 
called  into  the  mili 
tary  service  of   the 
Government  to   de 
fend  it  against  seces 
sion. 

I  immediately  en 
tered  upon  my  duties, 
commencing  by  in 
spections  in  detail  of 
the  existing  organi 
zations  of  volunteers. 
The  Potomac  Light 
Infantry  company, 
of  Georgetown,  I 
found  fairly  drilled, 
well  armed,  and, 
from  careful  infor 
mation,  it  seemed  to 
me  certain  that  the  majority  of  its  members  could  be  depended  upon  in  case 
of  need,  but  not  all  of  them. 

On  the  2d  of  January,  I  met,  at  the  entrance  of  the  Metropolitan  Hotel, 
Captain  Schaeffer,  of  the  "  National  Rifles "  of  Washington,  and  I  spoke  to 
him  about  his  company,  which  was  remarkable  for  drill.  Schaeffer  had  been 
a  lieutenant  in  the  Third  United  States  Artillery,  and  was  an  excellent  drill- 
master. 

He  had  evidently  not  yet  heard  of  my  appointment  as  Inspector-General, 
and  he  replied  to  my  complimentary  remarks  on  his  company : 

"  Yes,  it  is  a  good  company,  and  I  suppose  I  shall  soon  have  to  lead  it  to 
the  banks  of  the  Susquehanna  ! " 

"  Why  so  ?  "  I  asked. 

"  Why !  To  guard  the  frontier  of  Maryland  and  help  to  keep  the  Yankees 
from  coming  down  to  coerce  the  South ! " 

I  said  to  him  quietly  that  I  thought  it  very  imprudent  in  him,  an  employee 
of  the  Department  of  the  Interior  and  captain  of  a  company  of  District  of 
Columbia  volunteers,  to  use  such  expressions.  He  replied  that  most  of  his 
men  were  Marylanders,  and  would  have  to  defend  Maryland.  I  told  him  that 
he  would  soon  learn  that  he  had  been  imprudent,  and  advised  him  to  think 
more  seriously  of  his  position,  but  did  not  inform  him  of  my  appointment, 
which  he  would  be  certain  to  learn  the  following  morning  from  the  newspapers. 

It  must  be  admitted  that  this  was  not  a  very  cheerful  beginning. 


HEADQUARTERS    OF    GENERAL   WINFIELI)    SCOTT,    WASHINGTON. 
FROM    A    WAR-TIME    SKETCH. 


12 


WASHINGTON  ON   THE  EVE  OF  THE  WAR. 


THE    WASHINGTON    ARSENAL.       FROM    A    WAR-TIME    PHOTOGRAPH. 


On  inspecting  the  "  National  Rifles,"  I  found  that  Schaeffer  had  more  than 
100  men  on  his  rolls,  and  was  almost  daily  adding  to  the  number,  and  that  he 
had  a  full  supply  of  rifles  with  200  rounds  of  ball  cartridges,  two  mountain 

howitzers  with  harness 
and  carriages,  a  supply 
of  sabers  and  of  revolv 
ers  and  ammunition,  ah1 
drawn  from  the  United 
States  arsenal.  I  went 
to  the  Chief  of  Ordnance, 
to  learn  how  it  was  that 
this  company  of  riflemen 
happened  to  be  so  un 
usually  armed ;  and  I 
found  at  the  Ordnance 
Office  that  an  order  had 
been  given  by  the  late 
Secretary  of  War  (John 
B.  Floyd)  directing  the 
Chief  of  Ordnance  to  cause  to  be  issued  to  Captain  Schaeffer  "all  the 
ordnance  and  ordnance  stores  that  he  might  require  for  his  company ! n 
I  ascertained  also  that  Floyd  had  nominated  Captain  Schaeffer  to  the 
President  for  the  commission  of  major  in  the  District  of  Columbia  militia, 
and  that  the  commission  had  already  been  sent  to  the  President  for  his 
signature. 

I  immediately  presented  the  matter  to  the  new  Secretary  of  War  (Joseph 
Holt),  and  procured  from  him  two  orders, —  one,  an  order  to  the  Chief  of 
Ordnance  to  issue  no  arms  to  any  militia  or  volunteers  in  the  District  of 
Columbia  unless  the  requisition  should  be  countersigned  by  the  Inspector- 
General;  the  other,  an  order  that  all  commissions  issued  to  officers  of  the 
District  of  Columbia  should  be  sent  to  the  Inspector-General  for  delivery. 

An  office  was  assigned  me  in  the  War  Department,  convenient  to  the  army- 
registers  and  near  the  Secretary  of  War,  who  kindly  gave  orders  that  I  should 
at  all  times  be  admitted  to  his  cabinet  without  waiting,  and  room  was  made 
for  me  in  the  office  of  Major-General  Weightman,  the  senior  major-general 
of  the  District,  where  each  day  I  passed  several  hours  in  order  to  confer 
with  him,  and  to  be  able  promptly  to  obtain  his  authority  for  any  necessary 
order. 

The  Washington  Light  Infantry  organization  and  the  National  Guard  were 
old  volunteers  composed  of  Washington  people,  and  were  almost  to  a  man 
faithful  to  the  Government.  Of  their  officers,  Major-General  Weightman, 
though  aged,  and  Major-General  Force,  aged  and  infirm,  were  active,  and 
true  as  steel ;  Brigadier-Generals  Bacon  and  Carrington  were  young,  active, 
and  true.  Brigadier-General  Robert  Ould,  who  took  no  part  in  the  preparations 
of  the  winter,  joined  the  Confederates  as  soon  as  Virginia  passed  her  ordinance 
of  secession,  and  his  known  sentiments  precluded  consultation  with  him. 


WASHINGTON  ON  THE  EVE  OF   THE  WAR. 


Having  thus  studied  the  ground,  and  taken  the  first  necessary  steps  toward 
security,  I  commenced  the  work  of  providing  a  force  of  volunteers.  I 
addressed  individual  letters  to  some  forty  well-known  and  esteemed  gentle 
men  of  the  District,  informing  each  one  that  it  would  be  agreeable  to  the 
Government  should  he  in  his  neighborhood  raise  and  organize  a  company  of 
volunteers  for  the  preservation  of  order  in  the  District.  To  some  of  these  let 
ters  I  received  no  replies ;  to  some  I  received  replies  courteously  declining 
the  service ;  to  some  I  received  letters  sarcastically  declining ;  but  to  many 
I  received  replies  enthusiastically  accepting  the  service.  In  about  six  weeks 
thirty-three  companies  of  infantry  and  riflemen  and  two  troops  of  cavalry 
were  on  the  lists  of  the  District  volunteer  force ;  and  all  had  been  uniformed, 
equipped,  and  put  under  frequent  drill. 

The  Northern  Liberties  fire  companies  brought  their  quota ;  the  Lafayette 
Hose  Company  was  prompt  to  enroll ;  the  masons,  the  carpenters,  the  stone 
cutters,  the  painters,  and  the  German  timiers  responded:  each  corporation 
formed  its  companies  and  drilled  industriously.  Petty  rivalries  disappeared, 
and  each  company  strove  to  excel  the  others  in  drill  and  discipline.  While 
the  newly  organized  companies  thus  strove  to  perfect  themselves,  the  older 
organizations  resumed  their  drills  and  filled  their  ranks  with  good  recruits. 

The  National  Bines  company  (Captain  Schaeffer's)  was  carefully  observed, 
and  it  was  found  that  its  ranks  received  constant  accessions,  including  the 
most  openly  declared  secessionists  and  even  members  of  Congress  from  the 
Southern  States.  This  company  was  very  frequently  drilled  in  its  armory, 
and  its  recruits  were  drilled  nearly  every  night. 

Having,  as  Inspector-General,  a  secret  service  force  at  my  disposition,  I 
placed  a  detective  in  the  company,  and  had  regular  reports  of  the  proceed 
ings  of  its  captain.  He  was  evidently  pushing  for  an  independent  command 
of  infantry,  artillery,  and  cavalry,  having  his  rifles,  cannon,  sabers,  and  revolv 
ers  stored  in  his  armory.  He  also  began  to  prepare  for  action,  ordering  his 
men  to  take  their  rifles  and  equipments  home  with  them,  with  a  supply 
of  ammunition,  so  that  even  should  his  armory  be  occupied,  they  could 
assemble  on  short  notice,  ready  for  action.  Meantime,  his  commission  as 
major  was  signed  by  the  President  and  sent  to  me. 

I  reported  these  matters  to  General  Scott,  who  ordered  me  to  watch  these 
proceedings  carefully,  and  to  be  ready  to  suppress  any  attempt  at  violence ; 

but  to  avoid,  if  pos 
sible,  any  shock,  for, 
said  he,  "We  are  now 
in  such  a  state  that  a 
dog-fight  might  cause 
the  gutters  of  the 
capital  to  run  with 
blood." 

While  the  volunteer 
force  for  the  support 


THE    COLUMBIAN    AEMORY,    WASHINGTON.        FROM    A    WAR-TIME    SKETCH. 


Of       the 


WASHINGTON  ON   THE  E^E  OF   THE  WAR. 


was  organizing,  another  force  with  exactly  the  opposite  purpose  was  in  course 
of  formation.  I  learned  that  the  great  hall  over  Beach's  livery  stable  was  nightly 
filled  with  men  who  were  actively  drilled.  Doctor  B ,  of  well-known  seces 
sion  tendencies,  was  the  moving  spirit  of  these  men,  and  he  was  assisted  by 
other  citizens  of  high  standing,  among  whom  was  a  connection  of  Governor 
Letcher  of  Virginia.  The  numbers  of  these  occupants  of  Beach's  hall  increased 
rapidly,  and  I  found  it  well  to  have  a 
skillful  New  York  detective  officer,  who 
had  been  placed  at  my  disposition,  en 
rolled  among  them.  These  men  called 
themselves  "National  Volunteers,"  and 
in  their  meetings  openly  discussed  the 
seizure  of  the  national  capital  at  the 
proper  moment.  They  drilled  industri 
ously,  and  had  regular  business  meetings, 
full  reports  of  which  were  regularly  laid 
before  me  every  following  morning  by 
"  the  New  York  member."  In  the  meet 
ing  at  which  the  uniform  to  be  adopted 
was  discussed,  the  vote  was  for  gray  Ken 
tucky  jeans,  with  the  Maryland  button. 

A  Cautious   member   Suggested   that  they    JOSEPH  HOLT.  SECRETARY  OK  WAR  FROM  DEC.  31, 

must  remember  that,  in  order  to  procure   : 

arms,  it  would  be  "  necessary  to  get  the  requisition  signed  by  '  Old  Stone/ 
and  if  he  saw  that  they  had  adopted  the  Maryland  button,  and  not  that  of 
the  United  States,  he  might  suspect  them  and  refuse  the  issue  of  arms ! " 

Doctor  B supported  the  idea  of  the  Maryland  button,  and  said  that,  if 

Stone  refused  the  arms,  the  Governor  of  Virginia  would  see  them  furnished, 
etc.  These  gentlemen  probably  little  thought  that  a  full  report  of  their 
remarks  would  be  read  the  next  morning  by  "  Old  Stone "  to  the  General- 
in-Chief. 

The  procuring  of  arms  was  a  difficult  matter  for  them,  for  it  required  the 
election  of  officers,  the  regular  enrolling  of  men,  the  certificate  of  elections, 
and  the  muster-rolls,  all  to  be  reported  to  the  Inspector-General.  The  subject 
was  long  discussed  by  them,  and  it  was  finally  arranged  that,  out  of  the  360 
men,  a  pretended  company  should  be  organized,  officers  elected,  and  the 
demand  for  arms  made.  This  project  was  carried  out,  and  my  member 
brought  to  me  early  the  next  morning  the  report  of  the  proceedings,  inform 
ing  me  that  Doctor  B—  -  had  been  elected  captain,  and  would  call  on  the 

Inspector-General  for  arms.     Sure  enough  Doctor  B presented  himself  in 

my  office  and  informed  me  that  he  had  raised  a  company  of  volunteers,  and 
desired  an  order  for  arms.  He  produced  a  certificate  of  election  in  due  form. 
I  received  him  courteously,  and  informed  him  that  I  could  not  give  an  order 
for  arms  without  having  a  muster-roll  of  his  men,  proving  that  a  full  one 
hundred  had  signed  the  rolls.  It  was  desirable  to  have  the  names  of  men 
holding  such  sentiments  and  nursing  such  projects  as  were  known  to  be  theirs. 


WASHINGTON  ON   THE  EYE  OF   THE  WAR.  15 

He  returned,  I  think,  on  the  following  day,  with  a  muster-roll  in  due  form, 
containing  the  names  of  one  hundred  men.  This  was  all  that  I  wanted.  I 
looked  him  full  in  the  face,  smiled,  and  locked  the  muster-roll  in  a  drawer  of 
my  desk,  saying : 

"  Doctor  B ,  I  am  very  happy,  to  have  obtained  this  list,  and  I  wish  you 

good-morning." 

The  gallant  doctor  evidently  understood  me.  He  smiled,  bowed,  and  left  the 
office,  to  which  he  never  returned.  He  subsequently  proved  the  sincerity  of  his 
principles  by  abandoning  his  pleasant  home  in  Washington,  his  large  and  valu 
able  property,  and  giving  his  earnest  service  to  the  Confederate  cause.  The 
"  National  Volunteer  "  organization  broke  up  without  further  trouble. 

Xext  came  the  turn  of  Captain  Schaeffer.  He  entered  my  office  one  day 
with  the  air  of  an  injured  man,  holding  in  his  hand  a  requisition  for  anus  and 
ammunition,  and  saying,  that,  on  presenting  it  at  the  Ordnance  Office,  he  had 
been  informed  that  no  arms  could  be  issued  to  him  without  my  approval.  I 
informed  him  that  that  was  certainly  correct,  and  that  the  order  of  the  Sec 
retary  of  War  was  general.  I  told  him  that  he  had  already  in  his  possession 
more  rifles  than  were  required  for  a  company,  and  that  he  could  have  no  more. 
He  then  said,  sulkily,  that  with  his  company  he  could  easily  take  the  arms 
he  wanted.  I  asked  him,  "  Where  ? "  and  he  replied : 

"  You  have  only  four  soldiers  guarding  the  Columbian  armory,  where  there 
are  plenty  of  arms,  and  those  four  men  could  not  prevent  my  taking  them." 

"Ah!"  I  replied,  "in  what  part  of  the  armory  are  those  arms  kept?"  He 
said  they  were  on  the  upper  floor,  which  was  true. 

"  Well,"  said  I,  "  you  seem  to  be  well  informed.  If  you  think  it  best,  just 
try  taking  the  arms  by  force.  I  assure  you  that  if  you  do  you  shall  be  fired 
on  by  150  soldiers  as  you  come  out  of  the  armory." 

The  fact  was,  that  only  two  enlisted  men  of  ordnance  were  on  duty  at  the 
Columbian  armory,  so  feeble  was  the  military  force  at  the  time.  But  Barry's 
battery  had  just  arrived  at  the  Washington  arsenal,  and  on  my  application 
General  Scott  had  ordered  the  company  of  sappers  and  miners  at  West  Point 
to  come  to  Washington  to  guard  the  armory ;  but  they  had  not  yet  arrived. 
The  precautions  taken  in  ordering  them  were  thus  clearly  proved  advisable. 

The  time  had  evidently  come  to  disarm  Captain  Schaeffer ;  and  when  he 
reached  his  office  after  leaving  mine,  he  found  there  an  order  directing  him  to 
deposit  in  the  Columbian  armory,  before  sunset  on  that  day,  the  two  howitz 
ers  with  their  carnages  which  he  had  in  his  possession,  as  weU  as  the  sabers 
and  revolvers,  as  these  weapons  formed  no  part  of  the  proper  armament  of  a 
company  of  riflemen.  He  was  taken  by  surprise,  and  had  not  time  to  call 
together  men  enough  to  resist ;  so  that  nothing  was  left  to  him  but  to  comply 
with  the  order.  He  obeyed  it,  well  knowing  that  if  he  did  not  I  was  prepared 
to  take  the  guns  from  his  armory  by  means  of  other  troops. 

Having  obeyed,  he  presented  himself  again  in  my  office,  and  before  he  had 
time  to  speak  I  informed  him  that  I  had  a  commission  of  major  for  his  name. 
He  was  much  pleased,  and  said :  "  Yes,  I  heard  that  I  had  been  appointed." 
I  then  handed  him  a  slip  of  paper  on  which  I  had  written  out  the  form  of 


i6 


WASHINGTON  ON   THE  EVE  OF  THE  WAR. 


oath  which  the  old  law  required  to  be  taken  by  officers,  that  law  never  having 
been  repealed,  and  said  to  him  : 

"  Here  is  the  form  of  oath  you  are  to  take.     You  will  find  a  justice  of  the 

peace  on  the  next 
floor.  Please  qualify, 
sign  the  form  in  du 
plicate,  and  bring 
both  to  me.  One  will 
be  filed  with  your  let 
ter  of  acceptance,  the 
other  will  be  filed  in 
the  clerk's  office  of  the 
Circuit  Court  of  the 
District." 

He  took  the  paper 
with  a  sober  look,  and 
stood  near  my  table 
several  minutes  look 
ing  at  the  form  of 
oath  and  turning  the 
paper  over,  while  I, 
apparently  very  busy 
with  my  papers,  was 
observing  him  closely. 
I  then  said : 

"Ah,  Schaeffer,  have 
you  already  taken  the 
oath?" 

"  No,"  said  he. 

"  Well,  please  be 
quick  about  it,  as  I 
have  no  time  to 
spare." 

He    hesitated,   and 
said  slowly : 

"  In  ordinary  tunes 
I  would  not  mind  tak 
ing  it,  but  in  these 
times  - 

"Ah  ! "  said  I,  "  you 

JAMES    BUCHANAN,    PRESIDENT    OF    THE   UNITED    STATES    FROM    MARCH    4,    1857,  declill6    tO  aCC6pt  VO11T 

UNTIL    MARCH    4,    1861.       FROM    A    PHOTOGRAPH.  ^ 

commission  of  major. 
Very  well ! "  and  I  returned  his  commission  to  the  drawer  and  locked  it  in. 

"  Oh,  110,"  said  Schaeffer,  "  I  want  the  commission." 

"  But,  sir,  you  cannot  have  it.  Do  you  suppose  that,  in  these  times,  which 
are  not,  as  you  say,  '  ordinary  times,'  I  would  think  of  delivering  a  commission 


WASHINGTON  ON    THE  EVE  OF  THE  WAR. 


of  field-officer  to  a  man  who  hesitates  about  taking  the  oath  of  office  ?  Do 
you  think  that  the  Government  of  the  United  States  is  stupid  enough  to  allow 
a  man  to  march  armed  men  about  the  Federal  District  under  its  authority, 
when  that  man  hesitates  to  take  the  simple  oath  of  office  ?  No,  sir,  you  can 
not  have  this  commission ;  and  more  than  that,  I  now  inform  you  that  you 
hold  no  office  in  the  District  of  Colum 
bia  volunteers." 

"  Yes,  I  do ;  I  am  captain,  and  have 
my  commission  as  such,  signed  by  the 
President  and  delivered  to  me  by  the 
ma  j  or-general." 

"  I  am  aware  that  such  a  paper  was 
delivered  to  you,  but  you  failed  legally 
to  accept  it." 

"I  wrote  a  letter  of  acceptance  to 
the  adjutant-general,  and  forwarded 
it  through  the  major-general." 

"  Yes,  I  am  aware  that  you  did  ;  but 
I  know  also  that  you  failed  to  inclose 
in  that  letter,  according  to  law,  the 
form  of  oath  required  to  accompany 
all  letters  of  acceptance;  and  on  the 
register  of  the  War  Department,  while 
the  issuance  of  your  commission  is 
recorded,  the  acceptance  is  not  re 
corded.  You  have  never  legally  ac 
cepted  your  commission,  and  it  is  now 
too  late.  The  oath  of  a  man  who 
hesitates  to  take  it  will  not  now  be 
accepted." 

So  Captain  Schaeffer  left  the  "Na 
tional  Kifles,"  and  with  him  left  the 
secession  members  of  the  company.  I  induced  quite  a  number  of  true  men  to 
join  its  ranks ;  a  new  election  was  ordered,  and  a  strong,  loyal  man  (Lieu 
tenant  Smead  of  the  2d  Artillery)  was  elected  its  captain.  Smead  was 
then  on  duty  in  the  office  of  the  Coast  Survey,  and  I  easily  procured  from 
the  War  Department  permission  for  him  to  accept  the  position. 

If  my  information  was  correct,  the  plan  had  been  formed  for  seizing  the 
public  departments  at  the  proper  moment  and  obtaining  possession  of  the  seals 
of  the  Government.  Schaeffer's  part,  with  the  battalion  he  was  to  form,  was 
to  take  possession  of  the  Treasury  Department  for  the  benefit  of  the  new  Pro 
visional  Government.  Whatever  may  have  been  the  project,  it  was  effectually 
foiled.  With  the  breaking  up  of  the  "  National  Volunteers  " ;  with  the  trans 
formation  of  the  secession  company  of  "  National  Eifles"  into  a  thoroughly 
faithful  and  admirably  drilled  company  ready  for  the  service  of  the  Govern 
ment  ;  with  the  arrival  from  West  Point  of  the  company  of  sappers  and 


CHARLES    P.     STONE,     BRIGADIER-GENERAL,    TJ.  8.  V. 
FROM    A    PHOTOGRAPH. 


VOL.  I.     2 


1 8  WASHINGTON  ON  THE  EVE  OF  THE  WAR. 

miners,  and,  later,  the  arrival  of  the  Military  Academy  battery  under  Griffin ; 
and  with  the  formation  in  the  District  of  thirty  new  companies  of  infantry 
and  riflemen  from  among  the  citizens  of  Washington  and  Georgetown,  the 
face  of  things  in  the  capital  had  much  changed  before  the  4th  of  March. 

I  must  now  go  back  a  little  in  time,  to  mention  one  fact  which  will  show  in 
how  weak  and  dangerous  a  condition  our  Government  was  in  the  latter  part  of 
January  and  the  early  part  of  February,  1861.  The  invitations  which  I  had 
issued  for  the  raising  of  companies  of  volunteers  had,  as  already  stated,  been 
enthusiastically  responded  to,  and  companies  were  rapidly  organized.  The 
preparatory  drills  were  carried  on  every  night,  and  I  soon  found  that  the  men 
were  sufficiently  advanced  to  receive  their  arms.  I  began  to  approve  the 
requisitions  for  arms ;  but,  to  my  great  astonishment,  the  captains  who  first 
received  the  orders  came  back  to  me,  stating  that  the  Ordnance  Department 
had  refused  to  issue  any  arms !  On  referring  to  the  Ordnance  Office,  I  was 
informed  by  the  Chief  of  Ordnance  that  he  had  received,  the  day  before,  an 
order  not  to  issue  any  arms  to  the  District  of  Columbia  troops,  and  that  this 
order  had  come  from  the  President ! 

I  went  immediately  to  the  Secretary  of  War  (Mr.  Holt)  and  informed  him 
of  the  state  of  affairs,  telling  him  at  the  same  time  that  I  did  not  feel  disposed 
to  be  employed  in  child's  play,  organizing  troops  which  could  not  be  armed, 
and  that  unless  the  order  in  question  should  be  immediately  revoked  there 
was  no  use  for  me  in  my  place,  and  that  I  must  at  once  resign.  Mr.  Holt  told 
me  that  I  was  perfectly  right ;  that  unless  the  order  should  be  revoked  there 
was  no  use  in  my  holding  my  place,  and  he  added,  with  a  smile,  "  and  I  will 
also  say,  Colonel,  there  will  be  no  use  in  my  holding  my  place  any  longer.  Go 
to  the  President,  Colonel,  and  talk  to  him  as  you  have  talked  to  me." 

I  went  to  the  White  House,  and  was  received  by  Mr.  Buchanan.  I  found 
him  sitting  at  his  writing-table,  in  his  dressing-gown,  wearied  and  worried. 

I  opened  at  once  the  subject  of  arms,  and  stated  the  necessity  of  immediate 
issue,  as  the  refusal  of  arms  would  not  only  stop  the  instruction  of  the  volun 
teers,  which  they  needed  sadly,  but  would  make  them  lose  all  confidence  in 
the  Government  and  break  up  the  organizations.  I  closed  by  saying  that, 
while  I  begged  his  pardon  for  saying  it,  in  case  he  declined  to  revoke  his 
order  I  must  ask  him  to  accept  my  resignation  at  once. 

Mr.  Buchanan  was  evidently  in  distress  of  mind,  and  said : 

"  Colonel,  I  gave  that  order  acting  on  the  advice  of  the  District  Attorney, 
Mr.  Robert  Ould." 

"  Then,  Mr.  President,"  I  replied,  "  the  District  Attorney  has  advised  your 
Excellency  very  badly." 

"  But,  Colonel,  the  District  Attorney  is  an  old  resident  of  Washington,  and 
he  knows  all  the  little  jealousies  which  exist  here.  He  tells  me  that  you  have 
organized  a  company  from  the  Northern  Liberty  Fire  Company." 

"  Not  only  one,  but  two  excellent  companies  in  the  Northern  Liberty,  your 
Excellency." 

"And  then,  the  District  Attorney  tells  me  you  have  organized  another  com 
pany  from  among  the  members  of  the  Lafayette  Hose  Company." 


m 


FROM    AX    AMBROTYPE    TAKEN    FOE    MABCTTS    L.   WARD    (AFTERWARD    GOVERNOR    OF    NEW   JERSEY)    DT 
SPRINGFIELD,    ILL.,    MAY    20,    1860,    TWO    DAYS    AFTER    MR.  LINCOLN'S    FIRST    NOMINATION. 


20  WASHINGTON  ON    THE  El/E  OF  THE  WAR. 

"  Yes,  your  Excellency,  another  excellent  company." 

"And  the  District  Attorney  tells  me,  Colonel,  that  there  is  a  strong  feeling 
of  enmity  between  those  fire  companies,  and,  if  arms  are  put  in  their  hands, 
there  will  be  danger  of  bloodshed  in  the  city." 

"  Will  your  Excellency  excuse  me  if  I  say  that  the  District  Attorney  talks 
nonsense,  or  worse,  to  you  !  If  the  Northern  Liberties  and  the  Lafayette  Hose 
men  wish  to  fight,  can  they  not  procure  hundreds  of  arms  in  the  shops  along 
the  avenue  ?  Be  assured,  Mr.  President,  that  the  people  of  this  District  are 
thinking  now  of  other  things  than  old  ward  feuds.  They  are  thinking 
whether  or  not  the  Government  of  the  United  States  is  to  allow  itself  to 
crumble  out  of  existence  by  its  own  weakness.  And  I  believe  that  the 
District  Attorney  knows  that  as  well  as  I  do.  If  the  companies  of  volunteers 
are  not  armed,  they  will  disband,  and  the  Government  will  have  nothing  to 
protect  it  in  case  of  even  a  little  disturbance.  Is  it  not  better  for  the  public 
peace,  your  Excellency,  even  if  the  bloody  feud  exists  (which  I  believe  is  for 
gotten  in  a  greater  question), —  is  it  not  better  to  have  these  men  organized 
and  under  the  discipline  of  the  Government  ?  " 

The  President  hesitated  a  moment,  and  then  said : 

"I  don't  know  that  you  are  not  right,  Colonel;  but  you  must  take  the 
responsibility  on  you  that  no  bloodshed  results  from  arming  these  men." 

I  willingly  accepted  this  responsibility.  The  prohibitory  order  was  revoked. 
My  companies  received  their  arms,  and  made  good  use  of  them,  learning  the 
manual  of  arms  in  a  surprisingly  short  time.  Later,  they  made  good  use  of 
them  in  sustaining  the  Government  which  had  furnished  them  against 
the  faction  which  soon  became  its  public  enemy,  including  Mr.  Robert 
Ould,  who,  following  his  convictions  (no  doubt  as  honestly  as  I  was 
following  mine),  gave  his  earnest  services  to  his  State  against  the  Federal 
Government. 

I  think  that  the  country  has  never  properly  appreciated  the  services  of 
those  District  of  Columbia  volunteers.  It  certainly  has  not  appreciated  the 
difficulties  surmounted  in  their  organization.  Those  volunteers  were  citizens  of 
the  Federal  District,  and  therefore  had  not  at  the  time,  nor  have  they  ever  had 
since,  the  powerful  stimulant  of  State  feeling,  nor  the  powerful  support  of  a 
State  government,  a  State's  pride,  a  State  press  to  set  forth  and  make  much 
of  their  services.  They  did  their  duty  quietly,  and  they  did  it  well  and  faith 
fully.  Although  not  mustered  into  the  service  and  placed  on  pay  until  after  the 
fatal  day  when  the  flag  was  fired  upon  at  Sumter,  yet  they  rendered  great  ser 
vice  before  that  time  in  giving  confidence  to  the  Union  men,  to  members  of 
the  national  legislature,  and  also  to  the  President  in  the  knowledge  that  there 
was  at  least  a  small  force  at  its  disposition  ready  to  respond  at  any  moment  to 
his  call.  It  should  also  be  remembered  of  them,  that  the  first  troops  mustered 
into  the  service  were  sixteen  companies  of  these  volunteers  ;  and  that,  during 
the  dark  days  when  Washington  was  cut  off  from  communication  with  the 
North,  when  railway  bridges  were  burned  and  tracks  torn  up,  when  the  Poto 
mac  was  blockaded,  these  troops  were  the  only  reliance  of  the  Government 
for  guarding  the  public  departments,  for  preserving  order  and  for  holding 


WASHINGTON  ON   THE  El/E  OF  THE  WAR. 


21 


the  bridges  and  other  outposts ;  that  these  were  the  troops  which  recovered 
possession  of  the  railway  from  Washington  to  Annapolis  Junction  and  made 
practicable  the  reopening  of  communications.  They  also  formed  the  advance 
guard  of  the  force  which  first  crossed  the  Potomac  into  Virginia  and  captured 
the  city  of  Alexandria. 

Moreover,  these  were  the  troops  which  insured  the  regular  inauguration  on 
the  steps  of  the  Capitol  of  the  constitutionally  elected  President.  I  firmly 

believe  that  without  them  Mr.  Lincoln 
would  never  have  been  inaugurated.  I 
believe  that  tumults  would  have  been  cre 
ated,  during  which  he  would  have  been 
killed,  and  that  we  should  have  found  our 
selves  engaged  in  a  struggle,  without  prep 
aration,  and  without  a  recognized  head 
at  the  capital.  In  this  I  may  be  mistaken, 
of  course,  as  any  other  man  may  be  mis 
taken  ;  but  it  was  then  my  opinion,  when 
I  had  many  sources  of  information  at  my 
command,  and  it  remains  my  opinion  now, 
when,  after  the  lapse  of  many  years  and 
a  somewhat  large  experience,  I  look  back 
in  cool  blood  upon  those  days  of  political 
madness. 

One  day,  after  the  official  declaration  of 
the  election  of  Mr.  Lincoln,  my  duties 
called  me  to  the  House  of  Kepresenta- 
tives ;  and  while  standing  in  the  lobby  waiting  for  the  member  with  whom 
I  had  business,  I  conversed  with  a  distinguished  officer  from  New  York.  We 
were  leaning  against  the  sill  of  a  window  which  overlooked  the  steps  of  the 
Capitol,  where  the  President-elect  usually  stands  to  take  the  oath  of  office. 
The  gentleman  grew  excited  as  we  discussed  the  election  of  Mr.  Lincoln,  and 
pointing  to  the  portico  he  exclaimed : 

"  He  will  never  be  inaugurated  on  those  steps ! " 

"Mr.  Lincoln,"  I  replied,  "has  been  constitutionally  elected  President  of  the 
United  States.  You  may  be  sure  that,  if  he  lives  until  the  fourth  day  of 
March,  he  will  be  inaugurated  on  those  steps." 

As  I  spoke,  I  noticed  for  the  first  time  how  perfectly  the  wings  of  the  Capi 
tol  flanked  the  steps  in  question ;  and  on  the  morning  of  the  4th  of  March  I 
saw  to  it  that  each  window  of  the  two  wings  was  occupied  by  two  riflemen. 

I  received  daily  numerous  communications  from  various  parts  of  the  coun 
try,  informing  me  of  plots  to  prevent  the  arrival  of  the  President-elect  at  the 
capital.  These  warnings  came  from  St.  Louis,  from  Chicago,  from  Cincin 
nati,  from  Pittsburgh,  from  New  York,  from  Philadelphia,  and  especially  from 
Baltimore.  Every  morning  I  reported  to  General  Scott  on  the  occurrences  of 
the  night  and  the  information  received  by  the  morning's  mail ;  and  every 
evening  I  rendered  an  account  of  the  day's  work  and  received  instructions  for 


HANNIBAL    HAMMN,    VICE-PRESIDENT    OF    THE 

UNITED    STATES  FROM    MARCH  4,  1861,   TO 

MARCH  4,   1865.      FROM  A  PHOTOGRAPH. 


22 


WASHINGTON  ON  THE  El/E  OF  THE  WAR. 


the  night.  General  Scott  also  received  numerous  warnings  of  danger  to  the 
President-elect,  which  he  would  give  me  to  study  and  compare.  Many  of  the 
communications  were  anonymous  and  vague.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  many 
were  from  calm  and  wise  men,  one  of  whom  became,  shortly  afterward,  a  cabi 
net  minister; 
one  was  a 
railway  presi 
dent,  another 
a  distinguish 
ed  ex-gover 
nor  of  a  State, 
etc.  In  every 
case  where 
the  indica 
tions  were 
distinct,  they 
werefollowed 
up  to  learn  if 
real  danger 
existed. 

So  many 
clear  indica 
tions  pointed 
to  Baltimore, 

that  three  good  detectives  of  the  New  York  police  force  were  constantly  em 
ployed  there.  These  men  reported  frequently  to  me,  and  their  statements 
were  constantly  compared  with  the  information  received  from  independent 
sources. 

Doubtless,  Mr.  Lincoln,  at  his  home  in  Springfield,  111.,  received  many  and 
contradictory  reports  from  the  capital,  for  he  took  his  own  way  of  obtaining 
information.  One  night,  between  11  o'clock  and  midnight,  while  I  was  busy 
in  my  study  over  the  papers  of  the  day  and  evening,  a  card  was  brought  to 
me,  bearing  the  name  "  Mr.  Leonard  Swett,"  and  upon  it  was  written  in  the 
well-known  hand  of  General  Scott,  "  Colonel  Stone,  Inspector-General,  may 
converse  freely  with  Mr.  Swett."  Soon  a  tall  gentleman  of  marked  features 
entered  my  room.  At  first  I  thought  it  was  Mr.  Lincoln  himself,  so  much,  at 
first  glance,  did  Mr.  Swett's  face  resemble  the  portraits  I  had  seen  of  Mr.  Lin 
coln,  and  so  nearly  did  his  height  correspond  with  that  attributed  to  the 
President-elect.  But  I  quickly  found  that  the  gentleman's  card  bore  his  true 
name,  and  that  Mr.  Swett  had  come  directly  from  Mr.  Lincoln,  having  his  full 
confidence,  to  see  for  him  the  state  of  affairs  in  Washington,  and  report  to 
him  in  person. 

Mr.  Swett  remained  several  days  in  the  capital,  had  frequent  and  long  con 
versations  with  General  Scott  and  myself  (arid  I  suppose  also  with  many 
others),  and  with  me  visited  the  armories  of  some  of  the  volunteer  companies. 
As  he  drove  with  me  to  the  railway  station  on  his  departure,  Mr.  Swett  said : 


SOUTH    OK    GARDEN    SIDE    OF    THE    WHITE    HOUSE.—  TREASURY    BUILDING    IN     THE    DISTANCE. 


WASHINGTON  ON  THE  El/E  OF  THE  WAR.  23 

"  Mr.  Lincoln,  and  in  fact  almost  everybody,  is  ignorant  of  the  vast  amount 
of  careful  work  which  has  been  done  here  this  winter,  by  General  Scott  and 
yourself,  to  insure  the  existence  of  the  Government  and  to  render  certain  and 
safe  the  inauguration  of  Mr.  Lincoln.  He  will  be  very  grateful  to  both." 

I  replied,  with  more  sincerity  than  tact : 

"  Mr.  Lincoln  has  no  cause  to  be  'grateful  to  me.  I  was  opposed  to  his  elec 
tion,  and  believed  in  advance  that  it  would  bring  on  what  is  evidently  coming, 
a  fearful  war.  The  work  which  I  have  done  has  not  been  done  for  him,  and 
he  need  feel  under  no  obligations  to  me.  I  have  done  my  best  toward  saving 
the  Government  of  the  country  and  to  insure  the  regular  inauguration  of  the 
constitutionally  elected  President  on  the  4th  of  next  month." 

As  President  Lincoln  approached  the  capital,  it  became  certain  that  desper 
ate  attempts  would  be  made  to  prevent  his  arriving  there.  To  be  thoroughly 
informed  as  to  what  might  be  expected  in  Baltimore,  I  directed  a  detective  to 
be  constantly  near  the  chief  of  police  and  to  keep  up  relations  with  him ; 
while  two  others  were  instructed  to  watch,  without  the  knowledge  and 
independent  of  the  chief  of  police.  The  officer  who  was  near  the  chief  of 
police  reported  regularly,  until  near  the  last,  that  there  was  no  danger  in  Bal 
timore  ;  but  the  others  discovered  a  band  of  desperate  men  plotting  for  the 
destruction  of  Mr.  Lincoln  during  his  passage  through  the  city,  and  by  affilia 
ting  with  them,  these  detectives  obtained  the  details  of  the  plot. 

Mr.  Lincoln  passed  through  Baltimore  in  advance  of  the  time  announced 
for  the  journey  (in  accordance  with  advice  given  by  me  to  Mr.  Seward  and 


THE    WHITE    HOUSE    AT    NIGHT. 


WASHINGTON  ON   THE  El^E  OF  THE  WAR. 


INAUGURATION  OF  ABRAHAM    LINCOLN,   MARCH  4,   1861.     PROCESS    REPRODUCTION  OF  AN  IMPERFECT  PHOTOGRAPH. 

which  was  carried  by  Mr.  Frederick  W.  Seward  to  Mr.  Lincoln),  and  arrived 
safe  at  Washington  on  the  morning  of  the  day  he  was  to  have  passed  through 
Baltimore.  But  the  plotting  to  prevent  his  inauguration  continued ;  and  there 
was  only  too  good  reason  to  fear  that  an  attempt  would  be  made  against  his 
life  during  the  passage  of  the  inaugural  procession  from  Willard's  hotel,  where 
Mr,  Lincoln  lodged,  to  the  Capitol. 

On  the  afternoon  of  the  3d  of  March,  General  Scott  held  a  conference  at 
his  headquarters,  there  being  present  his  staff,  General  Sumner,  and  myself, 
and  then  was  arranged  the  programme  of  the  procession.  President 
Buchanan  was  to  drive  to  "Willard's  hotel,  and  call  upon  the  President-elect. 
The  two  were  to  ride  in  the  same  carriage,  between  double  files  of  a  squadron 
of  the  District  of  Columbia  cavalry.  The  company  of  sappers  and  miners 
were  to  march  in  front  of  the  presidential  carriage,  and  the  infantry  and  rifle 
men  of  the  District  of  Columbia  were  to  follow  it.  Riflemen  in  squads  were 
to  be  placed  on  the  roofs  of  certain  commanding  houses  which  I  had  selected, 


WASHINGTON  ON   THE  EVE  OF  THE  WAR.  25 

along  Pennsylvania  Avenue,  with  orders  to  watch  the  windows  on  the  oppo 
site  side  and  to  fire  upon  them  in  case  any  attempt  should  be  made  to  fire  from 
those  windows  on  the  presidential  carriage.  The  small  force  of  regular  cav 
alry  which  had  arrived  was  to  guard  the  side-street  crossings  of  Pennsylvania 
Avenue,  and  to  move  from  one  to  another  during  the  passage  of  the  proces 
sion.  A  battalion  of  District  of  Columbia  troops  were  to  be  placed  near  the 
steps  of  the  Capitol,  and  riflemen  in  the  windows  of  the  wings  of  the  Capitol. 
On  the  arrival  of  the  presidential  party  at  the  Capitol,  the  troops  were  to  be 
stationed  so  as  to  return  in  the  same  order  after  the  ceremony. 

To  illustrate  the  state  of  uncertainty  in  which  we  were  at  that  time  con 
cerning  men,  I  may  here  state  that  the  lieutenant-colonel,  military  secretary 
of  the  General-in-Chief,  who  that  afternoon  recorded  the  conclusions  of  the 
General  in  conference,  and  who  afterward  wrote  out  for  me  the  instructions 
regarding  the  disposition  of  troops,  resigned  his  commission  that  very  night, 
and  departed  for  the  South,  where  he  joined  the  Confederate  army. 

During  the  night  of  the  3d  of  March,  notice  was  brought  me  that  an 
attempt  would  be  made  to  blow  up  the  platform  on  which  the  President 
would  stand  to  take  the  oath  of  office.  I  immediately  placed  men  under 
the  steps,  and  at  daybreak  a  trusted  battalion  of  District  troops  (if  I  remem 
ber  rightly,  it  was  the  National  Guard,  under  Colonel  Tait)  formed  in  a  semi 
circle  at  the  foot  of  the  great  stairway,  and  prevented  all  entrance  from 
without.  When  the  crowd  began  to  assemble  in  front  of  the  portico,  a  large 
number  of  policemen  in  plain  clothes  were  scattered  through  the  mass  to 
observe  closely,  to  place  themselves  near  any  person  who  might  act  suspi 
ciously,  and  to  strike  down  any  hand  which  might  raise  a  weapon. 

At  the  appointed  hour,  Mr.  Buchanan  was  escorted  to  Willard's  hotel, 
which  he  entered.  There  I  found  a  number  of  mounted  "  marshals  of  the 
day,"  and  posted  them  around  the  carriage,  within  the  cavalry  guard.  The 
two  Presidents  were  saluted  by  the  troops  as  they  came  out  of  the  hotel  and 
took  their  places  in  the  carriage.  The  procession  started.  During  the  march 
to  the  Capitol  I  rode  near  the  carriage,  and  by  an  apparently  clumsy  use  of 
my  spurs  managed  to  keep  the  horses  of  the  cavalry  in  an  uneasy  state,  so 
that  it  would  have  been  very  difficult  for  even  a  good  marksman  to  get  an  aim 
at  one  of  the  inmates  of  the  carriage  between  the  prancing  horses. 

After  the  inaugural  ceremony,  the  President  and  the  ex-President  were 
escorted  in  the  same  order  to  the  White  House.  Arrived  there,  Mr.  Buchanan 
walked  to  the  door  with  Mr.  Lincoln,  and  there  bade  him  welcome  to  the 
House  and  good-morning.  The  infantry  escort  formed  in  line  from  the  gate 
of  the  White  House  to  the  house  of  Mr.  Quid,  whither  Mr.  Buchanan  drove, 
and  the  cavalry  escorted  his  carriage.  The  infantry  line  presented  arms  to 
the  ex-President  as  he  passed,  and  the  cavalry  escort  saluted  as  he  left  the 
carriage  and  entered  the  house.  Mr.  Buchanan  turned  on  the  steps,  and  grace 
fully  acknowledged  the  salute.  The  District  of  Columbia  volunteers  had  given 
to  President  Lincoln  his  first  militarv  salute  and  to  Mr.  Buchanan  his  last. 


-If^.  »;«^ 

i-    ---Cr!i^3y_-  ~ 

':, 


FORT    M'REE. 


THE         ( 
THE     BAR.        FROM 


FORT    PICKEN8,    SANTA    ROSA    ISLAND. 


WITH   SLEMMER   IN   PENSACOLA   HARBOR. 

BY  J.   II.  OILMAN,   BREVET   LIEUTENANT-COLONEL,   U.   S.   A.  | 

'NTERING  Pensacola  Harbor  from  the  Gulf  of  Mexico,  one  sees 
as  he  crosses  the  bar,  immediately  to  his  left,  Fort  McRee  on 
the  mainland,  or  west  shore  of  the  bay,  and  to  his  right  Fort 
Pickens  on  the  western  extremity  of  Santa  Rosa  Island,  which 
is  about  forty  miles  in  length,  nearly  parallel  to  the  shore 
of  the  mainland,  and  separated  from  it  by  Pensacola  Bay. 
On  the  mainland,  directly  opposite  Fort  Pickens,  about  a 
mile  and  a  half  from  it  and  two  miles  north-east  of  Fort 
McRee,  stands  Fort  Barrancas,  and,  now  forming  a  part  of  it, 

\  the  little  old  Spanish  fort,  San  Carlos  de  Barrancas.  About 
a  mile  and  a  half  east  of  this  is  the  village  of  Warrington, 
T«°  adjoining  the  Navy  Yard,  and  seven  miles  farther  up  the 
NAVYYARO.  FROM  A  SKETCH  hay  is  the  town  of  Pensacola.  Near  Fort  Barrancas,  and 

FROM   LIFE   BY  WILLIAM   WAUD. 

between  it  and  the  Navy  Yard,  is  the  post  of  Barrancas 
Barracks,  and  there,  in  January,  1861,  was  stationed  Company  G,  1st 
United  States  Artillery,  the  sole  force  of  the  United  States  army  in  the  har 
bor  to  guard  and  hold,  as  best  it  might,  the  property  of  the  United  States. 
The  captain  of  this  company,  John  H.  Winder  (afterward  brigadier-general 
in  the  Confederate  army,  and  widely  known  in  connection  with  the  military 
prisons  in  the  South),  and  the  senior  first  lieutenant,  A.  R.  Eddy,  were  absent 

4  Lieut.  Slemmer's  report  says  of  Lieut.  Gilman :  "  During  the  whole  affair  we  have  stood  side  by  side, 
and  if  any  credit  is  due  for  the  course  pursued,  he  is  entitled  [to  it]  equally  with  myself."— EDITORS. 


26 


WITH  SLEMMER  IN  PENSACOLA  HARBOR.  27 

on  leave,  and  the  only  officers  with  it  were  First  Lieutenant  Adam  J.  Slemmer 
and  the  writer  of  this  sketch, —  then  the  second  lieutenant  of  the  company, 
who,  by  virtue  of  that  high  rank,  was  also  the  post  treasurer,  post  quarter 
master,  post  commissary,  and  post  adjutant. 

With  the  new  year,  1861,  came  to  us  at  that  quiet  little  post  the  startling 
news  of  the  seizure  of  United  States  property  at  various  points  by  State  troops, 
and  by  January  7th  rumors,  to  us  still  more  startling,  reached  our  ears,  to  the 
effect  that  the  Navy  Yard  and  forts  in  Pensacola  Harbor  were  to  be  seized  by 
troops  already  preparing,  in  Florida  and  Alabama,  to  march  against  us.  As 
yet  no  orders  had  come  to  Lieutenant  Slemmer  for  his  guidance  in  this  emer 
gency,  and,  as  may  be  imagined,  we  had  frequent  conversations  as  to  what 
should  or  could  properly  be  done.  As  it  would  be  useless  to  attempt  to  hold 
Barrancas,  the  occupation  of  Fort  Pickens  was  suggested  and  considered;  but 
Lieutenant  Slemmer,  thinking  that  he  would  not  be  justified  in  changing  his 
station  without  authority,  decided  to  remain  where  he  was. 

On  January  8th  the  first  step  indicating  to  outsiders  an  intention  on  our 
part  to  resist  was  taken,  by  the  removal  of  the  powder  from  the  Spanish 
fort  to  Fort  Barrancas,  where  on  the  same  night  a  guard  was  placed  with 
loaded  muskets.  It  was  none  too  soon,  for  about  midnight  a  party  of  twenty 
men  came  to  the  fort,  evidently  with  the  intention  of  taking  possession, 
expecting  to  find  it  unoccupied  as  usual.  Being  challenged  and  not  answer 
ing  nor  halting  when  ordered,  the  party  was  fired  upon  by  the  guard  and  ran 
in  the  direction  of  Warrington,  their  footsteps  resounding  on  the  plank  walk 
as  the  long  roll  ceased  and  our  company  started  for  the  fort  at  double-quick. 
This,  I  believe,  was  the  first  gun  in  the  war  fired  on  our  side. 

Next  day,  January  9th,  an  order  came  from  General  Scott  to  Lieutenant 
Slemmer  to  do  all  in  his  power  to  prevent  the  seizure  of  the  public  property 
and  to  cooperate  with  Commodore  James  Armstrong  at  the  yard.  The  latter 
received  orders  on  the  same  day  to  cooperate  with  the  army;  but  he  was  already 
so  greatly  under  the  influence  of  Captain  Ebenezer  Farrand  and  other  seces 
sionist  officers  of  his  command  that  he  dared  not  take  any  very  active  part  in 
aiding  us,  not  even  so  far  as  to  let  us  have  the  marines,  as  he  had  promised. 
The  excitement  at  the  yard  and  in  the  village  of  Warrington  was  intense  and 
was  increasing  daily,  and  the  commodore  was  nearly  distracted.  He  was 
desirous  of  doing  his  duty,  and  apparently  saw  it  clearly  while  we  were  with 
him ;  but  as  soon  as  we  left,  became  demoralized,  and  was  thwarted  in  his 
plans  by  his  own  officers  and  others  about  him,  who  advised  and  warned  him 
not  to  inaugurate  civil  war  and  bloodshed  by  aiding  us  in  what  they  called 
the  mad  scheme  of  resisting  the  State  authorities. 

Fearing  that,  as  soon  as  the  determination  to  occupy  Pickens  became 
known,  attempts  would  be  made  to  prevent  it,  Lieutenant  Slemmer  decided 
to  move  at  once,  and  the  commodore  promised  to  have  the  Wyandotte  at 
Barrancas  to  take  us  across  at  1  P.  M.  that  day.  She  did  not  come,  however, 
and  we  had  to  visit  the  commodore  twice  more  that  day  to  counteract  the 
influence  of  those  about  him.  The  steamer  was  again  promised  at  5  P.  M., 
but  did  not  arrive  until  next  morning.  In  a  large  flat-boat  or  scow,  and 


28 


WITH  SLEMMER  IN  PENSACOLA  HARBOR. 


several  small  boats  loaded  with  our  men,  provisions,  brass  field-pieces,  ammu 
nition,  tools,  and  whatever  public  property  was  most  needed  and  could 
be  carried,  including,  I  remember,  an  old  mule  and  cart  (which  afterward 
proved  of  great  service  to  us),  we  were  towed  over  to  Pickens  and  landed  there 
about  10  A.  M.  January  10th,  1861,  the  day  that  Florida  seceded  from  the  Union. 
Lieutenant  Slemmer's  family  and  mine  were  sent  on  board  the  storeship 
Supply,  on  which,  a  few  days  later,  they  sailed  for  New  York.  All  our  men 


This  map  shown  the  Union  and  Confederate  batteries  as  they  existed  May  27,  1861.    The  shore  batteries  were 

constructed  by  the  Confederates  after  Slemmer's  crossing  to  Fort  Pickens.    Two  other  Union  batteries 

near  Fort  Pickens— batteries  Scott  and  Totten  — were  added  after  the  date  of  this  map. 

were  compelled  to  leave  behind  more  or  less  personal  property,  those  who 
were  married  leaving  their  houses  and  families  as  they  were.  Under  such  cir 
cumstances,  when  so  many  inducements  were  held  out  for  men  to  desert,  and 
when  so  many  men  in  higher  places  failed,  it  speaks  well  for  their  character, 
loyalty,  and  discipline  that  none  of  our  men  deserted.  No  company  of  men 
could  work  better  or  with  more  enthusiasm,  and  they  were  not  at  all  disposed 
to  give  information  to  those  outside.  The  day  before  we  left,  a  civilian,  visit 
ing  the  post  to  see  what  news  he  could  gather,  asked  one  of  them :  "  What  is 
all  this  stir  about  I  You  men  are  not  going  to  fight,  are  you  ?  "  "  Faith,  you 
needn't  ask  me;  I'm  not  the  man  that  gives  orders  here!"  "What  are  they 
moving  these  gun-carriages  out  for?"  "Well,  sir,  I  hear  they  are  to  be 
painted  to-morrow."  "  How  many  men  are  there  here  now  ?  "  "  Sure,  I'm 
not  the  baker,  and  don't  know  how  many  he  bakes  for." 

Next  to  the  commodore,  the  most  thoroughly  excited  and  demoralized  man 
I  saw  was  our  old  Spanish  friend,  Francisco  Gromez,  who  was  well  known  in 
all  that  region,  and  had  long  lived  in  a  little  cottage  just  in  front  of  the  bar 
racks.  He  was  the  friend  of  all  army  officers,  but  his  hero  was  General  Jack 
son,  and  his  great  delight  was  to  spin  yarns  to  us  about  Jackson's  capture  of 
Pensacola  from  the  British.  Gomez  was  a  true  "original  Jackson  man," 


WITH  SLEMMER  IN  PENSACOLA  HARBOR.  29 

having  as  a  youth  seen  him  at  Pensacola.  The  morning  we  left,  I  met  him 
walking  to  and  fro  in  front  of  his  cottage,  and  said:  "Good-bye,  Mr.  Gomez; 
you  must  take  care  of  things  here  now ! "  He  replied,  with  upturned  eyes, 
;'  My  God  !  My  God !  it  is  awful;  nothing  can  be  saved;  we  shall  all  be  killed 
-everything  destroyed.  I  am  afraid  to  say  anything.  How  I  wish  General 
Jackson  was  here."  And  the  old  man  straightened  himself  up  as  if  the  mere 
mention  of  the  name  gave  him  strength  and  courage. 

On  the  12th  we  saw  the  flag  at  the  Navy  Yard  lowered,  and  then  knew  that 
it  had  been  quietly  and  tamely  surrendered.  Seeing  our  flag  thus  lowered  to 
an  enemy  caused  intense  excitement  and  emotion,  a  mingled  feeling  of  shame, 
anger,  and  defiance.  Not  yet  having  a  flag-staff  up,  we  hung  our  flag  over 
the  north-west  bastion  of  the  fort,  that  all  might  see  "  that  our  flag  was  still 
there."  The  Supply  (Captain  Henry  Walke)  immediately  hoisted  extra  flags, 
and  soon  after  was  towed  out  of  the  harbor  by  the  Wyandotte  (Captain  O.  H. 
Berryman).  "With  the  capture  of  the  Navy  Yard  everything  on  shore  fell  into 
the  enemy's  hands,  including  the  large  fine  dry  dock — the  workshops,  material, 
and  supplies  of  all  sorts.  Fortunately,  the  Supply  and  Wyandotte,  the  only 
United  States  vessels  in  the  harbor,  were  commanded  by  loyal  men,  and 
were  saved. 

We  now  felt  sure  that  an  attack  on  the  fort  would  not  long  be  delayed. 
The  enemy  was  in  possession  of  everything  on  the  mainland,  and  Fort 
Pickens  alone  was  left,  and  it  was  in  a  very  dilapidated  condition,  not  having 
been  occupied  since  the  Mexican  war.  We  numbered,  all  told,  including  the 
30  ordinary  seamen,  only  81  men.  Our  first  attention  was  given  to  the  flank 
casemate  guns,  loading  with  grape  and  canister  such  as  could  be  worked, 
and  at  other  points  closing  the  embrasures. 

Just  before  sundown  that  evening,  four  gentlemen  landed,  and  demanded 
of  the  corporal  on  guard,  outside  the  gate,  admittance  to  the  fort  as  "  citizens 
of  Florida  and  Alabama."  Lieutenant  Slemmer  and  myself  went  to  the  gate 
and  found  Mr.  Abert,  civil  engineer  of  the  yard,  whom  we  knew  very  well, 
and  three  officers,  strangers  to  us,  whom  he  introduced  as  Captain  Randolph, 
Major  Marks,  and  Lieutenant  Rutledge.  Captain  Randolph  said :  "  We  have 
been  sent  by  the  governors  of  Florida  and  Alabama  to  demand  a  peaceable 
surrender  of  this  fort."  Lieutenant  Slemmer  replied:  "I  am  here  by  authority 
of  the  President  of  the  United  States,  and  I  do  not  recognize  the  authority 
of  any  governor  to  demand  the  surrender  of  United  States  property, —  a 
governor  is  nobody  here."  One  of  them  exclaimed  sharply :  "  Do  you  say  the 
governor  of  Florida  is  nobody,  the  governor  of  Alabama  nobody  ? "  Lieu 
tenant  Slemmer  replied :  "  I  know  neither  of  them,  and  I  mean  to  say  that 
they  are  nothing  to  me."  They  soon  left,  the  conference  being  very  short. 

The  next  night  (the  13th)  a  small  party  of  armed  men  was  discovered  near 
the  fort  by  our  patrol,  and  a  few  shots  were  fired.  We  had  little  fear  of  an 
attack  by  day,  but  had  every  reason  to  expect  a  night  attack,  an  attempt  to 
surprise  us  and  carry  the  place  by  storm.  All  the  men  had  to  work  by  day 
mounting  guns,  preparing  fire-balls,  hand-grenades,  etc.,  and  by  night  do 
picket  or  patrol  duty  or  stand  by  the  guns.  They  were  nearly  tired  out 


WITH  SLEMMER  IN  PENSACOLA  HARBOR. 


CONFEDERATE    WATER    BATTERY    NEAR    WARRINGTON,    PENSACOLA    HARBOR. 
FROM    A    WAR-TIME    PHOTOGRAPH    CAPTURED    AT    MOBILE    IN    18C4    BY    ADMIRAL    FARRAGUT. 

with  hard  work  and  want  of  sleep,  not  having  had  a  night's  rest  since  the 
night  of  January  7th. 

On  the  15th  Colonel  W.  H.  Chase,  commanding  the  enemy's  forces  at  the 
yard  and  Barrancas,  came  over  in  a  small  boat  with  Captain  Farrand  (late 
of  the  United  States  navy,  and  next  in  rank  at  the  yard  to  Commodore 
Armstrong)  and  landed  at  the  Pickens  wharf,  where  Lieutenant  Slemmer 
and  myself  met  them,  and  the  following  conversation  took  place : 

Colonel  Chase :  "  I  have  come  on  business  which  may  occupy  some  time, 
and,  if  you  have  no  objection,  we  had  better  go  inside  to  your  quarters." 

Lieutenant  Slemmer :  "I  have  objections,  and  it  could  hardly  be  expected 
that  I  would  take  you  into  the  fort." 

Colonel  Chase :  "As  I  built  the  fort  and  know  all  its  weak  and  strong  points, 
I  would  learn  nothing  new  by  going  in,  and  had  no  such  object  in  proposing  it." 

Lieutenant  Slemmer :  "I  understand  that  perfectly,  but  it  would  be  improper 
for  me  to  take  you  in;  and,  however  well  you  may  have  known  the  fort  before, 
you  do  not  know  what  it  now  contains,  nor  what  I  have  done  inside." 

Colonel  Chase :  "  That  is  true,  and  I  will  state  my  business  here.  It  is  a 
most  distressing  duty  to  me.  I  have  come  to  ask  of  you  young  officers,  officers 
of  the  same  army  in  which  I  have  spent  the  best  and  happiest  years  of  my  life, 
the  surrender  of  this  fort.  I  would  not  ask  it  if  I  did  not  believe  it  right  and 
necessary  to  save  bloodshed ;  and  fearing  that  I  might  not  be  able  to  say  it 
as  I  ought,  and  in  order,  also,  that  you  may  have  it  in  proper  form,  I  have 
put  it  in  writing  and  will  read  it." 


WITH  SLEMMER  IN  PENSACOLA  HARBOR. 


He  then  took  the  manuscript  from  his  pocket  and  began  to  read,  but,  after 
reading  a  few  lines,  his  voice  shook,  and  his  eyes  filled  with  tears.  He  stamped 
his  foot,  as  if  ashamed  of  exhibiting  such  weakness,  and  said,  "  I  can't  read  it. 
"  ve,  Farrand,  you  read  it."  Captain  Farrand  took  it,  and,  remarking  that  he 
.Ji  his  glasses  and  his  eyes  were  poor  (they  looked  watery),  passed  the 
paper  to  me,  saying,  "  Here,  Gilman,  you  have  good  eyes ;  please  read  it."  I 
took  the  paper  and  read  aloud  the  demand  for  the  surrender.  As  soon  as  I 
finished,  I  handed  the  paper  to  Lieuten 
ant  Slemmer,  when  he  and  I  went  a  few 
paces  away;  and,  after  talking  the  mat 
ter  over,  it  was  decided,  in  order  to  gain 
time  and  give  our  men  a  night's  rest,  to 
ask  until  next  day  to  consider  the  matter. 
We  returned  to  Colonel  Chase,  and  the 
following  conversation  took  place : 

Lieutenant  Slenimer :  "  Colonel,  how 
many  men  have  you  ?" 

Colonel  Chase :  "  To-night  I  shall  have 
800  or  900." 

Lieutenant  Slemmer :  "  Do  you  imagine 
you  could  take  this  fort  with  that  num 
ber  ? " 

Colonel  Chase :  "  I  certainly  do.  I  could 
carry  it  by  storm.  I  know  every  inch  of 
this  fort  and  its  condition." 

Lieutenant      Slemmer :     "  With    your 
knowledge  of  the  fort  and  of  your  troops,  what  proportion  of  them,  do  you 
imagine,  would  be  killed  in  such  an  attack?" 

Colonel  Chase  (shrugging  his  shoulders) :  "  If  you  have  made  the  best  pos 
sible  preparations,  as  I  suppose  you  have,  and  should  defend  it,  as  I  presume 
you  would,  I  might  lose  one-half  of  my  men." 

Lieutenant  Slemmer :  "At  least,  and  I  don't  believe  you  are  prepared  to 
sacrifice  that  many  men  for  such  a  purpose." 

Colonel  Chase :  "  You  must  know  very  well  that,  with  your  small  force, 
you  are  not  expected  to,  and  cannot,  hold  this  fort.  Florida  cannot  permit  it, 
and  the  troops  here  are  determined  to  have  it ;  and  if  not  surrendered  peace 
ably,  an  attack  and  the  inauguration  of  civil  war  cannot  be  prevented.  If  it 
is  a  question  of  numbers,  and  eight  hundred  is  not  enough,  I  can  easily 
bring  thousands  more." 

Lieutenant  Slemmer:  "I  will  give  this  letter  due  consideration,  and  as  I 
wish  to  consult  with  the  captains  of  the  Supply  and  Wyandotte  before  reply 
ing,  I  will  give  you  my  answer  to-morrow  morning." 

The  next  day  the  reply,  refusing  to  surrender,  was  sent,  Captain  Berry- 
man  of  the  Wyandotte  taking  it  to  the  yard.  Immediately  after,  the  Wyan 
dotte  steamed  out  of  the  harbor,  and,  the  same  day,  I  think,  the  Supply  sailed 
for  New  York. 


LIEUTENANT    ADAM    J.    SLEMMER,    U.  S.  A. 
FROM    A    PHOTOGRAPH. 


WITH  SLEMMER  IN  PENSACOLA  HARBOR. 


On  the  18th  another,  and  the  last,  demand  for  surrender  was  received  from 
Colonel  Chase,  and  next  day  Lieutenant  Slemmer  sent  the  following  reply : 
"In  reply  to  your  communication  of  yesterday,  I  have  the  honor  to  state 
that,  as  yet,  I  know  of  no  reason  why  my  answer  of  the  16th  inst.  should 
be  changed,  and  I  therefore  very  respectfully  refer  you  to  that  reply  for 
an  answer  to  this." 

With  his  small  command,  Lieutenant  Slermner  continued  to  hold  Fort 
Pickens  until  he  was  reenforced  about  the  middle  of  April.  He  remained 
there  until  about  the  middle  of  May,  when  our  company,  on  the  recommenda 
tion  of  the  surgeon,  the  men  being  much  broken  down  by  the  severe  labor, 
incessant  watching,  exposure,  and  want  of  proper  food  of  the  past  four  months, 
was  ordered  to  Fort  Hamilton,  New  York  Harbor,  to  recruit.  The  order  was 
a  humane  one,  and  came  none  too  soon,  as  scurvy  had  already  appeared  among 
the  men.  On  the  way  North  one  of  them  died,  and  few  of  them  ever  entirely 
recovered  from  the  effects  of  the  severe  physical  and  mental  strain  they  had 
endured  with  Slemmer  in  Pensacola  Harbor. 


During  the  remainder  of  the  war  Fort  Pickens 
continued  to  be  held  by  the  United  States  troops, 
assisted  by  various  vessels  of  the  blockading  squad 
ron.  Lieutenant  Slemmer  was  reenforced  on  the 
6th  of  February  by  one  company  under  Captain 
Israel  Vogdes  in  the  Brooklyn,  and  on  the  17th  of 
April  by  five  companies  in  the  Atlantic,  under  Col 
onel  Harvey  Brown,  who  had  been  appointed  to  the 
command  of  the  Department  of  Florida,  with  head 
quarters  at  Fort  Piekens,  and  continued  in  com 
mand  until  February  22d,  1862,  when  he  was 
succeeded  by  General  Lewis  G.  Arnold.  The  Con 
federates  continued  to  hold  the  opposite  shore  until 
the  9th  of  May,  1  8612,  when  it  was  evacuated  by 
them,  the  Union  forces  taking  possession  the  next 
day.  On  the  llth  of  March,  1861,  General  Brax- 
ton  Bragg  assumed  command  of  the  Confederate 
forces.  He  was  succeeded  in  command  of  the  Army 
of  Pensacola  on  the  27th  of  January,  1862,  by 
General  Samuel  Jones,  who,  on  the  8th  of  March, 
was  succeeded  in  command  of  the  post  by  Colonel 
Thomas  M.  Jones,  under  whom  the  evacuation  took 
place,  whereupon  the  position  was  occupied  by  the 
United  States  troops,  and  the  headquarters  of  the 
West  Gulf  Sqiiadron,  which  had  been  at  Ship  Isl 
and,  were  transferred  to  Pensacola.  The  harbor 
was  considered  the  best  on  the  Gulf. 

The  chief  events  during  the  Confederate  occu 
pation  were : 

September  2d,  1 8  6 1 .  Destruction  of  the  dry-dock 
at  Pensacola  by  order  of  Colonel  Harvey  Brown. 

September  14th.  Destruction  of  the  Confeder 
ate  war  schooner  Judali  by  a  night  expedition. 

The  Jndali  was  moored  to  the  wharf  at  the  Navy 
Yard  under  the  protection  of  a  battery  and  a  colum- 
biad,  and  was  armed  with  a  pivot  and  four  broad 
side  guns.  The  expedition,  which  was  matured  by 
Captain  Theodorus  Bailey  of  the  Colorado,  con 
sisted  of  100  men  in  4  boats,  under  the  com 
mand  of  Lieutenant  John  H.  Russell,  U.  S.  Navy. 
Lieutenant  Sproston  and  Gunner  Borton,  from  one 
of  the  boats,  succeeded  in  spiking  the  columbiad. 


Lieutenants  Russell  and  Blake  with  two  boats, 
after  receiving  a  volley  from  the  JudaJt,  boarded 
her,  and,  joined  later  by  their  comrades,  engaged 
in  a  hand-to-hand  conflict  withhcr  crew  of  75  men, 
who  made  a  brave  resistance,  but  were  driven  off 
to  the  wharf,  where  they  rallied,  and,  reenforced, 
kept  up  a  continuous  fire  upon  the  vessel,  which 
had  been  ignited  in  several  places  by  Lieutenant 
Russell's  men.  The  alarm  roll  was  sounded,  and 
rockets  were  sent  up  by  the  Confederates.  The 
enemy's  forces  being  aroused,  the  Colorado's  boats 
pulled  away,  rallying  at  a  short  distance  from  the 
shore  to  fire  six  charges  of  canister  from  their 
howitzers,  tinder  cover  of  which  they  returned  to 
the  fort.  The  Judali  burned  to  the  water's  edge, 
and,  having  been  set  free  from  her  moorings  by 
the  fire,  drifted  down  opposite  Fort  Barrancas, 
where  she  sank.  The  Union  loss  was  ','>  men  killed 
and  113  wounded.  Lieutenant  Russell's  gallantry 
was  the  subject  of  official  mention. 

October  9th.  Night  attack  by  a  Confederate  force 
of  one  thousand  men,  under  General  R.  H.  Ander 
son,  upon  the  camp  of  Colonel  William  Wilson's  6th 
New  York  (Zouave)  regiment  on  Santa  Rosa  Island. 
The  Confederates  landed  on  the  island  at  2  A.  M., 
burned  a  part  of  the  camp  four  miles  from  Fort 
Pickens,  and  retired  to  their  boats  after  encounter- 
ingUnion  reinforcements  from  the  fort.  The  losses 
in  killed,  wounded,  and  missing  were:  Union,  67; 
Confederate,  87. 

November  22d  and  23d.  Bombardment  of  the 
Confederate  lines  by  the  United  States  vessels 
Niagara  (Flag-Officer  McKean)  and  Richmond 
(Captain  Ellison),  and  by  Fort  Pickens  and  the 
neighboring  Union  batteries.  Although  Fort  Mc- 
Ree  was  so  badly  injured  that  General  Bragg  en 
tertained  the  idea  of  abandoning  it,  the  plan  of 
the  Union  commanders  to  "take  and  destroy"  it 
was  not  executed. 

January  1st,  1  8(52.  Bombardment  of  Forts  Mc- 
Ree  and  Barrancas  by  Union  batteries. 

May  9th.  Burning  and  evacuation  of  Pensacola. 

EDITORS. 


RECOLLECTIONS   OF  THE  TWIGGS   SURRENDER. 


A    TEXAS     RANGER— FROM    AN    AMBROTYPE. 


BY  MRS.   CAROLINE   BALDWIN   DARRO^*. 

T71ARLY  in  December,  1860,  a  rumor  reached  San 
Antonio,  Texas,  that  Captain  John  E.  Baylor,  well 
known  throughout  the  State,  was  organizing  a 
company  of  one  thousand  men  for  a  buffalo-hunt.^ 
As  Captain  Baylor's  secession  sentiments  were  well 
known,  this  was  believed  to  be  a  mere  pretense, 
and  his  real  design  to  be  to  surprise  and  seize  the 
arsenal  in  San  Antonio,  in  time  to  prevent  any 
resistance  on  the  part  of  the  United  States,  should 
Texas  go  out  of  the  Union.  The  Union  citizens, 
alarmed  lest  the  few  soldiers  stationed  there  should 
prove  insufficient,  appealed  to  General  David  E. 
Twiggs,  then  commanding  the  Department  of 
Texas,  to  increase  the  force.  He  accordingly  fur 
nished  several  hundred  men,  consisting  of  Knights  of  the  Golden  Circle  (a 
secret  secession  organization),  the  Alamo  Rifles,  two  other  citizen  com 
panies,  and  an  Irish  and  a  German  company.  This  quieted  apprehension 
for  a  time,  but  in  January  these  troops  were  quietly  withdrawn.  At  this 
time  General  Twiggs's  loyalty  to  the  United  States  Government  began  to  be 
questioned,  as  he  was  known  to  be  often  in  consultation  with  prominent 
secessionists,  some  of  them  ladies.  Toward  the  end  of  January  the  Union 
men  again  appealed  to  General  Twiggs,  but  nothing  was  accomplished, 
whereupon  they  armed  themselves,  waiting  with  undefined  dread  for  the  next 
move.  Meanwhile  no  one  trusted  his  neighbor,  since  spies  and  informers 
abounded,  and  to  add  to  the  terror,  there  were  fears  of  insurrection  among 
the  negroes,  some  of  whom  were  arrested;  while  all  of  them  were  forbidden 
to  walk  or  talk  together  on  the  streets,  or  to  assemble  as  they  had  been 
accustomed  to  do. 

Late  in  January  was  held  the  election  for  delegates  to  a  State  convention 
which  should  consider  the  question  of  secession.  San  Antonio  was  crowded. 
Women  vied  with  each  other  in  distributing  the  little  yellow  ballots,  on  which 
were  printed  in  large  type,  u  For  Secession,"  or  "Against  Secession."  Many 
an  ignorant  Mexican  received  instructions  that  the  ballot  "  with  the  longest 
words  "  was  the  right  one.  The  carteros  from  New  Mexico,  who  were  in  town 
with  their  wagon-trains,  were  bought  by  the  secessionists,  and  some  were 
known  to  have  voted  three  times.  It  was  well  known  that  the  Federal  civil 
officers  were  loyal;  the  French  and  German  citizens  were  emphatically  so;  and 


•fr  August  2d,  1861,  John  R.  Baylor,  then  Lieu- 
tenant-Colonel,  commanding  the  Confederate  army 
in  New  Mexico,  organized  that  part  of  the  Terri- 
tory  lying  south  of  the  thirty-fourth  parallel,  as 
the  Confederate  Territory  of  Arizona,  the  seat  of 


government  being  at  Mesilla,  and  the  authority 
of  governor  being  assumed  by  him.  This  action 
was  approved  by  General  Henry  H.  Sibley,  then 
in  command  of  the  Confederate  department.  — 
EDITORS. 


34  RECOLLECTIONS  OF  THE  TWIGGS  SURRENDER. 

yet  against  the  will  of  the  people,  "  by  superior  political  diplomacy,"  secession 
triumphed  in  San  Antonio  by  a  small  majority.  Many  Germans  gave  up  their 
business  and  left  the  town,  taking  refuge  in  New  Braunfels,  31  miles  away. 
Many  of  these  men  were  political  refugees  of  rare  culture  and  scholarly 
attainments. 

On  the  1st  of  February,  the  ordinance  of  secession  was  adopted  by  the 
Texas  ConventionJ  and  on  the  4th  commissioners  were  appointed  "  to  confer 
with  General  Twiggs,  with  regard  to  the  public  arms,  stores,  munitions  of 
war,  etc.,  under  his  control,  and  belonging  to  the  United  States,  with  power 
to  demand  [them]  in  the  name  of  the  people  of  the  State  of  Texas."  To  meet 
this  commission,  which  consisted  of  Thomas  J.  Devine,  P.  N.  Luckett,^  and 
Samuel  A.  Maverick,|  on  the  9th  of  February  General  Twiggs  appointed  a 
commission  consisting  of  Major  David  H.  Vinton,  Major  Sackfield  Maclin 
(secessionist),  and  Captain  R.  H.  K.  Whiteley.  By  this  time  the  news  of 
General  Twiggs's  disaffection  had  reached  the  Government,  and  Colonel 
C.  A.  Waite  was  sent  to  supersede  him. 

One  day,  accidentally  overhearing  parts  of  a  conversation  between  General 
Twiggs  and  a  prominent  Southern  lady,  I  felt  no  longer  any  doubt  that  he 
was  about  to  betray  his  trust,  and  reported  the  matter  to  Major  Vinton.  He 
sought  an  interview  with  General  Twiggs,  and  told  me  that  he  could  find  no 
suspicion  of  disloyalty,  and  that  I  was  entirely  mistaken.  Getting  information 
a  few  days  later,  which  led  me  to  believe  that  the  day  for  the  surrender  was 
fixed,  I  again  informed  Major  Vinton.  He  then  decided  to  remove  at  once 
from  his  safe  all  papers  that  would  give  valuable  information  to  the  State 
authorities,  and  the  moneys  belonging  to  the  Government,  and  he  intrusted 
them  to  his  confidential  clerk,  Charles  Darrow.  They  were  sent  at  midnight 
to  his  wife,^  who  was  waiting  to  receive  them,  and  who  buried  part  of  them 
in  a  deserted  garden ;  the  rest,  secreted  in  the  ashes  of  an  unused  stove  and 
in  the  tester  of  a  bed,  were  guarded  by  her  till  the  information  was  no  longer 
valuable. 

General  Twiggs  had  succeeded  in  completely  blinding  his  brother-officers 
as  to  his  plans ;  but  he  now  had  no  time  to  lose  before  Colonel  Waite's  arrival. 

On  the  15th  news  came  that  some  of  the  passengers  on  the  mail-coach  had 
alighted  at  the  crossing  of  the  Salado  and  joined  a  large  company  of  Texas 
Rangers  who,  under  the  command  of  Ben  McCulloch,  had  been  encamped 
there  for  several  days.  Captain  Baylor's  buffalo-hunt  had  at  last  assumed  a 
tangible  shape. 

To  be  prepared  for  any  emergency,  for  many  nights  we  had  kept  our  fire 
arms  beside  us.  On  the  night  of  the  15th,  worn  out  with  anxious  watch 
ing,  we  fell  asleep,  to  be  suddenly  roused  about  4  o'clock  by  the  screams 
of  the  negroes,  who  were  coining  home  from  market,  "  We're  all  going  to  be 

J  The  secession  of  Texas  was  not  legally  com-  &  James  H.  Rogers,  also  appointed,  was  a  com 
pleted  until  the  ratification  of  this  ordinance  by  missioner,  but  it  appears  from  the  Official  Records 
the  people,  February  23d,  but  the  secession  party  that  he  did  not  serve. —  EDITORS. 
considered  the  authority  of  the  convention  suffi-  |  From  whom  stray  cattle  were  styled  "Maver- 
cient  for  the  prior  seizure  of  United  States  prop-  icks." 
erty. —  EDITORS.  ]i  The  writer. 


RECOLLECTIONS  OF  THE  TWIGGS  SURRENDER. 


THE     ALAMO,    SAX    ANTOXIO. 


killed ! "  I  grasped  my  revolver,  and,  springing  to  my  feet,  looked  out  upon 
the  plaza.  In  the  dim  light  I  saw  the  revolutionists  appearing,  two  by  two, 
on  muleback  and  horseback,  mounted  and  on  foot,— a  motley  though  quite 
orderly  crowd,  carrying  the  Lone  Star  flag  before  them,  and  surrounded  and 
supported  by  armed  men.  The  nights  had  been  cold,  and  a  week  on  the 
Salado  without  comforts  had  not  added  to  their  valorous  appearance. 
Some  had  coats,  but  others  were  in  their  shirt-sleeves,  and  not  a  few  were 
wrapped  in  old  shawls  and  sad 
dle-blankets.  Their  arms  were  of 

every  description.     By  daylight  j 

more  had  appeared,  perhaps  a 
thousand  in  all,  and  so  great  was 
the  enthusiasm  of  two  women 
who  had  aided  General  Twiggs 
in  his  arrangements  that  they 
mounted  their  horses,  in  male 
attire,  and  with  pistols  in  their 
belts  rode  out  to  meet  their 
friends.  Coffee  and  refreshments 
had  been  provided,  and  blankets 
and  clothing  were  lavishly  dis 
tributed.  All  the  stores  were 
closed ;  men,  women,  and  children 
armed  themselves,  and  the  excitement  was  intense.  Companies  of  Union 
citizens,  well  drilled  and  well  armed,  were  marching  and  countermarching, 
presenting  an  imposing  contrast  to  the  other  party,  and  a  conflict  seemed 
inevitable.  The  arsenal  building  had  been  opened  and  was  swarming  with 
Rangers.  Early  in  the  morning  General  Twiggs  drove  down  to  the  main 
plaza,  where  he  was  instantly  surrounded  by  secessionists  demanding  the 
Government  property,  whereupon  he  went  through  the  form  of  refusing  their 
request.  He  then  held  a  conference  with  Major  W.  A.  Nichols,  his  assistant 
adjutant-general,  and  Ben  McCulloch,  and  was  given  six  hours  in  which  to 
reconsider.  By  noon  he  had  surreiidered  all  the  United  States  posts  and 
stores  in  Texas.  When  the  result  was  known  there  was  great  indignation 
against  him  among  the  citizens.  Two  or  three  hours  later  he  left  for  New 
Orleans,  where  he  was  received  with  public  honors. 

Orders  were  sent  to  all  the  outposts  to  turn  over  the  military  property 
to  the  State.  The  officers  and  men  were  widely  scattered,  and  many  of  them 
were  taken  completely  by  surprise.  The  Federal  troops  in  town  gave  their 
parole  "  not  to  take  up  arms  "  against  the  Confederacy,  and  were  ordered  to 
leave  the  post  in  the  afternoon.  By  this  time  the  German  company  had 
refused  to  act  against  the  United  States,  and  the  citizen  companies  had  dis 
banded.  The  Irish  company  had  twice  torn  down  the  Stars  and  Stripes  from 
the  Alamo,  and  had  raised  the  Lone  Star  flag  in  its  place.  An  attempt  was 
made  to  disarm  the  troops,  but  they  declared  that  they  would  kill  any  man 
who  interfered,  and  marched  away  under  Major  Larkin  Smith  and  Captain 


36  RECOLLECTIONS  OF  THE  TWIGGS  SURRENDER. 

John  H.  King,  with  the  stained  and  bullet-riddled  old  flag  of  the  8th  Regi 
ment  flying  over  them,  while  the  band  played  national  airs.  Strong  men 
wept ;  the  people  cheered  them  along  the  streets,  and  many  followed  them  to 
the  head  of  the  San  Pedro,  where  they  encamped.  By  6  o'clock  the  Rangers 
had  returned  to  their  camp  on  the  Salado,  and  the  day  ended  without  further 
excitement. 

About  2  o'clock  that  afternoon,  Colonel  Robert  E.  Lee  arrived  in  his  ambu 
lance  from  Fort  Mason,  Texas,  on  his  way  to  Washington,  whither  he  had 
been  ordered  by  General  Scott.  As  he  approached  the  Read  House  I  went 
out  to  greet  him.  At  the  same  time  some  of  the  Rangers  gathered  around 
his  wagons,  and,  attracted,  no  doubt,  by  their  insignia  of  rank,  the  red  flannel 
strips  sewed  on  their  shoulders,  he  asked,  "  Who  are  those  men  !  "  u  They 
are  McCulloch's,"  I  answered.  "  General  Twiggs  surrendered  everything  to 
the  State  this  morning,  and  we  are  all  prisoners  of  war."  I  shall  never 
forget  his  look  of  astonishment,  as  with  his  lips  trembling  and  his  eyes  full  of 
tears,  he  exclaimed,  "  Has  it  come  so  soon  as  this  f "  In  a  short  time  I  saw 
him  crossing  the  plaza  on  his  way  to  headquarters,  and  noticed  particularly 
that  he  was  in  citizen's  dress.  He  returned  at  night  and  shut  himself  in  his 
room,  which  was  over  mine,  and  I  heard  his  footsteps  through  the  night,  and 
sometimes  the  murmur  of  his  voice,  as  if  he  were  praying.  He  remained  at 
the  hotel  a  week,  and  in  conversations  declared  that  the  position  he  held  was 
a  neutral  one.  When  he  left  it  was  my  firm  belief  that  no  one  could  per 
suade  or  compel  him  to  change  his  decision.\ 

During  the  next  two  days  the  Rangers  were  drinking  and  shouting  about  the 
streets,  recklessly  shooting  any  one  who  happened  to  displease  them.  From 
this  time  on,  Union  men  were  in  danger,  and  Northerners  sent  their  families 
away.  Some  who  were  outspoken  were  imprisoned  and  barely  escaped  with 
their  lives  ;  among  them,  Charles  Anderson,  brother  of  Robert  Anderson. 

On  the  26th  of  February  a  dozen  men  of  the  State  troops  were  stationed 
on  guard  over  the  offices  of  the  disbursing  officers,  and  the  occupants  were 
ordered  to  leave,  but  forbidden  to  take  away  papers  or  effects,  though  allowed 
to  keep  the  keys  to  their  safes.  Colonel  Waite  had  now  arrived  and  assumed 
command,  and  the  secessionist  commissioners  made  a  second  demand  for 

\OnthispointCaptainR.  M.  Potter,  U.S.  A.,  says:  cause  for  revolution),  then  I  will  still  follow  my  na- 
"  I  saw  General  Lee  (then  Colonel  Lee)  whenhe  took  tive  State  with  my  sword,  and,  if  need  be,  with  my 
leave  of  his  friends  to  depart  for  Washington  some  life.  I  know  you  think  and  feel  very  differently,  but 
days  after  the  surrender  of  Twiggs.  I  have  seldom  I  can't  help  it.  These  are  my  principles,  and  I  must 
seen  a  more  distressed  man.  He  said,  '  When  I  follow  them."  Colonel  Anderson,  in  the  course  of 
get  to  Virginia  I  think  the  world  will  have  one  sol-  a  high  tribute  to  General  Lee's  character,  gives 
dier  less.  I  shall  resign  and  go  to  planting  corn.' "  General  Scott  as  his  authority  for  the  statement 
Colonel  Charles  Anderson,  U.  S.  V.,  who  is  referred  that  the  command  of  the  United  States  forces  (un 
to  above,  and  who  talked  with  General  Lee  on  the  der  Scott)  was  offered  to  Lee,  and  was  declined  by 
same  day,  thus  gives  the  substance  of  his  parting  him  on  the  same  ground, —  that  he  must  be  guided 
words  (see  "  Texas  Before  and  on  the  Eve  of  the  wholly  in  his  action  by  that  of  Virginia.  Colonel 
Rebellion."  Cincinnati,  1884):  "I  still  think  .  .  .  Albert  G.  Brackett,  U.  S.  A.,  says:  "When  the 
that  my  loyalty  to  Virginia  ought  to  take  precedence  civil  war  broke  out,  Lee  was  filled  with  sorrow 
over  that  which  is  due  to  the  Federal  Government,  at  the  condition  of  affairs,  and,  in  a  letter  to  me 
and  I  shall  so  report  myself  at  Washington.  If  Vir-  deploring  the  war  in  which  we  were  about  to  en- 
ginia  stands  by  the  old  Union,  so  will  I.  But  if  she  gage,  he  made  use  of  these  words :  '  I  fear  the  liber- 
secedes  (though  I  do  not  believe  in  secession  as  ties  of  our  country  will  be  buried  in  the  tomb  of 
a  constitutional  right,  nor  that  there  is  a  sufficient  a  great  nation.'  " — EDITORS. 


RECOLLECTIONS  OF  THE  TWIGGS  SURRENDER.  37 

"  a  statement  of  the  amount  of  indebtedness  and  funds  on  hand  and  required 
a  promise  from  each  officer  that  he  would  pay  outstanding  debts  with  funds 
and  turn  the  balance  over  to  the  State":  it  being  very  desirable  to  the  enemy 
to  possess  the  G-overnment  records,  which  exhibited  the  number  of  troops  and 
the  condition  of  the  whole  department.  Imprisonment  and  death  were  to 
be  the  penalty  in  case  of  refusal;  but  Major  Vinton  of  the  quartermaster's 

department  declared  that  he  did  not  fear 
either,  would  do  nothing  dishonorable  and 
would  not  comply.  Major  Daniel  Mc- 
Clure  of  the  pay  department  ft  and  Cap 
tain  Whiteley  of  the  ordnance  department 
also  refused,  but  several  officers  did  com 
ply  and  were  returned  to  their  offices. 
The  larger  responsibilities  of  the  quarter 
master's  department  detained  Major  Vin 
ton  after  the  above-named  officers  had 
left,  and  thus  he  fought  his  battle  almost 
alone.  His  office  was  transferred  to  his 
own  house,  where  with  the  aid  of  Mr.  Dar- 
row  he  transacted  his  business.  He  soon 
became  so  ill  that  it  was  impossible  for 
him  to  leave  his  bed.  Both  were  after 
ward  arrested  and  given  ten  days  in 
which  to  surrender  the  papers  and  funds 
or  be  shot.  These  threats  were  not  executed,  for  on  the  morning  of  the 
tenth  day  we  were  gladdened  by  the  news  that  United  States  troops  from 
the  different  outposts  were  within  a  few  miles  of  the  town,  having  been 
three  weeks  on  the  way.  They  were  met  at  the  San  Pedro  and  paroled  not 
to  take  arms  against  the  Confederacy  or  serve  in  any  capacity  during  the 
war.  These  troops,  representing  the  army  in  Texas,  were  loyal  almost  to  a 
man,  while  all  but  forty  of  the  officers  went  over  to  the  Confederacy.  The 
commissioners  had  promised  to  furnish  facilities  for  the  transportation  of 
these  troops  to  the  coast,  but  so  great  had  been  the  confusion  and  so  many 
supplies  had  been  carried  off,  that  the  soldiers  were  left  almost  destitute.  I 
visited  their  camp  and  found  them  cursing  the  man  who  had  placed  them 
in  this  position. 

Major  Vinton  and  family,  with  my  husband  and  myself,  were  the  last  to 
leave.  On  the  morning  of  our  departure,  the  llth  of  May,  as  the  ambulances 
and  baggage  wagons  stood  at  the  door,  to  add  to  the  gloom,  a  storm  broke 
over  the  city,  enveloping  us  in  midnight  darkness.  The  thunder  and  light 
ning  was  so  loud  and  incessant  as  to  seem  like  the  noise  of  battle.  For  two 
weeks  we  journeyed  over  the  park-like  prairies,  fragrant  and  brilliant  with 

ft  Captain  Potter  says:   "  The  officers  detained  brother  officers,  when  no  public  funds  were  acces- 

in   San   Antonio  were   much   indebted  to   Major  sible.     He,   of  course,   had  no  office  in  which  to 

McClure  for  his  successful  efforts  to  raise  money,  transact  business,  and  paid  the  officers  covertly 

on   his   own    responsibility,    for  the  pay   of    his  in  holes  and  corners." 


COLONEL  DANIEL  H.  VINTON,  U.  S.  A. 
FROM  A  PHOTOGRAPH. 


38  RECOLLECTIONS  OF  THE  TWIGGS  SURRENDER. 

flowers.  We  forded  streams  and  rivers,  crossed  the  Brazos  by  a  rope  ferry, 
and,  taking  the  railroad  train  from  Harrisburg  to  Gralveston,  caught  the  last 
steamer  before  the  blockade  of  New  Orleans.  We  went  up  the  Mississippi  in 
the  steamer  Hiawatha,  which  was  crowded  with  refugees,  who  made  no  sign 
until,  in  answer  to  a  shot  from  shore  at  Cairo,  the  steamer  rounded  to  and  we 
found  ourselves  once  more  under  the  protection  of  our  own  flag. 


On  the  13th  of  December,  1860,  General  David 
E.  Twiggs,  of  the  United  States  Array,  who  had 
served  with  distinction  in  the  war  with  Mexico, 
and  who  was  at  that  date  in  command  of  the  De 
partment  of  Texas,  wrote  the  following  letter  to 
General  Scott  from  San  Antonio  : 

"  I  think  there  can  he  no  doubt  that  many  of  the 
Southern  States  will  secede  from  the  Union.  The  State 
of  Texas  will  be  among  the  number,  and,  from  all  ap 
pearances  at  present,  it  will  be  at  an  early  day ;  certainly 
before  the  4th  of  March  next.  What  is  to  be  done  with 
public  property  in  charge  of  the  army?  The  arsenal  at 
this  place  has  some  ordnance  and  other  munitions  of 
war.  I  do  not  expect  an  order  for  the  present  for  the 
disposition  of  them,  but  I  would  be  pleased  to  receive 
your  views  and  suggestions.  My  course,  as  respects 
myself,  will  be  to  remain  at  my  post  and  protect  this 
frontier  as  long  as  I  can,  and  then  when  turned  adrift 
make  my  way  home,  if  I  have  one.  I  would  be  pleased 
to  hear  from  you  at  your  earliest  convenience." 

At  this  time  it  took  from  ten  to  fifteen  days  for  a 
letter  to  pass  between  San  Antonio  and  army  head 
quarters.  December  28th,  General  Scott  replied: 

"  In  cases  of  political  disturbance  involving  local 
conflict  with  the  authority  of  the  general  government, 
the  general-iu-chief  considers  that  the  military  ques 
tions,  such  as  you  suggest,  contain  n.  political  element, 
with  due  regard  to  which,  and  in  due  deference  to  the 
chief  executive  authority,  no  extraordinary  instructions 
concerning  them  must  be  issued  without  the  consent 
of  such  authority.  He  has  labored  hard  in  suggesting 
and  urging  proper  measures  to  vindicate  the  laws  and 
protect  the  property  of  the  United  States  without 
waging  war  or  acting  offensively  against  any  State  or 
community.  All  such  suggestions,  though  long  since 
made  in  good  time  to  have  been  peaceably  .and  efficiently 
carried  out,  have  failed  to  secure  the  favorable  attention 
of  the  Government.  The  President  has  listened  to  him 
with  due  friendliness  and  respect,  but  the  War  Depart 
ment  has  been  little  communicative.  [Mr.  Floyd  was 
then  Secretary  of  War.]  Up  to  this  time  he  has  not  been 
shown  the  written  instructions  of  Major  Anderson,  nor 
been  informed  of  the  purport  of  those  more  recently 
conveyed  to  Fort  Moultrie  verbally  by  Major  Buell. 
Probably  the  policy  of  the  Government  in  regard  to  the 
forts  and  dejtots  within  the  limits  of  seceding  States 
will  have  been  clearly  indicated  before  events  can  have 
caused  a  practical  issue  to  be  made  up  in  Texas.  The 
general  does  not  see,  at  this  moment,  that  he  can  tender 
you  any  special  advice,  but  leaves  the  administration 
of  your  command  in  your  own  hands,  with  the  laws  and 

*  Captain  Potter  (before  quoted),  in  a  written  memorandum 
to  the  Editors,  .says  : 

"It  was  on  the  evening  before  McCulloch  entered  San 
Antonio,  or,  perhaps,  two  evenings  before,  that  I  met  Gen 
eral  Twiggs  at  a  wedding  party.  He  said  to  me:  'It  is 
rumored  that  Ben  McCulloch  has  been  in  town;  have  you 
seen  him?'  I  replied,  no.  After  a  few  more  words  on  the 
state  of  aifairs,  he  said  :  '  There  is  no  need  of  sending  him  to 
coerce  me.  If  an  old  woman  with  a  broomstick  should 
come  with  full  authority  from  the  State  of  Texas  to  demand 
the  public  property,  I  would  give  it  up  to  her.' "  Captain  Pot 
ter  further  says:  "From  the  date  of  Twiggs's  return  from 
New  Orleans  [about  the  27th  of  November]  there  was  no 


regulations  to  guide,  in  the  full  confidence  that  your 
discretion,  firmness,  and  patriotism  will  effect  all  of 
good  that  the  sad  state  of  the  times  may  permit." 

December  27th,  and  January  2d,  7th,  and  23d, 
General  Twiggs  wrote  similar  letters  to  army  head 
quarters,  making  urgent  requests  for  instructions. 
January  15th,  after  the  receipt  of  the  above 
letter  from  General  Scott,  General  Twiggs  wrote 
to  him  again,  this  time  expressing  sympathy  with 
the  secession  movement,  and  asking  to  be  re 
lieved  from  command  of  the  department  on  or 
before  the  4th  of  March.  The  order  relieving 
him,  and  appointing  Colonel  Waite  as  his  suc 
cessor,  is  dated  January  28th,  and  was  received 
by  General  Twiggs  on  the  15th  of  February. 
Meanwhile  the  secession  party  in  Texas  had 
made  decided  progress  toward  carrying  the  State 
out  of  the  Union.  Late  in  January  an  election 
had  been  held  for  delegates  to  a  State  convention 
to  consider  the  question  of  secession.  This  con 
vention  had  met  on  the  28th  of  January,  at  Aus 
tin,  and  on  the  1st  of  February  had  passed  an 
ordinance  of  secession  which  was  to  take  effect 
on  the  2d  of  March,  if  it  should  be  ratified  by  the 
people  on  the  23d  of  February.  General  Twiggs 
did  not  wait  till  the  ordinance  was  in  operation,  or 
even  till  its  ratification,  to  surrender  the  military 
posts  and  public  property  under  his  charge.  Feb 
ruary  9th  he  appointed  a  military  commission  to 
treat  with  a  commission  from  the  convention, —  as 
his  order  of  that  date  announced,  "to  transact 
such  business  as  relates  to  the  disposition  of  the 
public  property  upon  the  demand  of  the  State  of 
Texas."  February  1  Oth,  three  days  before  the 
arrival  of  Colonel  Waite,  the  actual  surrender  took 
place,  nominally  to  superior  forces  under  Colonel 
Ben  McCulloch,  then  in  command  of  1000  to 
1500  men,  and  acting  under  the  authority,  not 
of  the  governor  (General  Sam  Houston,  a  Union 
man),  but  of  the  commissioners  appointed  by  the 
convention.*  On  the  17th  the  State  Commissioners 
wrote  to  General  Twiggs : 

"  In  our  communication  of  the  16th  instant  we  required 
a  delivery  up  by  you  of  the  positions  held  and  public 
property  held  by  or  under  your  control  as  commander 

doubt  of  his  intention  not  to  withstand  any  insurrectionary 
movement  on  the  part  of  the  .State.  He  constantly  said  that 
the  break-up  was  coming,  and  that  there  was  no  one  living 
who  could  resist  the  secession  movement  successfully." 

On  the  same  point,  Colonel  Charles  Anderson  says :  "  It 
must  be  remembered  distinctly,  on  this,  my  testimony,  and 
that  of  very  many  others,  that  from  the  time  of  his  return, 
with  increasing  frequency  and  vehemence  of  his  speeches, 
General  Twiggs  had  not  only  declared  that  he  'would  never 
fire  on  American  citizens  under  any  circumstances,'  but  that 
he  would  surrender  the  United  States  property  in  his  depart 
ment  to  the  State  of  Texas  whenever  it  was  demanded."— 
("  Texas,  Before  and  on  the  Eve  of  the  Ilebelliou.") 


RECOLLECTIONS  OF  THE   TWIGGS  SURRENDER. 


39 


in  this  department.  As  no  reply  .save  your  verbal 
declaration  (which  declaration  was  that  you 'gave  up 
everything')  has  been  given  to  our  note,  .  .  .  we  again 
demand  the  surrender  .  .  .  " 

To  this  General  Twiggs  replied  the  same  day: 

"  I  have  to  say  that  you  are  already  aware  of  my  views 
in  regard  to  the  delivery  of  the  public  property  of  this 
department,  and  I  now  repeat  that  I  will  direct 'the 
positions  held  by  the  Federal  troops  to  be  turned  over  to 
the  authorized  agents  of  the  State  of  Texas,  provided 
the  troops  retain  their  arms  and  clothing,  camp  and 
garrison  equipage,  quartermaster's  stores,  subsistence, 
medical,  hospital  stores,  and  sucli  means  of  transporta 
tion  of  every  kind  as  may  be  necessary  for  an  efficient 
and  orderly  movement  of  the  troops  from  Texas,  pre 
pared  for  attack  or  defense  against  aggression  from  any 
source." 

The  commissioners  then  wrote,  making  two  f  ur- 
ther  conditions :  that  the  troops  should  leave  Texas 
by  way  of  the  coast,  and  that  they  should  there  sur 
render  all  means  of  transportation  as  well  as  the 
artillery.  General  Twiggs  responded,  consentingto 
the  first  condition,  but  objecting  to  the  second  so 
far  as  it  related  to  the  guns  of  the  light  batteries, 
and  it  was  to  that  extent  waived  by  the  commis 
sioners.  Thus  the  formal  surrender  was  consum 
mated  on  the  18th  of  February,  five  days  before 
the  ratification  of  the  ordinance  of  secession  by 
the  people  of  Texas.  In  a  letter  to  Mr.  Davis, 
dated  New  Orleans,  February  25th,  1861,  Gen 
eral  Braxton  Bragg  says:  " General  Twiggs  was 
ordered  to  turn  over  the  command  to  Colonel 
Waite,  a  Northern  man,  but  preferred  surrender 
ing  to  Texas."  March  1st,  General  Twiggs  was 
dismissed  from  the  United  States  army.  He  was 
appointed  major-general  in  the  Confederate  serv 
ice,  and  was  placed  in  command  at  New  Orleans. 
He  died  September  15th,  1862,  at  Augusta, 
Georgia,  his  own  State. 

On  the  28th  of  January,  General  Twiggs's  suc 
cessor,  Colonel  Waite,  was  in  command  at  Camp 
Verde,  65  miles  from  San  Antonio.  In  a  letter 
of  that  date  to  General  Twiggs's  assistant  adju 
tant-general  at  San  Antonio,  Colonel  Waite  said : 

"  For  the  purpose  of  making  some  defensive  arrange 
ments,  I  have  deemed  it  proper  to  order  the  remainder 
of  Captain  Brackett's  company  to  this  place  without 
waiting  for  further  instructions  from  your  office.  .  .  . 
I  respectfully  request  that  1  or  2  pieces  of  artillery 
.  .  .  may  be  sent  here  as  early  as  practicable.  In 
making  this  application  I  assume  that  there  is  a  prob 
ability,  or  at  least  a  possibility,  that  a  mob  of  reckless 
men  may  attempt  to  seize  the  public  property  here, 
the  most  valuable  of  which  consists  of  53  camels,  .  .  . 
worth  some  $-20.000.  ...  I  hold  it  to  be  the  duty  of 
every  commanding  officer  to  be  at  all  times,  and  under 
all  circumstances,  prepared  as  far  as  possible  for  any 
and  every  emergency.  To  this  end  he  must  anticipate 
Ms  wants  and  take  timely  measures  to  meet  them." 

February  12th,  he  wrote  again  : 

"  Being  desirous  of  concentrating  my  regiment  (the 
1st  Infantry)  so  as  to  bring  the  companies  more  under 
my  control,  I  respectfully  request  permission  to  move 
out  of  the  department  with  the  five  companies  now  serv 
ing  hero  and  join  the  remainder  of  the  regiment  which  is 
in  the  Department  of  the  West." 

February  26th,  in  his  report  o«f  the  situation 
after  he  had  assumed  command,  he  says  : 


"To  concentrate  a  sufficient  number  [of  troops]  to 
make  a  successful  resistance  after  the  Texaus  had  taken 
the  field  was  not  practicable.  Besides,  we  had  no  large 
depot  of  provisions  to  move  upon,  and  the  means  of 
transportation  at  the  posts  were  so  limited  that  the 
troops  could  have  taken  with  them  a  supply  for  only  a 
few  days.  An  attempt  to  bring  them  together  under 
these  circumstances  would  have  no  doubt  resulted  in 
their  being  cut  up  in  detail  before  they  could  get  out  of 
the  country.  Under  these  circumstances,  I  felt  it  my 
duty  to  comply  with  the  agreement  entered  into  by  Gen 
eral  Twiggs,  and  remove  the  troops  from  the  country  as 
early  as  possible." 

For  this  purpose  Colonel  Waite  continued  at  San 
Antonio.  The  troops  (except  those  mentioned 
below)  marched  to  the  coast,  where  vessels  char 
tered  by  the  United  States  awaited  them. 

Concerning  the  advantages  which  General 
Twiggs's  surrender  conferred  upon  the  cause  of 
secession,  Colonel  Charles  Anderson  says: 

"  Of  its  successes,  the  first  was  that  it  carried  the  so- 
called  election  five  days  afterward.  Without  this  brill 
iant  coup  de  main  (the  first  victory  of  rebellion)  the 
majority  would  have  surely  been  in  Texas  for  the  Union 
cause.  As  it  was,  only  42,000  votes  (less  than  half  the 
total  vote  of  the  State)  was  polled,  of  which  13,000  votes 
were  given  by  the  now  confounded  and  dismayed 
Unionists.  [The  exact  vote  was:  for  ratification,  34,794; 
against,  11,235. —  EDITORS.]  And  just  here  (a  second 
and  great  success)  was  the  beginning  of  that  series  of 
(lockings  part  passu,  with  every  disaster  to  the  Union 
cause,  of  our  Douglas  Democrats,  and  our  Bell  and 
Everett  men  to  the  winning  side  —  the  Breckiuridge 
Democrats.  ...  A  third  gain  to  the  rebellion  was 
the  immense  money  and  military  values  of  the  public 
arms  and  other  war  properties  on  the  very  verge  of  the 
coming  war,  which  it  hastened,  if  it  did  not  determine. 
Fourthly,  our  national  prestige  lost  was  a  vast  and 
instant  impulse  to  secession  and  rebellion  in  every 
slave  State." 

The  number  of  posts  surrendered  was  19.  The 
number  of  troops  "  to  be  removed,  in  compli 
ance  with  General  Twiggs's  agreement,"  was  re 
ported  by  Colonel  Waite,  February  26th,  at  2328. 
This  agreement  was  not  respected  by  the  Con 
federate  authorities,  who,  on  the  llth  of  April, 
on  the  ground  "that  hostility  exists  between  the 
United  States  and  Confederate  States,"  gave  in 
structions  to  Colonel  Earl  Van  Dom  "  to  intercept 
and  prevent  the  movement  of  the  United  States 
troops  from  the  State  of  Texas."  Under  these 
orders  815  officers  and  men  were  captured,  in 
cluding  Colonel  Waite  and  his  staff,  who  accepted 
parole  under  protest.  Many  of  the  private  soldiers 
were  kept  in  confinement  for  nearly  two  years. 
The  San  Antonio  "Herald,"  of  February  23d, 
1861,  estimated  the  total  value  of  the  property 
surrendered  at  $1,209.500,  "  exclusive  of  public 
buildings  to  which  the  Federal  Government  has  a 
title.''  This  property  included  mules,  wagons, 
horses,  harness,  tools,  corn,  clothing,  commissary 
and  ordnance  stores. 

In  the  main  the  authority  for  the  foregoing  state 
ments  is  Volume  I.  of  the  "Official  Records  of  the 
Union  and  Confederate  Armies,"  issued  by  the 
War  Department,  under  the  editorship  of  Lieu 
tenant-Colonel  Robert  X.  Scott.  U.  S.  A.  This 
work  will  be  referred  to  hereafter  in  these  pages 
as  "Official  Records."  — EDITORS. 


FROM    MOULTRIE   TO   SUMTER. 

BY  ABNER  DOUBLEDAY,   BREVET  MAJOR-GENERAL,   U.  S.  A.,   RETIRED. 

AS  senior  captain  of  the  1st  Regiment  of  United  States  Artillery,  I  had  been 
-£*.  stationed  at  Fort  Moultrie,  Charleston  Harbor,  two  or  three  years  previ 
ous  to  the  outbreak  of  1861.  There  were  two  other  forts  in  the  harbor.  Of 
these,  Fort  Sumter  was  unoccupied,  being  in  an  unfinished  state,  while  Castle 
Pinckney  was  in  charge  of  a  single  ordnance  sergeant.  The  garrison  of  Fort 
Moultrie  consisted  of  2  companies  that  had  been  reduced  to  65  men,  who 
with  the  band  raised  the  number  in  the  post  to  73.  Fort  Moultrie  had 
no  strength ;  it  was  merely  a  sea  battery.  No  one  ever  imagined  it  would  be 
attacked  by  our  own  people ;  and  if  assailed  by  foreigners,  it  was  supposed 
that  an  army  of  citizen-soldiery  would  be  there  to  defend  it.  It  was  very 
low,  the  walls  having  about  the  height  of  an  ordinary  room.  It  was  little 
more,  in  fact,  than  the  old  fort  of  Revolutionary  time  of  which  the  father  of 
Major  Robert  Anderson  had  been  a  defender.  The  sand  had  drifted  from  the 
sea  against  the  wall,  so  that  cows  would  actually  scale  the  ramparts.  In  1860 
we  applied  to  have  the  fort  put  in  order,  but  the  quartermaster-general, 
afterward  the  famous  Joseph  E.  Johnston,  said  the  matter  did  not  pertain 
to  his  department.  We  were  then  apprehending  trouble,  for  the  signs  of  the 
times  indicated  that  the  South  was  drifting  toward  secession,  though  the 
Northern  people  could  not  be  made  to  believe  this,  and  regarded  our  repre 
sentation  to  this  effect  as  nonsense.  I  remember  that  at  that  time  our  engi 
neer  officer,  Captain  J.  O.  Foster,  was  alone,  of  the  officers,  in  thinking  there 
would  be  no  trouble.  We  were  commanded  by  a  Northern  man  of  advanced 
age,  Colonel  John  L.  Gardner,  who  had  been  wounded  in  the  war  of  1812  and 
had  served  with  credit  in  Florida  and  Mexico.  November  15th,  1860,  Mr. 


FROM  MOULTRJE  TO  SUMTER. 


Floyd,  the  Secretary  of  War,  relieved  him   and  put  in   command  Major 
Robert  Anderson  of  Kentucky,  who  was  a  regular  officer.   Floyd  thought  the 
new  commander  could  be  relied  upon  to  carry  out  the  Southern  programme, 
but     we     never     believed 
that  Anderson   took  com 
mand  with  a  knowledge  of 
that  programme  or  a  desire 
that  it  should  succeed.    He 
simply  obeyed  orders;    he 
had  to  obey  or  leave  the 


army. 
Union 


Anderson 
man    and, 


was     a 

in    the 


incipiency,  was  perfectly 
willing  to  chastise  South 
Carolina  in  case  she  should 
attempt  any  revolutionary 
measures.  His  feeling  as 
to  coercion  changed  when 
he  found  that  all  the  South 
ern  States  had  joined  South 
Carolina,  for  he  looked  up 
on  the  conquest  of  the  South 
as  hopeless. 

Soon  after  his  arrival, 
which  took  place  011  the 
2 1st  of  November,  Anderson 
wanted  the  sand  removed 
from  the  walls  of  Moultrie, 
and  urged  that  it  be  done. 
Suddenly  the  Secretary  of 
War  seemed  to  adopt  this 
view.  He  pretended  there 
was  danger  of  war  with  Eng 
land,  with  reference  to  Mex 
ico,  which  was  absurd ;  and 
under  this  pretext  was  seized 
with  a  sudden  zeal  to  put  the 
harbor  of  Charleston  in  con 
dition,—  to  be  turned  over  to  the  Confederate  forces.  He  appropriated  $150,- 
000  for  Moultrie  and  $80,000  to  finish  Sumter.  There  was  not  much  to  be 
made  out  of  Fort  Moultrie,  with  all  our  efforts,  because  it  was  hardly  defen 
sible;  but  Major  Anderson  strove  to  strengthen  it.  He  put  up  heavy  gates  to 
prevent  Charleston  secessionists  from  entering,  and  made  a  little  man-hole 
through  which  visitors  had  to  crawl  in  and  out. 

We  could  get  no  additional  ammunition,  but  Colonel  Gardner  had  man 
aged  to  procure  a  six  months'  supply  of  food  from  the  North  before  the  trouble 


MAJOK  ROBERT  AXDERSOI..   FROM  A  PHOTOGRAPH. 


FROM  MOULTRIE  TO  SUMTER. 


ANDERSON  AND  HIS  OFFICERS.   PROCESS  REPRODUCTION  OF  AN  IMPERFECT  PHOTOGRAPH. 


Second.  Lieutenant  Norman  J.  Hall,  who  was  present 
at  the  bombardment,  was  absent  when  the  photograph 
was  taken.  Lieutenant  Talbot  had  been  sent  to  Wash 
ington,  and  had  returned  with  a  message  from  President 


Lincoln  announcing  to  Governor  1'ickens  that  the  Gov 
ernment  would  attempt  to  provision  Sumter;  he  was 
not  permitted  to  rejoin  Anderson.  The  picture,  though 
dim,  has  the  value  of  a  fac-simile. 


came.  The  Secretary  of  War  would  not  let  us  have  a  man  in  the  way  of  reen- 
forcement,  the  plea  being  that  reinforcements  would  irritate  the  people.  The 
secessionists  could  hardly  be  restrained  from  attacking  us,  but  the  leaders  kept 
them  back,  knowing  that  our  workmen  were  laboring  in  their  interests,  at  the 
expense  of  the  United  States.  When  Captain  Truman  Seymour  was  sent  with 
a  party  to  the  United  States  arsenal  in  Charleston  to  get  some  friction  primers 
and  a  little  ammunition,  a  crowd  interfered  and  drove  his  men  back.  It  became 
evident,  as  I  told  Anderson,  that  we  could  not  defend  the  fort,  because  the 
houses  around  us  on  Sullivan's  Island  looked  down  into  Moultrie,  and  could 
be  occupied  by  our  enemies.  At  last  it  was  rumored  that  two  thousand 
riflemen  had  been  detailed  to  shoot  us  down  from  the  tops  of  those  houses.  I 
proposed  to  anticipate  the  enemy  and  burn  the  dwellings,  but  Anderson  would 
not  take  so  decided  a  step  at  a  time  when  the  North  did  not  believe  there 
was  going  to  be  war.  It  was  plain  that  the  only  thing  to  be  done  was  to  slip 
over  the  water  to  Fort  Sumter,  but  Anderson  said  he  had  been  assigned  to 
Fort  Moultrie,  and  that  he  must  stay  there.  We  were  then  in  a  very  peculiar 
position.  It  was  commonly  believed  that  we  would  not  be  supported  even  by 
the  North,  as  the  Democrats  had  been  bitterly  opposed  to  the  election  of 
Lincoln ;  that  at  the  first  sign  of  war  twenty  thousand  men  in  sympathy 
with  the  South  would  rise  in  New  York.  Moreover,  the  one  to  whom  we 


FROM   MOULTRIE  TO  SUMTER. 


43 


THE    SEA    BATTERY    OF    FORT    MOULTRIE. 
FROM    A    PHOTOGRAPH    TAKEN    BEFORE    THE    WAR. 


soldiers  always  looked  up  as  to  a  father, — the  Secretary  of  War,  seemed  to  be 
devising  arrangements  to  have  us  made  away  with.  We  believed  that  in 
the  event  of  an  outbreak  from  Charleston  few  of  us  would  survive ;  but  it 
did  not  greatly  concern  us,  since  that  risk  was  merely  a  part  of  our  business, 
and  we  intended  to  make  the  best  fight  we  could.  The  officers,  upon  talk 
ing  the  matter  over,  thought  they  might  control  any  demonstration  at 
Charleston  by  throwing  shells  into  the  city  from  Castle  Pinckney.  But,  with 
only  sixty-four  soldiers  and  a 
brass  band,  we  could  not  de 
tach  any  force  in  that  direction. 

Finally,  Captain  Foster,  who 
had  misapprehended  the  whole 
situation,  and  who  had  orders  to 
put  both  Moultrie  and  Sumter 
in  perfect  order,  brought  sever 
al  hundred  workmen  from  Bal 
timore.  Unfortunately,  these 
wrere  nearly  all  in  sympathy 
with  the  Charlestonians,  many 
even  wearing  secession  badges. 

Bands  of  secessionists  were 
now  patrolling  near  us  by  day 
and  night.  We  were  so  worn  out  with  guard-duty — watching  them — that  on 
one  occasion  my  wife  and  Captain  Seymour's  relieved  us  on  guard,  all  that 
was  needed  being  some  one  to  give  the  alarm  in  case  there  was  an  attempt 
to  break  in.  Foster  thought  that  out  of  his  several  hundred  wrorkmen  he 
could  get  a  few  Union  men  to  drill  at  the  guns  as  a  garrison  in  Castle  Pinck 
ney,  but  they  rebelled  the  moment  they  found  they  were  expected  to  act  as 
artillerists,  and  said  that  they  were  not  there  as  warriors.  It  was  said  that 
when  the  enemy  took  possession  of  the  castle,  some  of  these  workmen  were 
hauled  from  under  beds  and  from  other  hiding-places. 

The  day  before  Christmas  I  asked  Major  Anderson  for  wire  to  make  an 
entanglement  in  front  of  my  part  of  the  fort,  so  that  any  one  who  should  charge 
would  tumble  over  the  wires  and  could  be  shot  at  our  leisure.  I  had  already 
caused  a  sloping  picket  fence  to  be  projected  over  the  parapet  on  my  side  of 
the  works  so  that  scaling-ladders  could  not  be  raised  against  us.  The  dis 
cussion  in  Charleston  over  our  proceedings  was  of  an  amusing  character. 
This  wooden  f raise  puzzled  the  Charleston  militia  and  editors ;  one  of  the 
latter  said,  "  Make  ready  your  sharpened  stakes,  but  you  will  not  intimidate 
freemen." 

When  I  asked  Anderson  for  the  wire,  he  said  I  should  have  a  mile  of  it,  with 
a  peculiar  smile  that  puzzled  me  for  the  moment.  He  then  sent  for  Hall,  the 
post  quartermaster,  bound  him  to  secrecy,  and  told  him  to  take  three  schooners 
and  some  barges  which  had  been  chartered  for  the  purpose  of  taking  the 
women  and  children  and  six  months'  supply  of  provisions  to  Fort  Johnson, 
opposite  Charleston.  He  was  instructed  when  the  secession  patrols  should 


44 


FROM  MOULT RIE   TO  SUMTER. 


-v" 'iVv^vi  HTO1        t>^    \       r  •/)  I  .-.vy*1  ""fcX&Ni;?;  ^.'W.ii  »••*..•'."« 


CHARLESTON 
HARBOR 

AND   VICINITY. 


ask  what  this  meant,  to  tell  them  we  were  sending  off  the  families  of  the 
officers  and  men  to  the  North  because  they  were  in  the  way.  The  excuse 
was  plausible,  and  no  one  interfered.  We  were  so  closely  watched  that  we 
could  make  no  movement  without  demands  being  made  as  to  the  reason 
of  it.  On  the  day  we  left — the  day  after  Christmas — Anderson  gave  up 
his  own  mess,  and  came  to  live  with  me  as  my  guest.  In  the  evening  of 
that  day  I  went  to  notify  the  major  that  tea  was  ready.  Upon  going  to 
the  parapet  for  that  purpose,  I  found  all  the  officers  there,  and  noticed 
something  strange  in  their  manner.  The  problem  was  solved  when  Ander 
son  walked  up  to  me  and  said :  "  Captain,  in  twenty  minutes  you  will  leave 
this  fort  with  your  company  for  Fort  Sumter."  The  order  was  startling  and 
unexpected,  and  I  thought  of  the  immediate  hostilities  of  which  the  movement 


FROM  MOULT RIE   TO  SUMTER.  45 

would  be  the  occasion.  I  rushed  over  to  my  company  quarters  and  informed 
my  men,  so  that  they  might  put  on  their  knapsacks  and  have  everything  in 
readiness.  This  took  about  ten  minutes.  Then  I  went  to  my  house,  told  my 
wife  that  there  might  be  fighting,  and  that  she  must  get  out  of  the  fort  as  soon 
as  she  could  and  take  refuge  behind  the  sand-hills.  I  put  her  trunks  out  of  the 
sally-port,  and  she  followed  them.  Then  I  started  with  my  company  to  join 
Captain  Seymour  and  his  men.  We  had  to  go  a  quarter  of  a  mile  through  the 
little  town  of  Moultrieville  to  reach  the  point  of  embarkation.  It  was  about 
sunset,  the  hour  of  the  siesta,  and  fortunately  the  Charleston  militia  were 
taking  their  afternoon  nap.  We  saw  nobody,  and  soon  reached  a  low 
line  of  sea-wall  under  which  were  hidden  the  boats  in  charge  of  the  three 
engineers,  for  Lieutenants  Snyder  and  Meade  had  been  sent  by  Floyd  to  help 
Captain  Foster  do  the  work  on  the  forts.  The  boats  had  been  used  in  going 
back  and  forward  in  the  work  of  construction,  manned  by  ordinary  work 
men,  who  now  vacated  them  for  our  use.  Lieutenant  Snyder  said  to  me  in  a 
low  tone :  "  Captain,  those  boats  are  for  your  men."  So  saying,  he  started 
with  his  own  party  up  the  coast.  When  my  thirty  men  were  embarked  I 
went  straight  for  Fort  Sumter.  It  was  getting  dusk.  I  made  slow  work  in 
crossing  over,  for  my  men  were  not  expert  oarsmen.  Soon  I  saw  the  lights 
of  the  secession  guard-boat  coming  down  on  us.  I  told  the  men  to  take  off 
their  coats  and  cover  up  their  muskets,  and  I  threw  my  own  coat  open  to 
conceal  my  buttons.  I  wished  to  give  the  impression  that  it  was  an  officer  in 
charge  of  laborers.  The  guard-ship  stopped  its  paddles  and  inspected  us  in 
the  gathering  darkness,  but  concluded  we  were  all  right  and  passed  on.  My 
party  was  the  first  to  reach  Fort  Sumter. 

We  went  up  the  steps  of  the  wharf  in  the  face  of  an  excited  band  of  seces 
sion  workmen,  some  of  whom  were  armed  with  pistols.  One  or  two  Union 
men  among  them  cheered,  but  some  of  the  others  said  angrily :  "  What  are 
these  soldiers  doing  here  ?  what  is  the  meaning  of  this  ? "  Ordering  my  men 
to  charge  bayonets,  we  drove  the  workmen  into  the  center  of  the  fort.  I  took 
possession  of  the  guard-room  commanding  the  main  entrance  and  placed 
sentinels.  Twenty  minutes  after,  Seymour  arrived  with  the  rest  of  the  men. 
Meantime  Anderson  had  crossed  in  one  of  the  engineer  boats.  As  soon 
as  the  troops  were  all  in  we  fired  a  cannon,  to  give  notice  of  our  arrival 
to  the  quartermaster,  who  had  anchored  at  Fort  Johnson  with  the  schooners 
carrying  the  women  and  children.  He  immediately  sailed  up  to  the  wharf 
and  landed  his  passengers  and  stores.  Then  the  workmen  of  secession  sym 
pathies  were  sent  aboard  the  schooners  to  be  taken  ashore. 

Lieutenant  Jefferson  C.  Davis  of  my  company  had  been  left  with  a  rear 
guard  at  Moultrie.  These,  with  Captain  Foster  and  Assistant-Surgeon  Craw 
ford,  stood  at  loaded  columbiads  during  our  passage,  with  orders  to  fire  upon 
the  guard-boats  and  sink  them  if  they  tried  to  run  us  down.  On  withdraw 
ing,  the  rear-guard  spiked  the  guns  of  the  fort,  burned  the  gun-carriages  on 
the  front  looking  toward  Sumter,  and  cut  down  the  flag-staff.  Mrs.  Doubleday 
first  took  refuge  at  the  house  of  the  post  sutler,  and  afterward  with  the  family 
of  Chaplain  Harris,  with  whom  she  sought  shelter  behind  the  sand-hills. 


46  FROM  MOULTRIE  TO  SUMTER. 

When  all  was  quiet  they  paced  the  beach,  anxiously  watching  Fort  Sumter. 
Finding  that  the  South  Carolinians  were  ignorant  of  what  had  happened, 
we  sent  the  boats  back  to  procure  additional  supplies.J 

The  next  morning  Charleston  was  furious.  Messengers  wrere  sent  out  to 
ring  every  door-bell  and  convey  the  news  to  every  family.  The  governor  sent 
two  or  three  of  his  aides  to  demand  that  we  return  to  Moultrie.  Anderson 
replied  in  my  hearing  that  he  was  a  Southern  man,  but  that  he  had  been 
assigned  to  the  defense  of  Charleston  Harbor,  and  intended  to  defend  it. 

Chaplain  Harris  was  a  spirited  old  man.  He  had  lived  at  Charleston  most 
of  his  life  and  knew  the  South  Carolinians  well.  He  visited  Fort  Suniter  on 
our  first  day  there  and  made  a  prayer  at  the  raising  of  the  nag,  after  which 
he  returned  to  his  home  at  Moultrieville.  One  dayjtie  went  to  the  com 
mander  of  Fort  Moultrie  and  said  to  him :  "  Will  any  impediment  be  put  in 
the  way  of  my  going  over  to  Fort  Sumter ! "  The  reply  was :  "  Oh,  110,  par 
son  ;  I  reckon  we'll  give  you  a  pass."  The  chaplain  answered :  "  I  didn't  ask 
you  for  a  pass,  sir.  I  am  a  United  States  officer,  and  will  go  to  any  United 
States  fort  without  your  permission.  I  asked  you  a  different  question:  whether 
you  would  prevent  my  going  by  force."  He  was  not  allowed  to  cross,  after  that. 

We  had  110  light  and  were  obliged  to  procure  some  if  possible,  for  the  win 
ter  nights  were  long.  There  was  much  money  due  the  workmen  who  had  been 
discharged,  and  the  secessionists  sent  them  over  to  demand  their  pay.  Mrs. 
Doubleday  came  in  the  same  boat  with  them,  and  managed  to  ship  us  a 
box  of  candles  at  the  same  time ;  she  also  brought  a  bandbox  full  of 
matches.  At  the  same  time  Mrs.  Seymour  reached  us  stealthily  in  a  boat 
rowed  by  two  little  boys.  Mrs.  Foster  was  already  there.  Anderson  thought 
there  was  going  to  be  trouble,  so  he  requested  the  ladies  to  return  to  Moultrie 
ville  that  night.  The  next  day  they  went  to  a  Charleston  hotel,  where  they 
were  obliged  to  keep  very  quiet  and  have  their  meals  served  privately  in  their 
rooms.  After  a  day  or  two  they  left  for  the  North,  on  account  of  the  feeling 
in  the  city. 

From  December  26th  until  April  12th  we  busied  ourselves  in  preparing  for 
the  expected  attack,  and  our  enemies  did  the  same  on  all  sides  of  us.  Ander 
son  apparently  did  not  want  reinforcements,  and  he  shrank  from  civil  war. 
He  endured  all  kinds  of  hostile  proceedings  on  the  part  of  the  secessionists, 
in  the  hope  that  Congress  would  make  some  compromise  that  would  save 
slavery  and  the  Union  together. 

Soon  after  daylight  on  the  9th  of  January,  with  my  glass  I  saw  a  large 
steamer  pass  the  bar  and  enter  the  Morris  Island  Channel.  It  was  the  Star 
of  the  West,  with  reinforcements  and  supplies  for  us.  When  she  came  near 
the  upper  part  of  the  island  the  secessionists  fired  a  shot  at  her.  I  hastened 

^  I  will   give    an   incident    here   to   show  how  successful  transit  to  Fort  Sumter,  went  back  to 

completely  even  our  own  people  were  deceived  by  Moultrie  in  small  boats  to  procure  additional  sup- 

the    celerity   and    secrecy   of    Major    Anderson's  plies,   Davis  walked  over  to  the  mess.     He  was 

movement.      Lieutenant  Davis    and   some   other  received  very  indignantly  by  the  woman,  for  coming 

officers  had  a  mess,  which  was  in  charge  of  the  to  supper  when  everything  was  cold.  Nothing  could 

wife  of  one  of  the  soldiers.     She  had  prepared  the  exceed  her  astonishment  when  she  learned  that  the 

evening  meal  as  usual  and  was  amazed   that  no  entire  garrison  was  in  Fort  Sumter.    Davis  carried 

one  came  to  eat  it.     When  the  officers,  after  their  her  and  her  pots  and  kettles  back  with  him. 


FROM  MOULTRIE   TO  SUMTER.  47 

to  Major  Anderson's  room,  and  was  ordered  by  him  to  have  the  long  roll 
beaten  and  to  post  the  men  at  the  barbette  guns.  By  the  time  we  reached 
the  parapet  the  transport  coming  to  our  relief  had  approached  so  near 
that  Moultrie  opened  fire.  Major  Anderson  would  not  allow  us  to  return 
the  fire,  so  the  transport  turned,  about  and  steamed  seaward.  Ander 
son  asked  for  an  explanation  of  the  firing  from  Governor  Pickens,  and 
announced  that  he  would  allow  no  vessel  to  pass  within  range  of  the  guns  of 
Suinter  if  the  answer  was  unsatisfactory.  Governor  Pickens  replied  that  he 
would  renew  the  firing  under  like  circumstances.  I  think  Major  Anderson 
had  received  an  intimation  that  the  Star  of  the  West  was  coming,  but  did  not 
believe  it.  He  thought  General  Scott  would  send  a  man-of-war  instead  of  a 
merchant  vessel.  Great  secrecy  was  observed  in  loading  her,  but  the  purpose 
of  the  expedition  got  into  the  newspapers,  and,  of  course,  was  telegraphed  to 
Charleston.  Bishop  Stevens  of  the  Methodist  Church  stated  in  a  speech 
made  by  him  on  Memorial  Day  in  the  Academy  of  Music,  New  York,  that 
he  aimed  the  first  gun  against  the  Star  of  the  West.  I  aimed  the  first  gun  on 
our  side  in  reply  to  the  attack  on  Fort  Sumter. 

Sure  that  we  would  all  be  tasked  to  the  utmost  in  the  coming  conflict,  and 
be  kept  on  the  alert  by  day  and  night,  I  desired  to  get  all  the  sleep  I  could 
beforehand,  and  lay  down  on  a  cot  bedstead  in  the  magazine  nearest  to 
Morris  Island, —  one  of  the  few  places  that  would  be  shell-proof  when  the  fire 
opened.  About  4  A.  M.  on  the  12th,  Major  Anderson  came  to  me  as  his 
executive  officer,  and  informed  me  that  the  enemy  would  fire  upon  us  as  soon 
as  it  was  light  enough  to  see  the  fort.  He  said  he  would  not  return  it  until 
it  was  broad  daylight,  the  idea  being  that  he  did  not  desire  to  waste  his 
ammunition. 

We  have  not  been  in  the  habit  of  regarding  the  signal  shell  fired  from  Fort 
Johnson  as  the  first  gun  of  the  conflict,  although  it  was  undoubtedly  aimed 
at  Fort  Sumter.  Edmund  Ruffin  of  Virginia  is  usually  credited  with  opening 
the  attack  by  firing  the  first  gun  from  the  iron-clad  battery  on  Morris  Island. 
The  ball  from  that  gun  struck  the  wall  of  the  magazine  where  I  was  lying, 
penetrated  the  masonry,  and  burst  very  near  my  head.  As  the  smoke  from 
this  explosion  came  in  through  the  ventilators  of  the  magazine,  and  as  the 
floor  was  strewn  with  powder  where  the  flannel  cartridges  had  been  filled, 
I  thought  for  a  moment  the  place  was  on  fire. 

When  it  was  fully  light  we  took  breakfast  leisurely  before  going  to  the 
guns,  our  food  consisting  of  pork  and  water. 

The  first  night  after  the  bombardment  we  expected  that  the  naval  vessels 
outside  would  take  advantage  of  the  darkness  to  send  a  fleet  of  boats  with 
reinforcements  of  men  and  supplies  of  provisions,  and  as  it  was  altogether 
probable  that  the  enemy  would  also  improvise  a  fleet  of  small  boats  to  meet 
those  of  the  navy,  it  became  an  interesting  question,  in  case  parties  came  to 
us  in  this  way,  to  decide  whether  we  were  admitting  friends  or  enemies. 
However,  the  night  passed  quietly  away  without  any  demonstration. 

Captain  Chester,  in  his  paper  which  follows,  has  omitted  a  fact  that  I  will 
mention.  As  the  fire  against  us  came  from  all  directions,  a  shot  from 


48 


FROM  MOULT RIE   TO  SUMTER. 


THE    HOT-SHOT    FURNACE,    FORT   MOUI.TRIE  —  FROM    A    PHOTOGRAPH. 


Sullivan's  Island  struck  near  the  lock  of  the  magazine,  and  bent  the  copper 
door,  so  that  all  access  to  the  few  cartridges  we  had  there  was  cut  off.  Just 
previous  to  this  the  officers  had  been  engaged,  amid  a  shower  of  shells,  in 
vigorous  efforts  to  cut  away  wood-work  which  was  dangerously  near  the 
magazine. 

After  the  surrender  we  were  allowed  to  salute  our  flag  with  a  hundred 
guns  before  marching  out,  but  it  was  very  dangerous  and  difficult  to  do  so ; 
for,  owing  to  the  recent  conflagration,  there  were  fire  and  'sparks  all  around 
the  cannon,  and  it  was  not  easy  to  find  a  safe  place  of  deposit  for  the  car 
tridges.  It  happened  that  some  flakes  of  fire  had  entered  the  muzzle  of  one 
of  the  guns  after  it  was  sponged.  Of  course,  when  the  gunner  attempted  to 
ram  the  cartridge  down  it  exploded  prematurely,  killing  Private  Daniel 
Hough  instantly,  and  setting  fire  to  a  pile  of  cartridges  underneath,  which 
also  exploded,  seriously  wounding  five  men.  Fifty  guns  were  fired  in  the 
salute. 

With  banners  flying,  and  with  drums  beating  "Yankee  Doodle,"  we 
marched  on  board  the  transport  that  was  to  take  us  to  the  steamship  Baltic, 
which  drew  too  much  water  to  pass  the  bar  and  was  anchored  outside.  We 
were  soon  on  our  way  to  New  York. 

With  the  first  shot  against  Sumter  the  whole  North  became  united.  Mobs 
went  about  New  York  and  made  every  doubtful  newspaper  and  private  house 
display  the  Stars  and  Stripes.  When  we  reached  that  city  we  had  a  royal 
reception.  The  streets  were  alive  with  banners.  Our  men  and  officers  were 
seized  and  forced  to  ride  on  the  shoulders  of  crowds  wild  with  enthusiasm. 
When  we  purchased  anything,  merchants  generally  refused  all  compensation. 


FROM  MOULTRIE  TO  SUMTER. 


49 


Fort  Hamilton,  where  we  were  stationed,  was  besieged  with  visitors,  many  of 
whom  were  among  the  most  highly  distinguished  in  all  walks  of  life.  The 
Chamber  of  Commerce  of  New  York  voted  a  bronze  medal  to  each  officer  and 
soldier  of  the  garrison. 

We  were  soon  called  upon  to  take  an  active  part  in  the  war,  and  the  two 
Sumter  companies  were  sent  under  my  command  to  reenforce  General  Patter 
son's  column,  which  was  to  serve  in  the  Shenandoah  Valley.  Our  march  through 
Pennsylvania  was  a  continuous  ovation.  Flowers,  fruits,  and  delicacies  of  all 
kinds  were  showered  upon  us,  and  the  hearts  of  the  people  seemed  overflow 
ing  with  gratitude  for  the  very  little  we  had  been  able  to  accomplish. 

Major  Anderson  was  made  a  brigadier-general  in  the  regular  army,  and 
assigned  to  command  in  his  native  State,  Kentucky ;  but  his  system  had  been 
undermined  by  his  great  responsibilities  ;  he  was  threatened  with  softening 
of  the  brain,  and  was  obliged  to  retire  from  active  service.  The  other  officers 
were  engaged  in  battles  and  skirmishes  in  many  parts  of  the  field  of  war. 
Anderson,  Foster,  Seymour,  Crawford,  Davis,  and  myself  became  major- 
generals  of  volunteers.  Norman  J.  Hall,  who  rendered  brilliant  service  at 
Gettysburg,  became  a  colonel,  and  would  doubtless  have  risen  higher  had  he 
not  been  compelled  by  ill  health  to  retire.  Talbot  became  an  assistant 
adjutant-general  with  the  rank  of  captain,  but  died  before  the  war  had  fairly 
begun.  He  was  not  with  us  during  the  bombardment,  as  he  had  been  sent  as 
a  special  messenger  to  Washington  with  dispatches.  Lieutenant  Snyder  of 
the  engineers,  a  most  promising  young  officer,  also  died  at  the  very  com 
mencement  of  hostilities. 

Only  one  of  our  number  left  us  and  joined  the  Confederacy, — Lieutenant 
R.  K.  Meade  of  the  engineers,  a  Virginian.  His  death  occurred  soon  after. 


SUMTER.  GUARD-BOAT. 

MAJOK    ANDERSON'S    MEN    CROSSING    IN    BOATS    TO    FORT    SUMTER.      FROM    A    WAR-TIME    SKETCH. 


VOL.  I.    4 


g  gL KJ          ^ 

jfe^W;^^ 

i    Wt^llflllffillMjrtMlMlIlilSlI! ; 


-    --  "'-.  ;    ;    .'•  '    f  j:  :        ,"  i'  |;      ("p"  [•     T^^feti  '      ,i    :  :'^   Ti   ~          '•-"  " 

ji1]  -^  jft;,%lU^ilWfe^ 

'^:3==Aia^: 


INSIDE   SUMTER   IN   '61. 

BY  JAMES   CHESTER,   CAPTAIN  THIRD   ARTILLERY,   U.  S.  A. 

TOWARD  the  close  of  I860,  the  national  defenses  of  Charleston  Harbor, 
consisting  of  Castle  Pinckney,  Fort  Moultrie,  and  Fort  Sumter,  were 
garrisoned  by  an  army  of  65  men  instead  of  the  1050  men  that  were  required. 
Fort  Moultrie  alone,  where  the  65  soldiers  were  stationed,  required  300  men 
for  its  defense,  and  Fort  Sumter,  to  which  they  were  ultimately  transferred, 
was  designed  for  a  garrison  of  650. 

Fort  Moultrie,  at  the  time  of  which  we  write,  was  considered  a  rather  pleas 
ant  station,  Sullivan's  Island  being  a  favorite  summer  resort.  Many  of  the 
wealthy  citizens  of  Charleston  had  their  summer  residences  there,  and  indeed 
some  of  them  lived  there  all  the  year  round.  There  was  a  large  summer  hotel 
on  the  beach  half-way  up  the  island,  and  a  horse  railway  connected  the  steam 
boat  wharf  and  the  hotel.  The  military  reservation  stretched  across  the  island 
from  the  front  to  the  back  beach,  like  a  waistbelt  of  moderate  width,  and 
the  fort  looked  like  a  big  buckle  at  the  front  end.  It  was  a  brick  structure, 
or  rather  an  earthen  structure  revetted  with  brick.  It  was  bastioned  on  the 
land  side,  and  had  a  scarp  wall  perhaps  fifteen  feet  high ;  but  the  sand  had 
drifted  against  it  at  some  points  so  as  almost  to  bury  its  masonry.  With 
its  full  complement  of  men  it  could  hardly  have  been  held  against  a  numerous 
and  enterprising  enemy,  and  with  65  men  it  was  plainly  untenable. 

This  garrison  consisted  of  two  skeleton  companies  and  the  regimental  band 
of  the  1st  Artillery.  They  had  occupied  the  fort  since  1857,  and  were  fairly 
well  acquainted  in  the  neighborhood.  Indeed,  several  of  the  men  had  been 
enlisted  at  the  post,  and  were  native  Carolinians.  As  the  political  pot  began 
to  boil  toward  the  close  of  1860  and  secession  was  openly  discussed,  the  social 
position  of  the  garrison  became  anomalous.  Army  officers  had  always  been 
favorites  in  the  South ;  and  as  they  were  discreet  and  agreeable,  it  is  not  sur 
prising,  perhaps,  that  their  society  continued  to  be  sought  after,  even  by  the 
most  outspoken  secessionists,  up  to  the  actual  commencement  of  hostilities. 
But  enlisted  men,  even  in  the  South,  were  social  outcasts.  It  was  rather  sur 
prising,  therefore,  to  find  them  receiving  attentions  from  civilians.  But  the 
fact  is  that  the  soldiers  of  the  army  were  never  before  treated  with  such 
consideration  in  the  South  as  on  the  eve  of  the  rebellion.  •£  The  secession- 

•fc  An  amusing  incident  which  illustrates  this  always  peculiar.  It  could  hardly  be  said  that 
occurred  during  the  election  excitement  in  Novem-  there  were  two  parties,  but  there  generally  were 
ber,  1860.  Elections  in  South  Carolina  were  two  candidates  tor  every  office  in  the  State.  In 

50 


INSIDE  SUMTER  IN  '61.  51 

ists  were  determined  to  have  the  fort,  and  they  wanted  to  get  it  without 
bloodshed.  They  had  failed  with  the  commissioned  officers,  and  they  had 
no  better  success  with  the  soldiers :  every  enlisted  man  remained  faithful 
to  the  Union. 

The  old  commander  of  Fort  Moultrie,  Colonel  John  L.  Gardner,  was 
removed;  the  new  one,  Major  Robert  Anderson  of  Kentucky,  arrived  on 
November  21st.  As  a  Southern  man,  he  was  expected  to  be  reasonable.  If  he 
had  scruples  upon  the  question  of  qualified  allegiance,  he  might  surrender 
on  demand,  on  purely  professional  grounds.  No  one  doubted  Major  Ander 
son's  professional  ability,  and  of  course  he  could  see  the  hopelessness  of 
his  situation  at  Moultrie.  Moreover,  he  was  a  humane  man,  and  would  be 
unwilling  to  shed  blood  needlessly.  But  his  actions  clearly  indicated  that  he 
would  not  surrender  on  demand.  He  continued  defensive  preparations  with 
as  much  energy  and  zeal  as  his  predecessor,  and  manifestly  meant  to  fight. 
This  was  very  discouraging  to  the  preachers  of  bloodless  secession,  and  when 
he  transferred  his  command  to  Suniter  their  occupation  was  completely  gone. 
Nothing  but  war  would  now  get  him  out.  Hence  the  efforts  to  get  him 
ordered  back  again  by  President  Buchanan — efforts  which  almost  succeeded. 

The  transfer  of  Major  Anderson's  command  from  Moultrie  to  Sumter  was 
neatly  executed  early  in  the  evening  of  December  26th,  1860.  It  was  a  few 
minutes  after  sunset  when  the  troops  left  Moultrie ;  the  short  twilight  was 
about  over  when  they  reached  the  boats;  fifteen  or  twenty  minutes  more  car 
ried  them  to  Sumter.  The  workmen  had  just  settled  down  to  an  evening's 
enjoyment  when  armed  men  at  the  door  startled  them.  There  was  no  par 
leying,  no  explaining ;  nothing  but  stern  commands,  silent  astonishment,  and 
prompt  obedience.  The  workmen  were  on  the  wharf,  outside  the  fort,  before 
they  were  certain  whether  their  captors  were  secessionists  or  Yankees. 

Meantime  the  newly  arrived  troops  were  busy  enough.  Guards  were 
posted,  einbrasures  secured,  and,  as  far  as  practicable,  the  place  was  put  in 
a  defensible  condition  against  any  storming-party  which  chagrin  might  drive 
the  guard-boat  people  to  send  against  it.  Such  an  attempt  was  perfectly 
feasible.  The  night  was  very  dark ;  the  soldiers  were  on  unknown  ground 

such  eases  the  candidates  would  each  give  a  barbe-  had  had  his  eyes  on  the  fragment  of  ham  for  some 

cue  or  feast  of  some  kind  to  the  voters,  at  which  time,  deliberately  mounted  the  table  at  the  lower 

stump   speeches   were   delivered  in   a   somewhat  end,  and  carefully  picking  his  steps  among  the 

florid  style.     The  whole  body  of  voters  attended  dishes,  walked  to  the  chairman's  end,  picked  up 

both  entertainments,  and  it  is  to  be  feared  decided  the  coveted  fragment,  and  started  on  the  return 

rather  upon  the  merits  of  the  feast  than  the  fitness  trip.     The  audacity  of  the  man  stunned  the  audi- 

of  the  candidate.  At  one  of  these  entertainments  on  ence  for  a  moment,  but  indignation  soon  got  the 

Sullivan's  Island,  the  regimental  band  attended,—  better  of   astonishment,  and  the   soldier  was  in 

hired  as  an  attraction, —and  such  soldiers  as  were  some  danger  of  rough  treatment.  But  the  chairman 

on  pass  gathered  around  the  outskirts  of  the  crowd  had  his  revolver  out  in  a  second,  and  holding  it 

which  surrounded  the  open-air  supper  table.    The  aloft  proclaimed:   "I'll  shoot  the  first  man  who 

supper  was  over,   and  the   speaking  had  begun,  interferes  with   that   soldier."    And   the   soldier 

Everything  eatable  had  been  devoured  except  a  carried    off    the   fragment.      Of    course    he    was 

remnant  of  ham  which  rested  on  a  platter  in  front  drunk;  but  he  could  not  have  done  the  same  thing 

of  the  chairman  — who  perhaps  was  also  the  can-  without   a  drubbing  in  1859.     This    anecdote  — 

didate  — at  one  end  of  the  long  table.  The  chairman  and  others  might  be  related  — indicates  the  policy 

was  speaking,  and  the  audience  was  enthusiastic,  and   perhaps  the   expectations   of  the  secessioi 

A  storm  of  applause  had  just  broken  out  at  some-  ists  in  connection  with  the  soldiers  of  Fort  Moul- 

thing  the  speaker  had  said,  when  a  soldier,  who  trie. —  J.  C. 


52  INSIDE  SUMTER  IN  '61. 

and  could  not  find  their  way  about  readily ;  many  of  the  embrasures  could 
not  be  closed ;  and  there  were  at  least  a  hundred  willing  guides  and  helpers 
already  on  the  wharf  and  in  a  fine  frame  of  mind  for  such  work.  But  nothing 
was  attempted,  and  when  the  soldiers  felt  themselves  in  a  position  to  repel 
any  attempt  against  them  that  night,  two  guns  were  fired  as  a  signal  to 
friends  that  the  occupation  had  been  successfully  accomplished,  and  that  they 
might  proceed  with  their  part  of  the  programme.  This  was  the  first  intima 
tion  the  guard-boat  people  had  of  the  transfer;  and,  indeed,  it  told  them 
nothing,  except  that  some  soldiers  must  have  got  into  Sumter.  But  they 
blew  their  alarm- whistle  all  the  same,  and  burned  blue-lights ;  signal-rockets 
were  sent  up  from  various  points,  and  there  was  great  excitement  everywhere 
in  the  harbor  until  morning. 

When  the  signal-guns  were  fired,  the  officer  in  charge  of  the  two  schooners 
which  had  carried  provisions  and  ammunition  to  Fort  Johnson  (under  the 
pretense  that  they  were  subsistence  for  the  women  and  children,  whom  he  had 
also  carried  there  as  a  cloak)  cast  loose  his  lines  and  made  all  speed  for 
Sumter,  and  the  old  sergeant  who  had  been  left  in  Moultrie  for  the  purpose 
set  fire  to  the  combustibles  which  had  been  heaped  around  the  gun-carriages, 
while  another  man  spiked  the  guns.  The  garrison  from  the  ramparts  of  its 
new  nest  grimly  approved  of  the  destruction  of  the  old  one. 

At  dawn  of  December  27th  the  men  were  up  and  ready  for  any  emergency; 
indeed,  most  of  them  had  been  up  all  night.  Captain  Foster  had  been  spe 
cially  busy  with  his  former  employees.  Among  them  he  found  several  loyal 
men,  and  also  some  doubtful  ones  who  were  willing  to  share  the  fortunes 
of  the  garrison.  These  constituted  an  acceptable  addition  to  our  work 
ing  strength,  although  those  classed  as  doubtful  would  have  been  an  ele 
ment  of  weakness  in  case  of  a  fight.  However,  they  did  much  good  work 
before  hostilities  began,  and  the  worst  ones  were  weeded  out  before  we  were 
closely  invested.  Those  who  remained  to  the  end  were  excellent  men.  They 
endured  the  hardships  of  the  siege  and  the  dangers  of  the  bombardment  without 
a  murmur,  and  left  Sumter  with  the  garrison  —  one  of  them,  John  Swearer, 
severely  wounded  —  with  little  besides  the  clothes  they  stood  in.  They  were 
the  first  volunteers  for  the  Union,  but  were  barred  from  the  benefits  secured 
by  legislation  for  the  national  soldiers,  having  never  been  "  mustered  in." 

Fort  Sumter  was  unfinished,  and  the  interior  was  filled  with  building 
materials,  guns,  carriages,  shot,  shell,  derricks,  timbers,  blocks  and  tackle, 
and  coils  of  rope  in  great  confusion.  Few  guns  were  mounted,  and  these 
few  were  chiefly  on  the  lowest  tier.  The  work  was  intended  for  three  tiers 
of  guns,  but  the  embrasures  of  the  second  tier  were  incomplete,  and  guns 
could  be  mounted  on  the  first  and  third  tiers  only. 

The  complete  armament  of  the  work  had  not  yet  arrived,  but  there  were 
more  guns  on  hand  than  we  could  mount  or  man.  The  first  thing  to  be  con 
sidered  was  immediate  defense.  The  possibility  of  a  sudden  dash  by  the 
enemy,  under  cover  of  darkness  and  guided  by  the  discharged  workmen  then 
in  Charleston,  demanded  instant  attention.  It  was  impossible  to  spread  65 
men  over  ground  intended  for  650,  so  some  of  the  embrasures  had  to  be 


INSIDE  SUMTER  IN  '61. 


THE    SALLY-PORT    OF    FORT    SUMTER. 
FROM    A    PHOTOGRAPH    TAKEN    FROM    THE    WHARF. 


bricked  up.  Selecting  those,  therefore,  essential  to  artillery  defense,  and 
mounting  guns  in  them,  Anderson  closed  the  rest.  This  was  the  work  of 
many  days ;  but  we  were  in  no  immediate  danger  of  an  artillery  attack.  The 
armament  of  Moultrie  was  destroyed ;  its  guns  were  spiked,  and  their  car 
riages  burned ;  and  it  would  take  a  longer  time  to  put  them  in  condition  than 
it  would  to  mount  the  guns  of  Sumter. 

On  the  parade  were  quantities  of  flag-stones  standing  on  end  in 
masses  and  columns  everywhere.  We  dared  not  leave  them  where  they 
were,  even  if  they  had  not 
been  in  the  way,  because 
mortar  shells  bursting 
among  them  would  have 
made  the  very  bomb-proofs 
untenable.  A  happy  idea 
occurred  to  some  one  in  au 
thority,  and  the  flag-stones 
were  arranged  two  tiers 
high  in  front  of  the  case 
mates,  and  just  under  the 
arches,  thus  partly  closing 
the  casemates  and  making 
excellent  splinter-proofs. 
This  arrangement,  no  doubt, 
saved  the  garrison  from  many  wounds  similar  to  that  inflicted  on  John 
Swearer,  for  it  was  in  passing  an  opening  unprotected  by  the  screen  that 
he  was  struck  by  a  fragment  of  shell. 

Moving  such  immense  quantities  of  material,  mounting  guns,  distributing 
shot,  and  bricking  up  embrasures  kept  us  busy  for  many  weeks.  But  order 
was  coming  out  of  chaos  every  day,  and  the  soldiers  began  to  feel  that  they 
were  a  match  for  their  adversaries.  Still,  they  could  not  shut  their  eyes  to 
the  fact  that  formidable  works  were  growing  up  around  them.  The  seces 
sionists  were  busy  too,  and  they  had  the  advantage  of  unlimited  labor  and 
material.  Fort  Moultrie  had  its  armament  again  in  position,  and  was  receiv 
ing  the  framework  of  logs  which  formed  the  foundation  for  its  sandbag  bomb- 
proofs.  The  Stevens'  Point  floating  battery  was  being  made  impregnable  by 
an  overcoat  of  railroad  iron ;  and  batteries  on  Morris,  James,  and  Sullivan's 
islands  were  approaching  completion.  But  our  preparations  were  more 
advanced  than  theirs ;  and  if  we  had  been  permitted  to  open  on  them  at 
this  time,  the  bombardment  of  Sumter  would  have  had  a  very  different  ter 
mination.  But  our  hands  were  tied  by  policy  and  instructions. 

The  heaviest  guns  in  Sumter  were  three  ten-inch  columbiads — considered 
very  big  guns  in  those  days.  They  weighed  fifteen  thousand  pounds  each, 
and  were  intended  for  the  gorge  and  salient  angles  of  the  work.  We  found 
them  skidded  on  the  parade  ground.  Besides  these  there  was  a  large  number 
of  eight-inch  columbiads — more  than  we  could  mount  or  man — and  a  full 
supply  of  42,  32,  and  24-pounders,  and  some  eight-inch  sea-coast  howitzers. 


54 


INSIDE  SUMTER  IN  '61. 


GROUND-PLAN    OF    FORT    SUMTK.R. 
BASED    ON    AN    OFFICIAL    DRAWING. 


There  was  an  ample  supply  of  shot  and  shell,  and  plenty  of  powder  in  the 
magazines,  but  friction  primers  were  not  abundant  and  cartridge-bags  were 
scarce.  The  scarcity  of  cartridge-bags  drove  us  to  some  strange  makeshifts. 
During  the  bombardment  several  tailors  were  kept  busy  making  cartridge- 
bags  out  of  soldiers'  flannel  shirts,  and  we 
fired  away  several  dozen  pairs  of  woolen 
socks  belonging  to  Major  Anderson.  In  the 
matter  of  friction  primers  strict  economy 
had  to  be  observed,  as  we  had  no  means  of 
improvising  a  substitute. 

Our  first  efforts  in  preparation  were  di 
rected  toward  mounting  the  necessary  guns 
on  the  lowest  tier.  These  consisted  of  42  and 
32-pounders,  and  as  the  necessary  trucks, 
gins,  and  tackle  were  on  hand,  the  work 
went  on  rapidly.  The  men  were  in  fine  con 
dition  and  as  yet  well  fed;  besides,  they 
had  the  assistance  of  the  engineer  workmen, 
who  soon  became  experts  at  this  kind  of  work.  Meantime  a  party  of 
mechanics  were  making  the  main  gate  secure.  This  was  situated  at  the 
middle  of  the  gorge  or  base  of  the  pentagon  (the  trace  of  the  work  was  pen 
tagonal),  which  was  also  the  south-west  side.  It  was  closed  by  two  heavy 
iron-studded  gates,  the  outer  a  folding  pair,  and  the  inner  arranged  on 
pulleys,  so  that  it  could  be  raised  or  lowered  at  will.  It  was  clear  that  the 
enemy,  if  he  meant  to  bombard  us,  would  erect  batteries  on  Morris  Island, 
and  thus  would  be  able  to  deliver  an  oblique  fire  on  the  gate  sufficient  to 
demolish  it  in  a  very  few  minutes.  The  gate  once  demolished,  a  night 
assault  would  become  practicable. 

To  meet  this  possible  emergency  the  main  entrance  was  closed  by  a  sub 
stantial  brick  wall,  with  a  man-hole  in  the  middle  two  feet  wide  and  opposite 
to  the  man-hole  in  the  gate.  This  wall  was  about  six  feet  high,  and  to  increase 
the  security  and  sweep  the  wharf,  an  eight-inch  sea-coast  howitzer  was 
mounted  on  its  upper  carriage  without  any  chassis,  so  as  to  fire  through  the 
man-hole.  The  howitzer  was  kept  loaded  with  double  canister.  To  induce 
the  belief  that  the  folding  gates  were  our  sole  dependence  at  this  point,  their 
outer  surface  was  covered  with  iron. 

The  lower  tier  of  guns  being  mounted,  the  more  difficult  operation  of  send 
ing  guns  up  to  the  third  tier  began.  The  terre-plein  of  the  work  was  about 
fifty  feet  above  parade  level, —  a  considerable  hoist, —  but  a  pair  of  shears  being 
already  in  position,  and  our  tackle  equal  to  the  wreight  of  eight-inch  colum- 
biads,  the  work  went  on  amidst  much  good  humor  until  all  the  guns  of  that 
caliber  were  in  position. 

We  had  now  reached  a  problem  more  difficult  to  solve,  namely,  sending  up 
our  ten-inch  columbiads.  We  were  extremely  desirous  to  have  them — or  at 
least  two  of  them — on  the  upper  tier.  They  were  more  powerful  guns  than 
any  the  enemy  had  at  that  time,  and  the  only  ones  in  our  possession  capable 


INSIDE  SUMTER  IN  '61.  55 

of  smashing  the  iron-clad  defenses  which  might  be  constructed  against  us. 
We  had  rumors  that  an  iron-clad  floating  battery  was  being  built  in  Charles 
ton,  which  the  enemy  proposed  to  anchor  in  some  convenient  position  so  as 
to  breach  Sumter  at  his  leisure.  We  had  no  faith  in  the  penetrating  power 
of  the  eight-inch  guns,  and  if  we  wished  to  demolish  this  floating  adversary, 
it  was  necessary  that  the  ten-inch  guns  should  be  mounted.  Besides,  an  iron 
clad  battery  was  well  on  the  road  to  completion  at  Cumming's  Point  (twelve 
hundred  yards  from  the  weakest  side  of  Sumter),  which,  from  what  we  could 
see  of  it,  would  be  impervious  to  any  less  powerful  gun. 

There  was  in  the  fort  a  large  coil  of  very  heavy  rope,  new,  and  strong 
enough  to  sustain  fifteen  thousand  pounds,  but  some  of  the  doubtful  work 
men  had  cut  several  strands  of  it  at  various  points  on  the  outside  of  the  coil ; 
at  least  we  could  account  in  no  other  way  for  the  damage.  Besides,  we  had 
no  blocks  large  enough  to  receive  the  rope  even  if  it  had  been  uninjured. 
The  rope  was  uncoiled  and  examined.  The  portion  on  the  inner  side  of  the 
coil  was  found  uninjured,  and  a  few  splices  gave  rope  enough  for  a  triple 
tackle  sixty  feet  long.  The  improvisation  of  blocks  of  sufficient  size  and 
strength  now  became  the  sole  remaining  difficulty,  and  it  was  overcome  in 
this  way :  the  gun-carriages  of  those  days  were  made  of  well-seasoned  oak, 
and  one  of  them  was  cut  up  and  the  material  used  for  the  construction  of 
blocks.  When  the  blocks  were  finished  the  iron-clad  battery  was  shorn  of 
half  its  terrors. 

The  tackle  thus  improvised  was  rigged  on  the  shears,  the  first  gun  was 
rolled  into  position  for  hoisting,  the  sling  was  attached,  and  the  windlass  was 
manned.  After  carefully  inspecting  every  knot  and  lashing,  the  officer  in 
charge  gave  the  word,  "  Heave  away,"  and  the  men  bent  to  their  work  steadily 
and  earnestly,  feeling,  110  doubt,  that  the  battle  with  the  iron-clad  had  really 
begun.  Every  eye  watched  the  ropes  as  they  began  to  take  the  strain,  and 
when  the  gun  had  fairly  left  the  skids,  and  there  was  no  accident,  the  song 
which  anxiety  had  suspended  was  resumed,  all  hands  joining  in  the  chorus, 
"  On  the  plains  of  Mexico,"  with  a  sonorous  heartiness  that  might  well  have 
been  heard  at  Fort  Moultrie.  The  gun  made  the  vertical  passage  of  fifty  feet 
successfully,  and  was  safely  landed  on  the  terre-plein.  The  chassis  and 
carriage  were  then  sent  up,  transported  to  the  proper  emplacement,  and  put 
in  position,  and  the  gun  was  mounted. 

The  ten-inch  columbiad  threw  a  shot  weighing  one  hundred  and  twenty-eight 
pounds,  and  it  was  now  necessary  that  a  supply  of  such  shot  should  be  raised. 
Of  course,  they  could  have  been  sent  up  at  the  derrick,  but  that  would  have  been 
a  slow  process,  and,  moreover,  it  would  have  required  the  derrick  and  the  men, 
when  they  were  needed  for  other  work.  So  after  retreat  roll-call,  when  the 
day's  work  was  over,  the  men  were  bantered  by  some  designing  sergeant  as  to 
their  ability  to  carry  a  ten-inch  shot  up  the  stairway.  Some  of  the  soldiers,  full 
of  confidence  and  energy,  shouldered  a  shot  each  and  started.  They  accom 
plished  the  feat,  and  the  less  confident,  unwilling  to  be  outdone  by  comrades  no 
bigger  than  themselves,  shouldered  a  shot  each  and  made  the  passage.  In  a  few 
minutes  sixty  shot  were  deposited  near  the  gun  ;  and  it  became  the  custom  to 


56  INSIDE  SUMTER.  IN  '61. 

carry  up  a  ten-inch  shot  after  retreat — just  for  fun — as  long  as  there  were 
any  to  carry. 

These  trivial  incidents  serve  to  show  the  spirit  and  humor  of  the  men 
better  than  any  description.  There  never  was  a  happier  or  more  contented 
set  of  men  in  any  garrison  than  the  Sumter  soldiers.  There  was  no  sulkiness 
among  them,  and  no  grumbling  until  they  had  to  try  their  teeth  on  spun 
yarn  as  a  substitute  for  tobacco.  This  occurred  long  before  the  ration  was 
reduced,  and  it  produced  some  of  the  loudest  grumbling  ever  listened  to. 

The  second  ten-inch  columbiad  was  less  fortunate  than  its  fellow.  It 
reached  the  level  of  the  terre-plein  without  accident,  but  almost  at  the  first 
haul  on  the  watch  tackle  to  swing  it  in,  it  broke  away  and  fell  with  a  dull 
thud.  There  was  no  mirth  in  the  faces  of  the  men  at  the  watch  tackle  as 
they  looked  over  the  edge  of  the  parade  wall  to  see  how  many  of  the  men  at 
the  windlass  were  left.  The  gun  had  descended,  breech  first,  like  a  bolt  from 
a  catapult,  and  had  buried  itself  in  the  sand  up  to  the  trunnions ;  but  beyond 
breaking  the  transoms  of  the  derrick,  no  damage  was  done.  The  cause  of 
the  accident  was  easily  discovered.  The  amateur  block-maker,  unwilling  to 
weaken  the  blocks  by  too  much  trimming,  had  left  their  upper  edges  too 
sharp,  and  the  strap  of  the  upper  block  had  been  cut  in  consequence.  In  four 
days  the  derrick  was  repaired,  and  the  gun  safely  landed  on  the  terre-plein. 

The  third  ten-inch  columbiad  was  not  sent  up.  It  was  mounted  as  a  mortar 
on  the  parade,  for  the  purpose  of  shelling  Charleston  should  that  become 
advisable.  A  mortar  platform  already  existed  there.  A  ten-inch  top  carriage 
was  placed  on  it  and  the  gun  mounted  pointing  toward  the  city. 

A  laughable  incident  occurred  in  connection  with  this  gun  soon  after  it 
was  mounted.  Some  of  the  officers  were  anxious  to  try  how  it  would  work, 
and  perhaps  to  see  how  true  its  alignment  was,  and  to  advertise  to  the  enemy 
the  fact  that  we  had  at  least  one  formidable  mortar  in  Fort  Sumter.  At  any 
rate  they  obtained  permission  from  Major  Anderson  to  try  the  gun  with  a 
"  very  small  charge."  So,  one  afternoon  the  gun  was  loaded  with  a  blind 
shell,  and  what  was  considered  a  "  very  small  charge  "  of  powder.  The  regu 
lation  charge  for  the  gun,  as  a  gun,  was  eighteen  pounds.  On  this  occasion  two 
pounds  only  were  used.  It  was  not  expected  that  the  shell  would  be  thrown  over 
a  thousand  yards,  and  as  the  bay  was  clear  no  danger  was  anticipated.  Every 
thing  being  in  readiness,  the  gun  was  fired,  and  the  eyes  of  the  garrison 
followed  the  shell  as  it  described  its  graceful  curve  in  the  direction  of  the 
city.  By  the  time  it  reached  the  summit  of  its  trajectory,  the  fact  that  the 
charge  used  was  not  a  "  very  small"  one  for  the  gun  fired  as  a  mortar  became 
painfully  apparent  to  every  observer,  and  fears  were  entertained  by  some 
that  the  shell  would  reach  the  city,  or  at  least  the  shipping  near  the  wharves. 
But  fortunately  it  fell  short,  and  did  no  damage  beyond  scaring  the  seces 
sionist  guard-boat  then  leaving  the  wharf  for  her  nightly  post  of  observation. 
The  guard-boat  put  back  and  Sumter  was  visited  by  a  flag  of  truce,  perhaps 
to  find  out  the  meaning  of  our  performance.  No  doubt  the  explanations 
given  were  satisfactory.  No  more  experiments  for  range  were  tried  with  that 
gun,  but  we  knew  that  Charleston  was  within  range. 


l&^n 


INSIDE  SUMTER  IN  '61.  ^ 

Although  the  full  armament  of  Sumter  was  not  on  hand,  there  were  many 
more   guns   than  places   to   put   them.     This   resulted  from  the   fact  that 
no  guns  were  mounted  on  the  second  tier,  and  because  many  embrasures  on 
the  first  tier  were  bricked  up.     There  were  four  unplaced  eight-inch  colum- 
biads  after  the  fort  had  been   satisfactorily  garnished  with  guns     But  we 
were  entirely  without  mortars.     Perhaps  this  serious  defect  in  our  armament 
and  perhaps  our  success  with  the  ten-inch  gun  mounted  as  a  mortar,  induced 
Major  Anderson  to  mount  his  extra  eight-inch  guns  in  that  way.     Morris 
Island,   twelve   hun 
dred  yards  away,  was 
the      nearest      terra 
firma  to  Fort  Sumter, 
and  there  the  enemy 
would  plant  his  most 
important    batteries. 

The  more  searching     -^^^M^KS^^A  !<i 

and  severe  the  fire 
that  could  be  brought 
to  bear  upon  that 
island,  therefore,  the 
better.  So  the  four 
extra  columbiads 
were  mounted  as 
mortars  to  fire  in 
that  direction.  We 
had  no  carriages  for 
the  guns  and  no  plat 
forms.  So  a  trench 
was  dug  in  the  parade  at  right  angles  to  the  proposed  line  of  fire.  A  heavy 
timber  was  then  embedded  in  the  sand  at  the  bottom  of  the  trench,  and 
another  on  the  Morris  Island  side  of  it,  in  such  a  way  that  a  gun  resting  on 
the  one  and  leaning  on  the  other  would  be  supported  at  an  angle  of  forty- 
five  degrees.  The  guns  were  then  placed  in  notches  at  equal  intervals  along 
the  trench.  We  had  no  opportunity  to  try  this  novel  mortar  battery,  but 
everybody  was  satisfied  that  it  could  have  done  good  service. 

It  was  expected  that  the  walls  of  Fort  Sumter  would  be  able  to  withstand 
the  guns  which  we  knew  the  enemy  possessed,  but  we  did  not  anticipate 
importations  from  abroad.  During  the  bombardment  a  Whitworth  gun  of 
small  caliber,  just  received  from  England,  was  mounted  in  one  of  the  Morris 
Island  batteries,  and  in  a  few  rounds  demonstrated  its  ability  to  breach  the 
work.  Fortunately  its  supply  of  ammunition  was  limited,  and  the  fire  stopped 
short  of  an  actual  breach.  But  a  few  hours  more  of  that  Whitworth  12- 
pounder  would  have  knocked  a  hole  in  our  defenses. 

A  breach  was  not  dreaded  by  the  garrison,  for,  weak  as  it  was,  it  could  have 
given  a  good  account  of  itself  defending  a  breach.  The  greatest  danger  was  a 
simultaneous  attack  on  all  sides.  Sixty-four  men  could  not  be  made  very 


INTERIOR     OF     SUMTER     AFTER     THE      SURRENDER,      SHOWING     THE      8-INCH 

COLUMBIADS    PLANTED    AS    MORTARS,     AM)    THE    CONFEDERATE    FLAG 

FLYING    FliOM    THE    DERRICK    BY    WHICH     THE     GUNS    WERE 

RAISICD   TO    THE    UPPER    TIER.     FROM  A  PHOTOGRAPH. 


58  INSIDE  SUMTER  IN  '61. 

effective  at  a  dozen  different  points.  The  possibility  of  the  enemy,  under 
cover  of  darkness,  getting  a  foothold  in  force  on  the  narrow  bit  of  riprapping 
between  tide-water  and  the  foundation  of  the  scarp  was  ever  present  in 
our  minds. 

The  most  likely  place  to  land  was  the  wharf,  a  stone  structure  in  front  of 
the  main  entrance.  There  an  assaulting  column  might  be  formed  and  the 
main  gate  stormed,  while  the  bulk  of  the  garrison  was  defending  the  embra 
sures.  To  checkmate  any  such  attempt,  means  of  blowing  the  wharf  out  of 
existence  were  devised.  Two  five-gallon  demijohns  filled  with  powder  were 
planted  as  mines,  well  under  the  wharf  pavement,  in  such  a  way  as  to.  insure 
the  total  demolition  of  the  structure  by  their  explosion.  These  -mines  were 
arranged  so  that  both  should  explode  at  the  same  instant.  The  means  of  firing 
were  twofold :  first,  a  powder-hose  leading  from  the  mines  through  a  wooden 
trough  buried  under  the  pavement,  and  terminating  in  a  dry  well  just  inside 
the  gate ;  second,  a  long  lanyard  connected  with  friction  primers  inserted  in 
the  corks  of  the  powder  demijohns,  and  extending  through  the  trough  into  the 
well,  whence  it  branched  like  a  bell  wire  to  convenient  points  inside  the  fort. 

Another  place  offering  special  advantages  to  a  storming  party  was  the 
esplanade.  This  was  a  broad  promenade  extending  the  whole  length  of  the 
gorge  wall  on  the  outside,  and  paved  with  immense  blocks  of  dressed  granite. 
As  Fort  Sumter  was  not  designed  to  resist  attack  by  storm,  the  esplanade 
was  unswept  by  any  fire.  To  remedy  this  defect  the  stone  fougasse  was 
resorted  to.  To  the  uninitiated  the  "  fougasse "  looked  like  a  harmless  pile 
of  stones  resting  against  the  scarp  wall.  The  only  thing  that  would  be  likely 
to  attract  his  attention  was  the  bin-like  inclosure  of  solid  masonry  open  at 
the  outer  side,  which  looked  like  an  immense  dust-pan,  and  which  he  might 
think  was  a  rather  elaborate  arrangement  to  hold  merely  a  pile  of  stones 
together.  There  was  nothing  to  indicate  that  beneath  the  stones,  in  the  angle 
close  to  the  scarp  wall,  a  magazine  of  gunpowder  lay  concealed,  and  that 
behind  were  arrangements  for  firing  it  from  the  inside  of  the  works.  These 
harmless-looking  piles  of  stones  were  mines  of  the  deadliest  kind.  In  addi 
tion,  two  eight-inch  sea-coast  howitzers  were  mounted  on  their  upper  carriages 
only,  and  placed  in  front  of  the  main  entrance,  pointing  to  the  right  and  left 
so  as  to  sweep  the  esplanade. 

The  possibility  of  a  hostile  landing  on  the  narrow  strip  of  riprapping 
between  the  scarp  wall  and  tide-water  still  remained  to  be  provided  for. 
Before  secondary  defenses  were  constructed,  this  was  a  continuous  dead  space 
on  which  a  thousand  men  could  have  found  a  safe  lodgment  perfectly  screened 
from  fire  and  observation.  The  danger  from  such  a  lodgment  was,  that  from 
it  all  our  embrasures  could  have  been  assaulted  at  the  same  time.  It  was 
all-important,  therefore,  that  the  entrance  by  an  embrasure  should  be  made  as 
difficult  as  possible.  The  ledge  of  riprapping  was  little  more  than  four  feet 
below  the  sills  of  the  embrasures,  and  there  would  have  been  no  difficulty  in 
stepping  in,  if  the  two  or  three  guards  inside  were  disposed  of.  This  fact  was 
well  known  to  the  enemy,  and  we  felt  certain  that,  if  he  decided  to  attempt  an 
assault  in  this  way,  he  would  consider  scaling-ladders  unnecessary.  In  order 


INSIDE  SUMTER  IN  '61. 


INTERIOR    OF    S(  MTER    AFTER    THE    BOMBARDMENT,    SHOWING    THE    GATE   AND    THE    GORGE    WALL:    ALSO    OKE 
OF  THE  8-INCII  COLCMBIADS  SET  AS  MORTARS,  BEARING  ON   MORRIS  ISLAND.      FROM  A  PHOTOGRAPH. 

to  disappoint  him,  therefore,  we  removed  the  riprapping  in  front  of  each 
embrasure  to  the  depth  of  four  or  five  feet,  rolling  the  large  stones  into  the 
water.  This  gave  a  height  of  eight  or  nine  feet  to  the  embrasure  sills. 

Machicoulis  galleries  were  also  erected  on  all  the  flanks  and  faces  of  the 
work.  The  machicoulis  when  completed  looked  like  an  immense  dry-goods 
box,  set  upon  the  parapet  so  as  to  project  over  the  wall  some  three  or  four 
feet.  The  beams  upon  which  it  rested  extended  inward  to  the  terre-plein 
and  were  securely  anchored  down.  But  the  dry-goods  box  was  deceptive. 
Inside  it  was  lined  with  heavy  iron  plates  to  make  it  bullet-proof.  That  portion 
of  the  bottom  which  projected  beyond  the  wall  was  loop-holed  for  musketry, 
and  a  marksman  in  the  machicoulis  could  shoot  a  man,  however  close  he 
might  be  to  the  scarp  wall.  But  musketry  from  the  machicoulis  could  hardly 
be  expected  to  beat  off  a  determined  assault  upon  the  flanks  and  faces  of 
the  work.  To  meet  this  difficulty,  hand-grenades  were  improvised.  Shells  of 
all  sizes,  from  12-pounders  to  10-inch,  were  loaded,  and  the  fuse-holes  stopped 
with  wooden  plugs.  The  plugs  were  then  bored  through  with  a  gimlet,  and 
friction  primers  inserted.  Behind  the  parapet  at  short  intervals,  and 
wherever  it  was  thought  they  might  be  useful,  numbers  of  these  shell-grenades 
were  stored  under  safe  cover  in  readiness  for  any  emergency.  The  method 
of  throwing  them  was  simple.  Lanyards  of  sufficient  length  to  reach  to 
within  about  four  feet  of  the  riprapping  were  prepared,  and  fastened  securely 
at  the  handle  end  near  the  piles  of  shell-grenades.  To  throw  a  grenade,  the 
soldier  lifted  it  on  the  parapet,  hooked  the  lanyard  into  the  eye  of  the  friction 
primer,  and  threw  the  shell  over  the  parapet.  When  the  lanyard  reached 
its  length,  the  shell  exploded.  Thus  a  very  few  men  would  be  more  than  a 
match  for  all  that  could  assemble  on  the  riprapping. 


60  INSIDE  SUMTER.  IN  '61. 

Another  contrivance,  the  "  flying  fougasse,"  or  bursting  barrel,  a  device  of 
Captain  Truman  Seymour,  consisted  of  an  ordinary  cask  or  barrel  filled  with 
broken  stones,  and  having  in  its  center  a  canister  of  powder,  sufficient  to 
burst  the  barrel  and  scatter  its  contents  with  considerable  force.  A  fuse  con 
nected  the  powder  in  the  canister  with  a  friction  primer  in  the  bung,  and  the 
barrel  was  exploded  by  attaching  a  lanyard  to  the  eye  of  the  primer,  arid 
letting  the  barrel  roll  over  the  parapet,  as  in  the  case  of  the  shell-grenade.  If 
one  experiment  can  justify  an  opinion,  the  flying  fougasse  wTould  have  been  a 
success.  When  it  became  known  in  the  fort  that  one  of  the  barrels  was  about 
to  be  fired  as  an  experiment,  the  novelty  of  the  thing  attracted  most  of  the 
men  to  the  place,  and  the  little  crowd  attracted  the  attention  of  the  enemy. 
No  doubt  glasses  were  focused  on  the  party  from  every  battery  within  sight. 
When  everything  was  ready  the  barrel  was  allowed  to  roll  over  the  parapet, 
and  an  instant  afterward  a  terrific  explosion  took  place.  The;  stones  were 
thrown  in  every  direction,  and  the  surface  of  the  water  was  lashed  into  foam 
for  a  considerable  distance.  The  effect  as  seen  by  the  secessionists  must 
have  appeared  greater  than  it  did  to  us,  although  we  thought  it  quite  satis 
factory.  The  Charleston  newspapers  described  the  effect  of  the  "  infernal 
machine "  as  simply  terrific.  Only  three  of  them  were  constructed,  yet  for 
moral  effect  an  empty  barrel  set  upon  the  parapet  would  have  been  just  as  good. 

In  war,  plan  as  we  may,  much  depends  upon  accident,  and  the  moral  effect 
of  very  insignificant  incidents  is  often  considerable.  For  this  reason  "  Witty- 
man's  Masterpiece"  deserves  to  be  mentioned.  Wittyman  was  a  German 
carpenter,  not  very  familiar  with  English,  and  wholly  ignorant  of  military 
engineering.  His  captain  had  conceived  the  idea  that  a  die val-de-f rise  across 
the  riprapping  at  the  salient  angles  of  the  fort  would  confine  the  enemy  on 
whatever  face  he  landed  until  he  had  been  treated  liberally  with  shell- 
grenades.  So  Wittyman  was  ordered  to  build  a  clieval-de-frisc  at  the  angle 
of  the  gorge  nearest  Morris  Island.  It  was  easy  to  see  that  Wittyman  was  not 
familiar  with  chevaitx-de-frise,  so  the  captain  explained  and  roughly  illustrated 
the  construction.  At  last  Wittyman  seemed  to  grasp  the  idea  and  went  to 
work  upon  it  forthwith.  Perhaps  the  work  was  not  examined  during  con 
struction,  nor  seen  by  any  one  but  Wittyman  until  it  w^as  placed.  But  from  that 
day  forward  it  was  the  fountain  of  amusement  for  the  men.  No  matter  how 
sick  or  sad  a  man  might  be,  let  him  look  at  the  masterpiece  and  his  ailments 
were  forgotten.  Not  a  steamer  passed, — and  they  were  passing  almost  every 
hour, —  but  every  glass  on  board  was  leveled  at  the  masterpiece.  But  it  baffled 
every  one  of  them.  Not  one  could  guess  what  it  was,  or  what  it  was  intended 
to  be ;  and  after  the  bombardment  was  over  we  learned,  quite  accidentally, 
that  it  had  been  set  down  by  the  enemy  as  a  means  of  exploding  the  mines. 

Any  description  of  the  siege  of  Sumter  would  be  incomplete  without  some 
sort  of  reference  to  the  Star  of  the  West  fiasco.  At  reveille  on  the  9th  of 
January,  it  became  generally  known  among  the  men  that  a  large  steamer 
flying  the  United  States  flag  was  off  the  bar,  seemingly  at  anchor.  There 
had  been  some  talk  among  the  men,  based  upo  a  rumors  from  Charleston, 
that  the  garrison  would  either  be  withdrawn  frc,  the  harbor  or  returned  to 


INSIDE  SUMTEK  IN  '61. 


61 


Fort  Moultrie;  and  there  were  some  who  believed  the  rumors.  These 
believers  were  now  confident  that  withdrawal  had  been  determined  on,  and 
that  the  steamer  off  the  bar  was  the  transport  come  to  take  them  away. 
There  was  no  denying  that  appearances  favored  the  theory,  yet  there  was  no 
enthusiasm.  The  men  were  beginning  to  feel  that  they  were  a  match  for 
their  adversaries,  and  they  were  loath  to  leave  without  proving  it.  And, 
indeed,  at  that  time  Surnter  was  master  of  the  situation.  Moultrie  had  very 
few  guns  mounted,— only  one,  according  to  report,— and  that  fact  ought  to 

have  been  known  to  the  people 
on  the  Star  of  the  West.  It  was 
known  officially  in  Washington 
that  fourteen  days  previously 
Major  Anderson  had  spiked  the 
guns  and  burned  the  carriages 
at  Moultrie,  and  gun-carriages 
cannot  be  replaced  in  two  weeks 
when  they  have  to  be  fabricat 
ed.  Hence  Moultrie  could  not 
have  been  formidable,  and  as 
soon  as  it  should  have  passed 
the  battery  on  Morris  Island,  it 
would  have  been  comparatively 
safe. 

When  the  Star  of  the  West 
was  seen  standing  in,  the  nov 
elty  of  a  steamer  carrying  the 
national  flag  had  more  attrac 
tions  for  the  men  than  the  breakfast  table.  They  soon  made  her  out  to  be 
a  merchant  steamer,  as  the  walking-beam,  plainly  visible  as  she  rounded  into 
the  channel,  was  unknown  on  a  man-of-war.  She  had  taken  the  Morris  Island 
channel,  and  was  approaching  at  a  fair  rate  of  speed.  Perhaps  every  man  in 
Sumter  was  on  the  ramparts,  but  there  was  no  excitement.  But  when  the 
blue  puff  of  smoke  from  a  hidden  battery  on  Morris  Island  advertised  the  fact 
that  she  was  being  fired  on,  there  was  great  scurrying  and  scampering  among 
the  men.  The  long  roll  was  beaten,  and  the  batteries  were  manned  almost 
before  the  guns  of  the  hidden  battery  had  fired  their  second  shot.  As  she 
approached,  a  single  gun  at  Fort  Moultrie  opened  at  extreme  long  range,  its 
shot  falling  over  half  a  mile  short.  There  seemed  to  be  much  perplexity 
among  our  officers,  and  Major  Anderson  had  a  conference  with  some  of 
them  in  a  room  used  as  a  laundry  which  opened  on  the  terre-plein  of  the 
sea-flank.  The  conference  was  an  impromptu  one,  as  Captain  Doubleday 
and  Lieutenant  Davis  were  not  of  it.  But  Captain  Foster  was  there,  and  by 
his  actions  demonstrated  his  disappointment  at  the  result.  He  left  the  laun 
dry,  bounding  up  the  two  or  three  steps  that  led  to  the  terre-plein,  smashing  his 
hat,  and  muttering  someth  'g  about  the  flag,  of  which  the  words  "  trample  on 
it "  reached  the  ears  of  thf  en  at  the  guns,  and  let  them  know  that  there  was 


INTERIOR  OF  FORT   SUMTER  —  THE   10-INCH  COLUMBIAD  BEARING 
OX    CHARLESTON.      FROM    A    PHOTOGRAPH. 


62  INSIDE  SUMTER  IN  '61. 

to  be  no  fighting,  on  their  part  at  least.  Meantime  the  steamer  had  worn 
ship,  and  was  standing  out  again,  receiving  the  fire  of  the  hidden  battery  in 
passing.  This  is  about  all  the  men  saw  or  knew  about  the  strange  vessel 
at  the  time,  although  she  came  near  enough  for  them  to  look  down  upon  her 
decks  and  see  that  there  were  no  troops  visible  on  her.-& 

With  the  exception  of  the  mounting  of  the  guns,  the  preparations  described 
were  chiefly  intended  to  ward  off  assault.  The  actions  of  the  enemy  now 
indicated  that  he  proposed  to  bombard  the  work  at  an  early  day.  If  we 
would  meet  Moultrie,  and  the  numerous  batteries  which  were  being  con 
structed  against  us,  on  anything  like  even  terms,  we  must  be  prepared  to 
shoot  accurately. 

Few  artillerymen,  without  actual  experience,  have  any  idea  of  the  diffi 
culty  of  aiming  a  gun  during  a  bombardment.  They  may  be  able  to  hit  a 
target  in  ordinary  practice  with  absolute  certainty,  and  yet  be  unable  to 
deliver  a  single  satisfactory  shot  in  a  bombardment.  The  error  from  smoke  is 
difficult  to  deal  with,  because  it  is  a  variable,  depending  upon  the  density  of 
the  smoke  clouds  which  envelop  your  own  and  your  adversary's  batteries. 
(Within  the  writer's  experience,  a  thin  veil  of  fog  protected  a  mass  of  army 
wagons — 900,  it  was  said — from  the  fire  of  some  8  or  10  guns,  during  a 
whole  forenoon,  although  the  guns  were  within  easy  range,  and  the  wagons 
could  be  distinctly  seen.  Refraction  saved  them,  every  shot  going  over.) 
Then  danger  and  its  consequent  excitement  are  also  disturbing  elements, 
especially  where  delicate  instruments  have  to  be  used.  It  is  easier  to  lead  a 
forlorn  hope  than  to  set  a  vernier  under  a  heavy  artillery  fire.  Fortunately, 
we  had  officers  of  experience  in  Sumter,  and  fortunately,  too,  we  had  very 
few  instruments ;  one  gunner's  level  and  two  old  quadrants  being  the  extent 
of  the  outfit,  with  perhaps  some  breech-sights  and  tangent-scales.  The  paucity 
of  aiming-instruments,  and  perhaps  the  experience  of  some  of  the  officers,  led 
to  the  devising  of  instruments  and  methods  which  neither  smoke  nor  excite 
ment  could  disturb;  and  as  some  of  them,  in  a  much  more  perfect  form, 
have  since  been  adopted,  the  rude  originals  may  as  well  be  described  here. 
Aiming  cannon  consists  of  two  distinct  operations:  namely,  alignment  and 
elevation.  In  the  former,  according  to  instructions  and  practice,  the  gunner 
depends  upon  his  eye  and  the  cannon-sights.  But  for  night  firing  or  when 
the  enemy  is  enveloped  in  smoke, — as  he  is  sure  to  be  in  any  artillery  duel, — 
the  eye  cannot  be  depended  on.  Visual  aiming  in  a  bombardment  is  a  delusion 
and  a  snare.  To  overcome  this  difficulty,  on  clear  days,  when  all  the  conditions 
were  favorable  to  accuracy,  and  we  could  work  at  our  leisure,  every  gun 
in  the  armament  was  carefully  aimed  at  all  the  prominent  objects  within  its 
field  of  fire,  and  its  position  marked  on  the  traverse  circle,  the  index  being  a 
pointer  securely  fastened  to  the  traverse  fork.  After  this  had  been  done, 
alignment  became  as  easy  as  setting  a  watch,  and  could  be  done  by  night  or 
day,  by  the  least  intelligent  soldier  in  the  garrison. 

The  elevation  was  more  difficult  to  deal  with.  The  ordinary  method  by  the 
use  of  a  breech-sight  could  not  be  depended  on,  even  if  there  had  been  a 

•&  The  troops  on  the  Star  of  the  West  consisted  of  200  men,  under  Lieut.  Charles  E.  Woods. — EDITORS. 


INSIDE  SUMTER  IN  '61. 


EFFECT    OF    THE    BOMBARDMENT    ON    THE    BARBETTE    GUNS    OF 
THE    SEA    FRONT    OF    SUMTER.     FROM  A   PHOTOGRAPH. 


sufficient  supply  of  such  instruments,  because  darkness  or  smoke  would  render 
it  inapplicable  or  inaccurate ;  and  the  two  quadrants  in  the  outfit  could  not  be 
distributed  all  over  the  fort. 

Before  the  correct  elevation  to  carry  a  shot  to  a  given  object  can  be  deter 
mined,  it  is  necessary  to  know  the'  exact  distance  of  the  object.  This  was 
obtained  from  the  coast-survey 
chart  of  the  harbor.  The  neces 
sary  elevation  was  then  calcu 
lated,  or  taken  from  the  tables, 
and  the  gun  elevated  accord 


ingly  by  means  of  the  quad 
rant.  The  question  then  became, 
How  can  the  gunner  bring  the 
gun  to  this  elevation  in  the  heat 
of  action,  and  without  the  use 
of  a  quadrant!  There  was  an 
abundance  of  brass  rods,  per 
haps  a  quarter-inch  in  diame 
ter,  in  the  fort.  Pieces  of  such 
rods,  eighteen  inches  long,  were 
prepared  by  shaping  one  end  to 
fit  into  a  socket  on  the  cheek  of 
the  carriage,  and  the  other  into  a  chisel  edge.  They  were  called  by  the  men 
pointing  rods.  A  vertical  line  was  then  drawn  on  the  right  breech  of  the  gun, 
and  painted  white.  The  non-commissioned  officer  who  attended  to  this  prep 
aration,  having  carefully  elevated  the  gun  with  the  quadrant  for  a  particular 
object,  set  the  pointing  rod  in  the  socket,  and  brought  its  chisel  end  down  on 
the  vertical  line.  The  point  thus  cut  was  marked  and  the  initials  of  the  object 
to  be  struck  with  that  elevation  written  opposite.  These  arrangements, 
which  originated  with  Captain  Doubleday,  were  of  great  value  during  the 
bombardrn  ent. 

The  preparation  of  Sumter  for  defense  afforded  a  fine  field  for  ingenuity, 
because  nothing  connected  with  its  equipment  was  complete.  As  another 
illustration  of  this  ingenuity,  the  following  is  in  point.  It  might  become 
desirable  to  continue  a  bombardment  into  the  night,  and  the  casemates, 
owing  to  the  partial  closing  up  of  the  arches  with  flagstones,  were  as  dark  as 
dungeons,  even  on  very  clear  nights.  Lights  of  some  kind  were  absolutely 
necessary,  but  there  were  no  candles  and  no  lamps.  There  was  a  light-house 
on  the  fort,  however,  and  the  light-keeper  had  several  barrels  of  oil  on  hand. 
Small  tubes  of  tin,  to  receive  wicks,  were  made,  and  fitted  into  disks  of  cork 
sufficiently  large  to  float  them  on  the  surface  of  the  oil.  Coffee-cups  were 
then  filled  with  oil  and  the  floats  laid  on  the  surface. 

Among  the  many  incidents  of  the  siege  may  be  mentioned  the  mishap  of  an 
ice-laden  Yankee  schooner  that  strayed  within  range  of  the  secession  batteries ; 
the  accidental  solid  shot  fired  at  Fort  Sumter  by  an  impatient  secessionist 
in  the  Cumming's  Point  battery,  and  the  daring  generosity  of  Mclnerny,  a 


INSIDE  SUMTER.  IN  '61. 


THE     SUMTER    GARRISON    WATCHING    THE    FIRING    ON    THE   "STAR    OF    THE    WEST." 

Fort  Moult rie  is  shown  on  the  left,  and  the  sinok«  of  the  Morris  Island  battery  out  the  extreme  right. 

warm-hearted  and  loyal  Irishman,  who  did  not  "  cross  the  broad  Atlantic  to 
become  the  citizen  of  only  one  Shtate,"  and  who  cheerfully  risked  his  life 
and  ruined  his  Sunday  shirt  by  tearing  a  white  flag  from  it,  that  he  might 
be  able  to  deliver  in  person  his  donation  of  tobacco  to  the  besieged 
soldiers.  There  is  one  other  incident  which  should  find  a  place  in  these 
reminiscences. 

Major  Anderson  was  fully  impressed  with  the  solemn  responsibilities  which 
rested  upon  him  when  he  transferred  his  command  to  Sumter.  When  he 
reached  Sumter  there  were  no  halliards  to  the  flag-staff,  and  as  there  was 
more  pressing  work  on  hand  for  several  days,  some  time  elapsed  before 
it  became  possible  to  display  the  national  flag.  At  length,  however, 
halliards  were  rigged,  and  everything  was  ready  for  the  flag.  The  usual 
method  of  proceeding  in  such  a  case  would  have  been  to  order  the  sergeant  of 
the  guard  to  send  up  the  flag,  but  it  was  otherwise  arranged  on  this  occasion. 
A  dress-parade  was  ordered,  and  the  little  garrison  formed  around  the 
flag-staff,  the  officers  in  the  center.  Presently  Major  Anderson,  with  Chap 
lain  Harris  of  Fort  Moultrie,  who  perhaps  had  been  summoned  for  the 
purpose,  approached  the  flag-staff,  and  the  command  was  brought  to 
"Attention."  The  flag,  already  bent  to  the  halliards,  was  held  by  one  officer, 
and  another  held  the  hoisting  end  of  the  halliards.  The  chaplain  then,  in  a 
few  words,  invited  those  present  to  join  with  him  in  prayer,  and  Major  Ander 
son,  receiving  the  halliards  from  the  officer  who  till  that  time  had  held  them, 
knelt  beside  the  chaplain,  most  of  the  officers  and  some  of  the  men  in  the 
ranks  following  his  example.  Prayers  being  ended,  all  rose,  and  the  flag  of 


INSIDE  SUMTER  IN  '61.  65 

Fort  Sumter  was  raised  by  Major  Anderson,  and  the  halliards  secured.  He 
then  turned  toward  the  officers  and  directed  that  the  companies  be  dismissed. 
If  any  of  those  who  doubted  the  loyalty  to  the  Union  of  Major  Anderson 
could  have  had  but  one  glimpse  of  that  impressive  scene,  they  would  have 
doubted  no  longer. 

The  weary  waiting  for  war  or  deliverance  which  filled  up  the  few  weeks 
that  intervened  between  the  preparations  and  the  actual  bombardment 
developed  no  discontent  among  the  men,  although  food  and  fuel  were  getting 
scarce.  The  latter  was  replenished  from  time  to  time  by  tearing  down 
sheds  and  temporary  workshops,  but  the  former  was  a  constantly  dimin 
ishing  quantity,  and  the  men  could  count  on  their  fingers  the  number 
of  days  between  them  and  starvation.  It  was  a  favorite  belief  among  the 
secessionists  that  the  pinchings  of  hunger  would  arouse  a  spirit  of  mutiny 
among  the  soldiers,  and  compel  Major  Anderson  to  propose  terms  of 
evacuation.  But  no  such  spirit  manifested  itself.  On  the  contrary,  the 
men  exhibited  a  devotion  to  their  Government  and  the  officers  appointed 
over  them  which  surprised  their  enemies,  but  attracted  little  attention  from 
their  friends.  ,1 

The  opening  of  the  bombardment  was  a  somewhat  dramatic  event.  A  reliev 
ing  fleet  was  approaching,  all  unknown  to  the  Sumter  garrison,  and  General 
Beauregard,  perhaps  with  the  hope  of  tying  Major  Anderson's  hands  in  the 
expected  fight  with  that  fleet,  had  opened  negotiations  with  him  on  the  llth 
of  April  looking  toward  the  evacuation  of  the  fort.  But  Major  Anderson 
declined  to  evacuate  his  post  till  compelled  by  hunger.  The  last  ounce  of 
breadstuffs  had  been  consumed,  and  matters  were  manifestly  approaching 
a  crisis.  It  was  evident  from  the  activity  of  the  enemy  that  something 
important  was  in  the  wind.  That  night  we  retired  as  usual.  Toward  half- 
past  three  on  the  morning  of  the  12th  we  were  startled  by  a  gun  fired  in  the 
immediate  vicinity  of  the  fort,  and  many  rose  to  see  what  was  the  matter. 
It  was  soon  learned  that  a  steamer  from  the  enemy  desired  to  communicate 
with  Major  Anderson,  and  a  small  boat  under  a  flag  of  truce  was  received 
and  delivered  the  message.  Although  no  formal  announcement  of  the  fact 
was  made,  it  became  generally  known  among  the  men  that  in  one  hour 
General  Beauregard  would  open  his  batteries  on  Sumter. 

The  men  waited  about  for  some  time  in  expectation  of  orders,  but 
received  none,  except  an  informal  order  to  go  to  bed,  and  the  information  that 
reveille  would  be  sounded  at  the  usual  hour.  This  was  daylight,  fully  two 
hours  off,  so  some  of  the  men  did  retire.  The  majority  perhaps  remained  up, 
anxious  to  see  the  opening,  for  which  purpose  they  had  all  gone  on  the  ram 
parts.  Except  that  the  flag  was  hoisted,  and  a  glimmer  of  light  was  visible 
at  the  guard-house,  the  fort  looked  so  dark  and  silent  as  to  seem  deserted. 
The  morning  was  dark  and  raw.  Some  of  the  watchers  surmised  that 
Beauregard  was  "  bluffing,"  and  that  there  would  be  no  bombardment.  But 

I  So  faithful  and  true  have  the  soldiers  of  the  which  were  abandoned  by  all  the  commissioned 

army  always  been  that  even  very  striking  exhibi-  officers,    at  which   not   one   of  the  enlisted   men 

tions  of  these  qualities  are  not  considered  worthy  proved   untrue.      The   loyalty   of    the   latter  has 

of  notice.      There  were   military  posts  in   1861  never  been  properly  appreciated.  —  J.  C. 
VOL.   I.    5 


66 


INSIDE  SUMTER  IN  '61. 


CONFEDERATE    FLOATING    BATTERY    IN    ACTION    AT    THE    WEST    END    OF    SULLIVAN'S    ISLAND. 


Colonel  Joseph  A.  Yates,  who  was  a  lieutenant  in 
the  attack  on  Fort  Sumter,  says  in  a  letter  accom 
panying  the  plan  on  the  next  page:  "I  send  a  rough 
sketch  of  the  floating  battery  which  I  commanded  ;  it  is 
rough,  but  from  my  recollection  it  is  very  like  her.  The 
battery  was  substantially  built,  flat,  heavily  timbered 


on  her  shield,  with  railroad  iron  laid  on  it—  two  courses 
of  rails  turned  inward  and  outward,  so  as  to  form  a 
pretty  smooth  surface.  The  bags  of  sand  represented 
on  the  deck  were  to  counterweigh  the  guns,  which 
were  32  and  42-pounders.  She  was  struck  many  times, 
several  shot  going  entirely  through  the  shield." 


promptly  at  4:30  A.  M.  a  flash  as  of  distant  lightning  in  the  direction  of  Mount 
Pleasant,  followed  by  the  dull  roar  of  a  mortar,  told  us  that  the  bombardment 
had  begun.  The  eyes  of  the  watchers  easily  detected  and  followed  the  burning 
fuse  which  marked  the  course  of  the  shell  as  it  mounted  among  the  stars,  and 
then  descended  with  ever-increasing  velocity,  until  it  landed  inside  the  fort 
and  burst.  It  was  a  capital  shot.  Then  the  batteries  opened  on  all  sides, 
and  shot  and  shell  went  screaming  over  Sumter  as  if  an  army  of  devils  were 
swooping  around  it.  As  a  rule  the  guns  were  aimed  too  high,  but  all  the 
mortar  practice  was  good.  In  a  few  minutes  the  novelty  disappeared  in  a 
realizing  sense  of  danger,  and  the  watchers  retired  to  the  bomb-proofs, 
where  they  discussed  probabilities  until  reveille. 

Habits  of  discipline  are  strong  among  old  soldiers.  If  it  had  not  been  for 
orders  to  the  contrary,  the  men  would  have  formed  for  roll-call  on  the  open 
parade,  as  it  was  their  custom  to  do,  although  mortar-shells  were  bursting 
there  at  the  lively  rate  of  about  one  a  minute.  But  they  were  formed  under 
the  bomb-proofs,  and  the  roll  was  called  as  if  nothing  unusual  was  going  on. 
They  were  then  directed  to  get  breakfast,  and  be  ready  to  fall  in  when 
"  assembly  "  was  beaten.  The  breakfast  part  of  the  order  was  considered  a 
grim  joke,  as  the  fare  was  reduced  to  the  solitary  item  of  fat  pork,  very 
rusty  indeed.  But  most  of  the  men  worried  down  a  little  of  it,  and  were 
"  readv  "  when  the  drum  called  them  to  their  work. 


INSIDE  SUMTEK   IN  '61.  67 

By  this  time  it  was  daylight,  and  the  effects  of  the  bombardment  became 
visible.  No  serious  damage  was  being  done  to  the  fort.  The  enemy  had 
concentrated  their  fire  on  the  barbette  batteries,  but,  like  most  inexperienced 
gunners,  they  were  firing  too  high.  .  After  daylight  their  shooting  improved, 
until  at  7:30  A.  M.,  when  "  assembly  "  was  beaten  in  Sumter,  it  had  become 
fairly  good.  At  "  assembly  "  the  men  were  again  paraded,  and  the  orders 
of  the  day  announced.  The  garrison  was  divided  into  two  reliefs,  and  the 
tour  of  duty  at  the  guns  was  to  be  four  hours.  Captain  Doubleday  being 
the  senior  captain,  his  battery  took  the  first  tour. 

There  were  three  points  to  be  fired  upon, —  the  Morris  Island  batteries,  the 
James  Island  batteries,  and  the  Sullivan's  Island  batteries.  With  these  last 
was  included  the  famous  iron-clad  floating  battery,  which  had  taken  up  a 
position  off  the  western  end  of  Sullivan's  Island  to  command  the  left  flank  of 
Sumter.  Captain  Doubleday  divided  his  men  into  three  parties :  the  first, 
under  his  own  immediate  command,  was  inarched  to  the  casemate  guns  bear 
ing  on  Morris  Island;  the  second,  under  Lieutenant  Jefferson  C.  Davis, 
manned  the  casemate  guns  bearing  on  the  James  Island  batteries ;  and  the 
third — without  a  commissioned  officer  until  Dr.  Crawford  joined  it — was 
marched  by  a  sergeant  3)  to  the  guns  bearing  on  Sullivan's  Island.  The 
guns  in  the  lower  tier,  which  were  the  only  ones  used  during  the  bombard 
ment, —  except  surreptitiously  without  orders, — were  32  and  42-pounders, 
and  some  curiosity  was  felt  as  to  the  effect  of  such  shot  on  the  iron-clad 
battery.  The  gunners  made  excellent  practice,  but  the  shot  were  seen  to 
bounce  off  its  sides  like  pease.  After  battering  it  for  about  an  hour  and  a  hah0, 
no  visible  effect  had  been  produced,  although  it  had  perceptibly  slackened 
its  fire,  perhaps  to  save  ammunition.  But  it  was  evident  that  throwing 
32-pounder  shot  at  it,  at  a  mile  range,  was  a  waste  of  iron,  and  the  attention 
of  the  gunners  was  transferred  to  Fort  Moultrie. 

Moultrie  was,  perhaps,  a  less  satisfactory  target  than  the  iron-clad.     It 
was  literally  buried   under   sand-bags,  the 
very    throats    of     the     embrasures    being 
closed  with  cotton-bales.     The  use  of  cot 
ton-bales    was    very    effective     as    against 
shot,  but  would  have  been  less  so  against  : 
shell.     The  fact  that  the  embrasures  were 
thus    closed    was    not   known    in    Sumter  : 
till   after   the  bombardment.     It  explained 

what     Was     Otherwise      inexplicable.        Shot  THE  IRON-CLAD  FLOATING  BATTERY. 

1    -i        -i  ,      -T  i  FROM    A    PLAN    BY    COLONEL    JOSEPH    A.    YATE8. 

would    be    seen    to    strike    an   embrasure, 

and  the  gunner  would  feel  that  he  had  settled  one  gun  for  certain,  but  even 

while  he  was  receiving  the  congratulations  of  his  comrades  the   supposed 

&  The  non-commissioned  officers  in  Fort  Sumter  William   A.   Harn,  and  James  Chester,  Corporals 

were  Ordnance-Sergeant  James  Kearney.  U.S.A.,  Owen  M'Guire,  Francis  J.  Oakes,  Charles  Bring- 

Quartermaster-Sergeant  William  H.  Hammer,  1st  hurst,  and    Henry   Ellerbrook ;   Company  H,   1st 

U.  S.  Artillery ;   Eegimental  Band,   1  st  Artillery :  Artillery :  First  Sergeant  John  Kenehan,  Sergeants 

Sergeant    James    E.    Galway,    Corporal    Andrew  James  M'Mahon,  John  Carmody,  and  John  Otto, 

Smith  ;  Company  E,  1st  Artillery:  First  Sergeant  Corporal  Christopher  Costolan.  —EDITORS. 
Eugene    Scheibner.    Sergeants    Thomas    Kirnan, 


68  INSIDE  SUMTER  IN  '61. 

disabled  gun  would  reply.  That  the  cotton-bales  could  not  be  seen  from 
Sumter  is  not  surprising.  The  sand-bag  casemates  which  covered  the  guns 
were  at  least  eighteen  feet  thick,  and  the  cotton-bale  shutter  was  no  doubt 
arranged  to  slide  up  and  down  like  a  portcullis  inside  the  pile  of  sand-bags. 
The  gunners  of  Sumter,  not  knowing  of  the  existence  of  these  shutters, 
directed  their  shot  either  on  the  embrasures  for  the  purpose  of  disabling 
the  enemy's  guns,  or  so  as  to  graze  the  sand-bag  parapet  for  the  purpose  of 
reaching  the  interior  of  the  work.  The  practice  was  very  good,  but  the  effect, 
for  reasons  already  stated,  was  in  considerable. 

At  the  end  of  the  first  four  hours,  Doubleday's  men  were  relieved  from 
the  guns  and  had  an  opportunity  to  look  about  them.  Not  a  man  was  visible 
near  any  of  the  batteries,  but  a  large  party,  apparently  of  non-combatants, 
had  collected  on  the  beach  of  Sullivan's  Island,  well  out  of  the  line  of  fire, 
to  witness  the  duel  between  Sumter  and  Moultrie.  Doubleday's  men  were 
not  in  the  best  of  temper.  They  were  irritated  at  the  thought  that  they 
had  been  unable  to  inflict  any  serious  damage  on  their  adversary,  and 
although  they  had  suffered  no  damage  in  return  they  were  dissatisfied.  The 
crowd  of  unsympathetic  spectators  was  more  than  they  could  bear,  and  two 
veteran  sergeants  determined  to  stir  them  up  a  little.  For  this  purpose  they 
directed  two  42-pounders  on  the  crowd,  and,  when  no  officer  was  near,  fired. 
The  first  shot  struck  about  fifty  yards  short,  and,  bounding  over  the  heads  of 
the  astonished  spectators,  went  crashing  through  the  Moultrie  House.  The 
second  followed  an  almost  identical  course,  doing  no  damage  except  to  the 
Moultrie  House,  and  the  spectators  scampered  off  in  a  rather  undignified 
manner.  The  Moultrie  House  was  flying  a  yellow  flag  at  the  time,  and  the 
Charleston  newspapers  discoursed  upon  the  barbarity  of  firing  upon  a  hospital 
flag,  forgetting,  perhaps,  that  we  also  had  a  hospital  in  Sumter,  which  they 
treated  to  red-hot  shot  during  the  bombardment.  Of  course,  none  of  the 
officers  of  Sumter  knew  anything  about  the  two  42-pounder  shot. 

The  smoke  which  enveloped  the  Confederate  batteries  during  the  first  day, 
while  not  so  thick  as  entirely  to  obscure  them,  was  sufficiently  so  to  make 
visual  aiming  extremely  unreliable ;  and  during  the  second  day,  when  Sumter 
was  on  fire,  nothing  could  be  seen  beyond  the  muzzles  of  our  own  guns.  But 
the  aiming  arrangements,  due  to  the  foresight  and  ingenuity  of  Captain 
Doubleday,  enabled  us  to  fire  with  as  much  accuracy  when  we  could  not  see 
the  object  as  when  we  could. 

Early  on  the  first  day  several  vessels  of  the  fleet  were  observed  off  the  bar, 
and  orders  were  given  to  dip  the  flag  to  them.  This  was  done,  and  the  salute 
was  returned,  but  while  our  flag  was  being  hoisted  after  the  third  dip,  a  shell 
burst  near  the  flag-staff  and  cut  the  halliards.  This  accident  put  the  flag 
beyond  our  control.  It  ran  down  until  the  kinky  halliards  jammed  in  the 
pulley  at  the  mast-head,  and  the  flag  remained  at  about  half -staff.  This  has 
been  interpreted  as  a  signal  of  distress,  but  it  was  only  an  accident.  There 
was  no  special  distress  in  Sumter,  and  no  signal  to  that  effect  was  intended. 

Major  Anderson  had  given  orders  that  only  the  casemate  batteries  should 
be  manned.  While  this  was  undoubtedly  prompted  by  a  desire  to  save  his 


INSIDE  SUMTER  IN  '61 


69 


men,  it  operated  also,  in  some  degree,  to  save  the  Confederates.  Our  most  pow 
erful  batteries  and  all  our  shell  guns  were  on  the  barbette  tier,  and,  being  for 
bidden  their  use,  we  were  compelled  to  oppose  a  destructive  shell  fire  with  solid 
shot  alone.  This,  especially  as  we  had  no  mortars,  was  a  great  disadvantage. 


••'    •    r\&?~i*-5**-' 


SERGEANT    JOHN    CAKMODY    FIRING    THE    BAKBETTE    GUNS. 

Had  we  been  permitted  to  use  our  shell  guns  we  could  have  set  fire  to  the 
barracks  and  quarters  in  Moultrie ;  for,  as  it  was,  we  wrecked  them  badly  with 
solid  shot,  although  we  could  not  see  them.  Then  the  cotton-bale  shutters  would 
have  been  destroyed,  and  we  could  have  made  it  much  livelier  generally  for 
our  adversaries.  This  was  so  apparent  to  the  men,  that  one  of  them  —  a  man 
named  Carmody  —  stole  up  on  the  ramparts  and  deliberately  fired  every  bar 
bette  gun  in  position  on  the  Moultrie  side  of  the  work.  The  guns  were  already 
loaded  and  roughly  aimed,  and  Carmody  simply  discharged  them  in  succession ; 
hence,  the  effect  was  less  than  it  would  have  been  if  the  aim  had  been  care 
fully  rectified.  But  Carmody's  effort  aroused  the  enemy  to  a  sense  of  his  dan 
ger.  He  supposed,  no  doubt,  that  Major  Anderson  had  determined  to  open 
his  barbette  batteries,  so  he  directed  every  gun  to  bear  on  the  barbette  tier 
of  Fort  Sumter,  and  probably  believed  that  the  vigor  of  his  fire  induced 
Major  Anderson  to  change  his  mind.  But  the  contest  was  merely  Carmody 
against  the  Confederate  States ;  and  Carmody  had  to  back  down,  not  because 
he  was  beaten,  but  because  he  was  unable,  single-handed,  to  reload  his  guns. 

Another  amusing  incident  in  this  line  occurred  on  the  Morris  Island  side  of 
the  fort.  There,  in  the  gorge  angle,  a  ten-inch  columbiad  was  mounted,  en 
barbette,  and  as  the  42-pounders  of  the  casemate  battery  were  making  no 


70  INSIDE  SUMTER  IN  '61. 

impression  on  the  Cumming's  Point  iron  battery,  the  two  veteran  sergeants 
who  had  surreptitiously  fired  upon  the  spectators,  as  already  related,  deter 
mined  to  try  a  shot  at  the  iron  battery  from  the  big  gun.  As  this  was  a  direct 
violation  of  orders,  caution  was  necessary.  Making  sure  that  the  major  was 
out  of  the  way,  and  that  no  officers  were  near,  the  two  sergeants  stole  upstairs 
to  the  ten-inch  gun.  It  was  loaded  and  aimed  already,  they  very  well  knew, 
so  all  they  would  have  to  do  was  to  fire  it.  This  was  the  work  of  a  few 
seconds  only.  The  gun  was  fired,  and  those  in  the  secret  down  below  watched 
the  flight  of  the  shot  in  great  expectations  of  decided  results.  Unfortunately 
the  shot  missed;  not  a  bad  shot — almost  grazing  the  crest  of  the  battery — 
but  a  miss.  A  little  less  elevation,  a  very  little,  and  the  battery  would  have 
been  smashed:  so  thought  the  sergeants,  for  they  had  great  faith  in  the 
power  of  their  gun ;  and  they  determined  to  try  a  second  shot.  The  gun  was 
reloaded,  a  feat  of  some  difficulty  for  two  men,  but  to  run  it  "  in  battery  "  was 
beyond  their  powers.  It  required  the  united  efforts  of  six  men  to  throw  the 
carriage  "  in  gear,"  and  the  two  sergeants  could  not  budge  it.  Things  were 
getting  desperate  around  them.  The  secessionists  had  noticed  the  first  shot, 
and  had  now  turned  every  gun  that  would  bear  on  that  ten-inch  gun.  They 
were  just  getting  the  range,  and  it  was  beginning  to  be  uncomfortable  for  the 
sergeants,  who  in  a  fit  of  desperation  determined  to  fire  the  gun  "  as  she  was." 
The  elevating  screw  was  given  half  a  turn  less  elevation,  and  the  primer  was 
inserted  in  the  vent.  Then  one  of  the  sergeants  ran  down  the  spiral  stairs  to 
see  if  the  coast  were  clear,  leaving  his  comrade  in  a  very  uncomfortable  posi 
tion  at  the  end  of  the  lanyard,  and  lying  flat  on  the  floor.  It  was  getting 
hotter  up  there  every  second,  and  a  perfect  hurricane  of  shot  was  sweeping 
over  the  prostrate  soldier.  Human  nature  could  stand  it  no  longer.  The 
lanyard  was  pulled  and  the  gun  was  fired.  The  other  sergeant  was  hastening 
up  the  stairway,  and  had  almost  reached  the  top,  when  he  met  the  gun  com 
ing  down,  or  at  least  trying  to.  Having  been  fired  "  from  battery,"  it  had 
recoiled  over  the  counter-hurters,  and,  turning  a  back  somersault,  had  landed 
across  the  head  of  the  stairway.  Realizing  in  a  moment  what  had  happened, 
and  what  would  be  to  pay  if  they  were  "found  out,  the  second  sergeant  crept 
to  the  head  of  the  stairway  and  called  his  comrade,  who,  scared  almost  to 
death, —  not  at  the  danger  he  was  in,  but  at  the  accident, — was  still  hugging 
the  floor  with  the  lanyard  in  his  hand.  Both  got  safely  down,  swearing 
eternal  secrecy  to  each  other;  and  it  is  doubtful  if  Major  Anderson  ever 
knew  how  that  ten-inch  gun  came  to  be  dismounted.  It  is  proper  to  add 
that  the  shot  was  a  capital  one,  striking  just  under  the  middle  embrasure 
of  the  iron  battery  and  half  covering  it  with  sand.  If  it  had  been  a  trifle 
higher  it  would  have  entered  the  embrasure. 

The  first  night  of  the  bombardment  was  one  of  great  anxiety.  The  fleet 
might  send  reinforcements ;  the  enemy  might  attempt  an  assault.  Both 
would  come  in  boats ;  both  would  answer  in  English.  It  would  be  horrible 
to  fire  upon  friends ;  it  would  be  fatal  not  to  fire  upon  enemies.  The  night 
was  dark  and  chilly.  Shells  were  dropping  into  the  fort  at  regular  intervals, 
and  the  men  were  tired,  hungry,  and  out  of  temper.  Any  party  that 


INSIDE  SUMTER  IN  '61. 


approached  that  night  would  have  been  rated  as  enemies  upon  general  prin 
ciples.  Fortunately  nobody  appeared;  reveille  sounded,  and  the  men  oiled 
their  appetites  with  the  fat  pork  at  the  usual  hour  by  way  of  breakfast. 

The  second  day's  bombardment  began  at  the  same  hour  as  did  the  first ;  that 
is,  on  the  Sumter  side.  The  enemy's  mortars  had  kept  up  a  very  slow  fire  all 
night,  which  gradually  warmed  up  after  daylight  as  their  batteries  seemed  to 
awaken,  until  its  vigor  was  about  equal 
to  their  fire  of  the  day  before.  The 
fleet  was  still  off  the  bar — perhaps  wait 
ing  to  see  the  end.  Fire  broke  out  once 
or  twice  in  the  officers'  quarters,  and 
was  extinguished.  It  broke  out  again 
in  several  places  at  once,  and  we  real 
ized  the  truth  and  let  the  quarters  burn. 
They  were  firing  red-hot  shot.  This  was 
about  9  o'clock.  As  soon  as  Sumter 
was  noticed  to  be  on  fire  the  secession 
ists  increased  the  fire  of  their  batteries 
to  a  maximum.  In  the  perfect  storm  of 
shot  and  shell  that  beat  upon  us  from 
all  sides,  the  flag-staff  was  shot  down, 
but  the  old  flag  was  rescued  and  nailed 
to  a  new  staff.  This,  with  much  diffi 
culty,  was  carried  to  the  ramparts  and 
lashed  to  some  chassis  piled  up  there 
for  a  traverse. 

We  were  not  sorry  to  see  the  quarters 
burn.  They  were  a  nuisance.  Built  for 
fire-proof  buildings,  they  were  not  fire-proof.  Neither  would  they  burn  up  in 
a  cheerful  way.  The  principal  cisterns  were  large  iron  tanks  immediately  under 
the  roof.  These  had  been  riddled,  and  the  quarters  below  had  been  deluged 
with  water.  Everything  was  wet  and  burned  badly,  yielding  an  amount  of 
pungent  piney  smoke  which  almost  suffocated  the  garrison. 

The  scene  inside  the  fort  as  the  fire  gained  headway  and  threatened  the 
magazine  was  an  exciting  one.  It  had  already  reached  some  of  our  stores  of 
loaded  shells  and  shell-grenades.  These  must  be  saved  at  all  hazard.  Soldiers 
brought  their  blankets  and  covered  the  precious  projectiles,  and  thus  the  most 
of  them  were  saved.  But  the  magazine  itself  was  in  danger.  Already  it  was 
full  of  smoke,  and  the  flames  were  rapidly  closing  in  upon  it.  It  was  evident 
that  it  must  be  closed,  and  it  would  be  many  hours  before  it  could  be  opened 
again.  During  these  hours  the  fire  must  be  maintained  with  such  powder 
as  we  could  secure  outside  the  magazine.  A  number  of  barrels  were  rolled 
out  for  this  purpose,  and  the  magazine  door  —  already  almost  too  hot  to 
handle — was  closed. 

It  was  the  intention  to  store  the  powder  taken  from  the  magazine  in  several 
safe  corners,  covering  it  with  damp  soldiers'  blankets.  But  safe  corners  were 


A  CASEMATE  GUN  DURING  THE  CONFLAGRATION. 


72 


INSIDE  SUMTEK  IN  '61. 


hard  to  find,  and  most  of  the  blankets  were  already  in  use  covering  loaded 
shells.  The  fire  was  raging  more  fiercely  than  ever,  and  safety  demanded  that 
the  uncovered  powder  be  thrown  overboard.  This  was  instantly  done,  and  if 
the  tide  had  been  high  we  should  have  been  well  rid  of  it.  But  the  tide  was 
low,  and  the  pile  of  powder-barrels  rested  on  the  riprapping  in  front  of  the 
embrasure.  This  was  observed  by  the  enemy,  and  some  shell  guns  were 
turned  upon  the  pile,  producing  an  explosion  which  blew  the  gun  at  that 
embrasure  clear  out  of  battery,  but  did  no  further  damage. 

The  fire  had  now  enveloped  the  magazine,  and  the  danger  of  an  explosion 
was  imminent.  Powder  had  been  carried  out  all  the  previous  day,  and  it  was 
more  than  likely  that 
enough  had  sifted 
through  the  cartridge- 
bags  to  carry  the  fire 
into  the  powder- 
chamber.  Major  An 
derson,  his  head  erect 
as  if  on  parade,  called 
the  men  around  him ; 


RUINS    OF    TH 


CASEMATES 
FLAG-STAFF. 


lit    THE    SALLY-POUT,   AND    OF 
FROM    PHOTOGRAPHS. 


BARBETTE  GUNS — EFFECT  OF 

II IK    RAKING    FIRE     FROM 

FORT    MOULTRIE. 

directed  that  a  shot  be 
fired  every  five  min 
utes  ;  and  mentioned 
that  there  was  some 
danger  of  the  maga 
zine  exploding.  Some 
of  the  men,  as  soon  as 
they  learned  what  the 
real  danger  was,  rushed 
to  the  door  of  the  magazine  and  hurriedly  dug  a  trench  in  front  of  it,  which 
they  kept  filled  with  water  until  the  danger  was  considered  over. 

It  was  during  this  excitement  that  ex-Senator  Wigfall  of  Texas  visited  the 
fort.  It  came  the  turn  of  one  of  the  guns  on  the  left  face  of  the  work  to 
m'e, —  we  were  now  firing  once  in  five  minutes, —  and  as  the  cannoneer 
approached  for  the  purpose  of  loading,  he  discovered  a  man  looking  in  at  the 
embrasure.  The  man  must  have  raised  himself  to  the  level  of  the  embrasure 
by  grasping  the  sill  with  his  hands.  A  short  but  lively  altercation  ensued 
between  the  man  and  the  cannoneer,  the  man  pleading  to  be  taken  in  lest  he 
should  be  killed  with  his  own  shot  and  shell.  He  was  hauled  in,  Thompson, 
the  cannoneer,  first  receiving  his  sword,  to  the  point  of  which  a  white  hand 
kerchief  was  attached,  not  by  way  of  surrender,  but  for  convenience.  Once 


INSIDE  SUMTER  IN  '61.  73 

inside,  the  bearer  asked  to  see  Major  Anderson.  The  major  was  soon  on  the 
spot  and  opened  the  conversation  by  asking,  "  To  what  am  I  indebted  for 
this  visit  ? "  The  visitor  replied,  "  I  am  Colonel  Wigfall,  of  General  Beaure- 
gard's  staff.  For  (rod's  sake,  Major,  let  this  thing  stop.  There  has  been 
enough  bloodshed  already."  To  which  the  major  replied,  "  There  has  been 
none  on  my  side,  and  besides,  your  batteries  are  still  firing  on  me."  At  which 
Wigfall  exclaimed,  UI'U  soon  stop  that,"  and  turning  to  Thompson,  who  still 
held  the  sword  under  his  arm,  he  said,  pointing  to  the  handkerchief,  "  Wave 
that  out  there."  Thompson  then  handed  the  sword  to  Wigfall,  saying,  in  sub 
stance,  "  Wave  it  yourself."  Wigfall  received  back  his  sword  and  took  a  few 
steps  toward  the  embrasure,  when  the  major  called  him  back,  saying,  "  If  you 
desire  that  to  be  seen  you  had  better  send  it  to  the  parapet."  There  was  a 
good  deal  more  said  on  the  subject  of  the  white  flag  both  by  Wigfall  and 
the  major  which  the  writer  cannot  recall,  but  the  end  of  it  all  was  that  a 
white  flag  was  ordered  to  be  displayed  from  the  parapet  at  the  request  of 
Colonel  Wigfall,  and  pending  negotiations  with  him,  which  was  instantly 
done,  a  hospital  sheet  being  used  for  the  purpose.  Then  the  firing  gradually 
ceased,  and  the  major  and  his  officers  and  Colonel  Wigfall  retired  into  the 
hospital  bomb-proof,  the  only  habitable  room  left.  This  was  about  3  o'clock 
in  the  afternoon. 

Wigfall's  conference  was  not  of  long  duration.  He  left  the  fort  in  the 
small  boat  which  brought  him  from  Morris  Island,  and  which  was  manned  by 
negroes.  Shortly  after  his  departure  another  small  boat  from  Sullivan's 
Island,  containing  officers  in  full  uniform  (Wigfall  wore  citizen's  dress  with 
the  sword),  approached  the  fort.  The  officers  in  this  boat  were  very  much 
astonished  and  annoyed  at  being  warned  off  by  the  sentinel,  and  compelled 
to  show  a  white  flag  before  they  were  permitted  to  approach.  They  were 
received  by  the  officer  of  the  day,  who  apologized  for  not  meeting  them  afloat, 
saying  that  all  our  boats  had  been  destroyed  by  shot  or  burned  up.  They 
were  indignant  at  their  reception,  and  demanded  to  know  whether  or  not 
the  fort  had  surrendered.  What  was  said  in  reply  was  not  distinctly  heard 
by  the  writer,  but  it  was  believed  to  be  a  negative.  The  officer  then  asked 
what  the  white  flag  meant,  and  Wigfall's  name  was  mentioned  in  reply, 
About  this  time  Major  Anderson  made  his  appearance,  and  the  visitors,  still 
talking  in  an  indignant  tone,  addressed  themselves  to  him.  What  was  said 
seemed  to  be  a  repetition  of  what  had  just  been  said  to  the  officer  of  the  day. 
The  major's  replies  were  inaudible  where  the  writer  of  this  stood,  except  when 
he  raised  his  hand  in  a  sweeping  sort  of  gesture  in  the  direction  of  Fort 
Moultrie,  and  said,  "  Very  well,  gentlemen,  you  can  return  to  your  batteries." 
They  did  not  return,  however,  immediately,  but  were  conducted  into  the 
hospital  where  Wigfall  had  been,  and  remained  there  some  time.  When  they 
left  we  learned  that  there  would  be  no  more  firing  until  General  Beauregard 
had  time  to  hear  from  his  Government  at  Montgomery. 

About  7  o'clock  in  the  evening  another  white  flag  brought  the  announce 
ment  that  the  terms  agreed  upon  between  General  Beauregard  and  Major 
Anderson  had  been  confirmed,  and  that  we  would  leave  Fort  Sumter  the 
following  day ;  which  we  did,  after  saluting  our  flag  with  fifty  guns. 


FORT  JOHNSO 


FORT  SUMTER. 
OHNSON  OVER  FORT  SUMTER 


THE    FIRST   STEP    IN   THE   WAR. 

BY    STEPHEN    D.    LEE,    LIEUTENANT-GENERAL,    C.  S.  A. 

IN  the  month  of  December,  1860,  the  South  itself  had  no  more  realizing 
sense  than  the  North  of  the  magnitude  of  events  about  to  be  entered  into 
so  lightly.  Even  the  Southern  leaders  did  not  realize  that  there  could  be  any 
obstacle  to  "  peaceable  secession."  Many  at  the  North  were  willing  to  "  let 
the  wayward  sisters  depart  in  peace."  Only  a  few  on  either  side  expected 
that  blood  would  be  shed.  When,  in  the  first  Confederate  Congress  at  Mont 
gomery,  one  prudent  debater  exclaimed,  "  What  if  we  really  have  a  war  1 " 
the  general  response  was,  "  There  will  be  no  war."  "  But,"  he  persisted,  "if 
there  is  a  war,  what  are  our  resources  I  "  and  when  one  man  in  reply  expressed 
his  conviction  that  if  the  worst  came,  the  South  could  put  fifty  thousand 
men  into  the  field,  he  was  looked  upon  as  an  enthusiast.  The  expectation 
of  "  peaceable  secession  "  was  the  delusion  that  precipitated  matters  in  the 
South;  and  it  was  on  this  expectation,  when  the  crisis  came,  that  South 
Carolina  seceded.  Her  first  step  was  to  organize  troops  and  assert  the  sov 
ereignty  in  which  she  believed,  by  the  occupation  of  her  territory. 

After  the  evacuation  of  Fort  Moultrie,  although  Major  Anderson  was  not 
permitted  by  the  South  Carolina  authorities  to  receive  any  large  supply 
of  provisions,  yet  he  received  a  daily  mail,  and  fresh  beef  and  vegetables 
from  the  city  of  Charleston,  and  was  unmolested  at  Fort  Sumter.  He  con 
tinued  industriously  to  strengthen  the  fort.  The  military  authorities  of 
South  Carolina,  and  afterward  of  the  Confederate  States,  took  possession  of 
Fort  Moultrie,  Castle  Pinckney,  the  arsenal,  and  other  United  States  property 
in  the  vicinity.  They  also  remounted  the  guns  at  Fort  Moultrie,  and  con 
structed  batteries  on  Sullivan's,  Morris,  and  James  islands,  and  at  other 
places,  looking  to  the  reduction  of  Fort  Sumter  if  it  should  become  necessary ; 
meantime  leaving  no  stone  unturned  to  secure  from  the  authorities  at  Wash 
ington  a  quiet  evacuation  of  the  fort.  Several  arrangements  to  accomplish 
this  purpose  were  almost  reached,  but  failed.  Two  attempts  were  made 
to  reenforce  and  supply  the  garrison :  one  by  the  steamer  Star  of  the  West, 
which  tried  to  reach  the  fort,  January  9th,  1861,  and  was  driven  back  by  a 
battery  011  Morris  Island,  manned  by  South  Carolina  troops ;  the  other  just 


74 


THE  FIRST  STEP  IN   THE  WAR.  75 

before  the  bombardment  of  Sumter,  April  12th.  The  feeling  of  the  Con 
federate  authorities  was  that  a  peaceful  issue  would  finally  be  arrived  at ;  but 
they  had  a  fixed  determination  to  use  force,  if  necessary,  to  occupy  the 
fort.  They  did  not  desire  or  intend  to  take  the  initiative,  if  it  could  be 
avoided.  So  soon,  however,  as  it  was  clearly  understood  that  the  authorities 
at  Washington  had  abandoned  peaceful  views,  and  would  assert  the  power  of 
the  United  States  to  supply  Fort  Sumter,  General  Beauregard,  the  commander 
of  the  Confederate  forces  at  Charleston,  in  obedience  to  the  command  of  his 
Government  at  Montgomery,  proceeded  to  reduce  the  fort.  His  arrangements 
were  about  complete,  and  on  April  llth  he  demanded  of  Major  Anderson 
the  evacuation  of  Fort  Sumter.  He  offered  to  transport  Major  Anderson 
and  his  command  to  any  port  in  the  United  States;  and  to  allow  him  to 
move  out  of  the  fort  with  company  arms  and  property,  and  all  private 
property,  and  to  salute  his  flag  in  lowering  it.  This  demand  was  deliv 
ered  to  Major  Anderson  at  3:45  p.  M.,  by  two  aides  of  General  Beauregard, 
James  Chesnut,  Jr.,  and  myself.  At  4:30  p.  M.  he  handed  us  his  reply, 
refusing  to  accede  to  the  demand;  but  added,  "Gentlemen,  if  you  do  not 
batter  the  fort  to  pieces  about  us,  we  shall  be  starved  out  in  a  few  days." 

The  reply  of  Major  Anderson  was  put  in  General  Beauregard's  hands  at 
5:15  P.M.,  and  he  was  also  told  of  this  informal  remark.  Anderson's  reply 
and  remark  were  communicated  to  the  Confederate  authorities  at  Montgom 
ery.  The  Secretary  of  War,  L.  P.  Walker,  replied  to  Beauregard  as  follows : 

"  Do  not  desire  needlessly  to  bombard  Fort  Sumter.  If  Major  Anderson  will  state  the  time 
at  which,  as  indicated  by  him,  he  will  evacuate,  and  agree  that  in  the  meantime  he  will  not  use 
his  guns  against  us,  unless  ours  should  be  employed  against  Fort  Sumter,  you  are  authorized 
thus  to  avoid  the  effusion  of  blood.  If  this,  or  its  equivalent,  be  refused,  reduce  the  fort 
as  your  judgment  decides  to  be  most  practicable." 

The  same  aides  bore  a  second  commu 
nication  to  Major  Anderson,  based  on  the 
above  instructions,  which  was  placed  in 
his  hands  at  12 : 45  A.  M.,  April  12th.  His 
reply  indicated  that  he  would  evacuate 
the  fort  on  the  15th,  provided  he  did  not 
in  the  meantime  receive  contradictory  in 
structions  from  his  Government,  or  addi 
tional  supplies,  but  he  declined  to  agree 
not  to  open  his  guns  upon  the  Confederate 
troops,  in  the  event  of  any  hostile  demon 
stration  on  their  part  against  his  nag. 
Major  Anderson  made  every  possible  effort 
to  retain  the  aides  till  daylight,  making  one 
excuse  and  then  another  for  not  replying. 
Finally,  at  3:15  A.M.,  he  delivered  his  reply. 
In  accordance  with  their  instructions,  the 
aides  read  it  and,  finding  it  unsatisfactory, 

FRANCIS    TV.     PICKENS,    GOVERNOR    OF    SOUTH  ,  r      .  AT  4-l^n         ^tlfis>n4-i^ 

CAROLINA,  1861.  FROM  A  PHOTOGRAPH.         gave  Major  Anderson  this  notification : 


THE  FIRST  STEP  IN   THE  WAR. 


"FORT  SUMTER,  S.  C.,  April  12,  1861,  3:20  A.M.  — SIR:  By  authority  of  Brigadier-General 
Beauregard,  commanding  the  Provisional  Forces  of  the  Confederate  States,  we  have  the  honor 
to  notify  you  that  he  will  open  the  fire  of  his  batteries  on  Fort  Sumter  in  one  hour  from  this 
time.  We  have  the  honor  to  be  very  respectfully,  Your  obedient  servants,  JAMES  CHESNUT, 
JR.,  Aide-de-camp.  STEPHEN  D.  LEE,  Captain  C.  S.  Army,  Aide-de-camp." 

The  above  note  was  written  in  one  of  the  casemates  of  the  fort,  and  in  the 
presence  of  Major  Anderson  and  several  of  his  officers.  On  receiving  it, 

he  was  much  affected.  He 
seemed  to  realize  the  full 
import  of  the  consequen 
ces,  and  the  great  respon 
sibility  of  his  position. 
Escorting  us  to  the  boat 
at  the  wharf,  he  cordially 
pressed  our  hands  in  fare 
well,  remarking,  "  If  we 
never  meet  in  this  world 
again,  God  grant  that  we 
may  meet  in  the  next." 

The  boat  containing  the 
two  aides  and  also  Eoger 
A.  Pryor,  of  Virginia,  and 
A.  R.  Chisolm,  of  South 
Carolina,  who  were  also 
members  of  General  Beauregard's  staff,  went  immediately  to  Fort  Johnson 
on  James  Island,  arid  the  order  to  fire  the  signal  gun  was  given  to  Captain 
George  S.  James,  commanding  the  battery  at  that  point.  It  was  then  4  A.  M. 
Captain  James  at  once  aroused  his  command,  and  arranged  to  carry  out  the 
order.  He  w^as  a  great  admirer  of  Roger  A.  Pryor,  and  said  to  him,  "You 
are  the  only  man  to  whom  I  would  give  up  the  honor  of  firing  -the  first  gun 
of  the  war  " ;  and  he  offered  to  allow  him  to  fire  it.  Pryor,  on  receiving  the 
offer,  was  very  much  agitated.  With  a  husky  voice  he  said,  "  I  could  not  fire 
the  first  gun  of  the  war."  His  manner  was  almost  similar  to  that  of  Major 
Anderson  as  we  left  him  a  few  moments  before  on  the  wharf  at  Fort  Sumter. 
Captain  James  would  allow  no  one  else  but  himself  to  fire  the  gun.^r 

The  boat  with  the  aides  of  General  Beauregard  left  Fort  Johnson  before 
arrangements  were  complete  for  the  firing  of  the  gun,  and  laid  on  its  oars, 
about  one-third  the  distance  between  the  fort  and  Sumter,  there  to  witness 
the  firing  of  "  the  first  gun  of  the  war"  between  the  States.  It  was  fired  from 
a  ten-inch  mortar  at  4 :  30  A.  M.,  April  12th,  1861.  Captain  James  was  a  skill 
ful  officer,  and  the  firing  of  the  shell  was  a  success.  It  burst  immediately 
over  the  fort,  apparently  about  one  hundred  feet  above.  The  firing  of  the 


CONFEDERATE     MOKTAIi-BATTERY     OX     MORRIS    ISLAM),    COMMANDED    BY 
LIEUTENANT  C.    R.    HOLMES.       FROM    A    PHOTOGRAPH. 


$•  When  the  Star  of  tJtc  West  arrived,  on  the 
9th  of  January,  the  first  shot,  aimed  across  her 
bow,  was  fired  by  G-.  E.  Haynsworth,  and  the 
second,  aimed  directly  at  her,  by  Cadet  Horlbeck. 
It  is  claimed  that  before  this  date  a  hostile  shot 


from  a  4-pounder  had  been  fired  from  Vicksburg 
by  Horace  Miller  at  a  passing  United  States  ves 
sel,  supposed  to  be  carrying  a  supply  of  arms 
and  ammunition  to  New  Orleans.  (See  also  pp. 
27  and  47.) — EDITORS-. 


THE  FIRST  STEP  IN   THE  WAR. 


77 


mortar  woke  the  echoes  from  every  nook  and  corner  of  the  harbor,  and  in 
this  the  dead  hour  of  night,  before  dawn,  that  shot  was  a  sound  of  alarm 
that  brought  every  soldier  in  the  harbor  to  his  feet,  and  every  man,  woman, 
and  child  in  the  city 
of  Charleston  from 
their  beds.  A  thrill 
went  through  the 
whole  city.  It  was 
felt  that  the  Rubi 
con  was  passed.  No 
one  thought  of  go 
ing  home ;  unused 
as  their  ears  were 
to  the  appalling 
sounds,  or  the  vivid 
flashes  from  the  bat 
teries,  they  stood 
for  hours  fascinated 
with  horror.  After 
the  second  shell  the 
different  batteries 
opened  their  fire  on 
Tort  Sumter,  and 
by  4: 45  A.M.  the  fir 
ing  was  general  and 
regular.  It  was  a 
hazy,  foggy  morn 
ing.  About  day 
light,  the  boat  with 
the  aides  reached 
Charleston,  and  they 
reported  to  General 
Beauregard. 

Fort  Sumter  did 
not  respond  with 
her  guns  till  7:30 
A.  M.  The  firing  from 
this  fort,  during 
the  entire  bombard 
ment,  was  slow 
and  deliberate,  and 
marked  with  little 

accuracy.  The  firing  continued  without  intermission  during  the  12th,  and 
more  slowly  during  the  night  of  the  12th  and  13th.  No  material  change 
was  noticed  till  8  A.  M.  on  the  13th,  when  the  barracks  in  Fort  Sumter 
were  set  on  fire  by  hot  shot  from  the  guns  of  Fort  Moultrie.  As  soon  as 


THE  FIRST  STEP  IN   THE  WAR. 


this  was  discovered,  the  Confederate 
batteries  redoubled  their  efforts,  to 
prevent  the  fire  being  extinguished. 
Fort  Sumter  fired  at  little  longer  in 
tervals,  to  enable  the  garrison  to  fight 
the  flames.  This  brave  action,  under 
such  a  trying  ordeal,  aroused  great 
sympathy  and  admiration  on  the  part 
of  the  Confederates  for  Major  Ander 
son  and  his  gallant  garrison ;  this 
feeling  was  shown  by  cheers  when 
ever  a  gun  was  fired  from  Sumter. 
It  was  shown  also  by  loud  reflec 
tions  on  the  "  men-of-war"  outside 
the  harbor.^ 

About  12:30  the  flag-staff  of  Fort 
Sumter  was  shot  down,  but  it  was 
soon  replaced.  As  soon  as  General 
Beauregard  heard  that  the  flag  was 
no  longer  flying,  he  sent  three  of  his 
aides,  William  Porcher  Miles,  Roger 
A.  Pryor,  and  myself,  to  offer,  and 
also  to  see  if  Major  Anderson  would 
receive  or  needed,  assistance,  in  sub 
duing  the  flames  inside  the  fort.  Before  we  reached  it,  we  saw  the  United 
States  flag  again  floating  over  it,  and  began  to  return  to  the  city.  Before 
going  far,  however,  we  saw  the  Stars  and  Stripes  replaced  by  a  white 
flag.  We  turned  about  at  once  and  rowed  rapidly  to  the  fort.  We  were 
directed,  from  an  embrasure,  not  to  go  to  the  wharf,  as  it  was  mined,  and 
the  fire  was  near  it.  We  were  assisted  through  an  embrasure  and  conducted 
to  Major  Anderson.  Our  mission  being  made  known  to  him,  he  replied, 
"Present  my  compliments  to  General  Beauregard,  and  say  to  him  I  thank  him 
for  his  kindness,  but  need  no  assistance."  He  further  remarked  that  he  hoped 
the  worst  was  over,  that  the  fire  had  settled  over  the  magazine,  and,  as  it  had 
not  exploded,  he  thought  the  real  danger  was  about  over.  Continuing,  he  said, 
"  Gentlemen,  do  I  understand  you  come  direct  from  General  Beauregard  ?  " 
The  reply  was  in  the  affirmative.  He  then  said,  "  Why  !  Colonel  Wigfall  has 
just  been  here  as  an  aide  too,  and  by  authority  of  General  Beauregard,  and 


SECESSION  HALL,  CHARLESTON,  SCENE,  OF  THE  PASSAGE 

OF    THE    ORDINANCE    OF    SECESSION. 

FROM  A  PHOTOGRAPH. 


3>  These  vessels,  part  of  the  second  expedition 
for  the  relief  of  Fort  Sumter,  were  the  Baltic  (no 
guns),  the  Pawnee  (8  9-inch  guns),  and  the  Harriet 
Lane  (1  8-inch  gun  and  4  32-pounders).  The 
Pocaliontas  did  not  arrive  till  the  afternoon  of  the 
13th.  The  expedition  was  in  charge  of  Captain 
Gustavus  V.  Fox  (afterward  Assistant  Secretary  of 
the  Navy),  who  had  visited  the  fort  on  the  21st  of 
March.  It  had  been  understood  between  Secre 
tary  Welles  and  Captain  Fox  that  the  movement 
should  be  supported  by  the  Pou-Jiatan  (1  11-inch 


and  10  9-inch  guns) ;  but,  unknown  to  Mr.  Welles, 
and  perhaps  without  full  understanding  of  this 
plan,  President  Lincoln  had  consented  to  the 
dispatch  of  the  ship  to  the  relief  of  Fort  Piekens, 
for  which  destination  it  had  sailed  from  New  York, 
April  6th,  under  command  of  Lieutenant  David 
D.  Porter.  This  conflict  of  plans  deprived  Captain 
Fox  of  the  ship  which  he  calls  the  "fighting 
portion "  of  his  fleet ;  and  to  this  circumstance 
he  attributed  the  failure  of  the  expedition. 

EDITORS. 


THE  FIRST  STEP  IN   THE  WAR.  79 

proposed  the  same  terms  of  evacuation  offered  on  the  llth  instant."  We 
informed  the  major  that  we  were  not  authorized  to  offer  terms  ;  that  we  were 
direct  from  General  Beauregard,  and  that  Colonel  Wigfall,  although  an  aide- 
de-camp  to  the  general,  had  been  detached,  and  had  not  seen  the  general  for 
several  days.  Major  Anderson  at  once  stated,  "  There  is  a  misunderstanding 
on  my  part,  and  I  will  at  once  run  up  my  flag  and  open  fire  again."  After  con 
sultation,  we  requested  him  not  to  do  so,  until  the  matter  was  explained  to 
General  Beauregard,  and  requested  Major  Anderson  to  reduce  to  writing  his 
understanding  with  Colonel  Wigfall,  which  he  did.  However,  before  we 
left  the  fort,  a  boat  arrived  from  Charleston,  bearing  Major  D.  R.  Jones, 
assistant  adjutant-general  on  General  Beauregard's  staff,  who  offered  sub 
stantially  the  same  terms  to  Major  Anderson  as  those  offered  on  the  llth,  and 
also  by  Colonel  Wigfall,  and  which  were  now  accepted. 

Thus  fell  Fort  Sumter,  April  13th,  1861.  At  this  time  fire  was  still  raging  in 
the  barracks,  and  settling  steadily  over  the  magazine.  All  egress  was  cut  off 
except  through  the  lower  embrasures.  Many  shells  from  the  Confederate  bat 
teries,  which  had  fallen  in  the  fort  and  had  not  exploded,  as  well  as  the  hand- 
grenades  used  for  defense,  were  exploding  as  they  were  reached  by  the  fire.  The 
wind  was  driving  the  heat  and  smoke  down  into  the  fort  and  into  the  case 
mates,  almost  causing  suffocation.  Major  Anderson,  his  officers,  and  men  were 
blackened  by  smoke  and  cinders,  and  showed  signs  of  fatigue  and  exhaustion, 
from  the  trying  ordeal  through  which  they  had  passed. 

It  was  soon  discovered,  by  conversation,  that  it  was  a  bloodless  battle ;  not  a 
man  had  been  killed  or  seriously  wounded  on  either  side  during  the  entire  bom 
bardment  of  nearly  forty  hours.  Congratulations  were  exchanged  on  so  happy 
a  result.  Major  Anderson  stated  that  he  had  instructed  his  officers  only  to 
fire  011  the  batteries  and  forts,  and  not  to  fire  on  private  property. 

The  terms  of  evacuation  offered  by  Greneral  Beauregard  were  generous,  and 
were  appreciated  by  Major  Anderson.  The  garrison  was  to  embark  on  the 
14th,  after  running  up  and  saluting  the  United  States  flag,  and  to  be  earned 


FORT    SUMTER    AFTER    THE    BOMBARDMENT.      FROM    A    SKETCH    MADE    IN    APEIL,    1861. 


JEFFERSON    DAVIS,    PRESIDENT    OF    THE    CONFEDERATE    STATES    OF    AMERICA. 
FROM    A    PHOTOGRAPH. 


THE  FIRST  STEP  IN   THE  WAR. 


81 


to  the  United  States  fleet.  A  soldier  killed  during  the  salute  was  buried 
inside  the  fort,  the  new  Confederate  garrison  uncovering  during  the  impres 
sive  ceremonies.  Major  Anderson  and  his  command  left  the  harbor,  bearing 
with  them  the  respect  and  admiration  of  the  Confederate  soldiers.  |  It  was 
conceded  that  he  had  done  his  duty  as  a  soldier  holding  a  most  delicate  trust. 
This  first  bombardment  of  Sumter  was  but  its  "  baptism  of  fire."  During 
subsequent  attacks  by  land  and  water,  it  was  battered  by  the  heaviest  Union 
artillery.  Its  walls  were  completely  crushed,  but  the  tons  of  iron  projectiles 
imbedded  in  its  ruins  added  strength  to  the  inaccessible  mass  that  surrounded 
it  and  made  it  impregnable.  It  was  never  taken,  but  the  operations  of  Gen 
eral  Sherman,  after  his  march  to  the  sea,  compelled  its  evacuation,  and  the 
Stars  and  Stripes  were  again  raised  over  it,  April  14th,  1865.  £ 


I  The  officers,  under  General  Beauregard,  of 
the  batteries  surrounding  Fort  Sumter  were : 

SULLIVAN'S  ISLAND,  Brigadier-General  R.  G.  M. 
Dunovant  commanding,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Ros- 
well  S.  Ripley,  commanding  the  artillery:  Five-gun 
Battery  (east  of  Fort  Moultrie),  Captain  S.  Y. 
Tupper;  Maffit  Channel  Battery  (2  guns)  and  Mor 
tar  Battery  No.  2  (2  10-inch  mortars),  Captain 
William  Butler,  Lieutenant  J.  A.  Hugueuin;  Fort 
Moultrie  (30  guns),  Captain  W.  R.  Calhoun:  con 
sisting  of  Channel  Battery,  Lieutenants  Thomas 
M.  Wagner,  Preston,  and  Sitgreaves,  Sumter 
Battery,  Lieutenants  Alfred  Rhett  and  John 
Mitchell,  and  Oblique  Battery,  Lieutenant  C.  W. 
Parker;  Mortar  Battery  No.  1  (2  10-inch  mortars) 
and  Enfilade  Battery  (4  guns),  Captain  James  H. 
Hallonquist,  Lieutenants  Flemming,  Jacob  Valen 
tine,  and  B.  S.  Burnet ;  the  Point  Battery  (1  9-inch 
Dahlgren)  and  the  Floating  Iron-clad  Battery  (2 
42-pounders  and  2  32-pounders),  Captain  John  R. 
Hamilton  and  Lieutenant  Joseph  A.  Yates;  the 
Mount  Pleasant  Battery  (2  10-inchmortars),  Captain 
Robert  Martin,  Lieutenant  George  X.  Reynolds. 

MORRIS  ISLAND,  Brigadier-General  James  Simons 
commanding,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Wilmot  G.  De 
Saussure,  commanding  the  artillery :  Major  P.  F. 
Stevens,  commanding  Gumming' s  Point  Battery 


( Blake ly  gun,  .which  arrived  from  Liverpool  April 
9th,  Captain  J.  P.  Thomas  ;  2  42-pounders,  Lieu 
tenant  T.  Sumter  Brownfield;  and  3  10-inch 
mortars,  Lieutenants  C.  R.  Holmes  and  N.  Arm 
strong)  and  the  Stevens  Iron-clad  Battery  (3  8-inch 
columbiads),  Captain  George  B.  Cuthbert,  Lieu 
tenant  G.  L.  Buist ;  Trapier  Battery  (3  10-inch 
mortars),  Captain  J.  Gadsden  King,  Lieutenants 
W.  I).  H.  Kirkwood,  J.  P.  Strohecker,  A.  M.  Huger, 
and  E.  L.  Parker. 

JAMES  ISLAND,  Major  X.  G.  Evans  commanding ; 
Fort  Johnson  (battery  of  24-pounders),  Captain 
George  S.  James  ;  Mortar  Battery,  Lieutenants  W. 
H.  Gibbes,  H.  S.  Farley,  J.  E.  McP.  Washington, 
and  T.  B.  Hayne ;  Upper  Battery  (2  10-inch  mor 
tars),  Lower  Battery  (2  10-inch  mortars),  Captain 
S.  C.  Thayer. — EDITORS. 

j)  Under  an  order  from  Secretary  Stanton,  the 
same  flag  that  was  lowered,  April  14th,  1861, 
was  raised  again  over  Sumter,  by  Major  (then 
General)  Anderson,  on  April  14th,  18G5,  the  day 
President  Lincoln  was  shot.  Of  Major  Anderson's 
former  officers,  Generals  Abuer  Doubleday  and 
Xorman  J.  Hall  and  Chaplain  Matthias  Harris 
were  present.  The  Rev.  Henry  Ward  Beecher 
delivered  an  oration,  and  other  prominent  anti- 
slavery  men  attended  the  ceremony. — EDITORS. 


VIEW    OF    CUMMIXG's    POINT.     FROM    A    SKETCH    MADE    AFTEK    THE    BOMBARDMENT. 


NOTES   ON  THE   SURRENDER   OF   FORT  SUMTER. 

BY  A.  R.  CHISOLM,  COLONEL,  C.  S.  A. 

TTERY  soon  after  Major  Eobert  Anderson  moved  with  his  command  into 
^  Fort  Sumter  from  Fort  Moultrie,  G-overiior  Francis  W.  Pickens  sent 
James  Fraser,  of  the  Charleston  Light  Dragoons,  to  me  at  my  plantation, 
fifty  miles  south  of  Charleston,  with  the  request  that  I  would  assist  with  my 
negroes  in  constructing  batteries  on  Morris  Island.  Taking  my  own  negro 
men  and  others  from  the  plantation  of  my  uncle,  Eobert  Chisolm,  and  that 
of  Nathaniel  Heyward,  I  was  engaged  in  this  work  when  General  Beauregard 
arrived  to  take  command.  I  then  informed  the  governor  that  it  would  be 
necessary  for  General  Beauregard  to  have  an  aide-de-camp  who  was  familiar 
with  the  harbor  and  with  boating;  that  I  was  the  owner  of  a  large  six-oared  boat 
and  six  superior  oarsmen,  that  were  at  his  service  free  of  cost.  I  was  thereupon 
commissioned  lieutenant- colonel,  and  ordered  to  report  to  General  Beauregard. 

Having  visited  Fort  Sumter  five  times  under  a  flag  of  truce,  and  once  after 
the  surrender,  I  became  well  acquainted  with  most  of  its  officers.  During  a 
visit  in  company  with  Captain  Samuel  W.  Ferguson,  the  officers  jokingly 
complained  of  being  short  of  cigars  and  like  luxuries.  With  General  Beau- 
regard's  approval,  the  next  time  duty  called  us  to  the  fort  we  presented  them 
with  several  cases  of  claret  and  boxes  of  cigars. 

April  12th,  1861,  I  visited  the  fort  in  company  with  James  Chesnut,  Jr., 
and  Captain  Stephen  D.  Lee  with  the  demand  for  its  surrender,  and  heard 
Major  Anderson  say  in  conversation  with  us,  "  I  shall  await  the  first  shot,  and 
if  you  do  not  batter  us  to  pieces  we  shall  be  starved  out  in  a  few  days."  These 
words  being  communicated  to  General  Beauregard,  we  were  again  sent  to  the 
fort,  arriving  there  about  1 : 30  A.  M.,  April  12th.  After  waiting  nearly  two  hours 
for  a  reply,  we  sent  word  to  Major  Anderson  that  our  orders  did  not  admit  of 
our  waiting  any  longer.  He  came  to  where  we  were  in  the  guard-room,  and 
informed  us  "  that  we  had  twice  fired  on  his  flag,  and  that  if  we  did  so  again 
he  would  open  his  fire  on  our  batteries."  Under  our  instructions  this  reply 
admitted  of  no  other  answer  than  the  one  dated  April  12th,  1861,  3:20  A.  M. 
[see  page  76],  which  was  dictated  by  Chesnut,  written  by  Lee,  and  copied  by 
me.  Roger  A.  Pryor  was  with  us  on  the  second  visit,  but  did  not  enter  the  fort, 
giving  me  as  a  reason  that  his  State,  Virginia,  had  not  yet  seceded.  For 
the  same  reason  he  declined  to  fire  the  signal  shot.  Moreover,  I  believe  he 
was  then  a  member  of  Congress,  and  may  have  been  unwilling  to  compro 
mise  himself. 

The  facts  of  the  surrender  of  Fort  Sumter  to  ex-Senator  Wigfall  are  these : 
General  Beauregard,  seeing  the  fort  on  fire,  sent  me  with  a  note  to  General 
James  Simons,  commanding  on  Morris  Island,  in  which  he  directed  him,  if  he 
could  do  so  without  risk  to  his  command,  to  offer  assistance  in  extinguishing 
the  fire.  I  passed  down  between  Fort  Sumter  and  our  batteries ;  delivering 
my  dispatches,  I  volunteered  to  go  to  Fort  Sumter,  which  offer  was  accepted. 


NOTES  ON   THE  SURRENDER  OF  FORT  SUMTER.  83 

Colonel  Wigf  all,  of  Texas,  volunteered  to  accompany  me.  While  bringing  my 
boat  from  its  moorings  in  a  creek,  Wigfall,  who  was  very  much  excited, 
jumped  into  a  small  skiff.  The  flag  of  the  fort,  which  had  been  shot  away, 
reappeared,  and  Wigfall  was  ordered  to  return,  but  he  was  out  of  hearing.  I 
was  ordered  to  return,  and  obeyed.  Colonel  Wigfall  climbed  through  an 
embrasure,  and,  assuming  authority  from  General  Beauregard,  called  upon 
Major  Anderson  to  surrender.  Major  Anderson  did  not  realize  the  unauthor 
ized  nature  of  WigfalPs  mission  until  the  arrival  of  Captain  Stephen  D.  Lee, 
William  Porcher  Miles,  and  Eoger  A.  Pryor  with  an  offer  direct  from  Gen 
eral  Beauregard,  similar  to  the  one  Greneral  Simons  was  authorized  to  make. 
Major  Anderson  was  about  to  renew  the  action,  when  Major  David  E. 
Jones  arrived  with  the  offer  of  terms  for  the  surrender  of  the  fort,  which  were 
virtually  almost  anything  that  Anderson  might  ask,  in  order  that  we  might 
get  possession  before  the  fleet  could  reenforce  and  provision  the  garrison. 

I  have  always  been  of  the  opinion  that  Major  Anderson  should  not  have 
surrendered  when  he  did.  The  fire  only  consumed  the  officers'  and  men's 
quarters;  the  two  magazines  were  uninjured,  only  one  man  had  been  wounded, 
the  walls  were  secure,  and  he  still  had  provisions  which  would  have  sustained 
his  small  command  until  the  fleet  could  both  have  provisioned  and  reenforced 
him.  I  was  present  with  Captain  Hartstene  during  the  evacuation,  and  was 
astonished  to  see  barrels  of  pork\  being  rolled  out  and  shipped  on  board  the 
Isabel,  the  steamer  furnished  by  General  Beauregard  to  transport  Anderson's 
men  to  the  fleet.  My  duty  often  required  that  I  should  pass  Fort  Sumter 
and  our  guard-boats  at  night  to  visit  Hartstene,  who  commanded  the  poor 
boats  we  used.  I  was  rarely  seen  and  had  such  a  contempt  for  our  guards 
that  on  one  occasion,  having  a  strong  tide  in  my  favor,  we  did  not  halt  when 
shots  were  fired  at  us.  In  fact,  we  were  seldom  seen  until  close  to  the  guards 
of  the  boat  we  sought.  Captain  Hartstene  was  well  aware  how  easy  it  was  to 
pass  to  Fort  Sumter  and  expressed  to  me  his  uneasiness  on  this  point ;  in  fact, 
one  bold  officer  in  command  of  a  navy  barge,  armed  with  a  boat  howitzer, 
could  have  easily  cleared  the  way  for  a  hundred  barges  with  men  and  sup 
plies  to  pass  to  the  fort.  The  night  but  one  previous,  to  the  surrender  was 
very  dark.  I  was  ordered  to  Hartstene  between  the  fort  and  the  fleet  in  the 
main  ship-channel,  and  my  boat  touched  his  guards  before  it  was  seen.  Later 
in  the  war,  when  Beauregard  defended  the  fort,  one  of  the  bravest  officers  in 
his  command  pronounced  the  work  untenable.  Beauregard  then  informed 
me  that  if  necessary  he  would  go  there  and  hold  the  fort  with  his  staff;  that 
on  no  condition  would  he  consent  to  give  it  up  to  General  Gillmore.  It  was 
after  this  that  General  (then  Major)  Stephen  Elliott  made  his  gallant  defense 
of  the  ruins ;  when,  with  the  exception  of  some  guns  buried  under  the  ruins 
of  the  casemate  facing  Fort  Moultrie,  but  one  small  gun  remained  mounted, 
and  that  was  pointed  toward  the  city,  being  used  merely  to  fire  the  salutes. 

\  Captain  J.  G.  Foster  in  his  report  says  that  the  the  fort,  but  with  plenty  of  cartridges  [referring  to 

supply  of  bread  in  Sumter  failed  April  10th,  and  the  lack  of  material  for  cartridge-bags]  the  men 

that  the  last  of  the  damaged  rice  was  served  at  would  have  cheerfully  fought  five  or  six  days,  and, 

breakfast  on  the  13th.   "  The  want  of  provisions,"  if  necessary,  much  longer,  on  pork  alone,  of  which 

he  adds,  "  would  soon  have  caused  the  surrender  of  we  had  a  sufficient  supply." — EDITORS. 


THE     AWKWARD     SQUAD. 


WAR    PREPARATIONS    IN   THH    NORTH. 

BY   JACOB   D.    COX,    MAJOR-GENERAL,  U.  S.  V.,    EX-GOVERNOR    OF    OHIO, 
EX-SECRETARY  OF  THE    INTERIOR. 


wonderful  outburst  of  national  feeling  in  the  North  in  the  spring  of 
1861  has  always  been  a  thrilling  and  almost  supernatural  thing  to  those 
who  participated  in  it.  The  classic  myth  that  the  resistless  terror  which  some 
times  unaccountably  seized  upon  an  army  was  the  work  of  the  god  Pan  might 
seem  to  have  its  counterpart  in  the  work  of  a  national  divinity  rousing  a 
whole  people,  not  to  terror,  but  to  a  sublime  enthusiasm  of  self-devotion. 
To  picture  it  as  a  whole  is  impossible.  A  new  generation  can  only  approxi 
mate  a  knowledge  of  the  'feelings  of  that  time  by  studying  in  detail  some  sep 
arate  scenes  of  the  drama  that  had  a  continent  for  its  stage.  The  writer  can 
only  tell  what  happened  under  his  eye.  The  like  was  happening  everywhere 
from  Maine  to  Kansas.  What  is  told  is  simply  a  type  of  the  rest.  J 

On  Friday,  the  twelfth  day  of  April,  1861,  the  Senate  of  Ohio  was  in  session, 
trying  to  go  on  in  the  ordinary  routine  of  business,  but  with  a  sense  of 
anxiety  and  strain  which  was  caused  by  the  troubled  condition  of  national 


^  In  those  opening  days  of  the  war,  the  National 
Government  seemed  for  the  moment  to  be  subor 
dinated  to  the  governments  of  the  States.  A  rev 
olution  in  the  seceding  South  had  half  destroyed 
the  national  legislature,  and  the  national  executive 
was  left  without  a  treasury,  without  an  army,  and 
without  laws  adequate  to  create  these  at  once.  At 
no  time  since  the  thirteen  colonies  declared  their 
independence  have  the  State  governors  and  the 
State  legislators  found  so  important  a  field  of  duty 
as  then.  A  little  hesitation,  a  little  lukewarmness, 
would  have  ended  all.  Then  it  was  that  the  in 
tense  zeal  and  high  spirit  of  Governor  Andrew  of 
Massachusetts  led  all  New  England,  and  was  ready 
to  lead  the  nation,  as  the  men  of  Concord  and  Lex 


ington  had  led  in  1775.  Then  it  was  that  Gov 
ernor  Morton  of  Indiana  came  to  the  front  with  a 
masculine  energy  arid  burly  weight  of  character 
and  of  will  which  was  typical  of  the  force  which 
the  Great  West  could  throw  into  the  struggle. 

Ohio  was  so  situated  with  regard  to  West  ATir- 
ginia  and  Kentucky  that  the  keystone  of  the  Union 
might  be  said  to  be  now  west  of  the  mountains. 
Governor  Dennison  mediated,  like  the  statesman 
he  was,  between  East  and  West;  and  Tod  and 
Brough,  following  him  by  the  will  of  the  people 
in  votes  that  ran  up  to  majorities  of  near  a  hun 
dred  thousand,  gave  that  vigorous  support  to  Mr. 
Lincoln  which  showed  the  earnest  nationality  of 
the  "war  Democrats"  of  that  day.  —  J.  D.  C. 


WAR  PREPARATIONS  IN  THE  NORTH.  8=> 

affairs.  The  passage  of  "  ordinances  of  secession  "  by  one  after  another  of  the 
Southern  States,  and  even  the  assembling  of  a  provisional  Confederate  govern 
ment  at  Montgomery,  had  not  wholly  destroyed  the  hope  that  some  peaceful 
way  out  of  our  troubles  would  be  found ;  yet  the  gathering  of  an  army  on  the 
sands  opposite  Fort  Sumter  was  really  war,  and  if  a  hostile  gun  were  fired,  we 
knew  it  would  mean  the  end  of  all  effort  at  arrangement.  Hoping  almost 
against  hope  that  blood  would  not  be  shed,  and  that  the  pageant  of  military 
array  and  of  a  secession  government  would  pass  by,  we  tried  to  give  our 
thoughts  to  business;  but  there  was  no  heart  in  it,  and  the  "morning 
hour "  lagged,  for  we  could  not  work  in  earnest,  and  we  were  unwilling  to 
adjourn. 

Suddenly  a  senator  came  in  from  the  lobby  in  an  excited  way,  and,  catch 
ing  the  chairman's  eye,  exclaimed,  "Mr.  President,  the  telegraph  announces  that 
the  secessionists  are  bombarding  Fort  Sumter ! "  There  was  a  solemn  and 
painful  hush,  but  it  was  broken  in  a  moment  by  a  woman's  shrill  voice  from 
the  spectators'  seats,  crying,  "  Glory  to  God  ! "  It  startled  every  one,  almost 
as  if  the  enemy  were  in  the  midst.  But  it  was  the  voice  of  a  radical  friend  of 
the  slave,  Abby  Kelly  Foster,  who,  after  a  lifetime  of  public  agitation,  believed 
that  only  through  blood  could  his  freedom  be  won,  and  who  had  shouted  the 
fierce  cry  of  joy  that  the  question  had  been  submitted  to  the  decision  of  the 
sword.  AVith  most  of  us,  the  gloomy  thought  that  civil  war  had  begun  in 
our  own  land  overshadowed  everything  else ;  this  seemed  too  great  a  price 
to  pay  for  any  good, —  a  scourge  to  be  borne  only  in  preference  to  yielding 
what  was  to  us  the  very  groundwork  of  our  republicanism,  the  right  to 
enforce  a  fair  interpretation  of  the  Constitution  through  the  election  of 
President  and  Congress. 

The  next  day  we  learned  that  Major  Anderson  had  surrendered,  and  the 
telegraphic  news  from  all  the  Northern  States  showed  plain  evidence  of  a 
popular  outburst  of  loyalty  to  the  Union,  following  a  brief  moment  of  dis 
may.  That  was  the  period  when  the  flag — The  Flag — flew  out  to  the 
wind  from  every  housetop  in  our  great  cities,  and  when,  in  New  York, 
wildly  excited  crowds  marched  the  streets  demanding  that  the  suspected 
or  the  lukewarm  should  show  the  symbol  of  nationality  as  a  committal  to 
the  country's  cause.  He  that  is  not  for  us  is  against  us,  was  the  deep, 
instinctive  feeling. 

Judge  Thomas  M.  Key  of  Cincinnati,^,  chairman  of  the  Judiciary  Com 
mittee,  was  the  recognized  leader  of  the  Democratic  party  in  the  Senate,  and 
at  an  early  hour  moved  an  adjournment  to  the  following  Tuesday,  in  order, 
as  he  said,  that  the  senators  might  have  the  opportunity  to  go  home  and 
consult  their  constituents  in  the  perilous  crisis  of  public  affairs.  No  objec 
tion  was  made  to  the  adjournment,  and  the  representatives  took  a  similar 
recess.  All  were  in  a  state  of  most  anxious  suspense, — the  Eepublicans  to 
know  what  initiative  the  Administration  at  Washington  would  take,  and 
the  Democrats  to  determine  what  course  they  should  follow  if  the  President 
should  call  for  troops  to  put  down  the  insurrection. 

&  Afterward  aide-de-camp  and  acting  judge-advocate  on  General  McClellau's  staff. 


86  WAR  PREPARATIONS  IN   THE  NORTH. 

Before  we  met  again,  Mr.  Lincoln's  proclamation  and  call  for  75,000  men  for 
three  months'  service  had  been  issued,  and  the  great  mass  of  the  people  of  the 
North,  forgetting  all  party  distinctions,  answered  with  an  enthusiasm  that 
swept  politicians  off  their  feet.  When  we  met  again  on  Tuesday  morning, 
Judge  Key,  taking  my  arm  and  pacing  the  floor  outside  the  railing,  broke  out 
impetuously,  "  Mr.  Cox,  the  people  have  gone  stark  mad !  "  —  "  I  knew  they 
would  if  a  blow  were  struck  against  the  flag,"  said  I,  reminding  him  of  some 
previous  conversations  we  had  had  on  the  subject.  He,  with  most  of  the  poli 
ticians  of  the  day,  partly  by  sympathy  with  the  overwhelming  current  of 
public  opinion,  and  partly  by  the  reaction  of  their  own  hearts  against  the 
theories  which  had  encouraged  the  secessionists,  determined  to  support  the 
war  measures  of  the  Government  and  to  make  no  factious  opposition  to 
such  State  legislation  as  might  be  necessary  to  sustain  the  Federal 
Administration. 

The  attitude  of  Mr.  Key  is  only  a  type  of  many  others,  and  marks  one  of 
the  most  striking  features  of  the  time.  On  the  8th  of  January  the  usual 
Democratic  convention  and  celebration  of  the  battle  of  New  Orleans  had 
taken  place,  and  a  series  of  resolutions  had  been  passed,  in  which,  professing 
to  speak  in  the  name  of  "  200,000  Democrats  of  Ohio,"  the  convention  had 
very  significantly  intimated  that  this  vast  organization  of  men  would  be  found 
in  the  way  of  any  attempt  to  put  down  secession  until  the  demands  of  the 
South  in  respect  to  slavery  were  complied  with.  A  few  days  afterward  I  was 
returning  to  Columbus  from  my  home  in  Trumbull  county,  and  meeting  upon 
the  railway  train  with  David  Tod,  then  an  active  Democratic  politician,  but 
afterward  one  of  our  loyal  "  war  governors,"  the  conversation  turned  on  the 
action  of  the  convention  which  had  just  adjourned.  Mr.  Tod  and  I  were  per 
sonal  friends  and  neighbors,  and  I  freely  expressed  my  surprise  that  the  con 
vention  should  have  committed  itself  to  what  must  be  interpreted  as  a  threat 
of  insurrection  in  the  North,  if  the  Administration  should,  in  opposing  seces 
sion  by  force,  follow  the  example  of  Andrew  Jackson,  in  whose  honor  they  had 
assembled.  He  rather  vehemently  reasserted  the  substance  of  the  resolution, 
saying  that  we  Republicans  would  find  the  200,000  Ohio  Democrats  in  front 
of  us,  if  we  attempted  to  cross  the  Ohio  River.  My  answer  was,  "  We  will  give 
up  the  contest  if  we  cannot  carry  your  200,000  over  the  heads  of  you  leaders." 

The  result  proved  how  hollow  the  party  assertions  had  been,  or,  perhaps,  I 
should  say,  how  superficial  was  the  hold  of  such  doctrines  upon  the  mass  of 
men  in  a  great  political  organization.  At  the  first  shot  from  Beauregard's 
guns  in  Charleston  Harbor  these  men  crowded  to  the  recruiting  stations  to 
enlist  for  the  defense  of  the  national  flag  and  the  national  union.  It  was  a 
popular  torrent  which  no  leaders  could  resist ;  but  many  of  these  should  be 
credited  with  the  same  patriotic  impulse,  and  it  made  them  nobly  oblivious 
of  party  consistency.  A  few  days  after  the  surrender  of  Sumter,  Stephen  A. 
Douglas  passed  through  Columbus  on  his  way  to  Washington,  and,  in  response 
to  the  calls  of  a  spontaneous  gathering  of  people,  spoke  to  them  from  the  win 
dow  of  his  bedroom  in  the  hotel.  There  had  been  no  thought  for  any  of  the 
common  surroundings  of  a  public  meeting.  There  were  no  torches,  no  music. 


WAR  PREPARATIONS  IN   THE  NORTH. 


A  dark  mass  of  men  filled  full  the  dimly  lit  street,  and  called  for  Douglas 
with  an  earnestness  of  tone  wholly  different  from  the  enthusiasm  of  common 
political  gatherings.  He  came  half-dressed  to  his  window,  and,  without  any 
light  near  him,  spoke  solemnly  to  the  people  upon  the  terrible  crisis  which 
had  come  upon  the  nation.  Men  of  'all  parties  were  there :  his  own  followers 
to  get  some  light  as  to  their  duty ;  the  Breckinridge  Democrats  ready,  most  of 
them,  repentantly  to  follow  a  Northern  leader  now  that  their  Southern  asso 
ciates  were  in  armed  opposition  to  the  Government ;  the  Republicans  eager  to 
know  whether  so  potent  an  influence  was  to  be  unreservedly  on  the  side  of  the 
nation.  I  remember  well  the  serious  solicitude  with  which  I  listened  to  his  open 
ing  sentences  as  I  leaned  against  the  railing  of  the  State  House  park,  trying 
in  vain  to  see  more  than  a  dim  outline  of  the  man  as  he  stood  at  the  unlighted 
window.  His  deep,  sonorous  tones  rolled  down  through  the  darkness  from 
above  us,  an  earnest,  measured  voice,  the  more  solemn,  the  more  impressive, 
because  we  could  not  see  the  speaker,  and  it  came  to  us  literally  as  "  a  voice 
in  the  night," — the  night  of  our  country's  unspeakable  trial.  There  was  no 
uncertainty  in  his  tone ;  the  Union  must  be  preserved  and  the  insurrection  must 
be  crushed ;  he  pledged  his  hearty  support  to  Mr.  Lincoln's  administration  in 
doing  this ;  other  questions  must  stand 
aside  till  the  national  authority  should 
be  everywhere  recognized.  I  do  not 
think  we  greatly  cheered  him, — it  was, 
rather,  a  deep  Amen  that  went  up 
from  the  crowd.  \Ve  went  home 
breathing  more  freely  in  the  assur 
ance  we  now  felt  that,  for  a  time  at 
least,  no  organized  opposition  to  the 
Federal  Government  and  its  policy  of 
coercion  could  be  formidable  in  the 
North. 

Yet  the  situation  hung  upon  us  like 
a  nightmare.  Garfield  and  I  were  lodg 
ing  together  at  the  time,  our  wives 
being  kept  at  home  by  family  cares, 
and  when  we  reached  our  sitting- 
room,  after  an  evening  session  of  the 
Senate,  we  often  found  ourselves  in 
voluntarily  groaning,  "  Civil  war  in 
our  land  !  "  The  shame,  the  folly,  the 
outrage,  seemed  too  great  to  believe, 
and  we  hah3  hoped  to  wake  from  it  as 
from  a  dream.  Among  the  painful  remembrances  of  those  days  is  the  ever- 
present  weight  at  the  heart  which  never  left  me  till  I  found  relief  in  the 
active  duties  of  camp  life  at  the  close  of  the  month.  I  went  about  my 
duties  (and  I  am  sure  most  of  those  with  whom  I  associated  did  the  same)  with 
the  half -choking  sense  of  a  grief  I  dared  not  think  of:  like  one  who  is 


LIFE-MASK    OF     STEPHEN     A.     DOUGLAS.       TAKEN     BY 

LEONARD    TOLK    SHORTLY  BEFORE  THE   LINCOLN- 

DOL'GLAS    DEBATES    OF    1858. 


WAR  PREPARATIONS  IN   THE  NORTH. 


STEPHEN    A.    DOUGLAS.      FROM    A    UAGUERKEOTYPE    TAKEN    IN    1852. 

dragging  himself  to   the  ordinary  labors   of  life  from   some   terrible   and 
recent  bereavement. 

We  talked  of  our  personal  duty,  and  though  both  Grarneld  and  myself  had 
young  families,  we  were  agreed  that  our  activity  in  the  organization  and  sup 
port  of  the  Republican  party  made  the  duty  of  supporting  the  Government 
by  military  service  come  peculiarly  home  to  us.  He  was,  for  the  moment, 
somewhat  trammeled  by  his  half-cleiical  position,  but  he  very  soon  cut  the 
knot.  My  own  path  seemed  unmistakably  plain.  He,  more  careful  for  his 
friend  than  for  himself,  urged  upon  me  his  doubts  whether  my  physical 
strength  was  equal  to  the  strain  that  would  be  put  upon  it.  "  I,"  said  he,  "  am 
big  and  strong,  and  if  my  relations  to  the  church  and  the  college  can  be 
loosened,  I  shall  have  no  excuse  for  not  enlisting ;  but  you  are  slender  and 


WAR  PREPARATIONS  IN   THE  NORTH.  89 

will  break  down."  It  is  true  I  then  looked  slender  for  a  man  six  feet  high  ; 
yet  I  had  confidence  in  the  elasticity  of  my  constitution,  and  the  result  justi 
fied  me,  while  it  also  showed  how  liable  one  is  to  mistake  in  such  things. 
Garfield  found  that  he  had  a  tendency  to  weakness  of  the  alimentary  system, 
which  broke  him  down  on  every  campaign  in  which  he  served,  and  led  to  his 
retiring  from  the  army  at  the  close  of  1863.  My  own  health,  on  the  other 
hand,  was  strengthened  by  outdoor  life  and  exposure,  and  I  served  to  the 
end  with  growing  physical  vigor. 

When  Mr.  Lincoln  issued  his  first  call  for  troops,  the  existing  laws  made  it 
necessary  that  these  should  be  fully  organized  and  officered  by  the  several 
States.  Then,  the  treasury  was  in  no  condition  to  bear  the  burden  of  war 
expenditures,  and,  till  Congress  could  assemble,  the  President  was  forced  to 
rely  on  the  States  for  means  to  equip  and  transport  their  own  men.  This 
threw  upon  the  governors  and  legislatures  of  the  loyal  States  responsibilities 
of  a  kind  wholly  unprecedented.  A  long  period  of  profound  peace  had 
made  every  military  organization  seem  almost  farcical.  A  few  inde 
pendent  companies  formed  the  merest  shadow  of  an  army,  and  the  State 
militia  proper  was  only  a  nominal  thing.  It  happened,  however,  that  I  held 
a  commission  as  brigadier  in  this  State  militia,  and  my  intimacy  with 
Governor  Dennison  led  him  to  call  upon  me  for  such  assistance  as  I  could 
render  in  the  first  enrollment  and  organization  of  the  Ohio  quota.  Arrang 
ing  to  be  called  to  the  Senate  chamber  when  my  vote  might  be  needed,  I 
gave  my  time  chiefly  to  such  military  matters  as  the  governor  appointed. 
Although,  as  I  have  said,  my  military  commission  had  been  a  nominal  thing, 
and  in  fact  I  had  never  worn  a  uniform,  I  had  not  wholly  neglected  theoretic 
preparation  for  such  work.  For  some  years,  the  possibility  of  a  war  of  seces 
sion  had  been  one  of  the  things  which  were  forced  upon  the  thoughts  of 
reflecting  people,  and  I  had  given  some  careful  study  to  such  books  of  tactics 
and  of  strategy  as  were  within  easy  reach.  I  had  especially  been  led  to  read 
military  history  with  critical  care,  and  had  carried  away  many  valuable  ideas 
from  that  most  useful  means  of  military  education.  I  had,  therefore,  some 
notion  of  the  work  before  us,  and  could  approach  its  problems  with  less  loss 
of  time,  at  least,  than  if  I  had  been  wholly  ignorant. 

My  commission  as  brigadier-general  in  the  Ohio  quota  in  national  service 
was  dated  the  23d  of  April.  Just  about  the  same  time  Captain  George  B. 
McClellan  was  requested  by  Governor  Dennison  to  come  to  Columbus  for 
consultation,  and,  by  the  governor's  request,  I  met  him  at  the  railway  station 
and  took  him  to  the  State  House.  I  think  Mr.  Lars  Anderson  (brother  of 
Major  Robert  Anderson)  and  Mr.  L'Hommedieu  of  Cincinnati  were  with 
him.  The  intimation  had  been  given  me  that  he  would  probably  be  made 
major-general  of  the  Ohio  contingent,  and  this,  naturally,  made  me  scan 
him  closely.  He  was  rather  under  the  medium  height,  but  muscularly 
formed,  with  broad  shoulders  and  a  well-poised  head,  active  and  graceful  in 
motion.  His  whole  appearance  was  quiet  and  modest,  but  when  drawn  out 
he  showed  no  lack  of  confidence  in  himself.  He  was  dressed  in  a  plain 
traveling  dress  and  wore  a  narrow-rimmed  soft  felt  hat.  In  short,  he  seemed 


90  WAR  PREPARATIONS  IN   THE   NORTH. 

what  he  was,  a  railway  superintendent  in  his  business  clothes.  At  the  time, 
his  name  was  a  good  deal  associated  with  Beauregard's,  and  they  were  spoken 
of  as  young  men  of  similar  standing  in  the  engineer  corps  of  the  army,  and 
great  things  were  expected  of  them  both  because  of  their  scientific  knowledge 
of  their  profession,  though  McClellan  had  been  in  civil  life  for  some  years. 
McClellan's  report  on  the  Crimean  war  was  one  of  the  few  important 
memoirs  our  old  army  had  produced,  and  was  valuable  enough  to  give  a  just 
reputation  for  comprehensive  understanding  of  military  organization,  and 
the  promise  of  ability  to  conduct  the  operations  of  an  army. 

I  was  present  at  the  interview  which  the  governor  had  with  him.  The  des 
titution  of  the  State  of  everything  like  military  material  and  equipment  was 
very  plainly  put,  and  the  magnitude  of  the  task  of  building  up  a  small  army 
out  of  nothing  was  not  blinked.  The  governor  spoke  of  the  embarrassment 
he  felt  at  every  step  from  the  lack  of  practical  military  experience  in  his  staff, 
and  of  his  desire  to  have  some  one  on  whom  he  could  properly  throw  the 
details  of  military  work.  McClellan  showed  that  he  fully  understood  the 
difficulties  there  would  be  before  him,  and  said  no  man  could  wholly  master 
them  at  once,  although  he  had  confidence  that  if  a  few  weeks'  time  for  prepara 
tion  were  given,  he  would  be  able  to  put  the  Ohio  division  into  reasonable  form 
for  taking  the  field.  The  command  was  then  formally  tendered  and  accepted. 
All  of  us  who  were  present  felt  that  the  selection  was  one  full  of  promise  and 
hope,  and  that  the  governor  had  done  the  wisest  thing  practicable  at  the  time. 

The  next  morning  McClellan  requested  me  to  accompany  him  to  the  State 
arsenal,  to  see  what  arms  and  material  might  be  there.  We  found  a  few  boxes 
of  smooth-bore  muskets  which  had  once  been  issued  to  militia  companies  and 
had  been  returned  rusted  and  damaged.  No  belts,  cartridge-boxes,  or  other 
accouterments  were  with  them.  There  were  two  or  three  smooth-bore  brass 
field-pieces,  6-pounders,  which  had  been  honey-combed  by  firing  salutes,  and 
of  which  the  vents  had  been  worn  out,  bushed,  and  worn  out  again.  In  a  heap 
in  one  corner  lay  a  confused  pile  of  mildewed  harness  which  had  been  once 
used  for  artillery  horses,  but  was  now  not  worth  carrying  away.  There  had 
for  many  years  been  no  money  appropriated  to  buy  military  material  or  even 
to  protect  the  little  the  State  had.  The  Federal  Government  had  occasionally 
distributed  some  arms  which  were  in  the  hands  of  the  independent  uniformed 
militia,  and  the  arsenal  was  simply  an  empty  store-house.  It  did  not  take 
long  to  complete  our  inspection.  At  the  door,  as  we  were  leaving  the  build 
ing,  McClellan  turned,  and,  looking  back  into  its  emptiness,  remarked,  half 
humorously  and  half  sadly,  "A  fine  stock  of  munitions  on  which  to  begin  a 
great  war ! " 

We  went  back  to  the  State  House  where  a  room  was  assigned  us,  and  we 
sat  down  to  work.  The  first  task  was  to  make  out  detailed  schedules  and 
estimates  of  what  would  be  needed  to  equip  ten  thousand  men  for  the  field. 
This  was  a  unit  which  could  be  used  by  the  governor  and  Legislature  in  esti 
mating  the  appropriations  needed  then  or  subsequently.  Intervals  in  this 
labor  were  used  in  discussing  the  general  situation  and  plans  of  campaign. 
Before  the  close  of  the  week  McClellan  drew  up  a  paper  embodying  his  own 


WAR  PREPARATIONS  IN   THE  NORTH.  91 

views,  and  forwarded  it  to  Lieutenant-General  Scott.  He  read  it  to  me,  and 
my  recollection  of  it  is  that  he  suggested  two  principal  lines  of  movement 
in  the  West :  one  to  move  eastward  by  the  Kanawha  Valley  with  a  heavy 
column  to  cooperate  with  an  army  in  front  of  Washington;  the  other  to 
march  directly  southward  and  to  open  the  Valley  of  the  Mississippi.  Scott's 
answer  was  appreciative  and  nattering,  without  distinctly  approving  his  plan, 
and  I  have  never  doubted  that  the  paper  prepared  the  way  for  his  appoint 
ment  in  the  regular  army,  which  followed  at  an  early  day.| 

But  in  trying  to  give  a  connected  idea  of  the  first  military  organization  of 
the  State,  I  have  outrun  some  incidents  of  those  days  which  are  worth  recol 
lection.  From  the  hour  the  call  for  troops  was  published,  enlistments  began, 
and  recruits  were  parading  the  streets  continually.  At  the  capitol  the  rest 
less  impulse  to  be  doing  something  military  seized  even  upon  the  members 
of  the  Legislature,  and  a  good  many  of  them  assembled  every  evening  upon 
the  east  terrace  of  the  State  House  to  be  drilled  in  marching  and  facing  by 
one  or  two  of  their  own  number  who  had  some  knowledge  of  company  tac 
tics.  Most  of  the  uniformed  independent  companies  in  the  cities  of  the  State 
immediately  tendered  their  services  and  began  to  recruit  their  numbers  to  the 
hundred  men  required  for  acceptance.  There  was  no  time  to  procure  uni 
forms,  nor  was  it  desirable ;  for  these  companies  had  chosen  their  own,  and 
would  have  to  change  it  for  that  of  the  United  States  as  soon  as  this  could 
be  furnished.  For  some  days  companies  could  be  seen  marching  and  drilling, 
of  which  part  would  be  uniformed  in  some  gaudy  style  such  as  is  apt  to  pre 
vail  in  holiday  parades  in  time  of  peace,  while  another  part  would  be  dressed 
in  the  ordinary  working  garb  of  citizens  of  all  degrees.  The  uniformed  files 
would  also  be  armed  and  accoutered,  the  others  would  be  without  arms  or 
equipments,  and  as  awkward  a  squad  as  could  well  be  imagined.  The  mate 
rial,  however,  was  magnificent  and  soon  began  to  take  shape.  The  fancy 
uniforms  were  left  at  home,  and  some  approximation  to  a  simple  and  useful 
costume  was  made.  The  recent  popular  outburst  in  Italy  furnished  a  useful 
idea,  and  the  "  Garibaldi  uniform  "  of  a  red  flannel  shirt  with  broad  falling 
collar,  with  blue  trousers  held  by  a  leathern  waist-belt,  and  a  soft  felt  hat  for 
the  head,  was  extensively  copied  and  served  an  excellent  purpose.  It  could 
be  made  by  the  wives  and  sisters  at  home,  and  was  all  the  more  acceptable 
for  that.  The  spring  was  opening  and  a  heavy  coat  would  not  be  much 
needed,  so  that  with  some  sort  of  overcoat  and  a  good  blanket  in  an  impro 
vised  knapsack,  the  new  company  was  not  badly  provided.  The  warm  scar 
let  color  reflected  from  their  enthusiastic  faces  as  they  stood  in  line  made  a 
picture  that  never  failed  to  impress  the  mustering  officers  with  the  splendid 
character  of  the  men. 

The  officering  of  these  new  troops  was  a  difficult  and  delicate  task,  and,  so 
far  as  company  officers  were  concerned,  there  seemed  no  better  way  at  the 
beginning  than  to  let  the  enlisted  men  elect  their  own,  as  was  in  fact  done. 
In  most  cases  where  entirely  new  companies  were  raised,  it  had  been  by  the 

I  Scott's  answer  was  dated  May  3d,  and  is  given  by  General  E.  D.  Townsend  (then  on  Scott's  staff), 
in  Ms  "  Anecdotes  of  the  Civil  War." 


WAR  PREPARATIONS  IN  THE  NORTH. 


MAJOR-GENERAL    GEORGE    B.    McCLELLAX.      FROM    A  WAR-TIME    PHOTOGRAPH. 

enthusiastic  efforts  of  some  energetic  volunteers  who  were  naturally  made  the 
commissioned  officers.  But  not  always.  There  were  numerous  examples  of 
self-denial  by  men  who  remained  in  the  ranks  after  expending  much  labor 
and  money  in  recruiting,  modestly  refusing  the  honors,  and  giving  way  to  some 
one  supposed  to  have  military  knowledge  or  experience.  The  war  in  Mexico 
in  1846-7  had  been  our  latest  conflict  with  a  civilized  people,  and  to  have  served 
in  it  was  a  sure  passport  to  confidence.  It  had  often  been  a  service  more  in 
name  than  in  fact ;  but  the  young  volunteers  felt  so  deeply  their  own  igno 
rance  that  they  were  ready  to  yield  to  any  pretense  of  superior  knowledge, 
and  generously  to  trust  themselves  to  any  one  who  would  offer  to  lead  them. 
Hosts  of  charlatans  and  incompetents  were  thus  put  into  responsible  places  at 


WAR  PREPARATIONS  IN   THE  NORTH.  93 

the  beginning,  but  the  sifting  work  went  on  fast  after  the  troops  were  once 
in  the  field.  The  election  of  field-officers,  however,  ought  not  to  have  been 
allowed.  Companies  were  necessarily  regimented  together  of  which  each 
could  have  little  personal  knowledge  of  the  officers  of  the  others ;  intrigue 
and  demagogy  soon  came  into  play,  and  almost  fatal  mistakes  were  made  in 
selection.  The  evil  worked  its  cure,  but  the  ill  effects  of  it  were  long  visible. 

The  immediate  need  of  troops  to  protect  Washington  caused  most  of  the 
uniformed  companies  to  be  united  into  the  first  two  regiments,  which  were 
quickly  dispatched  to  the  East.  These  off,  companies  began  to  stream  in  from 
all  parts  of  the  State.  On  their  first  arrival  they  were  quartered  wherever 
shelter  could  be  had,  as  there  were  no  tents  or  sheds  to  make  a  camp  for  them. 
Going  to  my  evening  work  at  the  State  House,  as  I  crossed  the  rotunda  I  saw 
a  company  marching  in  by  the  south  door,  and  another  disposing  itself  for 
the  night  upon  the  marble  pavement  near  the  east  entrance ;  as  I  passed  on  to 
the  north  hall,  I  saw  another  that  had  come  a  little  earlier  holding  a  prayer- 
meeting,  the  stone  arches  echoing  with  the  excited  supplications  of  some  one 
who  was  borne  out  of  himself  by  the  terrible  pressure  of  events  around  him, 
while,  mingling  with  his  pathetic,  beseeching  tones  as  he  prayed  for  his  country, 
came  the  shrill  notes  of  the  fife  and  the  thundering  din  of  the  ubiquitous 
bass-drum  from  the  company  marching  in  on  the  other  side.  In  the  Senate 
chamber  a  company  was  quartered,  and  the  senators  were  supplying  them 
with  paper  and  pens  with  which  "  the  boys  "  were  writing  their  farewells  to 
mothers  and  sweethearts,  whom  they  hardly  dared  hope  they  should  see 
again.  A  similar  scene  was  going  on  in  the  Eepresentatives'  hall,  another  in 
the  Supreme  Court-room.  In  the  executive  office  sat  the  governor,  the 
unwonted  noises,  when  the  door  was  opened,  breaking  in  on  the  quiet,  business 
like  air  of  the  room, —  he  meanwhile  dictating  dispatches,  indicating  answers 
to  others,  receiving  committees  of  citizens,  giving  directions  to  officers  of  com 
panies  and  regiments,  accommodating  himself  to  the  willful  democracy  of  our 
institutions  which  insists  upon  seeing  the  man  in  chief  command,  and  will  not 
take  its  answer  from  a  subordinate,  until  in  the  small  hours  of  the  night  the 
noises  were  hushed,  and  after  a  brief  hour  of  effective,  undisturbed  work  upon 
the  matters  of  chief  importance,  he  could  leave  the  glare  of  his  gas-lighted 
office  and  seek  a  few  hours'  rest,  only  to  renew  his  wearing  labors  on  the 
morrow. 

On  the  streets  the  excitement  was  of  a  rougher  if  not  more  intense  charac 
ter.  A  minority  of  unthinking  partisans  could  not  understand  the  strength 
and  sweep  of  the  great  popular  movement,  and  would  sometimes  venture  to 
speak  out  their  sympathy  with  the  rebellion,  or  their  sneers  at  some  party 
friend  who  had  enlisted.  In  the  boiling  temper  of  the  time  the  quick  answer 
was  a  blow ;  and  it  was  one  of  the  common  incidents  of  the  day  for  those  who 
came  into  the  State  House  to  tell  of  a  knock-down  that  had  occurred  here  or 
there,  when  this  popular  punishment  had  been  administered  to  some  indis 
creet  "  rebel-sympathizer." 

Various  duties  brought  young  army  officers  of  the  regular  service  to  the 
State  capital,  and  others  sought  a  brief  leave  of  absence  to  come  and  offer 


94  WAR  PREPARATIONS  IN   THE  NORTH. 

their  services  to  the  governor  of  their  native  State.  General  Scott  had 
planted  himself  firmly  on  the  theory  that  the  regular  army  must  be  the  prin 
cipal  reliance  for  severe  work,  and  that  the  volunteers  could  only  be  auxilia 
ries  around  this  solid  nucleus  which  would  show  them  the  way  to  perform 
their  duty,  and  take  the  brunt  of  every  encounter.  The  young  regulars  who 
asked  leave  to  accept  commissions  in  State  regiments  were  therefore  refused, 
and  were  ordered  to  their  own  subaltern  positions  and  posts.  There  can  be 
no  doubt  that  the  true  policy  would  have  been  to  encourage  the  whole  of  this 
younger  class  to  enter  at  once  the  volunteer  service.  They  would  have  been 
field-officers  in  the  new  regiments,  and  would  have  impressed  discipline  and 
system  upon  the  organization  from  the  beginning.  The  Confederates  really 
profited  by  having  no  regular  army.  They  gave  to  the  officers  who  left  our 
service,  it  is  true,  commissions  in  their  so-called  "provisional"  army,  to 
encourage  them  to  expect  permanent  military  positions  if  the  war  should  end 
in  the  independence  of  the  South ;  but  this  was  only  a  nominal  organization, 
and  their  real  army  was  made  up  (as  ours  turned  out  practically  to  be)  from  the 
regiments  of  State  volunteers.  Less  than  a  year  afterward  we  changed  our  pol 
icy,  but  it  was  then  too  late  to  induce  many  of  the  regular  officers  to  take  regi 
mental  positions  in  the  volunteer  troops.  I  hesitate  to  declare  that  this  was 
not,  after  all,  for  the  best ;  for,  although  the  organization  of  our  army  would 
have  been  more  rapidly  perfected,  there  are  other  considerations  which  have 
much  weight.  The  army  would  not  have  been  the  popular  thing  it  was,  its 
close  identification  with  the  people's  movement  would  have  been  weakened, 
and  it,  perhaps,  would  not  so  readily  have  melted  again  into  the  mass  of  the 
nation  at  the  close  of  the  war. 

On  the  29th  of  April  I  was  ordered  by  McClellan  to  proceed  next  morning 
to  Camp  Dennison,  near  Cincinnati,  where  he  had  fixed  the  site  for  a  per 
manent  camp  of  instruction.  I  took  with  me  one  full  regiment  and  half  of 
another.  The  day  was  a  fair  one,  and  when  about  noon  our  railway  train 
reached  the  camping  ground,  it  seemed  an  excellent  place  for  our  work.  The 
drawback  was  that  the  land  was  planted  in  wheat  and  corn,  instead  of  being 
meadow  or  pasture  land.  Captain  Rosecrans  (later  the  well-known  general) 
met  us  as  McClellan's  engineer  officer,  coming  from  Cincinnati  with  a  train- 
load  of  lumber.  With  his  compass  and  chain,  and  by  the  help  of  a  small 
detail  of  men,  he  soon  laid  off  the  two  regimental  camps,  and  the  general 
lines  of  the  whole  encampment  for  a  dozen  regiments.  The  men  of  the 
regiments  shouldered  the  pine  boards,  and  carried  them  up  to  the  lines  of  the 
company  streets  which  were  close  to  the  hills  skirting  the  valley,  and  which 
opened  into  the  parade  and  drill  ground  along  the  railway.  Vigorous  work 
housed  all  the  men  before  night,  and  it  was  well  that  it  did  so,  for  the  weather 
changed  in  the  evening,  a  cold  rain  came  on,  and  the  next  morning  was  a  chill 
and  dreary  one.  My  own  headquarters  were  in  a  little  brick  school-house  of  one 
story,  and  Avith  a  single  aide  (my  only  staff-officer)  we  bestowed  ourselves  for 
the  night  in  the  little  spaces  between  the  pupils'  desks  and  the  teacher's  pulpit. 
The  windy,  cheerless  night  was  a  long  one,  but  gave  place  at  last  to  a  fickle, 
changeable  day  of  drifting  showers  and  occasional  sunshine,  and  we  were 


WAR  PREPARATIONS  IN   THE  NORTH.  95 

roused  by  our  first  reveille  in  camp.  A  breakfast  was  made  from  some 
cooked  provisions  brought  with  us,  and  we  resumed  the  duty  of  organizing 
and  instructing  the  camp.  With  the  vigorous  outdoor  life  and  the  full 
physical  and  mental  employment,  the  depression  which  had  weighed  upon 
me  since  the  news  of  the  guns  at  Sumter  passed  away,  never  to  return. 

Xew  battalions  arrived  from  day  to  day,  the  cantonments  were  built  by 
themselves,  like  the  first,  and  the  business  of  instruction  and  drill  was  systema 
tized.  The  men  were  not  yet  armed,  so  there  was  no  temptation  to  begin  too 
soon  with  the  manual  of  the  musket,  and  they  were  kept  industriously  employed 
in  inarching  in  single  line,  by  file,  in  changing  direction,  in  forming  column  of 
fours  from,  double  line,  etc.,  before  their  guns  were  put  into  their  hands.  Each 
regiment  was  treated  as  a  separate  camp  with  its  own  chain  of  sentinels,  and 
the  officers  of  the  guard  were  constantly  busy  inspecting  the  sentinels  on  post 
and  teaching  guard  and  picket  duty  theoretically  to  the  reliefs  off  duty.  Schools 
were  established  in  each  regiment  for  field  and  staff  as  well  as  for  company 
officers,  and  Hardee's  "Tactics"  was  in  the  hands  of  everybody  who  could  pro 
cure  a  copy.  One  of  the  proofs  of  the  unprecedented  scale  of  our  war  prepara 
tion  is  found  in  the  fact  that  the  supply  of  the  authorized  "  Tactics  "  was  soon 
exhausted,  making  it  difficult  to  get  the  means  of  instruction  in  the  company 
schools.  The  arriving  regiments  sometimes  had  their  first  taste  of  camp  life 
under  circumstances  well  calculated  to  dampen  their  ardor.  The  4th  Ohio,  under 
Colonel  Lorin  Andrews,  president  of  Kenyon  College,  came  just  before  a  thunder 
storm  one  evening,  and  the  bivouac  that  night  was  as  rough  a  one  as  his  men 
were  likely  to  experience  for  many  a  day.  They  made  shelter  by  placing  boards 
from  the  fence-tops  to  the  ground,  but  the  fields  were  level  and  soon  became  a 
mire  under  the  pouring  rain,  so  that  they  were  a  queer-looking  lot  when  they 
crawled  out  in  the  morning.  The  sun  was  then  shining  bright,  however,  and 
they  had  better  cover  for  their  heads  by  the  next  night.  The  7th  Ohio, 
which  was  recruited  in  Cleveland  and  on  the  "Western  Reserve,"  sent  a 
party  in  advance  to  build  some  of  their  huts,  and  though  they  too  came 
in  a  rain-storm,  they  were  less  uncomfortable  than  some  of  the  others. 
In  the  course  of  a  fortnight  all  the  regiments  of  the  Ohio  contingent  were 
in  the  camp,  except  the  two  that  had  been  hurried  to  Washington.  They 
were  organized  into  three  brigades.  The  brigadiers,  besides  myself,  were 
Generals  J.  H.  Bates  and  Xewton  Schleich.  General  Bates,  who  was  the 
senior,  and  as  such  assumed  command  of  the  camp  in  McClellan's  absence, 
was  a  graduate  of  West  Point  who  had  served  some  years  in  the  regular 
army,  but  had  resigned  and  adopted  the  profession  of  law.  General  Schleich 
was  a  Democratic  senator,  who  had  been  in  the  State  militia,  and  had  been 
one  of  the  drill-masters  of  the  Legislative  Squad,  which  had  drilled  upon  the 
Capitol  terrace.  McClellan  had  intended  to  make  his  own  headquarters  in 
the  camp ;  but  the  convenience  of  attending  to  official  business  in  Cincinnati 
kept  him  in  the  city.  His  purpose  was  to  make  the  brigade  organizations 
permanent,  and  to  take  them  as  a  division  to  the  field  when  they  were  a  little 
prepared  for  the  work.  Like  many  other  good  plans,  it  failed  to  be  carried 
out.  I  was  the  only  one  of  the  brigadiers  who  remained  in  the  service  after 


96  WAR  PREPARATIONS  IN   THE  NORTH. 

the  first  enlistment  for  ninety  days,  and  it  was  my  fate  to  take  the  field  with 
new  regiments,  only  one  of  which  had  been  in  my  brigade  in  camp.  After 
General  Bates's  arrival  my  own  hut  was  built  on  the  slope  of  the  hillside 
behind  my  brigade,  close  under  the  wooded  ridge,  and  here  for  the  next  six 
weeks  was  my  home.  The  morning  brought  its  hour  of  business  correspond 
ence  relating  to  the  command ;  then  came  the  drill,  when  the  parade  ground 
was  full  of  marching  companies  and  squads.  Officers'  drill  followed,  with 
sword  exercise  and  pistol  practice,  and  the  evening  was  allotted  to  schools  of 
theoretic  tactics,  outpost  duty,  and  the  like. 

The  first  fortnight  in  camp  was  the  hardest  for  the  troops.  The  plowed 
fields  became  deep  with  mud  which  nothing  could  remove  till  steady  good 
weather  should  allow  them  to  be  packed  hard  under  the  continued  tramp  of 
thousands  of  men.  The  organization  of  camp-kitchens  had  to  be  learned  by 
the  hardest  experience  also,  and  the  men  who  had  some  aptitude  for  cook 
ing  had  to  be  found  by  a  slow  process  of  natural  selection,  during  which 
many  an  unpalatable  meal  had  to  be  eaten.  A  disagreeable  bit  of  informa 
tion  soon  came  to  us  in  the  proof  that  more  than  half  the  men  had  never  had 
the  contagious  diseases  of  infancy.  The  measles  broke  out,  and  we  had  to 
organize  a  camp-hospital  at  once.  A  large  barn  near  by  was  taken  for  this 
purpose,  and  the  surgeons  had  their  hands  full  of  cases,  which,  however  triv 
ial  they  might  seem  at  home,  were  here  aggravated  into  dangerous  illness  by 
the  unwonted  surroundings,  and  the  impossibility  of  securing  the  needed  pro 
tection  from  exposure.  The  good  women  of  Cincinnati  took  promptly  in 
hand  the  task  of  providing  nurses  for  the  sick  and  proper  diet  and  delicacies 
for  hospital  use.  The  Sisters  of  Charity,  under  the  lead  of  Sister  Anthony,  a 
noble  woman,  came  out  in  force,  and  their  black  and  white  robes  harmonized 
picturesquely  with  the  military  surroundings,  as  they  flitted  about  under  the 
rough  timber  framing  of  the  old  barn,  carrying  comfort  and  hope  from  one 
rude  couch  to  another. 

As  to  supplies,  hardly  a  man  in  a  regiment  knew  how  to  make  out  a  requi 
sition  for  rations  or  for  clothing,  and,  easy  as  it  is  to  rail  at  "  red-tape,"  the 
necessity  of  keeping  a  check  upon  embezzlement  and  wastefulness  justified 
the  staff-bureaus  at  Washington  in  insisting  upon  regular  vouchers  to  support 
the  quartermasters'  and  commissaries'1  accounts.  But  here,  too,  men  were 
gradually  found  who  had  special  talent  for  the  work.  Where  everybody  had 
to  learn  a  new  business,  it  would  have  been  miraculous  if  grave  errors  had  not 
frequently  occurred.  Looking  back  at  it,  the  wonder  is  that  the  blunders  arid 
mishaps  had  not  been  tenfold  more  numerous  than  they  were. 

By  the  middle  of  May  the  confusion  had  given  way  to  reasonable  system, 
but  we  now  were  obliged  to  meet  the  embarrassments  of  reorganization  for  three 
years,  under  the  President's  second  call  for  troops  (May  3d).  In  every  company 
some  discontented  spirits  wanted  to  go  home,  and,  to  avoid  the  odium  of 
going  alone,  they  became  mischief-makers,  seeking  to  prevent  the  whole  com 
pany  from  reenlistirig.  The  growing  discipline  was  relaxed  or  lost  in  the  solici 
tations,  the  electioneering,  the  speech-making,  and  the  other  common  arts  of 
persuasion.  In  spite  of  all  these  discouragements,  however,  the  daily  drills 


WAR  PREPARATIONS  IN   THE  NORTH. 


97 


and  instruction  went  on  with  some  approach  to  regularity,  and  our  raw 
volunteers  began  to  look  more  like  soldiers.  Captain  Gordon  Granger,  of  the 
regular  army,  came  to  muster  the  reenlisted  regiments  into  the  three-years 
service,  and  as  he  stood  at  the  right  of  the  4th  Ohio,  looking  down  the  line  of 
a  thousand  stalwart  men,  all  in  their  Garibaldi  shirts  (for  we  had  not  yet  got 
our  uniforms),  he  turned  to  me  and  exclaimed,  "  My  God !  that  such  men 

should  be  food  for  powder  ! "  It  certainly 
was  a  display  of  manliness  and  intelli 
gence  such  as  had  hardly  ever  been  seen 
in  the  ranks  of  an  army.  There  were  in 
camp  at  that  time,  three  if  not  four  com 
panies  in  different  regiments  that  were 
wholly  made  up  of  under-graduates  of 
colleges,  who  had  enlisted  together,  their 
officers  being  their  tutors  and  professors. 
And  where  there  was  not  so  striking  evi 
dence  as  this  of  the  enlistment  of  the  best 
of  our  youth,  every  company  could  still 
show  that  it  was  largely  recruited  from 
the  best  nurtured  and  most  promising 
young  men  of  the  community. 

Granger  had  been  in  the  South-west 
when  the  secession  movement  began,  and 
had  seen  the  formation  of  military  compa 
nies  everywhere,  and  the  incessant  drill 
ing  which  had  been  going  on  all  winter ; 
while  we,  in  a  strange  condition  of  political  paralysis,  had  been  doing  nothing. 
His  information  was  eagerly  sought  by  us  all,  and  he  lost  no  opportunity  of 
impressing  upon  us  the  fact  that  the  South  was  nearly  six  months  ahead  of  us 
in  organization  and  preparation.  He  did  not  conceal  his  belief  that  we  were 
likely  to  find  the  war  a  much  longer  and  more  serious  piece  of  business  than 
was  commonly  expected,  and  that,  unless  we  pushed  hard  our  drilling  and 
instruction,  we  should  find  ourselves  at  a  disadvantage  in  our  earlier  encoun 
ters.  What  he  said  had  a  good  effect  in  making  officers  and  men  take  more 
willingly  to  the  laborious  routine  of  the  parade  ground  and  the  regimental 
school ;  for  such  opinions  as  his  soon  ran  through  a  camp,  and  they  were  com 
mented  upon  by  the  enlisted  men  quite  as  earnestly  as  among  the  officers. 
Still,  hope  kept  the  upper  hand,  and  I  believe  that  three-fourths  of  us  still 
cherished  the  belief  that  a  single  campaign  would  end  the  war. 

Though  most  of  our  men  were  native  Ohioans,  we  had  in  camp  two 
regiments  made  up  of  other  material.  The  9th  Ohio  was  recruited 
from  the  Germans  of  Cincinnati,  and  was  commanded  by  Colonel  Robert 
McCook.  In  camp,  the  drilling  of  the  regiment  fell  almost  completely  into 
the  hands  of  the  adjutant,  Lieutenant  August  Willich  (afterward  a  general  of 
division),  and  McCook,  who  humorously  exaggerated  his  own  lack  of  military 
knowledge,  used  to  say  that  he  was  only  "  clerk  for  a  thousand  Dutchmen,"  so 


-MAJOR-GENERAL  GORDON   GRANGER. 
FROM   A  PHOTOGRAPH. 


98 


WAR  PREPARATIONS  IN   THE  NORTH. 


completely  did  the  care  of  equipping  and  providing  for  his  regiment  engross 
his  time  and  labor.  The  10th  Ohio  was  an  Irish  regiment,  also  from  Cincin 
nati,  and  its  men  were  proud  to  call  themselves  the  "  Bloody  Tinth."  The 
brilliant  Lytle  was  its  commander,  and  his  control  over  them,  even  in  the 
beginning  of  their  service  and  near  the  city  of  their  home,  showed  that  they 
had  fallen  into  competent  hands.  It  happened,  of  course,  that  the  guard 
house  pretty  frequently  contained  representatives  of  the  10th,  who,  on  the 
short  furloughs  that  were  allowed  them,  took  a  parting  glass  too  many  with 
their  friends  in  the  city,  and  came  to  camp  boisterously  drunk.  But  the  men 
of  the  regiment  got  it  into  their  heads  that  the  13th,  which  lay  just  opposite 
them  across  the  railroad,  took  a  malicious  pleasure  in  filling  the  guard-house 
with  the  Irishmen.  Some  threats  had  been  made  that  they  would  go  over 
and  "  clean  out "  the  13th,  and  one  fine  evening  these  came  to  a  head.  I  sud 
denly  got  orders  from  General  Bates  to  form  my  brigade  and  march  them  at 
once  between  the  10th  and  13th  to  prevent  a  collision  that  seemed  imminent. 
The  long-roll  was  beaten  as  if  the  drummers  realized  the  full  importance  of 
the  first  opportunity  to  sound  that  warlike  signal.  We  marched  by  the  moon 
light  into  the  space  between  the  belligerent  regiments ;  but  Lytle  already  had 
got  his  own  men  under  control,  and  the  less  mercurial  13th  were  not  disposed 
to  be  aggressive,  so  that  we  were  soon  dismissed,  with  a  compliment  for  our 
promptness. 

The  six  weeks  of  our  stay  in  Camp  Dennison  seem  like  months  in  the  retro 
spect,  so  full  were  they  crowded  with  new  experiences.  The  change  came  in 
an  unexpected  way.  The  initiative  taken  by  the  Confederates  in  West  Vir 
ginia  had  to  be  met  by  prompt  action,  and  McClellan  was  forced  to  drop  his 
own  plans  and  meet  the  exigency.  The  organization  and  equipment  of  the 
regiments  for  the  three-years  service  was  still  incomplete,  and  the  brigades 
were  broken  up,  to  take  across  the  Ohio  the  regiments  best  prepared  to  go. 
This  was  discouraging  to  a  brigade  commander,  for,  even  with  veteran  troops, 
acquaintanceship  between  the  officer  and  his  command  is  a  necessary  condition 
of  confidence  and  a  most  important  element  of  strength.  My  own  assign 
ment  to  the  Great  Kanawha  district  was  one  I  had  every  reason  to  be  content 
with,  except  that  for  several  months  I  felt  the  disadvantage  I  suffered  from 
having  command  of  troops  which  I  had  never  seen  till  we  met  in  the  field. 


CAMP    DENNISON,    NEAR    CINCINNATI. 


VIEW    OF    MONTGOMERY,     ALABAMA,     SHOWING    THE    STATE    CAPITOL 
FROM    A    SKETCH    MADE    IN     1861. 


THE   CONFEDERATE   GOVERNMENT  AT   MONTGOMERY. 

BY   R.  BARXAVELL   RHETT    (EDITOR   OF  THE   CHARLESTON*   "  MERCURY,"  1860-62 ). 

TWENTY-SIX  years  have  passed  since  the  delegates  of  six  States  of  the 
South  that  had  seceded  from  the  Union  met  in  a  convention  or  Pro 
visional  Congress,  at  the  Capitol,  at  Montgomery,  Alabama.  Twenty-one 
years  have  elapsed  since  the  close  of  the  war  between  the  States  of  the  North 
and  the  eleven  States  of  the  South  that  entered  the  Confederate  Govern 
ment  then  and  there  organized.  Most  of  the  men  who  participated  in  the 
deliberations  of  that  convention  are  dead,  and  the  few  now  left  will  before 
long  be  laid  away.  Of  the  debates  of  that  body  there  is  no  record,  and  the 
proceedings  in  secret  session  have  never  been  published.  In  Washington 
the  proceedings  of  the  Congress  of  the  United  States  were  open,  and  at 
the  North  there  was  an  intelligent,  well-informed,  powerful  public  opinion 
throughout  the  war.  Not  so  at  the  South.  Secret  sessions  were  commenced 
at  Montgomery,  and  at  Richmond  almost  all  important  business  was  trans 
acted  away  from  the  knowledge  and  thus  beyond  the  criticism  of  the  people. 
Latterly,  accounts  of  the  battles  fought  have  been  written  from  every  stand 
point  ;  but  of  the  course  and  policy  of  the  Confederate  Government,  which 
held  in  its  hands  all  the  resources  of  the  Southern  people,  and  directed  their 
affairs,  diplomatic,  financial,  naval,  and  military,  little  has  been  said.  During 
the  war  scarcely  anything  was  known  except  results,  and  when  the  war  ter 
minated,  the  people  of  the  South,  though  greatly  dissatisfied,  were  generally 
as  ignorant  of  the  management  of  Confederate  affairs  as  the  people  of  the 
North.  The  arrest  and  long  imprisonment  of  the  President  of  the  Confed 
eracy  made  of  him  a  representative  martyr,  and  silenced  the  voice  of  criticism 
at  tiie  South.  And  up  to  this  time  little  has  been  done  to  point  out  the 
causes  of  the  events  which  occurred,  or  to  develop  the  truth  of  history  in  this 
direction.  It  very  well  suits  men  at  the  South  who  opposed  secession  to  com 
pliment  their  own  sagacity  by  assuming  that  the  end  was  inevitable.  Nor 
do  men  identified  with  the  Confederacy  by  office,  or  feeling  obligation  for  its 
appreciation  of  their  personal  merits,  find  it  hard  to  persuade  themselves 
that  all  was  done  that  could  be  done  in  "  the  lost  cause."  And,  in  general, 


100 


THE  CONFEDERATE  GOVERNMENT  AT  MONTGOMERY. 


it  may  be  an  agreeable  sop  to  Southern  pride  to  take  for  granted  that  supe 
rior  numbers  alone  effected  the  result.  Yet,  in  the  great  wars  of  the  world, 
nothing  is  so  little  proved  as  that  the  more  numerous  always  and  necessarily 
prevail.  On  the  contrary,  the  facts  of  history  show  that  brains  have  ever 

been  more  potent  than  brawn. 
The  career  of  the  Confederate 
States  exhibits  no  exception  to 
this  rule.  Eliminate  the  good 
sense  and  unselfish  earnestness  of 
Mr.  Lincoln,  and  the  great  ability 
and  practical  energy  of  Seward 
and  Adams,  and  of  Stanton  and 
Chase  from  the  control  of  the 
affairs  of  the  United  States ;  con 
ceive  a  management  of  third-rate 
and  incompetent  men  in  their 
places — will  any  one  doubt  that 
matters  would  have  ended  differ 
ently  !  To  many  it  may  be  unpal 
atable  to  hear  that  at  the  South  all 
was  not  done  that  might  have  been 
done  and  that  cardinal  blunders 
were  made.  But  what  is  pleasing 
is  not  always  true,  and  there  can  be 
no  good  excuse  now  for  suppress 
ing  important  facts  or  perverting 
history.  The  time  has  come  when 
public  attention  may  with  pro 
priety  be  directed  to  the  realities  of  that  momentous  period  at  the  South. 

On  the  20th  of  December,  1860,  South  Carolina  passed  unanimously  the  first 
ordinance  of  secession,  in  these  words : 

"  We,  the  people  of  the  State  of  South  Carolina  in  convention  assembled,  do  declare  and 
ordain,  and  it  is  hereby  declared  and  ordained,  that  the  ordinance  adopted  by  us  in  convention 
on  the  twenty-third  day  of  May,  in  the  year  of  our  Lord  one  thousand  seven  hundred  and  eighty- 
eight,  whereby  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  of  America  was  ratified,  and  also,  all 
Acts  and  parts  of  Acts  of  the  General  Assembly  of  this  State,  ratifying  amendments  of  the  said 
Constitution,  are  hereby  repealed ;  and  that  the  Union  now  subsisting  between  South  Carolina 
and  other  States,  under  the  name  of  'the  United  States  of  America,'  is  hereby  dissolved." 

On  her  invitation,  six  other  Southern  States  sent  delegates  to  a  conven 
tion  in  Montgomery,  Alabama,  for  the  purpose  of  organizing  a  Confederacy. 
On  the  4th  of  February,  1861,  this  convention  assembled.  The  material 
which  constituted  it  was  of  a  mixed  character.  There  were  members  who 
were  constitutionally  timid  and  unfit  by  character  and  temperament  to  par 
ticipate  in  such  work  as  was  on  hand.  Others  had  little  knowledge  of  public 
affairs  on  a  large  scale,  and  had  studied  neither  the  resources  of  the  South 
nor  the  conduct  of  the  movement.  A  number  of  them,  however,  were  men  of 


ALEXANDER    H.    STEPHENS,   VICE-PRESIDENT    OF    THE 
CONFEDERACY.      FROM    A    PHOTOGRAPH. 


THE  CONFEDERATE  GOVERNMENT  AT  MONTGOMERY. 


101 


ripe  experience  and  statesmanlike  grasp  of  the  situation  —  men  of  large 
knowledge,  with  calm,  strong,  clear  views  of  the  policies  to  be  pursued. 
Alexander  H.  Stephens  characterized  this  convention  as  "the  ablest  body 
with  which  he  ever  served,  and  singularly  free  from  revolutionary  spirit."  J 

In  the  organization  of  the  convention,  Howell  Cobb  was  chosen  to  preside, 
and  J.  J.  Hooper,  of  Montgomery,  to  act  as  secretary.  It  was  decided  to 
organize  a  provisional  government  under  a  provisional  constitution,  which 
was  adopted  on  the  8th  of  February.  On  the  9th  a  provisional  President 
and  Vice-President  were  elected,  who  were  installed  in  office  on  the  18th 
to  carry  the  government  into  effect.  In  regard  to  this  election,  it  was  agreed 
that  when  four  delegations  out  of  the  six  should  settle  upon  men,  the  elec 
tion  should  take  place.  Jef 
ferson  Davis  was  put  forward 
by  the  Mississippi  delega 
tion  and  Howell  Cobb  by 
that  of  Georgia.  The  Florida 
delegation  proposed  to  vote  for 
whomsoever  South  Carolina 
should  support.  The  South 
Carolina  delegation  offered  no 
candidate  and  held  no  meet 
ing  to  confer  upon  the  matter. 
The  chairman,  Mr.  E.  Barn- 
well  Rhett,  $  did  not  call  them 
together.  Mr.  Barn  well,  how 
ever,  was  an  active  supporter 
of  Mr.  Davis,  and  it  was  af 
terward  said  that  while  in 
Washington  in  December,  as 
a  commissioner  to  treat  for 
the  evacuation  of  Fort  Sum- 
ter,  he  had  committed  himself 
to  Mr.  Davis.  At  any  rate,  he 
was  zealous.  Colonel  Keitt 
afterward  stated  to  the  writer 
and  others  in  Charleston  that 


WILLIAM    L.    YAXCEY,    MEMBER    OF    THE    CONFEDERATE    SENATE, 

CONFEDERATE    COMMISSIONER    TO    EUROPE    IN    1861. 

FRO.M    A    PHOTOGRAPH. 


J  The    deputies   elected   to    meet    at  the    Mont-     Jabez  L.    M.    Curry ;    GEORGIA,  Robert   Tooinbs, 


gomery  convention  were :  SOUTH  CAROLINA,  B. 
Barnwell  Rhett,  Lawrence  M.  Keitt,  C.  G.  Mein- 
minger,  Thomas  J.  Withers,  Robert  W.  Barnwell, 
James  Chesnut,  Jr.,  W.  Porcher  Miles,  and  Will 
iam  W.  Boyce ;  FLORIDA,  Jackson  Morton,  James 
B.  Owens,  and  J.  Patton  Anderson;  MISSISSIPPI, 
Wiley  P.  Harris,  W.  S.  Wilson,  Walker  Brooke, 
Alexander  M.  Clayton,  James  T.  Harrison,  William 
ft.  Barry,  and  J.  A.  P.  Campbell ;  ALABAMA, 
Richard  W.  Walker,  Colin  J.  McRae,  William  P. 
Chilton,  David  P.  Lewis,  Robert  H.  Smith,  John 
Gill  Shorter,  Stephen  F.  Hale,  Thomas  Fearn,  and 


Martin  J.  Crawford,  Benjamin  H.  Hill,  Augustus 
R.  Wright,  Augustus  H.  Kenan,  Francis  S.  Bar- 
tow,  Eugenius  A.  Nisbet,  Howell  Cobb,  Thomas  R. 
B.  Cobb,  and  Alexander  H.  Stephens  ;  LOUISIANA, 
John  Perkins.  Jr.,  Charles  M.  Conrad,  Edward 
Sparrow,  Alexander  I)e  Clouet,  Duncan  F.  Ken- 
ner,  and  Henry  Marshall.  The  Texas  delegates 
were  not  appointed  until  February  14th. 

These  delegates  had  been  appointed  by  the  con 
ventions  of  their  respective  States  on  the  ground 
that  the  people  had  intrusted  the  State  conven 
tions  with  unlimited  powers.  They  constituted 


£  Father  of  the  writer. — EDITORS. 


IO2 


THE  CONFEDERATE  GOVERNMENT  AT  MONTGOMERY. 


a  majority  of  the  delegation  were  opposed  to  Mr.  Davis,  but  that,  not  having 
compared  opinions,  they  did  not  understand  one  another,  and  that  Mr.  Davis 
received  the  vote  of  South  Carolina,  and  was  elected,  by  the  casting  vote  of 
Mr.  Rhett.  Personally  Mr.  Rhett  knew  little  of  Mr.  Davis.  He  regarded  him 

as  an  accomplished  man,  but  egotisti 
cal,  arrogant,  and  vindictive,  without 
depth  or  statesmanship.  Besides  this, 
he  judged  him  not  sufficiently  in  ac 
cord  with  the  movement  to  lead  it. 
His  speech  on  the  4th  of  July,  1858, 
between  New  York  and  Boston,  was 
reported  as  denunciatory  of  secession 
ists,  and  as  comparing  them  to  "  mos 
quitoes  around  the  horns  of  an  ox,  who 
could  annoy,  but  could  do  no  harm." 
The  strong  Union  sentiments  uttered 
in  his  New  England  electioneering  tour, 
which  secured  to  him  the  vote  of  B.  F. 
Butler  and  others  at  the  Democratic 
convention  at  Charleston,  in  1860,  were 
confirmatory  of  the  newspaper  report. 
As  late  as  November  10th,  1860,  after 
the  South  Carolina  convention  was 
called,  Mr.  Davis  had  written  a  letter, 
within  the  cognizance  of  Mr.  Rhett, 
and  published  by  himself  since  the  war, 
in  which  he  unmistakably  indicated 
the  opinion  that,  if  South  Carolina 
seceded,  neither  Georgia,  nor  Alabama, 
nor  Mississippi,  nor  Louisiana,  nor 
any  other  State  would  secede  unless 

negotiating  friendly  relations  and  for  the  settle 
ment  of  all  questions  of  disagreement  between  the 
two  governments,  was  appointed  and  confirmed. 
The  commissioners  were  A.  B.  Roman,  of  Louisi 
ana,  Martin  J.  Crawford,  of  Georgia,  and  John 
Forsyth,  of  Alabama.  An  act  of  February  20th 
provided  for  the  repeal  of  all  laws  which  forbade 
the  employment  in  the  coasting  trade  of  vessels 
not  enrolled  or  licensed,  and  all  laws  imposing 
discriminating  duties  on  foreign  vessels  or  goods 
imported  in  them.  This  Provisional  Congress  of 
one  House  held  four  sessions,  as  follows :  I.  Feb 
ruary  4th-March  K'th,  1861;  II.  April  2!>th- 
May  22d,  1801;  III.  July  20th-August  22d, 
1861;  IV.  November  ISth,  1861-February  17th, 
1862  ;  the  first  and  second  of  these  at  Montgom 
ery,  the  third  and  fourth  at  Richmond,  whither  the 
Executive  Department  was  removed  late  in  May, 
1 861 , — because  of  "the  hostile  demonstrations  of 
the  United  States  Government  against  Virginia," 
as  Mr.  Davis  says  in  his  "Rise  and  Fall  of  the 
Confederate  Government." —  EDITORS. 


ROBERT  TOOMHS,  KIHST  SECRETARY   OF  STATE  OF  THE 
CONFEDERACY ;   MEMBER  OF  THE   CONFEDERATE 

SENATE;  BRIGADIER-GENERAL,  c.  s.  A. 

FROM   A  PHOTOGRAPH. 

both  the  convention  that  organized  the  Confederacy 
and  its  Provisional  Congress.  On  the  8th  of  Feb 
ruary  the  Provisional  Constitution  was  adopted, 
to  be  in  force  one  year.  On  the  Oth  was  passed 
the  first  enactment,  providing  "That  all  the 
laws  of  the  United  States  of  America  in  force  and 
in  use  in  the  Confederate  States  of  America 
on  the  first  day  of  November  last,  and  not  incon 
sistent  with  the  Constitution  of  the  Confederate 
States,  be  and  the  same  are  hereby  continued  in 
force  until  altered  or  repealed  by  the  Congress." 
The  next  act,  adopted  February  14th,  continued 
in  office  until  April  1st  all  officers  connected  with 
the  collection  of  customs,  and  the  assistant  treas 
urers,  with  the  same  powers  and  functions  as 
under  the  Government  of  the  United  States.  An 
act  of  the  25th  of  February  declared  the  peaceful 
navigation  of  the  Mississippi  River  free  to  the 
citizens  of  any  of  the  States  upon  its  borders,  or 
upon  the  borders  of  its  navigable  tributaries.  On 
the  25th  of  February  a  commission  to  the  Govern 
ment  of  the  United  States,  for  the  purpose  of 


THE  CONFEDERATE  GOVERNMENT  AT  MONTGOMERY. 


10 3 


LEKOY    POPE    WALKER,   FIRST    CONFEDERATE 

SECRETARY  OF  WAR. 
FROM    A    PHOTOGRAPH. 


the  United  States  Government  should 
attempt  to  coerce  South  Carolina  back 
into  the  Union,  or  to  blockade  her  ports. 
His  expectation,  at  that  late  period,  ap 
parently  was  that  South  Carolina  would 
be  left  out  of  the  Union  alone,  and  that 
the  United  States  Government  would 
simply  collect  duties  off  the  bars  of 
her  seaports;  and  he  expressed  himself 
"in  favor  of  seeking  to  bring  those  [the 
planting  States]  into  cooperation  before 
asking  for  a  popular  decision  upon  a  new 
policy  and  relation  to  the  nations  of  the 
earth."  These  views  did  not  strengthen 
him  with  Mr.  Rhett  for  the  executive 
head  of  the  Southern  Confederacy;  nor 
did  the  published  report  of  his  shedding 
tears  on  retiring  from  the  United  States 
Senate  after  the  secession  of  Mississippi. 
But  Mr.  Rhett's  cotemporary  and  second 

cousin,  Mr.  Barnwell,  called  three  times  to  solicit  his  vote  for  Mr.  Davis.    The 

impression  was  produced  upon  his  mind  that  he,  Mr.  Rhett,  was  the  only  man 

in   the    delegation   opposed  to    Mr. 

Davis.  In  reply  to  objections  sug 
gested  by  Mr.  Rhett,  Mr.  Barnwell 

said    that   Mr.  Rhett's   standard  of 

the     statesmanship     requisite     was 

higher  than  he  might  be  able  to  get. 

He  added  that  he  knew  Mr.  Davis, 

and    although    he    considered    him 

not    a    man    of    great    ability,    yet 

he  believed  him  just  and  honorable, 

and   that  he  would  utilize  the  best 

ability  of  the  country,  as  Monroe  and 

Polk  and  others  had  done,  and  would 

administer  the  powers  intrusted  to 

him  as  President,  with  an  eye  single 

to  the  interests  of  the  Confederacy. 

Upon   this   presentment    Mr.  Rhett 

concluded  to  forego  his  own  mistrust, 

and  to  give  his  vote  for  Mr.  Davis, 

along  with  the  rest,  as  he  supposed. 

On  taking  the  vote  in  the  conven 
tion  (February  9th)  Georgia  gave 

hers  to  Mr.  Cobb,  and  the  other  States  theirs  to  Mr.  Davis.     Georgia  then 

changed  her  vote,  which  elected  Mr.  Davis  unanimously.     Mr.  Alexander  H. 


ROBERT    BARNWELL    RHETT,    CHAIRMAN  OF    COMMITTEE 

ON  FOREIGN  AFFAIRS,  CONFEDERATE  PROVISIONAL 

CONGRESS.     FROM    A    PHOTOGRAPH. 


104  THE  CONFEDERATE  GOVERNMENT  AT  MONTGOMERY. 

Stephens  was  chosen  Vice-President.  |  Mr.  Rhett  was  made  chairman  of  the 
committee  to  notify  the  President-elect,  and  to  present  him  to  the  convention 
for  inauguration.  This  office  he  performed  in  complimentary  style,  reflecting 
the  estimate  of  Mr.  Barn  well  rather  than  his  own  fears.  Within  six  weeks  the 
Provisional  Congress  found  out  that  they  had  made  a  mistake,  and  that  there 
was  danger  of  a  division  into  an  administration  and  an  anti-administration 
party,  which  might  paralyze  the  Government.  To  avoid  this,  and  to  confer 
all  power  on  the  President,  they  resorted  to  secret  sessions. 

Mr.  Davis  offered  the  office  of  Secretary  of  State  to  Mr.  Barnwell,  but  he 
declined  it,  and  recommended  Mr.  C.  G.  Memminger,  also  of  South  Carolina, 
for  the  Treasury  portfolio,  which  was  promptly  accorded  to  him.  Both  of 
these  gentlemen  had  been  cooperationists,  and  up  to  the  last  had  opposed 
secession.  Mr.  Barnwell  would  not  have  been  sent  to  the  State  convention 
from  Beaufort  but  for  the  efforts  of  Edmund  Rhett,  an  influential  State  sen 
ator.  Of  Mr.  Memminger  it  was  said  that  when  a  bill  was  on  its  passage 
through  the  Legislature  of  South  Carolina  in  1859,  appropriating  a  sum  of 
money  for  the  purchase  of  arms,  he  had  slipped  in  an  amendment  which 
had  operated  to  prevent  Governor  Gist  from  drawing  the  money  and  procur 
ing  the  arms.  In  Charleston  he  was  known  as  an  active  friend  of  the  free- 
school  system  and  orphan  house,  a  moral  and  charitable  Episcopalian,  arid  a 
lawyer,  industrious,  shrewd,  and  thrifty.  As  chairman  of  the  Committee  on 
Ways  and  Means  in  the  House  of  Representatives,  he  was  familiar  with  the 
cut-and-dried  plan  of  raising  the  small  revenue  necessary  to  carry  on  the 
government  of  South  Carolina.  Such  was  his  record  and  experience  when 
appointed  to  the  cabinet  of  Mr.  Davis.  Mr.  Memminger  received  no  recom 
mendation  for  this  office  from  the  South  Carolina  delegation ;  nor  did  the 
delegation  from  any  State,  so  far  as  known,  attempt  to  influence  the  Presi 
dent  in  the  choice  of  his  cabinet. 

Mr.  Robert  Toombs,  of  Georgia,  was  appointed  Secretary  of  State.  This 
was  in  deference  to  the  importance  of  his  State  and  the  public  appreciation 
of  his  great  mental  powers  and  thorough  earnestness,  not  for  the  active  part 
he  had  taken  in  the  State  convention  in  behalf  of  secession.  In  public  too 
fond  of  sensational  oratory,  in  counsel  he  was  a  man  of  large  and  wise  views. 

Mr.  Leroy  Pope  Walker,  of  Alabama,  was  appointed  Secretary  of  War  on 
the  recommendation  of  Mr.  William  L.  Yancey.  Ambitious,  without  any 
special  fitness  for  this  post,  and  overloaded,  he  accepted  the  office  with  the 
understanding  that  Mr.  Davis  would  direct  and  control  its  business,  which 
he  did.  After  differing  with  the  President  as  to  the  number  of  arms  to  be 
imported,  and  the  number  of  men  to  be  placed  in  camp  in  the  winter  of  1861-62 
(being  in  favor  of  very  many  more  than  the  President),  he  wisely  resigned. 

Mr.  Stephen  R.  Mallory,  of  Florida,  was  appointed  Secretary  of  the  Navy.  He 
was  a  gentleman  of  unpretending  manners  and  ordinary  good  sense,  who  had 
served  in  the  Senate  with  Mr.  Davis,  and  had  been  chairman  of  the  Committee 

I  The  choice  was  provisional  only,  but  was  made  permanent  on  the  6th  of  November,  18(51,  when 
Mr.  Davis  and  Mr.  Stephens  were  unanimously  elected  for  six  years.  The  Confederate  Constitution 
made  them  ineligible  to  reelection.  — EDITORS. 


THE  CONFEDERATE  GOVERNMENT  AT  MONTGOMERY. 


on  Naval  Affairs.  With  some  acquaintance  with  officers  of  the  United  States 
Navy,  and  some  knowledge  of  nautical  matters,  he  had  small  comprehen 
sion  of  the  responsibilities  of  the  office.  His  efforts  were  feeble  and  dilatory, 
and  he  utterly  failed  to  provide  for  keeping  open  the  seaports  of  'the  Confed 
eracy.  But  he  was  one  of  the  few  who  remained  in  the  cabinet  to  the  end. 

Mr.  Judah  P.  Benjamin,  of  Louisiana,  was  appointed  Attorney-General,  and 
held  that  office  until  the  resignation  of  Mr.  Walker,  when  he  was  transferred 

to  the  post  of  Secre 
tary  of  War.  Upon 
the  fall  of  New  Or 
leans,  public  indig 
nation  compelled  a 
change,  and  he  was 
made  Secretary  of 
State.  A  man  of 
great  fertility  of 
mind  and  resource 
and  of  facile  charac 
ter,  he  was  the  facto 
tum  of  the  President, 
performed  his  bid 
ding  in  various  ways, 
and  gave  him  the 
benefit  of  his  brains 
in  furtherance  of  the 
views  of  Mr.  Davis,  j) 
Although  a  pro 
visional  government 
was  more  free  to 
meet  emergencies 
and  correct  mistakes, 
it  was  determined  to 
proceed  to  the  forma 
tion  of  a  permanent 
government.  It  was 
apprehended  that  in 
the  lapse  of  time  and 


HOWELL   COBB,    PRESIDENT  OF    THE    FIRST    CONFEDERATE    CONGRESS  ; 
MAJOR-GENERAL,    C.   S.    A.       FROM    A    PHOTOGRAPH. 


|  Mr.  Davis's  reasons  for  the  selection  of  the  mem 
bers  of  the  first  Cabinet  are  given  in  his  "  Eise  and 
Fall  of  the  Confederate  Government "  (  New  York : 
1).  Appleton  &  Co.,  1881),  Vol.  I.,  pp.  1241-3,  in 
tlies3  words: 

"  After  being  inaugurated,  I  proceeded  to  the  forma 
tion  of  my  Cabinet,  that  is,  the  heads  of  the  executive 
departments  authorized  by  the  laws  of  the  Provisional 
Congress.  The  unanimity  existing  among  our  people 
made  this  a  much  easier  and  more  agreeable  task  than 
where  the  rivalries  in  the  party  of  an  executive  have  to 
be  consulted  and  accommodated,  often  at  the  expense 
of  the  highest  capacity  and  titness.  Unencumbered  by 


any  other  consideration  than  the  public  welfare,  having 
no  friends  to  reward  or  enemies  to  punish,  it  resulted 
that  not  one  of  those  who  formed  my  first  Cabinet  had 
borne  to  me  the  relation  of  close  personal  friendship, 
or  had  political  claims  upon  me;  indeed,  with  two  of 
them  I  had  no  previous  acquaintance. 

"  It  was  my  wish  that  the  Hon.  Robert  W.  Barnwell,  of 
South  Carolina,  should  be  Secretary  of  State.  I  had 
known  him  intimately  during  a  trying  period  of  our 
joint  service  in  the  United  States  Senate,  and  he  had  won 
alike  my  esteem  and  regard.  Before  making  known  to 
him  my  wish  in  this  connection,  the  delegation  of 
South  Carolina,  of  which  he  was  a  member,  had 
resolved  to  recommend  one  of  their  number  to  be 
Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  and  Mr.  Bamwell,  with 


I  ob 


THE  CONFEDERATE  GOVERNMENT   AT  MONTGOMERY. 


change  of  circumstances  and  of  men,  the  cardinal  points  for  which  the 
South  had  contended,  and  on  which  the  separation  of  sections  had  occurred, 
might  be  lost  sight  of;  so  it  was  decided  to  impress  at  once  upon  the 
new  government  the  constitutional  amendments  regarded  as  essential. 

The  committee,  of  which  Mr.  Rhett 
was  chairman,  agreed  at  its  first 
meeting  that  the  Constitution  of 
the  United  States  should  be  adopt 
ed,  with  only  such  alterations  as 
experience  had  proved  desirable, 
and  to  avoid  latitudinarian  con 
structions.  Most  of  the  important 
amendments  were  adopted  on  mo 
tion  of  the  chairman.  But  the 
limits  of  this  paper  do  not  permit 
a  specific  statement  of  their  char 
acter  and  scope.  \ 

The  permanent  constitution  was 
adopted  011  the  llth  of  March, 
1861,  and  went  into  operation,  with 
the  permanent  government,  at 
Richmond,  on  the  18th  of  Febru 
ary,  1862,  when  the  Provisional 
Congress  expired. 

Those  men  who  had  studied  the 
situation  felt  'great  anxiety  about 
the  keeping  open  of  the  ports  of 
the  Confederacy.  Much  was  said 
and  published  about  the  immediate 


STEPHEN    R.    MALLORY,   SECRETARY   OF  THE  NAVY  TO  THE 
CONFEDERACY.      FROM    A    PHOTOGRAPH. 

characteristic  delicacy,  declined  to  accept  my  offer 
to  him. 

"  I  had  intended  to  offer  the  Treasury  Department  to 
Mr.  Toombs,  of  Georgia,  whose  knowledge  on  subjects  of 
finance  had  particularly  attracted  my  notice  when  we 
served  together  in  the  United  States  Senate.  Mr.  Barn- 
well  having  declined  the  State  Department,  and  a  col 
league  of  his,  said  to  be  peculiarly  qualified  for  the 
Treasury  Department,  having  been  recommended  for 
it,  Mr.  Toombs  was  offered  the  State  Department,  for 
which  others  believed  him  to  be  well  qualified. 

"Mr.  Mallory,  of  Florida,  had  been  chairman  of  the 
Committee  on  Naval  Affairs  in  the  United  States  Senate, 
was  extensively  acquainted  with  the  officers  of  the 
navy,  and  for  a  landsman  had  much  knowledge  of 
nautical  affairs  ;  therefore  he  was  selected  for  Secretary 
of  the  Navy. 

"  Mr.  Benjamin,  of  Louisiana,  had  a  very  high  reputa 
tion  as  a  lawyer,  and  my  acquaintance  with  him  in  the 
Senate  had  impressed  me  with  the  lucidity  of  his  intel 
lect,  his  systematic  habits  and  capacity  for  labor.  He 
was  therefore  invited  to  the  post  of  Attorney-General. 

"  Mr.  Reagan,  of  Texas,  I  had  known  for  a  sturdy,  hon 
est  Representative  iu  the  United  States  Congress,  and 
his  acquaintance  with  the  territory  included  in  the  Con 
federate  States  was  both  extensive  and  accurate.  These, 
together  with  his  industry  and  ability  to  labor,  indicated 
him  as  peculiarly  lit  for  the  office  of  Postmaster-Gen 
eral. 


"  Mr.  Memmiuger,  of  South  Carolina,  had  a  high  repu 
tation  for  knowledge  of  finance.  He  bore  an  unimpeach 
able  character  for  integrity  and  close  attention  to  duties, 
and,  on  the  recommendation  of  the  delegation  from 
South  Carolina,  he  was  appointed  Secretary  of  the  Treas 
ury,  and  proved  himself  entirely  worthy  of  the  trust. 

"  Mr.  Walker,  of  Alabama,  was  a  distinguished  mem 
ber  of  the  bar  of  north  Alabama,  and  was  eminent 
among  the  politicians  of  that  section.  He  was  earnestly 
recommended  by  gentlemen  intimately  and  favorably 
known  to  me,  and  was  therefore  selected  for  the  War 
Department.  His  was  the  only  name  presented  from 
Alabama."  EDITORS. 

\  One  of  them,  offered  by  Mr.  Rhett,  and  unani 
mously  adopted,  relates  to  civil-service  reform, 
and  is  in  the  following  words  : 

"The  principal  officer  in  each  of  the  executive  depart 
ments,  and  all  persons  connected  with  the  diplomatic 
service,  may  be  removed  from  office  at  the  pleasure  of 
the  President.  All  other  civil  officers  of  the  executive 
department  may  be  removed  at  any  time  bv  the  Presi 
dent  or  other  appointing  power,  when  their  services  arc 
unnecessary,  or  for  dishonesty,  incapacity,  inefficiency, 
misconduct,  or  neglect  of  duty  ;  and  when  so  removed, 
the  removal  shall  be  reported  to  the  Senate,  together 
with  the  reasons  therefor."  R  B  R 


THE  CONFEDERATE  GOVERNMENT  AT  MONTGOMERY. 


107 


necessity  of  providing  gun-boats  and  shipping  suitable  for  that  purpose. 
In  the  winter  of  1861  Mr.  C.  K.  Prioleau,  of  the  firm  of  John  Fraser  & 
Co.,  of  Liverpool,  found  a  fleet  of  ten  first-class  East  Indiamen,  available 
to  a  buyer  at  less  than  half  their  -cost.  They  belonged  to  the  East  India 
Company,  and  had  been  built  in  Great  Britain  for  armament  if  required, 
or  for  moving  troops  and  carrying  valuable  cargoes  and  treasure.  Four 
of  them  were  vessels  of  great  size  and  power  and  of  the  very  first  class ; 
and  there  were  six  others,  which,  although  smaller,  were  scarcely  inferior  for 
the  required  purpose.  On  surrendering  their  powers  to  the  British  throne, 
the  company  had  these  steamships  for  sale.  Mr.  Prioleau  secured  the  refusal 
of  this  fleet.  The  total  cost  of  buying,  arming,  and  fitting  out  the  ten  ships 
and  putting  them  011  the  Southern  coast  ready  for  action  was  estimated  at 
$10,000,000,  or,  say,  40,000  bales  of  cotton.  The  harbor  of  Port  Eoyal,  selected 
before  the  war  as  a  coaling  station  for  the  United  States  Navy,  with  26  feet 
of  water  at  mean  low  tide,  was  admirably  adapted  for  a  rendezvous  and 
point  of  supply.  Brunswick,  Georgia,  was  another  good  harbor,  fit  for  such  a 
fleet.  The  proposal  was  submitted  to  the  Government  through  a  partner 
of  Mr.  Prioleau  in  Charleston.  Mr.  George  A.  Trenholm,  who  forwarded  the 
proposition  by  his  son,  William  L.  Trenholm.  Its  importance  was  not  at  all 

comprehended,  and  it  was  rejected 
by  the  executive.  Captain  J.  D. 
Bulloch,  the  secret  naval  agent  in 
Europe,  who  had  the  Alabama  built, 
states  that  "  the  Confederate  Gov 
ernment  wanted  ships  to  cruise  and 
to  destroy  the  enemy's  mercantile 
marine."  It  was  of  infinitely  more 
importance  to  keep  Southern  ports 
open,  but  this  does  not  seem  to 
have  been  understood  until  too  late. 
The  opportunity  of  obtaining  these 
ships  was  thrown  away.  They  were 
engaged  by  the  British  Govern 
ment. 

To  show  the  narrow  spirit  of  those 
in  office,  an  incident  concerning 
Captain  Maffit,  who  figured  after 
ward  in  command  of  the  Florida, 
may  be  mentioned.  In  May,  after 
the  reduction  of  Fort  Sumter,  Maf- 

JUDAH     1>.     BENJAMtN,     CONFEDERATE     ATTORNEY-GENERAL  fi  «  WashillfftOll     tO    Ott'ei' 

UNTIL     SEPT.     17TH,    1861  ;     SECOND     SECRETARY  OF  WAR  ; 

THIRD    SECRETARY  OF  STATE.      FROM    A  PHOTOGRAPH.  J^g     gervices?    an(J   Wh611     he     met     tllO 

writer  was  in  a  state  of  indignation  and  disgust.  He  said  that  after  having 
been  caressed  and  offered  a  command  in  the  Pacific,  he  had  sneaked  away 
from  Washington  to  join  the  Confederacy,  and  that  he  had  been  received  by 
the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  as  if  he  (Maffit)  had  designs  upon  him. 


io8 


THE  CONFEDERATE  GOVERNMENT  AT  MONTGOMERY, 


The  Secretary  of  War  has  stated  that  before  the  Government  moved  from 
Montgomery  360,000  men,  the  flower  of  the  South,  had  tendered  their  services 
in  the  army.  Only  a  small  fraction  of  the  number  were  received.  The  Secretary 
was  worn  out  with  personal  applications  of  ardent  officers,  and  himself 
stated  that  in  May,  18(>1,  he  was  constantly  waylaid,  in  walking  the  back 
way  from  his  office  to  the  Exchange 
Hotel,  by  men  offering  their  lives  in 
the  Confederate  cause. 

Another  instance  of  narrowness  may 
be  named  in  the  case  of  William  Cut 
ting  Hey  ward.  He  was  a  wealthy  rice- 
plaiiter  and  an  eminently  practical  and 
efficient  man,  a  graduate  at  West  Point 
in  the  class  with  Mr.  Davis.  He  went 
to  Montgomery  to  tender  a  regiment. 
He  sent  in  his  card  to  the  President 
and  waited  for  days  in  the  lobby  with 
out  obtaining  an  interview,  and  then 
returned  home.  He  finally  died  from 
exposure,  performing  the  duties  of  a 
private  in  the  Home  Guard  at  Charles 
ton.  The  reason  alleged  for  not  ac 
cepting  more  men  was  the  want  of 
arms,  and  Mr.  Davis's  book  is  an  apol 
ogy  for  not  procuring  them.  Insisting 
that  a  great  war  was  probable,  and  in 
augurated  on  the  18th  of  February, —  there  was  no  declaration  of  war  before 
the  middle  of  April  and  no  efficient  blockade  of  the  ports  for  many  months, — 
yet  it  was  in  May  that  he  started  Major  Huse  over  to  England  with  instruc 
tions  to  purchase  10,000  Eiifield  rifles !  By  these  facts  may  be  gauged  his 
estimate  of  the  emergency  or  of  the  purchasing  ability  of  the  Confederate 
States.  The  provisional  constitution  provided  that  "  Congress  shall  appro 
priate  no  money  from  the  Treasury  unless  it  be  asked  and  estimated  for  by 
the  President  or  some  one  of  the  heads  of  departments,  except  for  the  purpose 
of  paying  its-own  expenses  and  contingencies."  The  Congress  could,  therefore, 
do  nothing  about  the  purchase  of  arms  without  a  call  from  the  executive. 

But  for  the  Treaty  of  Paris  in  1778,  made  by  Benjamin  Franklin,  Silas 
Dean,  and  Arthur  Lee,  with  France,  the  independence  of  the  thirteen  original 
States  would  not  have  been  established.  It  was  deemed  important  in  the  Pro 
visional  Congress  of  the  Confederate  States  to  send  commissioners  abroad  to 
negotiate  for  a  recognition  of  their  independence,  and,  in  case  of  war  with  the 
States  of  the  North,  perhaps  for  assistance.  The  chairman  of  the  Committee 
on  Foreign  Affairs,  Mr.  Rhett,  reported  such  a  resolution,  which  was  unani 
mously  adopted.  As  the  treaty-making  power  of  the  Government  belonged 
to  the  President,  Congress  could  not  dictate  to  him  the  limit  of  authority  that 
should  be  conferred  upon  the  commissioners,  in  the  negotiations  desired.  But 


C11AKLES    G.    MEMMINGER,   FIRST  SECRETARY  OF 

THE    TREASURY     TO     THE     CONFEDERACY. 

FROM    A    STEEL    ENGRAVING. 


THE  CONFEDERATE  GOVERNMENT  AT  MONTGOMERY. 


109 


all  those  who  had  reflected  upon  the  subject  expected  the  President  to  give 
extensive  authority  for  making  treaties.  The  views  held  by  the  chairman  were 
that  the  commissioners  should  be  authorized  to  propose  to  Great  Britain, 
France,  and  other  European  nations,  upon  the  conditions  of  recognition  and 
alliance,  that  the  Confederate  States  for  twenty  years  would  agree  to  lay  no 
higher  duties  on  productions  imported  than  fifteen  or  twenty  per  cent,  ad  val 
orem  ;  that  for  this  period,  no  tonnage  duties  would  be  laid  on  their  shipping, 
entering  or  leaving  Confederate  ports,  but  such  as  should  be  imposed  to  keep 
in  order  the  harbors  and  rivers  ;  that  the  navigation  between  the  ports  of  the 
Confederate  States  for  the  same  time  should  be  free  to  the  nations  entering 
into  alliance  with  the  Confederate  States,  while  upon  the  productions  and  ton 
nage  of  all  nations  refusing  to  recognize  their  independence  and  enter  into 
treaty  with  them,  a  discriminating  duty  of  ten  per  cent,  would  be  imposed. 
He  believed,  moreover,  that  they  should  be  authorized  to  make  an  offen 
sive  and  defensive  league,  with  special  guarantees,  as  was  done  in  1778. 
Here  was  a  direct  and  powerful  appeal  to  the  interests  of  foreign  nations, 
especially  England.  "Would  any  British  Minister  have  dared  to  reject 
a  treaty  offering  such  vast  advantages  to  his  country?  And  if  so,  when 
the  fact  became  known  to  Parliament,  could  he  have  retained  his  place  ? 

Up  to  September,  1862,  the  United 
States  Government  was  committed, 
both  by  diplomatic  dispatches  and  by 
the  action  of  Congress,  to  the  declara 
tion  that  the  war  was  made  solely  to 
preserve  the  Union  and  with  the  pur 
pose  of  maintaining  the  institutions  of 
the  seceded  States,  unimpaired  and 
unaltered.  Hence,  at  this  period,  the 
issue  of  slavery  had  not  been  injected 
into  diplomacy,  and  was  no  obstacle  to 
negotiating  treaties. 

When  Mr.  Yancey  received  the  ap 
pointment  at  the  head  of  the  commis 
sion,  Mr.  Rhett  conferred  with  him  at 
length,  and  found  that  the  commis 
sioner  fully  concurred  in  the  views 
just  mentioned.  But  he  surprised  Mr. 
Rhett  by  the  statement  that  the  Presi 
dent  had  given  110  powers  whatever 
to  make  commercial  treaties,  or  to  give 

any  special  interest  in  Confederate  trade  or  navigation  to  any  foreign  nations, 
but  relied  upon  the  idea  that  "  Cotton  is  King."  "  Then,"  rejoined  Mr.  Rhett, 
"  if  you  will  take  my  advice,  as  your  friend,  do  not  accept  the  appointment. 
For  you  will  have  nothing  to  propose  and  nothing  to  treat  about,  and  must 
necessarily  fail.  Demand  of  the  President  the  powers  essential  to  the  success 
of  your  mission,  or  stay  at  home.'' 


JOHN  H.   REAGAN,    CONFEDERATE  POSTMASTER- 
GENERAL.      FROM  A   STEEL  ENGRAVING. 


no  THE  CONFEDERATE  GOVERNMENT  AT  MONTGOMERY. 

On  the  reassembling  of  the  Provisional  Congress  in  April,  ascertaining  that 
these  powers  had  not  been  conferred  upon  the  commission,  Mr.  Rhett  pre 
pared  a  resolution  requesting  the  President  to  empower  the  commissioners  to 
propose  to  European  nations,  as  the  basis  of  a  commercial  treaty,  a  tariff  of 
duties  for  20  years  110  higher  than  20  per  cent,  ad  valorem  011  their  imports 
into  the  Confederate  States.  This  he  submitted  to  Mr.  Toombs,  the  Secretary 
of  State,  who  promptly  approved  it  and  appeared  before  the  Committee  on 
Foreign  Affairs  to  urge  it.  It  was  reported,  with  the  indorsement  of  the  com 
mittee,  to  the  Congress,  and  was  not  opposed  in  debate;  but  Mr.  Perkins 
moved,  as  an  amendment,  six  years  instead  of  twenty.  As  this  was  carried, 
Mr.  Rhett  moved  to  lay  the  resolution  on  the  table,  which  was  done  ;  and  this 
was  the  only  effort  made  to  appeal  to  the  interests  of  foreign  nations,  to  secure 
recognition  of  the  independence  of  the  Confederate  States,  or  to  obtain  assist 
ance.  Upon  his  return  from  abroad,  Mr.  Yancey  met  Mr.  Rhett  and  said: 
"You  were  right,  sir.  I  went  on  a  fool's  errand."  In  December,  1863,  at 
Richmond,  James  L.  Orr,  chairman  of  the  Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs  of  the 
Senate,  said  to  the  writer,  "  The  Confederate  States  have  had  no  diplomacy." 

In  March,  1863,  proposals  were  made  for  a  loan  of  $15,000,000  on  7  per  cent, 
bonds,  secured  by  an  engagement  of  the  Confederate  Government  to  deliver 
cotton  at  12  cents  per  pound  within  6  months  after  peace.  The  loan  stood 
in  the  London  market  at  5  per  cent,  premium ;  and  the  applications  for  it 
exceeded  $75,000,000.  In  the  Provisional  Congress  at  Montgomery,  Mr. 
Stephens  proposed  that  the  Confederate  Grovernment  should  purchase  cot 
ton  at  8  cents  per  pound,  paying  in  8  per  cent,  bonds,  running  20  or  30 
years.  He  believed  that  2,000,000  bales  of  the  crop  of  1860  could  be  obtained 
in  that  way  from  the  planters,  and  that,  of  the  crop  of  1861,  2,000,000  more 
bales  might  be  obtained  afterward.  By  using  this  cotton  ^as  security,  or 
shipping  it  abroad,  he  maintained  the  finances  of  the  Confederate  States 
could  at  once  be  placed  on  a  solid  basis.  His  plan  met  with  much  favor,  but 
was  opposed  by  the  administration  and  was  not  carried  through.  Money  for 
the  long  war  was  to  be  raised  by  loans  from  Confederate  citizens  on  bonds  sup 
plemented  by  the  issue  of  Treasury  notes  and  by  a  duty  on  exported  cotton. 

In  April,  1865,  after  the  collapse  of  the  Confederacy,  Mr.  Barnwell,  who 
had  steadfastly  supported  Mr.  Davis  in  the  Confederate  Senate,  met  the 
writer  at  Greenville,  S.  C.,  where  Governor  Magrath  had  summoned  the 
Legislature  of  the  State  to  assemble.  There,  in  conversation,  Mr.  BarnwTell 
explicitly  expressed  his  judgment  in  the  following  words :  "  Mr.  Davis  never 
had  any  policy ;  he  drifted,  from  the  beginning  to  the  end  of  the  war." 

For  practical  regret  at  the  issue  of  the  secession  movement,  the  time  has 
long  passed  by.  The  people  of  the  South  have  reconciled  themselves  to  the 
restoration  of  the  Union  and  to  the  abolishment  of  slavery.  They  have 
bravely  and  strenuously  endeavored  to  go  through  the  transition  period  of 
an  enormous  change  without  wreck.  In  complete  harmony  with  the  destinies 
of  the  Union,  they  are  working  out  the  future  of  the  United  States  faithfully. 

This  is  set  down  to  prevent  the  suppression  of  important  facts  in  history, 
and  in  justice  to  eminent  men,  now  dead,  who  have  been  much  misunderstood. 


^ 


RICHMOND,     VIRGINIA,     IN 


JACKSON   AT  HARPER'S    FERRY   IN    1861. 

BY  JOHN   D.   IMBODEN,    BRIGADIER-GENERAL,   C.  S.  A. 

THE  movement  to  capture  Harper's  Ferry,  Virginia,  and  the  fire-arms 
manufactured  and  stored  there  was  organized  at  the  Exchange  Hotel 
in  Richmond  on  the  night  of  April  16th,  1861.  Ex-Governor  Henry  A.  Wise 
was  at  the  head  of  this  purely  impromptu  affair.  The  Virginia  Secession 
Convention,  then  sitting,  was  by  a  large  majority  "  Union  "  in  its  sentiment  till 
Sumter  was  fired  on  and  captured,  and  Mr.  Lincoln  called  for  seventy-five  thou 
sand  men  to  enforce  the  laws  in  certain  Southern  States.  Virginia  was  then, 
as  it  were,  forced  to  "  take  sides,"  and  she  did  not  hesitate.  I  had  been  one 
of  the  candidates  for  a  seat  in  that  convention  from  Augusta  county,  but  had 
been  overwhelmingly  defeated  by  the  "  Union  "  candidates,  because  I  favored 
secession  as  the  only  "  peace  measure "  Virginia  could  then  adopt,  our  aim 
being  to  put  the  State  in  an  independent  position  to  negotiate  between  the 
United  States  and  the  seceded  Gulf  and  Cotton  States  for  a  new  Union,  to 
be  formed  on  a  compromise  of  the  slavery  question  by  a  convention  to  be 
held  for  that  purpose. 

Late  on  April  15th  I  received  a  telegram  from  "  Nat "  Tyler,  the  editor  of 
the  "Richmond  Enquirer,"  summoning  me  to  Richmond,  where  I  arrived 
the  next  day.  Before  reaching  the  Exchange  Hotel  I  met  ex-Governor 
Wise  011  the  street.  He  asked  me  to  find  as  many  officers  of  the  armed 
and  equipped  volunteers  of  the  inland  towns  and  counties  as  I  could, 
and  request  them  to  be  at  the  hotel  by  7  in  the  evening  to  confer  about 
a  military  movement  which  he  deemed  important.  Not  many  such 
officers  were  in  town,  but  I  found  Captains  Turner  Ashby  and  Richard 
Ashby  of  Fauquier  county,  Oliver  R.  Funsten  of  Clarke  county,  all 
commanders  of  volunteer  companies  of  cavalry;  also  Captain  John  A. 
Harman  of  Staunton  —  my  home — and  Alfred  M.  Barbour,  the  latter 
ex-civil  superintendent  of  the  Government  works  at  Harper's  Ferry. ft 
These  persons,  with  myself,  promptly  joined  ex-Governor  Wise,  and  a  plan 

•&  See  page  125  for  a  letter  of  Mr.  Barbour,  regarding  the  security  of  the  armory. — EDITOFP. 

in 


I  12 


JACKSON  AT  HARPER'S  FERRY  IN   1861. 


for  the  capture  of  Harper's  Ferry  was  at  once  discussed  and  settled  upon. 
The  movement,  it  was  agreed,  should  commence  the  next  day,  the  17th,  as 
soon  as  the  convention  voted  to  secede,  —  provided  we  could  get  railway 
transportation  and  the  concurrence  of  Governor  Letcher.  Colonel  Edmund 
Fontaine,  president  of  the  Virginia  Central  railroad,  and  John  S.  Barbour, 
president  of  the  Orange  and  Alexandria  and  Manassas  Gap  railroads,  were 
sent  for,  and  joined  us  at  the  hotel  near  midnight.  They  agreed  to  put  the 

necessary  trains  in  readiness 
next  day  to  obey  any  request 
of  Governor  Letcher  for  the 
movement  of  troops. 

A  committee,  of  which  I  was 
chairman,  waited  on  Governor 
Letcher  after  midnight,  and, 
arousing  him  from  his  bed,  laid 
the  scheme  before  him.  Ho 
stated  that  he  would  take  110 
step  till  officially  informed  that 
the  ordinance  of  secession  was 
passed  by  the  convention.  Ho 
was  then  asked  if  contingent 
upon  the  event  ho  would  next 


THE    PALMETTO    REGIMENT    PARADING    IN    CHARLESTON,    S.    C., 
EN    ROUTE    FOR    RICHMOND.       FROM    A    SKETCH. 


Ol'dei'       tllO 

-.          ,„ 

telegraph.  He  consented.  Wo 
then  informed  him  what  companies  would  be  under  arms  ready  to  move  at  a 
moment's  notice.  All  the  persons  I  have  named  above  are  now  dead,  except 
John  S.  Barbour,  "  Nat  "  Tyler,  and  myself. 

On  returning  to  the  hotel  and  reporting  Governor  Lotcher's  promise,  it  was 
decided  to  telegraph  the  captains  of  companies  along  the  railroads  mentioned 
to  be  ready  next  day  for  orders  from  the  governor.  In  that  way  I  ordered 
the  Staunton  Artillery,  which  I  commanded,  to  assemble  at  their  armory  by 
4  P.  M.  on  the  17th,  to  receive  orders  from  the  governor  to  aid  in  the  capture 
of  the  Portsmouth  Navy  Yard.  This  destination  had  been  indicated  in  all 
our  dispatches,  to  deceive  the  Government  at  Washington  in  case  there  should 
be  a  "  leak  "  in  the  telegraph  offices.  Early  in  the  evening  a  message  had  been 
received  by  ex-Governor  Wise  from  his  son-in-law  Doctor  Garnett  of  Wash 
ington,  to  the  effect  that  a  Massachusetts  regiment,  one  thousand  strong,  had 
been  ordered  to  Harper's  Ferry.  Without  this  reenforcement  we  knew  tho 
guard  there  consisted  of  only  forty-five  men,  who  could  be  captured  or  driven 
away,  perhaps  without  firing  a  shot,  if  we  could  reach  the  place  secretly. 

The  Ashbys,  Funsten,  Harman,  and  I  remained  up  the  entire  night.  Tho 
superintendent  and  commandant  of  the  Virginia  Armory  at  Richmond,  Cap 
tain  Charles  Dimmock,  a  Northern  man  by  birth  and  a  West  Point  graduate, 
was  in  full  sympathy  with  us,  and  that  night  filled  our  requisitions  for 
ammunition  and  moved  it  to  the  railway  station  before  sunrise.  He  also 
granted  one  hundred  stand  of  arms  for  the  Martinsburg  Light  Infantry,  a 


JACKSON  AT  HARPER'S  FERRY  IN  1861. 


new  company  just  formed.  All  these  I  receipted  for  and  saw  placed  on  the 
train.  Just  before  we  moved  out  of  the  depot,  Alfred  Barbour  made  an 
unguarded  remark  in  the  car,  which  was  overheard  by  a  Northern  traveler,  who 
immediately  wrote  a  message  to  President  Lincoln  and  paid  a  negro  a  dollar 
to  take  it  to  the  telegraph  office.  This  act  was  discovered  by  one  of  our  party, 
who  induced  a  friend  to  follow  the  negro  and  take  the  dispatch  from  him. 
This  perhaps  prevented  troops  being  sent  to  head  us  off. 

My  telegram  to  the  Stauiitoii  Artillery  produced  wild  excitement,  and  spread 
rapidly  through  the  county,  and  brought  thousands  of  people  to  Staunton 
during  the  day.  Augusta  had  been  a  strong  Union  county,  and  a  doubt  was 
raised  by  some  whether  I  was  acting  under  the  orders  of  Governor  Letcher. 


JACKSON  AT  HARPER'S  FERRY  IN  1861. 


To  satisfy  them,  my  brother,  George  W.  Imboden,  sent  a  message  to  me  at 
Gordons ville,  inquiring  under  whose  authority  I  had  acted.  On  the  arrival  of  the 
train  at  Gordonsville,  Captain  Harman  received  the  message  and  replied  to  it 
in  my  name,  that  I  was  acting  by  order  of  the  governor.  Harman  had  been  of  the 
committee,  the  night  before,  that  waited  on  Governor  Letcher,  and  he  assumed 
that  by  that  hour — noon — the  convention  must  have  voted  the  State  out  of 
the  Union,  and  that  the  governor  had  kept  his  promise  to  send  orders  by 
wire.  Before  we  reached  Stauiiton,  Harman  handed  me  the  dispatch  and  told 
me  what  he  had  done.  I  was  annoyed  by  his  action  till  the  train  drew  up  at 
Stauiiton,  where  thousands  of  people  were  assembled,  and  my  artillery  com 
pany  and  the  West  Augusta  Guards  (the  finest  infantry  company  in  the 
valley)  were  in  line.  Major-General  Kenton  Harper,  a  native  of  Pennsylvania, 
"  a  born  soldier,"  and  Brigadier-General  William  H.  Harman,  both  holding 
commissions  in  the  Virginia  militia, —  and  both  of  whom  had  won  their  spurs 
in  the  regiment  the  State  had  sent  to  the  Mexican  war, — met  me  as  I  alighted, 
with  a  telegram  from  Governor  Letcher  ordering  them  into  service,  and 
referring  them  to  me  for  information  as  to  our  destination  and  troops.  Until 
I  imparted  to  them  confidentially  what  had  occurred  the  night  before,  they 
thought,  as  did  all  the  people  assembled,  that  we  were  bound  for  the  Ports 
mouth  Navy  Yard.  For  prudential  reasons,  we  said  nothing  to  dispel  this 
illusion.  The  governor  in  his  dispatch  informed  General  Harper  that  he  was 
to  take  chief  command,  and  that  full  written  instructions  would  reach  him  en- 
route.  He  waited 
till  after  dark, 
and  then  set  out 
for  Winchester 
behind  a  good 
team.  Brigadier- 
General  Harman 
was  ordered  to 
take  command  of 
the  trains  and  of 
all  troops  that 
might  report  en 
route.  (See  map, 
page  113.) 

About  sunset  we 
took  train  ;  our 
departure  was  an 
exciting  and  af- 

lecting  SCeiie.     At     THE  COURT-HOUSE,  CHARLESTOWN,  VA.,  WHERE  JOHN  BROWN  AND  HIS  ASSOCIATES 
CharlotteSVille,  in  WEKE  TWEI>  ASI>  SESTBS«:D-     ™>M  A  PHOTOGRAPH. 

the  night,  the  Monticello  Guards,  Captain  W.  B.  Mallory,  and  the  Albemarle 
Rifles,  under  Captain  R.  T.  W.  Duke,  came  aboard.     At  Culpeper  a  rifle  com 
pany  joined  us,  and  just  as  the  sun  rose  on  the  18th  we  reached  Manassas. 
The  Ashbys   and   Funsten   had  gone  on  the  day  before  to  collect  their 


JACKSON  AT  HARPER'S  FERRY  IN  1861. 


i  is 


cavalry  companies,  and  also  the  famous  "Black  Horse  Cavalry,"  a  superb 
body  of  men  and  horses,  under  Captains  John  Scott  and  Welby  Carter  of 
Fauquier.  By  marching  across  the  Blue  Ridge,  they  were  to  rendezvous  near 
Harper's  Ferry. 
Ashby  had  sent 
men  on  the  night 
of  the  17th  to 
cut  the  wires  be 
tween  Manassas 
Junction  and  Al 
exandria,  and  to 
keep  them  cut 
for  several  days. 
Our  advent  at 
the  Junction 
astounded  the 
quiet  people  of 
the  village.  Gen 
eral  Harman  at 


MAP    OF    HARPER'S    FERRY. 


once       impress 
ed"  the  Manassas 

O-ap  train  to  take  the  lead,  and  switched  two  or  three  other  trains  to  that  line 
in  order  to  proceed  to  Strasburg.  I  was  put  in  command  of  the  foremost 
train.  We  had  not  gone  five  miles  when  I  discovered  that  the  engineer  could 
not  be  trusted.  He  let  his  fire  go  down,  and  came  to  a  dead  standstill  on  a 
slight  ascending  grade.  A  cocked  pistol  induced  him  to  fire  up  and  go  ahead. 
From  there  to  Strasburg  I  rode  in  the  engine-cab,  and  we  made  full  forty 
miles  an  hour  with  the  aid  of  good  dry  wood  and  a  navy  revolver. 

At  Strasburg  we  left  the  cars,  and  before  10  o'clock  the  infantry  com 
panies  took  up  the  line  of  march  for  Winchester.  I  now  had  to  procure  horses 
for  my  guns.  The  farmers  were  in  then-  corn-fields,  and  some  of  them  agreed 
to  hire  us  horses  as  far  as  Winchester,  eighteen  miles,  while  others  refused. 
The  situation  being  urgent,  we  took  the  horses  by  force,  under  threats  of 
being  indicted  by  the  next  grand  jury  of  the  county.  By  noon  we  had  a  suffi 
cient  number  of  teams.  We  followed  the  infantry  down  the  Valley  Turnpike, 
reaching  Winchester  just  at  nightfall.  The  people  generally  received  us  very 
coldly.  The  war  spirit  that  bore  them  up  through  four  years  of  trial  and 
privation  had  not  yet  been  aroused. 

General  Harper  was  at  Winchester,  and  had  sent  forward  his  infantry  by 
rail  to  Charlestown,  eight  miles  from  Harper's  Ferry.  In  a  short  time  a  train 
returned  for  my  battery.  The  farmers  got  their  horses  and  went  home  rejoic 
ing,  and  we  set  out  for  our  destination.  The  infantry  moved  out  of  Charles- 
town  about  midnight.  We  kept  to  our  train  as  far  as  Halltown,  only  four  miles 
from  the  ferry.  There  we  set  down  our  guns  to  be  run  forward  by  hand 
to  Bolivar  Heights,  west  of  the  town,  from  which  we  could  shell  the  place  if 
necessary. 


n6 


JACKSON  AT  HARPER'S  FERRY  IN  1861. 


The  well-known  raid  of  John  Brown  upon  Har 
per's  Ferry,  Virginia,  for  the  purpose  of  freeing 
slaves  by  force  of  arms,  occurred  011  the  evening  of 
Sunday,  the  17th  of  October,  1859.  His  party, 
including  himself  and  five  negroes  (three  of  whom 
were  fugitive  slaves),  consisted  of  22  men,  three  of 
whom  remained  at  the  rendezvous  on  the  Marvland 


side  of  the  Potomac.  The  others  crossed  by  the 
bridge  and  seized  the  United  States  armory  and 
arsenal,  and  during  the  next  eighteen  hours  were 
busy  in  arousing  slaves,  cutting  telegraph  wires, 
providing  defenses  against  attack,  and  imprisoning 
citizens.  They  were  at  last  besieged  in  the  engine- 
house  by  a  large  number  of  citizens  and  militia,  to 


JACKSON  AT  HARPER'S  FERRY  IN   1861. 


117 


A  little  before  dawn  of  the  next  day,  April  18th,  a  brilliant  light  arose 
from  near  the  point  of  confluence  of  the  Shenandoah  and  Potomac  rivers. 
General  Harper,  who  up  to  that  moment  had  expected  a  conflict  with  the 
Massachusetts  regiment  supposed  to  be  at  Harper's  Ferry,  was  making  his 
dispositions  for  an  attack  at  daybreak,  when  this  light  convinced  him  that 
the  enemy  had  fired  the  arsenal  and  fled.  He  marched  in  and  took  posses 
sion,  but  too  late  to  extinguish  the  flames.  Nearly  twenty  thousand  rifles 
and  pistols  were  destroyed.  The  workshops  had  not  been  fired.  The  people 
of  the  town  told  us  the  catastrophe,  for  such  it  was  to  us,  was  owing  to 
declarations  made  the  day  before  by  the  ex-superintendent,  Alfred  Barbour. 
He  reached  Harper's  Ferry,  via  Washington,  on  the  17th  about  noon,  and, 
collecting  the  mechanics  in  groups,  informed  them  that  the  place  would  be  capt 
ured  within  twenty-four  hours  by  Virginia  troops.  He  urged  them  to  protect 
the  property,  and  join  the 
Southern  cause,  promising, 
if  war  ensued,  that  the  place 
would  be  held  by  the  South,  and 
that  they  would  be  continued  at 
work  on  high  wages.  His  influence 
with  the  men  was  great,  and  most  of 
them  decided  to  accept  his  advice.  But 
Lieutenant  Roger  Jones,  who  com 
manded  the  little  guard  of  forty- 
five  men,  hearing  what  was  going 


- 


on,  at  once  took  measures 
to    destroy    the    place 
if  necessary.    Trains 
of  gunpowder 


^rfftr^--— 


THE    EXGIXE-HOUSE,    HARPER'S    FERRY— "JOHN    BROWN'S    FORT,"    IN    WHICH    HE    WAS    CAPTURED. 


whom  were  added,  on  the  morning  of  Tuesday,  a 
force  of  United  States  marines,  sent  from  Wash 
ington  under  Colonel  Robert  E.  Lee  and  Lieuten 
ants  Green  and  J.  E.  B.  Stuart.  The  marines 
battered  down  the  door  of  the  engine-house  and 
captured  the  insurgents,  after  a  brave  resistance. 
In  the  conflict  John  Brown  was  wounded  ;  his  sons 
Watson  and  Oliver  were  mortally  wounded,  and 
eight  others  of  the  party  were  killed.  Five,  in 
cluding  another  son,  Owen  Brown,  escaped.  Seven 


were  captured,  and,  after  trial  and  conviction, 
were  hanged  at  Chariest  own,  Virginia, —  John 
Brown  on  the  2d  of  December,  1859;  John  E. 
Cook,  Edwin  Coppoc,  John  A.  Copeland  (a  mulat 
to),  and  Shields  Green  (a  negro)  on  the  16th  of 
December ;  and  Aaron  D.  Stevens  and  Albert  Haz- 
lett  on  the  16th  of  the  following  March.  Three 
citizens  and  a  number  of  negroes  were  killed  by 
the  insurgents,  and  others  were  wounded. 

EDITORS. 


n8 


JACKSON  AT  HARPER'S  FERRY  IN  1861. 


were  laid  through  the 
buildings  to  be  fired.  In 
the  shops  the  men  of 
Southern  sympathies 
managed  to  wet  the 
powder  in  many  places 
during  the  night,  render 
ing  it  harmless.  Jones's 
troops,  however,  held 
the  arsenal  buildings 
and  stores,  and  when 
their  commander  was 
advised  of  Harper's  rapid 
approach  the  gunpowder 
was  fired,  and  he  crossed 
into  Maryland  with  his 
handful  of  men.  So 
we  secured  only  the  ma 
chinery  and  the  gun  and 
pistol  barrels  and  locks, 
which,  however,  were 
sent  to  Richmond  and 
Columbia,  South  Caro 
lina,  and  were  worked 
over  into  excellent  arms. 
[See  note,  page  125.] 

Within  a  week  about 
thirteen  hundred  Vir 
ginia  volunteers  had  as 
sembled  there.  As  these 
companies  were,  in  fact,  a 
part  of  the  State  militia, 
they  were  legally  under 
command  of  the  three 
brigadiers  and  one  ma 
jor-general  of  militia,  who  had  authority  over  this,  that,  or  the  other  organiza 
tion.  These  generals  surrounded  themselves  with  a  numerous  staff,  material 
for  which  was  abundant  in  the  rank  and  file  of  the  volunteers ;  for  instance,  in 
my  battery  there  were  at  least  a  dozen  college  graduates  of  and  below  the  grade 
of  corporal.  Every  fair  afternoon  the  official  display  in  Harper's  Ferry  of 
"  fuss  and  feathers  "  would  have  done  no  discredit  to  the  Champs  Elysees. 

One  afternoon,  six  or  eight  days  after  our  occupation,  General  Harper 
sent  for  me,  as  the  senior  artillery  officer  (we  then  had  three  batteries,  but  all 
without  horses),  to  say  he  had  been  told  that  a  number  of  trains  011  the  Balti 
more  and  Ohio  railroad  would  try  to  pass  us  in  the  night,  transporting 
troops  from  the  West  to  Washington,  and  that  he  had  decided  to  prevent 


COLONEL  ROBERT  E.  LEE. 
FROM  A  PHOTOGRAPH  TAKEN  BEFORE  THE  WAR. 

April  23d,  1861,  Robert  E.  Lee,  with  the  rank  of  major-general,  was 
appointed  by  Governor  Letcher  commander-in-chief  of  the  military  and 
naval  forces  of  the  State  of  Virginia,  and  assumed  charge  of  the  military 
defenses  of  the  State.  June  8th,  1861,  in  accordance  with  the  proclamation 
of  Governor  Letcher,  he  transferred  the  command  to  the  Confederate 
States,  but  he  remained  the  ranking  officer  of  the  Virginia  military  forces. 


JACKSON  AT  HARPER'S  FERRY  IN  1861. 


119 


ARYLAND     HEIGHTS 


them  at  the  risk  of  bringing  on  a  battle.  He  ordered  the  posting  of  guns 
so  as  to  command  the  road  for  half  a  mile  or  more,  all  to  be  accurately 
trained  on  the  track  by  the  light  of  day,  and  ready  to  be  discharged  at  any 
moment.  Infantry  companies  were  stationed  to  fire  into  the  trains,  if  the 
artillery  failed  to  stop  them.  Pickets  were  posted  out  two  or  three  miles, 
with  orders  to  fire  signal-guns  as  soon  as  the  first  troop-laden  train  should 
pass.  About  1  o'clock  at  night  we  heard  the  rumbling  of  an  approach 
ing  train.  The  long  roll  was  beat;  the  men  assembled  at  their  assigned 
positions  and  in 
silence  awaited  the 
sound  of  the  sig 
nal-guns.  A  nerv 
ous  cavalryman 
was  the  vedette.  As 
the  train  passed 
him  (it  was  the 
regular  mail)  he 
thought  he  saw 
soldiers  in  it,  and 
fired.  Pop  !  pop ! 
pop !  came  down 
the  road  from  suc 
cessive  sentries. 
Primers  were  in 
serted  and  lan 
yards  held  taut,  to  be  pulled  when  the  engine  should  turn  a  certain  point 
four  hundred  yards  distant  from  the  battery.  By  great  good  luck  Colonel 
William  S.  H.  Baylor,  commanding  the  5th  Virginia  regiment,  was  with 
some  of  his  men  stationed  a  little  beyond  the  point,  and,  seeing  no  troops 
aboard  the  train,  signaled  it  to  stop.  It  did  so,  not  one  hundred  yards  beyond 
where  the  artillery  would  have  opened  on  it.  When  the  first  excitement  was 
over,  he  demanded  of  the  conductor  what  troops,  if  any,  were  on  board,  and 
was  told  there  was  "  one  old  fellow  in  uniform  asleep  on  the  mail-bags 
in  the  first  car."  Entering  that  car  with  a  file  of  soldiers,  he  secured  the 
third  prisoner  of  war  taken  in  Virginia.  It  proved  to  be  Brigadier-General 
W.  S.  Harney,  of  the  United  States  army,  011  his  way  from  the  West  to 
Washington,  to  resign  his  commission  and  go  to  Europe  rather  than  engage 
in  a  fratricidal  war.  He  surrendered  with  a  pleasant  remark,  and  was  taken 
to  General  Harper's  headquarters,  where  he  spent  the  night.  On  his  assur 
ance  that  he  knew  of  no  troops  coming  from  the  W^est,  Harper  ordered  us 
all  to  quarters.  Next  morning  General  Harney  was  paroled  to  report  in 
Eichmond,  and  was  escorted  to  a  train  about  to  leave  for  Winchester.  He 
was  a  fine-looking  old  soldier,  and  as  he  walked  down  the  street  to  the  depot 
he  saw  all  our  forces  except  the  cavalry.  He  was  accompanied  socially  by 
two  or  three  of  our  generals  and  a  swarm  of  staff-officers.  He  cast  his 
glance  over  the  few  hundred  men  in  sight,  and  turning  to  General  Harper, 
I  heard  him  inquire,  with  a  merry  twinkle  in  his  eye,  "  Where  is  your  army 


LOUDOUN     HEIGHTS. 

HARPER'S  FERRY,  LOOKIXG  DOWX  THE  POTOMAC. 
FROM  A  PHOTOGRAPH  TAKES  FROM  THE  HILL  ABOVE  THE  TOWN. 


I2O 


JACKSON  AT  HARPER'S  FERRY  IN  1861. 


encamped',  general!"  Harper's  face  crimsoned  as  he  replied,  "Excuse  me 
from  giving  information."  Harney  smiled,  and  said  politely,  "  Pardon  me 
for  asking  an  improper  question,  but  I  had  forgotten  I  was  a  prisoner."  He 
went  on  to  Richmond,  was  treated  with  marked  courtesy,  and  in  a  day  or 
two  proceeded  to  Washington. 

In  a  few  days  our  forces  began  to  increase  by  the  arrival  of  fresh  volunteer 
companies.  Being  only  a  captain,  I  was  kept  very  busy  in  trying  to  get  my 
battery  into  the  best  condition.  We  had  no  caissons  and  but  insufficient  har 
ness.  For  the  latter  I  sent  to  Baltimore,  purchasing  on  my  private  credit.  In  the 
same  way  I  ordered  from  Richmond  red  flannel  shirts  and  other  clothing  for 
all  my  men,  our  uniforms  being  too  fine  for  camp  life.  The  governor  subse 
quently  ordered  these  bills  to  be  paid  by  the  State  treasurer.  We  found  at 
the  armory  a  large  number  of  very  strong  horse-carts.  In  my  battery  were 
thirty  or  more  excellent  young  mechanics.  By  using  the  wheels  and  axles 
of  the  carts  they  soon  constructed  good  caissons,  which  served  us  till  after 
the  first  battle  of  Bull  Run. 

We  had  no  telegraph  line  to  Richmond  except  via  Washington,  and  the 
time  of  communication  by  mail  was  two  days.  General  Harper  found  it  so 
difficult  to  obtain  needed  munitions  and  supplies,  that  about  the  last  of  April 
he  decided  to  send  me  to  the  governor,  who  was  my  intimate  friend,  with  a 
requisition  for  all  we  needed,  and  verbal  instructions  to  make  to  him  a  full 
statement  of  our  necessitous  and  defenseless  condition,  in  case  General  Robert 

Patterson,who  was  re 


ported  with  a  Federal 
force  at  Chambers- 
burg,  should  move 
against  us.  When  I 
arrived  in  Richmond, 
General  Robert  E.  Lee 
had  been  placed  in 
command  of  all  the 
Virginia  forces  by  the 
governor,  and  by  an 
ordinance  every  mi 
litia  officer  in  the 
State  above  the  rank 
of  captain  had  been 
decapitated,  and  the 
governor  and  his  mil 
itary  council  had  been 
authorized  to  fill  va 
cancies  thus  created. 
This  was  a  disastrous  blow  to  "  the  pomp  and  circumstance  of  glorious  war"  at 
Harper's  Ferry.  Militia  generals  and  the  brilliant  "  staff  "  were  stricken  down, 
and  their  functions  devolved,  according  to  Governor  Letcher's  order  of 
April  27th,  upon  Thomas  J.  Jackson,  colonel  commandant,  and  James  W. 


HARPER'S    FERRY,    FROM    THE    MARYLAND    SIDE. 

The  railway  bridge  was  destroyed  by  the  Confederates  on  the  13th  of  June,  1861. 
Two  days  later,  on  the  approach  of  Union  forces  under  General  Robert  Patter 
son,  near  Williauisport,  and  under  Colonel  Lew  Wallace  at  Romuey  (see  foot 
note  page  127),  General  Joseph  E.  Johnston  (who  had  succeeded  Colonel  Jack 
son  in  command  on  the  23d  of  May),  considering  the  position  untenable,  with 
drew  the  Confederate  army  to  Winchester. 


JACKSON  AT  HARPER'S  FERRY  IN  1861. 


121 


Massie,  major  and  assistant  adjutant-general,  who  arrived  during  the  first 
week  of  May. 

This  was  "  Stonewall "  Jackson's  first  appearance  on  the  theater  of  the  war. 
I  spent  one  day  and  night  in  Kich'mond,  and  then  returned  to  camp,  arriv 
ing  about  2  p.  M.  What  a  revolution  three  or  four  days  had  wrought !  I  could 
scarcely  realize  the  change.  The  militia  generals  were  all  gone,  and  the  staff 
had  vanished.  The  commanding  colonel  and  his  adjutant  had  arrived,  and 
were  occupying  a  small  room  in  the  little  wayside  hotel  near  the  railroad 
bridge.  Knowing  them  both,  I  immediately  sought  an  interview,  and  deliv 
ered  a  letter  and  some  papers  I  had  brought  from  General  Lee.  Jackson  and  his 
adjutant  were  at  a  little  pine  table  figuring 
upon  the  rolls  of  the  troops  present.  They 
were  dressed  in  well-worn,  dingy  uniforms 
of  professors  in  the  Virginia  Military  Insti 
tute,  where  both  had  recently  occupied  chairs. 
Colonel  Jackson  had  issued  and  sent  to  the 
camps  a  short,  simple  order  assuming  the 
command,  but  had  had  no  intercourse  with 
the  troops.  The  deposed  officers  had  nearly 
all  left  for  home  or  for  Bichrnond  in  a  high 
state  of  indignation.  After  an  interview  of 
perhaps  a  half  hour  I  proceeded  to  my  camp 
on  the  hill,  and  found  the  men  of  the  5th  Vir 
ginia  regiment,  from  my  own  county,  in 
assembly,  and  greatly  excited.  They  were 
deeply  attached  to  their  field-officers,  and  re 
garded  the  ordinance  of  the  convention  as  an 
outrage  on  freemen  and  volunteers,  and  were 
discussing  the  propriety  of  passing  denunci 
atory  resolutions.  On  seeing  me  they  called 
for  a  speech.  As  I  did  not  belong  to  the  regiment,  I  declined  to  say  any 
thing,  but  ordered  the  men  of  the  Staunton  Artillery  to  fall  into  line.  Then  I 
briefly  told  them  that  we  were  required  to  muster  into  service  either  for  twelve 
months  or  during  the  war,  at  our  option,  and  urged  them  to  go  in  for  the  full 
period  of  the  war,  as  such  action  would  be  most  creditable  to  them,  and  a  good 
example  to  others.  They  unanimously  shouted,  "  For  the  war !  For  the  war!" 
Before  they  were  dismissed  the  ceremony  of  mustering  in  was  completed,  and 
I  proudly  took  the  roll  down  to  Colonel  Jackson  with  the  remark,  "  There, 
colonel,  is  the  roll  of  your  first  company  mustered  in  for  the  war."  He  looked 
it  over,  and,  rising,  shook  my  hand,  saying,  "Thank  you,  captain — thank  you ; 
and  please  thank  your  men  for  me."  He  had  heard  that  there  was  dissatisfac 
tion  in  the  camps,  and  asked  me  to  act  as  mustering  officer  for  two  other  artil 
lery  companies  present.  Before  sunset  the  rolls  were  returned.  This  prompt 
action  of  the  batteries  was  eniulated  the  next  day  by  the  other  troops,  and  all 
were  mustered  in.  Within  a  week  Governor  Letcher  wisely  appointed 
Major-General  Harper  colonel  of  the  5th  Virginia,  Brigadier-General  Har- 


GEXERAL  THOMAS    J.    ("STONEWALL") 
JACKSON.      FROM  A  PHOTOGRAPH. 


122  JACKSON  AT  HARPER'S  FERRY  IN  1861. 

man  lieutenant-colonel,  and  Colonel  Baylor  major,  and  I  venture  to  say  110 
regiment  in  either  army  was  better  officered,  as  the  fame  it  won  in  the 
"  Stonewall "  brigade  will  prove.  The  presence  of  a  master  mind  was  visible 
in  the  changed  condition  of  the  camp.  Perfect  order  reigned  everywhere. 
Instruction  in  the  details  of  military  duties  occupied  Jackson's  whole  time. 
He  urged  the  officers  to  call  upon  him  for  information  about  even  the  minutest 
details  of  duty,  often  remarking  that  it  was  110  discredit  to  a  civilian  to  be 
ignorant  of  military  matters.  He  was  a  rigid  disciplinarian,  and  yet  as  gen 
tle  and  kind  as  a  woman.  He  was  the  easiest  man  in  our  army  to  get 
along  with  pleasantly  so  long  as  one  did  his  duty,  but  as  inexorable  as  fate  in 
exacting  the  performance  of  it ;  yet  he  would  overlook  serious  faults  if  he  saw 
they  were  the  result  of  ignorance,  and  would  instruct  the  offender  in  a  kindly 
way.  He  was  as  courteous  to  the  humblest  private  who  sought  an  inter 
view  for  any  purpose  as  to  the  highest  officer  in  his  command.  He  despised 
superciliousness  and  self-assertion,  and  nothing  angered  him  so  quickly  as  to 
see  an  officer  wound  the  feelings  of  those  under  him  by  irony  or  sarcasm. 

When  Jackson  found  \ve  were  without  artillery  horses,  he  went  into  no 
red-tape  correspondence  with  the  circumlocution  offices  in  Richmond,  but 
ordered  his  quartermaster,  Major  John  A.  Harman,  to  proceed  with  men  to 
the  Quaker  settlements  in  the  rich  county  of  Loudoun,  famous  for  its  good 
horses,  and  buy  or  impress  as  many  as  we  needed.  Harman  executed  his 
orders  with  such  energy  and  dispatch  that  he  won  Jackson's  confidence,  and 
remained  his  chief  quartermaster  till  the  day  of  Jackson's  death. 

By  Jackson's  orders  I  took  possession  of  the  bridge  across  the  Potomac 
at  Point  of  Rocks,  twelve  miles  below  Harper's  Ferry,  and  fortified  the  Vir 
ginia  end  of  the  bridge,  as  we  expected  a  visit  any  night  from  General  B.  F. 
Butler,  who  was  at  the  Relay  House  on  the  Baltimore-  and  Ohio  railroad.  It 
was  my  habit  to  keep  awake  all  night  to  be  ready  for  emergencies,  and  to 
sleep  in  the  day-time,  making  daily  reports,  night  and  morning,  to  Jackson. 
One  Sunday  afternoon,  a  little  over  a  week  after  we  occupied  this  post,  I  was 
aroused  from  my  nap  by  one  of  my  men,  who  said  there  were  two  men  in 
blue  uniforms  (we  had  not  yet  adopted  the  gray)  riding  about  our  camp,  and 
looking  so  closely  at  everything  that  he  believed  they  were  spies.  I  went 
out  to  see  who  they  were,  and  found  Jackson  and  one  of  his  staff.  As  I 
approached  them,  he  put  his  finger  on  his  lips  and  shook  his  head  as  a  signal 
for  silence.  In  a  low  tone  he  said  he  preferred  it  should  not  be  known  he  had 
come  there.  He  approved  of  all  I  had  done,  and  soon  galloped  away.  I  after 
ward  suspected  that  the  visit  was  simply  to  familiarize  himself  with  the  line 
of  the  canal  and  railroad  from  Point  of  Rocks  to  Harper's  Ferry  preparatory 
to  a  sharp  bit  of  strategy  which  he  practiced  a  few  days  later. 

From  the  very  beginning  of  the  war  the  Confederacy  was  greatly  in  need 
of  rolling-stock  for  the  railroads.  We  were  particularly  short  of  locomo 
tives,  and  were  without  the  shops  to  build  them.  Jackson,  appreciating 
this,  hit  upon  a  plan  to  obtain  a  good  supply  from  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio 
road.  Its  line  was  double-tracked,  at  least  from  Point  of  Rocks  to  Martins- 
burg,  a  distance  of  25  or  30  miles.  We  had  not  interfered  with  the  running 


JACKSON  AT  HARPER'S    FERRY  IN  1861. 


123 


PEN  SKETCH  OF  GENERAL  JACKSOK,  DRAWN 

FKOM  LIFE,  NEAR  BALL'S  BLUFF, 

PROBABLY  IS  1861. 


of  trains,  except  on  the  occasion  of  the  arrest 
of  General  Harney.  The  coal  traffic  from 
Cumberland  was  immense,  as  the  Washing 
ton  government  was  accumulating  supplies 
of  coal  on  the  seaboard.  These  coal  trains 
passed  Harper's  Ferry  at  all  hours  of  the  day 
and  night,  and  thus  furnished  Jackson  with 
iti  a  pretext  for  arranging  a  brilliant  "  scoop." 
When  he  sent  me  to  Point  of  Rocks,  he 
ordered  Colonel  Harper  with  the  5th  Vir 
ginia  Infantry  to  Martinsburg.  He  then 
complained  to  President  Garrett,  of  the 
Baltimore  and  Ohio,  that  the  night  trains, 
eastward  bound,  disturbed  the  repose  of 
his  camp,  and  requested  a  change  of  sched 
ule  that  would  pass  all  east-bound  trains  by 
Harper's  Ferry  between  11  and  1  o'clock  in 
the  day-time.  Mr.  Garrett  complied,  and 
thereafter  for  several  days  we  heard  the  con 
stant  roar  of  passing  trains  for  an  hour 
before  and  an  hour  after  noon.  But  since 
the  "  empties "  were  sent  up  the  road  at 
night,  Jackson,  again  complained  that  the  nuisance  was  as  great  as  ever,  and, 
as  the  road  had  two  tracks,  said  he  must  insist  that  the  west-bound  trains 
should  pass  during  the  same  two  hours  as  those  going  east.  Mr.  Garrett 
promptly  complied,  and  we  then  had,  for  two  hours  every  day,  the  liveliest 
railroad  in  America.  One  night,  as  soon  as  the  schedule  was  working  at  its 
best,  Jackson  sent  me  an  order  to  take  a  force  of  men  across  to  the  Maryland 
side  of  the  river  the  next  day  at  11  o'clock,  and,  letting  all  west-bound  trains 
pass  till  12  o'clock,  to  permit  none  to  go  east,  and  at  12  o'clock  to  obstruct 
the  road  so  that  it  would  require  several  days  to  repair  it.  He  ordered  the 
reverse  to  be  done  at  Martinsburg.  Thus  he  caught  all  the  trains  that  were 
going  east  or  west  between  those  points,  and  these  he  ran  up  to  Winchester, 
thirty-two  miles  on  the  branch  road,  where  they  were  safe,  and  whence  they 
were  removed  by  horse-power  to  the  railway  at  Strasburg.  I  do  not  remem 
ber  the  number  of  trains  captured,  but  the  loss  crippled  the  Baltimore  and 
Ohio  road  seriously  for  some  time,  and  the  gain  to  our  scantily  stocked 
Virginia  roads  of  the  same  gauge  was  invaluable. 

While  we  held  the  Point  of  Rocks  bridge,  J.  E.  B.  Stuart  (afterward  so 
famous  as  a  cavalry  leader)  was  commissioned  lieutenant-colonel,  and  reported 
to  Colonel  Jackson  for  assignment  to  duty.  Jackson  ordered  the  consolidation 
of  all  the  cavalry  companies  into  a  battalion  to  be  commanded  by  Stuart, 
who  then  appeared  more  like  a  well-grown,  manly  youth  than  the  mature 
man  he  really  was.  This  order  was  very  offensive  to  Captain  Turner  Ashby, 
at  that  time  the  idol  of  all  the  troopers  in  the  field,  as  well  he  might  be,  for  a 
more  brave  and  chivalrous  officer  never  rode  at  the  head  of  well-mounted 


124 


JACKSON  AT  HARPER'S  FERRY  IN  1861. 


troopers.  Ashby  was  older  than  Stuart,  and  he  thought,  arid  we  all  believed, 
that  he  was  entitled  to  first  promotion.  When  not  absent  scouting,  Ashby  spent 
his  nights  with  me  at  the  bridge.  He  told  me  of  Jackson's  order,  and  that 
he  would  reply  to  it  with  his  resignation.  I  expostulated  with  him,  although 
he  had  all  my  sympathies.  I  urged  him  to  call  upon  Colonel  Jackson  that 
night.  It  was  only  twelve  miles  by  the  tow-path  of  the  canal,  and  on  his 
black  Arabian  he  could  make  it  in  less  than  an  hour.  I  believed  Jackson 
would  respect  his  feelings  and  leave  his  company  out  of  Stuart's  battalion.  I 

ventured  to  write  a  private  letter 
to  Jackson,  appealing  in  the  strong 
est  terms  for  the  saving  of  Ashby 
to  the  service.  The  result  of  his 
night  ride  was  that  Jackson  not 
only  relieved  him  from  the  obnox 
ious  order,  but  agreed  to  divide  the 
companies  between  him  and  Stuart, 
and  to  ask  for  his  immediate  pro 
motion,  forming  thus  the  nuclei  of 
two  regiments  of  cavalry,  to  be 
filled  as  rapidly  as  new  companies 
came  to  the  front.  One  of  these 
regiments  was  commanded  at  first 
by  Colonel  Angus  McDonald, 
with  Ashby  as  lieutenant-colonel, 
and  in  a  few  months  Ashby  was 
promoted  to  its  full  command. 
Ashby  got  back  to  Point  of  Rocks 
about  2  in  the  morning,  as  happy 
a  man  as  I  ever  saw,  and  completely 
enraptured  with  Jackson.  From  that  night  on,  the  affection  and  confidence  of 
the  two  men  were  remarkable.  A  trip  Ashby  had  made  a  few  days  before  to 
Chambersburg  and  the  encampment  of  General  Robert  Patterson  was  the 
real  reason  for  Jackson's  favor.  Ashby  had  rigged  himself  in  a  farmer's  suit 
of  homespun  that  he  had  borrowed,  and,  hiring  a  plow-horse,  had  personated 
a  rustic  horse-doctor.  With  his  saddle-bags  full  of  some  remedy  for  spavin 
or  ringbone,  he  had  gone  to  Chambersburg,  and  had  returned  in  the  night 
with  an  immense  amount  of  information.  The  career  of  Ashby  was  a  romance 
from  that  time  on  till  he  fell,  shot  through  the  heart,  two  days  before  the 
battle  of  Cross  Keys. 

May  23d,  1861,  Colonel  Jackson  was  superseded  in  command  at  Harper's 
Ferry  by  Brigadier-General  Joseph  E.  Johnston.  When  General  Johnston 
arrived  several  thousand  men  had  been  assembled  there,  representing  nearly  all 
the  seceded  States  east  of  the  Mississippi  River.  Johnston  at  once  began  the 
work  of  organization  on  a  larger  scale  than  Jackson  had  attempted.  He 
brigaded  the  troops,  and  assigned  Colonel  Jackson  to  the  command  of  the  ex 
clusively  Virginia  brigade.  The  latter  was  almost  immediately  commissioned 


COLONEL  ROGER  JONES.   FROM  A  PHOTOGRAPH. 


JACKSON  AT  HARPER'S  FERRY  IN  1861. 


brigadier-general,  and  when  on  the  15th  of  June  Johnston  withdrew  from  Har 
per's  Ferry  to  Winchester,  he  kept  Jackson  at  the  front  along  the  Baltimore 
and  Ohio  road  to  observe  General  Patterson's  preparations.  Nothing  of  much 
importance  occurred  for  several  weeks,  beyond  a  little  affair  near  Martinsburg 
in  which  Jackson  captured  about  forty  men  of  a  reconnoitering  party  sent  out 
by  Patterson.  His  vigilance  was  ceaseless,  and  General  Johnston  felt  sure,  at 
Winchester,  of  ample  warning  of  any  aggressive  movement  of  the  enemy. 


On  the  2d  of  January,  1861,  Alfred  M.  Barbour 
(mentioned  in  the  foregoing  paper),  Superinten 
dent  of  the  United  States  Armory  at  Harper's 
Ferry,  wrote  to  Captain  William  Maynadier  of  the 
Ordnance  Bureau,  Washington,  in  part  as  follows: 

"  I  have  reason  to  apprehend  that  some  assault  will 
be  made  upon  the  United  States  Armory  at  Harper's 
Ferry.  My  reasons  I  do  not  feel  at  liberty  to  disclose. 
They  may  or  they  may  riot  be  well  founded.  I  deem  it 
iny  duty  to  inform  you  that  there  is  no  regularly  organ 
ized  defense  for  the  post.  The  armorers  have  been  formed 
into  volunteer  companies,  and  anus  and  ammuni 
tion  furnished  them.  .  .  .  But  the  armory  might  be 
taken  and  destroyed  ;  the  arms  might  be  abstracted  and 
removed  or  destroyed ;  vast  amount  of  damage  might  be 
done  to  the  Government  property  before  the  companies 
could  be  notified  or  rallied.  ...  I  cannot  be  held  re 
sponsible  for  consequences  at  present,  unless  the  Gov 
ernment  itself  sees  to  the  protection  of  its  property  by 
placing  reliable  regularly  drilled  forces  to  sustain  me.  I 
do  not  look  to  personal  consequences  at  all.  I  look  to  the 
duty  of  protecting  the  property  of  the  Federal  Govern 
ment  now  under  my  charge." 

The  next  day  Major  (now  General)  Henry  J. 
Hunt  was  assigned  to  command  at  Harper's  Ferry, 
and  Lieutenant  Roger  Jones  was  ordered  to  report 
to  him  with  a  small  force  from  Carlisle  Barracks, 
Pennsylvania.  Major  Hunt,  in  response  to  his  re 
quest  for  instructions,  accompanied  by  a  statement 
of  the  weakness  of  his  position,  was  directed  by  the 
Secretary  of  War  (Holt)  to  avoid  all  needless  irri 
tation  of  the  public  mind.  April  2d  Major  Hunt 
was  ordered  to  other  service,  and  the  command 
devolved  upon  Lieutenant  Jones  (now  Colonel 
and  Inspector-General,  U.  S.  A.),  who,  in  a  letter 
to  the  Editors,  gives  the  following  account  of  the 
destruction  of  the  armory  : 

"  From  an  early  day  after  I  reported  with  my  detachment 
of  sixty  men  from  Carlisle,  it  became  evident  that  a  de 
fense  of  the  valuable  Government  interests  at  Harper's 
Ferry  would  be  impracticable  unless  large  reeuforce- 
ments  were  sent  there ;  and  as  there  was  every  reason 
for  believing  that  this  would  not  be  done,  I  early  became 
convinced  that  there  was  but  one  course  to  pursue, — 
viz.,  to  destroy  what  could  not  be  defended.  The  chances 
for  the  capture  or  destruction  of  my  small  force  —  re 
duced  on  April  18th  to  i5  men  —  were  overwhelming,  but 
I  counted  on  the  unorganized  and  undisciplined  state  of 
the  troops  to  be  sent  against  me,  on  their  surprise  and 
bitter  disappointment,  as  circumstances  favoring  our 
escape. 

"  On  the  Sunday  preceding  the  seizure  of  the  armory, 
a  wealthy  miller  of  the  village  came  to  me  and  offered  to 


be  the  bearer  of  any  message  I  might  care  to  send  to  the 
Secretary  of  War  [Mr.  Simon  Cameron],  saying  he  knew 
him  intimately  and  that  he  believed  Mr.  Cameron  would 
heed  and  give  due  consideration  to  any  representation 
coming  from  him.  Having  full  confidence  in  the  gentle 
man,  I  intrusted  him  with  a  message  to  Mr.  Cameron, 
to  the  effect  that  if  he  would  save  for  the  Government 
the  arms,  etc.,  etc.,  at  the  armory,  troops  must  be  sent 
there  at  once  and  by  the  thousand.  I  further  charged 
this  gentleman  to  go  to  Washington  that  night,  and  not 
delay  until  the  next  morning,  as  he  had  intended  — all  of 
which  he  promised  to  do  and  none  of  which  he  did.  But 
of  his  failure  and  change  of  purpose  I  was  ignorant  until 
his  return  to  the  Ferry  Wednesday  evening,  when  I 
learned  that  fear  of  the  consequences  of  his  mission, 
voluntarily  assumed,  had  made  him  abandon  it.  Mon 
day  was  passed  in  anxious  expectation ;  the  silence  of 
Tuesday  added  to  my  anxiety,  which  culminated  on  the 
following  morning,  when  Ex-Superintendent  Barbour, 
fresh  from  the  convention  at  Richmond,  appeared  upon 
the  scene,  told  what  had  been  done,  and  announced  that 
within  twenty-four  hours  the  forces  of  the  State  of  Vir- 
nia  would  be  in  possession  of  the  armory. 

"  As  I  was  acting  entirely  on  my  own  judgment  and 
responsibility,  it  was  apparent  I  must  not  act  prema 
turely,  before  the  danger  was  self-evident  and  imminent. 
As  the  evening  advanced,  nearer  and  nearer  came  the 
troops  from  Halltown,  and  finally,  shortly  afterQ  o'clock, 
when  they  had  advanced  to  within  less  than  a  mile  of 
the  armory, —  in  time  less  than  five  minutes,— the  torch 
was  applied,  and  before  I  could  withdraw  my  men  from 
the  village,  the  two  arsenal  buildings,  containing  about 
twenty  thousand  stand  of  rifles  and  rifle  muskets,  were 
ablaze.  But  very  few  of  these  arms  were  saved,  for  the 
constantly  recurring  explosions  of  powder  which  had 
been  distribtited  through  the  buildings  kept  the  crowd 
aloof.  The  fire  in  the  shops  was  extinguished,  but  the 
arms,  which  were  then  of  incalculable  value,  were  de 
stroyed.  The  spirit,  devotion,  and  loyalty  of  my  men,  ex- 
except  two  deserters,  were  admirable ;  four  of  them 
were  captured  at  their  posts,  but  they  all  eventually 
escaped, —  one  by  swimming  the  river, —  and  reported  to 
me  at  Carlisle.  I  have  heard  that  within  a  few  minutes 
after  my  command  had  crossed  the  Potomac  to  the  Mary 
land  side  of  the  river,  a  train  was  heard  starting  off  for 
Baltimore,  and  that  it  was  assumed  by  the  Virginia 
troops  and  their  officers  that  my  command  had  been 
taken  off  by  that  train,  and  that,  consequently,  pursuit 
was  useless." 

Lieutenant  Jones's  action  was  warmly  approved 
by  the  President  in  a  congratulatory  letter  from 
Secretary  Cameron. 

Governor  Letcher  estimated  the  value  of  the 
property  secured  to  the  State  by  the  seizure  of 
the  Gosport  Navy  Yard  and  the  Harper's  Ferry 
Arsenal  at  $25,000,000  to  $30,000,000. 

EDITORS. 


MCCLELLAN   IN  WEST  VIRGINIA. 

BY  JACOB  D.  COX,  MAJOR-GENERAL,  V.  S.  V. 

THE  reasons  which  made  it  important  to  occupy  West  Virginia  with 
national  troops  were  twofold — political  and  strategic.  The  people  were 
strongly  attached  to  the  Union,  and  had  opposed  the  secession  of  Virginia, 
of  which  State  they  were  then  a  part.  But  few  slaves  were  owned  by  them, 
and  all  their  interests  bound  them  more  to  Ohio  and  Pennsylvania  than  to 
eastern  Virginia.  Under  the  influence  of  Lincoln's  administration,  strongly 
backed,  and,  indeed,  chiefly  represented,  by  Governor  Dennison  of  Ohio,  a 
movement  was  on  foot  to  organize  a  loyal  Virginia  government,  repudiating 
that  of  Governor  Letcher  and  the  State  convention  as  self -destroyed  by  the 
act  of  secession.  Governor  Dennison  had  been  urging  McClellan  to  cross  the 
Ohio  to  protect  and  encourage  the  loyal  men  when,  on  the  26th  of  May,  news 
came  that  the  Confederates  had  taken  the  initiative,  and  that  some  bridges 
had  been  burned  on  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio  railroad  a  little  west  of  Grafton, 
the  crossing  of  the  Monongahela  River,  where  the  two  western  branches  of  the 
railroad  unite,  viz.,  the  line  from  Wheeling  and  that  from  Parkersburg.  [See 
map,  p.  129.]  The  great  line  of  communication  between  Washington  and  the 
west  had  thus  been  cut,  and  action  on  our  part  was  made  necessary.  Governor 
Dennison  had  anticipated  the  need  of  more  troops  than  the  thirteen  regiments 
which  had  been  organized  as  Ohio's  quota  under  the  President's  first  call.  He 
had  organized  nine  other  regiments,  numbering  them  consecutively  with  those 
mustered  into  the  national  service,  and  had  put  them  in  camps  near  the  Ohio 
River,  where  they  could  occupy  Wheeling,  Parkersburg,  and  the  mouth  of  the 
Great  Kanawha  at  a  moment's  notice.  Two  Union  regiments  were  also 
organizing  in  West  Virginia  itself,  at  Wheeling  and  Parkersburg,  of  which 
the  first  was  commanded  by  Colonel  (afterward  General)  B.  F.  Kelley. 
West  Virginia  was  in  McClellan's  department,  and  the  formal  authority  to 
act  had  come  from  Washington  on  the  24th,  in  the  shape  of  an  inquiry  from 
General  Scott  whether  the  enemy's  force  at  Grafton  could  be  counteracted. 


12C 


MCCLELLAN  IN  WEST 


127 


The  dispatch  directed  McClellan  to  "act  promptly."  On  the  27th  Colonel 
Kelley  was  sent  by  rail  from  Wheeling  to  drive  off  the  enemy  and  protect 
the  railroad.  The  hostile  parties  withdrew  at  Kelley's  approach,  and  the 
bridges  were  quickly  rebuilt.  At  the  same  time  several  of  the  Ohio  regi 
ments  were  ordered  across  the  river,  and  a  brigade  of  Indiana  volunteers 
under  Brigadier-General  Thomas  A.  Morris  was  sent  forward  by  rail  from 
Indianapolis.  Morris  reached  Graftoii  on  the  1st  of  June,  and  was  intrusted 
with  the  command  of  all  the  troops  in  West  Virginia.  He  found  that  Colonel 
Kelley  had  already  planned  an  expedition  against  the  enemy,  who  had  retired 
southward  to  Philippi,  about  thirty  miles  from  Grafton.  Morris  approved 
the  plan,  but  enlarged  it  by  sending  another  column  under  Colonel  Ebenezer 
Dumont  of  the  7th  Indiana  to  cooperate  with  Kelley.  Both  columns  were 
directed  to  make  a  night  march,  starting  from  points  on  the  railroad  about 
twelve  miles  apart,  and  converging  on  Philippi,  which  they  were  to  attack 
at  daybreak  of  June  3d.  Each  column  consisted  of  about  1500  men,  and 
Dumont's  had  with  it  2  field-pieces  of  artillery,  smooth  6-pounders. 

The  Confederate  force  was  commanded  by  Colonel  Gr.  A.  Porterfield,  of 
the  Virginia  volunteers,  and  was  something  less  than  a  thousand  strong, 
about  one-fourth  cavalry.  J 

The  night  was  dark  and  stormy,  and  Porterfield's  raw  troops  had  not 
learned  picket  duty.  The  concerted  movement  against  them  was  more  suc 
cessful  than  such  marches  commonly  are,  and  Porterfield's  first  notice  of 

danger  was  the  opening  of  the  artillery 
upon  his  sleeping  troops.  It  had  been  ex 
pected  that  the  two  columns  would  inclose 
the  enemy's  camp  and  capture  the  whole ; 
but,  though  in  disorderly  rout,  Porterfield 
succeeded,  by  personal  coolness  and  cour 
age,  in  getting  them  off  with  but  few  casu 
alties  and  the  loss  of  a  few  arms.  The  camp 
equipage  and  supplies  were,  of  course, 
captured.  Colonel  Kelley  was  wounded 
by  a  pistol-shot  in  the  breast,  which  was 
the  only  injury  reported  on  the  National 
side  ;  no  prisoners  were  taken,  nor  did  any 
dead  or  wounded  fall  into  our  hands.  Por 
terfield  retreated  to  Beverly,  some  thirty 
miles  farther  to  the  south-east,  and  the 
National  forces  occupied  Philippi.  The 
telegraphic  reports  had  put  the  Confed 
erate  force  at  2000  and  their  loss  at  15 


MAJOR-GENERAL    LEW   WALLACE. 
FROM    A    WAR-TIME    PHOTOGRAPH. 


\  A  Confederate  Court  of  Inquiry  reported  that 
he  had  "  600  effective  infantry  (or  thereabouts) 
and  173  cavalry  (or  thereabouts)."  —  OFFICIAL 
RECORDS,  II.,  p.  72. 

4-  The  llth  Indiana  Zouaves,  Colonel  Lew  Wal 
lace,  passed  through  Cincinnati  June  7th  on  their 


way  to  the  front.  They  belonged  to  General  Mor 
ris's  First  Indiana  Brigade  (which  also  included  the 
6th,  7th,  8th,  9th,  and  10th  Indiana  regiments), 
but  were  placed  on  detached  service  at  Cumber 
land,  on  the  Potomac.  Under  instructions  from 
General  Robert  Patterson,  Colonel  Wallace  led  an 


128  MCCLELLAN  IN  WEST  VIRGINIA. 

killed.  This  implied  a  considerable  list  of  wounded  and  prisoners  also,  and 
the  newspapers  gave  it  the  air  of  a  considerable  victory.  The  campaign 
thus  opened  with  apparent  eclat  for  McClellan,  and  the  "  Philippi  races,"  as 
they  were  locally  called,  greatly  encouraged  the  Union  men  of  West  Virginia 
and  correspondingly  depressed  the  secessionists. 

McClellan,  however,  was  still  of  the  opinion  that  his  most  promising  line  of 
operations  would  be  by  the  Great  Kanawha  Valley,  and  he  retained  in  their 
camp  of  instruction  the  Ohio  regiments  which  were  mustered  into  the  service 
of  the  United  States,  sending  into  Virginia  only  those  known  as  the  State 
forces.  Another  reason  for  this  was  that  the  older  regiments  were  now  nearly 
at  the  end  of  their  three-months'  enlistment,  and  were  trying  to  reorganize 
under  the  President's  second  call,  which  required  enlistment  for  "  three  years 
or  the  war."  |  Nearly  a  month  elapsed,  when,  having  received  reports  that 
forces  of  the  enemy  were  gathering  at  Beverly,  McClellan  determined  to  pro 
ceed  in  person  to  that  region  with  his  best-prepared  troops,  postponing  his 
Kanawha  plan  till  north-western  Virginia  should  be  cleared  of  hostile  forces. 

Reference  to  the  map  will  show  that  as  the  Potomac  route  was  usually  in 
the  hands  of  the  Northern  forces,  a  Confederate  occupation  of  West  Virginia 
must  be  made  either  by  the  Staunton  and  Beverly  road,  or  by  the  Kanawha 
route,  of  which  the  key-point  west  of  the  mountains  was  Gauley  Bridge. 

General  Lee  determined  to  send  columns  upon  both  these  lines  —  General 
Henry  A.  Wise  upon  the  Kanawha  route,  and  General  Robert  S.  Garnett  to 
Beverly.  Upon  Porterfield's  retreat  to  Beverly  after  the  "  Philippi  races," 
Garnett,  who  had  been  an  officer  in  the  United  States  army,  was  ordered  to 
Beverly  to  assume  command  and  to  stimulate  the  recruiting  and  organization 
of  regiments  from  the  secession  element  of  the  population.  Some  Virginia 
regiments,  raised  on  the  eastern  slope  of  the  mountains,  were  sent  with  him, 

expedition  against  a  force  of  about  five  hundred     Into  a  position  that  soon  drove  the  enemy  from  the  house 

Confederates  at  Romney,  which  influenced  General     and  into  a  mountain  to  its  rear.    My  attention  was  then 

J.  E.  Johnston  in  his  decision  to  evacuate  Harper's  turned  to  th('  "f  .twT  ?'.'  tbc  hl.1L    '    ',  '  /  ?n**ca  rtv,° 

companies  m  skirmishing  order,  and  at  double-quick 

Ferry  (see  note,  page  120).     In  his  report  of  the  time,  up  a  hill  to  the  right,  intending  to  get  around  the 

Eomney  engagement  Colonel  Wallace  says :  left  flank  of  the  enemy,  and  cut  off  their  retreat.    .    .    . 

Between  their  position  and  that  of  my  men  was  a  deep, 

•  I  left  Cumberland  at  10  o'clock  on  the  night  of  the  prceipltous  ^       the  CTOS8illK  „,  which  occupied  about 

12th  June  with  8  companies,  in  all  about  500  men    and  ten  milm(es.    whcn  tnfi  oppOHito  rirtfre  was  Kalnwl  wo 

by  railway -went  to  >ew  Creek  station,  21  miles  distant.  discovore(1  the  rohe]H    ill(li8,riminately  blent,  with    a 

A  little  after  4  o'clock  I  started  my  men  across  the  ]nass  of  W()men  ftn(l  (t]lll(l         flyi       a8'for  life  from  the 

mountains,  23  miles  off,  intending  to  reach  the  town  by  fown     Hftyl      JJ()  -      «        cannoncers  waa 

6  o'clock  m  the  morning  The  road was  very  fatiguing  llllpO88ible.  ...  After  searching  the  town  for  arms, 
and  rough  .  .  With  the  utmost  industry  I  did  not  equipage,  etc.,  I  returned  to  Cumberland  by  the 

get  near  Romney  until  about  8  o'clock.         .         I  after-  fiamo  road  reacn,       can     at  n  o,c]ock  at  ni  ht  „ 
ward  learned  that  they  had  notice  of  my  coming  full  an 

hour  before  my  arrival.    In  approaching  the  place,  it  -hDITORS. 

was  necessary  for  me  to  cross  a  bridge  over  the  South 

Branch  of  the  Potomac,    A  reconnaissance  satisfied  me         4-  "IS  necessary  to  remember  that  at  this  time 

thatthepassageof  the  bridge  would  be  the  chief  obstacle  the  Virginia  State  Government  at  Richmond  was 

in  my  way,  although  I  could  distinctly  see  the  enemy  trying  to  keep  up  an  appearance  of  independence, 

drawn  up  on  the  bluff,  which  is  the  town  site,  support-  a]^d  that  Ro^ert  E.  Lee  had  been  made  major 
ing  a  battery  of  two  guns,  planted  so  as  to  sweep  the  n  „  -,T.  .  .  ,  14.- 

road  completely.    I  directed  mv  advance  guard  to  cross  general  °f  V"^1™  troops,  conducting  a  campaign 

the  bridge  on  the  run,  leap  down  an  embankment  at  the  ostensibly  under  the  direction  of  Governor  Letcher, 

farther  entrance,  and  observe  the  windows  of  a  large  and  not  of  the  Confederate  authorities.     A  sirnil- 

brick  house  not  farther  off  than  seventy-five  yards.  Their  acrum   of  neutrality  was    still  preserved     and   a 

appearance  was  the  signal  for  an  assault.  A  warm  fire  shadow  of  doubt  regarding  Virginia's  ultimate 
opened  from  the  house,  which  the  guard  returned,  with  ,  ,  , 

no  other  loss  than  the  wounding  of  a  sergeant.  The  firing  attitude  had  some  effect  in  delaying  active  opera- 
continued  several  minutes.  I  led  a  second  company  tions  along  the  Ohio  as  well  as  upon  the  Potomac, 
across  the  bridge,  and  by  following  up  a  ravine  got  them  —  J.  D.  C. 


MCCLELLAN  IN  WEST  VIRGINIA. 


129 


and  to  these  was  soon  added  the  1st  Georgia.  On  the  1st  of  July  he  reported 
his  force  as  4500  men,  but  declared  that  his  efforts  to  recruit  had  proven  a 
complete  failure,  only  23  having  joined.  The  West  Virginians,  he  says,  "  are 
thoroughly  imbued  with  an  ignorant  and  bigoted  Union  sentiment."  Other 
reinforcements  were  promised  Garnett,  but  none  reached  him  except  the 
44th  Virginia  regiment,  which  arrived  at  Beverly  the  very  day  of  the  action, 
but  which  did  not  take 
part  in  the  fighting. 

Tygart's  Valley,  in 
which  Beverly  lies,  is 
between  Cheat  Mountain 


on  the  east,  and 
Rich  Mountain  on 
the  west.  The 
river,  of  the  same 
name  as  the  val 
ley,  flows  north 
ward  about  fifteen  miles,  then  turns  westward,  breaking  through  the  ridge, 
passes  by  Philippi,  and  afterward  crosses  the  railroad  at  Grafton.  The 
Staunton  and  Parkersburg  Turnpike  divides  at  Beverly,  the  Parkersburg 
route  passing  over  a  saddle  in  Rich  Mountain,  and  the  Wheeling  route 
following  the  river  to  Philippi.  The  ridge  north  of  the  river  at  the  gap  is 
known  as  Laurel  Mountain,  and  the  road  passes  over  a  spur  of  it.  Garnett 
regarded  the  two  positions  at  Rich  Mountain  and  Laurel  Mountain  as  the 
gates  to  all  the  region  beyond,  and  to  the  West.  A  rough  mountain  road, 
barely  passable,  connected  the  Laurel  Mountain  position  with  Cheat  River 
on  the  east,  and  it  was  possible  to  go  by  this  way  northward  through  St. 
George  to  the  Northwestern  Turnpike,  turning  the  mountain  ranges.  [See 
map,  p.  131.] 

Garnett  thought  the  pass  over  Rich  Mountain  much  the  stronger  and  more 
easily  held,  and  he  therefore   intrenched  there  about  1300  of  his  men  and 


130 


MCCLELLAN  IN  WEST  VIRGINIA. 


4  cannon,  under  command  of  Lieutenant-Colonel  Pegram.  The  position 
chosen  was  on  a  spur  of  the  mountain  near  its  western  base,  and  it  was 
rudely  fortified  with  breastworks  of  logs  covered  with  an  abattis  of  slashed 
timber  along  its  front.  The  remainder  of  his  force  he  placed  in  a  similar 
fortified  position  on  the  road  at  Laurel  Mountain,  where  he  also  had  four 
guns,  of  which  one  was  rifled.  Here 
he  commanded  in  person.  His  depot 
of  supplies  was  at  Beverly,  which  was 
16  miles  from  the  Laurel  Mountain 
position  and  5  from  that  at  Rich 
Mountain.  He  was  pretty  accurately 
informed  of  McClellan's  forces  and 
movements,  and  his  preparations  had 
barely  been  completed  by  the  9th  of 
July,  when  the  Union  general  ap 
peared  in  his  front. 

McClellan  entered  West  Virginia  in 
person  on  the  22d  of  June,  and  on  the 
23d  issued  from  Graf  ton  a  proclama 
tion  to  the  inhabitants.  He  had  grad 
ually  collected  his  forces  along  the 
Baltimore  and  Ohio  railroad,  which, 
at  the  time  of  the  affair  at  Rich  Moun 
tain,  consisted  of  16  Ohio  regiments, 
9  from  Indiana  and  2  from  West  Virginia;  in  all,  27  regiments  with  4  batteries 
of  artillery  of  6  guns  each,  2  troops  of  cavalry,  and  an  independent  company 
of  riflemen.  Of  his  batteries,  one  was  of  the  regular  army,  and  another,  a 
company  of  regulars  (Company  I,  4th  U.  S.  Artillery),  was  with  him  awaiting 
mountain  howitzers,  which  arrived  a  little  later.  J)  The  regiments  varied 
somewhat  in  strength,  but  all  were  recently  organized,  and  must  have  aver 
aged  at  least  700  men  each,  making  the  whole  force  about  20,000.  Of  these, 
about  5000  were  guarding  the  railroad  and  its  bridges  for  some  200  miles, 
under  the  command  of  Brigadier-General  C.  W.  Hill,  of  the  Ohio  Militia ;  a 
strong  brigade  under  Brigadier-General  Morris,  of  Indiana,  was  at  Philippi,  and 
the  rest  were  in  three  brigades  forming  the  immediate  command  of  McClellan, 
the  brigadiers  being  General  W.  S.  Rosecrans,  U.  S.  A.,  General  Newton 
Schleich,  of  Ohio,  and  Colonel  Robert  L.  McCook,  of  Ohio.  On  the  date  of  his 
proclamation  McClellan  intended,  as  he  informed  General  Scott,  to  move  his 
principal  column  to  Buckhannon  on  June  25th,  and  thence  at  once  upon 
Beverly ;  but  delays  occurred,  and  it  was  not  till  July  2d  that  he  reached 
Buckhannon,  which  is  24  miles  west  of  Beverly,  on  the  Parkersburg  branch 


mUGADIER-GENKRAL    THOMAS    A.    MOKIUS. 
FKOM    A    1'HOTOGKAPH. 


|  As  part  of  the  troops  were  State  troops  not 
mustered  into  the  United  States  service,  no  report 
of  them  is  found  in  the  War  Department ;  but  the 
following  are  the  numbers  of  the  regiments  found 
named  as  present  in  the  correspondence  and  re 
ports,— viz.,  3d,  4th,  5th,  Oth,  7th,  8th,  9th,  10th, 
13th,  14th,  15th,  16th,  17th,  18th,  19th,  20th, 


and  22d  Ohio;  (5th,  7th,  Sth,  9th,  10th,  llth, 
13th,  14th,  15th  Indiana,  and  1st  and  2d  Vir 
ginia ;  also  Howe's  United  States  battery,  Bar- 
nett's  Ohio  battery,  Loomis's  Michigan  battery, 
and  Daum's  Virginia  battery ;  the  cavalry  were 
Burdsal's  Ohio  Dragoons  and  Barker's  Illinois 
Cavalry. — J.  D.  C. 


MCCLELLAN  IN  U/EST  VIRGINIA. 


of  the  turnpike.  Before  leaving  Grafton  the  rumors  he  heard  had  made  him 
estimate  Garnett's  force  at  6000  or  7000  men,  of  which  the  larger  part  were  at 
Laurel  Mountain  in  front  of  General  Morris.  On  the  6th  of  July  he  moved 
McCook  with  two  regiments  to  Middle  Fork  Bridge,  about  half-way  to 
Beverly,  and  on  the  same  day  ordered  Morris  to  march  with  his  brigade 
from  Philippi  to  a  position  one  and  a  half  miles  in  front  of  Garnett's  princi 
pal  camp,  which  was  promptly  done.  Three  days  later,  McClellan  concen 
trated  the  three  brigades  of  his  own  column  at  Roaring  Creek,  about  two 
miles  from  Colonel  Pegram's  position  at  the  base  of  Rich  Mountain.  The 
advance  on  both  lines  had  been  made  with  only  a  skirmishing  resistance,  the 
Confederates  being  aware  of  McClellan's  great  superiority  in  numbers,  and 
choosing  to  await  his  attack  in  their  fortified  positions.  The  National  com 
mander  was  now  convinced  that  his  opponent  was  10,000  strong,  of  which 
about  2000  were  before  him  at  Rich  Mountain.  A  reconnoissance  made  on 
the  10th  showed  that  Pegram's  position  would  be  difficult  to  assail  in  front, 
but  preparations  were  made  to  attack  the  next  day,  while  Morris  was  directed 
to  hold  firmly  his  position  before  Garnett,  watching  for  the  effect  of  the 
attack  at  Rich  Mountain.  In  the  evening  Rosecrans  took  to  McClellan  a 
young  man  named  Hart,  whose  father  lived  on  the  top  of  the  mountain  two 
miles  in  rear  of  Pegram,  and  who  thought  he  could  guide  a  column  of 
infantry  to  his  father's  farm  by  a  circuit  around  Pegram's  left  flank  south  of  the 
turnpike.  The  paths  were  so  difficult  that  cannon  could  not  go  by  them,  but 
Rosecrans  offered  to  lead  a  column  of 
infantry  and  seize  the  road  at  the  Hart 
farm.  After  some  discussion  McClellan 
adopted  the  suggestion,  and  it  was 
arranged  that  Rosecrans  should  march 
at  daybreak  of  the  llth  with  about 
two  thousand  men,  including  a  troop 
of  horse,  and  that  upon  the  sound  of 
his  engagement  in  the  rear  of  Pegram, 
McClellan  would  attack  in  force  in 
front.  By  a  blunder  in  one  of  the 
regimental  camps,  the  reveille  and 
assembly  were  sounded  at  midnight, 
and  Pegram  was  put  on  the  qui  vive. 
He,  however,  believed  that  the  attempt 
to  turn  his  position  would  be  by  a  path 
or  country  road  passing  round  his 
right,  between  him  and  Garnett  (of 
which  the  latter  had  warned  him),  and 
his  attention  was  diverted  from  Rose- 
crans's  actual  route,  which  he  thought 
impracticable.  The  alert  which  had 
occurred  at  midnight  made  Rosecrans 
think  it  best  to  make  a  longer  circuit 


r 


F  Rosecrans'Iiine 


COMBAT     AT 
RICH  MOUNTAIN 

SCALE    OF  MILES 


132 


IN  WEST  VIRGINIA. 


than  he  at  first  intended,  and  it  took  ten  hours  of  severe  marching  and 
mountain  climbing  to  reach  the  Hart  farm.  The  turning  movement  was 
made,  but  he  found  an  enemy  opposing  him.  Pegram  had  detached  about 
350  men  from  the  1300  which  he  had,  and  had  ordered  them  to  guard  the 
road  at  the  mountain  summit.  He  sent  with  them  a  single  cannon  from  the; 
four  which  constituted  his  only  battery, 
and  they  threw  together  a  breastwork  of 
logs.  The  turnpike  at  Hart's  runs  in  a 
depression  of  the  summit,  and  as  Rose- 
crans,  early  in  the  afternoon,  came  out  upon 
the  road,  he  was  warmly  received  by  both 
musketry  and  cannon.  The  ground  was 
rough,  the  men  were  for  the  first  time  under 
fire,  and  the  skirmishing  combat  varied 
through  two  or  three  hours,  when  a  charge 
by  part  of  Rosecrans's  line,  aided  by  a  few 
heavy  volleys  from  another  portion  of  his 
forces  which  had  secured  a  good  position, 
broke  the  enemy's  line.  Reinforcements 
from  Pegram  were  nearly  at  hand,  with 
another  cannon,  but  they  did  not  come  into 
action,  and  the  runaway  team  of  the  caisson 
on  the  hill-top,  dashing  into  the  gun  that 
was  coming  up,  capsized  it  down  the  moun 
tain-side  where  the  descending  road  was 
scarped  diagonally  along  it.  BotK  guns  fell  into  Rosecrans's  hands,  and  he 
was  in  possession  of  the  field.  The  march  and  the  assault  had  been  made 
in  rain  and  storm.  Nothing  was  heard  from  McClellan,  and  the  enemy,  rally 
ing  on  their  reinforcements,  made  such  show  of  resistance  on  the  crest  a 
little  farther  on,  that  Rosecrans  directed  his  men  to  rest  upon  their  arms, 
till  next  morning.  When  day  broke  on  the  12th,  the  enemy  had  disappeared 
from  the  mountain-top,  and  Rosecrans,  feeling  his  way  down  to  the  rear  of 
Pegram's  position,  found  it  also  abandoned,  the  two  remaining  cannon  being 
spiked,  and  a  few  sick  and  wounded  being  left  in  charge  of  a  surgeon.  Still 
nothing  was  seen  of  McClellan,  and  Rosecrans  sent  word  to  him,  in  his  camp 
beyond  Roaring  Creek,  that  he  was  in  possession  of  the  enemy's  position. 
Rosecrans's  loss  had  been  12  killed  and  49  wounded.  The  Confederates  left 
20  wounded  oil  the  field,  and  63  were  surrendered  at  the  lower  camp, 
including  the  sick.  No  trustworthy  report  of  their  dead  was  made. 

The  noise  of  the  engagement  had  been  heard  in  McClellan's  camp,  and  he 
formed  his  troops  for  attack,  but  the  long  continuance  of  the  cannonade  and 
some  signs  of  exultation  in  Pegram's  camp  seem  to  have  made  him  think 
Rosecrans  had  been  repulsed.  The  failure  to  attack  in  accordance  with  the 
plan  has  never  been  explained.  Rosecrans's  messengers  had  failed  to  reach 
McClellan  during  the  llth,  but  the  sound  of  the  battle  was  sufficient  notice 
that  he  had  gained  the  summit  and  was  engaged ;  and  he  was,  in  fact,  left  to< 


BRIGADIER-GENERAL     JOHN     PEGRAM,     C.   S.    A. 
(KILLED   AT  HATCHER'S  KUN,   NEAH  PETERS 
BURG,    FEBRUARY    C,    1865).     FROM    A 
PHOTOGRAPH. 


MCCLELLAN  IN  WEST  VIRGINIA.  133 

win  his  own  battle  or  to  get  out  of  his  embarrassment  as  he  could.  Toward 
evening  McClellan  began  to  cut  a  road  for  artillery  to  a  neighboring  height, 
from  which  he  hoped  his  twelve  guns  would  make  Pegram's  position  unten 
able  ;  but  his  lines  were  withdrawn  a"gain  beyond  Roaring  Creek  at  nightfall, 
and  further  action  was  postponed  to  the  next  day. 

About  half  of  Pegram's  men  had  succeeded  in  passing  around  Rosecrans's 
right  flank  during  the  night  and  had  gained  Beverly.  These,  with  the  newly 
arrived  Confederate  regiment,  fled  southward  on  the  Staunton  road.  Garnett 
had  learned  in  the  evening  by  messenger  from  Beverly  that  Rich  Mountain 
summit  was  carried,  and  evacuated  his  camp  in  front  of  Morris  about  mid 
night.  He  first  marched  toward  Beverly,  and  was  within  five  miles  of  that 
place  when  he  received  information  (false  at  the  time)  that  the  National 
forces  already  occupied  it.  He  then  retraced  his  steps  nearly  to  his  camp, 
and,  leaving  the  turnpike  at  Leadsville,  he  turned  off  upon  a  country  road  over 
Cheat  Mountain  into  Cheat  River  Valley,  following  the  stream  northward 
toward  St.  George  and  West  Union,  in  the  forlorn  hope  of  turning  the  moun 
tains  at  the  north  end  of  the  ridges  and  regaining  his  communications  by  a 
very  long  detour.  He  might  have  continued  southward  through  Beverly 
almost  at  leisure,  for  McClellan  did  not  enter  the  town  till  past  noon  on  the  12th. 

Morris  learned  of  Garnett's  retreat  at  dawn,  and  started  in  pursuit  as  soon 
as  rations  could  be  issued.  He  marched  first  to  Leadsville,  where  he  halted 
to  communicate  with  McClellan  at  Beverly  and  get  further  orders.  These 
reached  him  in  the  night,  and  at  daybreak  of  the  13th  he  resumed  the  pur 
suit.  His  advance-guard  of  three  regiments,  accompanied  by  Captain  H.  W. 
Benham  of  the  Engineers,  overtook  the  rear  of  the  Confederate  column  about 
noon  and  continued  a  skirmishing  pursuit  for  some  two  hours.  Garnett  him 
self  handled  his  rear-guard  with  skill,  and  at  Carrick's  Ford  a  lively 
encounter  was  had.  A  mile  or  two  farther,  at  another  ford  and  when  the 
skirmishing  was  very  slight,  he  was  killed  while  withdrawing  his  skirmishers 
from  behind  a  pile  of  driftwood  which  he  had  used  as  a  barricade.  One  of 
his  cannon  had  become  stalled  in  the  ford,  and,  with  about  forty  wagons, 
fell  into  Morris's  hands.  The  direct  pursuit  was  here  discontinued,  but 
McClellan  had  sent  a  dispatch  to  General  Hill  at  Grafton,  to  collect  the  gar 
risons  along  the  railway  and  block  the  way  of  the  Confederates  where  they 
must  pass  around  the  northern  spurs  of  the  mountains. 

His  military  telegraph  terminated  at  the  Roaring  Creek  camp,  and  the  dis 
patch  written  in  the  evening  of  the  12th  was  not  forwarded  to  Hill  till  near 
noon  of  the  13th.  This  officer  immediately  ordered  the  collection  of  the 
greater  part  of  his  detachments  at  Oakland  and  called  upon  the  railway 
officials  for  special  trains  to  hurry  them  to  the  rendezvous.  About  one 
thousand  men  under  Colonel  James  Irvine  of  the  16th  Ohio  were  at  West 
Union  where  the  St.  George  road  reaches  the  Northwestern  Turnpike, 
and  Hill's  information  was  that  a  detachment  of  these  held  Red  House,  a 
crossing  several  miles  in  advance  by  which  the  retreating  enemy  might  go. 
Irvine  was  directed  to  hold  his  positions  at  all  hazards  till  he  could  be  reen- 
f  orced.  Hill  himself  hastened  with  the  first  train  from  Grafton  to  Oakland  with 


i34  MCCLELLAN  IN  WEST  VIRGINIA. 

about  500  men  and  3  cannon,  reached  his  destination  at  nightfall,  and  hurried 
his  detachment  forward  by  a  night  march  to  Irvine,  10  or  12  miles  over  rough 
roads.  It  turned  out  that  Irvine  did  not  occupy  Red  House,  and  the  preva 
lent  belief  that  the  enemy  was  about  eight  thousand  in  number,  with  the 
uncertainty  of  the  road  he  would  take,  made  it  proper  to  keep  the  little  force 
concentrated  till  reinforcements  should  come.  The 
first  of  these  reached  Irvine  about  6  o'clock  011 
the  morning  of  the  14th,  raising  his  command  to 
1500,  but  a  few  moments  after  their  arrival  he 
learned  that  the  enemy  had  passed  Red  House 
soon  after  daylight.  He  gave  chase,  but  did  not 
overtake  them. 

Meanwhile,  General  Hill  had  spent  the  night 
in  trying  to  hasten  forward  the  railway  trains, 
but  none  were  able  to  reach  Oakland  till  morn 
ing,  and  Garnett's  forces  had  now  more  than 
twenty  miles  the  start,  and  were  on  fairly  good 

roads,    moving    Southward    On  the  eastern   side    Of     BRIGADIER-GENERAL   ROBERT    SELDEX 

the  mountains.     McClellan  still  telegraphed  that      GA1™' FCKOSMAA  S™^1™; 13> 
Hill  had  the  one  opportunity  of  a  lifetime  to  cap 
ture  the  fleeing  army,  and  that  officer  hastened  in  pursuit,  though  unprovided 
with  wagons  or  extra  rations.    When,  however,  the  Union  commander  learned 
that  the  enemy  had  fairly  turned  the  mountains,  he  ordered  the  pursuit 
stopped.     Hill  had  used  both  intelligence  and  energy  in  his  attempt  to  con 
centrate  his  troops,  but  it  proved  simply  impossible  for  the  railroad  to  carry 
them  to  Oakland  before  the  enemy  had   passed  the  turning-point,  twenty 
miles  to  the  southward. 

During  the  12th  Pegram's  situation  and  movements  were  unknown.  He 
had  intended,  when  he  evacuated  his  camp,  to  follow  the  line  of  retreat  taken 
by  the  detachment  already  near  the  mountain-top,  but,  in  the  darkness  of  the 
night  and  in  the  tangled  woods  and  thickets  of  the  mountain-side,  his  column 
got  divided,  and,  with  the  rear  portion  of  it,  he  wandered  all  day  on  the  12th, 
seeking  to  make  his  way  to  Garnett.  He  halted  at  evening  at  the  Tygart 
Valley  River,  six  miles  north  of  Beverly,  and  learned  from  some  country 
people  of  Grarnett's  retreat.  It  was  still  possible  to  reach  the  mountains  east 
of  the  valley,  but  beyond  was  a  hundred  miles  of  wilderness  and  half  a  dozen 
mountain  ridges  on  which  little,  if  any,  food  could  be  found  for  his  men.  He 
called  a  council  of  war,  and,  by  advice  of  his  officers,  sent  to  McClellan,  at 
Beverly,  an  offer  of  surrender.  This  was  received  on  the  13th,  and  Pegram 
brought  in  30  officers  and  525  men.  McClellan  then  moved  southward  him 
self,  following  the  Staunton  road,  by  which  the  remnant  of  Pegram's  little 
force  had  escaped,  and  on  the  14th  occupied  Huttonsville.  Two  regiments 
of  Confederate  troops  were  hastening  from  Staunton  to  reenforce  Garnett. 
These  were  halted  at  Monterey,  east  of  the  principal  ridge  of  the  Alleghanies, 
and  upon  them  the  retreating  forces  rallied.  Brigadier-General  H.  R.  Jackson 
was  assigned  to  command  in  Garnett's  place,  and  both  Governor  Letcher  and 
General  Lee  made  strenuous  efforts  to  increase  this  army  to  a  force  sufficient 


MCCLELLAN  IN  WEST  VIRGINIA.  \y-> 

to  resume  aggressive  operations.  On  McClellaii's  part  nothing  further  was 
attempted,  till,  on  the  22d,  he  was  summoned  to  Washington  to  assume  com 
mand  of  the  army,  which  had  retreated  to  the  capital  after  the  panic  of  the 
first  Bull  Run  battle. 

The  affair  at  Rich  Mountain  and  the  subsequent  movements  were  among 
the  minor  events  of  a  great  war,  and  would  not  warrant  a  detailed  descrip 
tion,  were  it  not  for  the  momentous  effect  they  had  upon  the  conduct  of  the 
war,  by  being  the  occasion  of  McClellan's  promotion  to  the  command  of  the 
Potomac  army.  The  narrative  which  has  been  given  contains  the  "  unvar 
nished  tale,"  as  nearly  as  official  records  of  both  sides  can  give  it,  and  it  is  a 
curious  task  to  compare  it  with  the  picture  of  the  campaign  and  its  results 
which  was  then  given  to  the  world  in  the  series  of  proclamations  and  dis 
patches  of  the  young  general,  beginning  with  his  first  occupation  of  the 
country  and  ending  with  his  congratulations  to  his  troops,  in  which  he 
announced  that  they  had  "  annihilated  two  armies,  commanded  by  educated 
and  experienced  soldiers,  intrenched  in  mountain  fastnesses  fortified  at  their 
leisure."  The  country  was  eager  for  good  news,  and  took  it  as  literally  true. 
McClellan  was  the  hero  of  the  moment,  and  when,  but  a  week  later,  his  suc 
cess  was  followed  by  the  disaster  to  McDowell  at  Bull  Run,  he  seemed  pointed 
out  by  Providence  as  the  ideal  chieftain,  who  could  repair  the  misfortune  and 
lead  our  armies  to  certain  victory.  His  personal  intercourse  with  those  about 
him  was  so  kindly,  and  his  bearing  so  modest,  that  his  dispatches,  proclama 
tions,  and  correspondence  are  a  psychological  study,  more  puzzling  to  those 
who  knew  him  well  than  to  strangers.  Their  turgid  rhetoric  and  exaggerated 
pretense  did  not  seem  natural  to  him.  In  them  he  seemed  to  be  composing  for 
stage  effect,  something  to  be  spoken  in  character  by  a  quite  different  person 
from  the  sensible  and  genial  man  we  knew  in  daily  life  and  conversation.  The 
career  of  the  great  Napoleon  had  been  the  study  and  the  absorbing  admira 
tion  of  young  American  soldiers,  and  it  was,  perhaps,  not  strange  that  when 
real  war  came  they  should  copy  his  bulletins  and  even  his  personal  bearing. 
It  was,  for  the  moment,  the  bent  of  the  people  to  be  pleased  with  McClellan's 
rendering  of  the  role;  they  dubbed  him  the  young  Napoleon,  and  the 
photographers  got  him  to  stand  with  folded  arms,  in  the  historic  pose.  For 
two  or  three  weeks  his  dispatches  and  letters  were  all  on  fire  with  enthusiastic 
energy.  He  appeared  to  be  in  a  morbid  condition  of  mental  exaltation. 
When  he  came  out  of  it,  he  was  as  genial  as  ever,  as  can  be  seen  by  the  con 
trast  between  his  official  communications  and  that  private  letter  to  General 
Burnside,  written  just  after  the  evacuation  of  Yorktown,  which,  oddly  enough, 
has  found  its  way  into  the  official  records  of  the  war.\  The  assumed  dash 

\  Letter  of  May  21st,  1862.  "  My  Dear  Burn  :  arms,  and  rely  far  more  on  his  goodness  than  I  do 
Your  dispatch  and  kind  letter  received.  I  have  on  my  own  poor  intellect.  I  sometimes  think  now 
instructed  Seth  [Williams]  to  reply  to  the  official  that  I  can  almost  realize  that  Mahomet  was  sin- 
letter,  and  now  acknowledge  the  kind  private  cere.  When  I  see  the  hand  of  God  guarding  one 
note.  It  always  does  me  good,  in  the  midst  of  so  weak  as  myself,  I  can  almost  think  myself  a 
my  cares  and  perplexities,  to  see  your  wretched  chosen  instrument  to  carry  out  his  schemes, 
old  scrawling.  I  have  terrible  troubles  to  contend  Would  that  a  better  man  had  been  selected, 
with,  but  have  met  them  with  a  good  heart,  like  .  .  .  Good-bye,  and  God  bless  you,  Burn, 
your  good  old  self,  and  have  thus  far  struggled  With  the  sincere  hope  that  we  may  soon  shake 
through  successfully.  .  .  .  The  crisis  cannot  hands,  I  am  as  ever, 
long  be  deferred.  I  pray  for  God's  blessing  on  our  Your  sincere  friend.  McClellan." — J.  D.  C. 


MAJOR-GENERAL    W.    S.    RO6ECRANS.       FROM    A    WAR-TIME    PHOTOGRAPH. 

136 


MCCLELLAN  IN  WEST  VIRGINIA.  137 

and  energy  of  his  first  campaign  made  the  disappointment  and  the  reaction 
more  painful,  when  the  excessive  caution  of  his  conduct  in  command  of  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  was  seen.  But  the  Rich  Mountain  affair,  when 
analyzed,  shows  the  same  characteristics  which  became  well  known  later. 
There  was  the  same  overestimate  of  the  enemy,  the  same  tendency  to  inter 
pret  unfavorably  the  sights  and  sounds  in  front,  the  same  hesitancy  to  throw 
in  his  whole  force  when  he  knew  that  his  subordinate  was  engaged.  If 
Garnett  had  been  as  strong  as  McClellan  believed  him,  he  had  abundant  time 
and  means  to  overwhelm  Morris,  who  lay  four  days  in  easy  striking  distance, 
while  the  National  commander  delayed  attacking  Pegram ;  and  had  Morris 
been  beaten,  Garnet  t  would  have  been  as  near  Clarksburg  as  his  opponent, 
and  there  would  have  been  a  race  for  the  railroad.  But,  happily,  Garnett 
was  less  strong  and  less  enterprising  than  he  was  credited  with  being. 
Pegram  was  dislodged,  and  the  Confederates  made  a  precipitate  retreat. 

THE   KAXAWHA   VALLEY. 

WHEN  McClellan  reached  Buckhannon,  on  the  2d  of  July,  the  rumors  he 
heard  of  Garnett's  strength,  and  the  news  of  the  presence  of  General  Wise 
with  a  considerable  force  in  the  Great  Kanawha  Valley,  made  him  conclude 
to  order  a  brigade  to  that  region  for  the  purpose  of  holding  the  lower  part 
of  the  valley  defensively  till  he  might  try  to  cut  off  Wise's  army  after  Gar 
nett  should  be  disposed  of.  This  duty  was  assigned  to  me.  The  brigade 
which  I  had  organized  had  all  been  taken  for  his  own  campaign,  except  the 
llth  Ohio  (only  five  companies  present),  but  the  12th  Ohio,  which  was  still 
at  Camp  Dennison,  was  ordered  to  report  to  me,  and  these  two  regiments 
were  to  be  sent  by  rail  to  Gallipolis  as  soon  as  the  railways  could  furnish 
transportation.  At  Gallipolis  we  should  find  the  21st  Ohio  militia,  and  the 
1st  and  2d  Kentucky  volunteers  were  also  to  join  me  there,  coming  by  steam 
boat  from  Cincinnati.  The  two  Kentucky  regiments  had  been  organized  in 
Cincinnati,  and  were  made  up  chiefly  of  steamboat  crews  and  "longshore 
men  "  thrown  out  of  employment  by  the  stoppage  of  commerce  on  the  river. 
There  were  in  them  some  companies  of  other  material,  but  these  gave  the 
distinctive  character  to  the  regiments  as  a  whole.  The  colonels  and  part  of 
the  field-officers  were  Kentuckians,  but  the  organizations  were  Ohio  regi 
ments  in  nearly  everything  but  the  name.  The  men  were  mostly  of  a  rough 
and  reckless  class,  and  gave  a  good  deal  of  trouble  by  insubordination ;  but 
they  did  not  lack  courage,  and,  after  they  had  been  under  discipline  for  a 
while,  became  good  fighting  regiments. 

The  troops  moved  the  moment  transportation  could  be  furnished,  and 
those  going  by  rail  were  at  Gallipolis  and  Point  Pleasant  (the  mouth  of  the 
Great  Kanawha)  on  the  10th.  My  only  artillery  was  a  section  of  2  bronze 
rifles,  altered  from  smooth  6-pounders,  and  my  only  cavalry  some  30 
raw  recruits,  useful  only  as  messengers.  Meanwhile,  my  orders  had  been 
changed,  and  in  accordance  with  them  I  directed  the  2d  Kentucky  to  land 
at  Guyandotte,  on  the  Ohio,  about  70  miles  below  the  Kanawha,  the 


I38 


MCCLELLAN  IN  WEST  VIRGINIA. 


1st  Kentucky  to  proceed  to  Ripley,  landing  at  Ravens  wood,  about  50  miles 
above,  while  with  two  and  a  half  regiments  I  myself  should  move  up  the 
Kanawha  Valley.  The  two  detachments  would  join  me  after  a  time  by 
lateral  roads.  My  total  force,  when  assembled,  would  be  a  little  over  three 
thousand  men,  the  regiments  having  the  same  average  strength  as  those  with 
McClellan.  The  opposing  force  under 
General  Wise  was  four  thousand  by  the 
time  the  campaign  was  fully  opened, 
though  somewhat  less  at  the  begin - 
ning.-fr 

The  Kanawha  River  was  navigable 
for  small  steamboats  about  70  miles,  to 
a  point  10  or  12  miles  above  Charleston, 
the  only  important  town  of  the  region 
and  lying  at  the  confluence  of  the  Kan 
awha  and  Elk  rivers.  Steamboats  were 
plenty,  owing  to  the  interruption  of 
trade,  and  wagons  were  wholly  lacking, 
so  that  my  column  was  accompanied 
and  partly  carried  by  a  fleet  of  stern- 
wheel  steamers. 

On  the  llth  of  July  the  movement 
from  Point  Pleasant  began.  An  advance- 
guard  was  sent  out  on  each  side  of  the 
river,  marching  upon  the  roads  which  were  near  its  banks.  The  few  horse 
men  were  divided  and  sent  with  them  as  messengers,  and  the  boats  followed, 
steaming  slowly  along  in  rear  of  the  marching  men.  Most  of  two  regiments 
were  carried  on  the  steamers,  to  save  fatigue  to  the  men,  who  were  as  yet 
unused  to  their  work,  and  many  of  whom  were  footsore  from  their  first  long 
march  of  25  miles  to  Gallipolis,  from  the  station  where  they  left  the  railway. 
The  arrangement  was  also  a  good  one  in  a  military  point  of  view,  for  if  an 
enemy  were  met  on  either  bank  of  the  stream,  the  boats  could  land  in  a 
moment  and  the  troops  disembark  without  delay. 

Our  first  day's  sail  was  thirteen  miles  up  the  river,  and  it  was  the  very 
romance  of  campaigning.  I  took  my  station  on  top  of  the  pilot-house  of  the 
leading  boat,  so  that  I  might  see  over  the  banks  of  the  stream  and  across 
the  bottom-lands  which  bounded  the  valley.  The  afternoon  was  a  lovely 
one.  Summer  clouds  lazily  drifted  across  the  sky,  the  boats  were  dressed 
in  their  colors,  and  swarmed  with  men  as  a  hive  with  bees.  The  bands  played 
national  tunes,  and  as  we  passed  the  houses  of  Union  citizens,  the  inmates 
would  wave  their  handkerchiefs  to  us  and  were  answered  by  cheers  from  the 
troops.  The  scenery  was  picturesque,  the  gently  winding  river  making 
beautiful  reaches  that  opened  new  scenes  upon  us  at  every  turn.  On  either 

•5^- Wise  reported  his  force  on  17th  July  as  on  the  18th.  When  he  abandoned  the  valley 
3500  "  effective "  men  and  10  cannon,  and  says  ten  days  later  he  reported  his  force  4000  in 
he  received  "perhaps  300"  in  reinforcements  round  numbers. — J.  D.  C. 


BRIGAUIEH-GENERAT,    HENRY    A.    WIRE,   C.  S.  A., 

EX-GOVERNOR    OF    VIRGINIA. 

FROM   A  PHOTOGRAPH. 


MCCLELLAN  IN  WEST  VIRGINIA.  139 

side  the  advance-guard  could  be  seen  in  the  distance,  the  main  body  in  the 
road,  with  skirmishers  exploring  the  way  in  front  and  flankers  on  the  sides. 
Now  and  then  a  horseman  would  bring  some  message  to  the  shore  from  the 
front,  and  a  small  boat  would  be  sent  to  receive  it,  giving  us  the  rumors  with 
which  the  country  was  rife,  and  which  gave  just  enough  of  excitement  and  of 
the  spice  of  possible  danger  to  make  this  our  first  day  in  the  enemy's  country 
key  everybody  to  a  pitch  that  doubled  the  vividness  of  every  sensation.  The 
landscape  seemed  more  beautiful,  the  sunshine  more  bright,  and  the  exhilara 
tion  of  outdoor  life  more  joyous  than  any  we  had  ever  before  known. 

Our  first  night's  camp  was  in  a  picturesque  spot  in  keeping  with  the  beauties 
of  the  day's  progress,  and  was  enlivened  by  a  report  that  the  enemy  was 
advancing  to  attack  us  in  force.  It  was  only  a  rumor,  based  upon  the  actual 
approach  of  a  reconnoitering  party  of  cavalry,  and  the  camp  was  not  allowed 
to  be  disturbed  except  to  send  a  small  reconnoissance  forward  on  our  own  part. 
Two  more  days'  advance,  in  the  face  of  a  slight  skirmishing  resistance,  brought 
us  to  the  Pocotalico,  a  stream  entering  the  Kanawha  from  the  north. 

"Wise  had  placed  his  principal  camp  at  Tyler  Mountain,  a  bold  spur  which 
reaches  the  river  on  the  northern  side  (on  which  is  also  the  turnpike  road) 
about  12  miles  above  my  position,  while  he  occupied  the  south  side  with 
a  detachment  above  Scary  Creek  some  3  miles  from  us.  The  hills  closing  in 
nearer  to  the  river  make  it  easy  to  stop  steamboat  navigation  with  a  small 
force,  and  it  became  necessary  to  halt  a  little  and  await  the  arrival  of  the 
wagons  which  had  not  yet  been  sent  me,  and  of  the  2d  Kentucky  regiment, 
which  was  marching  to  me  from  Barboursville,  where  one  wing  of  it,  com 
manded  by  Lieutenant-Colonel  Neff ,  had  a  brilliant  little  affair  with  a  body  of 
Confederate  recruits  occupying  the  place.  On  the  afternoon  of  the  17th,  the 
Kentuckians  having  arrived,  and  a  reconnoissance  having  been  made  of  the 
Scary  Creek  position,  which  was  found  to  be  held  by  about  500  of  the  enemy 
with  1  or  2  cannon,  Colonel  John  W.  Lowe  of  the  12th  Ohio  was  ferried  over 
the  river  with  his  own  regiment  and  2  companies  of  the  21st  Ohio  with  our 
2  cannon,  and  directed  to  occupy  the  attention  of  the  enemy  in  front  at  the 
creek,  which  was  unfordable  at  its  mouth,  while  he  tried  to  turn  the  position 
with  part  of  his  command.  The  enemy  at  first  retreated,  leaving  one  cannon 
disabled,  but,  being  reenf  orced,  they  rallied,  and,  no  good  crossing  of  the  creek 
being  found,  Lowe  was  foiled  in  his  effort  to  dislodge  them  after  a  sharp 
engagement  across  the  stream. 

The  wagons  reached  us  a  few  at  a  time,  but  by  the  24th  I  was  able  to  move 
from  our  strong  position  behind  Pocotalico,  and,  taking  circuitous  country 
roads  among  the  hills,  to  come  upon  the  rear  of  Wise's  camp  at  Tyler  Mountain. 
The  march  was  a  long  and  difficult  one,  but  was  successful.  As  soon  as  his 
outposts  were  driven  in,  the  enemy  decamped  in  a  panic,  leaving  his  camp- 
kettles  and  supper  over  the  fires.  We  had  also  cut  off  a  steamboat  with 
troops  which  was  just  below  us  as  we  came  to  the  bluff,  and  which,  under  the 
fire  of  our  cannon,  was  run  ashore  and  burned,  while  the  detachments  on  the 
other  side  of  the  river  hastened  by  country  roads  to  rejoin  Wise  at  Charleston. 
It  was  now  nightfall,  and  we  bivouacked  upon  the  mountain-side.  Wise 


140 


M^CLELLAN  IN  WEST  VIRGINIA. 


BRIGADIER-GENERAL  JOHN  B.  FLOYD,  C.  S.  A. 

.SECRETARY   OF   WAR    IINDF.R   PRESIDENT 

BUCHANAN.     FROM   A   PHOTOGRAPH. 


abandoned  Charleston  in  the  night  and  re 
treated  toward  Gauley  Bridge.  On  the  25th 
I  occupied  Charleston  without  resistance,  and 
moved  on,  ordering  the  1st  Kentucky  up  from 
Ripley  to  garrison  the  place  and  establish  my 
depot  there. 

At  every  mile  above  Charleston  the  scenery 
grows  wilder,  the  mountains  crowding  in 
upon  the  river,  often  with  high,  beetling  cliffs 
overhanging  it,  and  offering  numerous  posi 
tions  where  a  small  detachment  might  hold 
an  army  in  check.  Wise,  however,  made  no 
resistance  worth  naming,  except  to  fell  timber 
into  the  road,  and  he  passed  the  Gauley,  burn 
ing  the  important  bridge  there  and  continu 
ing  his  hasty  retreat  to  the  White  Sulphur 
Springs,  hurried,  no  doubt,  by  the  fear  that 
McClellan  might  intercept  him  by  way  of 
Huntersville  and  Lewisburg.  McClellan  had 
recognized  the  fact  that  he  was  asking  me  to 
face  the  enemy  with  no  odds  in  my  favor,  and  as  soon  as  he  heard  that 
Wise  was  disposed  to  make  a  stand,  he  had  directed  me  not  to  risk  attacking 
him  in  front,  but  rather  to  await  the  result  of  his  own  movement  toward 
the  Upper  Kanawha.  Rosecrans  did  the  same  when  he  assumed  com 
mand;  but  I  knew  the  hope  had  been  that  I  could  reach  Gauley  Bridge1, 
and  I  felt  warranted,  as  soon  as  wagons  reached  me,  in  attempting  the  turning 
movement  which  seems  to  have  thrown  Wise  into  a  panic  from  which  he 
did  not  recover  till  he  got  out  of  the  valley.  Rosecrans  ordered  me  to 
remain  on  the  defensive  at  Charleston,  but  his  dispatches  did  not  reach  me, 
fortunately,  till  I  was  close  to  Gauley  Bridge,  some  forty  miles  above  Charles 
ton,  and  was  quite  sure  of  my  ability  to  take  possession  of  that  defile,  as  I  did 
on  the  29th  of  July.  Another  reason  for  haste  was  that  the  time  of  enlist 
ment  of  the  21st  Ohio  had  expired,  and  I  was  ordered  by  the  governor  to  send 
it  back  to  Ohio  for  reorganization,  which  would  make  a  reduction  of  one- 
fourth  of  my  numbers. 

At  my  first  night's  encampment  above  Charleston,  in  a  lovely  nook 
between  spurs  of  the  hills,  I  was  treated  to  a  little  surprise  on  the  part  of 
three  of  my  subordinates  which  was  an  unexpected  enlargement  of  my  mil 
itary  experience,  and  which  is  worth  preserving  to  show  some  of  the  con 
ditions  attending  the  beginning  of  a  war  with  undisciplined  troops.  The 
camp  was  nicely  organized  for  the  night  and  supper  was  over,  when  I  was 
waited  upon  at  my  tent  by  these  gentlemen.  Their  spokesman  informed  me 
that  after  consultation  they  had  concluded  that  it  was  foolhardy  to  follow 
the  Confederates  into  the  gorge  we  were  traveling,  and,  unless  I  could  show 
them  satisfactory  reasons  for  changing  their  opinion,  they  would  not  lead 
their  commands  farther  into  it.  I  dryly  asked  if  he  was  quite  sure  he  under- 


MCCLELLAN  IN  WEST 


141 


stood  the  nature  of  his  communication.  There  was  probably  something  in 
the  tone  of  my  question  which  was  not  altogether  expected,  and  his  compan 
ions  began  to  look  a  little  uneasy.  He  then  protested  that  they  meant  no 
disrespect,  but,  as  their  military  experience  was  about  as  extensive  as  my  own, 
they  thought  I  ought  to  make  no  movement  but  on  consultation  with  them 
and  by  their  consent.  The  others  seemed  better  pleased  with  this  way  of  put 
ting  it.  My  answer  was  that  whether  they  meant  it  or  not,  their  action  was 
mutinous,  and  only  their  ignorance  of  military  law  could  palliate  it.  The 
responsibility  for  the  movement  of  the  army  was  with  me,  and,  while  glad  to 
confer  freely  with  them,  I  should  call  no  council  of  war  and  submit  nothing  to 
vote  till  I  felt  incompetent  to  decide  for  myself.  If  they  apologized  for  their 
conduct  and  showed  earnestness  in  military  obedience,  what  they  had  now 
said  would  be  overlooked,  but  on  any  recurrence  of  insubordination  I  should 
enforce  my  power  by  arresting  the  offender  at  once.  I  dismissed  them  with 
this,  and  immediately  sent  out  orders  through  my  adjutant-general  to  march 
early  next  morning.  Before  they  slept,  one  of  the  three  had  come  to  me  with 
an  earnest  apology  for  his  part  in  the  matter,  and  a  short  time  made  them  all 
as  subordinate  as  I  could  wish.  The  incident  could  not  have  occurred  in  the 
brigade  which  had 
been  under  my  com 
mand  at  Camp  Deii- 
nison,  and  was  the 
natural  result  of  the 
sudden  assembling 
of  inexperienced 
men  under  a  bri 
gade  commander  of 
whom  they  knew 
nothing  except  that 
at  the  beginning  of 
the  war  he  had  been 
a  civilian  like  them 
selves. 

The  same  march 
enabled  me  to  make 
the  acquaintance  of 
another  army  "insti 
tution," — the  news 
paper  correspond 
ent.  At  Charleston 
I  was  joined  by  two 
men  representing 
influential  newspapers,  who  wished  to  know  on  what  terms  they  might  accom 
pany  the  column.  The  answer  was  that  the  quartermaster  would  furnish 
them  with  a  tent  and  with  transportation,  and  that  their  letters  should  be 
submitted  to  one  of  the  staff  to  protect  us  from  the  publication  of  facts  which 


POST    HOSPITAL    AND    WAGOX-SHOP    AT    KANAWHA     FALLS,     NEAR 
GACLEY     BKIDGE.      FROM    A    PHOTOGRAPH. 


142 


MCCLELLAN  IN  WEST  VIRGINIA. 


SCALE   Or  MILES 


3      /  FayetteC.l 
GAULEY  BRIDGE  &VICINITY. 


might  aid 


the  enemy.  This  seemed 
unsatisfactory,  and  they  intimated  that 
they  expected  to  be  taken  into  my 
mess,  and  to  be  announced  as  volun 
teer  aides  with  military  rank.  They 
were  told  that  military  position  or 
rank  could  only  be  given  by  authority 
much  higher  than  mine,  and  that  they 
could  be  more  honestly  independent 
if  free  from  personal  obligation  and 
from  temptation  to  repay  favors  with 
flattery.  My  only  purpose  was  to  put 
the  matter  upon  the  foundation  of 
public  right  and  of  mutual  self-re 
spect.  The  day  before  we  reached 
Gauley  Bridge  they  opened  the  matter 
again  to  my  adjutant-general,  but  were 
informed  that  I  had  decided  it  upon 

a  principle  by  which  I  meant  to  abide.  Their  reply  was,  "Very  well;  General 
Cox  thinks  he  can  get  along  without  us.  We  will  show  him.  We  will  write 
him  down ! "  They  left  the  camp  the  same  evening  and  wrote  letters  to  their 
papers,  describing  the  army  as  a  rabble  of  ruffians,  burning  houses,  ravishing 
women,  robbing  and  destroying  property,  and  the  commander  as  totally  incom 
petent.  As  to  the  troops,  more  baseless  slander  was  never  uttered.  Their 
march  had  been  orderly,  no  willful  injury  had  been  done  to  private  property, 
and  no  case  of  personal  violence  to  any  non-combatant,  man  or  woman,  had 
been  even  charged.  Yet  the  publication  of  such  communications  in  widely 
read  journals  was  likely  to  be  as  damaging  as  if  it  were  true.  My  nomination 
as  brigadier-general  was  then  before  the  Senate  for  confirmation,  and  "  the 
pen  "  would  probably  have  proved  "'mightier  than  the  sword  "  but  for  McClel- 
lan's  knowledge  of  the  nature  of  the  task  we  had  accomplished,  as  he  was 
then  in  the  flood-tide  of  power  at  Washington,  and  had  expressed  his  satisfac 
tion  at  the  performance  of  our  part  of  the  campaign  which  he  had  planned. 


ROSECRANS     IN     COMMAND. 

GENERAL  ROSECRANS  had  succeeded  McClellan  as  ranking  officer  in  West 
Virginia,  but  it  was  not  until  the  beginning  of  November,  1861,  that  the  region 
was  made  a  department  and  he  was  regularly  assigned  to  command.  Meanwhile 
the  three-months'  enlistments  were  expiring,  many  regiments  were  sent  home, 
new  ones  were  received,  and  a  complete  reorganization  of  his  forces  took 
place.  Besides  holding  the  railroad,  he  fortified  the  Cheat  Mountain  Pass 
looking  toward  Staunton,  and  the  pass  at  Elkwater  on  the  mountain  summit 
between  Huttonsville  and  Huntersville.  In  similar  manner  I  was  directed 
to  fortify  the  camp  at  Gauley  Bridge,  and  to  cover  the  front  in  every  direc 
tion  with  active  detachments,  constantly  moving  from  the  central  position. 


M^CLELLAN  IN  WEST  VIRGINIA. 


'43 


By  the  middle  of  August,  Rosecrans  had  established  a  chain  of  posts,  with 
a  regiment  or  two  at  each,  on  a  line  upon  which  he  afterward  marched 
from  Weston,  by  way  of  Bulltown,  Button,  and  Summersville,  to  Gauley 
Bridge. 

The  Confederates  had  also  been  straining  every  nerve  to  collect  a  force  that 
might  give  us  an  effective  return  blow,  and  Robert  E.  Lee  was  expected  to 
lead  their  forces  in  person.  After  ten  days'  quiet  occupation  of  Grauley 
Bridge,  in  which  I  had  reconnoitered  the  country  nearly  forty  miles  in  front 
and  on  each  flank,  we  learned  that  General  John  B.  Floyd  had  joined  "Wise 
with  a  brigade,  and  that  both  were  moving  toward  the  Kanawha.  At  the  same 
time  the  militia  of  Raleigh,  Mercer,  and  Fayette  counties  were  called  out, 
making  a  force  of  two  thousand  men  under  General  Chapman.  The  total  force 
confronting  us  was  thus  about  eight  thousand. ,!  To  resist  these  I  kept  2 
regiments  at  Gauley  Bridge,  an  advance-guard  of  8  companies  vigorously 
skirmishing  toward  Sewell  Mountain,  a  regiment  distributed  on  the  Kanawha 
to  cover  the  steamboat  communications,  and  some  West  Virginia  recruits 
organizing  at  the  mouth  of  the  river.  By  extreme  activity  these  were  able 
to  baffle  the  enemy  and  impose  upon  him  the  belief  that  our  numbers  were 

more    than   double    our   actual  force. 
Rosecrans   had    informed   me    of    his 
purpose  to  march  a  strong  column  to 
join  me  as  soon  as  Lee's  plans  were 
fully  developed,  and  I  accumulated  sup 
plies  and  munitions  at  Gauley  Bridge, 
determined  to  stand  a  siege  if  neces 
sary.     On  the  13th  of  August  the  7th 
Ohio,  Colonel  E.  B.  Tyler,  was  ordered 
by  Rosecrans  to  Cross  Lanes,  covering 
Carnifex  Ferry  on   the  Gauley 
River  about  twenty  miles  above 
us,  where   a   road  from  Lewis- 
burg   meets  that  going  up   the 
Gauley  to  Summersville.     I  was  author 
ized    to  call  Tyler    to   me   if  seriously 
attacked.     On    the   20th  Wise  made   a 
strong  demonstration  in  front,  but  was 
met  at  Pig  Creek,  three   miles  up  the 
On   the   26th    Floyd,  having   raised  a 
flat-boat  which  Tyler  had  sunk,  crossed  the  Gauley  at  Carnifex  Ferry  with 
2000  or  3000  men,  and  surprised  him,  routing  the  regiment  with  a  loss  to  us 
of   15  killed   and   about   100   captured,  of  which  50  were  wounded.      The 
greater  part  of  the  regiment  was  rallied  by  Major  Casement,  and  led  over  the 


GAt'LEY    BRIDGE,    LOOKING     DOWN    STREAM. 
FROM  A  PHOTOGRAPH. 

New  River,    and  easily  repulsed. 


^On  the  14th  of  August  Wise  reported  to 
General  Lee  that  he  had  2000  ready  to  move, 
and  could  have  2500  ready  in  5  days;  that  550 
of  his  cavalrv  were  with  Flovd,  besides  an  artil- 


force  3100.  At  that  time  he  gives  Floyd's  force  at 
1200,  with  2  strong  regiments  coming  up,  besides 
2000  militia  under  General  Chapman,  as  stated 
above.  The  aggregate  force  operating  on  the  Kana- 


lery   detachment   of    50.     This   makes    his   total     wha  line  he  gives  as  7800,  Sept.  9th.— J.  D.  C. 


OF  THK 

'UNIVERSITY! 


144 


M^CLELLAN  IN  WEST  VIRGINIA. 


mountains  to  Elk  River,  and  thence 
to  Charleston.  Floyd  intrenched 
his  position,  and  built  a  foot-bridge 
to  connect  it  with  the  eastern  side 
of  the  wild  gorge.  Wise's  failure  to 
cooperate  was  Floyd's  reason  for 
abandoning  his  announced  purpose 
of  inarching  upon  my  rear ;  but  he 
was  on  my  northern  line  of  commu 
nication  with  Rosecrans,  and  the 
latter  hastened  his  preparations  to 
come  to  my  relief. 

On  the  3d  of  September,  Wise  and 
Chapman  attempted  a  concerted 
attack  upon  Gauley  Bridge,  the  first 
pushing  in  upon  the  turnpike, 
while  Chapman  advanced  from 
Fayette  by  Cotton  Hill  and  a  road 
to  the  river  a  little  below  Kanawha 
Falls.  Wise  was  again  met  at  Pig 
Creek  and  driven  back;  Chapman 
reached  the  bluffs  overlooking  the 
river  in  rear  of  us,  driving  in  our 
outposts,  but  did  us  little  mischief, 
except  to  throw  a  few  shells  into  our 
lower  camp,  and  on  Wise's  repulse 
he  also  withdrew.  Our  detachments 
followed  them  up  on  both  lines  with 
daily  warm  skirmishes,  and  the 
advance-guard  ambushed  and  pun 
ished  the  enemy's  cavalry  in  a  very  demoralizing  way.  Efforts  to  reach 
the  river  and  stop  our  steamboats,  kept  the  posts  and  detachments  below  us 


NEW    RIVER    CLIFFS,    NEAR    GAULEY    BRIDGE. 
FROM    A    PHOTOGRAPH. 


MCCLELLAN  IN  WEST  VIRGINIA. 


145 


on  the  alert,  and  an  expedition  of  half  the  1st  Kentucky,  under  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  D.  A.  Enyart,  sent  to  break  up  a  Confederate  militia  encampment  at 
Boone  Court  House,  40  miles  southward,  routed  the  enemy,  who  left  25  dead 
upon  the  field.  The  march  and  attack  had  been  swift  and  vigorous,  and  the 
terror  of  the  blow  kept  that  region  quiet  for  some  time  afterward. 

1  was  puzzled  at  Floyd's  inaction  at  Carnifex  Ferry,  but  the  mystery  is 
partly  solved  by  the  publication  of  the  Confederate  records.  There  was  no 
cooperation  between  the  commanders,  and  Wise  refused  the  assistance  Floyd 
demanded,  nor  could  even  the  authority  of  Lee  reduce  the  ex-governor  of 
Virginia  to  real  subordination.  The  letters  of  Wise  show  a  capacity  for 
keeping  a  command  in  hot  water  which  was  unique.  If  he  had  been  half  as 
troublesome  to  me  as  he  was  to  Floyd,  I  should,  indeed,  have  had  a  hot  time 
of  it.  But  he  did  me  royal  service  by  preventing  anything  approaching 
unity  of  action  between  the  two  piincipal  Confederate  columns. 

Rosecrans  now  began  his  march  from  Clarksburg  with  three  brigades, 
having  left  the  Upper  Potomac  line  in  command  of  General  Kelley,  and  the 
Cheat  Mountain  region  in  command  of  General  J.  J.  Reynolds.  His  route 
(already  indicated)  was  a  rough  one,  and  the  portion  of  it  between  Button 
and  Summersville,  over  Birch  Mountain,  was  very  wild  and  difficult.  He 
left  his  bivouac  on  the  morning  of  the  10th  of  September,  before  daybreak, 
and,  marching  through  Summersville,  reached  Cross  Lanes  about  2  o'clock 
in  the  afternoon.  Floyd's  position  was  now  about  two  miles  distant,  and 

waiting  only  for  his  column  to  close 
up,  he  again  pressed  forward.  Gen 
eral  Benham's  brigade  was  in  front, 
and  soon  met  the  enemy's  pickets. 
Getting  the  impression  that  Floyd 
was  in  retreat,  Benham  pressed  for 
ward  rather  rashly,  deploying  to  the 
left,  and  coming  under  a  sharp  fire 
from  the  right  of  the  enemy's  works. 
The  woods  were  dense  and  tangled, 
it  was  too  late  for  a  proper  recon- 
noissance,  and  Rosecrans  could  only 
hasten  the  advance  and  deployment 
of  the  other  brigades  under  Colonels 
McCook  and  Scanimon.  Benham  had 
sent  a  howitzer  battery  and  two  rifled 
cannon  with  his  head  of  column  at 
the  left,  and  these  soon  got  a  position, 
from  which,  in  fact,  they  enfiladed 
part  of  Floyd's  line,  though  it  was 
impossible  to  see  much  of  the  situa 
tion.  Charges  were  made  by  portions 
of  Benham's  and  McCook's  brigades 
as  they  came  up,  but  they  lacked 


AFFAIR    AT 

CARNIFEX    FERRY 

Tke  Continuous  doullz  lines  rcrcTIiyds  m!renc7ments 

ROSECRANS'  TORCES    ARE    MARKED   THUS 

A  3*10*JZ".l01vLo    B  /2?28'!'t3',h07iio 
C    Scammons  Ttriga.de  Tnovint/  up. 
D  Sc7ineider's  battery  imposition 
E  ^Mc^fu21in's    ~ba.ttr.ry  -moving  up 


VOL.  I.     10 


146 


MCCLELLAN  IN  WEST  VIRGINIA. 


unity,  and  Rosecrans  was  dissatisfied  that  his  head  of  column  should  be 
engaged  before  he  had  time  to  plan  an  attack.  Colonel  Lowe,  of  the  12th 
Ohio,  had  been  killed  at  the  head  of  his  regiment,  and  Colonel  W.  H.  Lytle, 
of  the  10th,  had  been  severely  wounded;  darkness  was  rapidly  coming  on, 
and  Rosecrans  ordered  the  troops  withdrawn  from  fire,  till  positions  could 
be  rectified,  and  the  attack  renewed  in  the  morning.  Seventeen  had  been 
killed  and  141  had  been  wounded  in  the  sharp  but  irregular  combat.  Floyd, 
however,  had  learned  that  his  position  could  be  subjected  to  a  destructive 
cannonade;  he  was  himself  slightly  wounded,  and  his  officers  and  men 
were  discouraged.  He  therefore  retreated  across  the  Gauley  in  the  night, 
having  great  difficulty  in  carrying  his  artillery  down  the  cliffs  by  a 
wretched  road  in  the  darkness.  He  had  built  a  slight  foot-bridge  for 
infantry,  in  the  bit  of  smooth  water  known  as  the  Ferry,  though  both 
above  and  below  the  stream  is  an  impassable  mountain  torrent.  Once  over, 
the  bridge  was  broken  up  and  the  ferry-boat  was  destroyed.  He  reported 
but  twenty  casualties,  and  threw  much  of  the  responsibility  upon  Wise,  who 
had  not  obeyed  orders  to  reenforce  him.  His  hospital,  containing  the 
wounded  prisoners  taken  from  Tyler,  fell  into  Rosecrans's  hands. 

On  the  12th  of  September  we  first  heard,  at  Gauley  Bridge,  of  the  engagement 
at  Carnif  ex  Ferry,  and  I  at  once  moved  with  two  regiments  to  attack  Wise,  who 
retired  as  we  advanced,  till  I  occupied  the  junction  of  the  turnpike  with  the 
Sunday  road.  The  whole  hostile  force  had  retreated  to  Sewell  Mountain,  and 
Rosecrans  halted  me  until  he  could  create  means  of  crossing  the  Gauley. 

McCook's  brigade  joined  me  on  the  16th  of  September,  and  my  own  command 
was  increased  by  bringing  up  another  of  my  regiments  from  below.  With 


FLOYD'S    COMMAND    RECROSSING    THE    GAULEY    RIVER    AFTER    THE    FIGHT    OF    SEPTEMBER    10TH, 
AT    CARNIFEX    FERRY.      AFTER    A    SKETCH    MADE    AT    THE   TIME. 


MCCLELLAN  IN  WEST  VIRGINIA. 


147 


the  two  brigades  I 
advanced  to  Spy 
Eock,  a  strong  posi 
tion  overlooking  a 
valley  several  miles 
broad,  beyond  which 
was  Big  Sewell 
Mountain,  the  crest 
of  which  we  occu 
pied  with  an  ad 
vance-guard  on  the 
20th  and  in  force  on 
the  24th.  Before  the 
1st  of  October  Rose- 
crans  had  concentra 
ted  his  force  at  the 
mountain,  the  four 
brigades  being  so 
reduced  by  sickness 
and  by  detachments 
that  he  reported  the 
whole  as  making 
only  5200  effective 
men.  Immediately 
in  front,  across  a 
deep  gorge,  lay  the 
united  forces  of 
Floyd  and  Wise, 
commanded  by  Lee 
in  person.  The  autumn  rains  set  in  upon  the  very  day  of  Rosecrans's  arrival, 
and  continued  without  intermission.  The  roads  became  so  difficult  that  the 
animals  of  the  wagon  trains  were  being  destroyed  in  the  effort  to  supply  the 
command.  The  camp  was  35  miles  from  Gauley  Bridge,  and  our  stores  were 
landed  from  steamboats  25  miles  below  that  post,  making  60  miles  of  wagoning. 
The  enemy  was  as  badly  off,  and  no  aggressive  operations  were  possible  on 
either  side.  This  became  so  evident  that  on  the  5th  of  October  Rosecrans 
withdrew  his  forces  to  camps  within  3  or  4  miles  of  Gauley  Bridge. 

Lee  had  directed  an  effort  to  be  made  by  General  Loring,  his  subordinate 
on  the  Staunton  line,  to  test  the  strength  of  the  posts  under  Reynolds  at 
Cheat  Mountain  and  Elkwater,  and  lively  combats  had  resulted  on  the  12th 
and  14th  of  September.  Reynolds  held  firm,  and  Rosecrans  had  not  been 
diverted  from  his  own  plans.  On  October  2d  Reynolds  delivered  a  return 
blow  upon  the  Confederate  position  at  Greenbrier  River,  but  found  it  too 
strong  to  be  carried.  Both  parties  now  remained  in  observation  till  the  end 
of  October.  Floyd  reported  to  his  Government  that  the  eleven  days  of  cold 
storms  at  Sewell  Mountain  had  "  cost  more  men,  sick  and  dead,  than  the 


A.  DETACHMENT  FROM  GENERAL  FLOYD'S  COMMAND  PREPARING  TO  SHELL  GENERAL, 
ROSECRANS'S  CAMP  AT  GACLEY  BRIDGE.      FROM  A  SKETCH   MADE    AT  THE  TIME. 


148 


MCCLELLAN  IN  WEST  VIRGINIA. 


battle  of  Manassas  Plains."  More  enterprising  in  plans  than  resolnte  or 
skillful  in  carrying  them  out,  he  determined  upon  another  effort,  with  Lee's 
consent.  Taking  advantage  of  Rosecraiis's  neglect  to  occupy  Fayette  Court 
House  and  Cotton  Hill,  a  mountainous  mass  in  the  angle  of  the  Kanawha 
and  New  rivers,  he  moved  with  a  column  of  about  five  thousand  men  across 
New  River  and  down  its  left  bank,  and  startled  the  Union  commander  by 
opening  with  cannon  upon  the  post  at  Gauley  Bridge  011  the  1st  of  Novem 
ber.  The  demonstration  was  more  noisy  than  dangerous,  for  Floyd  had  no 
means  of  crossing  the  river.  The  ordnance  stores  at  the  post  were  moved 
into  a  gorge  out  of  the  range  of  fire,  and  a  battery  was  established  high  up 
on  Gauley  Mount  to  reply  to  the  enemy.  Rosecraiis  had  hopes  of  capturing 
Floyd,  by  turning  his  position  from  below  by  Benham's  and  Robert  C. 
Schenck's  (formerly  Scamm  oil's)  brigades.  Delays  occurred  which  Rosecraiis 
attributed  to  failure  to  obey  orders  on  the  part  of  Benham.  On  the  10th 
detachments  from  my  brigade  at  Gauley  Bridge  crossed  the  river  and  scaled 
the  heights,  attacking  Floyd  in  front  and  securing  a  position  on  the  top  of 
the  mountain.  Floyd  withdrew  his  artillery,  and  on  the  12th,  learning  that 
Schenck  and  Benham  were  moving  toward  his  rear,  decamped,  and  did  not 
cease  his  retreat  till  he  reached  the  Holston  Valley  railroad. 

Lee  returned  to  Richmond,  and  portions  of  the  troops  on  both  sides  were 
sent  to  other  fields,  where  military  operations  in  winter  were  thought  to  be  more 
practicable.  The  remnant  went  into  winter  quarters,  and  though  some  com 
bats  occurred,  the  most  noteworthy  of  which  was  Milroy's  attack  upon  the 
Confederates  in  front  of  Cheat  Mountain  Pass  in  December,  these  engage 
ments  did  not  change  the  situation.  West  Virginia  had  organized  as  a  free 
State  within  the  Union,  and  this  substantial  result  of  the  campaign  crowned 
it  with  success.  The  line  of  the  Alleghanies  became  the  northern  frontier 
of  the  Confederacy  in  Virginia,  and  was  never  again  seriously  broken. 


VIEW    OF    ROMNEY,   VA.       FROM    A    SKETCH. 

On  October  26th,  1861,  Brigadier-General  B.  F.  Kelley,  gagement,  the  Confederates  were  driven  from  their  in- 

with  a  small  foree  of  infantry  and  cavalry,  advanced  trenchments  and  the  town  was  captured.     The  Union 

upon  Roinney  from  New  Creek  Station,  26  miles  distant,  forces  lost  1  killed  and  20  wounded.    In  the  sketch  are 

on  the  Potomac  (see  map,  page  129).    After  a  sharp  en-  shown  the  camps  of  General  Kelley's  troops. 


Sp0fftf<flte^% 

-*—  /  si 


//  X 


.^ 


GOING  TO   THE    FRONT. 

RECOLLECTIONS   OF  A   PRIVATE— I.     BY  WARREN"   LEE   GO8S. 

BEFORE  I  reached  the  point  of  enlisting,  I  had  read  and  been  "  enthused  " 
by  General  Dix's  famous  "  shoot  him  on  the  spot "  dispatch ;  I  had 
attended  flag-raisings,  and  had  heard  orators  declaim  of  "  undying  devotion  to 
the  Union."  One  speaker  to  whom  I  listened  declared  that  "  human  life  must 
be  cheapened  " ;  but  I  never  learned  that  he  helped  on  the  work  experiment 
ally.  When  men  by  the  hundred  walked  soberly  to  the  front  and  signed  the 
enlistment  papers,  he  was  not  one  of  them.  As  I  came  out  of  the  hall,  with 
conflicting  emotions,  feeling  as  though  I  should  have  to  go  finally  or  forfeit 
my  birthright  as  an  American  citizen,  one  of  the  orators  who  stood  at  the 
door,  glowing  with  enthusiasm  and  patriotism,  and  shaking  hands  effusively 
with  those  who  enlisted,  said  to  me  : 

" Did  you  enlist  ?"     "No,"  I  said.    "Did  you?" 

u  Xo  ;  they  won't  take  me.  I  have  got  a  lame  leg  and  a  widowed  mother 
to  take  care  of." 

I  remember  another  enthusiast  who  was  eager  to  enlist  others.  He 
declared  that  the  family  of  no  man  who  went  to  the  front  should  suffer.  After 


•£  January  18th,  1801,  three  days  after  he  had 
entered  on  his  duties  as  Secretary  of  the  Treasury 
to  President  Buchanan.  General  Dix  sent  W. 
Hemphill  Jones,  chief  clerk  of  one  of  the  Treasury 
bureaus,  to  the  South,  for  the  purpose  of  saving 
the  revenue-cutters  at  New  Orleans,  Mobile,  and 
Galveston.  January  29th.  Mr.  Jones  telegraphed 
from  New  Orleans  that  the  captain  of  the  revenue- 
cutter  McClelland  refused  to  obey  the  Secretary's 
orders.  It  was  seven  in  the  evening  when  the 
dispatch  was  received.  Immediately,  Secretary 


Dix  wrote  the  following  reply:  "Treasury  De 
partment,  January  29,  1801.  Tell  Lieutenant 
Caldwell  to  arrest  Captain  Breshwood,  assume 
command  of  the  cutter,  and  obey  the  order  I  gave 
through  you.  If  Captain  Breshwood,  after  arrest, 
undertakes  to  interfere  with  the  command  of  the 
cutter,  tell  Lieutenant  Caldwell  to  consider  him  as 
a  mutineer,  and  treat  him  accordingly.  If  any  one 
attempts  to  haul  down  the  American  flag,  shoot 
him  on  the  spot.  JOHN  A.  Dix,  Secretary  of  the 
Treasury."  —  EDITORS. 


GOING    TO   THE  FRONT. 


.VKKIVAL    OF  THE    SEVENTH    SEW    YORK   AT   ANNAPOLIS,    APRIL    20,     1861,    ON    THE    WAY    TO    WASHINGTON. 

FROM   A  SKETCH    MADE    AT    THE    TIME. 

the  war  he  was  prominent  among  those  who  at  town-meeting  voted  to  refund 
the  money  to  such  as  had  expended  it  to  procure  substitutes.  He  has,  moreover, 
been  fierce  and  uncompromising  toward  the  ex-Confederates  since  the  war. 

From  the  first  I  did  not  believe  the  trouble  would  blow  over  in  "  sixty 
days";  J  nor  did  I  consider  eleven  dollars  a  month, $  and  the  promised  glory, 
large  pay  for  the  services  of  an  able-bodied  young  man. 

It  was  the  news  that  the  6th  Massachusetts  regiment  had  been  mobbed  by 
roughs  on  their  passage  through  Baltimore  which  gave  me  the  war  fever.  | 


)  Mr.  Seward,  speaking  in  New  York  two  days 
after  the  secession  of  South  Carolina,  said  :  "  Sixty 
days'  more  suns  will  give  you  a  much  brighter  and 
more  cheerful  atmosphere." 

&  The  monthly  pay  of  Union  privates  was : 
cavalry  $12,  artillery  and  infantry  $11;  from 
August  6th,  1861,  $13  for  all  arms,  and  from 
May  1st,  1864,  $16.  Confederate  privates  re 
ceived:  in  the  cavalry  and  light  batteries  $12  ;  in 
the  artillery  and  infantry  $11  ;  increased  June 
9th,  1864,  to  $19  and  $18  per  month  for  a 
period  of  one  year  from  that  date. — EDITORS. 

4  Concerning  this  encounter  Colonel  Edward  F. 
Jones,  of  the  6th  Massachusetts,  says  in  his  report : 

"After  leaving  Philadelphia  I  received  intimation 
that  our  passage  through  the  city  of  Baltimore  would 
be  resisted.  I  caused  ammunition  to  be  distributed 
and  arms  loaded,  and  went  personally  through  the 
cars,  and  issued  the  following  order,  viz.,  'The  regi 
ment  will  march  through  Baltimore  in  column  of  sec 
tions,  arms  at  will.  You  will  undoubtedly  be  insulted, 
abused,  and  perhaps  assaulted,  to  which  you  must  pay 
no  attention  whatever,  but  march  with  your  faces 
square  to  the  front  and  pay  no  attention  to  the  mob, 
even  if  they  throw  stones,  bricks,  or  other  missiles; 
but  if  you  are  fired  upon  and  any  one  of  you  is  hit,  your 
officers  will  order  you  to  fire.  Do  not  fire  into  any  pro 
miscuous  crowds,  but  select  any  man  whom  you  may 
see  aiming  at  you,  and  be  sure  you  drop  him.'  Reach 
ing  Baltimore,  horses  were  attached  the  instant  that 
the  locomotive  was  detached,  and  the  cars  were  driven 
at  a  rapid  pace  across  the  city.  After  the  cars  con 
taining  seven  companies  had  reached  the  Washington 
depot  the  track  behind  them  was  barricaded,  and  the 
cars  containing  .  .  .  the  following  companies,  viz., 
Company  C,  of  Lowell,  Captain  Follausbee;  Company 


D,  of  Lowell,  Captain  Hart ;  Company  I,  :>f  Lawrence, 
Captain  Pickering,  and  Company  L,  of  Stoneham,  Cap 
tain  Dike,  were  vacated,  and  they  proceeded  but  a  short 
distance  before  they  were  furiously  attacked  by  a  shower 
of  missiles,  which  came  faster  as  they  advanced.  They 
increased  their  steps  to  double-quick,  which  seemed  to 
infuriate  the  mob,  as  it  evidently  impressed  the  mob 
with  the  idea  that  the  soldiers  dared  not  tire  or  had  no 
ammunition,  and  pistol-shots  were  numerously  fired 
into  the  ranks,  and  one  soldier  fell  dead.  The  order 
'  Fire '  was  given,  and  it  was  executed.  In  conse 
quence,  several  of  the  mob  fell,  and  the  soldiers  again 
advanced  hastily.  The  mayor  of  Baltimore  placed  him 
self  at  the  head  of  the  column  beside  Captain  Follaus 
bee,  and  proceeded  with  them  a  short  distance."  .  .  . 

The  Hon.  George  William  Brown,  then  mayor  of 
Baltimore,  in  his  volume  entitled  "Baltimore  and 
the  19th  of  April,  1861,"  thus  describes  the  march 
of  the  soldiers  after  he  joined  the  column  : 

"  They  were  firing  wildly,  sometimes  backward,  over 
their  shoulders.  So  rapid  was  the  march  that  they 
could  not  stop  to  take  aim.  The  mob,  which  was  not 
very  large,  as  it  seemed  to  me,  was  pursuing  with 
shouts  and  stones,  and,  I  think,  an  occasional  pistol- 
shot.  The  uproar  was  furious.  I  ran  at  once  to  the 
head  of  the  column,  some  persons  in  the  crowd  shout 
ing,  '  Here  comes  the  mayor.'  I  shook  hands  with  the 
officer  in  command,  Captain  Follausbee,  saying,  as  I  did 
so,  'I  am  the  mayor  of  Baltimore.'  The  captain  greeted 
me  cordially.  I  at  once  objected  to  the  double-quick, 
which  was  immediately  stopped.  I  placed  myself  by  his 
side,  and  marched  with  him.  He  said,  •  AVe  have  been 
attacked  without  provocation, 'or  words  to  that  ett'ect.  I 
replied,  '  You  must  defend  yourselves.'  I  expected  that 
he  would  face  his  men  to  the  rear,  and,  after  giving 
warning,  would  fire  if  necessary.  But  I  said  no  more, 
for  I  immediately  felt  that,  as  mayor  of  the  city,  it  was 


GOING   TO   THE  FRONT. 


And  yet  when  I  read  Governor  John  A.  Andrew's  instructions  to  have 
the  hero  martyrs  "preserved  in  ice  and  tenderly  sent  forward,"  somehow, 
though  I  felt  the  pathos  of  it,  I  could  not  reconcile  myself  to  the  ice. 
Ice  in  connection  with  patriotism  did  not  give  me  agreeable  impressions 
of  war,  and  when  I  came  to  think  of  it,  the  stoning  of  the  heroic  "  Sixth  " 
didn't  suit  me;  it  detracted  from  my  desire  to  die  a 
soldier's  death. 

I  lay  awake  all  night  thinking  the  matter  over,  with 
the  "  ice "  and  "  brick-bats "  before  my  mind.  How 
ever,  the  fever  culminated  that  night,  and  I  resolved 
to  enlist. 

"  Cold  chills  "  ran  up  and  down  my  back  as  I  got  out  of 
bed  after  the  sleepless  night,  and  shaved,  preparatory  to 
other  desperate  deeds  of  valor.  I  was  twenty  years  of 
age,  and  when  anything  unusual  was  to  be  done,  like 
fighting  or  courting,  I  shaved. 

AVith  a  nervous  tremor  convulsing  my  system,  and 
my  heart  thumping  like  muffled  drum-beats,  I  stood 
before  the  door  of  the  recruiting-office,  and,  before  turn 
ing  the  knob  to  enter,  read  and  re-read  the  advertisement 
for  recruits  posted  thereon,  until  I  knew  all  its  pecu 
liarities.  The  promised  chances  for  "  travel  and  promo- 


*XIFORM  OF  THE  SIXTH 

MASSACHUSETTS. 

FROM  A  PHOTOGRAPH. 


not  my  province  to  volunteer  such  advice.  Once  beforc- 
iu  my  life  1  bad  taken  part  in  opposing  a  formidable 
riot,  and  had  learned  by  experience  tbat  the  safest  and 
most  humane  manner  of  quelling  a  mob  is  to  meet  it  at 
the  beginning  with  armed  resistance.  The  column  con 
tinued  its  march.  There  was  neither  concert  of  action 
nor  organization  among  the  rioters.  They  were  armed 
only  with  such  stones  or  missiles  as  they  could  pick  up, 
and  a  few  pistols.  My  presence  for  a  short  time  had 
some  effect,  but  very  soon  the  attack  was  renewed  with 
greater  violence.  The  mob  grew  bolder.  Stones  flew 
thick  and  fast.  Rioters  rushed  at  the  soldiers  and  at 
tempted  to  snatch  their  muskets,  and  at  least  on  two 
occasions  succeeded.  With  one  of  these  muskets  a  sol 
dier  was  killed.  Men  fell  on  both  sides.  A  young  law 
yer,  then  and  now  known  as  a  quiet  citizen,  seized  a 
flag  of  one  of  the  companies  and  nearly  tore  it  from  its 
staff.  He  was  shot  through  the  thigh,  and  was  carried 
home  apparently  a  dying  man,  but  he  survived  to  enter 
the  army  of  the  Confederacy, where  he  rose  to  the  rank  of 
captain,  and  he  afterward  returned  to  Baltimore,  where 
he  still  lives.  The  soldiers  fired  at  will.  There  was  no 
firing  by  platoons,  and  I  heard  no  order  given  to  fire. 
I  remember  that  at  the  corner  of  South  street  several 
citizens  standing  in  a  group  fell,  either  killed  or 
wounded.  It  was  impossible  for  the  troops  to  discrimi 
nate  between  the  rioters  and  the  by-stauders,  but  the 
latter  seemed  to  suffer  most.  .  .  .  Marshal  Kane, 
with  about  fifty  policemen  (as  I  then  supposed,  but  I 
have  since  ascertained  that,  in  fact,  there  were  not  so 
many),  came  at  a  run  from  the  direction  of  the  Camden 
street  station,  and  throwing  themselves  in  the  rear  of 
the  troops,  they  formed  a  line  in  front  of  the  mob,  and 
with  drawn  revolvers  kept  it  back.  This  was  between 
Light  and  Charles  streets.  Marshal  Kane's  voice 
shouted,  '  Keep  back,  men,  or  I  shoot ! '  This  movement, 
which  I  saw  myself,  was  gallantly  executed,  and  was 
perfectly  successful.  The  mob  recoiled  like  water  from 
a  rock.  One  of  the  leading  rioters,  then  a  young  man, 
now  a  peaceful  merchant,  tried,  as  he  has  himself  told 
me,  to  pass  the  line,  but  the  marshal  seized  him,  and 


vowed  he  would  shoot  if  the  attempt  was  made.  This 
nearly  ended  the  fight,  and  the  column  passed  on  under 
the  protection  of  the  police,  without  serious  molesta 
tion,  to  Camden  station  " 

Sumner  H.  Xeedham,  of  Lawrence,  Acldison  O. 
Whitney  and  Luther  C.  Ladd,  of  Lowell,  and 
Charles  A.  Taylor  were  the  killed,  and  thirty-six 
of  their  comrades  were  wounded.  Twelve  citi 
zens  were  killed,  and  an  unknown  number  were 
wounded.  Col.  Jones  continues  : 

"As  the  men  went  into  the  cars  I  caused  the  blinds  to 
the  cars  to  be  closed,  and  took  every  precaution  to  pre 
vent  any  shadow  of  offense  to  the  people  of  Baltimore  ; 
but  still  the  stones  flew  thick  and  fast  into  the  train, 
and  it  was  with  the  utmost  difficulty  that  I  could  pre 
vent  the  troops  from  leaving  the  cars  and  revenging 
the  death  of  their  comrades.  ...  On  reaching 
Washington  we  were  quartered  at  the  Capitol,  in  the 
Senate  Chamber." 

This  regiment,  the  Gth  Massachusetts,  were  the 
first  armed  troops  to  reach  Washington  in  re 
sponse  to  the  call  of  the  President. 

The  27th  Pennsylvania  Regiment  (unarmed) 
arrived  at  Baltimore  by  the  same  train  as  the 
Massachusetts  troops.  It  was  attacked  by  a  mob 
and  obliged  to  remain  at  the  President  street 
station,  from  which  point  it  was  sent  back  the 
same  day  in  the  direction  of  Philadelphia.  The 
same  night,  by  order  of  the  Board  of  Police  Com 
missioners,  with  the  concurrence  of  Governor 
Hicks  and  Mayor  Brown,  the  railways  from  the 
north  were  obstructed,  so  that  the  8th  Massa 
chusetts,  with  General  B.  F.  Butler,  and  the  7th 
Xew  York  were  compelled  to  go  to  Annapolis  by 
water  and  march  thence  to  Washington. — EDITORS. 


152 


GOING   TO   THE  FRONT. 


tion"  seemed  good,  and  I  thought  I  might  have  made  a  mistake  in  con 
sidering  war  so  serious  after  all.  "  Chances  for  travel ! "  I  must  confess 
now,  after  four  years  of  soldiering,  that  the  "chances  for  travel"  were  no 
myth ;  but  "  promotion  "  was  a  little  un 
certain  and  slow. 

I  was  in  no  hurry  to  open  the  door. 
Though  determined  to  enlist,  I  was  half 
inclined  to  put  it  off  awhile ;  I  had  a  fluc 
tuation  of  desires;  I  was  faint-hearted 
and  brave;  I  wanted  to  enlist,  and  yet 

Here  I  turned  the  knob,  and  was 

relieved.  I  had  been  more  prompt,  with 
all  my  hesitation,  than  the  officer  in  his 
duty ;  he  wasn't  in.  Finally  he  came,  and 
said:  "What  do  you  want,  my  boy ?"  "I 
want  to  enlist,"  I  responded,  blushing 
deeply  with  upwelling  patriotism  and 
bashfulness.  Then  the  surgeon  came  to 
strip  and  examine  me.  In  justice  to  my 
self,  it  must  be  stated  that  I  signed  the 
rolls  without  a  tremor.  It  is  common  to 
the  most  of  humanity,  I  believe,  that, 
when  confronted  with  actual  danger,  men 
have  less  fear  than  in  its  contemplation. 
I  will,  however,  make  one  exception  in 
favor  of  the  first  shell  I  heard  uttering  its 
blood-curdling  hisses,  as  though  a  steam 
locomotive  were  traveling  the  air.  With 
this  exception  I  have  found  the  actual 
dangers  of  war  always  less  terrible  face  to 
face  than  on  the  night  before  the  battle. 

My  first  uniform  was  a  bad  fit:  my  trousers  were  too  long  by  three 
or  four  inches;  the  flannel  shirt  was  coarse  and  unpleasant,  too  large 
at  the  neck  and  too  short  elsewhere.  The  forage  cap  was  an  un 
gainly  bag  with  pasteboard  top  and  leather  visor;  the  blouse  was 
the  only  part  which  seemed  decent ;  while  the  overcoat  made  me  feel 
like  a  little  nubbin  of  corn  in  a  large  preponderance  of  husk.  Nothing 
except  "Virginia  mud"  ever  took  down  my  ideas  of  military  pomp  quite 
so  low. 

After  enlisting  I  did  not  seem  of  so  much  consequence  as  I  had  expected. 
There  was  not  so  much  excitement  on  account  of  my  military  appearance  as 
I  deemed  justly  my  due.  I  was  taught  my  facings,  and  at  the  time  I  thought 
the  drill-master  needlessly  fussy  about  shouldering,  ordering,  and  presenting 
arms.  At  this  time  men  were  often  drilled  in  company  and  regimental 
evolutions  long  before  they  learned  the  manual  of  arms,  because  of  the  diffi 
culty  of  obtaining  muskets.  These  we  obtained  at  an  early  day,  but  we 


•  AND    THE    CORPORAL    DID  !  " 


GOING   TO    THE  FRONT. 


would  willingly  have  resigned  them  after  carrying  them  for  a  few  hours. 
The  musket,  after  an  hour's  drill,  seemed  heavier  and  less  ornamental 
than  it  had  looked  to  be.  The  first  day  I  went  out  to  drill,  getting  tired  of 
doing  the  same  things  over  and  over,  I  said  to  the  drill-sergeant :  "  Let's  stop 
this  fooling  and  go  over  to  the  grocery."  His  only  reply  was  addressed  to  a 
corporal :  "  Corporal,  take  this  man  out  and  drill  him  like  h — 1 " ;  and  the  cor 
poral  did  !  I  found  that  suggestions  were  not  so  well  appreciated  in  the  army 
as  in  private  life,  and  that  no  wisdom  was  equal  to  a  drill-master's  "  Right 
face,"  "  Left  wheel,"  and  "Right,  oblique,  march."  It  takes  a  raw  recruit 
some  time  to  learn  that  he  is  not  to  think  or  suggest,  but  obey.  Some 
never  do  learn.  I  acquired  it  at  last,  in  humility  and  mud,  but  it  was  tough. 
Yet  I  doubt  if  my  patriotism,  during  my  first  three  weeks'  drill,  was  quite 
knee-high.  Drilling  looks  easy  to  a  spectator,  but  it  isn't.  Old  soldiers  who 
read  this  will  remember  their  green  recruithood  and  smile  assent.  After  a 
time  I  had  cut  down  my  uniform  so  that  I  could  see  out  of  it,  and  had  con 
quered  the  drill  sufficiently  to  see  through  it.  Then  the  word  came:  On 
to  "Washington ! 

Our  company  was  quartered  at  a  large  hotel  near  the  railway  station  in 
the  town  in  which  it  had  been  recruited.  Bunks  had  been  fitted  up  within  a 
part  of  the  hotel  but  little  used.  We  took 
our  meals  at  the  public  table,  and  found 
fault  with  the  style.  Six  months  later  we 
would  have  considered  ourselves  aristo 
cratic  to  have  slept  in  the  hotel  stables 
with  the  meal-bin  for  a  dining-table.  One 
morning  there  was  great  excitement  at  the 
report  that  we  were  going  to  be  sent  to 
the  front.  Most  of  us  obtained  a  limited 
pass  and  went  to  see  our  friends  for  the 
last  time,  returning  the  same  night. 
Many  of  our  schoolmates  came  in  tears 
to  say  good-bye.  We  took  leave  of 
them  all  with  heavy  hearts,  for,  lightly 
as  I  may  here  seem  to  treat  the  sub 
ject,  it  was  no  light  thing  for  a  boy 
of  twenty  to  start  out  for  three  years 
*into  the  unknown  dangers  of  a  civil  war. 
Our  mothers  —  God  bless  them  !  —  had 
brought  us  something  good  to  eat, — pies, 
cakes,  doughnuts,  and  jellies.  It  was 
one  way  in  which  a  mother's  heart 
found  utterance.  The  young  ladies 
(sisters,  of  course)  brought  an  invention,  usually  made  of  leather  or  cloth, 
containing  needles,  pins,  thread,  buttons,  and  scissors,  so  that  nearly  every 
recruit  had  an  embryo  tailor's  shop,  with  the  goose  outside.  One  old  lady, 
in  the  innocence  of  her  heart,  brought  her  son  an  umbrella.  We  did  not  see 


A    MOTHER'S   PARTING    GIFT. 


IS4 


GOING   TO   THE  FRONT. 


anything  particularly  laughable  about  it  at  the  time,  but  our  old  drill-sergeant 
did.  Finally  we  were  ready  to  move ;  our  tears  were  wiped  away,  our  buttons 
were  polished,  and  our  muskets  were  as  bright  as  emery  paper  could  make  them. 
"  Wad  "  Rider,  a  member  of  our  company,  had  come  from  a  neighboring 
State  to  enlist  with  us.  He  was  about  eighteen  years  of  age,  red-headed, 
freckled-faced,  good-natured  and  rough,  with  a  wonderful  aptitude  for  crying 
or  laughing  from  sympathy.  Another  comrade,  whom  I  will  call  Jack,  was 
honored  with  a  call  from  his  mother,  a  little  woman,  hardly  reaching  up  to 
his  shoulder,  with  a  sweet,  motherly,  care-worn  face.  At  the  last  moment, 
though  she  had  tried  hard  to  preserve  her  composure,  as  is  the  habit  of  New 
England  people,  she  threw  her  arms  around  her  boy's  neck,  and  with  an 
outburst  of  sobbing  and  crying,  said :  "  My  dear  boy,  my  dear  boy,  what  will 

your  poor  old  mother  do  without  you  I 
You  are  going  to  fight  for  your  country. 
Don't  forget  your  mother,  Jack ;  God 
bless  you,  God  bless  you ! "  We  felt  as  if 
the  mother's  tears  and  blessing  were  a 
benediction  over  us  all.  There  was  a  touch 
of  nature  in  her  homely  sorrow  and  solici 
tude  over  her  big  boy,  which  drew  tears 
of  sympathy  from  my  eyes  as  I  thought 
of  my  own  sorrowing  mother  at  home. 
The  sympathetic  Wad  Rider  burst  into 
tears  and  sobs.  His  eyes  refused,  as  he 
expressed  it,  to  "  dry  up,"  until,  as  we  were 
moving  off,  Jack's  mother,  rushing  toward 
him  with  a  bundle  tied  like  a  wheat-sheaf, 
called  out  in  a  most  pathetic  voice, 
"  Jack !  Jack !  you've  forgotten  to  take 
your  pennyroyal."  We  all -laughed,  and 
so  did  Jack,  and  I  think  the  laugh  helped 
him  more  than  the  cry  did.  Everybody 
had  said  his  last  word,  and  the  cars  were 
off.  Handkerchiefs  were  waved  at  us 
from  all  the  houses  we  passed;  we 
cheered  till  we  were  hoarse,  and  then  set 
tled  back  and  swung  our  handkerchiefs. 

Just  here  let  me  name  over  the  con 
tents  of  my  knapsack,  as  a  fair  sample  of 
what  all  the  volunteers  started  with.  There 
were  in  it  a  pair  of  trousers,  two  pairs  of 
drawers,  a  pair  of  thick  boots,  four  pairs 
of  stockings,  four  flannel  shirts,  a  blouse, 
a  looking-glass,  a  can  of  peaches,  a  bottle 
of  cough-mixture,  a  button-stick,  chalk, 
razor  and  strop,  the  "  tailor's  shop " 


A    MILITIA    VNIFORM    OF    '61. —AFTER    THE    NEW 

YORK    SEVENTH'S    MEMORIAL    STATUE    1N 

THE   CENTRAL  1'ARK. 


GOING    TO    THE  FRONT. 


THE    NEW    YORK    SEVENTH    MARCHING    DOWN    BROADWAY,    APRIL    19,   1861. 

spoken  of  above,  a  Bible,  a  small  volume,  of  Shakspere,  and  writing  utensils. 
To  its  top  was  strapped  a  double  woolen  blanket  and  a  rubber  one.  Many  other 
things  were  left  behind  because  of  lack  of  room  in  or  about  the  knapsack.  J) 

On  our  arrival  in  Boston  we  were  marched  through  the  streets  —  the  first 
march  of  any  consequence  we  had  taken  with  our  knapsacks  and  equipments. 
Our  dress  consisted  of  a  belt  about  the  body,  which  held  a  cartridge-box 
and  bayonet,  a  cross-belt,  also  a  haversack  and  tin  drinking-cup,  a  canteen, 
and,  last  but  not  least,  the  knapsack  strapped  to  the  back.  The  straps  ran 
over,  around,  and  about  one,  in  confusion  most  perplexing  to  our  unsophisti 
cated  shoulders,  the  knapsack  constantly  giving  the  wearer  the  feeling  that  he 
was  being  pulled  over  backward.  My  canteen  banged  against  my  bayonet, 
both  tin  cup  and  bayonet  badly  interfered  with  the  butt  of  my  musket,  while 
my  cartridge-box  and  haversack  were  constantly  flopping  up  and  down— the 
whole  jangling  like  loose  harness  and  chains  on  a  runaway  horse.  As  we 
marched  into  Boston  Common,  I  involuntarily  cast  my  eye  about  for  a  bench. 
But  for  a  former  experience  in  offering  advice,  I  should  have  proposed  to  the 
captain  to  "  chip  in  "  and  hire  a  team  to  carry  our  equipments.  Such  was  my 
first  experience  in  war  harness.  Afterward,  with  hardened  muscles,  rendered 
athletic  by  long  marches  and  invigorated  by  hardships,  I  could  look  back 
upon  those  days  and  smile,  while  carrying  a  knapsack  as  lightly  as  my  heart. 
That  morning  my  heart  was  as  heavy  as  my  knapsack.  At  last  the  welcome 

j>  It  is  said  by  one  of  the  '•  Monticello  Guards,"  that  most  of  its  members  started  for  Bull  Run  with  a 
trunk  and  an  abundant  supply  of  fine  linen  shirts. — EDITORS. 


GOING   TO   THE  FRONT. 


FEDERAL  HILL,  BALTIMORE.   FROM  A  SKETCH  MADE  OX  THE  DAY  OF  THE  OCCUPATION  BY  GENERAL  BUTLEH. 


On  the  27th  of  April,  1861,  General  B.  F.  Butler  was 
assigned  to  the  command  of  the.  Department  of  Anna 
polis,  which  did  not  include  Baltimore.  On  the  5th  of 
May,  with  two  regiments  and  a  battery  of  artillery,  he 
moved  from  Washington  to  the  Relay  House,  on  the 
Baltimore  and  Ohio  Railway,  7  miles  from  Baltimore,  at 
the  junction  of  the  Washington  branch.  He  fortified 
this  position,  and  on  the  13th  entered  Baltimore  and 


occupied  and  fortified  Federal  Hill,  overlooking  the 
harbor  and  commanding  the  city.  On  the  15th  he  was 
followed  in  command  of  the  Department  by  General 
George  Cadwalader,  who  was  succeeded  on  the  llth  of 
June  by  General  N.  P.  Banks,  who  administered  the 
Department  until  succeeded  by  General  John  A.  Dix, 
July  23d,  1861.  On  the  22d  of  May  General  Butler 
assumed  command  at  Fort  Monroe,  Va. 


orders  came :  "  Prepare  to  open  ranks  !  Rear,  open  order,  maivli !  Right 
dress !  Front !  Order  arms  !  Fix  bayonets !  Stack  arms  !  Unsling  knapsacks ! 
In  place,  rest ! " 

The  tendency  of  raw  soldiers  at  first  is  to  overload  themselves.  On  the  first 
long  march  the  reaction  sets  in,  and  the  recruit  goes  to  the  opposite  extreme, 
not  carrying  enough,  and  thereby  becoming  dependent  upon  his  comrades. 
Old  soldiers  preserve  a  happy  medium.  I  have  seen  a  new  regiment  start  out 
with  a  lot  of  indescribable  material,  including  sheet-iron  stoves,  and  come  back 
after  a  long  march  covered  with  more  mud  than  baggage,  stripped  of  every 
thing  except  blankets,  haversacks,  canteens,  muskets,  and  cartridge-boxes. 

During  that  afternoon  in  Boston,  after  marching  and  countermarching,  or, 
as  one  of  our  farmer-boy  recruits  expressed  it,  after  "hawing  and  geeing" 
about  the  streets,  we  were  sent  to  Fort  Independence  for  the  night  for  safe 
keeping.  A  company  of  regulars  held  the  fort,  and  the  guards  walked  their 
post  with  an  uprightness  that  was  astonishing.  Our  first  impression  of  them 
was  that  there  was  a  needless  amount  of  "  wheel  about  and  turn  about,  and 
walk  just  so,"  and  of  saluting,  and  presenting  arms.  We  were  all  marched  to 


GOING   TO   THE  FRONT.  157 

our  quarters  within  the  fort,  where  we  unslung  our  knapsacks.  After  the 
first  day's  struggle  with  a  knapsack,  the  general  verdict  was,  "  got  too  much 
of  it."  At  supper-time  we  were  marched  to  the  dining-barracks,  where  our 
bill  of  fare  was  beefsteak,  coffee,  wheat  bread,  and  potatoes,  but  not  a  sign 
of  milk  or  butter.  It  struck  me  as  queer  when  I  heard  that  the  army  was 
never  provided  with  butter  and  milk. 

The  next  day  we  started  for  Washington,  by  rail.  We  marched  through  New 
York's  crowded  streets  without  awakening  the  enthusiasm  we  thought  our 
due ;  for  we  had  read  of  the  exciting  scenes  attending  the  departure  of  the 
New  York  7th  for  Washington,  on  the  day  the  6th  Massachusetts  was 
mobbed  in  Baltimore,  and  also  of  the  march  of  the  12th  Massachusetts  down 
Broadway  on  the  24th  of  July,  when  the  regiment  sang  the  then  new  and 
always  thrilling  lyric,  "John  Brown's  Body."  The  following  morning  we 
took  breakfast  in  Philadelphia,  where  we  were  attended  by  matrons  and 
maidens,  who  waited  upon  us  with  thoughtful  tenderness,  as  if  they  had  been 
our  own  mothers  and  sweethearts  instead  of  strangers.  They  feasted  us  and 
then  filled  our  haversacks.  God  bless  them !  If  we  did  not  quite  appreciate 
them  then,  we  did  afterward.  After  embarking  on  the  cars  at  Philadelphia, 
the  waving  of  handkerchiefs  was  less  and  less  noticeable  along  the  route. 
We  arrived  in  Baltimore  late  at  night ;  Union  troops  now  controlled  the  city, 
and  we  marched  through  its  deserted  streets  unmolested.  On  our  arrival  at 
Washington  the  next  morning,  we  were  marched  to  barracks,  dignified  by  the 
name  of  "  Soldiers'  Eetreat,"  where  each  man  received  a  half  loaf  of  "  soft- 
tack,"  as  we  had  already  begun  to  call  wheat  bread,  with  a  piece  of  "  salt 
junk,"  about  as  big  and  tough  as  the  heel  of  my  government  shoe,  and  a 
quart  of  coffee, — which  constituted  our  breakfast.  Our  first  day  in  Wash 
ington  was  spent  in  shaving,  washing,  polishing  our  brasses  and  buttons,  and 
cleaning-up  for  inspection.  A  day  or  two  later  we  moved  to  quarters  not 
far  from  the  armory,  looking  out  on  the  broad  Potomac,  within  sight  of  Long 
Bridge  and  the  city  of  Alexandria. 

Here  and  there  the  sound  of  a  gun  broke  the  serenity,  but  otherwise  the 
quiet  seemed  inconsistent  with  the  war  preparations  going  on  around  us.  In 
the  distance,  across  the  wide  river,  we  could  see  the  steeples  and  towers  of  the 
city  of  Alexandria,  while  up  stream,  on  the  right,  was  the  Long  Bridge.  Here 
and  there  was  to  be  seen  the  moving  panorama  of  armed  men,  as  a  regiment 
crossed  the  bridge ;  a  flash  of  sunlight  on  the  polished  muskets  revealed  them 
to  the  eye ;  while  the  white-topped  army  baggage-wagons  filed  over  in  con 
stant  procession,  looking  like  sections  of  whitewashed  fence  in  motion.  The 
overgrown  country  village  of  that  period,  called  Washington,  can  be  described 
in  a  few  words.  There  were  wide  streets  stretching  out  from  a  common  center 
like  a  spider's  web.  The  Capitol,  with  its  unfinished  dome ;  the  Patent  Office, 
the  Treasury,  and  the  other  public  buildings,  were  in  marked  and  classic  con 
trast  with  the  dilapidated,  tumble-down,  shabby  look  of  the  average  homes, 
stores,  groceries,  and  groggeries,  which  increased  in  shabbiness  and  dirty  dilapi 
dation  as  they  approached  the  suburbs.  The  climate  of  Washington  was 
genial,  but  in  the  winter  mouths  the  mud  was  fearful.  I  have  drilled  in  it, 


158 


GOING    TO   THE  FRONT. 


I  *^ 

*     ;K-^5^TO; 


--     -  s-i^- 

j.  '""       --  MAlfl 


PENNSYLVANIA    AVENUE,    WASHINGTON.      FKO-M    A    SKETCH    MADE    IN    18G1. 

marched  in  it,  and  run  from  the  provost-guard  in  it,  and  I  think  I  appreciate 
it  from  actual  and  familiar  knowledge.  In  the  lower  quarter  of  the  city 
there  was  not  a  piece  of  sidewalk.  Even  Pennsylvania  Avenue,  with  its  side 
walks,  was  extremely  dirty ;  and  the  cavalcade  of  teams,  artillery  caissons, 
and  baggage-wagons,  with  their  heavy  wheels,  stirred  the  mud  into  a  stiff 
batter  for  the  pedestrian. 

Officers  in  tinsel  and  gold  lace  were  so  thick  on  Pennsylvania  Avenue  that 
it  was  a  severe  trial  for  a  private  to  walk  there.  The  salute  exacted  by 
officers,  of  bringing  the  hand  to  the  visor  of  the  cap,  extending  the  arm  to  its 
full  length,  and  then  letting  it  drop  by  the  side,  was  tiresome  when  followed 
up  with  the  industry  required  by  this  horde.  Perhaps  I  exaggerate,  but  in  a 
half-hour's  wralk  on  the  avenue  I  think  I  have  saluted  two  hundred  officers. 
Brigadier-generals  were  more  numerous  there  than  I  ever  knew  them  to  be  at 
the  front.  These  officers,  many  of  whom  won  their  positions  by  political 
wire-pulling  at  Washington,  we  privates  thought  the  great  bane  of  the  war ; 
they  ought  to  have  been  sent  to  the  front  rank  of  battle,  to  serve  as  privates 
until  they  had  learned  the  duties  of  a  soldier.  Mingled  with  these  gaudy, 
useless  officers  were  citizens  in  search  of  fat  contracts,  privates,  "  non-com's  " 
and  officers  whose  uniforms  were  well  worn  and  faded,  showing  that  they 
were  from  encampments  and  active  service.  Occasionally  a  regiment  passed 
through  the  streets,  on  the  way  to  camp ;  all  surged  up  and  down  wide 
Pennsylvania  Avenue. 

The  soldiers  of  this  period  were  eager  to  collect  mementoes  of  the  war. 
One  of  my  acquaintances  in  another  regiment  made  sketches  of  the  different 
camps  he  had  visited  around  Washington,  including  "  Brightwood  "  and  Camp 


GOING    TO   THE  FRONT.  i  =,9 

Cameron ;  the  latter  he  termed  "  a  nursery  for  brigadier-generals."  Another 
friend  hoarded  specimens  of  official  signatures  and  passes  issued  in  Wash 
ington,  conspicuous  among  which  was  a  pass  with  the  well-known  John- 
Hancock-like  signature  of  Drake  De  Kay.  (See  page  173.) 

Before  enlisting,  and  while  on  a  visit  to  a  neighboring  town,  I  was  one  even 
ing  at  the  village  store,  when  the  talk  turned  upon  the  duration  of  the  war. 
Jim  Tinkham,  the  clerk  of  the  grocery  store,  announced  his  belief  in  a  sixty 
days'  war.  I  modestly  asked  him  for  more  time.  The  older  ones  agreed  with 
Jim  and  argued,  as  was  common  at  that  time,  that  the  Government  would 
soon  blockade  all  the  rebel  ports  and  starve  them  out.  Tinkham  proposed 
to  wager  a  supper  for  those  present,  if  the  rebels  did  not  surrender  before 
snow  came  that  year.  I  accepted.  Neither  of  us  put  up  any  money,  and 
in  the  excitement  of  the  weeks  which  followed  I  had  forgotten  the  wager. 
During  my  first  week  in  Washington,  whom  should  I  meet  but  Jim  Tinkham, 
the  apostle  of  the  sixty-day  theory.  He  was  brown  with  sunburn,  and  clad 
in  a  rusty  uniform  which  showed  service  in  the  field.  He  was  a  veteran,  for 
he  had  been  at  the  battle  of  Bull  Eun.  He  confidentially  declared  that 
after  getting  the  order  to  retreat  at  that  battle,  he  should  not  have  stopped 
short  of  Boston  if  he  had  not  been  halted  by  a  soldier  with  a  musket,  after 
crossing  Long  Bridge. 


THE    SEVENTH    NEW   YORK    AT    CAMP    CAMERON,    WASHINGTON. 


VIRGINIA    SCENES    IN   '61 


BY   CONSTANCE   CARY   HARRISON. 


only  association  I  have  with  my  old  home  in 
rirginia  that  is  not  one  of  unmixed  happiness 
relates  to  the  time  immediately  succeeding  the  exe 
cution  of  John  Brown  at  Harper's  Ferry.  Our 
homestead  was  in  Fairfax,  at  a  considerable  dis 
tance  from  the  theater  of  that  tragic  episode ;  and, 
belonging  as  we  did  to  a  family  among  the  first  in 
the  State  to  manumit  slaves, — our  grandfather  hav 
ing  set  free  those  that  came  to  him  by  inheritance, 

CONFEDERATE     BATTLE-FLAG.        SEE    PAGE     167.  ^^     ^-^     pgQpJg     -yyJjQ     gCl'VCd    US     being    llU'Cd     f  1*0111     tllOU' 

owners  and  remaining  in  our  employ  through  years  of  kindliest  relations, — 
there  seemed  to  be  no  especial  reason  for  us  to  share  in  the  apprehension  of  an 
uprising  of  the  blacks.  But  there  was  the  fear  —  unspoken,. .or  pooh-poohed 
at  by  the  men  who  were  mouth-pieces  for  our  community — dark,  boding, 
oppressive,  and  altogether  hateful.  I  can  remember  taking  it  to  bed  with  me 
at  night,  and  awaking  suddenly  oftentimes  to  confront  it  through  a  vigil  of 
nervous  terror,  of  which  it  never  occurred  to  me  to  speak  to  any  one.  The 
notes  of  whip-poor-wills  in  the  sweet-gum  swamp  near  the  stable,  the  mut- 
terings  of  a  distant  thunder-storm,  even  the  rustle  of  the  night  wind  in  the 
oaks  that  shaded  my  window,  filled  me  with  nameless  dread.  In  the  day 
time  it  seemed  impossible  to  associate  suspicion  with  those  familiar  tawny  or 
sable  faces  that  surrounded  us.  We  had  seen  them  for  so  many  years  smil 
ing  or  saddening  with  the  family  joys  or  sorrows ;  they  were  so  guileless,  so 
patient,  so  satisfied.  What  subtle  influence  was  at  work  that  should  trans 
form  them  into  tigers  thirsting  for  our  blood  ?  The  idea  was  preposterous. 
But  when  evening  came  again,  and  with  it  the  hour  when  the  colored  people 
(who  in  summer  and  autumn  weather  kept  astir  half  the  night)  assembled 
themselves  together  for  dance  or  prayer-meeting,  the  ghost  that  refused  to  be 
laid  was  again  at  one's  elbow.  Rusty  bolts  were  drawn  and  rusty  fire-arms 
loaded.  A  watch  was  set  where  never  before  had  eye  or  ear  been  lent  to  such 
a  service.  In  short,  peace  had  flown  from  the  borders  of  Virginia. 

Although  the  newspapers  were  full  of  secession  talk  and  the  matter  was 
eagerly  discussed  at  our  tables,  I  cannot  remember  that,  as  late  as  Christmas 
time  of  the  year  1860,  coming  events  had  cast  any  definite  shadow  on  our 
homes.  The  people  in  our  neighborhood,  of  one  opinion  with  their  dear  and 
honored  friend,  Colonel  Robert  E.  Lee,  of  Arlington,  were  slow  to  accept  the 
startling  suggestion  of  disruption  of  the  Union.  At  any  rate,  we  enjoyed  the 
usual  holiday  gathering  of  kinsfolk  in  the  usual  fashion.  The  old  Vaucluse 
house,  known  for  many  years  past  as  a  center  of  cheerful  hospitality  in  the 
county,  threw  wide  open  its  doors  to  receive  all  the  members  who  could  be 
gathered  there  of  a  large  family  circle.  The  woods  about  were  despoiled  of 


VIRGINIA  SCENES  IN  '61. 


161 


"VAUCLUSE" — A    VIRGINIA    HOMESTEAD. 


holly  and  spruce,  pine  and  cedar,  to  deck  the  walls  and  wreathe  the  picture- 
frames.  On  Christmas  Eve  we  had  a  grand  rally  of  youths  and  boys  belonging 
to  the  "  clan,"  as  they  loved  to  call  it,  to  roll  in  a  yule  log,  which  was  deposited 
upon  a  glowing  bed  of  coals  in  the  big  "  red-parlor"  fire-place,  and  sit  about  it 
afterward,  welcoming  the  Christmas  in  with  goblets  of  egg-nog  and  apple-toddy. 

"  Where  shall  we  be  a  year  hence  I "  some  one  asked  at  a  pause  in  the  merry 
chat ;  and,  in  the  brief  silence  that  followed,  arose  a  sudden  spectral  thought 
of  war.  All  felt  its  presence ;  no  one  cared  to  speak  first  of  its  grim  possibilities. 

On  Christmas  Eve  of  the  following  year  the  old  house  lay  in  ruins,  a  sacri 
fice  by  Union  troops  to  military  necessity ;  the  forest  giants  that  kept  watch 
around  her  walls  had  been  cut  down  and  made  to  serve  as  breastworks  for  a 
fort  erected  on  the  Vaucluse  property  as  part  of  the  defenses  of  Washington. 
Of  the  young  men  and  boys  who  took  part  in  that  holiday  festivity,  all  were 
in  the  active  service  of  the  South, —  one  of  them,  alas !  soon  to  fall  under  a 
rain  of  shot  and  shell  beside  his  gun  at  Fredericksburg ;  the  youngest  of  the 
number  had  left  his  mother's  knee  to  fight  at  Manassas,  and  found  himself, 
before  the  year  was  out,  a  midshipman  aboard  the  Confederate  steamer 
Nashville,  on  her  cruise  in  distant  seas! 

My  first  vivid  impression  of  war-days  was  during  a  ramble  in  the  neigh 
boring  woods  one  Sunday  afternoon  in  spring,  when  the  young  people  in 
a  happy  band  set  out  in  search  of  wild  flowers.  Pink  honeysuckles,  blue 
lupine,  beds  of  fairy  flax,  anemones,  and  ferns  in  abundance  sprung  under 


VOL.  I.    11 


1 62  yiRGINIA  SCENES  IN  '61. 

the  canopy  of  young  leaves  on  the  forest  boughs,  and  the  air  was  full  of  the 
song  of  birds  and  the  music  of  running  waters.  We  knew  every  mossy  path 
far  and  near  in  those  woods  ;  every  tree  had  been  watched  and  cherished  by 
those  who  went  before  us,  and  dearer  than  any  other  spot  on  earth  was  our 
tranquil,  sweet  Vaucluse.  Suddenly  the  shrill  whistle  of  a  locomotive  struck 
the  ear,  an  unwonted  sound  on  Sunday.  "  Do  you  know  what  that  means  ?  " 
said  one  of  the  older  cousins  who  accompanied  the  party.  "  It  is  the  special 
train  carrying  Alexandria  volunteers  to  Manassas,  and  to-morrow  I  shall 
follow  with  my  company."  Silence  fell  upon  our  little  band.  A  cloud 
seemed  to  come  between  us  and  the  sun.  It  was  the  beginning  of  the  end 
too  soon  to  come. 

The  story  of  one  broken  circle  is  the  story  of  another  at  the  outset  of  such 
a  war.  Before  the  week  was  over,  the  scattering  of  our  household,  which  no 
one  then  believed  to  be  more  than  temporary,  had  begun.  Living  as  we  did 
upon  ground  likely  to  be  in  the  track  of  armies  gathering  to  confront  each 
other,  it  was  deemed  advisable  to  send  the  children  and  young  girls  into  a 
place  more  remote  from  chances  of  danger.  Some  weeks  later  the  heads  of 
the  household,  two  widowed  sisters  whose  sons  were  at  Manassas,  drove 
away  from  their  home  in  their  carriage  at  early  morning,  having  spent  the 
previous  night  in  company  with  a  half-grown  lad  digging  in  the  cellar  hasty 
graves  for  the  interment  of  two  boxes  of  old  English  silver-ware,  heirlooms 
in  the  family,  for  which  there  was  no  time  to  provide  otherwise.  Although 
the  enemy  were  long  encamped  immediately  above  it  after  the  house  was 
burnt  the  following  year,  this  silver  was  found  there  when  the  war  had  ended; 
it  was  lying  loose  in  the  earth,  the  boxes  having  rotted  away. 

The  point  at  which  our  family  reunited  within  the  Confederate  lines  was 
Bristoe,  the  station  next  beyond  Manassas,  a  cheerless  railway  inn ;  a  part  of 
the  premises  was  used  as  a  country  grocery  store ;  and  there  quarters  were 
secured  for  us  with  a  view  to  being  near  the  army.  By  this  time  all  our 
kith  and  kin  of  fighting  age  had  joined  the  volunteers.  One  cannot  pic 
ture  accommodations  more  forlorn  than  these  eagerly  taken  for  us  and  for 
other  families  attracted  to  Bristoe  by  the  same  powerful  magnet.  The  sum 
mer  sun  poured  its  burning  rays  upon  whitewashed  walls  unshaded  by  a  tree. 
Our  bedrooms  were  almost  uninhabitable  by  day  or  night,  our  fare  the  plain 
est.  From  the  windows  we  beheld  only  a  flat,  uncultivated  country,  crossed 
by  red-clay  roads,  then  ankle-deep  in  dust.  We  learned  to  look  for  all  excite 
ment  to  the  glittering  lines  of  railway  track,  along  which  continually  thun 
dered  trains  bound  to  and  from  the  front.  It  was  impossible  to  allow  such  a 
train  to  pass  without  running  out  upon  the  platform  to  salute  it,  for  in  this 
way  we  greeted  many  an  old  friend  or  relative  buttoned  up  in  the  smart  gray 
uniform,  speeding  with  high  hope  to  the  scene  of  coming  conflict.  Such  shouts 
as  went  up  from  sturdy  throats  while  we  stood  waving  hands,  handkerchiefs, 
or  the  rough  woolen  garments  we  were  at  work  upon  !  Then  fairly  awoke  the 
spirit  that  made  of  Southern  women  the  inspiration  of  Southern  men  through 
out  the  war.  Most  of  the  young  fellows  we  knew  arid  were  cheering  onward 
wore  the  uniform  of  privates,  and  for  the  right  to  wear  it  had  left  homes  of 


VIRGINIA  SCENES  IN  '61. 


ON    THE    WAY    TO   MAXASSA8. 


ease  and  luxury.  To  such  we  gave  our  best  homage ;  and  from  that  time  forth 
the  youth  who  was  lukewarm  in  the  cause  or  unambitious  of  military  glory 
fared  uncomfortably  in  the  presence  of  the  average  Confederate  maiden. 

Thanks  to  our  own  carriage,  we  were  able  during  those  rallying  days  of 
June  to  drive  frequently  to  visit  "  the  boys  "  in  camp,  timing  the  expeditions 
to  include  battalion  drill  and  dress  parade,  and  taking  tea  afterward  in  the 
different  tents.  Then  were  the  gala  days  of  war,  and  our  proud  hosts  has 
tened  to  produce  home  dainties  dispatched  from  the  far-away  plantations — 
tears  and  blessings  interspersed  amid  the  packing,  we  were  sure;  though  I 
have  seen  a  pretty  girl  persist  in  declining  other  fare,  to  make  her  meal  upon 
raw  biscuit  and  huckleberry  pie  compounded  by  the  bright-eyed  amateur  cook 
of  a  well-beloved  mess.  Feminine  heroism  could  no  farther  go. 

And  so  the  days  wore  on  until  the  17th  of  July,  when  a  rumor  from  the 
front  sent  an  electric  shock  through  our  circle.  The  enemy  were  moving  for 
ward  !  On  the  morning  of  the  18th  those  who  had  been  able  to  sleep  at  all 
awoke  early  to  listen  for  the  first  guns  of  the  engagement  of  Blackburn's  Ford. 
Abandoned  as  the  women  at  Bristoe  were  by  every  male  creature  old 
enough  to  gather  news,  there  was,  for  us,  no  way  of  knowing  the  progress 
of  events  during  the  long,  long  day  of  waiting,  of  watching,  of  weeping,  of 
praying,  of  rushing  out  upon  the  railway  track  to  walk  as  far  as  we  dared  in 
the  direction  whence  came  that  intolerable  booming  of  artillery.  The  cloud  of 
dun  smoke  arising  over  Manassas  became  heavier  in  volume  as  the  day  pro 
gressed.  Still,  not  a  word  of  tidings,  till  toward  afternoon  there  came  limping 


164 


SCENES  IN  '61. 


up  a  single,  very  dirty,  soldier  with  his  arm  in  a  sling.  What  a  heaven- 
send  he  was,  if  only  as  an  escape-valve  for  our  pent-up  sympathies !  We  seized 
him,  we  washed  him,  we  cried  over  him,  we  glorified  him  until  the  man  was 
fairly  bewildered.  Our  best  endeavors  could  only  develop  a  pin-scratch  of  a 
wound  on  his  right  hand ;  but  when  our  hero  had  laid  in  a  substantial  meal 
of  bread  and  meat,  we  plied  him  with  trembling  questions,  each  asking  news 
of  some  staff  or  regiment  or 
company.  It  has  since  oc 
curred  to  me  that  he  was  a 
humorist  in  disguise.  His 
invariable  reply,  as  he  looked 
from  one  to  the  other  of  his 


LISTKXIXG    rOIl    TIIK    KIIIST   GUN. 


satellites,  was : 
Virginia,  marm  1  Why,  of 
coase.  They  warift  no  two 
ways  o'  thinkin'  'bout  that  ar 
reg'ment.  They  just  kh'crcd 
tharselves  with  glory !  " 

A  little  later  two  wagon- 
loads  of  slightly  wounded 
claimed  our  care,  and  with 
them  came  authentic  news 
of  the  day.  Most  of  us  re 
ceived  notes  on  paper  torn 
from  a  soldier's  pocket-book  and  grimed  with  gunpowder,  containing 
assurance  of  the  safety  of  our  own.  At  nightfall  a  train  carrying  more 
wounded  to  the  hospitals  at  Culpeper  made  a  halt  at  Bristoe ;  and,  preceded 
by  men  holding  lanterns,  we  went  in  among  the  stretchers  with  milk,  food, 
and  water  to  the  sufferers.  One  of  the  first  discoveries  I  made,  bending  over 
in  that  fitful  light,  was  a  young  officer  whom  I  knew  to  be  a  special  object  of 
solicitude  with  one  of  my  comrades  in  the  search  ;  but  he  was  badly  hurt,  and 
neither  he  nor  she  knew  the  other  was  near  until  the  train  had  moved  on. 
The  next  day,  and  the  next,  were  full  of  burning  excitement  over  the  impend 
ing  general  engagement,  which  people  then  said  would  decide  the  fate  of  the 
young  Confederacy.  Fresh  troops  came  by  with  every  train,  and  we  lived  only 
to  turn  from  one  scene  to  another  of  welcome  and  farewell.  On  Saturday  even 
ing  arrived  a  message  from  General  Beauregard,  saying  that  early  on  Sunday 
an  engine  and  car  would  be  put  at  our  disposal,  to  take  us  to  some  point  more 
remote  from  danger.  We  looked  at  one  another,  and,  tacitly  agreeing  the  gal 
lant  general  had  sent  riot  an  order  but  a  suggestion,  declined  his  kind  proposal. 

Another  unspeakably  long  day,  full  of  the  straining  anguish  of  suspense. 
Dawning  bright  and  fair,  it  closed  under  a  sky  darkened  by  cannon-smoke. 
The  roar  of  guns  seemed  never  to  cease.  First,  a  long  sullen  boom;  then  a 
sharper  rattling  fire,  painfully  distinct ;  then  stragglers  from  the  field,  with 
varying  rumors;  at  last,  the  news  of  victory;  and,  as  before,  the  wounded, 
to  force  our  numbed  faculties  into  service.  One  of  our  group,  the  mother  of 


VIRGINIA  SCENES  IN  '61.  165 

an  only  son  barely  fifteen  years  of  age,  heard  that  her  boy,  after  being  in  action 
all  the  early  part  of  the  day,  had  through  sheer  fatigue  fallen  asleep  upon 
the  ground,  where  he  was  found  resting  peacefully  amidst  the  roar  of  the  guns. 

A  few  days  later  we  rode  over  the  field.  The  trampled  grass  had  begun 
to  spring  again,  and  wild  flowers  were  blooming  around  carelessly  made 
graves.  From  one  of  these  imperfect  mounds  of  clay  I  saw  a  hand  extended ; 
and  when,  years  afterward,  I  visited  the  tomb  of  Rousseau  beneath  the 
Pantheon  in  Paris,  where  a  sculptured  hand  bearing  a  torch  protrudes  from 
the  sarcophagus,  I  thought  of  that  mournful  spectacle  upon  the  field  of 
Manassas.  Fences  were  everywhere  thrown  down;  the  undergrowth  of  the 
woods  was  riddled  with  shot;  here  and  there  we  came  upon  spiked  guns, 
disabled  gun-carriages,  cannon-balls,  blood-stained  blankets,  and  dead  horses. 
We  were  glad  enough  to  turn  away  and  gallop  homeward. 

With  August  heats  and  lack  of  water,  Bristoe  was  forsaken  for  quarters 
near  Culpeper,  where  my  mother  went  into  the  soldiers'  barracks,  sharing 
soldiers'  accommodations,  to  nurse  the  wounded.  In  September  quite  a  party 
of  us,  upon  invitation,  visited  the  different  headquarters.  We  stopped  over 
night  at  Manassas,  five  ladies,  sleeping  upon  a  couch  made  of  rolls  of  car 
tridge-flannel,  in  a  tent  guarded  by  a  faithful  sentry.  I  remember  the  comical 
effect  of  the  five  bird-cages  (of  a  kind  without  which  no  self-respecting  young 
woman  of  that  day  would  present  herself  in  public)  suspended  upon  a  line 
running  across  the  upper  part  of  our  tent,  after  we  had  reluctantly  removed 
them  in  order  to  adjust  ourselves  for  repose.  Our  progress  during  that  mem 
orable  visit  was  royal ;  an  ambulance  with  a  picked  troop  of  cavalrymen  had 
been  placed  at  our  service,  and  the  convoy  was  "  personally  conducted  "  by  a 
pleasing  variety  of  distinguished  officers.  It  was  at  this  time,  after  a  supper 
at  the  headquarters  of  the  "  Maryland  line  "  at  Fairfax,  that  the  afterward  uni 
versal  war-song,  "  My  Maryland  ! "  was  put  afloat  upon  the  tide  of  army  favor. 
We  were  sitting  outside  a  tent  in  the  warm  starlight  of  an  early  autumn  night, 
when  music  was  proposed.  At  once  we  struck  up  Randall's  verses  to  the 
tune  of  the  old  college  song,  "  Lauriger  Horatius," — a  young  lady  of  the  party, 
Jennie  Gary,  of  Baltimore,  having  recently  set  them  to  this  music  before 
leaving  home  to  share  the  fortunes  of  the  Confederacy.  All  joined  in  the  ring 
ing  chorus;  and,  when  we  finished,  a  burst  of  applause  came  from  some  soldiers 
listening  in  the  darkness  behind  a  belt  of  trees.  Next  day  the  melody  was 
hummed  far  and  near  through  the  camps,  and  in  due  time  it  had  gained 
the  place  of  favorite  song  in  the  army.  Other  songs  sung  that  evening, 
which  afterward  had  a  great  vogue,  were  one  beginning  "  By  blue  Patapsco's 
billowy  dash,"  and  "  The  years  glide  slowly  by,  Lorena." 

Another  incident  of  note,  during  the  autumn  of  '61,  was  that  to  my  cousins, 
Hetty  and  Jennie  Gary,  and  to  me  was  intrusted  the  making  of  the  first  three 
battle-flags  of  the  Confederacy.  They  were  jaunty  squares  of  scarlet  crossed 
with  dark  blue  edged  with  white,  the  cross  bearing  stars  to  indicate  the 
number  of  the  seceded  States.  We  set  our  best  stitches  upon  them,  edged 
them  with  golden  fringes,  and,  when  they  were  finished,  dispatched  one 
to  Johnston,  another  to  Beauregard,  and  the  third  to  Earl  Van  Dorn,  then 


ibb 


VIRGINIA    SCENES  IN  '<$/. 


commanding  infantry  at  Manassas.  The  banners  were  received  with  all 
possible  enthusiasm  ;  were  toasted,  feted,  and  cheered  abundantly.  After 
two  years,  when  Van  Dorn  had  been  killed  in  Tennessee,  mine  came  back 
to  me,  tattered  and  storm-stained  from  long  and  honorable  service  in  the 
field.  But  it  was  only  a  little  while  after  it  had  been  bestowed  that  there 
arrived  one  day  at  our  lodgings  in  Culpeper  a  huge,  bashful  Mississippi 
scout,  —  one  of  the  most  daring  in  the  army,  —  with  the  frame  of  a  Hercules 
and  the  face  of  a  child.  He  had  been  bidden  to  come  there  by  his  general, 
he  said,  to  ask,  if  I  would  not  give  him  an  order  to  fetch  some  cherished 
object  from  my  dear  old  home  —  something  that  would  prove  to  me  "how 
much  they  thought  of  the  maker  of  that  flag!"  A  week  later  I  was  the 
astonished  recipient  of  a  lamented  bit  of  finery  left  "within  the  lines,"  a 
wrap,  brought  to  us  by  Dillon  himself,  with  a  beaming  face.  Mounted  on 
a  load  of  fire-wood,  lie  had  gone  through  the  Union  pickets,  and  while 
peddling  poultry  had  presented  himself  at  the  house  of  my  uncle,  Dr.  Fairfax, 
in  Alexandria,  whence  he  carried  off  his  prize  in  triumph,  with  a  letter  in 
its  folds  telling  us  how  relatives  left  behind  longed  to  be  sharing  the  joys  and 
sorrows  of  those  at  large  in  the  Confederacy. 


&sf^?/r&!^. 

FAC-SIMILE    OF  AUTOGRAPHIC  COPY  OF  THE    FIRST   STANZA   OK     "  MY    MARYLAND  !" 


SCRUTINIZING     A     PASS     AT     THE     WASHINGTON     END     OF     THE     LONG     BRIDGE. 


MCDOWELL'S    ADVANCE    TO    BULL    RUN. 

BY  JAMES   B.  FRY,  BREVET  MAJOR-GENERAL,  U.  S.  A.  (AT  BULL  RUN,  CAPTAIN  AND  ASSISTANT 
ADJUTANT-GENERAL  ON  McDOWELL'S  STAFFi. 

S  President  Buchanan's  administration  was  drawing  to  a 
close,  lie  was  forced  by  the  action  of  the  South  to  decide 
whether  the  power  of  the  general  Government  should  be 
used  to  coerce  into  submission  States  that  had  attempted 
to  secede  from  the  Union.  His  opinion  was  that  the  con 
tingency  was  not  provided  for,  that  while  a  State  had  no 
right  to  secede,  the  Constitution  gave  no  authority  to 
coerce,  and  that  he  had  no  right  to  do  anything  except 
hold  the  property  and  enforce  the  laws  of  the  United 
States. 

Before  he  went  out  of  office  the  capital  of  the  nation 
seemed  to  be  in  danger  of  seizure.  For  its  protection,  and 
in  order  to  consult  about  holding  Southern  forts  and 
arsenals,  General  Scott  was  in  December  called  to  "Wash 
ington,  from  which  he  had  been  absent  since  the  inaugu 
ration  of  Pierce,  who  had  defeated  him  for  the  presidency. 
Jefferson  Davis,  Pierce's  Secretary  of  AVar,  and  General  Scott  had  quarreled, 
and  the  genius  of  acrimony  controlled  the  correspondence  which  took  place 

)  The  battle  of  Bull  Run  was  notable  in  a  minor     by  their  several  States.    The  Confederate  uniforms 


j 

'r 


way  for  the  variety  of  uniforms  worn  on  both 
sides  —  a  variety  greater  than  was  shown  in  any 
later  engagement.  The  Federal  blue  had  not  yet 
been  issued,  and  the  troops  wore  either  the  uni 
forms  of  their  militia  organizations  (including  vari 
ous  patterns  of  Zouave  dress)  or  those  furnished 


exhibited  similar  variety ;  some  regiments  were  in 
citizens'  dress,  and  several  of  the  general  officers 
who  had  been  in  the  old  service  —  including,  we 
are  informed,  Generals  Johnston,  Beauregard,  and 
Longstreet  —  still  wore  the  dress  of  the  United 
States  Army. —  EDITORS. 


167 


168 


MCDOWELL'S  ADVANCE   TO  BULL  RUN. 


between  them.     Notwithstanding  the  fact  that  on  account  of  his  age  and 
infirmities  he  was  soon  overwhelmed  by  the  rush  of  events,  General  Scott's 
laurels  had  not  withered  at  the  outbreak  of  the  war,  and  he  brought  to  the 
emergency  ability,  experience,  and  prestige.     A  high  light  in  the  whole  mili 
tary  world,  he  towered  above  the  rest  of  our  army  at  that  time  profession 
ally  as  he  did  physically.    As  the  effect  of  his  unusual  stature  was  increased 
by  contrast  with  a  short  aide-de-camp  (purposely  chosen,  it  was  suspected), 
so  was  his  exalted  character  marked  by 
one   or   two   conspicuous   but    not  very 
harmful    foibles.      With   much  learning, 
great  military  ability,    a   strict    sense  of 
justice,  and   a  kind  heart,  he  was  vain 
and  somewhat  petulant.     He   loved  the 
Union  and  hated  Jefferson  Davis. 

By  authority  of  President  Buchanan, 
Scott  assembled  a  small  force  of  regulars 
in  the  capital,  and  for  the  first  time  in 
the  history  of  the  country  the  electoral 
count  was  made  and  a  President  was  in 
augurated  under  the  protection  of  sol 
diery.  But  before  the  inauguration  of 
Lincoln,  March  4th,  the  secession  move 
ment  had  spread  through  the  "cotton- 
belt"  and  delegates  from  the  secession 
States  had  met  as  a  congress  at  Mont 
gomery,  Alabama,  February  4th.  On  the 
8th  they  had  organized  the  "  Provisional 
Government  of  the  Confederate  States  of 
America,"  and  on  the  9th  had  elected  Jefferson  Davis  President  and  Alex 
ander  H.  Stephens  Vice-President. 

When  the  news  of  the  firing  upon  Sumter  reached  Washington,  President 
Lincoln  prepared  a  proclamation,  and  issued  it  April  15th,  convening  Con 
gress  and  calling  forth  75,000  three-months  militia  to  suppress  combinations 
against  the  Government.  The  Federal  situation  was  alarming.  Sumter  fell  on 
the  13th  of  April,  and  was  evacuated  on  the  14th.  Virginia  seceded  on  the  17th, 
and  seized  Harper's  Ferry  on  the  18th  and  the  Norfolk  Navy  Yard  on  the  20th. 
On  the  19th  a  mob  in  Baltimore  assaulted  the  6th  Massachusetts  volunteers 
as  it  passed  through  to  Washington,  and  at  once  bridges  were  burned  and 
railway  communication  was  cut  off  between  Washington  and  the  North. 

Lincoln  had  had  no  experience  as  a  party  leader  or  executive  officer,  and 
was  without  knowledge  of  military  affairs  or  acquaintance  with  military  men. 
Davis  at  the  head  of  the  Confederacy  was  an  experienced  and  acknowledged 
Southern  leader ;  he  was  a  graduate  of  the  Military  Academy;  had  commanded 
a  regiment  in  the  Mexican  war;  had  been  Secretary  of  War  under  Presi 
dent  Pierce,  and  had  been  chairman  of  the  Military  Committee  in  the  United 
States  Senate  up  to  the  time  he  left  Congress  to  take  part  with  the  South. 


SIMON    CAMERON,    SECRETARY    OF    MAR    FROM 

MARCH    4,   1861,   UNTIL    JAN.   15,  1862. 

FROM    A    PHOTOGRAPH. 


MCDOWELL'S  ADVANCE   TO  BULL  K  JN. 


169 


He  was  not  only  well  versed  in  everything  relating  to  war,  but  was 
thoroughly  informed  concerning  the  character  and  capacity  of  prominent 
and  promising  officers  of  the  army.  There  was  nothing  experimental  in 
his  choice  of  high  military  commaliders.  With  but  few  exceptions,  those 
appointed  at  the  beginning  retained  command  until  they  lost  their  lives  or 
the  war  closed. 

The  Southern  States,  all  claiming  to  be  independent  republics  after  seces 
sion,  with  all  their  governmental  machinery,  including  militia  and  volunteer 
organizations,  in  complete  working  order,  transferred  themselves  as  States 
from  the  Union  to  the  Confederacy.  The  organization  of  a  general  govern 
ment  from  such  elements,  with  war  as  its  immediate  purpose,  was  a  simple 
matter.  Davis  had  only  to  accept  and  arrange,  according  to  his  ample  infor 
mation  and  well-matured  judgment,  the  abundant  and  ambitious  material 
at  hand  in  the  way  that  he  thought  would  best  secure  his  purposes.  Lincoln 
had  to  adapt  the  machinery  of  a  conservative  old  government,  some  of  it 
unsuitable,  some  unsound,  to  sudden  demands  for  which  it  was  not  designed. 
The  talents  of  Simon  Cameron,  his  first  Secretary  of  War,  were  political,  not 
military.  He  was  a  kind,  gentle,  placid  man,  gifted  with  powers  to  persuade, 
not  to  command.  Shrewd  and  skilled  in  the  management  of  business  and 
personal  matters,  he  had  no  knowledge  of  military  affairs, 
and  could  not  give  the  President  much  assistance  in  as 
sembling  and  organizing  for  war  the  earnest  and  impa 
tient,  but  unrnilitary  people  of  the  North. 

Officers  from  all  departments  of  the  Federal  civil  service 
hurried  to  the  Confederacy  and  placed  themselves  at  the 
disposal  of  Davis,  and  officers  from  all  the  corps  of  the 
regular  army,  most  of  them  full  of  vigor,  with  the  same 
education  and  experience  as  those  who  remained,  went 
South  and  awaited  assignment  to  the  duties  for  which 
Davis  might  regard  them  as  best  qualified.  All  Confed 
erate  offices  were  vacant,  and  the  Confederate  President 
had  large  if  not  absolute  power  in  filling  them.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  civil  offices  under  Lincoln  were  occupied 
or  controlled  by  party,  and  in  the  small  regular  army  of 
the  Union  the  law  required  that  vacancies  should  as  a 
rule  be  filled  by  seniority.  There  was  no  retired  list  for 

,,.,,,  -Til  11  UNIFORM  OF  THE  1ST  MASS. 

the  disabled,  and  the  army  was  weighed  down  by  Ion-      AT  BULL  RUN.  FROM 
gevity ;  by  venerated  traditions ;  by  prerogatives  of  service 
rendered  in  former  wars ;  by  the  firmly  tied  red-tape  of  military  bureauism, 
and  by  the  deep-seated  and  well-founded  fear  of  the  auditors  and  comp 
trollers  of  the  treasury.  Nothing  but  time  and  experience — possibly  nothing 
but  disaster — could  remove  from  the  path  of  the  Union  President  difficulties 
from  which  the  Confederate  President  was,  by  the  situation,  quite  free.     In 
the  beginning  of  the  war,  the  military  advantage  was  on  the  side  of  the  Con 
federates,  notwithstanding  the  greater  resources  of  the  North,  which  produced 
their  effect  only  as  the  contest  was  prolonged. 


i  yo 


MCDOWELL'S  ADVANCE   TO  BULL  RUN. 


FROM    A     PHOTOGRAPH. 


After  the  firing  of  the  first  gun  upon  Sumter,  the  two  sides  were  equally 
active  in  marshaling  their  forces  on  a  line  along  the  border  States  from 
the  Atlantic  coast  of  Virginia  in  the  east  to  Kansas  in  the  west.  Many 
of  the  earlier  collisions  along  this  line  were  due  rather  to  special  causes  or 
local  feeling  than  to  general  military  considerations.  The  prompt  advance 
of  the  Union  forces  under  McClellan  to  West  Virginia  was  to  protect  that 
new-born  free  State.  Patterson's  movement  to  Hagerstown  and  thence  to 
Harper's  Ferry  was  to  prevent  Maryland  from  joining  or  aiding  the  rebellion, 
to  re-open  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio  railroad,  and  prevent  invasion  from  the 
Shenandoah  Valley.  The  Southerners  having  left  the  Union  and  set  up  the 
Confederacy  upon  the  principle  of  State  rights,  in  violation  of  that  principle 


MCDOWELL'S  ADVANCE   TO  BULL   RUN. 


171 


invaded  the  State  of  Kentucky  in  opposition  to  her  apparent  purpose  of 
armed  neutrality.  That  made  Kentucky  a  field  of  early  hostilities  and  helped 
to  anchor  her  to  the  Union.  Missouri  was  rescued  from  secession  through  the 
energy  of  General  F.  P.  Blair  and  her  other  Union  men,  and  by  the  indomi 
table  will  of  Captain  Lyon  of  the  regular  army,  whose  great  work  was  accom 
plished  under  many  disadvantages.  In  illustration  of  the  difficulty  with  which 
the  new  condition  of  affairs  penetrated  the  case-hardened  bureauism  of  long 
peace,  it  may  be  mentioned  that  the  venerable  adjutant-general  of  the  army, 
when  a  crisis  was  at  hand  in  Missouri,  came  from  a  consultation  with  the 
President  and  Secretary  Cameron,  and  with  a  sorry  expres 
sion  of  countenance  and  an  ominous  shake  of  the  head 
exclaimed,  "  It's  bad,  very  bad ;  we're  giving  that  young 
man  Lyon  a  great  deal  too  much  power  in  Missouri." 

Early  in  the  contest  another  young  Union  officer  came 
to  the  front.  Major  Irvin  McDowell  was  appointed  briga 
dier-general  May  14th.  He  was  forty-three  years  of  age, 
of  unexceptionable  habits  and  great  physical  powers.  His 
education,  begun  in  France,  was  continued  at  the  United 
States  Military  Academy,  from  which  he  was  graduated  in 
1838.  Always  a  close  student,  he  was  well  informed  out 
side  as  well  as  inside  his  profession.  Distinguished  in  the 
Mexican  war,  intensely  Union  in  his  sentiments,  full  of 
energy  and  patriotism,  outspoken  in  his  opinions,  highly 
esteemed  by  General  Scott,  on  whose  staff  he  had  served, 
he  at  once  secured  the  confidence  of  the  President  and  the 

.  rXIFORM  OF  THE  2D  OHIO 

Secretary  of  A>  ar,  under  whose  observation  he  was  serv-         AT  BULL  RUN. 

TTT         i    •  TT^'j.1  TJ_-         1  1  FROM   A    PHOTOGRAPH. 

ing   in   \\  ashmgtoii.     \v  ithout    political    antecedents    or 

acquaintances,  he  was  chosen  for  advancement  on  account  of  his  record, 

his  ability,  and  his  vigor. 

Northern  forces  had  hastened  to  Washington  upon  the  call  of  President 
Lincoln,  but  prior  to  May  24th  they  had  been  held  rigidly  on  the  north  side  of 
the  Potomac.  On  the  night  of  May  23d-24th,  the  Confederate  pickets  being 
then  in  sight  of  the  Capitol,  three  columns  were  thrown  across  the  river  by 
General  J.  K.  F.  Mansfield,  then  commanding  the  Department  of  Washing 
ton,  and  a  line  from  Alexandria  below  to  chain-bridge  above  Washington 
was  intrenched  under  guidance  of  able  engineers.  On  the  27th  Brigadier- 
General  Irvin  McDowell  was  placed  in  command  south  of  the  Potomac.  J. 

By  the  1st  of  June  the  Southern  Government  had  been  transferred  from 
Montgomery  to  Eichmond,  and  the  capitals  of  the  Union  and  of  the  Confed 
eracy  stood  defiantly  confronting  each  other.  General  Scott  was  in  chief  com 
mand  of  the  Union  forces,  with  McDowell  south  of  the  Potomac,  confronted 
by  his  old  classmate,  Beauregard,  hot  from  the  capture  of  Fort  Surnter. 

&  The  aspect  of  affairs  was  so  threatening  after  and  without  waiting  for  the  meeting  of  Congress, 

President  Lincoln's  call  of  April  loth  for  75,000  the  President   entered  upon  the   creation  of   an 

three-months    militia,  and  General  Scott  was  so  additional   volunteer    army   to    be    composed    of 

averse  to  undertaking  any  active  operations  with  42,034  three-years  men,  together  with  an  increase 

such  short-term  troops,  that,  as  early  as  May  3d,  of  22,714  regulars  and  18,000  seamen.— J.  B.  F. 


172 


MCDOWELL'S  ADVANCE    TO  BULL  RUN. 


SCALE  OF  MILES 

D= 

3 


MAP    OF    THE    VICINITY    OF    WASHINGTON,    JULY,    1861. 

General  Patterson,  of  Pennsylvania,  a  veteran  of  the  war  of  1812  and  the 
war  with  Mexico,  was  in  command  near  Harper's  Ferry,  opposed  by  General 
Joseph  E.  Johnston.  The  Confederate  President,  Davis,  then  in  Richmond, 
with  General  R.  E.  Lee  as  military  adviser,  exercised  in  person  general 
military  control  of  the  Southern  forces.  The  enemy  to  be  engaged  by 
McDowell  occupied  what  was  called  the  "Alexandria  line,"  with  head 
quarters  at  Manassas,  the  junction  of  the  Orange  and  Alexandria  with  the 
Manassas  Gap  railroad.  The  stream  known  as  Bull  Run,  some  three  miles 
in  front  of  Manassas,  was  the  line  of  defense.  On  Beauregard's  right,  30 
miles  away,  at  the  mouth  of  Aquia  Creek,  there  was  a  Confederate  bri 
gade  of  3000  men  and  6  guns  under  General  Holmes.  The  approach  to 
Richmond  from  the  Lower  Chesapeake,  threatened  by  General  B.  F.  Butler, 
was  guarded  by  Confederates  under  Generals  Huger  and  Magruder. 


MCDOWELL'S  ADl/ANCE   TO  BULL  RUN. 


'73 


On  Beauregard's  left, 
sixty  miles  distant,  in 
the  Lower  Shenaiidoah 
Valley  and  separated 
from  him  by  the  Blue 
Ridge  Mountains,  was 
the  Confederate  army  of 
the  Shenandoah  under 
command  of  General 
Johnston.  Beauregard's 
authority  did  not  extend 
over  the  forces  of  John 
ston,  Huger,  Magruder, 
or  Holmes,  but  Holmes 
was  with  him  before  the 
battle  of  Bull  Bun,  and 
so  was  Johnston,  who, 
as  will  appear  more  fully 
hereafter,  joined  at  a 
decisive  moment. 

Early  in  June  Patter 
son  was  pushing  his 
column  against  Harper's 
Ferry,  and  on  the  3d  of 
that  month  McDowell 
was  called  upon  by  Gen 
eral  Scott  to  submit "  an 
estimate  of  the  number 
and  composition  of  a 
column  to  be  pushed 
toward  Manassas  Junc 
tion  arid  perhaps  the 
Gap,  say  in  4  or  5  days, 
to  favor  Patterson's 
attack  upon  Harper's 
Ferry."  McDowell  had 
then  been  in  command 
at  Arlington  less  than  a 
week,  his  raw  regiments 
south  of  the  Potomac 
were  not  yet  brigaded, 
and  this  was  the  first 


FAC-SIMILE    OF    THE    FACE    OF    A  WASHINGTON   PASS   OF    1861.4 


| The  bold  signature  of  "Drake  De  Kay"  on  Drake  De  Kay,  who  was  the  son  of  Commodore 
the  passes  issued  by  General  Mansfield  while  com-  George  C.  De  Kay,  closed  his  shipping  and  com 
manding  the  Department  at  Washington,  gave  ce-  mission  office  in  New  York,  with  no  more  ceremony 
lebrityto  the  young  aide-de-camp  whose  duty  it  than  to  pin  to  the  door  the  statement,  "Gone  to 
was  to  sign  them.  At  the  outbreak  of  the  war  Washington.  Back  at  close  of  war."  He  took  with 


MCDOWELL'S  ADVANCE   TO  BULL  RUN. 


intimation  he  had  of  offensive  operations. 
He  reported,  June  4th,  that  12,000  infantry, 
2  batteries,  6  or  8  companies  of  cavalry, 
and  a  reserve  of  5000  ready  to  move  from 
Alexandria  would  be  required.  John 
ston,  however,  gave  up  Harper's  Ferry 
to  Patterson,  and  the  diversion  by  Mc 
Dowell  was  not  ordered.  But  the  public 
demand  for  an  advance  became  impera 
tive —  stimulated  perhaps  by  the  success 
ful  dash  of  fifty  men  of  the  2d  United 
States  Cavalry,  under  Lieutenant  C.  H. 
Tompkins,  through  the  enemy's  outposts 
at  Fairfax  Court  House  on  the  night  of 
June  1st,  and  by  the  unfortunate  result  of 
the  movement  of  a  regiment  under  Gen 
eral  Schenck  toward  Vienna,  June  9th, 
as  well  as  by  a  disaster  to  some  of  Gen 
eral  Butler's  troops  on  the  10th  at  Big 
Bethel,  near  Fort  Monroe.  On  the  24th 
of  June,  in  compliance  with  verbal  in 
structions  from  General  Scott,  McDowell 
submitted  a  "plan  of  operations  and 
the  composition  of  the  force  required 
to  carry  it  into  effect."  He  estimated 
the  Confederate  force  at  Manassas  Junc 
tion  and  its  dependencies  at  25,000 
men,  assumed  that  his  movements  could 
not  be  kept  secret  and  that  the  enemy 

him  a  detachment  of  his  employees  and  offered  his  own 
and  their  services  to  General  Scott  "  free  of  charge." 
Of  course  he  was  not  allowed  to  bear  the  expense  of  his 
contingent,  but  his  services  were  accepted,  and  he 
received  as  lieutenant  the  first  appointment  to  the 
army  from  civil  life  during  the  war.  He  accepted  a 
position  on  General  Mansfield's  staff  and  accompanied 
that  officer  to  Newport  News,  where,  as  captain  on  the 
staff,  he  distinguished  himself  in  several  daring  adven 
tures,  sometimes  undertaken  with  the  object  of  getting 
information  of  the  enemy.  In  the  second  Bull  Run 
campaign  he  was  aide-de-camp  to  General  Pope. 
Afterward  he  joined  his  regiment,  the  1 4th  Eegulars, 
and  he  was  brevetted  major  and  lieutenant-colonel  for 
gallant  service  at  the  Wilderness  and  at  Spotsylvania. 
We  are  indebted  to  Mr.  Murat  Halstead,  editor  of 
the  Cincinnati  "Commercial  Gazette,"  for  the  "Drake 
De  Kay  Pass,"  here  reproduced  in  fac-simile.  Of  the 
uses  of  a  bold  signature  on  the  passes,  Mr.  Halstead 
writes  with  a  characteristic  touch  of  humor  :  "A  state 
ment  I  have  heard,  that  the  famous  Drake  De  Kay 
passes  were  written  to  be  read  by  torchlight  at  picket 
posts,  reminds  me  that  I  have  preserved  one  among 


VVL 


X 


Si 


I 

< 


si    * 


FAC-SIMILE    OF    THE    BACK    OF    THE     PASS. 

my  papers.  It  is  inclosed.  My  recollection 
is  that  the  pass  was  gotten  up  in  this  style 
that  it  might  not  be  easily  imitated.  It  was 
intended  to  supersede  all  other  passes,  and 
did  so.  The  effect  was  to  check  the  promis 
cuous  running  through  the  lines.  It  was 
regarded  at  the  time  as  something  oracular 
and  formidable,  and  as  likely  to  convey  a 
salutary  impression  of  the  power  and  majesty 
of  the  United  States  of  America.  It  was  said 
that  General  Winfield  Scott  was  much  im 
pressed  by  it." —  EDITORS. 


MCDOWELL'S  ADVANCE   TO  BULL  RUN.  175 

would  call  up  additional  forces  from  all  quarters,  and  added :  "  If  General 
J.  E.  Johnston's  force  is  kept  engaged  by  Major-General  Patterson,  and 
Major-General  Butler  occupies  the  force  now  in  his  vicinity,  I  think  they 
will  not  be  able  to  bring  up  more  than  10,000  men,  so  we  may  calculate 
upon  having  to  do  with  about  35,000  men."  And  as  it  turned  out,  that  was 
about  the  number  he  "  had  to  do  with."  For  the  advance.  McDowell  asked 
"  a  force  of  30,000  of  all  arms,  with  a  reserve  of  10,000."  He  knew  that  Beau- 
regard  had  batteries  in  position  at  several  places  in  front  of  Bull  Eun  and 
defensive  works  behind  the  Run  and  at  Manassas  Junction.  The  stream  being 
fordable  at  many  places,  McDowell  proposed  in  his  plan  of  operations  to 
turn  the  enemy's  position  and  force  him  out  of  it  by  seizing  or  threatening 
his  communications.  Nevertheless,  he  said  in  his  report : 

"  Believing  the  chances  are  greatly  in  favor  of  the  enemy's  accepting  battle  between  this  and 
the  Junction  and  that  the  consequences  of  that  battle  will  be  of  the  greatest  importance  to  the 
country,  as  establishing  the  prestige  in  this  contest,  on  the  one  side  or  the  other,  —the  more  so  as 
the  two  sections  will  be  fairly  represented  by  regiments  from  almost  every  State, — I  think  it  of 
great  consequence  that,  as  for  the  most  part  our  regiments  are  exceedingly  raw  and  the  best  of 
them,  with  few  exceptions,  not  over  steady  in  line,  they  be  organized  into  as  many  small  fixed 
brigades  as  the  number  of  regular  colonels  will  admit,  ...  so  that  the  men  may  have  as 
fair  a  chance  as  the  nature  of  things  and  the  comparative  inexperience  of  most  will  allow." 

This  remarkably  sound  report  was  approved,  and  McDowell  was  directed 
to  carry  his  plan  into  effect  July  8th.  But  the  government  machinery 
worked  slowly  and  there  was  jealousy  in  the  way,  so  that  the  troops  to  bring 
his  army  up  to  the  strength  agreed  upon  did  not  reach  him  until  the  16th. 

Beauregard's  Army  of  the  Potomac  at  Manassas  consisted  of  the  brigades 
of  Holmes,  Bonham,  Ewell,  D.  R.  Jones,  Longstreet,  Cocke  and  Early,  and  of 

3  regiments  of  infantry,  1  regiment  and  3  battalions  of  cavalry,  and  6  bat 
teries  of  artillery,  containing  in  all  '27  guns,  making  an  aggregate  available 
force  on  the  field  of  Bull  Run  of  about  23,000  men.     Johnston's  army  from 
the  Shenandoah  consisted  of  the  brigades  of  Jackson,  Bee,  Bartow,  and 
Kirby  Smith,  2  regiments  of  infantry  not  brigaded,  1  regiment  of  cavalry 
(12  companies),  and  5  batteries  (20  guns),  making  an  aggregate  at  Bull  Run 
of  8340.  ^ 

McDowell's  army  consisted  of  5  divisions,  Tyler's  First  Division,  containing 

4  brigades  (Keyes's,  Schenck's,  TV.  T.  Sherman's,  and  Richardson's) ;  Hunter's 
Second  Division,  containing  2  brigades  (Andrew  Porter's  and  Burnside's) ; 
Heintzelman's  Third  Division,  containing  3  brigades  (Franklin's,  TVillcox's,  and 
Howard's) ;  Runyon's  Fourth  Division  (9  regiments  not  brigaded) ;  and  Miles's 
Fifth  Division,  containing  2  brigades  (Blenker's  and  Davies's), — 10  batteries  of 
artillery,  besides  2  guns  attached  to  infantry  regiments,  49  guns  in  all,  and  7 

J)  Beauregard  himself  has  said  that  on  the  18th  30.000  men  of  all  arms.''     The  figures  are  probably 

of  July  he  had  " along  the  line  of  Bull  Run  about  under  the  mark,  as  Hampton's  Legion,  McRea's 

17,000  men;  that  on  the  19th  General  Holmes'joined  regiment,  a  North  Carolina  ''regiment  and  two 

him  with  about  3000  men";  and  that  he '-received  battalions   of    Mississippi   and  Alabama"  joined 

from  Richmond  between  the  18th  and  21st  about  between  the  17th  and   21st.      Beauregard's  force 

2000  more";  and  that  Johnston  brought  about  8000  may  fairly  be  placed  at  32,000;  and  the  opposing 

more,  the  advance  arriving  "on  the  morning  of  the  armies,  both   in   the  aggregate  and  in  the   parts 

20th  and  the  remainder  about  noon  of  the  21st,"  engaged,  were  nearer  equal   in  that  than  in  any 

making  his  whole  force,  as  he  states  it,   "nearly  other  battle  in  Virginia.— J.  B.  F. 


176 


MCDOWELL'S  ADVANCE  TO  BULL  RUN. 


VHITE    HOUSE 


ASHINGTON     MONUMEN 


VIEW    OF  WASHINGTON    FROM    THE     SIGNAL    CAMP,    GEORGETOWN    HEIGHTS.— I. 

companies  of  regular  cavalry.  Of  the  foregoing  forces,  9  of  the  batteries  and  8 
companies  of  infantry  were  regulars,  and  1  small  battalion  was  marines. 
The  aggregate  force  was  about  35,000  men.  Runyoii's  Fourth  Division  was 
6  or  7  miles  in  the  rear  guarding  the  road  to  Alexandria,  and,  though  counted 
in  the  aggregate,  was  not  embraced  in  McDowell's  order  for  battle.\ 

There  was  an  ill-suppressed  feeling  of  sympathy  with  the  Confederacy  in  the 
Southern  element  of  Washington  society ;  but  the  halls  of  Congress  resounded 
with  the  eloquence  of  Union  speakers.  Martial  music  filled  the  air,  and  war 
was  the  topic  wherever  men  met.  By  day  and  night  the  tramp  of  soldiers  was 
heard,  and  staff-officers  and  orderlies  galloped  through  the  streets  between 
the  headquarters  of  Generals  Scott  arid  McDowell.  Northern  enthusiasm  was 
unbounded.  "  On  to  Richmond "  was  the  war-cry.  Public  sentiment  was 
irresistible,  and  in  response  to  it  the  army  advanced.  It  was  a  glorious 
spectacle.  The  various  regiments  were  brilliantly  uniformed  according  to 
the  esthetic  taste  of  peace,  and  the  silken  banners  they  flung  to  the  breeze  were 
unsoiled  and  untorn.  The  bitter  realities  of  war  were  nearer  than  we  knew. 

McDowell  marched  on  the  afternoon  of  July  16th,  the  men  carrying  three 
days'  rations  in  their  haversacks ;  provision  wagons  were  to  follow  from 
Alexandria  the  next  day.  On  the  morning  of  the  18th  his  forces  were  con 
centrated  at  Centre ville,  a  point  about  20  miles  west  of  the  Potomac  and 


*\  The  average  length  of  service  of  McDowell's  men  prior  to  the  battle  was  about  sixty  days, 
longest  in  service  were  the  three-mouths  men,  and  of  these  he  had  fourteen  regiments. —  J.  B.  F. 


The 


MCDOWELL'S  ADVANCE   TO  BULL  RUN. 


'77 

ARLINGTON. 


LONG      BRIDGE.  GEORGETOWN     OBSERVATORY. 

VIEW    FROM  THE  SIGNAL  CAMP.      II.      FROM  A   SKETCH  MADE  AT  THE   TIME. 

6  or  7  miles  east  of  Manassas  Junction.  Beauregard's  outposts  fell  back 
without  resistance.  Bull  Run,  flowing  south-easterly,  is  about  half-way 
between  Centreville  and  Manassas  Junction,  and,  owing  to  its  abrupt 
banks,  the  timber  with  which  it  was  fringed,  and  some  artificial  defenses 
at  the  fords,  was  a  formidable  obstacle.  The  stream  was  fordable,  but 
all  the  crossings  for  eight  miles,  from  Union  Mills  on  the  south  to  the  Stone 
Bridge  on  the  north,  were  defended  by  Beauregard's  forces.  [See  map,  page 
180.]  The  Warrenton  Turnpike,  passing  through  Centreville,  leads  nearly  due 
west,  crossing  Bull  Run  at  the  Stone  Bridge.  The  direct  road  from  Centre 
ville  to  Manassas  crosses  Bull  Run  at  Mitchell's  Ford,  half  a  mile  or  so  above 
another  crossing  known  as  Blackburn's  Ford.  Union  Mills  was  covered  by 
Ewell's  brigade,  supported  after  the  18th  by  Holrnes's  brigade;  McLean's 
Ford,  next  to  the  north,  was  covered  by  D.  R.  Jones's  brigade ;  Blackburn's 
Ford  was  defended  by  Longstreet's  brigade,  supported  by  Early's  brigade ; 
Mitchell's  Ford  was  held  by  Bonham's  brigade,  with  an  outpost  of  two  guns 
and  an  infantry  support  east  of  Bull  Run;  the  stream  between  Mitchell's 
Ford  and  the  Stone  Bridge  was  covered  by  Cocke's  brigade ;  the  Stone  Bridge 
on  the  Confederate  left  was  held  by  Evans  with  1  regiment  and  Wheat's  special 
battalion  of  infantry,  1  battery  of  -4  guns,  and  2  companies  of  cavalry.  •& 

•fc  The  state  of  General  Beauregard's  mind  at  the  enemy  has  assaulted  my  outposts  in  heavy  force, 
time  is  indicated  by  the  following  telegram  on  the  I  have  fallen  back  on  the  line  of  Bull  Run  and  will 
17th  of  Julv  from  him  to  Jefferson  Davis  :  "The  make  a  stand  at  Mitchell's  Ford.  If  his  force  is  over- 


MCDOWELL'S  ADVANCE   TO  BULL  RUN. 


THE    STONE    CHUKCH,    CEXTHEVILLE.      FROM    A    PHOTOGRAPH    TAKEN    IS    MARCH,    1802. 

McDowell  was  compelled  to  wait  at  Centreville  until  his  provision  wagons 
arrived  and  he  could  issue  rations.  His  orders  having  carried  his  leading- 
division  under  Tyler  110  farther  than  Centreville,  he  wrote  that  officer  at 
8:15  A.  M.  on  the  18th,  "Observe  well  the  roads  to  Bull  Eun  and  to  Warren- 
ton.  Do  not  bring  on  an  engagement,  but  keep  up  the  impression  that  we 
are  moving  on  Manassas."  McDowell  then  went  to  the  extreme  left  of  his 
line  to  examine  the  country  with  reference  to  a  sudden  movement  of  the 
army  to  turn  the  enemy's  right  flank.  The  recoiinoissance  showed  him  that 
the  country  was  unfavorable  to  the  movement,  and  he  abandoned  it.  While 
he  was  gone  to  the  left,  Tyler,  presumably  to  "  keep  up  the  impression  that 
we  were  moving  on  Manassas,"  went  forward  from  Centreville  with  a  squadron 
of  cavalry  and  two  companies  of  infantry  for  the  purpose  of  making  a  recoii 
noissance  of  Mitchell's  and  Blackburn's  fords  along  the  direct  road  to  Manas 
sas.  The  force  of  the  enemy  at  these  fords  has  just  been  given.  Reaching 
the  crest  of  the  ridge  overlooking  the  valley  of  Bull  Eun  and  a  mile  or  so 
from  the  stream,  the  enemy  was  seen  on  the  opposite  bank,  and  Tyler 
brought  up  Benjamin's  artillery,  2  20-pouiider  rifled  guns,  Ayres's  field 
battery  of  6  guns,  and  Richardson's  brigade  of  infantry.  The  20-pounders 
opened  from  the  ridge  and  a  few  shots  were  exchanged  with  the  enemy's 
batteries.  Desiring  more  information  than  the  long-range  cannonade  afforded, 


whelming,  I  shall  retire  to  Eappahaiinock  railroad 
bridge,  saving  my  command  for  defense  there  and 
future  operations.  Please  inform  Johnston  of  this 
via  Staunton,  and  also  Holmes.  Sen;!  forward  any 
reeul'orcements  at  the  earliest  possible  instant  and 
by  every  possible  means."  The  alarm  in  this  dis 
patch  and  the  apprehension  it  shows  of  McDowell's 


"overwhelming"  strength  are  not  in  harmony 
with  the  more  recent  assurance  of  the  Confederate 
commander,  that  through  sources  in  Washington 
treasonable  to  the  Union,  and  in  other  ways,  he 
"was  almost  as  well  informed  of  the  strength 
of  the  hostile  army  in  my  [his]  front  as  its  com 
mander."— J.  B.  F. 


MCDOWELL'S  ADVANCE   TO  BULL  RUN. 


179 


Tyler  ordered  Richardson's  brigade  and  a  section  of  Ayres's  battery,  sup 
ported  by  a  squadron  of  cavalry,  to  move  from  the  ridge  across  the  open 
bottom  of  Bull  Run  and  take  position  near  the  stream  and  have  skirmishers 
"  scour  the  thick  woods  "  which  skirted  it.  Two  regiments  of  infantry,  2  pieces 
of  artillery,  and  a  squadron  of  cavalry  moved  down  the  slope  into  the  woods 
and  opened  fire,  driving  Bonham's  outpost  to  the  cover  of  intrenchments  across 
the  stream.  The  brigades  of  Bonham  and  Longstreet,  the  latter  being  reen- 
forced  for  the  occasion  by  Eaiiy's  brigade,  responded  at  short  range  to  the 
fire  of  the  Federal  reconnoitering  force  and  drove  it  back  in  disorder.  Tyler 
reported  that  having  satisfied  himself  "that  the  enemy 
was  in  force,"  and  ascertained  "  the  position  of  his  bat 
teries,"  he  withdrew.  J  This  unauthorized  reconnoissance, 
called  by  the  Federals  the  affair  at  Blackburn's  Ford,  was 
regarded  at  the  time  by  the  Confederates  as  a  serious 
attack,  and  was  dignified  by  the  name  of  the  "  battle  of 
Bull  Run,"  the  engagement  of  the  21st  being  called  by 
them  the  battle  of  Manassas.  The  Confederates,  feeling 
that  they  had  repulsed  a  heavy  and  real  attack,  were 
encouraged  by  the  result.  The  Federal  troops,  on  the 
other  hand,  were  greatly  depressed.  The  regiment  which 
suffered  most  was  completely  demoralized,  and  McDowell 
thought  that  the  depression  of  the  repulse  was  felt 
throughout  his  army  and  produced  its  effect  upon  the 
Pennsylvania  regiment  and  the  New  York  battery 
which  insisted  (their  terms  having  expired)  upon  their  UNIFORM  OF  THE  urn 

T        1  ,  ,  ,.,  ,  ,     .,  -IT  YORK  IFIRE   ZOUAVES)  AT 

discharge,  and  on  the  21st,  as  he  expressed  it,     inarched        BULL  RUN-.  FROM  A 
to  the  rear  to  the  sound  of  the  enemy's  cannon."     Even 
Tyler  himself  felt  the  depressing  effect  of  his  repulse,  if  we  may  judge  By 
his  cautious  and  feeble  action  on  the  21st  when  dash  was  required. 

The  operations  of  the  18th  confirmed  McDowell  in  his  opinion  that  with 
his  raw  troops  the  Confederate  position  should  be  turned  instead  of  attacked 
in  front.  Careful  examination  had  satisfied  him  that  the  country  did  not 
favor  a  movement  to  turn  the  enemy's  right.  On  the  night  of  the  18th 


I  The  casualties  in  the  affair  were  :  Union,  1 
officer  and  18  enlisted  men  killed ;  1  officer  and  37 
enlisted  men  wounded  ;  26  enlisted  men  missing, — 
aggregate,  83.  Confederate  (Beauregard  in  his 
official  report  of  1861  \  *'15  killed  and  53  wounded 
men,  several  of  whom  have  since  died." —  J.  B.  F. 

&  The  llth  New  York,  or  "  The  First  Fire  Zou 
aves,"  was  recruited  in  April,  1861,  from  among 
the  firemen  of  New  York  City  by  Colonel  E.  Elmer 
Ellsworth,  a  young  man  of  twenty-four,  who,  before 
the  war,  had  organized  in  Chicago  a  fine  body  of 
Zouaves  and  exhibited  the  Zouave  drill  in  several 
cities  of  the  North.  President  Lincoln, who hadbeen 
escorted  to  Washington  by  Ellsworth,  appointed 
him  to  a  second  lieutenancy  in  the  regular  army. 

On  the  morning  of  May  24th,  when  the  Union 
forces  crossed  into  Virginia,  Ellsworth's  Zouaves 
occupied  the  city  of  Alexandria.  The  colonel,  with 


the  secretary  and  the  chaplain  of  the  regiment,  a 
correspondent  of  the  New  York  "  Tribune/'  and  a 
sergeant's  squad  were  proceeding  toward  the  center 
of  the  town,  when  they  saw  a  secession  flag  flying 
from  the  Marshall  house.  With  his  two  com 
panions  Ellsworth  ascended  to  the  roof,  leaving 
Private  Francis  E.  Brownell  at  the  foot  of  the 
garret  stairs.  On  descending  those  stairs  with  the 
flag  in  his  hands,  Ellsworth  was  shot  through  the 
heart  by  James  T.  Jackson,  the  keeper  of  the  hotel, 
who  emptied  the  second  barrel  of  his  shot-gun  at 
Brownell.  The  latter,  who  was  not  hit,  shot  Jackson 
through  the  head.  Colonel  Ellsworth  had  endeared 
himself  to  President  Lincoln,  who  was  deeply  af 
fected  by  his  death.  For  several  hours  the  remains 
lay  in  state  in  the  East  Room  of  the  White  House. 
His  death  made  a  profound  impression  and  greatly 
stimulated  the  war  feeling  in  the  North.—  EDITORS. 


i8o 


MCDOWELL'S  ADVANCE  TO  BULL  RUN. 


OUTLINE    MAP    OF    THE    BATTLE-FIELD    OF    BULL    RUN. 

A,  A,  A,  A,  A.     General  line  of  Confederate  disposi-      made  to  repel  McDowell's  flank  attack  l>y  the  Sudley 
tions  during  the  skirmish  at  Mitchell's  and  Blackburn's      and  Newmarket  Road. 

Fords  (July  18th),  and  until  the  morning  of  the  main  The  Union  dispositions  are  represented  as  they 
engagement  (July  21st).  were  at  the  climax  of  the  fighting  on  the  Henry 

B,  B,  B.     General  line  of  Confederate  dispositions,      plateau. 

the  haversacks  of  his  men  were  empty,  and  had  to  be  replenished  from  the 
provision  wagons,  which  were  late  in  getting  up.  Nor  had  he  yet  determined 
upon  his  point  or  plan  of  attack.  While  resting  and  provisioning  his  men, 
he  devoted  the  19th  and  20th  to  a  careful  examination  by  his  engineers  of 
the  enemy's  position  and  the  intervening  country.  His  men,  not  soldiers, 
but  civilians  in  uniform,  unused  to  marching,  hot,  weary,  and  footsore, 
dropped  down  as  they  had  halted  and  bivouacked  on  the  roads  about  Centre- 
ville.  Notwithstanding  Beauregard's  elation  over  the  affair  at  Blackburn's 
Ford  on  the  18th,  he  permitted  the  19th  and  20th  to  pass  without  a  move 
ment  to  follow  up  the  advantage  he  had  gained.  During  these  two  days, 
McDowell  carefully  examined  the  Confederate  position,  and  made  his  plan 


MCDOWELL'S  ADVANCE   TO  BULL  RUN. 


181 


to  manoeuvre  the  enemy  out  of  it.  Beauregard  ordered  no  aggressive  move 
ment  until  the  21st,  and  then,  as  appears  from  his  own  statement,  through 
miscarriage  of  orders  and  lack  of  apprehension  on  the  part  of  subordinates, 
the  effort  was  a  complete  fiasco,  with  the  comical  result  of  frightening  his 
own  troops,  who,  late  in  the  afternoon,  mistook  the  return  of  one  of  their 
brigades  for  an  attack  by  McDowell's  left,  and  the  serious  result  of  inter 
fering  with  the  pursuit  after  he  had  gained  the  battle  of  the  21st. 

But  Beauregard,  though  not  aggressive  on  the  19th  and  20th,  was  not  idle 
within  his  own  lines.     The  Confederate  President  had  authorized  Johnston, 
Beauregard's    senior,   to    use 
his  discretion    in  moving  to 
the  support  of  Manassas,  and 
Beauregard,  urging  Johnston 
to  do  so,  sent  railway  trans 
portation    for     the     Shenan- 
doah  forces.  But,  as  he 
states,   "he    at     the 
same  time  submit 
ted     the    alter 
native  proposi 
tion  to  Johnston 
that,  having  pass 
ed  the  Blue  Ridge, 
he  should  assemble  his 
forces,  press   forward  by 
way    of     Aldie,    north-west 
of    Manassas,    and    fall    upon 

McDowell's  right  rear,"  while  he,  Beauregard,  "  prepared  for  the  operation 
at  the  first  sound  of  the  conflict,  should  strenuously  assume  the  offensive 
in  front."  "The  situation  and  circumstances  specially  favored  the  signal 
success  of  such  an  operation,"  says  Beauregard.  An  attack  by  two  armies 
moving  from  opposite  points  upon  an  enemy,  with  the  time  of  attack  for  one 
depending  upon  the  sound  of  the  other's  cannon,  is  hazardous  even  with  well- 
disciplined  and  well-seasoned  troops,  and  is  next  to  fatal  with  raw  levies. 
Johnston  chose  the  wiser  course  of  moving  by  rail  to  Manassas,  thus  preserv 
ing  the  benefit  of  "  interior  lines,"  which,  Beauregard  says,  was  the  "  sole 
military  advantage  at  the  moment  that  the  Confederates  possessed." 

The  campaign  which  General  Scott  required  McDowell  to  make  was  under 
taken  with  the  understanding  that  Johnston  should  be  prevented  from  join 
ing  Beauregard.  With  no  lack  of  confidence  in  himself,  McDowell  was 
dominated  by  the  feeling  of  subordination  and  deference  to  General  Scott 
which  at  that  time  pervaded  the  whole  army,  and  General  Scott,  who  con 
trolled  both  McDowell  and  Patterson,  assured  McDowell  that  Johnston  should 
not  join  Beauregard  without  having  "Patterson  on  his  heels."  Yet  John 
ston's  army,  nearly  nine  thousand  strong,  joined  Beauregard,  Bee's  brigade 
and  Johnston  in  person  arriving  on  the  morning  of  the  20th,  the  remainder 


SCDI.EY  SPRINGS  HOTEL, 
OX  THE  LISE  OF 
MCDOWELL'S  FLAXK 

ATTACK  UPOX  THE 
CONFEDERATE  FORCES. 
SKETCHED  FROM  THE 
MILL,  A  FEW  RODS 
ABOVE  THE  FORD. 


182 


MCDOWELL'S  ADVANCE   TO  BULL  RUN. 


SUDLEY    SPRINGS    FORD,    LOOKING    NORTH.      FROM    A    SKETCH    -MADE    IX    1884. 


This  stream  is  the  Cat  Harpin  Run,  which  empties 
into  Bull  Run  a  short  distance  below  the  Smiley  Springs 
Ford.  lu  making  the  flank  movement  the  Union  troops, 
under  Generals  Hunter  and  Heiutzelmau,  crossed  this 
ford,  followed  later  in  the  day  by  the  ambulances  and 


munition  wagons.  The  retreat,  also,  was  largely  by 
this  ford.  The  ruins  of  the  Sudley  Sulphur  Spring 
House  are  shown  on  the  left.  The  Sudley  church, 
which  was  the  main  hospital  after  the  tight,  is  a  short 
distance  south.—  EDITORS. 


about  noon  on  the  21st.  Although  the  enforced  delay  at  Centreville  enabled 
McDowell  to  provision  his  troops  and  gain  information  upon  which  to  base 
an  excellent  plan  of  attack,  it  proved  fatal  by  affording  time  for  a  junction  of 
the  opposing  forces.  On  the  21st  of  July  General  Scott  addressed  a  dispatch 
to  McDowell,  saying :  "  It  is  known  that  a  strong  reinforcement  lef t  Winches 
ter  on  the  afternoon  of  the  18th,  which  you  will  also  have  to  beat.  Four  new 
regiments  will  leave  to-day  to  be  at  Fairfax  Station  to-night.  Others  shall 
follow  to-morrow  —  twice  the  number  if  necessary."  When  this  dispatch  was 
penned,  McDowell  was  fighting  the  "  strong  reenforcement "  which  left 
Winchester  on  the  18th.  General  Scott's  report  that  Beauregard  had  been 
reeiiforced,  the  information  that  four  regiments  had  been  sent  to  McDowell, 
and  the  promise  that  twice  the  number  would  be  sent  if  necessary ,  all  came 
too  late  —  and  Patterson  came  not  at  all. 


I  On  the  17th  of  July  Patterson,  with  some 
16,000  three-mpnths  men,  whose  terms  began  to 
expire  on  the  24th,  was  at  Charlestown,  and  John 
ston,  with  about  the  same  number,  was  at  Winches 
ter.  On  that  day  General  Scott  telegraphed 
Patterson,  "  McDowell's  first  day's  work  has  driven 
the  enemy  behind  Fairfax  Court  House.  Do  not 
let  the  enemy  amuse  and  delay  you  with  a  small 
force  in  front  while  he  reenforces  the  Junction  with 
his  main  body."  To  this  Patterson  replied  at  half- 


past  1  o'clock  in  the  morning  of  the  18th,  stating 
his  difficulties  and  asking,  ''  Shall  I  attack  ?"  Gen 
eral  Scott  answered  on  the  same  day  :  "  I  have 
certainly  been  expecting  you  to  beat  the  enemy," 
or  that  you  "at  least  had  occupied  him  by  threats 
and  demonstrations.  You  have  been  at  least  his 
equal  and  I  suppose  superior  in  numbers.  Has  he 
not  stolen  a  march  and  sent  reinforcements  toward 
Manassas  Junction  ?  "  Patterson  replied  on  the 
same  day  (18th),  "  The  enemy  has  stolen  no  march 


MCDOWELL'S  ADVANCE  TO  BULL  RUN. 


183 


During  the  19th  and  20th  the  bivouacs  of  McDowell's  army  at  Centreville, 
almost  within  cannon  range  of  the  enemy,  were  thronged  by  visitors,  official 
and  unofficial,  who  came  in  carriages  from  Washington,  bringing  their  own 
supplies.  They  were  under  no  military  restraint,  and  passed  to  and  fro 
among  the  troops  as  they  pleased,  giving  the  scene  the  appearance  of  a 
monster  military  picnic.  £  Among  others,  the  venerable  Secretary  of  War, 
Cameron,  called  upon  McDowell.  Whether  due  to  a  naturally  serious 
expression,  to  a  sense  of  responsibil 
ity,  to  a  premonition  of  the  fate  of  his 
brother  who  fell  upon  the  field  on  the 
21st,  or  to  other  cause,  his  countenance 
showed  apprehension  of  evil ;  but  men 
generally  were  confident  and  jovial. 

McDowell's  plan  of  battle  promul 
gated  on  the  20th,  was  to  turn  the 
enemy's  left,  force  him  from  his  de 
fensive  position,  arid,  "if  possible, 
destroy  the  railroad  leading  from 
Manassas  to  the  Valley  of  Virginia, 
where  the  enemy  has  a  large  force." 
He  did  not  know  when  he  issued 
this  order  that  Johnston  had  joined 
Beauregard,  though  he  suspected  it. 
son's  brigade  of  Tyler's  division,  and  a  strong  force  of  artillery  was  to 


SCDLEY  SPRINGS  FOKD,  LOOKING  TOWARD  THE  BATTLE 
FIELD.      FROM   A  WAR-TIME  PHOTOGRAPH. 

On  the  right  are  the  ruins  of  the  Suilley  Sulphur 
Spring  House.  The  building  on  the  hill  is  Sudley  Church. 
It  is  a  mile  by  the  Smiley  and  Manassas  road  from 
the  ford  to  where  the  battle  began.  — EDITORS. 

Miles's  Fifth  Division,  with  Richard- 


upon  me.  I  have  caused  him  to  be  reeuforced  " ; 
a:id  at  1  o'clock  p.  M.  on  that  day  he  added :  "  I  have 
succeeded,  in  accordance  with  the  wishes  of  the  Gen 
eral-in-Chief,  in  keeping  General  Johnston's  force 
at  Winchester."  At  the  very  hour  that  Patterson 
was  writing  this  dispatch  Johnston's  advance  was 
leaving  Winchester.  On  the  18th  Johnston  tele 
graphed  to  Richmond  that  Patterson  was  at  Charles- 
town,  and  said  :  "  Unless  he  prevents  it,  we  shall 
move  toward  General  Beauregard  to-day."  He 
moved  accordingly,  and  the  Confederate  armies 
were  imited  for  battle.  It  rested,  however,  with 
higher  authority  than  Patterson  to  establish  be 
tween  his  army  and  McDowell's  the  relations  that 
the  occasion  called  for.  In  considering  the  require 
ments  for  McDowell's  movement  against  Manassas, 
General  Scott  gave  great  weight  to  the  general 
and  irresistible  fear  then  prevailing  in  Washing 
ton  that  the  capital  might  be  seized  by  a  dash.  Its 
direct  defense  was  the  first  purpose  of  the  three- 
months  militia.  The  Potomac  at  Washington  was 
itself  a  strong  barrier,  and  with  the  field-works  on 
its  south  bank  afforded  security  in  that  quarter. 
The  danger  was  thought  to  be  from  the  Shenan- 
doah,  and  that  induced  the  Government  to  keep 
Patterson  in  the  valley.  Indeed,  on  the  30th  of 
June  Colonel  C.  P.  Stone's  command  was  ordered 
from  Point  of  Rocks  to  Patterson  at  Martins- 
burg,  where  it  arrived  on  the  8th  of  July  ;  where 
as  the  offensive  campaign  against  Manassas, 
ordered  soon  after,  required  Patterson  to  go  to 


Stone,  as  he  proposed  to  do  June  21st,  instead  of 
Stone  to  Patterson.  The  campaign  of  McDowell 
was  forced  upon  General  Scott  by  public  opinion, 
but  did  not  relieve  the  authorities  from  the  fear 
that  Johnston  might  rush  down  and  seize  Wash 
ington.  General  Scott,  under  the  pressure  of  the 
offensive  in  one  quarter  and  the  defensive  in 
another,  imposed  upon  Patterson  the  double  task, 
difficult  if  not  impossible,  of  preventing  Johnston 
from  moving  on  the  capital  and  from  joining  Beau- 
regard.  If  that  task  was  possible,  it  could  have 
been  accomplished  only  by  persistent  fighting,  and 
that  General  Scott  was  unwilling  to  order;  though 
in  his  dispatch  of  the  18th  in  reply  to  Patterson's 
question,  "Shall  I  attack  ?"  he  said,  ''I  have  cer 
tainly  been  expecting  you  to  beat  the  enemy." 
Prior  to  that,  his  instructions  to  Patterson  had 
enjoined  caution.  As  soon  as  McDowell  advanced, 
Patterson  was  upon  an  exterior  line  and  in  a  false 
military  position.  Admitting  that  he  might  have 
done  more  to  detain  Johnston,  bad  strategy  was 
probably  more  to  1  >lame  for  the  result  than  any  action 
or  lack  of  action  on  Patterson's  part. —  J.  B.  F. 

|  The  presence  of  senators,  congressmen,  and 
other  civilians  upon  the  field  on  the  21st  gave  rise 
to  extravagant  and  absurd  stories,  in  which  alleged 
forethought  and  valor  among  them  are  contrasted 
with  a  lack  of  these  qualities  in  the  troops.  The 
plain  truth  is  that  the  non-combatants  and  their 
vehicles  merely  increased  the  confusion  and 
demoralization  of  the  retreat. — J.  B.  F. 


1 84 


MCDOWELL'S  ADVANCE   TO    BULL  RUN. 


remain  in  reserve  at  Centreville,  prepare  defensive  works  there  and  threaten 
Blackburn's  Ford.  Tyler's  First  Division,  which  was  on  the  turnpike 
in  advance,  was  to  move  at  2 : 30  A.  M.,  threaten  the  Stone  Bridge  and  open  fire 
upon  it  at  daybreak.  This  demonstration  was  to  be  vigorous,  its  first  purpose 
being  to  divert  attention  from  the  movements  of  the  turning  column. 
As  soon  as  Tyler's 
troops  cleared  the 
way,  Hunter's  Sec 
ond  Division,  follow 
ed  by  Heintzelman's 
Third  Division,  was 
to  move  to  a  point 
on  the  Warrenton 
Turnpike  about  1  or 
2  miles  east  of  Cen 
treville  and  there 
take  a  country  road 
to  the  right,  cross 
the  Run  at  Sudley 
Springs,  come  down 
upon  the  flank  and 
rear  of  the  enemy  at 
the  Stone  Bridge,  and 
force  him  to  open 
the  way  for  Tyler's  di 
vision  to  cross  there 
and  attack,  fresh  and 
in  full  force. 

Tyler's  start  was  so 
late  and  his  advance 
was  so  slow  as  to  hold 
Hunter  andHeintzel- 
man  2  or  3  hours  on 
the  mile  or  two  of 
the  turnpike  between 
their  camps  and  the  point  at  which  they  were  to  turn  off  for  the  flank  march. 
This  delay,  and  the  fact  that  the  flank  march  proved  difficult  and  some  12 
miles  instead  of  about  6  as  was  expected,  were  of  serious  moment.  The  flank 
ing  column  did  not  cross  at  Sudley  Springs  until  9 : 30  instead  of  7,  the  long 
march,  with  its  many  interruptions,  tired  out  the  men,  and  the  delay 
gave  the  enemy  time  to  discover  the  turning  movement.  Tyler's  opera 
tions  against  the  Stone  Bridge  were  feeble  and  ineffective.  By  8  o'clock 
Evans  was  satisfied  that  he  was  in  no  danger  in  front,  and  perceived  the 
movement  to  turn  his  position.  He  was  on  the  left  of  the  Confederate  line, 
guarding  the  point  where  the  Warrenton  Turnpike,  the  great  highway  to  the 
field,  crossed  Bull  Run,  the  Confederate  line  of  defense.  He  had  110  instruc- 


THE    STONE    BRIDGE    OVER    BULL    RUN,    LOOKING   TOWARD    CENTREVILLE. 
FROM    A    SKETCH    3IADE    IN    1884. 


MCDOWELL'S  ADVANCE   TO  BULL  RUN. 


tions  to  guide  him  in  the  emergency  that  had  arisen.  But  he  did  not  hesitate. 
Reporting  his  information  and  purpose  to  the  adjoining  commander,  Cocke, 
and  leaving  4  companies  of  infantry  to  deceive  and  hold  Tyler  at  the  bridge, 
Evans  before  9  o'clock  turned  his  back  upon  the  point  he  was  set  to  guard, 
marched  a  mile  away,  and,  seizing  the  high  ground  to  the  north  of  Young's 
Branch  of  Bull  Run,  formed  line  of  battle  at  right  angles  to  his  former  line, 
his  left  resting  near  the  Sudley  Springs  road,  by  which  Burnside  with  the 
head  of  the  turning  column  was  approaching,  thus  covering  the  Warrenton 
Turnpike  and  opposing  a  determined  front  to  the  Federal  advance  upon  the 
Confederate  left  and  rear.\  In  his  rear  to  the  south  lay  the  valley  of 
Young's  Branch,  and  rising  from  that  was  the  higher  ridge  or  plateau  on 
which  the  Robinson  house  and  the  Henry  house  were  situated,  and  on  which 
the  main  action  took  place  in  the  afternoon.  Burnside,  finding  Evans  across 
his  path,  promptly  formed  line  of  battle  and  attacked  about  9:45  A.  M. 
Hunter,  the  division  commander,  who  was  at  the  head  of  Burnside's  brigade 
directing  the  formation  of  the  first  skirmish  line,  was  severely  wounded  and 
taken  to  the  rear  at  the  opening  of  the  action.  Evans  not  only  repulsed  but 
pursued  the  troops  that  made  the  attack  upon  him.  Andrew  Porter's  brigade 
of  Hunter's  division  followed  Burnside  closely  and  came 
to  his  support.  In  the  mean  time  Bee  had  formed  a 
Confederate  line  of  battle  with  his  and  Bartow's  bri 
gades  of  Johnston's  army  on  the  Henry  house  plateau, 
a  stronger  position  than  the  one  held  by  Evans,  and 
desired  Evans  to  fall  back  to  that  line;  but  Evans, 
probably  feeling  bound  to  cover  the  Warrenton  Turn 
pike  and  hold  it  against  Tyler  as  well  as  against  the 
flanking  column,  insisted  that  Bee  should  move  across 
the  valley  to  his  support,  which  was  done. 

After  Bee  joined  Evans,  the  preliminary  battle  con 
tinued  to  rage  upon  the  ground  chosen  by  the  latter. 
The  opposing  forces  were  Burnside's  and  Porter's  bri 
gades,  with  one  regiment  of  Heintzelman's  division  on 
the  Federal  side,  and  Evans's,  Bee's,  and  Bartow's 
brigades  on  the  Confederate  side.  The  Confederates 
were  dislodged  and  driven  back  to  the  Henry  house 
plateau,  where  Bee  had  previously  formed  line  and  where  what  Beauregard 
called  "the  mingled  remnants  of  Bee's,  Bartow's,  and  Evans's  commands"  were 
re-fornied  under  cover  of  Stonewall  Jackson's  brigade  of  Johnston's  army. 


FATIGUE    UNIFORM   AND    KILTS 
OF  THE  79TH  SEW 


\  Evans's  action  was  probably  one  of  the  best 
pieces  of  soldiership  on  either  side  during  the 
campaign,  but  it  seems  to  have  received  no  special 
commendation  from  his  superiors. — J.  B.  F. 

£•  William  Todd,  of  Company  B,  70th  New 
York  (Highlanders),  writing  to  correct  a  statement 
to  the  effect  "  that  the  79th  New  York  wore  the 
Highland  dress  at  the  battle  of  Bull  Run,"  says : 
"  If  by  that  is  meant  the  '  kilts,'  it  is  an  error.  It 
is  true  that  all  the  officers  and  many  of  the  men 
did  wear  that  uniform  when  we  left  the  city  in 


Jime,  IS 61,  and  on  dress-parade  occasions  in 
Washington,  but  when  we  went  into  Virginia  it 
was  laid  aside,  together  with  the  plaid  trousers 
worn  by  all  the  men  on  ordinary  occasions,  and  we 

donned  the  ordinary  blue.     Captain was  the 

only  one  who  insisted  011  wearing  the  kilts  on  the 
march  to  Bull  Run,  but  the  day  before  we  reached 
Centreville  the  kilts  were  the  cause  of  his  drawing 
upon  himself  much  ridicule,  and  when  we  started 
for  the  battle-field  on  that  Sunday  morning  he,  also, 
appeared  in  ordinary  blue  uniform." — EDITORS. 


MCDOWELL'S  ADVANCE   TO  BULL   RUN. 


THE    SUDI.EY     SPRINGS    IJOAI),    LOOKING    NORTH     FROM    THE    SLOPE    OK    THE    HENRY    HOUSE    HILL. 


In  the  middle-ground  on  the  "\Varrenton  turnpike 
stands  the  Stone  house,  a  central  laudinark  in  l)oth 
battles  of  Bull  Knii.  The  bant  in  the  right  foreground 
was  a  cover  during  the  first  battle  for  some  of  the  sup 
ports  of  Griffin's  and  Kicketts's  butteries  that  were 
on  the  Henry  house  hill,  the  crest  of  which  is  two  hun 


dred  and  fifty  yards  from  the  right  of  the  picture.  In 
the  first  battle  the  fighting  began  on  the  Matthews  hill, 
seen  in  the  background  behind  the  Stone  house,  and 
was  most  desperate  on  the  Henry  hill.  Young's  Branch 
(see  map,  page  180)  crosses  the  Smiley  road  nearits.junc- 
tion  with  the  turnpike,  and  flows  near  the  Stone  house. 


The  time  of  this  repulse,  as  proved  by  so  accurate  an  authority  as  Stone 
wall  Jackson,  was  before  11:30  A.  M.,  and  this  is  substantially  confirmed  by 
Beauregard's  official  report  made  at  the  time.  Sherman  and  Keyes  had 
nothing  to  do  with  it.  They  did  not  begin  to  cross  Bull  Run  until  noon. 
Thus,  after  nearly  two  hours'  stubborn  fighting  with  the  forces  of  Johnston, 
which  General  Scott  had  promised  should  be  kept  away,  McDowell  won  the 
first  advantage ;  but  Johnston  had  cost  him  dearly. 

During  all  this  time  Johnston  and  Beauregard  had  been  waiting  near 
Mitchell's  Ford  for  the  development  of  the  attack  they  had  ordered  by  their 
right  upon  McDowell  at  Centreville.  The  gravity  of  the  situation  upon 
their  left  had  not  yet  dawned  upon  them.  What  might  the  result  have  been 
if  the  Union  column  had  not  been  detained  by  Tyler's  delay  in  moving 
out  in  the  early  morning,  or  if  Johnston's  army,  to  which  Bee,  Bartow,  and 
Jackson  belonged,  had  not  arrived  'I 

But  the  heavy  firing  on  the  left  soon  diverted  Johnston  and  Beauregard 
from  all  thought  of  an  offensive  movement  with  their  right,  and  decided  them, 
as  Beauregard  has  said,  "to  hurry  up  all  available  reinforcements,  includ 
ing  the  reserves  that  were  to  have  moved  upon  Centreville,  to  our  left,  and 
fight  the  battle  out  in  that  quarter."  Thereupon  Beauregard  ordered  "  Ewell, 
Jones,  and  Longstreet  to  make  a  strong  demonstration  all  along  their  front  on 
the  other  side  of  Bull  Run,  and  ordered  the  reserves,  Holmes's  brigade  with 


MCDOWELL'S  ADVANCE   TO  BULL  RUN.  187 

six  guns,  and  Eaiiy's  brigade,  to  move  swiftly  to  the  left,"  and  he  and  John 
ston  set  out  at  full  speed  for  the  point  of  conflict,  which  they  reached  while 
Bee  was  attempting  to  rally  his  men  about  Jackson's  brigade  on  the  Henry 
house  plateau.  McDowell  had  waited  in  the  morning  at  the  point  on  the 
Warrenton  Turnpike  where  his  flanking  column  turned  to  the  right,  until 
the  troops,  except  Howard's  brigade,  which  he  halted  at  that  point,  had 
passed.  He  gazed  silently  arid  with  evident  pride  upon  the  gay  regiments 
as  they  filed  briskly  but  quietly  past  in  the  freshness  of  the  early  morning, 
and  then,  remarking  to  his  staff,  "  Gentlemen,  that  is  a  big  force,"  he  mounted 
and  moved  forward  to  the  field  by  way  of  Sudley  Springs.  He  reached  the 
scene  of  actual  conflict  somewhat  earlier  than  Johnston  and  Beauregard  did, 
and,  seeing  the  enemy  driven  across  the  valley  of  Young's  Branch  and 
behind  the  Warrenton  Turnpike,  at  once  sent  a  swift  aide-de-camp  to  Tyler 
with  orders  to  "  press  the  attack  "  at  the  Stone  Bridge.  Tyler  acknowledged 
that  he  received  this  order  by  11  o'clock.  It  was  Tyler's  division  upon  which 
McDowell  relied  for  the  decisive  fighting  of  the  day.  He  knew  that  the  march 
of  the  turning  column  would  be  fatiguing,  and  when  by  a  sturdy  fight  it  had 
cleared  the  Warrenton  Turnpike  for  the  advance  of  Tyler's  division,  it  had, 
in  fact,  done  more  than  its  fair  proportion  of  the  work.  But  Tyler  did  not 
attempt  to  force  the  passage  of  the  Stone  Bridge,  which,  after  about  8  o'clock, 
was  defended  by  only  four  companies  of  infantry,  though  he  admitted  that  by 
the  plan  of  battle,  when  Hunter  and  Heintzelman  had  attacked  the  enemy  in 
the  vicinity  of  the  Stone  Bridge,  "  he  was  to  force  the  passage  of  Bull  Eun  at 
that  point  and  attack  the  enemy  in  flank."  rl  Soon  after  McDowell's  arrival 
at  the  front,  Buriiside  rode  up  to  him  and  said  that  his  brigade  had  borne  the 
brunt  of  the  battle,  that  it  was  out  of  ammunition,  and  that  he  wanted  per 
mission  to  withdraw,  refit  and  fill  cartridge-boxes.  McDowell  in  the  excite 
ment  of  the  occasion  gave  reluctant  consent,  and  the  brigade,  which  certainly 
had  done  nobly,  marched  to  the  rear,  stacked  arms,  and  took  no  further 
part  in  the  fight.  Having  sent  the  order  to  Tyler  to  press  his  attack 
and  orders  to  the  rear  of  the  turning  column  to  hurry  forward,  McDowell, 
like  Beauregard,  rushed  in  person  into  the  conflict,  and  by  the  force  of  cir 
cumstances  became  for  the  time  the  commander  of  the  turning  column  and 
the  force  actually  engaged,  rather  than  the  commander  of  his  whole  army. 
With  the  exception  of  sending  his  adjutant-general  to  find  and  hurry  Tyler 
forward,  his  subsequent  orders  were  mainly  or  wholly  to  the  troops  under  his 
own  observation.  Unlike  Beauregard,  he  had  no  Johnston  in  rear  with  full 
authority  and  knowledge  of  the  situation  to  throw  forward  reserves  and 
reinforcements.  It  was  not  until  12  o'clock  that  Sherman  received  orders 
from  Tyler  to  cross  the  stream,  which  he  did  at  a  ford  above  the  Stone 
Bridge,  going  to  the  assistance  of  Hunter.  Sherman  reported  to  McDowell 

J  After  the  affair  at  Blackburn's  Ford  on  the  ished  for  my  leniency  to  that  man !     If  there  is 

18th  and  Tyler's  action  in  the  battle  of  the  _!lst,  anything  clearer  to   me  than  anything  else  with 

a  bitterness  between  Tyler  and  McDowell  grew  up  reference  to  our  operations  in  that  campaign,  it  is 

which  lasted   till   they  died.     As   late   as   1884,  that  if  we   had  had  another  commander  for  our 

McDowell,  writing  to  me  of   Tyler's  criticism   of  right  we  should  have  had  a  complete  and  brilliant 

him  after  the  war,  said,  ''How  I  have  been  pun-  success." — J.  B.  F. 


1 88 


MCDOWELL'S  ADVANCE  TO  BULL  RUN. 


CAPTAIN    CHARLES   GRIFFIN,    AFTERWARD 
MAJOR-GENERAL. 


on  the  field  and  joined  in  the  pursuit 
of  Bee's  forces  across  the  valley  of 
Young's  Branch.  Reyes's  brigade,  ac 
companied  by  Tyler  in  person,  followed 
across  the  stream  where  Sherman  ford 
ed,  but  without  uniting  with  the  other 
forces  on  the  field,  made  a  feeble 
advance  upon  the  slope  of  the  plateau 
toward  the  Robinson  house,  and  then 
about  "2  o'clock  filed  off  by  flank  to  its 
left  and,  sheltered  by  the  east  front 
of  the  bluff  that  forms  the  plateau, 
marched  down  Young's  Branch  out  of 
sight  of  the  enemy  and  took  no  further 
part  in  the  engagement.  McDowell 
did  not  know  where  it  was,  nor  did  he 
then  know  that  Schenck's  brigade  of 
Tyler's  division  did  not  cross  the  Eun 
at  all. 

The  line  taken  up  by  Stonewall 
Jackson  upon  which  Bee,  Bartow,  and 
Evans  rallied  on  the  southern  part  of 

the  plateau  was  a  very  strong  one.  The  ground  was  high  and  afforded  the 
cover  of  a  curvilinear  wood  with  the  concave  side  toward  the  Federal  line 
of  attack.  According  to  Beauregard's  official  report  made  at  the  time,  he  had 
upon  this  part  of  the  field,  at  the  beginning,  6500  infantry,  13  pieces  of 
artillery,  and  2  companies  of  cavalry,  and  this  line  was  continuously  reen- 
forced  from  Beauregard's  own  reserves  and  by  the  arrival  of  the  troops  from 
the  Shenandoah  Valley. 

To  carry  this  formidable  position,  McDowell  had  at  hand  the  brigades 
of  Franklin,  Willcox,  Sherman,  and  Porter,  Palmer's  battalion  of  regular  cav 
alry,  and  Ricketts's  and  Griffin's  regular  batteries.  Porter's  brigade  had  been 
reduced  and  shaken  by  the  morning  fight.  Howard's  brigade  was  in  reserve 
and  only  came  into  action  late  in  the  afternoon.  The  men,  unused  to  field  ser 
vice,  and  not  yet  over  the  hot  and  dusty  march  from  the  Potomac,  had  been 
under  arms  since  midnight.  The  plateau,  however,  was  promptly  assaulted, 
the  northern  part  of  it  was  carried,  the  batteries  of  Ricketts  and  Griffin  were 
planted  near  the  Henry  house,  and  McDowell  clambered  to  the  upper  story 
of  that  structure  to  get  a  glance  at  the  whole  field.  Upon  the  Henry  house 
plateau,  of  which  the  Confederates  held  the  southern  and  the  Federals  the 
northern  part,  the  tide  of  battle  ebbed  and  flowed  as  McDowell  pushed  in 
Franklin's,  Willcox's,  Sherman's,  Porter's,  and  at  last  Howard's  brigades,  and 
as  Beauregard  put  into  action  reserves  which  Johnston  sent  from  the  right 
and  reenforcements  which  he  hurried  forward  from  the  Shenandoah  Valley 
as  they  arrived  by  cars.  On  the  plateau,  Beauregard  says,  the  disadvantage 
of  his  "  smooth-bore  guns  was  reduced  by  the  shortness  of  range."  The 


MCDOWELL'S  ADVANCE  TO  BULL  KUN. 


189 


short  range  was  due  to  the  Federal  advance,  and  the  several  struggles  for  the 
plateau  were  at  close  quarters  and  gallant  on  both  sides.     The  batteries  of 
Ricketts  and  Griffin,  by  their  fine  discipline,  wonderful  daring,  and  matchless 
skill,  were  the  prime  features  in  the  fight.     The  battle  was  not  lost  till  they 
were  lost.     When  in  their  advanced  and  perilous  position,  and  just  after  their 
infantry  supports  had  been  driven  over  the  slopes,  a  fatal  mistake  occurred. 
A  regiment  of  infantry  came  out  of  the  woods  on  Griffin's  right,  and  as  he  was 
in  the  act  of  opening  upon  it  with  canister,  he  was  deterred  by  the  assurance 
of  Major  Barry,  the  chief  of  artillery,  that  it  "was  a  regiment  sent  by  Colonel 
Heintzelman  to  support  the  battery  ."&   A  moment  more  and  the  doubtful  regi 
ment  proved  its  identity  by  a  deadly  volley,  and,  as  Griffin  states  in  his  official 
report,  "  every  cannoneer  was  cut  down  and  a  large  number  of  horses  killed, 
____ _____          leaving  the  battery  (which  was  without 

support  excepting  in  name)  perfectly 
helpless."  The  effect  upon  Ricketts  was 
equally  fatal.  He,  desperately  wounded, 
and  Ramsay,  his  lieutenant,  killed,  lay 
in  the  wreck  of  the  battery.  Beauregard 
speaks  of  his  last  advance  on  the  plateau 
as  "leaving  in  our  final  possession  the 
Robinson  and  Henry  houses,  with  most 
of  Ricketts's  and  Griffin's  batteries,  the 
men  of  which  were  mostly  shot  down 
where  they  bravely  stood  by  their  guns." 
Having  become  separated  from  Mc 
Dowell,  I  fell  in  with  Barnard,  his  chief 
engineer,  and  while  together  we  ob 
served  the  New  York  Fire  Zouaves,  who 
had  been  supporting  Griffin's  battery, 
fleeing  to  the  rear  in  their  gaudy  uni 
forms,  in  utter  confusion.  Thereupon 


CAPTAIN    JAMES    ]!.    RICKETTS,     AFTERWARD 
MAJOR-GENERAL. 


&  Griffin  himself  told  me  so  as  we  rode  together 
after  leaving  Centreville.  He  and  I  were  class 
mates  and  warm  friends. —  J.  B.  F. 

Major  Wm.  F.  Barry  gives,  in  his  report,  this 
explanation  of  the  disaster  to  the  batteries  : 

"  Returning  to  the  position  occupied  by  Ricketts'  and 
Griffin's  batteries,  I  received  ail  order  from  General 
McDowell  to  advance  two  batteries  to  an  eminence  [the 
Henry  Hill]  specially  designated  by  him,  about  eight 
hundred  yards  in  front  of  the  line  previously  occupied 
by  our  artillery,  and  very  near  the  position  first  occupied 
by  the.  enemy's  batteries.  I  therefore  ordered  these  two 
batteries  to  move  forward  at  once,  and,  as  soon  as  they 
were  in  motion,  -went  for  and  procured  as  supports  the 
llth  (Fire  Zouaves)  and  the  14th  (Brooklyn)  New  York 
regiments.  I  accompanied  the  former  regiment  to  guide, 
it  to  its  proper  position,  and  Colonel  Heintzelman,  17th 
U.  8.  Infantry,  performed  the  same  service  for  the  14th, 
on  the  right  of  the  llth.  A  squadron  of  United  States 
cavalry  under  Captaiu  Colburn,  1st  Cavalry,  was  subse 
quently  ordered  as  additional  support.  We  were  soon 
upon  the  ground  designated,  and  the  two  batteries  at 
once  opened  a  very  effective  tire  upon  the  enemy's  left. 
The  new  position  had  scarcely  been  occupied  when  a 


troop  of  the  enemy's  cavalry,  debouching  from  a  piece 
of  woods  close  upon  our  right  flank,  charged  down  upon 
the  New  York  llth.  The  Zouaves,  catching  sight  of  the 
cavalry  a  few  moments  before  they  were  upon  them, 
broke  ranks  to  such  a  degree  that  the  cavalry  dashed 
through  without  doing  them  much  harm.  The  Zouaves 
gave  them  a  scattering  fire  as  they  passed,  which  emptied 
five  saddles  and  killed  three  horses.  A  few  minutes  after 
ward  a  regiment  of  the  enemy's  infantry,  covered  by  a 
high  fence,  presented  itself  in  line  on  the  left  and  front 
of  the  two  batteries  at  not  more  than  sixty  or  seventy 
yards'  distance,  and  delivered  a  volley  ftill  upon  the  bat 
teries  and  their  supports.  Lieutenant  Ramsay,  1st  Artil 
lery,  was  killed,  and  Captain  Ricketts,  1st  Artillery,  was 
wounded,  and  a  number  of  men  and  horses  were  killed 
or  disabled  by  this  close  and  well-directed  volley.  The 
llth  and  14th  regiments  instantly  broke  and  fled  in  con 
fusion  to  the  rear,  and  in  spite  of  the  repeated  and  ear 
nest  efforts  of  Colonel  Ileintzelman  with  the  latter,  and 
myself  with  the  former,  refused  to  rally  and  return  to 
the  support  of  the  batteries.  The  enemy,  seeing  the  guns 
thus  abandoned  by  their  supports,  i-ushed  upon  them, 
and  driving  off  the  cannoneers,  who,  with  their  officers, 
stood  bravely  at  their  posts  until  the  last  moment,  cap 
tured  them,  ten  in  number.  These  were  the  only  guns 
taken  by  the  enemy  on  the  field." — EDITORS. 


MCDOWELL'S  ADVANCE   TO  BULL  RUN. 


THE    CONTEST    FOR    THE    HENRY    HILL. 


Colonel  William  T.  Sherman,  -who  commanded  the. 
Third  Brigade  of  Tyler's  division,  describes  as  follows 
some  of  the  efforts  to  regain  the  Henry  Hill  after  the 
capture  of  Griffin's  and  Ricketts's  batteries:  "Before 
reaching  the  crest  of  this  [Henry]  hill,  the  roadway  [see 
picture,  page  186]  was  worn  deep  enough  to  afford  shelter, 
and  I  kept  the  several  regiments  in  it  as  long  as  possible ; 
but  wheu  the  Wisconsin  2d  was  abreast  of  the  enemy,  by 
order  of  Major  Wadsworth,  of  General  McDowell's  staff, 
I  ordered  it  to  leave  the  roadway  by  the  left  flank,  and 
to  attack  the  enemy.  This  regiment  ascended  to  the 
brow  of  the  hill  steadily,  received  the  severe  fire  of  the 
enemy,  returned  it  with  spirit,  and  advanced  delivering 
its  tire.  This  regiment  is  uniformed  in  gray  cloth, 
almost  identical  with  that  of  the  great  bulk  of  the  seces 
sion  army,  and  when  the  regiment  fell  into  confusion 
and  i-etreated  toward  the  road,  there  was  an  universal 
cry  that  they  were  being  tired  on  by  our  own  men.  The 
regiment  rallied  again,  passed  the  brow  of  the  hill  a 
second  time,  but  was  again  repulsed  in  disorder.  By 
this  time  the  New  York  79th  had  closed  up,  and  in  like 


manner  it  was  ordered  to  cross  the  brow  of  the  hill  and 
drive  the  enemy  from  cover.  It  was  impossible  to  get  a 
good  view  of  this  ground.  In  it  there  was  one  battery 
of  artillery,  which  poured  an  incessant  fire  upon  our 
advancing  columns,  and  the  ground  was  very  irregular, 
with  small  clusters  of  pines,  affording  shelter,  of  which 
the  enemy  took  good  advantage.  The  tire  of  rifles  and 
musketry  was  very  severe.  The  79th,  headed  by  its 
colonel  (Cameron),  charged  across  the  hill,  and  for  a 
short  time  the  contest  was  severe.  They  rallied  several 
times  under  tire,  but  finally  broke  and  gained  the  cover 
of  the  hill.  This  left  the  field  open  to  the  New  York 
C9th,  Colonel  Corcoran,  who  in  his  turn  led  his  regiment 
over  the  crest,  and  had  in  full  open  view  the  ground  so 
severely  contested.  The  firing  was  very  severe,  and  the 
roar  of  cannon,  muskets,  and  rifles  incessant.  It  was 
manifest  the  enemy  was  here  in  great  force,  far  supe 
rior  to  us  at  that  point.  The  69th  held  the  ground  for 
some  time,  but  finally  fell  back  in  disorder.  .  . 
Here,  about  3: 30  P.  M.,  began  the  scene  of  confusion  and 
disorder  that  characterized  the  remainder  of  the  day.'' 


I  rode  back  to  where  I  knew  Burnside's  brigade  was  at  rest,  and  stated  to 
Burnside  the  condition  of  affairs,  with  the  suggestion  that  he  form  and  move 
his  brigade  to  the  front.  Returning,  I  again  met  Barnard,  and  as  the  battle 
seemed  to  him  and  me  to  be  going  against  us,  and  not  knowing  where 
McDowell  was,  with  the  concurrence  of  Barnard,  as  stated  in  his  official 
report,  I  immediately  sent  a  note  to  Miles,  telling  him  to  move  two  brigades 
of  his  reserve  up  to  the  Stone  Bridge  and  telegraph  to  Washington  to  send 
forward  all  the  troops  that  could  be  spared. 

After  the  arrival  of  Howard's  brigade,  McDowell  for  the  last  time  pressed 
up  the  slope  to  the  plateau,  forced  back  the  Confederate  line,  and  regained 
possession  of  the  Henry  and  Robinson  houses  and  of  the  lost  batteries.  But 
there  were  no  longer  cannoneers  to  man  or  horses  to  move  these  guns  that 
had  done  so  much.  By  the  arrival  upon  this  part  of  the  field  of  his  own 
reserves  and  Kirby  Smith's  brigade  of  Johnston's  army  about  half-past  3, 


MCDOWELL'S  ADVANCE   TO  BULL  RUN. 


191 


UNIFORM     OF    THE    GARI 
BALDI    GUARDS, 
COLONEL    D'UTASST. 


Beauregard  extended  his  left  to  outflank  McDowell's  shattered,  shortened,  and 
disconnected  line,  and  the  Federals  left  the  field  about  half -past  4.  Until  then 
they  had  fought  wonderfully  well  for  raw  troops.  There  were  no  fresh  forces  on 
the  field  to  support  or  encourage  them,  and  the  men  seemed 
to  be  seized  simultaneously  by  the  conviction  that  it  was  no 
use  to  do  anything  more  and  they  might  as  well  start 
home.  Cohesion  was  lost,  the  organizations  with  some  ex 
ceptions  being  disintegrated,  and  the  men  quietly  walked  off. 
There  was  no  special  excitement  except  that  arising  from 
the  frantic  efforts  of  officers  to  stop  men  who  paid  little 
or  no  attention  to  anything  that  was  said.  On  the  high 
ground  by  the  Matthews  house,  about  where  Evans  had 
taken  position  in  the  morning  to  check  Burnside,  Mc 
Dowell  and  his  staff,  aided  by  other  officers,  made  a 
desperate  but  futile  effort  to  arrest  the  masses  and  form 
them  into  line.  There,  I  went  to  Arnold's  battery  as  it 
came  by,  and  advised  that  he  unlimber  and  make  a  stand  as 
a  rallying-point,  which  he  did,  saying  he  was  in  fair  con 
dition  and  ready  to  fight  as  long  as  there  was  any  fighting 
to  be  done.  But  all  efforts  failed.  The  stragglers  moved 
past  the  guns,  in  spite  of  all  that  could  be  done,  and,  as 
stated  in  his  report,  Arnold  at  my  direction  joined  Sykes's  battalion  of  infan 
try  of  Porter's  brigade  and  Palmer's  battalion  of  cavalry,  all  of  the  regular 
army,  to  cover  the  rear,  as  the  men  trooped  back  in 
great  disorder  across  Bull  Run.  There  were  some  hours 
of  daylight  for  the  Confederates  to  gather  the  fruits  of 
victory,  but  a  few  rounds  of  shell  and  canister  checked 
all  the  pursuit  that  was  attempted,  and  the  occasion  called 
for  no  sacrifices  or  valorous  deeds  by  the  stanch  regulars 
of  the  rear-guard.  There  was  no  panic,  in  the  ordinary 
meaning  of  the  word,  until  the  retiring  soldiers,  guns, 
wagons,  congressmen,  and  carriages  were  fired  upon,  on 
the  road  east  of  Bull  Run.  Then  the  panic  began,  and 
the  bridge  over  Cub  Run  being  rendered  impassable  for 
vehicles  by  a  wagon  that  was  upset  upon  it,  utter  con 
fusion  set  in :  pleasure-carriages,  gun-carriages,  and  am 
munition  wagons  which  could  not  be  put  across  the  Run 
were  abandoned  and  blocked  the  way,  and  stragglers 
broke  and  threw  aside  their  muskets  and  cut  horses 
from  their  harness  and  rode  off  upon  them.  In  leaving 
the  field  the  men  took  the  same  routes,  in  a  general  way, 
by  which  they  had  reached  it.  Hence  when  the  men 
of  Hunter's  and  Heintzelman's  divisions  got  back  to  Cen- 
treville,  they  had  walked  about  25  miles.  That  night  they  walked  back  to 
the  Potomac,  an  additional  distance  of  20  miles ;  so  that  these  undisciplined 
and  unseasoned  men  within  36  hours  walked  fully  45  miles,  besides  fighting 


UNIFORM  OF  BLENKER'S  8TH 
NEW  YORK   VOLUNTEERS. 


I  92 


MCDOWELL'S  ADVANCE  TO  BULL  RUN. 


from  about  10  A.  M.  until  4  p.  M.  on  a  hot  and  dusty  day  in  July.  McDowell 
in  person  reached  Centreville  before  sunset,  |  and  found  there  Miles's  division 
with  Richardson's  brigade  and  3  regiments  of  Runyon's  division,  and  Hunt's, 
Tidball's,  Ayres's,  and  Greene's  batteries  and  1  or  2  fragments  of  batteries, 
making  about  20  guns.  It  was  a  formidable  force,  but  there  was  a  lack 
of  food  and  the  mass  of  the  army  was 
completely  demoralized.  Beauregard 
had  about  an  equal  force  which  had 
not  been  in  the  fight,  consisting  of 
Swell's,  Jones's,  and  Longstreet's  bri 
gades  and  some  troops  of  other  brigades. 
McDowell  consulted  the  division  and 
brigade  commanders  who  were  at  hand 
upon  the  question  of  making  a  stand  or 
retreating.  The  verdict  was  in  favor  of 
the  latter,  but  a  decision  of  officers  one 
way  or  the  other  was  of  no  moment; 
the  men  had  already  decided  for  them 
selves  and  were  streaming  away  to  the 
rear,  in  spite  of  all  that  could  be  done. 
They  had  no  interest  or  treasure  in 
Centreville,  and  their  hearts  were  not 
there.  Their  tents,  provisions,  baggage, 
and  letters  from  home  were  upon  the 
banks  of  the  Potomac,  and  no  power  could  have  stopped  them  short  of 
the  camps  they  had  left  less  than  a  week  before.  As  before  stated,  most 
of  them  were  sovereigns  in  uniform,  not  soldiers.  McDowell  accepted  the 
situation,  detailed  Richardson's  and  Blenker's  brigades  to  cover  the  retreat, 
and  the  army,  a  disorganized  mass,  with  some  creditable  exceptions,  drifted 


BRIGADIEK-GENERAL    LOUIS    BLENKEE.^ 
FROM  A  PHOTOGRAPH. 


4. 1  left  the  field  with  General  Franklin.  His 
brigade  had  dissolved.  We  moved  first  northerly, 
crossed  Bull  Run  below  the  Sudley  Spring  Ford, 
and  then  bore  south  and  east.  Learning  by  inquir 
ies  of  the  men  I  passed  that  McDowell  was  ahead 
of  me,  I  leftFranklin  and  hurried  on  to  Centreville, 
where  I  found  McDowell,  just  after  sunset,  re 
arranging  the  positions  of  his  reserves. — J.  B.  F. 

])  Colonel  Louis  Blenker,  commanding  the  First 
Brigade  of  Miles's  division,  covered  the  retreat  of 
the  army  from  Centreville,  which  he  describes  as 
follows :  "  In  this  position  the  brigade  remained 
until  about  4  o'clock  p.  M.,  when  I  received  orders 
to  advance  upon  the  road  from  Centreville  to  War- 
renton.  This  order  was  executed  with  great  diffi 
culty,  as  the  road  was  nearly  choked  up  by  the 
retreating  baggage-wagons  of  several  divisions, 
and  by  the  vast  numbers  of  flying  soldiers  belong 
ing  to  various  regiments.  .  .  .  The  8th  [New 
York  Volunteer]  Regiment  took  position  one  and  a 
half  miles  south  of  Centreville,  on  both  sides  of  the 
road  leading  to  Bull  Run.  The  29th  [New  York] 
Regiment  stood  half  a  mile  behind  the  8th,  en 
echiquier  by  companies.  The  Garibaldi  Guard  stood 


as  reserve  in  line  behind  the  29th  Regiment. 
The  retreat  of  great  numbers  of  flying  soldiers 
continued  till  9  o'clock  in  the  evening,  the  great 
majority  in  wild  confusion,  but  few  in  collected 
bodies.  Soon  afterward  several  squadrons  of  the 
enemy's  cavalry  advanced  along  the  road  and 
appeared  before  the  outposts.  They  were  chal 
lenged  by  '  Who  comes  there  ? '  and  remaining 
without  any  answer,  I,  being  just  present  at  the 
outposts,  called,  'Union  forever.'  Whereupon  the 
officer  of  the  enemy's  cavalry  commanded,  '  En 
avant ;  en  circuit.  Knock  him  down!'  Now  the 
skirmishers  fired,  when  the  enemy  turned  around, 
leaving  several  killed  and  wounded  on  the  spot. 
About  nine  prisoners,  who  were  already  in  their 
hands,  were  liberated  by  this  action.  Afterward 
we  were  several  times  molested  from  various  sides 
by  the  enemy's  cavalry.  At  about  midnight  the 
command  to  leave  the  position  and  march  to 
Washington  was  given  by  General  McDowell. 
The  brigade  retired  in  perfect  order,  and  ready 
to  repel  any  attack  on  the  road  from  Centre 
ville  to  Fairfax  Court  House,  Annaudale  to  Wash 
ington." —  EDITORS. 


MCDOWELL'S  ADVANCE   TO  BULL  RUN. 


'93 


as  the  men  pleased  away  from  the  scene  of  action.  There  was  no  pur 
suit,  and  the  march  from  Centreville  was  as  barren  of  opportunities  for  the 
rear-guard  as  the  withdrawal  from  the  field  of  battle  had  been.\  When 
McDowell  reached  Fairfax  Court  House  in  the  night,  he  was  in  communica 
tion  with  Washington  and  exchanged  telegrams  with  General  Scott,  in  one  of 
which  the  old  hero  said,  "  We  are  not  discouraged " ;  but  that  dispatch  did 
not  lighten  the  gloom  in  which  it  was  received.  McDowell  was  so  tired  that 
while  sitting  on  the  ground  writing  a  dispatch  he  fell  asleep,  pencil  in  hand, 
in  the  middle  of  a  sentence.  His  adjutant-general  aroused  him  ;  the  dispatch 
was  finished,  and  the  weary  ride  to  the  Potomac  resumed.  When  the  unfortu 
nate  commander  dismounted  at  Arlington  next  forenoon  in  a  soaking  rain, 
after  32  hours  in  the  saddle,  his  disastrous  campaign  of  6  days  was  closed. 

The  first  martial  effervescence  of  the  country  was  over.  The  three- 
months  men  went  home,  and  the  three-months  chapter  of  the  war  ended  — 
with  the  South  triumphant  and  confident;  the  North  disappointed  but 
determined. 


\  The  revised  losses  are  as  follows :  Federal, 
16  officers  and  444  enlisted  men  killed;  78  offi 
cers  and  1046  enlisted  men  wounded  ;  50  officers 
and  1262  enlisted  men  missing;  25  pieces  of  artil- 

*  The  scene  in  Washington  after  the  battle  has 
been  graphically  described  by  Walt  Whitman,  from 
whose  "  Specimen  Days  andCollect"  (Philadelphia: 
Rees,  Welch  &  Co.)  we  make  these^xtracts  : 

"  The  defeated  troops  commenced  pouring  into  Wash 
ington  over  the  Long  Bridge  at  daylight  on  Monday, 
22d — day  drizzling  all  throngh  with  rain.  The  Saturday 
and  Sunday  of  the  battle  (20th,  21st)  had  been  parched 
and  hot  to  an  extreme  —  the  dust,  the  grime  and  smoke, 
in  layers,  sweated  in,  follow'd  by  other  layers  again 
sweated  in,  absorb'd  by  those  excited  souls  —  their 
clothes  all  saturated  with  the  clay-powder  tilling  the 
air  —  stirr'd  up  everywhere  on  the  dry  roads  and  trod 
den  fields  by  the  regiments,  swarming  wagons,  artillery, 
etc. —  all  the  men  with  this  coating  of  murk  and  sweat 
and  rain,  now  recoiling  back,  pouring  over  the  Long 
Bridge — a  horrible  march  of  twenty  miles,  returning  to 
Washington  baffled,  humiliated,  panic-struck.  Where 
are  the  vaunts  and  the  proud  boasts  with  which  you 
went  forth?  Where  are  your  banners,  and  your  bands 
of  music,  and  your  ropes  to  bring  back  your  prisoners  ? 
Well,  there  isn't  a  baud  playing  —  and  there  isn't  a  flag 
but  clings  ashamed  and  lank  to  its  staff. 

"  The  sun  rises,  but  shines  not.  The  men  appear,  at 
first  sparsely  and  shame-faced  enough,  then  thicker,  in 
the  streets  of  Washington  —  appear  in  Pennsylvania 
Avenue,  and  ou  the  steps  and  basement  entrances.  They 
come  along  in  disorderly  mobs,  some  in  squads,  strag 
glers,  companies.  Occasionally,  a  rare  regiment,  in  per 
fect  order,  with  its  officers  (some  gaps,  dead,  the  true 
braves),  marching  in  silence,  with  lowering  faces,  stern, 
weary  to  sinking,  all  black  and  dirty,  but  every  man 
with  liis  musket,  and  stepping  alive  ;  but  these  are  the 
exceptions.  Sidewalks  of  Pennsylvania  Avenue,  Four 
teenth  street,  etc.,  crowded,  jamm'd  with  citizens,  dar 
kies,  clerks,  everybody,  lookers-on  ;  women  in  the  win 
dows,  curious  expressions  from  faces,  as  those  swarms 
of  dirt-cover'd  return'd  soldiers  there  (Will  they  never 
end?)  move  by;  but  nothing  said,  no  comments ;  (half 
our  lookers-on  '  secesh '  of  the  most  venomous  kind  — 


lery  and  a  large  quantity  of  small  arms.  Confeder 
ate,  25  officers  and  362  enlisted  men  killed;  63 
officers  and  1519  enlisted  men  wounded ;  1  officer 
and  12  enlisted  men  missing. — J.  B.  P. 

they  say  nothing;  but  the  devil  snickers  in  their  faces). 
During  the  forenoon,  Washington  gets  all  over  motley 
with  these  defeated  soldiers  —  queer-looking  objects, 
strange  eyes  and  faces,  drench'd  (the  steady  rain  drizzles 
on  all  day)  and  fearfully  worn,  hungry,  haggard,  blister'd 
in  the  feet.  Good  people  (but  not  over-many  of  them 
either)  hurry  up  something  for  their  grub.  They  put 
wash-kettles  on  the  fire,  for  soup,  for  coffee.  They  set 
tables  on  the  sidewalks  —  wagon-loads  of  bread  are  pur- 
ehas'd,  swiftly  cut  in  stout  chunks.  Here  are  two  aged 
ladies,  beautiful,  the  first  in  the  city  lor  culture  and 
charm,  they  stand  with  store  of  eating  and  drink  at  an 
improvis'd  table  of  rough  plank,  and  give  food,  and  have 
the  store  replenished  from  their  house  every  half-hour 
all  that  day ;  and  there  in  the  rain  they  stand,  active, 
silent,  white-hair'd,  and  give  food,  though  the  tears 
stream  down  their  cheeks,  almost  without  intermission, 
the  whole  time.  Amid  the  deep  excitement,  crowds  and 
motion,  and  desperate  eagerness,  it  seems  strange  to  see 
many,  very  many,  of  the  soldiers  sleeping  —  in  the  midst 
of  all,  sleeping  sound.  They  drop  down  anywhere,  on 
the  steps  of  houses,  up  close  by  the  basements  or  fences, 
on  the  sidewalk,  aside  on  some  vacant  lot,  and  deeply 
sleep.  A  poor  seventeen  or  eighteen  year  old  boy  lies 
there,  on  the  stoop  of  a  grand  house ;  he  sleeps  so  calmly, 
so  profoundly.  Some  clutch  their  muskets  firmly  even  in 
sleep.  Some  in  squads ;  comrades,  brothers,  close  to 
gether —  and  on  them,  as  they  lay,  sulkily  drips  the 
rain.  .  .  . 

"  But  the  hour,  the  day,  the  night  pass'd,  and  what 
ever  returns,  an  hour,  a  day,  a  night  like  that  can  never 
again  return.  The  President,  recovering  himself,  begins 
that  very  night  —  sternly,  rapidly  sets  about  the  task  of 
reorganizing  his  forces,  and  placing  himself  in  positions 
for  future  and  surer  work.  If  there  were  nothing  else  of 
Abraham  Lincoln  for  history  to  stamp  him  with,  it  is 
enough  to  send  him  with  his  wreath  to  the  memory  of  all 
future  time,  that  he  endured  that  hour,  that  day,  bitterer 
than  gall  —  indeed  a  crucifixion  day — that  it  did  not 
conquer  him — that  he  unflinchingly  stemm'd  it,  and 
resolv'd  to  lift  himself  and  the  Union  out  of  it." 


VOL.  I.    13 


THE   OPPOSING    ARMIES    AT   THE    FIRST   BULL    RUN. 


[The  composition  and  losses  of  each  army  as  here  stated  give  the  gist  of  all  the  data  obtainable  in  the  Official  Records. 
K  stands  for  killed  ;  w  for  wounded ;  in  for  captured  or  missing  :  c  for  captured.— EDITORS.] 

COMPOSITION  AND   LOSSES  OF  THE   UNION   ARMY. 
Brig.-Gen.  Irvin  McDowell.    Staff  loss:  \v,  l.    (Capt.  O.  H.  Tillingliast,  mortally  wounded.) 


FIRST  DIVISION,  Brig.-Gen.  Daniel  Tyler.  Start'  loss: 
w,  2.  First  Brigade,  Col.  Erasmus  D.  Keyes :  2d  Me., 
Col.  C.  D.  Jameson;  1st  Comi.,  Col.  G.  S.  Burnhani;  2d 
Conn.,  Col.  A.  H.  Terry ;  3d  Conn.,  Col.  John  L.  Chat- 
fleld.  Brigade  loss :  k,  19;  w,  50;  in,  154  =  223.  Second 
Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  Robert  C.  Sehenck:  2dN.Y.  (militia), 
CoL  G.  W.  B.  Tompkins ;  1st  Ohio,  Col.  A.  MeD.  McCook ; 
2d  Ohio,  Lieut.-Col.  Roduey  Mason;  E,  2d  U.  S.  Arty., 
Capt.  J.  H.  Carlisle.  Brigade  loss :  k,  21 ;  w,  25  ;  in,  52  = 
98.  Third  Brigade,  Col.  W.  T.  Sherman:.  13th  N.  Y.,  Col. 
I.  F.  Qniuby  ;  69th  N.  Y.,  Col.  M.  Corcoran  (w  and  c), 
Capt.  James  Kelly;  79th  N.  Y.,  Col.  James  Cameron  (k) ; 
2d  Wis.,  Lieut.-Col.  H.  W.  Peck;  E,  3d  U.  S.  Arty.,  Capt. 
R.  B.  Ayres.  Brigade"  loss  :  k,  107  ;  w,  205 ;  111,  293=  605. 
Fourth  Brigade,  JCol,  Israel  B.  Richardson:  1st  Miiss., 
Col.  Robert  Cowdin;  12th  N.  Y.,  Col.  Ezra  L.  Walrath: 
2d  Mich.,  Major  A.  W.  Williams ;  3d  Mich.,  Col.  Daniel 
MeCounell ;  G,  1st  U.  S.  Arty.,  Lieut.  John  Edwards ; 
M,  2d  U.  S.  Arty.,  Capt.  Henry  J.  Hunt.  This  brigade  was 
only  slightly  en  gaged  in  front  of  Blackburn's  Ford,  with 
the  loss  of  one  officer  killed. 

SECOND  DIVISION,  Col.  D.  Hunter  (w),  Col.  Andrew 
Porter.  Stuff  loss  :  w,  1 ;  m,  1=2.  First  Brigade,  Col. 
Andrew  Porter :  8th  N.  Y.  (militia),  Col.  Geo.  Lyons ;  14th 
N.  Y.  (militia),  Col.  A.  M.  Wood  (w  and  c),  Lieut.-Col.  E. 
B.  Fowler;  27th  N.  Y.,  Col.  H.  W.  Slocum  (w),  Major  J. 
J.  Bartlett ;  Battalion  U.  S".  IiiTantryTMajor  George 
Sykes;  Battalion  U.  S.  Marines,  Major  J.  G.  Reynolds; 
Battalion  U.  S.  Cavalry,  Major  I.  N.  Palmer ;  D,  5th  U 
S.  Arty.,  Capt.  Charles  Griffin.  Brigade  loss:  k,  86;  w, 
177;  m,  201  =  461.  Second  Brigade,  Col.  Ambrose  E. 
Bnrnside  :  2dN.  H.,  Col.  Oilman  Marston  (w),  Lieut.-Col. 
^FTsTisTJe;  1st  R.  I.,  Major  J.  P.  Balchf  2d  R.  I.  (with 
battery),  Col.  John  S.  Slocum  (k),  Lieut.-Col.  Frank 
Wheatou;  71st  N.  Y.  (with  two  howitzers),  Col.  H.  P. 
Martin.  Brigade  loss :  k,  58 ;  w,  171 ;  m,  134  =  363. 

Total  loss  of  the  Union  army  :  killed,  460;  wound< 


THIRD  DIVISION,  Col.  Samuel  P.  Hcmtzelmnn.  First 
Brigade,  Col.  W.  B.  Franklin  :  5th  MassTTCoTTFTC'.  Law 
rence;  llth  Mass.,  Col.  George  Clark,  Jr.;  1st  Minn., 
Col.  W.  A.  Gorman ;  1, 1st  U.  S.  Arty.,  Capt.  J.  B.  Rick- 
etts  (w  andc),  Lieut.  Edmund  Kirby.  Brigade  loss:  k, 
70;  w,  197;  m,  92=359.  Second  Brigade,  Col.  Orlando 
B.  Willcox  (w  and  c),  Col.  J.  H.  H.  Ward:  llth  N.  Y., 
Lieut.-Col.  N.  L.  Faniham ;  38th  N.  Y.,  Col.  J.  II.  II. 
Ward,  Lieut.-Col.  A.  Farnsworth;  1st  Mich.,  Major  A.  F. 
Bidwell ;  4th  Michigan,  Col.  D.  A.  Woodbury ;  I),  2d  IT.  S. 
Arty.,  Capt.  Richard  Arnold.  Brigade  loss:  k,  G5;  w, 
177;  m,lSO  =  432.  Third  Brigade,  Col.  Oliver  O.  How 
ard:  3d  Me.,  Major  H.  G.  Staples;  4th  Me.,  Col.  H.  G. 
Berry;  5th  Me.,  Col.  M.  H.  Duunell;  2d  Vt.,  Col.  Henry 
Whiting.  Brigade  loss:  k,  27  ;  w,  100;  m,  !)8  =  225. 

FOURTH  (RESERVE)  DIVISION.  [Not  on  the  field  of  bat 
tle. 1  Brig.-Gen.  Theodore  Runyon.  Militia:  1st  N.  J., 
Col.  A.  J.  Johnson  ;  2d  N.  J.,  Col.  H.  M.  Baker;  3d  X.  J., 
Col.  AVm  Naptou ;  4th  N.  J.,  Col.  Matthew  Miller,  Jr. 
Volunteers:  1st  N.  J.,  Col.  W.  R.  Montgomery:  2d  N. 
J.,  Col.  Geo.  W.  McLean ;  3d  N.  J.,  Col.  George  W.  Taylor; 
41st  N.  Y.,  Col.  Leopold  von  Gilsa. 

FIFTH  DIVISION.  [In  reserve  at  Ceiitreville  and  not 
engaged  in  the  battle  proper.  It  had  some  skirmishing 
during  the  day  and  while  covering  the  retreat  of  the 
army.]  Col.  Dixon  S.  Miles.  First  Brigade,  Col.  Louis 
Bleiiker:  8th  X.*'.  (Vols.)  Lieut.-Col.  Julius  Stahel;  29th 
N.  Y.,  Col.  Adolph  von  Stein wehr;  39th  N.  Y.  (Garibaldi 
Guards),  Col.  F.  G.  D'Utassy ;  27th  Penna..  Col.  Max 
Einstein;  A,  2d  U.  S.  Arty.,  Capt.  John  C.  Tidball ;  Book- 
wood's  N.  Y.  battery,  Captain  Charles  Bookwood.  Bri 
gade  loss  :  k,  6;  w,  16  ;  in,  96  =  118.  Second  Brigade,  Col. 
Thomas  A.  Davies  :  16th  N.Y.,  Lieut.-Col.  Samuel  Marsh  ; 
18th  N.Y.,  Col.  W.  A.  Jackson  ;  31st  N.  Y.,  Col.  C.  E.  Pratt ; 
32d  N.  Y.,  Col.  R.  Matheson;  G,  2d  U.  S.  Arty.,  Lieut. 
O.  D.  Greene.  Brigade  loss  :  w,  2  ;  m,  1  =  3. 
d,  1124;  captured  or  missing,  1312,— grand  total,  289(1. 


STRENGTH   OF   THE   UNION   ARMY. 


General  James  B.  Fry,  who  was  General  McDowell's 
adjutant-general,  prepared  in  October,  1884,  a  statement 
of  the  strength  of  the  army,  in  brief  as  follows : 

"  It  was  not  practicable  at  the  time  to  ascertain  the 
strength  of  the  army  with  accuracy;  and  it  is  impossible 
now  to  make,  a  return  which  can  be  pronounced  abso 
lutely  correct. 

"  The  abstract  which  appears  on  page  309,  vol.  ii., '  Offi 
cial  Records,'  is  not  a  return  of  McDowell's  army  at  the 
battle  of  Bull  Rim,  and  was  not  prepared  by  me,  but,  as 
I  understand,  has  been  compiled  since  the  war.  It  pur 
ports  to  give  the  strength  of  the  '  Department  of  North 
eastern  Virginia,'  July  16th  and  17th,  not  of  McDowell's 
army,  July  21st.  It  does  not  show  the  losses  resulting 
from  the  discharge  of  the  4th  Pennsylvania  Infantry  and 
Varian's  New  York  battery,  which  marched  to  the  rear 
on  the  morning  of  the  21st,  nor  the  heavy  losses  inci 
dent  to  the  march  of  the  army  from  the  Potomac ;  it 
embraces  two  regiments — the  21st  and  25th  New  York  In 
fantry—which  were  not  with  the  army  in  the  field  ;  and 
it  contains  the  strength  of  Company  E,  Second  United 
States  Cavalry,  as  a  special  item,  whereas  that  company 
is  embraced  in  the  strength  of  the  Second  (Hunter's) 
Division,  to  which  it,  with  the  rest  of  the  cavalry, 
belonged. 


"In  his  report  of  the  battle  (p.  324,  vol.  ii.,  'Official 
Records')  General  McDowell  says  he  crossed  Bull  Run 
'  with  about  eighteen  thousand  men.'  I  collected  infor 
mation  to  that  effect  for  him  at  the  time.  His  statement 
is  substantially  correct.  The,  following  is  an  exhibit  in 
detail  of  the  forces  actually  engaged  : 


COMMANDS. 

Officers. 

Enlisted 
men. 

General  staff                                

19 

First  Division,  two  brigades  .... 
Second  Division,  two  brigades   . 
Third  Division,  three  brigades.  .  . 

284 
252 
341 

5,008 
5,717 
6,891 

Total      seven  brigades  

896 

17,076 

"Only  Reyes's  and  Sherman's  brigades  of  the  four 
brigades  of  the  First  Division  crossed  Bull  Run. 

"  The  Fifth  Division,  with  Richardson's  brigade  of  the 
First  Division  attached,  was  in  reserve  at  and  in  front 
of  Ceiitreville.  Some  of  it  was  lightly  engaged  on  our 
side  of  Bull  Run  in  repelling  a  feeble  advance  of  tin; 
enemy.  The  Fourth  (Reserve)  Division  was  left  to 
guard  our  communications  with  the  Potomac,  its  ad 
vance  being  seven  miles  in  rear  of  Centreville. 


194 


THE  OPPOSING  ARMIES  AT  THE  FIRST  BULL  RUN. 


"That  is  to  say,  McDowell  crossed  Bull  Run  with  896 
officers,  17,676  rank  and  tile,  and  24  pieces  of  artillery. 

"  The  artillerymen  who  crossed  Bull  Run  are  embraced 
in  the  figures  of  the  foregoing  table.  The  guns  were  as 
follows:  Ricketts's  Battery,  6  10-pouuder  rifle  guns; 
Griffin's  Battery,  4  10-pounder  rifle  guns,  2  12-pounder. 
howitzers;  Arnold's  Battery,  2  13-pounder  rifle  guns, 
2  6-pounder  smooth-bores ;  R.  I.  Battery,  6  13-pounder 
rifles;  71st  X.  Y.  Reg't's  Battery,  2  Dahlgren  howitzers. 


"  The  artillery,  in  addition  to  that  which  crossed  Bull 
Run,  was  as  follows:  Hunt's  Battery,  4  12-pouuder 
rifle  guns  ;  Carlisle's  Battery,  2  13-pounder  rifle  guns,  2 
6-pounder  smooth-bore  guns ;  Tidball's  Battery,  2 
6-pouuder  smooth-bore  guns,  2  12-pouuder  howitzers; 
Greene's  Battery,  4  10-pounder  rifle  guns;  Ayres's  Bat 
tery,  2  10-pounder  rifle  guns,  2  6-pounder  smooth-bore 
guus,  2  12-pounder  howitzers  ;  Edwards's  Battery,  2  20- 
pounder  rifle  guns,  1  30-pounder  rifle  gun." 


COMPOSITION   AND   LOSSES  OF   THE   CONFEDERATE  ARMY. 

General  Joseph  E.  Johnston. 


AHMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC,  Brig.-Gen.  G.  T.  Eeauregard. 
First  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  M.  L.  BouhaiifT  llth  X.  C.,  CoT. 
W.  W.  Kirkland;  2d  S.  C.,  Col.  J.  B.  Kershaw;  3d  S.  C., 
Col.  J.  II.  Williams  ;  7th  S.  C.,  Col.  Thomas  G.  Bacon; 
8th  S.  C.,  Col.  E.  B.  C.  Cast.  Loss:  k,  10;  w,  66  =  76. 
Second  Brigade  [not  actively  engaged],  Brig.-Gen.  R.  S. 
Ewell  :(5th~5Ta?>  Col.  R.  E.  Rodes;  6th  Ala.,  Col.  J.  J. 
Seibels  ;BTTi  La.,  Col.  J.  <3.  Seymour.  Third  Briyude, 
Brig.-Gen.  D.  R.  Jones :  17th  Miss.,  Col.  W.  S.  Feather- 
ston ;  18th  Miss.,  Col.  E.  R.  Burt ;  5th  S.  C.,  Col.  M.  Jen 
kins.  Loss:  k,  13;  w,  62  =  75.  Fourth  Brigade  [not  act 
ively  engaged],  Brig.-Gen.  James  Longstrect :  5th  N.  C., 
Lieut.-Col.  Jones;  1st  Va.,  Major  F.  G.  Skinner;  llth  Va., 
Col.  S.  Garland,  Jr. ;  17th  Va.,  Col.  M.  D.  Corse.  Loss :  k,  2 ; 
w.  12  =  14.  Fifth  Brigade,  Col.  P.  St.  6eo.  Cocke :  8th  Va., 
Col.  Eppa  Huutoii ;  18th  Va.,  Col.  R.  E.  Withers ;  19th  Va., 
Lieut.-Col.  J.  B.  Strauge ;  28th  Va.,  Col.  R.  T.  Preston ; 
49th  Va.  (3  cos.i,  Col.  Win.  Smith.  Loss :  k,  23 ;  w,  79;  m,  2 
=  104.  Sixth  Brigade,  Col.  Junal  A.  Earl£:  7th  La.,  Col. 
Harry  T.  Hays;  13th  Miss.,  Col.  Win.  Barksdalc;  7th  Va., 
Col.  J.  L.  Kemper;  24th  Va.,  Lieut.  Col.  P.  Hairston,  Jr. 
Loss:  k,  12;  w,  67  =  79.  Evans's  command  (temporarily 
organized),Col.  X.  G.  Evans:  1st  La.  Battalion,  Major  C. 
R. Wheat  ( w) ;  4th  S.  C.,  Col.  J.  B.  E.  Sloan  ;  Cavalry,  Capt. 
W.  R.  Terry ;  Artillery,  Lieut.  G.  S.  Davidson.  Loss:  k, 
20 ;  w,  118 ;  m,  8  =  146.  Reserve  Briyude  fnot  actively  en 
gaged],  Brig.-Gen.  T.  H.  Holmes:  1st  Arkansas  and  2d 
Tennessee.  Unattached  Infantry.  8th  La.  :  Col.  H.  B. 
Kelly;  Hampton's  (S.  C.)  Legion,  Col.  Wade  Hampton. 


Loss  :  k,  19;  w,  100 ;  m,  2  =  121.  Cavalry  :  30th  Virginia, 
Col.  R.  C.  W.  Radford ;  Harrison's  Battalion  ;  Ten  inde 
pendent  companies.  Loss  :  k,  5 ;  w,  8  =  13.  Artillery  : 
Battalion  Washington  Artillery  (La.),  Major  J.  B.  Wal 
ton  ;  Alexandria  ( Va.)  Battery,  Capt.  Del  Kemper ;  La 
tham's  (Va.)  Battery,  Capt.  H.  G.  Latham ;  Loudoun 
(Va.)  Artillery,  Capt.  Arthur  L.  Rogers  ;  Shields's  (Va.) 
Battery,  Capt.  J.  C.  Shields.  Loss :  k,  2  ;  w,  8  =  10.  Total 
loss  Army  of  the  Potomac:  k,  105  ;  w,  519  ;  m,  12  =  636. 

ARMY  OF  THE  SHENANDOAH,  General  Joseph  E. 
Johnston.  First  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  T.  J.  Jackson :  2d 
Va.,  Col.  J.  W.  Allen  ;  4th  Va.,  Col.  Jt~F.  PrestonT  5th 
Va.,  Col.  Kenton  Harper;  27th  Va.,  Lieut.-Col.  John 
Echols;  33d  Va.,  Col.  A.  C.  Cummings.  Loss:  k,  119;  w, 
442  =  561.  Second  Brigade,  Col.  F.  S.  Bartow  (k) :  7th  Ga., 
Col.  Lucius  J.  Gartrell ;  8th  Ga.,  Lieut.-Col.  W.  M.  Gard 
ner.  Loss:  k,  60;  w,  293  =  353.  Third  Brigade,  Brig.- 
Gen.  B.  E.  Bee  (k) :  4th  Ala  ,  Col.  Jones  (k),  Col.  S.  R. 
Gist;  £d  Miss^.  Col.  W.  C^Falknei-:  llth  Miss.  (2  cos.), 
Lieut.-Col.  P.  F.  Liddell ;  6th  X.  C.,  Col.  C.  F.  Fisher  (k). 
Loss:  k,  95 ;  w,  309;  m,  1  =405.  Fourth  Brigade,  Brig.- 
Gen.  E.  K.  Smith  (w),  Col.  Arnold  Elzey :  1st  Md.  Bat 
talion,  Lieut.-Col.  George  H.  Steuart ;  3d  Tennessee, 
Col.  John  C.  Vaughn  ;  10th  Va.,  Col.  S.  B.  Gibbons ;  13th 
Va.,  Col.  A.R  Hill.  Loss  :  k,  8 ;  w,  19  =  27.  Artillery: 
Imbodenvs7s"fanard's,  Pendleton's,  Alburtis's,  and  Beck- 
ham's  batteries.  Cavalry :  1st  Va.,  Col.  J.  E.  R.  Stuart. 
(Loss  not  specifically  reported.)  Total  loss  Armyof  the 
Shenandoah  :  k,  282  ;  w,  1063 ;  m,  1  =  1346. 


Total  loss  of  the  Confederate  Army  :  killed,  387;  wounded,  1582 ;  captured  or  missing,  13,— grand  total,  1982. 


STRENGTH  OF  THE  CONFEDERATE  ARMY. 


In  October,  1884,  General  Thomas  Jordan,  who  was 
General  Beauregard's  adjutant-general,  prepared  a 
statement  of  the  strength  of  the  Coufederate  army  at 
Bull  Run  or  Manassas,  of  which  the  following  is  a  con 
densation  : 

"  So  far  as  the  troops  of  Beauregard's  immediate  Army 
of  the  Potomac  are  concerned,  this  statement  is  con 
densed  from  two  that  I  prepared  with  the  sub-returns 
of  all  the  commands  before  me  as  the  adjutant-gen 
eral  of  that  army,  September  25th,  1861,  and  I  will 
vouch  for  its  exactness.  In  respect  to  the  Army  of  the 
Sheuandoah,  I  have  been  obliged  to  present  an  estimate 
of  8340  as  the  total  of  the  rank  and  file  of  Johnston's 
army,  my  authority  for  which  is  a  statement  written 
by  me  in  the  official  report  of  the  battle,  and  based,  as  I 
distinctly  recollect,  upon  official  documents  and  returns 
in  my  hands  at  the  time,  of  the  accuracy  of  which  I  was 
and  am  satisfied.  The  totals  of  General  Beauregard's 
Army  of  the  Potomac  are  : 


ARMY   OF  THE  POTOMAC  AVAILABLE  ON  THE  FIELD. 

Generals  and  Staff 37 

Infantry,  Rank  and  File 19,569 

Cavalry,       "             "    1,468 

Artillery,      "               "     826 


Field  Guns 


21,900 

27 


ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC   ACTIVELY    ENGAGED. 

Generals  and  Staff 10 

Infantry,  Rank  and  File 8,415 

Cavalry,         "              "     1,000 

Artillery,        "  "    . 

9,713 
Field  Guns...  17 


RECAPITULATION. 

Infantry. 

Army  of  the  Potomac  —  Rank  and  File  engaged 8.415    . 

Shenandoah,    "  "  "          (estimated)     7,684    . 


Total  Rank  and  File,  both  Confederate  armies,  engaged  ....      16,099 


Car  air  y. 

1,000 

300 


Artillery.  Staff. 
288  ...  10  . 
350  .  6  . 


1,300 


638 


16 


Total. 
9,713 
8,340 

18,053 ' 


THE    FIRST   BATTLE   OF    BULL   RUN 


BY    G.   T.    BKAUREGARD,    GENERAL,    C.  S.  A. 

SOON  after  the  first  conflict  between  the  authorities  of  the 
Federal  Union   and  those  of  the   Confederate  States    had 
occurred  in  Charleston  Harbor,  by  the  bombardment  of  Fort 
Sumter, — which,  beginning  at  4:30  A.  M.  on  the  12th  of  April, 
1861,  forced  the  surrender  of  that  fortress  within  thirty  hours 
thereafter  into  my  hands, — I  was  called  to  Richmond,  which 
by  that  time  had  become  the  Confederate  seat  of  government, 
and  was  directed  to  "  assume  command  of  the  Confederate 
troops  on   the  Alexandria  line."     Arriving   at   Manassas 
Junction,  I  took  command  on  the  2d  of  June,  forty-nine 
days  after  the  evacuation  of  Fort  Sumter. 

Although  the  position  at  the  time  was  strategically  of 
commanding  importance  to  the  Confederates,  the  mere 
terrain  was  not  only  without  natural  defensive  advan 
tages,  but,  on  the  contrary,  was  absolutely  unfavorable. 
Its  strategic  value  was  that,  being  close  to  the  Federal 
capital,  it  held  in  observation  the  chief  army  then  being 
assembled  near  Arlington  by  General  McDowell,  under  the  immediate  eye  of 
the  commander-in-chief,  General  Scott,  for  an  offensive  movement  against 
Richmond ;  and  while  it  had  a  railway  approach  in  its  rear  for  the  easy  accu 
mulation  of  reenforcements  and  all  the  necessary  munitions  of  war  from  the 
southward,  at  the  same  time  another  (the  Manassas  Gap)  railway,  diverging 
laterally  to  the  left  from  that  point,  gave  rapid  communications  with  the  fer 
tile  valley  of  the  Shenandoah,  then  teeming  with  live  stock  and  cereal  subsist 
ence,  as  well  as  with  other  resources  essential  to  the  Confederates.  There  was 
this  further  value  in  the  position  to  the  Confederate  army :  that  during  the 
period  of  accumulation,  seasoning,  and  training,  it  might  be  fed  from  the  fat 
fields,  pastures,  and  garners  of  Loudoun,  Fauquier,  and  the  Lower  Shenandoah 
Valley  counties,  which  otherwise  must  have  fallen  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy. 
But,  on  the  other  hand,  Bull  Run,  a  petty  stream,  was  of  little  or  no  defen 
sive  strength ;  for  it  abounded  in  fords,  and  although  for  the  most  part  its 
banks  were  rocky  arid  abrupt,  the  side  from  which  it  would  be  approached 
offensively  in  most  places  commanded  the  opposite  ground. 

At  the  time  of  my  arrival  at  Manassas,  a  Confederate  army  under  General 
Joseph  E.  Johnston  was  in  occupation  of  the  Lower  Shenandoah  Valley,  along 
the  line  of  the  Upper  Potomac,  chiefly  at  Harper's  Ferry,  which  was  regarded 
as  the  gateway  of  the  valley  and  of  one  of  the  possible  approaches  to  Rich 
mond  ;  a  position  from  which  he  was  speedily  forced  to  retire,  however,  by  a 
flank  movement  of  a  Federal  army,  under  the  veteran  General  Patterson, 
thrown  across  the  Potomac  at  or  about  Martinsburg.  On  my  other  or  right 
flank,  so  to  speak,  a  Confederate  force  of  some  2500  men  under  General 


19fi 


THE  FIRST  BATTLE  OF  BULL  RUN. 


197 


TON,  THE  HOME  OF  GENERAL  KOBEUT  E.  LEE. 


Holmes  occupied  the  position  of  Aquia  Creek  on  the  lower  Potomac,  upon 
the  line  of  approach  to  Richmond  from  that  direction  through  Fredericks- 
burg.  The  other  approach,  that  by  way  of  the  James  River,  was  held  by 
Confederate  troops  under 
Generals  Huger  and  Ma- 
gruder.  Establishing  small 
outposts  at  Leesburg  to  ob 
serve  the  crossings  of  the 
Potomac  in  that  quarter, 
and  at  Fairfax  Court  House 
in  observation  of  Arlington, 
with  other  detachments  in 
advance  of  Manassas  toward 
Alexandria  on  the  south 
side  of  the  railroad,  from 
the  very  outset  I  was  anx 
iously  aware  that  the  sole 
military  advantage  at  the 
moment  to  the  Confeder 
ates  was  that  of  holding  the 
interior  lines.  On  the  Fed 
eral  or  hostile  side  were  all  material  advantages,  including  superior  numbers, 
largely  drawn  from  the  old  militia  organizations  of  the  great  cities  of  the 
North,  decidedly  better  armed  and  equipped  than  the  troops  under  me,  and 
strengthened  by  a  small  but  incomparable  body  of  regular  infantry  as  well 
as  a  number  of  batteries  of  regular  field  artillery  of  the  highest  class,  and  a 
very  large  and  thoroughly  organized  staff  corps,  besides  a  numerous  body 
of  professionally  educated  officers  in  command  of  volunteer  regiments J  — 
all  precious  military  elements  at  such  a  juncture. 

Happily,  through  the  foresight  of  Colonel  Thomas  Jordan, — whom  General 
Lee  had  placed  as  the  adjutant-general  of  the  forces  there  assembled 
before  my  arrival, —  arrangements  were  made  which  enabled  nle  to  receive 
regularly,  from  private  persons  at  the  Federal  capital,  most  accurate  infor 
mation,  of  which  politicians  high  in  council,  as  well  as  War  Department 
clerks,  were  the  unconscious  ducts.  On  the  4th  of  July,  my  pickets  hap 
pened  upon  and  captured  a  soldier  of  the  regulars,  who  proved  to  be  a  clerk 
in  the  adjutant-general's  office  of  General  McDowell,  intrusted  with  the  special 
duty  of  compiling  returns  of  his  army — a  work  which  he  confessed,  without 
reluctance,  he  had  just  executed,  showing  the  forces  under  McDowell  about 
the  1st  of  July.  His  statement  of  the  strength  and  composition  of  that  force 
tallied  so  closely  with  that  which  had  been  acquired  through  my  Washington 
agencies,  already  mentioned,  as  well  as  through  the  leading  Northern  news 
papers  (regular  files  of  which  were  also  transmitted  to  my  headquarters  from 
the  Federal  capital),  that  I  could  not  doubt  them. 

)  The  professionally  educated  officers  on  the  Confederate  side  at  Bull  Run  included  Generals  Johnston, 
Beauregard,  Stonewall  Jackson,  Longstreet,  Kirby  Smith,  Ewell,  Early,  Bee,  D.  R.  Jones,  Holmes, 
Evans,  Elzey,-and  Jordan,  all  in  high  positions,  besides  others  not  so  prominent. —  EDITORS. 


198  THE  FIRST  BATTLE  OF  BULL  RUN. 

In  these  several  ways,  therefore,  I  was  almost  as  well  advised  of  the 
strength  of  the  hostile  army  in  my  front  as  its  commander,  who,  I  may  men 
tion,  had  been  a  classmate  of  mine  at  West  Point.  Under  those  circumstances 
I  had  become  satisfied  that  a  well-eqnipped,  well-constituted  Federal  army  at 
least  50,000  strong,  of  all  arms,  confronted  me  at  or  about  Arlington,  ready 
and  on  the  very  eve  of  an  offensive  operation  against  me,  and  to  meet  which 
I  could  muster  barely  18,000  men  with  29  field-guns.  & 

Previously, — indeed,  as  early  as  the  middle  of  June, — it  had  become  appar 
ent  to  my  mind  that  through  only  one  course  of  action  could  there  be  a  well- 
grounded  hope  of  ability  on  the  part  of  the  Confederates  to  encounter 
successfully  the  offensive  operations  for  which  the  Federal  authorities  were 
then  vigorously  preparing  in  my  immediate  front,  with  so  consummate  a 
strategist  and  military  administrator  as  Lieutenant-General  Scott  in  general 
command  at  Washington,  aided  by  his  accomplished  heads  of  the  large  Gen 
eral  Staff  Corps  of  the  United  States  Army.  This  course  was  to  make  the 
most  enterprising,  warlike  use  of  the  interior  lines  which  we  possessed,  for  the 
swift  concentration  at  the  critical  instant  of  every  available  Confederate  force 
upon  the  menaced  position,  at  the  risk,  if  need  were,  of  sacrificing  all  minor 
places  to  the  one  clearly  of  major  military  value — there  to  meet  our  adversary 
so  offensively  as  to  overwhelm  him,  under  circumstances  that  must  assure 
immediate  ability  to  assume  the  general  offensive  even  upon  his  territory, 
and  thus  conquer  an  early  peace  by  a  few  well-delivered  blows. 

My  views  of  such  import  had  been  already  earnestly  communicated  to  the 
proper  authorities ;  but  about  the  middle  of  July,  satisfied  that  McDowell  was 
on  the  eve  of  taking  the  offensive  against  me,  I  dispatched  Colonel  James 
Chesnut,  of  South  Carolina,  a  volunteer  aide-de-camp  on  my  staff  who  had 
served  on  an  intimate  footing  with  Mr.  Davis  in  the  Senate  of  the  United 
States,  to  urge  in  substance  the  necessity  for  the  immediate  concentration  of 
the  larger  part  of  the  forces  of  Johnston  and  Holmes  at  Manassas,  so  that 
the  moment  McDowell  should  be  sufficiently  far  detached  from  Washing 
ton,  I  would  be  enabled  to  move  rapidly  round  his  more  convenient  flank 
upon  his  rear  and  his  communications,  and  attack  him  in  reverse,  or  get 
between  his  forces,  then  separated,  thus  cutting  off  his  retreat  upon  Arling 
ton  in  the  event  of  his  defeat,  and  insuring  as  an  immediate  consequence 
the  crushing  of  Patterson,  the  liberation  of  Maryland,  and  the  capture  of 
Washington. 

This  plan  was  rejected  by  Mr.  Davis  and  his  military  advisers  (Adjutant- 
General  Cooper  and  General  Lee),  who  characterized  it  as  "  brilliant  and  com 
prehensive,"  but  essentially  impracticable.  Furthermore,  Colonel  Chesnut 
came  back  impressed  with  the  views  entertained  at  Richmond, —  as  he  com 
municated  at  once  to  my  adjutant-general, —  that  should  the  Federal  army 
soon  move  offensively  upon  my  position,  my  best  course  would  be  to  retire 
behind  the  Rappahannock  and  accept  battle  there  instead  of  at  Manassas. 
In  effect,  it  was  regarded  as  best  to  sever  communications  between  the  two  chief 
Confederate  armies,  that  of  the  Potomac  and  that  of  the  Shenandoah,  with  the 

3>For  the  forces  actually  engaged  in  the  campaign  and  on  the  field,  see  pp.  194-5. — EDITORS. 


THE  FIRST  BATTLE  OF  BULL  RUN. 


199 


inevitable  immediate  result  that  Johnston  would  be  forced  to  leave  Patterson 
in  possession  of  the  Lower  Shenandoah  Valley,  abandoning  to  the  enemy  so 

large  a  part  of  the  most  resourceful 
sections  of  Virginia,  and  to  retreat 
southward  by  way  of  the  Luray  Val 
ley,  pass  across  the  Blue  Ridge  at 
Thornton's  Gap  and  unite  with  me 
after  all,  but  at  Fredericksburg, 
much  nearer  Richmond  than  Manas- 
sas.  These  views,  however,  were  not 
made  known  to  me  at  the  time,  and 
happily  my  mind  was  left  free  to  the 
grave  problem  imposed  upon  me  by 
the  rejection  of  my  plan  for  the  im 
mediate  concentration  of  a  materially 
larger  force, —  I.  e.,  the  problem  of 
placing  and  using  my  resources  for 
a  successful  encounter  behind  Bull 
Eun  with  the  Federal  army,  which  I 
was  not  permitted  to  doubt  was  about 
to  take  the  field  against  me. 

It  is  almost  needless  to  say  that  I 
had  caused  to  be  made  a  thorough 
reconnoissance  of  all  the  ground  in 
my  front  and  flanks,  and  had  made 
myself  personally  acquainted  with  the 
most  material  points,  including  the 
region  of  Sudley's  Church  on  my  left, 
where  a  small  detachment  was  posted  in  observation.  Left  now  to  my  own 
resources,  of  course  the  contingency  of  defeat  had  to  be  considered  and  pro 
vided  for.  Among  the  measures  of  precaution  for  such  a  result,  I  ordered 
the  destruction  of  the  railroad  bridge  across  Bull  Run  at  Union  Mills,  on.  my 
right,  in  order  that  the  enemy,  in  the  event  of  my  def eat,  should  not  have  the 
immediate  use  of  the  railroad  in  following  up  their  movement  against  Rich 
mond —  a  railroad  which  could  have  had  no  corresponding  value  to  us 
eastward  beyond  Manassas  in  any  operations  on  our  side  with  Washington 
as  the  objective,  inasmuch  as  any  such  operations  must  have  been  made  by 
the  way  of  the  Upper  Potomac  and  upon  the  rear  of  that  city. 

Just  before  Colonel  Chesnut  was  dispatched  011  the  mission  of  which  I  have 
spoken,  a  former  clerk  in  one  of  the  departments  at  Washington,  well  known 
to  him,  had  volunteered  to  return  thither  and  bring  back  the  latest  informa 
tion  of  the  military  and  political  situation  from  our  most  trusted  friends. 
His  loyalty  to  our  cause,  his  intelligence,  and  his  desire  to  be  of  service  being 
vouched  for,  he  was  at  once  sent  across  the  Potomac  below  Alexandria,  merely 
accredited  by  a  small  scrap  of  paper  bearing  in  Colonel  Jordan's  cipher  the 
two  words,  "  Trust  bearer,"  with  which  he  was  to  call  at  a  certain  house  in 


MAP  OF  THE  BULL  BUX  CAMPAIGN. 


200  THE  FIRST  BATTLE  OF  BULL  RUN. 

Washington  within  easy  rifle-range  of  the  White  House,  ask  for  the  lady  of 
the  house,  and  present  it  only  to  her.  This  delicate  mission  was  as  fortunately 
as  it  was  deftly  executed.  In  the  early  morning,  as  the  newsboys  were  cry 
ing  in  the  empty  streets  of  Washington  the  intelligence  that  the  order  was 
given  for  the  Federal  army  to  move  at  once  upon  my  position,  that  scrap  of 
paper  reached  the  hands  of  the  one  person  in  all  that  city  who  could  extract 
any  meaning  from  it.  With  no  more  delay  than  was  necessary  for  a  hurried 

breakfast  and  the  writing  in  cipher  by  Mrs.   G of  the  words,  "  Order 

issued  for  McDowell  to  inarch  upon  Manassas  to-night,"  my  agent  was  placed 
in  communication  with  another  friend,  who  carried  him  in  a  buggy  with  a 
relay  of  horses  as  swiftly  as  possible  down  the  eastern  shore  of  the  Potomac 
to  our  regular  ferry  across  that  river.  Without  untoward  incident  the 
momentous  dispatch  was  quickly  delivered  into  the  hands  of  a  cavalry 
courier,  and  by  means  of  relays  it  was  in  my  hands  between  8  and  9  o'clock 
that  night.  Within  half  an  hour  my  outpost  commanders,  advised  of  what 
was  impending,  were  directed,  at  the  first  evidence  of  the  near  presence  of 
the  enemy  in  their  front,  to  fall  back  in  the  manner  and  to  positions  already 
prescribed  in  anticipation  of  such  a  contingency  in  an  order  confidentially 
communicated  to  them  four  weeks  before,  and  the  detachment  at  Leesburg 
was  directed  to  join  me  by  forced  marches.  Having  thus  cleared  my  decks 
for  action,  I  next  acquainted  Mr.  Davis  with  the  situation,  and  ventured  once 
more  to  suggest  that  the  Army  of  the  Shenandoah,  with  the  brigade  at  Fred- 
ericksburg  or  Aquia  Creek,  should  be  ordered  to  reenforce  me, —  suggestions 
that  were  at  once  heeded  so  far  that  General  Holmes  was  ordered  to  carry  his 
command  to  my  aid,  and  General  Johnston  was  given  discretion  to  do  like 
wise.  After  some  telegraphic  discussion  with  me,  General  Johnston  was 
induced  to  exercise  this  discretion  in  favor  of  the  swift  march  of  the  Army 
of  the  Shenandoah  to  my  relief;  and  to  facilitate  that  vital  movement,  I 
hastened  to  accumulate  all  possible  means  of  railway  transport  at  a  desig 
nated  point  on  the  Manassas  Gap  railroad  at  the  eastern  foot  of  the  Blue 
Ridge,  to  which  Johnston's  troops  directed  their  march.  However,  at  the 
same  time,  I  had  submitted  the  alternative  proposition  to  General  Johnston, 
that,  having  passed  the  Blue  Ridge,  he  should  assemble  his  forces,  press 
forward  by  way  of  Aldie,  north-west  of  Manassas,  and  fall  upon  McDowell's 
right  rear ;  while  I,  prepared  for  the  operation,  at  the  first  sound  of  the  con 
flict,  should  strenuously  assume  the  offensive  in  my  front.  The  situation  and 
circumstances  specially  favored  the  signal  success  of  such  an  operation.  The 
march  to  the  point  of  attack  could  have  been  accomplished  as  soon  as  the 
forces  were  brought  ultimately  by  rail  to  Manassas  Junction ;  our  enemy, 
thus  attacked  so  nearly  simultaneously  on  his  right  flank,  his  rear,  and  his 
front,  naturally  would  suppose  that  I  had  been  able  to  turn  his  flank  while 
attacking  him  in  front,  and  therefore,  that  I  must  have  an  overwhelming 
superiority  of  numbers;  and  his  forces,  being  new  troops,  most  of  them 
under  fire  for  the  first  time,  must  have  soon  fallen  into  a  disastrous  panic. 
Moreover,  such  an  operation  must  have  resulted  advantageously  to  the  Con 
federates,  in  the  event  that  McDowell  should,  as  might  have  been  antici- 


THE  FIRST  BATTLE  OF  BULL  RUN. 


20 1 


pated,  attempt  to  strike  the  Manassas  Gap  railway  to  my  left,  and  thus  cut 
off  railway  communications  between  Johnston's  forces  and  my  own,  instead 
of  the  mere  effort  to  strike  my  left  flank  which  he  actually  essayed.  | 

It  seemed,  however,  as  though  the  deferred  attempt  at  concentration 
was  to  go  for  naught,  for  on  the  morning  of  the  18th  the  Federal  forces 

were  massed  around 
Centreville,  but  three 
miles  from  Mitchell's 
Ford,  and  soon  were 
seen  advancing  upon 
the  roads  leading  to 
that  and  Blackburn's 
Ford.  [See  map,  page 
180.]  My  order  of  bat 
tle,  issued  in  the  night 
of  the  17th,  contem 
plated  an  offensive 
return,  particularly 
from  the  strong  bri 
gades  on  the  right  and 
right  center.  The  Fed 
eral  artillery  opened 
in  front  of  both  fords, 
and  the  infantry, 
while  demonstrating  in  front  of  Mitchell's  Ford,  endeavored  to  force  a  pas 
sage  at  Blackburn's.  Their  column  of  attack,  Tyler's  division,  was  opposed 
by  Long-street's  forces,  to  the  reenforcement  of  which  Early's  brigade,  the 
reserve  line  at  McLean's  Ford,  was  ordered1  up.  The  Federals,  after  sev 
eral  attempts  to  force  a  passage,  met  a  final  repulse  and  retreated.  After 
their  infantry  attack  had  ceased,  about  1  o'clock,  the  contest  lapsed  into  an 
artillery  duel,  in  which  the  Washington  Artillery  of  New  Orleans  won  credit 
against  the  renowned  batteries  of  the  United  States  regular  army.  A  comical 
effect  of  this  artillery  fight  was  the  destruction  of  the  dinner  of  myself  and 
staff  by  a  Federal  shell  that  fell  into  the  fire-place  of  my  headquarters  at 
the  McLean  House.  J) 

Our  success  in  this  first  limited  collision  was  of  special  prestige  to  my  army 
of  new  troops,  and,  moreover,  of  decisive  importance  by  so  increasing  Gen 
eral  McDowell's  caution  as  to  give  time  for  the  arrival  of  some  of  General 


THE  MCLEAN  HOUSE.   GENERAL  BEAUREGARD'S  HEADQUARTERS 
NEAR  MANASSAS.    FROM  A  PHOTOGRAI'II. 


4-"!  am,  however,  inclined  to  believe  he  [the 
enemy]  may  attempt  to  turn  my  left  flank  by  a 
movement  in  the  direction  of  Vienna,  Frying- 
paii  Church,  and,  possibly,  Gum  Spring,  and  thus 
cut  off  Johnston's  line  of  retreat  and  commu 
nication  with  this  place  [Manassas  Junction] 
via  the  Manassas  Gap  railroad,  while  threaten 
ing  my  own  communications  with  Richmond 
and  depots  of  supply  by  the  Alexandria  and 
Orange  railroad,  and  opening  his  communica 


tions  with  the  Potomac  through  Leesburg  and 
Edward's  Perry." — (Extract  from  a  letter  ad 
dressed  by  General  Beauregard  to  Jefferson  Davis, 
July  llth,  1861.) 

J)  It  is  denied  that  a  serious  attempt  "to  force 
a  passage"  was  made  oiithe  18th.  (Seepage  178.) 
This  engagement  was  called  by  the  Confederates 
the  battle  of  Bull  Run,  the  main  fight  on  the  21st 
being  known  in  the  South  as  the  battle  of  Manassas 
(pronounced  Ma-nass'-sa). — EDITORS. 


202  THE  FIRST  BATTLE  OF  BULL   RUN. 

Johnston's  forces.  But  while  on  the  19th  I  was  awaiting  a  renewed  and  gen 
eral  attack  by  the  Federal  army,  I  received  a  telegram  from  the  Richmond 
military  authorities,  urging  me  to  withdraw  my  call  on  General  Johnston  on 
account  of  the  supposed  impracticability  of  the  concentration  —  an  abiding 
conviction  which  had  been  but  momentarily  shaken  by  the  alarm  caused  by 
McDowell's  march  upon  Richmond. \  As  this  was  not  an  order  in  terms,  but 
an  urgency  which,  notwithstanding  its  superior  source,  left  me  technically 
free  and  could  define  me  as  responsible  for  any  misevent,  I  preferred  to  keep 
both  the  situation  and  the  responsibility,  and  continued  every  effort  for  the 
prompt  arrival  of  the  Shenandoah  forces,  being  resolved,  should  they  come 
before  General  McDowell  again  attacked,  to  take  myself  the  offensive.  Gen 
eral  McDowell,  fortunately  for  my  plans,  spent  the  19th  and  20th  in  recon- 
noissances ;  •&  and,  meanwhile,  General  Johnston  brought  8340  men  from 
the  Shenandoah  Valley,  with  20  guns,  and  General  Holmes  1265  rank  and 
file,  with  6  pieces  of  artillery,  from  Aquia  Creek.  As  these  forces  arrived 
(most  of  them  in  the  afternoon  of  the  20th)  I  placed  them  chiefly  so  as 
to  strengthen  my  left  center  and  left,  the  latter  being  weak  from  lack  of 
available  troops. 

The  disposition  of  the  entire  force  was  now  as  follows  [see  map,  page 
180] :  At  Union  Mills  Ford,  Ewell's  brigade,  supported  by  Holmes's ;  at 
McLean's  Ford,  D.  R.  Jones's  brigade,  supported  by  Early's ;  at  Blackburn's 
Ford,  Longstreet's  brigade ;  at  Mitchell's  Ford,  Bonham's  brigade.  Cocke's  bri 
gade  held  the  line  in  front  and  rear  of  Bull  Run  from  Bonham's  left,  covering 
Lewis's,  Ball's,  and  Island  fords,  to  the  right  of  Evans's  demi-brigade,  which 
covered  the  Stone  Bridge  and  a  farm  ford  about  a  mile  above,  and  formed 
part  also  of  Cocke's  command.  The  Shenandoah  forces  were  placed  in 
reserve  —  Bee's  and  Bartow's  brigades  between  McLean's  and  Blackburn's 
fords,  and  Jackson's  between  Blackburn's  and  Mitchell's  fords.  This  force 
mustered  29,188  rank  and  file  and  55  guns,  of  which  21,923  infantry,  cavalry, 
and  artillery,  with  29  guns,  belonged  to  my  immediate  forces,  i.  e.,  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac. 

The  preparation,  in  front  of  an  ever-threatening  enemy,  of  a  wholly  volun 
teer  army,  composed  of  men  very  few  of  whom  had  ever  belonged  to  any 
military  organization,  had  been  a  work  of  many  cares  not  incident  to  the 
command  of  a  regular  army.  These  were  increased  by  the  insufficiency  of 
my  staff  organization,  an  inefficient  management  of  the  quartermaster's 
department  at  Richmond,  and  the  preposterous  mismanagement  of  the  com 
missary-general,  who  not  only  failed  to  furnish  rations,  but  caused  the 
removal  of  the  army  commissaries,  who,  under  my  orders,  procured  food  from 

\  [TELEGRAM.]        RICHMOND,  July  19,  1861.  as  transportation  permits.     The  enemy  is  advised 

GENERAL  BEAUREGARD,  Manassas,  Va.  at  Washington  of  the  projected  movement  of  Gen- 

We  have  no  intelligence  from  General  Johnston,  erals   Johnston   and   Holmes,  and  may  vary  his 

If  the  enemy  in  front  of  you  has  abandoned  an  plans  in  conformity  thereto, 

immediate  attack,  and  General  Johnston  has  not  S.  COOPER,  Adjutant-General, 
moved,  you  had  better  withdraw  your  call  upon 

him,  so  that  he  may  be  left  to  his  full  discretion.  ^f  Lack  of  rations,  as  well  as  the  necessity  for 

All  the  troops  arriving  at  Lynchburg  are  ordered  information,    detained    McDowell    at    Centreville 

to  join  you.     From  this  place  we  will  send  as  fast  during  these  two  days. — EDITORS. 


THE  FIRST  BATTLE  OF  BULL  RUN.  203 

the  country  in  front  of  us  to  keep  the  army  from  absolute  want — supplies 
that  were  otherwise  exposed  to  be  gathered  by  the  enemy.  So  specially 
severe  had  been  the  recent  duties  at  headquarters,  aggravated  not  a  little  by 
night  alarms  arising  from  the  enemy's  immediate  presence,  that,  in  the  even 
ing  of  the  20th,  I  found  my  chief -of -staff  sunken  upon  the  papers  that  covered 
his  table,  asleep  in  sheer  exhaustion  from  the  overstraining  and  almost  slum- 
berless  labor  of  the  last  days  and  nights.  I  covered  his  door  with  a  guard 
to  secure  his  rest  against  any  interruption,  after  which  the  army  had  the 
benefit  of  his  usual  active  and  provident  services. 

There  was  much  in  this  decisive  conflict  about  to  open,  not  involved  in 
any  after  battle,  which  pervaded  the  two  armies  and  the  people  behind  them 
and  colored  the  responsibility  of  the  respective  commanders.  The  political 
hostilities  of  a  generation  were  now  face  to  face  with  weapons  instead  of 
words.  Defeat  to  either  side  would  be  a  deep  mortification,  but  defeat  to  the 
South  must  turn  its  claim  of  independence  into  an  empty  vaunt ;  and  the 
defeated  commander  on  either  side  might  expect,  though  not  the  personal 
fate  awarded  by  the  Carthaginians  to  an  unfortunate  commander,  at  least  a 
moral  fate  quite  similar.  Though  disappointed  that  the  concentration  I  had 
sought  had  not  been  permitted  at  the  moment  and  for  the  purpose  preferred 
by  me,  and  riot  withstanding  the  non-arrival  of  some  five  thousand  troops  of 
the  Shenandoah  forces,  my  strength  was  now  so  increased  that  I  had  good 
hope  of  successfully  meeting  my  adversary. 

General  Johnston  was  the  ranking  officer,  and  entitled,  therefore,  to  assume 
command  of  the  united  forces ;  but  as  the  extensive  field  of  operations  was 
one  which  I  had  occupied  since  the  beginning  of  June,  and  with  Avhich  I  was 
thoroughly  familiar  in  all  its  extent  and  military  bearings,  while  he  was 
wholly  unacquainted  with  it,  and,  moreover,  as  I  had  made  my  plans  and  dis 
positions  for  the  maintenance  of  the  position,  General  Johnston,  in  view  of 
the  gravity  of  the  impending  issue,  preferred  not  to  assume  the  responsi 
bilities  of  the  chief  direction  of  the  forces  during  the  battle,  but  to  assist  me 
upon  the  field.  Thereupon,  I  explained  my  plans  and  purposes,  to  which 
he  agreed.  J 

SUNDAY,  July  21st,  bearing  the  fate  of  the  new-born  Confederacy,  broke 
brightly  over  the  fields  and  woods  that  held  the  hostile  forces.  My  scouts, 
thrown  out  in  the  night  toward  Centreville  along  the  Warrenton  Turnpike,  had 
reported  that  the  enemy  was  concentrating  along  the  latter.  This  fact, 
together  with  the  failure  of  the  Federals  in  their  attack  upon  my  center  at 
Mitchell's  and  Blackburn's  fords,  had  caused  me  to  apprehend  that  they  would 
attempt  my  left  flank  at  the  Stone  Bridge,  and  orders  were  accordingly  issued 
by  half-past  4  o'clock  to  the  brigade  commanders  to  hold  their  forces  in 
readiness  to  move  at  a  moment's  notice,  together  with  the  suggestion  that  the 
Federal  attack  might  be  expected  in  that  quarter.  Shortly  afterward  the 
enemy  was  reported  to  be  advancing  from  Centreville  on  the  Warrenton 

}  See  General  Beauregard's  postscript  (page  226),  and  General  Johnston's  consideration  of  the 
same  topic  in  the  paper  to  follow  (page  245),  and  his  postscript  (page  258). —  EDITORS. 


CALE  OF    IOOO  FEET 


|_ 


TOl'OGRAPHICAL    MAP    OF    THE    BULL    RUN    BATTLE-FIELD. 

The  original  of  this  map  was  made  for  General  Beauregard,  soon  after  the  battle,  from  actual  surveys  by 
Captain  I).  B.  Harris,  assisted  by  Mr.  John  Grant. 

204 


THE  FIRST  BATTLE  OF  BULL  RUN.  205 

Turnpike,  and  at  half-past  5  o'clock  as  deploying  a  force  in  front  of  Evans. 
As  their  movement  against  my  left  developed  the  opportunity  I  desired,  I 
immediately  sent  orders  to  the  brigade  commanders,  both  front  and  reserves, 
on  my  right  and  center  to  advance  and  vigorously  attack  the  Federal  left 
flank  and  rear  at  Centreville,  while  my  left,  under  Cocke  and  Evans  with 
their  supports,  would  sustain  the  Federal  attack  in  the  quarter  of  the  Stone 
Bridge,  which  they  were  directed  to  do  to  the  last  extremity.  The  center  was 
likewise  to  advance  and  engage  the  enemy  in  front,  and  directions  were  given 
to  the  reserves,  when  without  orders,  to  move  toward  the  sound  of  the  heaviest 
firing.  The  ground  in  our  front  on  the  other  side  of  Bull  Run  afforded  par 
ticular  advantage  for  these  tactics.  Centreville  was  the  apex  of  a  triangle  — 
its  short  side  running  by  the  Warrenton  Turnpike  to  Stone  Bridge,  its  base 
Bull  Run,  its  long  side  a  road  that  ran  from  Union  Mills  along  the  front  of  my 
other  Bull  Run  positions  and  trended  off  to  the  rear  of  Centreville,  where 
McDowell  had  massed  his  main  forces  ;  branch  roads  led  up  to  this  one  frcm 
the  fords  between  Union  Mills  and  Mitchell's.  My  forces  to  the  right  of  the 
latter  ford  were  to  advance,  pivoting  on  that  position;  Bonham  was  in 
advance  from  Mitchell's  Ford,  Longstreet  from  Blackburn's,  D.  R.  Jones  from 
McLean's,  and  Ewell  from  Union  Mills  by  the  Centreville  road.  Ewell,  as  hav 
ing  the  longest  march,  was  to  begin  the  movement,  and  each  brigade  was  to 
be  followed  by  its  reserve.  In  anticipation  of  this  method  of  attack,  and  to 
prevent  accidents,  the  subordinate  commanders  had  been  carefully  instructed 
in  the  movement  by  me,  as  they  were  all  new  to  the  responsibilities  of  com 
mand.  They  were  to  establish  close  communication  with  each  other  before 
making  the  attack.  About  half -past  8  o'clock  I  set  out  with  General  John 
ston  for  a  convenient  position, —  a  hill  in  rear  of  Mitchell's  Ford, —  where  we 
waited  for  the  opening  of  the  attack  on  our  right,  from  which  I  expected  a 
decisive  victory  by  midday,  with  the  result  of  cutting  off  the  Federal  army 
from  retreat  upon  Washington. 

Meanwhile,  about  half -past  5  o'clock,  the  peal  of  a  heavy  rifled  gun  was 
heard  in  front  of  the  Stone  Bridge,  its  second  shot  striking  through  the  tent 
of  my  signal -officer,  Captain  E.  P.  Alexander ;  and  at  6  o'clock  a  full  rifled 
battery  opened  against  Evans  and  then  against  Cocke,  to  which  our  artillery 
remained  dumb,  as  it  had  not  sufficient  range  to  reply.  But  later,  as  the 
Federal  skirmish-line  advanced,  it  was  engaged  by  ours,  thrown  well  forward 
on  the  other  side  of  the  Run.  A  scattering  musketry  fire  followed,  and 
meanwhile,  about  7  o'clock,  I  ordered  Jackson's  brigade,  with  Imboden's  and 
five  guns  of  Walton's  battery,  to  the  left,  with  orders  to  support  Cocke  as 
well  as  Bonham ;  and  the  brigades  of  Bee  and  Bartow,  under  the  command 
of  the  former,  were  also  sent  to  the  support  of  the  left. 

At  half -past  8  o'clock  Evans,  seeing  that  the  Federal  attack  did  not  increase 
in  boldness  and  vigor,  and  observing  a  lengthening  line  of  dust  above  the 
trees  to  the  left  of  the  Warrenton  Turnpike,  became  satisfied  that  the  attack 
in  his  front  was  but  a  feint,  and  that  a  column  of  the  enemy  was  moving 
around  through  the  woods  to  fall  on  his  flank  from  the  direction  of  Sudley 
Ford.  Informing  his  immediate  commander,  Cocke,  of  the  enemy's  move- 


206  THE  FIRST  BATTLE  OF  BULL   RUN. 

ment,  and  of  his  own  dispositions  to  meet  it,  he  left  4  companies  under  cover 
at  the  Stone  Bridge,  and  led  the  remainder  of  his  force,  6  companies  of 
Sloan's  4th  South  Carolina  and  Wheat's  battalion  of  Louisiana  Tigers,  with  2 
6-pounder  howitzers,  across  the  valley  of  Young's  Branch  to  the  high  ground 
beyond  it.  Resting  his  left  on  the  Sudley  road,  he  distributed  his  troops  on 
each  side  of  a  small  copse,  with  such  cover  as  the  ground  afforded,  and  look 
ing  over  the  open  fields  and  a  reach  of  the  Sudley  road  which  the  Federals 
must  cover  in  their  approach.  His  two  howitzers  were  placed  one  at  each 
end  of  his  position,  and  here  he  silently  awaited  the  enemy  now  drawing  near. 

The  Federal  turning  column,  about  18,000  strong,  with  24  pieces  of  artil 
lery,  had  moved  down  from  Centreville  by  the  Warrenton  Turnpike,  and 
after  passing  Cub  Run  had  struck  to  the  right  by  a  forest  road  to  cross  Bull 
Run  at  Sudley  Ford,  about  3  miles  above  the  Stone  Bridge,  moving  by  a 
long  circuit  for  the  purpose  of  attacking  my  left  flank.  The  head  of  the  col 
umn,  Burnside's  brigade  of  Hunter's  division,  at  about  9:45  A.  M.  debouched 
from  the  woods  into  the  open  fields,  in  front  of  Evans.  Wheat  at  once 
engaged  their  skirmishers,  and  as  the  Second  Rhode  Island  regiment 
advanced,  supported  by  its  splendid  battery  of  6  rifled  guns,  the  fronting 
thicket  held  by  Evans's  South  Carolinians  poured  forth  its  sudden  volleys, 
while  the  2  howitzers  flung  their  grape-shot  upon  the  attacking  line,  which 
was  soon  shattered  and  driven  back  into  the  woods  behind.  Major  Wheat, 
after  handling  his  battalion  with  the  utmost  determination,  had  fallen  severely 
wounded  in  the  lungs.  Burnside's  entire  brigade  was  now  sent  forward  in  a 
second  charge,  supported  by  8  guns ;  but  they  encountered  again  the  unflinch 
ing  fire  of  Evans's  line,  and  were  once  more  driven  back  to  the  woods,  from 
the  cover  of  which  they  continued  the  attack,  reenforced  after  a  time  by  the 
arrival  of  8  companies  of  United  States  regular  infantry,  under  Major  Sykes, 
with  6  pieces  of  artillery,  quickly  followed  by  the  remaining  regiments  of 
Andrew  Porter's  brigade  of  the  same  division.  The  contest  here  lasted 
fully  an  hour;  meanwhile  Wheat's  battalion,  having  lost  its  leader,  had 
gradually  lost  its  organization,  and  Evans,  though  still  opposing  these 
heavy  odds  with  undiminished  firmness,  sought  reenforcement  from  the 
troops  in  his  rear. 

General  Bee,  of  South  Carolina,  a  man  of  marked  character,  whose  com 
mand  lay  in  reserve  in  rear  of  Cocke,  near  the  Stone  Bridge,  intelligently 
applying  the  general  order  given  to  the  reserves,  had  already  moved  toward 
the  neighboring  point  of  conflict,  and  taken  a  position  with  his  own  and  Bar- 
tow's  brigades  on  the  high  plateau  which  stands  in  rear  of  Bull  Run  in  the 
quarter  of  the  Stone  Bridge,  and  overlooking  the  scene  of  engagement  upon 
the  stretch  of  high  ground  from  which  it  was  separated  by  the  valley  of 
Young's  Branch.  This  plateau  is  inclosed  on  three  sides  by  two  small  water 
courses,  which  empty  into  Bull  Run  within  a  few  yards  of  each  other,  a  half 
mile  to  the  south  of  the  Stone  Bridge.  Rising  to  an  elevation  of  quite  100 
feet  above  the  level  of  Bull  Run  at  the  bridge,  it  falls  off  on  three  sides  to  the 
level  of  the  inclosing  streams  in  gentle  slopes,  but  furrowed  by  ravines  of 


THE  FIRST  BATTLE  OF  BULL  RUN.  207 

irregular  directions  and  length,  and  studded  with  clumps  and  patches  of  young 
pine  and  oaks.  The  general  direction  of  the  crest  of  the  plateau  is  oblique  to 
the  course  of  Bull  Run  in  that  quarter  and  to  the  Sudley  and  turnpike  roads, 
which  intersect  each  other  at  right  angles.  On  the  north-western  brow,  over 
looking  Young's  Branch,  and  near  the  Sudley  road,  as  the  latter  climbs  over 
the  plateau,  stood  the  house  of  the  widow  Henry,  while  to  its  right  and  for 
ward  on  a  projecting  spur  stood  the  house  and  sheds  of  the  free  negro  Robin 
son,  just  behind  the  turnpike,  densely  embowered  in  trees  and  shrubbery  and 
environed  by  a  double  row  of  fences  on  two  sides.  Around  the  eastern  and 
southern  brow  of  the  plateau  an  almost  unbroken  fringe  of  second-growth 
pines  gave  excellent  shelter  for  our  marksmen,  who  availed  themselves  of  it 
with  the  most  satisfactory  skill.  To  the  west,  adjoining  the  fields  that  sur 
rounded  the  houses  mentioned,  a  broad  belt  of  oaks  extends  directly  across 
the  crest  on  both  sides  of  the  Sudley  road,  in  which,  during  the  battle,  the 
hostile  forces  contended  for  the  mastery.  General  Bee,  with  a  soldier's  eye  to 
the  situation,  skillfully  disposed  his  forces.  His  two  brigades  on  either  side 
of  Imboden's  battery  —  which  he  had  borrowed  from  his  neighboring  reserve, 
Jackson's  brigade  —  were  placed  in  a  small  depression  of  the  plateau  in 
advance  of  the  Henry  house,  whence  he  had  a  full  view  of  the  contest  on  the 
opposite  height  across  the  valley  of  Young's  Branch.  Opening  with  his 
artillery  upon  the  Federal  batteries,  he  answered  Evans's  request  by  advising 
him  to  withdraw  to  his  own  position  on  the  height;  but  Evans,  full  of  the 
spirit  that  would  not  retreat,  renewed  his  appeal  that  the  forces  in  rear 
would  come  to  help  him  hold  his  ground.  The  newly  arrived  forces  had 
given  the  Federals  such  superiority  at  this  point  as  to  dwarf  Evans's  means 
of  resistance,  and  General  Bee,  generously  yielding  his  own  better  judgment 
to  Evans's  persistence,  led  the  two  brigades  across  the  valley  under  the  fire 
of  the  enemy's  artillery,  and  threw  them  into  action  —  1  regiment  in  the  copse 
held  by  Colonel  Evans,  2  along  a  fence  on  the  right,  and  2  under  General 
Bartow  on  the  prolonged  right  of  this  line,  but  extended  forward  at  a  right 
angle  and  along  the  edge  of  a  wood  not  more  than  100  yards  from  that 
held  by  the  enemy's  left,  where  the  contest  at  short  range  became  sharp  and 
deadly,  bringing  many  casualties  to  both  sides.  The  Federal  infantry, 
though  still  in  superior  numbers,  failed  to  make  any  headway  against  this 
sturdy  van,  notwithstanding  Bee's  whole  line  was  hammered  also  by  the 
enemy's  powerful  batteries,  until  Heintzelmaii's  division  of  2  strong  brigades, 
arriving  from  Sudley  Ford,  extended  the  fire  011  the  Federal  right,  while  its 
battery  of  6  10-pounder  rifled  guns  took  an  immediately  effective  part  from  a 
position  behind  the  Sudley  road.  Against  these  odds  the  Confederate  force 
was  still  endeavoring  to  hold  its  ground,  when  a  new  enemy  came  into  the 
field  upon  its  right.  Major  Wheat,  with  characteristic  daring  and  restless 
ness,  had  crossed  Bull  Run  alone  by  a  small  ford  above  the  Stone  Bridge,  in 
order  to  reconnoiter,  when  he  and  Evans  had  first  moved  to  the  left,  and,  fall 
ing  on  some  Federal  scouts,  had  shouted  a  taunting  defiance  and  withdrawn, 
not,  however,  without  his  place  of  crossing  having  been  observed.  This  dis- 


208 


THE  FIRST  BATTLE  OF  BULL  RUN. 


209 


closure  was  now  utilized  by  Sherman's  (W.  T.)  and  Reyes's  brigades  of 
Tyler's  division ;  crossing  at  this  point,  they  appeared  over  the  high  bank  of 
the  stream  and  moved  into  position  on  the  Federal  left.  There  was  no  choice 
now  for  Bee  but  to  retire  —  a  movement,  however,  to  be  accomplished  under 
different  circumstances  than  when  urged  by  him  upon  Evans.  The  three 
leaders  endeavored  to  preserve  the  stead 
iness  of  the  ranks  as  they  withdrew  over 
the  open  fields,  aided  by  the  fire  of  Im- 
boden's  guns  on  the  plateau  and  the 
retiring  howitzers ;  but  the  troops  were 
thrown  into  confusion,  and  the  greater 
part  soon  fell  into  rout  across  Young's 
Branch  and  around  the  base  of  the 
height  in  the  rear  of  the  Stone  Bridge. 

Meanwhile,  in  rear  of  Mitchell's  Ford, 
I  had  been  waiting  with  General  John 
ston  for  the  sound  of  conflict  to  open  in 
the  quarter  of  Centreville  upon  the  Fed 
eral  left  flank  and  rear  (making  allow 
ance,  however,  for  the  delays  possible 
to  commands  unused  to  battle),  when  I 
was  chagrined  to  hear  from  General  D. 
R.  Jones  that,  while  he  had  been  long 
ready  for  the  movement  upon  Centre 
ville,  General  Ewell  had  not  come  up  to 
form  on  his  right,  though  he  had  sent 
him  between  7  and  8  o'clock  a  copy  of 
his  own  order  which  recited  that  Ewell 
had  been  already  ordered  to  begin  the 
movement.  I  dispatched  an  immediate 
order  to  Ewell  to  advance ;  but  within  a 
quarter  of  an  hour,  just  as  I  received 
a  dispatch  from  him  informing  me  that 
he  had  received  no  order  to  advance  in 
the  morning,  the  firing  on  the  left  began  to  increase  so  intensely  as  to  indi 
cate  a  severe  attack,  whereupon  General  Johnston  said  that  he  would  go 
personally  to  that  quarter. 

After  weighing  attentively  the  firing,  which  seemed  rapidly  and  heavily 
increasing,  it  appeared  to  me  that  the  troops  on  the  right  would  be  unable  to 
get  into  position  before  the  Federal  offensive  should  have  made  too  much 
progress  on  our  left,  and  that  it  would  be  better  to  abandon  it  altogether, 
maintaining  only  a  strong  demonstration  so  as  to  detain  the  enemy  in  front 
of  our  right  and  center,  and  hurry  up  all  available  reenforcemeiits  —  includ 
ing  the  reserves  that  were  to  have  moved  upon  Centreville  —  to  our  left  and 
fight  the  battle  out  in  that  quarter.  Communicating  this  view  to  General 
Johnston,  who  approved  it  (giving  his  advice,  as  he  said,  for  what  it  was 


A    LOUISIANA   "  PELICAN." 


VOL.  I.     14 


210  THE  FIRST  BATTLE  OF  BULL   RUN. 

worth,  as  he  was  not  acquainted  with  the  country),  I  ordered  Ewell,  Jones, 
and  Longstreet  to  make  a  strong  demonstration  all  along  their  front  on  the 
other  side  of  the  Run,  and  ordered  the  reserves  below  our  position,  Holmes's 
brigade  with  6  guns,  and  Early's  brigade,  also  2  regiments  of  Bonham's 
brigade,  near  at  hand,  to  move  swiftly  to  the  left.  General  Johnston  and  I 
now  set  out  at  full  speed  for  the  point  of  conflict.  We  arrived  there  just  as 
Bee's  troops,  after  giving  way,  were  fleeing  in  disorder  behind  the  height  in 
rear  of  the  Stone  Bridge.  They  had  come  around  between  the  base  of  the 
hill  and  the  Stone  Bridge  into  a  shallow  ravine  which  ran  up  to  a  point  on 
the  crest  where  Jackson  had  already  formed  his  brigade  along  the  edge  of  the 
woods.  We  found  the  commanders  resolutely  stemming  the  further  flight  of 
the  routed  forces,  but  vainly  endeavoring  to  restore  order,  and  our  own 
efforts  were  as  futile.  Every  segment  of  line  we  succeeded  in  forming  was 
again  dissolved  while  another  was  being  formed ;  more  than  two  thousand  men 
were  shouting  each  some  suggestion  to  his  neighbor,  their  voices  mingling  with 
the  noise  of  the  shells  hurtling  through  the  trees  overhead,  and  all  word  of 
command  drowned  in  the  confusion  and  uproar.  It  was  at  this  moment  that 
General  Bee  used  the  famous  expression,  "  Look  at  Jackson's  brigade !  It 
stands  there  like  a  stone  wall " —  a  name  that  passed  from  the  brigade  to  its 
immortal  commander.  The  disorder  seemed  irretrievable,  but  happily  the 
thought  came  to  me  that  if  their  colors  were  planted  out  to  the  front  the  men 
might  rally  on  them,  and  I  gave  the  order  to  carry  the  standards  forward 
some  forty  yards,  which  was  promptly  executed  by  the  regimental  officers, 
thus  drawing  the  common  eye  of  the  troops.  They  now  received  easily  the 
orders  to  advance  and  form  on  the  line  of  their  colors,  which  they  obeyed 
with  a  general  movement ;  and  as  General  Johnston  and  myself  rode  forward 
shortly  after  with  the  colors  of  the  4th  Alabama  by  our  side,  the  line  that 
had  fought  all  morning,  and  had  fled,  routed  and  disordered,  now  advanced 
again  into  position  as  steadily  as  veterans.  The  4th  Alabama  had  previ 
ously  lost  all  its  field-officers ;  and  noticing  Colonel  S.  R.  Gist,  an  aide  to 
General  Bee,  a  young  man  whom  I  had  known  as  adjutant-general  of  South 
Carolina,  and  whom  I  greatly  esteemed,  I  presented  him  as  an  able  and  brave 
commander  to  the  stricken  regiment,  who  cheered  their  new  leader,  and  main 
tained  under  him,  to  the  end  of  the  day,  their  previous  gallant  behavior.  We 
had  come  none  too  soon,  as  the  enemy's  forces,  flushed  with  the  belief  of 
accomplished  victory,  were  already  advancing  across  the  valley  of  Young's 
Branch  and  up  the  slope,  where  they  had  encountered  for  a  while  the  fire  of 
the  Hampton  Legion,  which  had  been  led  forward  toward  the  Robinson  house 
and  the  turnpike  in  front,  covering  the  retreat  and  helping  materially  to  check 
the  panic  of  Bee's  routed  forces. 

As  soon  as  order  was  restored  I  requested  General  Johnston  to  go  back  to 
Portici  (the  Lewis  house),  and  from  that  point  —  which  I  considered  most 
favorable  for  the  purpose  —  forward  me  the  reenf orcemeiits  as  they  would 
come  from  the  Bull  Run  lines  below  and  those  that  were  expected  to  arrive 
from  Manassas,  while  I  should  direct  the  field.  General  Johnston  was  disin 
clined  to  leave  the  battle-field  for  that  position.  As  I  had  been  compelled  to 


THE  FIRST  BATTLE  OF  BULL  RUN.  211 

leave  my  chief -of-staff,  Colonel  Jordan,  at  Manassas  to  forward  any  troops 
arriving  there,  I  felt  it  was  a  necessity  that  one  of  us  should  go  to  this  duty, 
and  that  it  was  his  place  to  do  so,  as  I  felt  I  was  responsible  for  the  battle. 
He  considerately  yielded  to  my  urgency,  and  we  had  the  benefit  of  his  energy 
and  sagacity  in  so  directing  the  reinforcements  toward  the  field,  as  to  be  readily 
and  effectively  assistant  to  my  pressing  needs  and  insure  the  success  of  the  day. 

As  Greneral  Johnston  departed  for  Portici,  I  hastened  to  form  our  line  of 
battle  against  the  on-coming  enemy.  I  ordered  up  the  49th  and  8th  Vir 
ginia  regiments  from  Cocke's  neighboring  brigade  in  the  Bull  Run  lines. 
Grartrell's  7th  Greorgia  I  placed  in  position  on  the  left  of  Jackson's  bri 
gade,  along  the  belt  of  pines  occupied  by  the  latter  on  the  eastern  rim  of  the 
plateau.  As  the  49th  Virginia  rapidly  came  up,  its  colonel,  ex-Grovernor  William 
Smith,  was  encouraging  them  with  cheery  word  and  manner,  and,  as  they 
approached,  indicated  to  them  the  immediate  presence  of  the  commander. 
As  the  regiment  raised  a  loud  cheer,  the  name  was  caught  by  some  of  the 
troops  of  Jackson's  brigade  in  the  immediate  wood,  who  rushed  out,  calling 
for  Greneral  Beauregard.  Hastily  acknowledging  these  happy  signs  of  sym 
pathy  and  confidence,  which  reenforce  alike  the  capacity  of  commander  and 
troops,  I  placed  the  49th  Virginia  in  position  on  the  extreme  left  next 
to  Gartrell,  and  as  I  paused  to  say  a  few  words  to  Jackson,  while  hurry 
ing  back  to  the  right,  my  horse  was  killed  under  me  by  a  bursting  shell,  a 
fragment  of  which  carried  away  part  of  the  heel  of  my  boot.  The  Hampton 
Legion,  which  had  suffered  greatly,  was  placed  on  the  right  of  Jackson's 
brigade,  and  Hunton's  8th  Virginia,  as  it  arrived,  upon  the  right  of  Hampton ; 
the  two  latter  being  drawn  somewhat  to  the  rear  so  as  to  form  with  Jackson's 
right  regiment  a  reserve,  and  be  ready  likewise  to  make  defense  against  any 
advance  from  the  direction  of  the  Stone  Bridge,  whence  there  was  imminent 
peril  from  the  enemy's  heavy  forces,  as  I  had  just  stripped  that  position  almost 
entirely  of  troops  to  meet  the  active  crisis  on  the  plateau,  leaving  this  quarter 
now  covered  only  by  a  few  men,  whose  defense  was  otherwise  assisted  solely 
by  the  obstruction  of  an  abatis. 

With  6500  men  and  13  pieces  of  artillery,  I  now  awaited  the  onset  of  the 
enemy,  who  were  pressing  forward  20,000  strong,  $  with  24  pieces  of  superior 
artillery  and  7  companies  of  regular  cavalry.  They  soon  appeared  over  the 
farther  rim  of  the  plateau,  seizing  the  Robinson  house  on  my  right  and  the 
Henry  house  opposite  my  left  center.  Near  the  latter  they  placed  in  position 
the  two  powerful  batteries  of  Ricketts  and  Grriffin  of  the  regular  army,  and 
pushed  forward  up  the  Sudley  road,  the  slope  of  which  was  cut  so  deep  below 
the  adjacent  ground  as  to  afford  a  covered  way  up  to  the  plateau.  Supported 
by  the  formidable  lines  of  Federal  musketry,  these  2  batteries  lost  no  time  in 
making  themselves  felt,  while  3  more  batteries  in  rear  on  the  high  ground 
beyond  the  Sudley  and  Warrenton  cross-roads  swelled  the  shower  of  shell 
that  fell  among  our  ranks. 

&  According  to  General  Fry  (page  188),  the  Union  force  in  the  seizure  of  the  Henry  hill  consisted  of 
four  brigades,  a  cavalry  battalion,  and  two  batteries,  or  (as  we  deduce  from  General  Fry's  statements 
of  the  strength  of  McDowell's  forces,  page  195)  about  11,000  men.— EDITORS. 


212  THE  FIRST  BATTLE  OF  BULL  RUN. 

Our  own  batteries,  Imboden's,  Stanard's,  five  of  Walton's  guns,  reenforced 
later  by  Pendleton's  and  Alburtis's  (their  disadvantage  being  reduced  by  the 
shortness  of  range),  swept  the  surface  of  the  plateau  from  their  position  on 
the  eastern  rim.  I  felt  that,  after  the  accidents  of  the  morning,  much  depended 
on  maintaining  the  steadiness  of  the  troops  against  the  first  heavy  onslaught, 
and  rode  along  the  lines  encouraging  the  men  to  unflinching  behavior,  meet 
ing,  as  I  passed  each  command,  a  cheering  response.  The  steady  fire  of  their 
musketry  told  severely  on  the  Federal  ranks,  and  the  splendid  action  of  our 
batteries  was  a  fit  preface  to  the  marked  skill  exhibited  by  our  artillerists 
during  the  war.  The  enemy  suffered  particularly  from  the  musketry  on 
our  left,  now  further  reenforced  by  the  2d  Mississippi  —  the  troops  in  this 
quarter  confronting  each  other  at  very  short  range.  Here  two  companies  of 
Stuart's  cavalry  charged  through  the  Federal  ranks  that  filled  the  Sudley 
road,  increasing  the  disorder  wrought  upon  that  flank  of  the  enemy.  But 
with  superior  numbers  the  Federals  were  pushing  on  new  regiments  in  the 
attempt  to  flank  my  position,  and  several  guns,  in  the  effort  to  enfilade  ours, 
were  thrust  forward  so  near  the  33d  Virginia  that  some  of  its  men  sprang 
forward  and  captured  them,  but  were  driven  back  by  an  overpowering  force 
of  Federal  musketry.  Although  the  enemy  were  held  well  at  bay,  their  press 
ure  became  so  strong  that  I  resolved  to  take  the  offensive,  and  ordered  a 
charge  on  my  right  for  the  purpose  of  recovering  the  plateau.  The  movement, 
made  with  alacrity  and  force  by  the  commands  of  Bee,  Bartow,  Evans,  and 
Hampton,  thrilled  the  entire  line,  Jackson's  brigade  piercing  the  enemy's 
center,  and  the  left  of  the  line  under  Grartrell  and  Smith  following  up  the 
charge,  also,  in  that  quarter,  so  that  the  whole  of  the  open  surface  of  the 
plateau  was  swept  clear  of  the  Federals. 

Apart  from  its  impressions  on  the  enemy,  the  effect  of  this  brilliant  onset 
was  to  give  a  short  breathing-spell  to  our  troops  from  the  immediate  strain 
of  conflict,  and  encourage  them  in  withstanding  the  still  more  strenuous 
offensive  that  was  soon  to  bear  upon  them.  Reorganizing  our  line  of  battle 
under  the  unremitting  fire  of  the  Federal  batteries  opposite,  I  prepared  to 
meet  the  new  attack  which  the  enemy  were  about  to  make,  largely  reen 
forced  by  the  troops  of  Howard's  brigade,  newly  arrived  on  the  field.  The 
Federals  again  pushed  up  the  slope,  the  face  of  which  partly  afforded  good 
cover  by  the  numerous  ravines  that  scored  it  and  the  clumps  of  young 
pines  and  oaks  with  which  it  was  studded,  while  the  sunken  Sudley  road 
formed  a  good  ditch  and  parapet  for  their  aggressive  advance  upon  my  left 
flank  and  rear.  Gradually  they  pressed  our  lines  back  and  regained  possession 
of  their  lost  ground  and  guns.  With  the  Henry  and  Robinson  houses  once 
more  in  their  possession,  they  resumed  the  offensive,  urged  forward  by  their 
commanders  with  conspicuous  gallantry. 

The  conflict  now  became  very  severe  for  the  final  possession  of  this  position, 
which  was  the  key  to  victory.  The  Federal  numbers  enabled  them  so  to 
extend  their  lines  through  the  woods  beyond  the  Sudley  road  as  to  outreach 
my  left  flank,  which  I  was  compelled  partly  to  throw  back,  so  as  to  meet  the 
attack  from  that  quarter ;  meanwhile  their  numbers  equally  enabled  them  to 
outflank  my  right  in  the  direction  of  the  Stone  Bridge,  imposing  anxious 


THE  FIRST  BATTLE  OF  BULL  RUN. 


213 


watchfulness  in  that  direction.  I  knew  that  I  was  safe  if  I  could  hold  out 
till  the  arrival  of  reenf orcements,  which  was  but  a  matter  of  time ;  and,  with 
the  full  sense  of  my  own  responsibility,  I  was  determined  to  hold  the  line  of 
the  plateau,  even  if  surrounded  on 'all  sides,  until  assistance  should  come, 
unless  my  forces  were  sooner  overtaken  by  annihilation. 

It  was  now  between  half -past  2  and  3  o'clock ;  a  scorching  sun  increased 
the  oppression  of  the  troops,  exhausted  from  incessant  fighting,  many  of 

them  having  been 
engaged  since  the 
morning.  Fearing 
lest  the  Federal  of 
fensive  should  se 
cure  too  firm  a  grip, 
and  knowing  the 
fatal  result  that 
might  spring  from 
any  grave  infrac 
tion  of  my  line,  I 
determined  to  make 
another  effort  for 
the  recovery  of  the 
plateau,  and  ordered 
a  charge  of  the  en 
tire  line  of  battle, 
including  the  re 
serves,  which  at  this 
crisis  I  myself  led  into  action.  The  movement  was  made  with  such  keep 
ing  and  dash  that  the  whole  plateau  was  swept  clear  of  the  enemy,  who 
were  driven  down  the  slope  and  across  the  turnpike  on  our  right  and  the 
valley  of  Young's  Branch  on  our  left,  leaving  in  our  final  possession  the 
Robinson  and  Henry  houses,  with  most  of  Eicketts's  and  Griffin's  batteries, 
the  men  of  which  were  mostly  shot  down  where  they  bravely  stood  by  their 
guns.  Fisher's  6th  North  Carolina,  directed  to  the  Lewis  house  by  Colonel 
Jordan  from  Manassas,  where  it  had  just  arrived,  and  thence  to  the  field  by 
General  Johnston,  came  up  in  happy  time  to  join  in  this  charge  on  the  left. 
Withers's  18th  Virginia,  which  I  had  ordered  up  from  Cocke's  brigade, 
was  also  on  hand  in  time  to  follow  and  give  additional  effect  to  the  charge, 
capturing,  by  aid  of  the  Hampton  Legion,  several  guns,  which  were  immedi 
ately  turned  and  served  upon  the  broken  ranks  of  the  enemy  by  some  of  our 
officers.  This  handsome  work,  which  broke  the  Federal  fortunes  of  the  day, 
was  done,  however,  at  severe  cost.  The  soldierly  Bee,  and  the  gallant, 
impetuous  Bartow,  whose  day  of  strong  deeds  was  about  to  close  with  such 
credit,  fell  a  few  rods  back  of  the  Henry  house,  near  the  very  spot  whence 
in  the  morning  they  had  first  looked  forth  upon  Evans's  struggle  with  the 
enemy.  Colonel  Fisher  also  fell  at  the  very  head  of  his  troops.  Seeing 
Captain  Ricketts,  who  was  badly  wounded  in  the  leg,  and  having  known  him 
in  the  old  army,  I  paused  from  my  anxious  duties  to  ask  him  whether  I  could 


THE    ROBIXSOX    HOUSE.       FROM     A    WAR-TIME    PHOTOGRAPH. 


214  THE  FIRST  BATTLE  OF  BULL  RUN. 

do  anything  for  him.  He  answered  that  he  wanted  to  be  sent  back  to  Wash 
ington.  As  some  of  our  prisoners  were  there  held  under  threats  of  not  being 
treated  as  prisoners  of  war,  I  replied  that  that  must  depend  upon  how  our 
prisoners  were  treated,  and  ordered  him  to  be  carried  to  the  rear.  I  mention 
this,  because  the  report  of  the  Federal  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the 
War  exhibits  Captain  Ricketts  as  testifying  that  I  only  approached  him  to 
say  that  he  would  be  treated  as  our  prisoners  might  be  treated.  I  sent  my 
own  surgeons  to  care  for  him,  and  allowed  his  wife  to  cross  the  lines  and 
accompany  him  to  Richmond;  and  my  adjutant-general,  Colonel  Jordan, 
escorting  her  to  the  car  that  carried  them  to  that  city,  personally  attended  to 
the  comfortable  placing  of  the  wounded  enemy  for  the  journey. 

That  part  of  the  enemy  who  occupied  the  woods  beyond  our  left  and 
across  the  Sudley  road  had  not  been  reached  by  the  headlong  charge  which 
had  swept  their  comrades  from  the  plateau ;  but  the  now  arriving  ree'nf orce- 
ments  (Kershaw's  2d  and  Cash's  8th  South  Carolina)  were  led  into  that 
quarter.  Kemper's  battery  also  came  up,  preceded  by  its  commander, 
who,  while  alone,  fell  into  the  hands  of  a  number  of  the  enemy,  who  took 
him  prisoner,  until  a  few  moments  later,  when  he  handed  them  over  to  some 
of  our  own  troops  accompanying  his  battery.  A  small  plateau,  within  the 
south-west  angle  of  the  Sudley  and  turnpike  cross-roads,  was  still  held  by 
a  strong  Federal  brigade  —  Howard's  troops,  together  with  Sykes's  battalion 
of  regulars ;  and  wrhile  Kershaw  and  Cash,  after  passing  through  the  skirts 
of  the  oak  wood  along  the  Sudley  road,  engaged  this  force,  Kemper's  bat 
tery  was  sent  forward  by  Kershaw  along  the  same  road,  into  position  near 
where  a  hostile  battery  had  been  captured,  and  whence  it  played  upon  the 
enemy  in  the  open  field. 

Quickly  following  these  regiments  came  Preston's  28th  Virginia,  which, 
passing  through  the  woods,  encountered  and  drove  back  some  Michigan 
troops,  capturing  Brigadier-General  Willcox.  It  was  now  about  3  o'clock, 
when  another  important  ree'nf orcement  came  to  our  aid — Elzey's  brigade, 
1700  strong,  of  the  Army  of  the  Shenaiidoah,  which,  coming  from  Pied 
mont  by  railroad,  had  arrived  at  Manassas  station,  6  miles  in  rear  of  the 
battle-field,  at  noon,  and  had  been  without  delay  directed  thence  toward 
the  field  by  Colonel  Jordan,  aided  by  Major  T.  G.  Rhett,  who  that  morning 
had  passed  from  General  Bonham's  to  General  Johnston's  staff.  Upon 
nearing  the  vicinity  of  the  Lewis  house,  the  brigade  was  directed  by  a  staff- 
officer  sent  by  General  Johnston  toward  the  left  of  the  field.  As  it  reached 
the  oak  wood,  just  across  the  Sudley  road,  led  by  General  Kirby  Smith,  the 
latter  fell  severely  wounded;  but  the  command  devolved  upon  Colonel 
Elzey,  an  excellent  officer,  who  was  now  guided  by  Captain  D.  B.  Harris 
of  the  Engineers,  a  highly  accomplished  officer  of  my  staff,  still  farther  to 
the  left  and  through  the  woods,  so  as  to  form  in  extension  of  the  line  of  the 
preceding  reinforcements.  Beckham's  battery,  of  the  same  command,  was 
hurried  forward  by  the  Sudley  road  and  around  the  woods  into  position  near 
the  Chinn  house ;  from  a  well-selected  point  of  action,  in  full  view  of  the 
enemy  that  filled  the  open  fields  west  of  the  Sudley  road,  it  played  with 


THE  FIRST  BATTLE  OF  BULL  RUN.  21  =, 

deadly  and  decisive  effect  upon  their  ranks,  already  under  the  fire  of  Elzey's 
brigade.  Keyes's  Federal  brigade,  which  had  made  its  way  across  the  turn 
pike  in  rear  of  the  Stone  Bridge,  was  lurking  along  under  cover  of  the  ridges 
and  a  wood  in  order  to  turn  my  line  on  the  right,  but  was  easily  repulsed  by 
Latham's  battery,  already  placed  in  position  over  that  approach  by  Captain 
Harris,  aided  by  Alburtis's  battery,  opportunely  sent  to  Latham's  left  by 
General  Jackson,  and  supported  by  fragments  of  troops  collected  by  staff- 
officers.  Meanwhile,  the  enemy  had  formed  a  line  of  battle  of  formidable 
proportions  on  the  opposite  height,  and  stretching  in  crescent  outline,  with 
flanks  advanced,  from  the  Pittsylvania  (Carter)  mansion  on  their  left  across 
the  Sudley  road  in  rear  of  Dogan's  and  reaching  toward  the  Chinn  house. 
They  offered  a  fine  spectacle  as  they  threw  forward  a  cloud  of  skirmishers 
down  the  opposite  slope,  preparatory  to  a  new  assault  against  the  line  on  the 
plateau.  But  their  right  was  now  severely  pressed  by  the  troops  that  had 
successively  arrived ;  the  force  in  the  south-west  angle  of  the  Sudley  and 
Warrenton  cross-roads  were  driven  from  their  position,  and,  as  Early's 
brigade,  which,  by  direction  of  General  Johnston,  had  swept  around  by  the 
rear  of  the  woods  through  which  Elzey  had  passed,  appeared  on  the  field,  his 
line  of  march  bore  upon  the  flank  of  the  enemy,  now  retiring  in  that  quarter. 
This  movement  by  my  extreme  left  was  masked  by  the  trend  of  the 
woods  from  many  of  our  forces  on  the  plateau ;  and  bidding  those  of  my 
staff  and  escort  around  me  raise  a  loud  cheer,  I  dispatched  the  information 
to  the  several  commands,  with  orders  to  go  forward  in  a  common  charge. 
Before  the  full  advance  of  the  Confederate  ranks  the  enemy's  whole  line, 
whose  right  was  already  yielding,  irretrievably  broke,  fleeing  across  Bull  Run 
by  every  available  direction.  Major  Sykes's  regulars,  aided  by  Sherman's 
brigade,  made  a  steady  and  handsome  withdrawal,  protecting  the  rear  of  the 
routed  forces,  and  enabling  many  to  escape  by  the  Stone  Bridge.  Having 
ordered  in  pursuit  all  the  troops  on  the  field,  I  went  to  the  Lewis  house,  and, 
the  battle  being  ended,  turned  over  the  command  to  General  Johnston. 
Mounting  a  fresh  horse, —  the  fourth  on  that  day, —  I  started  to  press  the 
pursuit  which  was  being  made  by  our  infantry  and  cavalry,  some  of  the 
latter  having  been  sent  by  General  Johnston  from  Lewis's  Ford  to  intercept 
the  enemy  on  the  turnpike.  I  was  soon  overtaken,  however,  by  a  courier 
bearing  a  message  from  Major  T.  G.  Rhett,  General  Johnston's  chief -of -staff 
on  duty  at  Manassas  railroad  station,  informing  me  of  a  report  that  a  large 
Federal  force,  having  pierced  our  lower  line  on  Bull  Run,  was  moving  upon 
Camp  Pickens,  my  depot  of  supplies  near  Manassas.  I  returned,  and  com 
municated  this  important  news  to  General  Johnston.  Upon  consultation 
it  was  deemed  best  that  I  should  take  Ewell's  and  Holmes's  brigades,  which 
were  hastening  up  to  the  battle-field,  but  too  late  for  the  action,  and  fall  on 
this  force  of  the  enemy,  while  reinforcements  should  be  sent  me  from  the 
pursuing  forces,  who  were  to  be  recalled  for  that  purpose.  To  head  off  the 
danger  and  gain  time,  I  hastily  mounted  a  force  of  infantry  behind  the 
cavalrymen  then  present,  but,  on  approaching  the  line  of  march  near 
McLean's  Ford,  which  the  Federals  must  have  taken,  I  learned  that  the  news 


2l6 


THE  FIRST  BATTLE  OF  BULL  RUN. 


THE   MAIN    BATTLE-GROUND.— NO.   I. 


View  of  the  Henry  house,  looking  west  from  the  spot 
where  General  Bee  fell.  The  Bull  Run  mountains  and 
Thoroughfare  Gap  appear  in  the  distance.  The  Sudley 
road,  a  few  rods  beyond  the  house,  under  the  hill,  runs 


parallel  with  the  rail  fence  (in  the  middle  ground  on  the 
left).  Just  within  the  rail  fence  is  where  Griffin's  and 
Ricketts's  batteries  were  planted.  Near  the  house 
stands  the  Union  Monument,  commemorating  the  battle. 


was  a  false  alarm  caught  from  the  return  of  General  Jones's  forces  to  this 
side  of  the  Run,  the  similarity  of  the  uniforms  and  the  direction  of  their 
march  having  convinced  some  nervous  person  that  they  were  a  force  of  the 
enemy.  It  was  now  almost  dark,  and  too  late  to  resume  the  broken  pursuit ; 
on  my  return  I  met  the  coming  forces,  and,  as  they  were  very  tired,  I  ordered 
them  to  halt  and  bivouac  for  the  night  where  they  were.  After  giving  such 
attention  as  I  could  to  the  troops,  I  started  for  Manassas,  where  I  arrived 
about  10  o'clock,  and  found  Mr.  Davis  at  my  headquarters  with  General 
Johnston.  Arriving  from  Richmond  late  in  the  afternoon,  Mr.  Davis  had 
immediately  galloped  to  the  field,  accompanied  by  Colonel  Jordan.  They 
had  met  between  Manassas  and  the  battle-field  the  usual  number  of  strag 
glers  to  the  rear,  whose  appearance  belied  the  determined  array  then  sweep 
ing  the  enemy  before  it,  but  Mr.  Davis  had  the  happiness  to  arrive  in  time 
to  witness  the  last  of  the  Federals  disappearing  beyond  Bull  Run.  The  next 
morning  I  received  from  his  hand  at  our  breakfast-table  my  commission, 
dated  July  21st,  as  General  in  the  Army  of  the  Confederate  States,  and  after 
his  return  to  Richmond  the  kind  congratulations  of  the  Secretary  of  War 
and  of  General  Lee,  then  acting  as  military  adviser  to  the  President. 

It  was  a  point  made  at  the  time  at  the  North  that,  just  as  the  Confederate 
troops  were  about  to  break  and  flee,  the  Federal  troops  anticipated  them  by 
doing  so,  being  struck  into  this  precipitation  by  the  arrival  upon  their  flank 


THE  FIRST  BATTLE  OF  BULL  RUN. 


217 


THE    MAIN    BATTLE-GROUND.— NO.   2. 


View  of  the  Robinson  house,  looking  north  from  the 
spot  on  the  Henry  plateau  where  General  Bee  fell.  At 
1  p.  M.  this  ground  lay  between  the  hostile  lines,  which 
were  (roughly  speaking)  parallel  with  the  sides  of  the 
picture  :  Confederates  on  the  right,  Union  forces  on  the 


left.    The  foreground  was  between  the  centers  of  the 
positions. 

As  these  two  views  are  taken  from  the  same  spot,  the 
reader  will  best  understand  their  relation  by  holding 
the  pages  at  a  right  angle  to  each  other. 


of  the  Shenandoah  forces  marching  from  railroad  trains  halted  en  route  with 
that  aim — errors  that  have  been  repeated  by  a  number  of  writers,  and  by 
an  ambitious  but  superficial  French  author. 

There  were  certain  sentiments  of  a  personal  character  clustering  about  this 
first  battle,  and  personal  anxiety  as  to  its  issue,  that  gladly  accepted  this 
theory.  To  this  may  be  added  the  general  readiness  to  accept  a  sentimental 
or  ultra-dramatic  explanation — a  sorcery  wrought  by  the  delay  or  arrival  of 
some  force,  or  the  death  or  coming  of  somebody,  or  any  other  single  magical 
event — whereby  history  is  easily  caught,  rather  than  to  seek  an  understanding 
of  that  which  is  but  the  gradual  result  of  the  operation  of  many  forces,  both  of 
opposing  design  and  actual  collision,  modified  more  or  less  by  the  falls  of 
chance.  The  personal  sentiment,  though  natural  enough  at  the  time,  has  no 
place  in  any  military  estimate,  or  place  of  any  kind  at  this  day.  The  battle 
of  Manassas  was,  like  any  other  battle,  a  progression  and  development  from  the 
deliberate  counter-employment  of  the  military  resources  in  hand,  affected  by 
accidents,  as  always,  but  of  a  kind  very  different  from  those  referred  to. 
My  line  of  battle,  which  twice  had  not  only  withstood  the  enemy's  attack, 
but  had  taken  the  offensive  and  driven  him  back  in  disorder,  was  becoming 
momentarily  stronger  from  the  arrival,  at  last,  of  the  reenforcements  provided 
for ;  and  if  the  enemy  had  remained  on  the  field  till  the  arrival  of  Ewell  and 


218 


THE  FIRST  BATTLE  OF  BULL  RUN. 


COLONEL  F.  S.  BAKTOW.   FROM  A  PHOTOGRAPH. 


Holmes,  they  would  have  been  so  strongly  outflanked  that  many  who  escaped 
would  have  been  destroyed  or  captured. 

Though  my  adversary's  plan  of  battle  was  a  good  one  as  against  a  passive 
defensive  opponent,  such  as  he  may  have  deemed  I  must  be  from  the  respec 
tive  numbers  and  positions  of  our  forces,  it  would,  in  my  judgment,  have 
been  much  better  if,  with  more  dash,  the  flank  attack  had  been  made  by  the 
Stone  Bridge  itself  and  the  ford  immedi 
ately  above  it.  The  plan  adopted,  how 
ever,  favored  above  all  things  the  easy 
execution  of  the  offensive  operations  I 
had  designed  and  ordered  against  his  left 
flank  and  rear  at  Centreville.  His  turning 
column  — 18,000  strong,  and  presumably 
his  best  troops — was  thrown  off  by  a  long 
ellipse  through  a  narrow  forest  road  to 
Sudley  Ford,  from  which  it  moved  down 
upon  my  left  flank,  and  was  thus  dislo 
cated  from  his  main  body.  This  severed 
movement  of  his  forces  not  only  left  his 
exposed  left  and  rear  at  Centreville  weak 
against  the  simultaneous  offensive  of  my 
heaviest  forces  upon  it,  which  I  had  or 
dered,  but  the  movement  of  his  returning 
column  would  have  been  disconcerted  and  paralyzed  by  the  early  sound 
of  this  heavy  conflict  in  its  rear,  and  it  could  not  even  have  made  its  way 
back  so  as  to  be  available  for  manoeuvre  before  the  Centreville  fraction  had 
been  thrown  back  upon  it  in  disorder.  A  new  army  is  very  liable  to  panic, 
and,  in  view  of  the  actual  result  of  the  battle,  the  conclusion  can  hardly  be 
resisted  that  the  panic  which  fell  on  the  Federal  army  would  thus  have 
seized  it  early  in  the  day,  and  with  my  forces  in  such  a  position  as  wholly  to 
cut  off  its  retreat  upon  Washington.  But  the  commander  of  the  front  line  on 
my  right,  who  had  been  ordered  to  hold  himself  in  readiness  to  initiate  the 
offensive  at  a  moment's  notice,  did  not  make  the  move  expected  of  him 
because  through  accident  he  failed  to  receive  his  own  immediate  order  to 
advance.  |  The  Federal  commander's  flanking  movement,  being  thus  uninter 
rupted  by  such  a  counter-movement  as  I  had  projected,  was  further  assisted 
through  the  rawness  and  inadequacy  of  our  staff  organization  through  which 
I  was  left  unacquainted  with  the  actual  state  of  affairs  on  my  left.  The 
Federal  attack,  already  thus  greatly  favored,  and  encouraged,  moreover,  by 
the  rout  of  General  Bee's  advanced  line,  failed  for  two  reasons  :  their  forces 
were  not  handled  with  concert  of  masses  (a  fault  often  made  later  011  both 
sides),  and  the  individual  action  of  the  Confederate  troops  was  superior,  and 
for  a  very  palpable  reason.  That  one  army  was  fighting  for  union  and  the 
other  for  disunion  is  a  political  expression ;  the  actual  fact  on  the  battle-field,  in 
the  face  of  cannon  and  musket,  was  that  the  Federal  troops  came  as  invaders, 

4- General  E.  S.  Ewell.     See  statement  of  Major  Campbell  Brown,  page  259. —  EDITORS. 


THE  FIRST  BATTLE  OF  BULL  RUN.  219 

and  the  Southern  troops  stood  as  defenders  of  their  homes,  and  further  than 
this  we  need  not  go.  The  armies  were  vastly  greater  than  had  ever  before 
fought  on  this  continent,  and  were  the  largest  volunteer  armies  ever  assem 
bled  since  the  era  of  regular  armies.  The  personal  material  on  both  sides 
was  of  exceptionally  good  character,  and  collectively  superior  to  that  of  any 
subsequent  period  of  the  war.  ^  The  Confederate  army  was  filled  with 
generous  youths  who  had  answered  the  first  call  to  arms.  For  certain 
kinds  of  field  duty  they  were  not  as  yet  adapted,  many  of  them  having  at 
first  come  with  their  baggage  and  servants ;  these  they  had  to  dispense  with, 
but,  not  to  offend  their  susceptibilities,  I  then  exacted  the  least  work  from 
them,  apart  from  military  drills,  even  to  the  prejudice  of  important  field- 
works,  when  I  could  not  get  sufficient  negro  labor ;  they  "  had  come  to  fight, 
and  not  to  handle  the  pick  and  shovel,"  and  their  fighting  redeemed  well  their 
shortcomings  as  intrenchers.  Before  I  left  that  gallant  army,  however,  it  had 
learned  how  readily  the  humbler  could  aid  the  nobler  duty. 

As  to  immediate  results  and  trophies,  we  captured  a  great  many  stands  of 
arms,  batteries,  equipments,  standards,  and  flags,  one  of  which  was  sent  to 
me,  through  General  Longstreet,  as  a  personal  compliment  by  the  Texan 
"  crack  shot,"  Colonel  B.  F.  Terry,  who  lowered  it  from  its  mast  at  Fairfax 
Court  House,  by  cutting  the  halyards  by  means  of  his  unerring  rifle,  as  our 
troops  next  morning  reoccupied  that  place.  We  captured  also  many  pris 
oners,  including  a  number  of  surgeons,  whom  (the  first  time  in  war)  we 
treated  not  as  prisoners,  but  as  guests.  Calling  attention  to  their  brave 
devotion  to  their  wounded,  I  recommended  to  the  War  Department  that 
they  be  sent  home  without  exchange,  together  with  some  other  prisoners, 
who  had  shown  personal  kindness  to  Colonel  Jones,  of  the  4th  Alabama, 
who  had  been  mortally  wounded  early  in  the  day. 

SUBSEQUENT  RELATIONS  OF  MR.  DAVIS  AND  THE  WRITER. 

THE  military  result  of  the  victory  was  far  short  of  what  it  should  have 
been.  It  established  as  an  accomplished  fact,  on  the  indispensable  basis  of 
military  success,  the  Government  of  the  Confederate  States,  which  before 
was  but  a  political  assertion ;  but  it  should  have  reached  much  further.  The 
immediate  pursuit,  but  for  the  false  alarm  which  checked  it,  would  have  con 
tinued  as  far  as  the  Potomac,  but  must  have  stopped  there  with  no  greater 
result  tha,n  the  capture  of  more  prisoners  and  material.  The  true  immediate 
fruits  of  the  victory  should  have  been  the  dispersion  of  all  the  Federal  forces 
south  of  Baltimore  and  east  of  the  Alleghanies,  the  liberation  of  the  State  of 
Maryland,  and  the  capture  of  Washington,  which  could  have  been  made  only 
by  the  Upper  Potomac.  And  from  the  high  source  of  this  achievement  other 
decisive  results  would  have  continued  to  flow.  From  my  experience  in  the 

]i  This  battle  was  noteworthy  for  the  number  ton,  Fitzhugh  Lee,  Thomas  Jordan,  R.  E.  Rodes, 
of  participants  whose  names  are  now  prominently  E.  P.  Alexander,  and  others.  On  the  Federal  side 
associated  with  the  war.  On  the  Confederate  side,  were  Generals  McDowell,  W.  T.  Sherman,  Burn- 
besides  Generals  Johnston  and  Beauregard,  were  side,  Hunter,  Heintzelman,  Howard,  Franklin, 
Generals  Stonewall  Jackson,  Longstreet,  Ewell,  Slocum,  Keyes,  Hunt,  Barry,  Fry,  Sykes,  Barnard, 
Early,  J.  E.  B.  Stuart,  Kirby  Smith,  Wade  Hamp-  Wadsworth,  and  others.  —EDITORS. 


22O 


THE  FIRST  BATTLE  OF  BULL  RUN. 


Mexican  war  I  had  great  confidence  in  intelligent  volunteer  troops,  if  rightly 
handled;  and  with  such  an  active  and  victorious  war-engine  as  the  Con 
federate  Army  of  the  Potomac  could  have  immediately  been  made, —  reen- 
f orced,  as  time  went,  by  numbers  and  discipline, —  the  Federal  military 
power  in  the  East  could  never  have  reached  the  head  it  took  when  McClellaii 
was  allowed  to  organize  and  discipline  at  leisure  the  powerful  army  that, 
in  the  end,  wore  out 
the  South.  In  war 
one  success  makes 
another  easier,  and 
its  right  use  is  as 
the  step  to  another, 
until  final  achieve 
ment.  This  was  the 
use  besought  by  me 
in  the  plan  of  cam 
paign  I  have  men 
tioned  as  presented 
to  Mr.  Davis  on  the 
14th  of  July,  a  few 
days  before  the  bat 
tle,  but  rejected  by 
him  as  impractica 
ble,  and  as  rather  of- 


FAIRIAX    COURT    HOUSE. 


fering  opportunity 
to  the  enemy  to  crush  us.  To  supply  the  deficiency  of  transportation  (our 
vehicles  being  few  in  number,  and  many  so  poor  as  to  break  down  in  ordinary 
camp  service),  I  myself  had  assigned  to  special  duty  Colonel  (since  Governor) 
James  L.  Kemper,  of  Virginia,  who  quickly  obtained  for  me  some  two  hundred 
good  wagons,  to  which  number  I  had  limited  him  so  as  not  to  arouse  again 
the  jealousy  of  the  President's  staff.  If  my  plan  of  operations  for  the  capture 
of  Washington  had  been  adopted,  I  should  have  considered  myself  thereby 
authorized  and  free  to  obtain,  as  I  readily  could  have  done,  the  transportation 
necessary.  As  it  was — though  the  difficult  part  of  this  "impracticable"  plan 
of  operations  had  been  proven  feasible,  that  is,  the  concentration  of  the  Shen- 
aiidoah  forces  with  mine  (wrung  later  than  the  eleventh  hour  through  the 
alarm  over  the  march  upon  Eichmond,  and  discountenanced  again  nervously 
at  the  twelfth  hour  by  another  alarm  as  to  how  "  the  enemy  may  vary  his 
plans  "  in  consequence),  followed  by  the  decisive  defeat  of  the  main  Federal 
forces  —  nevertheless  the  army  remained  rooted  in  the  spot,  although  we 
had  more  than  fifteen  thousand  troops  who  had  been  not  at  all  or  but  little 
in  the  battle  and  were  perfectly  organized,  while  the  remaining  commands, 
in  the  high  spirits  of  victory,  could  have  been  reorganized  at  the  tap  of  the 
drum,  and  many  with  improved  captured  arms  and  equipments.  I  had 
already  urged  my  views  with  unusual  persistency,  and  acted  on  them  against 
all  but  an  express  order  to  the  contrary ;  and  as  they  had  been  deliberately 


THE  FIRST  BATTLE  OF  BULL  RUN.  221 

rejected  in  their  ultimate  scope  by  Mr.  Davis  as  the  commander-in-chief,  I 
did  not  feel  authorized  to  urge  them  further  than  their  execution  had  been 
allowed,  unless  the  subject  were  broached  anew  by  himself.  But  there  was 
no  intimation  of  any  such  change  of  purpose,  and  the  army,  consistently 
with  this  inertia,  was  left  unprovided  for  manoeuvre  with  transportation  for 
its  ammunition ;  its  fortitude,  moreover,  as  a  new  and  volunteer  army,  while 
spending  sometimes  24  hours  without  food,  being  only  less  wonderful  than 
the  commissary  administration  at  Richmond,  from  which  such  a  state  of 
affairs  could  proceed  even  two  weeks  after  the  battle  of  Manassas.  Although 
certain  political  superstitions  about  not  consolidating  the  North  may  then 
have  weighed  against  the  action  I  proposed,  they  would  have  been  light 
against  a  true  military  policy,  if  such  had  existed  in  the  head  of  the  Govern 
ment.  Apart  from  an  active  material  ally,  such  as  the  colonies  had  afield 
and  on  sea  in  the  War  of  Independence  with  Great  Britain,  a  country  in  fatal 
war  must  depend  on  the  vigor  of  its  warfare ;  the  more  inferior  the  country, 
the  bolder  and  more  enterprising  the  use  of  its  resources,  especially  if  its 
frontiers  are  convenient  to  the  enemy.  I  was  convinced  that  our  success  lay 
in  a  short,  quick  war  of  decisive  blows,  before  the  Federals,  with  their  vast 
resources,  could  build  up  a  great  military  power ;  to  which  end  a  concerted 
use  of  our  forces,  immediate  and  sustained,  was  necessary,  so  that,  weaker 
though  we  were  at  all  separate  points,  we  might  nevertheless  strike  with 
superior  strength  at  some  chosen  decisive  point,  and  after  victory  there 
reach  for  victory  now  made  easier  elsewhere,  and  thus  sum  up  success. 
Instead  of  this,  which  in  war  we  call  concentration,  our  actual  policy  was 
diffusion,  an  inferior  Confederate  force  at  each  separate  point  defensively 
confronting  a  superior  Federal  force ;  our  power  daily  shrinking,  that  of  the 
enemy  increasing ;  the  avowed  Federal  policy  being  that  of  "  attrition,"  their 
bigger  masses  grinding  our  smaller,  one  by  one,  to  naught.  Out  of  this 
state  we  never  emerged,  when  the  direction  of  the  Government  was,  as  almost 
always,  necessary,  excepting  when  "  Richmond  "  was  immediately  in  danger. 
Thus,  in  the  fall  of  1861,  about  three  months  after  the  battle  of  Manassas, — 
after  throwing  my  whole  force  forward  to  Fairfax  Court  House,  with  out 
posts  flaunting  our  flags  on  the  hills  in  sight  of  Washington,  in  order  to  chafe 
the  Federals  to  another  battle,  but  without  success, —  I  proposed  that  the 
army  should  be  raised  to  an  effective  of  60,000  men,  by  drawing  20,000  for  the 
immediate  enterprise  from  several  points  along  the  seaboard,  not  even  at  that 
time  threatened,  and  from  our  advanced  position  be  swiftly  thrown  across 
the  Potomac  at  a  point  which  I  had  had  carefully  surveyed  for  that  purpose, 
and  moved  upon  the  rear  of  Washington,  thus  forcing  McClellan  to  a  decisive 
engagement  before  his  organization  (new  enlistments)  was  completed,  and 
while  our  own  army  had  the  advantage  of  discipline  and  prestige  —  seasoned 
soldiers,  whose  term,  however,  would  expire  in  the  early  part  of  the  coming 
summer.  This  plan,  approved  by  General  Gustavus  W.  Smith  (then  imme 
diately  commanding  General  Johnston's  own  forces)  as  well  as  by  General 
Johnston,  was  submitted  to  Mr.  Davis  in  a  conference  at  my  headquarters, 
but  rejected  because  he  would  not  venture  to  strip  those  points  of  the  troops 


222  THE  FIRST  BATTLE  OF  BULL  RUN. 

we  required.  Even  if  those  points  had  been  captured,  though  none  were  then 
even  threatened,  they  must  have  reverted  as  a  direct  consequence  to  so  deci 
sive  a  success.  I  was  willing,  then,  should  it  have  come  to  that,  to  exchange 
even  Richmond  temporarily  for  Washington.  Yet  it  was  precisely  from  simi 
lar  combinations  and  elements  that  the  army  was  made  up,  to  enable  it  the 
next  spring,  under  General  Lee,  to  encounter  McClellan  at  the  very  door  of 
Richmond.  If  that  which  was  accepted  as  a  last  defensive  resort  against  an 
overwhelming  aggressive  army  had  been  used  in  an  enterprising  offensive 
against  that  same  army  while  yet  in  the  raw,  the  same  venture  had  been 
made  at  less  general  risk,  less  cost  of  valuable  lives,  and  with  greater 
certain  results.  The  Federal  army  would  have  had  no  chance  meanwhile 
to  become  tempered  to  that  magnificent  military  machine  which,  through 
all  its  defeats  and  losses,  remained  sound,  and  was  stronger,  with  its 
readily  assimilating  new  strength,  at  the  end  of  the  war  than  ever  before ; 
the  pressure  would  have  been  lifted  from  Kentucky  and  Missouri,  and 
we  should  have  maintained  what  is  called  an  active  defensive  warfare, 
that  is,  should  have  taken  and  kept  the  offensive  against  the  enemy, 
enforcing  peace. 

No  people  ever  warred  for  independence  with  more  relative  advantages 
than  the  Confederates ;  and  if,  as  a  military  question,  they  must  have  failed, 
then  no  country  must  aim  at  freedom  by  means  of  war.  We  were  one  in 
sentiment  as  in  territory,  starting  out,  not  with  a  struggling  administration 
of  doubtful  authority,  but  with  our  ancient  State  governments  and  a  fully 
organized  central  government.  As  a  military  question,  it  was  in  no  sense  a 
civil  war,  but  a  war  between  two  countries — for  conquest  on  one  side,  for 
self-preservation  on  the  other.  The  South,  with  its  great  material  resources, 
its  defensive  means  of  mountains,  rivers,  railroads,  and  telegraph,  with  the 
immense  advantage  of  the  interior  lines  of  war,  would  be  open  to  discredit 
as  a  people  if  its  failure  could  not  be  explained  otherwise  than  by  mere 
material  contrast.  The  great  Frederick,  at  the  head  of  a  little  people,  not 
only  beat  back  a  combination  of  several  great  military  powers,  but  conquered 
and  kept  territory;  and  Napoleon  held  combined  Europe  at  the  feet  of 
France  till  his  blind  ambition  overleaped  itself.  It  may  be  said  that  the 
South  had  no  Fredericks  or  Napoleons ;  but  it  had  at  least  as  good  com 
manders  as  its  adversary.  Nor  was  it  the  fault  of  our  soldiers  or  people. 
Our  soldiers  were  as  brave  and  intelligent  as  ever  bore  arms ;  and,  if  only 
for  reasons  already  mentioned,  they  did  not  lack  in  determination.  Our 
people  bore  a  devotion  to  the  cause  never  surpassed,  and  which  no  war-mak 
ing  monarch  ever  had  for  his  support;  they  gave  their  all — even  the  last 
striplings  under  the  family  roofs  filling  the  ranks  voided  by  the  fall  of  their 
fathers  and  brothers.  But  the  narrow  military  view  of  the  head  of  the  Govern 
ment,  which  illustrated  itself  at  the  outset  by  ordering  from  Europe,  not  100,000 
or  1,000,000,  but  10,000  stands  of  arms,  as  an  increase  upon  8000,  its  first 
estimate,  was  equally  narrow  and  timid  in  its  employment  of  our  armies. 

The  moral  and  material  forces  actually  engaged  in  the  war  made  our  success 
amoral  certainty,  but  for  the  timid  policy  which — ignoring  strategy  as  a 
science  and  boldness  of  enterprise  as  its  ally  —  could  never  be  brought  to 


THE  FIRST  BATTLE  OF  BULL  RUN.  223 

view  the  whole  theater  of  war  as  one  subject,  of  which  all  points  were  but 
integral  parts,  or  to  hazard  for  the  time  points  relatively  unimportant  for  the 
purpose  of  gathering  for  an  overwhelming  and  rapid  stroke  at  some  decisive 
point ;  and  which,  again,  with  characteristic  mis-elation,  would  push  a  vic 
torious  force  directly  forward  into  unsupported  and  disastrous  operations, 
instead  of  using  its  victory  to  spare  from  it  strength  sufficient  to  secure  an 
equally  important  success  in  another  quarter.  The  great  principles  of  war 
are  truths,  and  the  same  to-day  as  in  the  time  of  Caesar  or  Napoleon,  notwith 
standing  the  ideas  of  some  thoughtless  persons — their  applications  being  but 
intensified  by  the  scientific  discoveries  affecting  transportation  and  commu 
nication  of  intelligence.  These  principles  are  few  and  simple,  however 
various  their  deductions  and  application.  Skill  in  strategy  consists  in  seeing 
through  the  intricacies  of  the  whole  situation,  and  bringing  into  proper  com 
bination  forces  and  influences,  though  seemingly  unrelated,  so  as  to  apply 
these  principles,  and  with  boldness  of  decision  and  execution  appearing  with 
the  utmost  force,  and,  if  possible,  superior  odds,  before  the  enemy  at  some 
strategic,  that  is,  decisive  point.  And  although  a  sound  military  plan 
may  not  be  always  so  readily  conceived,  yet  any  plan  that  offers  decisive 
results,  if  it  agree  with  the  principles  of  war,  is  as  plain  and  intelligible  as 
these  principles  themselves,  and  no  more  to  be  rejected  than  they.  There 
still  remains,  of  course,  the  hazard  of  accident  in  execution,  and  the  appre 
hension  of  the  enemy's  movements  upsetting  your  own ;  but  hazard  may  also 
favor  as  well  as  disfavor,  and  will  not  unbefriend  the  enterprising  any  more 
than  the  timid.  It  was  this  fear  of  possible  consequences  that  kept  our  forces 
scattered  in  inferior  relative  strength  at  all  points  of  the  compass,  each  hold 
ing  its  bit  of  ground  till  by  slow  local  process  our  territory  was  taken  and 
our  separate  forces  destroyed,  or,  if  captured,  retained  by  the  enemy  without 
exchange  in  their  process  of  attrition.  To  stop  the  slow  consumption  of  this 
passive  mode  of  warfare  I  tried  my  part,  and,  at  certain  critical  junctures, 
proposed  to  the  Government  active  plans  of  operation  looking  to  such  results 
as  I  have  described, —  sometimes,  it  is  true,  in  relation  to  the  employment  of 
forces  not  under  my  control,  as  I  was  the  soldier  of  a  cause  and  people,  not  of 
a  monarch  nor  even  of  a  government.  Two  occasions  there  were  when  cer 
tain  of  the  most  noted  Federal  operations,  from  their  isolated  or  opportune 
character,  might,  with  energy  and  intelligent  venture  on  the  Confederate 
side,  have  been  turned  into  fatal  disaster ;  among  them  Grant's  movement  in 
front  of  Vicksburg,  and  his  change  of  base  from  the  north  to  the  south  of  the 
James  River,  where  I  was  in  command,  in  his  last  campaign  against  Rich 
mond.  I  urged  particularly  that  our  warfare  was  sure  of  final  defeat  unless 
we  attempted  decisive  strokes  that  might  be  followed  up  to  the  end,  and  that, 
even  if  earlier  defeat  might  chance  from  the  risk  involved  in  the  execution  of 
the  necessary  combinations,  we  ought  to  take  that  risk  and  thereby  either 
win  or  end  an  otherwise  useless  struggle.  But,  in  addition  to  the  radical 
divergence  of  military  ideas, —  the  passive  defensive  of  an  intellect  timid  of 
risk  and  not  at  home  in  war,  and  the  active  defensive  reaching  for  success 
through  enterprise  and  boldness,  according  to  the  lessons  taught  us  in  the 
campaigns  of  the  great  masters, —  there  was  a  personal  feeling  that  now  gave 


224 


THE  FIRST  BATTLE  OF  BULL  RUN. 


RUINS    OF    THE    STONE    BRIDGE,    LOOKING    ALONG    THE    WARRENTON    TURNPIKE    TOWARD   THE    BATTLE-FIELD. 


This  view  is  from  a  photograph  taken  in  March,  1802,  the 
region  having  been  left  open  to  the  Union  forces  by  the 
withdrawal  of  the  Confederates.  The  Confederate  bat 
tery  which  in  the  first  battle  of  Bull  Run  commanded 


the  bridge  was  plaeed  on  the  left  in  the  felled  timber, 
which  formed  an  abatis  across  the  road.  The  battle 
was  opened  from  beyond  the  small  house,  Van  Pelt's, 
on  the  right,  by  the  Rhode  Island  troops. —  EDITORS. 


cold  hearing,  or  none,  to  any  recommendations  of  mine.  Mr.  Da  vis's  friend 
ship,  warm  at  the  early  period  of  the  war,  was  changed,  some  time  after  the 
battle  of  Manassas,  to  a  corresponding  hostility  from  several  personal  causes, 
direct  and  indirect,  of  which  I  need  mention  but  one.  My  report  of  Manassas 
having  contained,  as  part  of  its  history,  a  statement  of  the  submission  of 
the  full  plan  of  campaign  for  concentrating  our  forces,  crushing  successively 
McDowell  and  Patterson  and  capturing  Washington,  Mr.  Davis  strangely 
took  offense  thereat;  and,  now  that  events  had  demonstrated  the  practica 
bility  of  that  plan,  he  sought  to  get  rid  of  his  self -accused  responsibility  for 
rejecting  it,  by  denying  that  any  such  had  been  submitted  —  an  issue,  for 
that  matter,  easily  settled  by  my  production  of  the  contemporaneous  report 
of  Colonel  James  Chesnut,  the  bearer  of  the  mission,  who,  moreover,  at  the 
time  of  this  controversy  was  on  Mr.  Davis's  own  staff,  where  he  remained. 
Mr.  Davis  made  an  endeavor  to  suppress  the  publication  of  my  report  of  the 
battle  of  Manassas.  The  matter  came  up  in  a  secret  debate  in  the  Confeder 
ate  Congress,  where  a  host  of  friends  were  ready  to  sustain  me ;  but  I  sent 
a  telegram  disclaiming  any  desire  for  its  publication,  and  advising  that  the 
safety  of  the  country  should  be  our  solicitude,  and  not  personal  ends. 

Thenceforth  Mr.  Davis's  hostility  was  watchful  and  adroit,  neglecting  no 
opportunity,  great  or  small ;  and  though,  from  motives  all  its  opposite,  it  was 


THE  FIRST  BATTLE  OF  BULL  RUN.  225 

not  exposed  during  the  war  by  any  murmurs  of  mine,  it  bruited  sometimes  in 
certain  quarters  of  its  own  force.  Thus,  when  in  January,  1862,  the  Western 
representatives  expressed  a  desire  that  I  should  separate  myself  for  a  time 
from  my  Virginia  forces  and  go  to  tl;e  defense  of  the  Mississippi  Valley  from 
the  impending  offensive  of  Halleck  and  Grant,  it  was  furthered  by  the  Execu 
tive  with  inducements  which  I  trusted, — in  disregard  of  Senator  Toombs's 
sagacious  warning,  that  iinder  this  furtherance  lurked  a  purpose  to  effect  my 
downfall,  urged  in  one  of  his  communications  through  his  son-in-law,  Mr. 
Alexander,  in  words  as  impressive  as  they  proved  prophetic :  "  Urge  General 
Beauregard  to  decline  all  proposals  and  solicitations.  The  Blade  of  Joab. 
Verb  urn-  Sapienti?  After  going  through  the  campaign  of  Shiloh  and  Corinth, 
not  only  with  those  inducements  unfulfilled,  but  with  vital  drawbacks  from 
the  Government,  including  the  refusal  of  necessary  rank  to  competent  subor 
dinates  to  assist  in  organizing  my  hastily  collected  and  mostly  raw  troops,  I 
was  forced,  the  following  June,  in  deferred  obedience  to  the  positive  order  of 
my  physicians,  to  withdraw  from  my  immediate  camp  to  another  point  in  my 
department  for  recovery  from  illness,  leaving  under  the  care  of  my  lieuten 
ant,  General  Bragg,  my  army,  then  unmenaced  and  under  reorganization  with 
a  view  to  an  immediate  offensive  I  had  purposed.  In  anticipation  and  exclu 
sion  of  the  receipt  of  full  dispatches  following  my  telegram,  the  latter  was 
tortuously  misread,  in  a  manner  not  creditable  to  a  school-boy  and  repug 
nant  to  Mr.  Davis's  exact  knowledge  of  syntax,  so  as  to  give  pretext  to  the 
shocking  charge  that  I  had  abandoned  my  army,  and  a  telegram  was  sent  in 
naked  haste  directly  to  G-eneral  Bragg,  telling  him  to  retain  the  permanent 
command  of  the  army.  The  "  Blade  of  Joab  "  had  given  its  thrust.  The  repre 
sentatives  in  Congress  from  the  West  and  South-west  applied  to  Mr.  Davis  in 
a  body  for  my  restoration ;  and  when,  disregarding  his  sheer  pretext  that  I  had 
abandoned  my  army,  they  still  insisted,  Mr.  Davis  declared  that  I  should  not 
be  restored  if  the  whole  world  should  ask  it  !  This  machination  went  to  such 
length  that  it  was  given  out  in  Richmond  that  I  had  softening  of  the  brain 
and  had  gone  crazy.  So  carefully  was  this  report  fostered  (one  of  its  tales 
being  that  I  would  sit  all  day  stroking  a  pheasant  \)  that  a  friend  of  mine, 
a  member  of  the  Confederate  Congress,  thought  it  his  duty  to  write  me  a 
special  letter  respecting  the  device,  advising  me  to  come  directly  to  Rich 
mond  to  confound  it  by  my  presence  —  a  proceeding  which  I  disdained 
to  take.  I  had  not  only  then,  but  from  later,  still  more  offensive  prov 
ocation,  imperative  cause  to  resign,  and  would  have  done  so  but  for 
a  sense  of  public  obligation.  Indeed,  in  my  after  fields  of  action  the 
same  hostility  was  more  and  more  active  in  its  various  embarrassments, 
reckless  that  the  strains  inflicted  upon  me  bore  upon  the  troops  and 
country  depending  on  me  and  relatively  upon  the  cause,  so  that  I  often 

\  This  silly  tale  was  borrowed  from  an  incident  to  place  it  iri  a  cage,  as  I  intended  sending  it  as  a 

of  Shiloh.     Toward  the  end  of  the  first  day's  bat-  pleasant  token  of  the  battle  to  the  family  of  Judge 

tie  a  soldier  had  found  a  pheasant  cowering,  ap-  Milton  Brown,  of  Jackson,  Tennessee,  from  whom 

pareiitly  paralyzed  under  the  ceaseless  din,  and  I  had  received  as  their  guest,  while  occupying  that 

brought   it  to   my  headquarters    as  a  present  to  place,  the  kindest  attentions ;  but  in  the  second 

me.    It  was  a  beautiful  bird,  and  I  gave  directions  day's  conflict  the  poor  waif  was  lost. —  G.  T.  B. 

VOL.  I.     15 


226  THE  FIRST  BATTLE  OF  BULL  RUN. 

dreaded  failure  more  from  my  own  Government  behind  me  than  from  the 
enemy  in  my  front ;  and,  when  success  came  in  spite  of  this,  it  was  acknowl 
edged  only  by  some  censorious  official  "  inquiry  "  contrasting  with  the  repeated 
thanks  of  the  Congress.  I  was,  however,  not  the  only  one  of  the  highest 
military  rank  with  whom  Mr.  Davis's  relations  were  habitually  unwholesome. 
It  is  an  extraordinary  fact  that  during  the  four  years  of  war  Mr.  Davis  did 
not  call  together  the  five  generals  [see  page  241  ]  with  a  view  to  determining 
the  best  military  policy  or  settling  upon  a  decisive  plan  of  operations  involv 
ing  the  whole  theater  of  war,  though  there  was  often  ample  opportunity  for  it. 
We  needed  for  President  either  a  military  man  of  a  high  order,  or  a  politician  of 
the  first  class  without  military  pretensions,  such  as  Howell  Cobb.  The  South 
did  not  fall  crushed  by  the  mere  weight  of  the  North ;  but  it  was  nibbled 
away  at  all  sides  and  ends  because  its  executive  head  never  gathered  and 
wielded  its  great  strength  under  the  ready  advantages  that  greatly  reduced 
or  neutralized  its  adversary's  naked  physical  superiority.  It  is  but  another 
of  the  many  proofs  that  timid  direction  may  readily  go  with  physical  cour 
age,  and  that  the  passive  defensive  policy  may  make  a  long  agony,  but  can 
never  win  a  war. 

POSTSCRIPT. —  Since  the  publication  of  the  foregoing  pages  in  "  The  Century  " 
for  November,  1884,  General  J.  E.  Johnston,  in  the  course  of  a  paper  also  con 
tributed  to  "  The  Century"  [see  page  240],  took  occasion,  for  the  first  time,  to 
set  up  with  positiveness  and  circumstantiality  the  claim  to  having  exercised 
a  controlling  connection  with  the  tactics  of  all  the  phases  of  the  battle  of  the  21st 
of  July,  1861.  Bespecting  such  a  pretension  I  shall  be  content  for  the  present 
to  recall  that,  while  entirely  at  variance  with  the  part  I  have  ascribed  to  him 
in  relation  to  that  field,  it  is  logically  untenable,  at  this  day,  when  confronted 
with  the  records  of  the  period.  In  my  own  official  report  of  the  battle  closely 
contemporaneous  with  the  events  narrated  —  a  report  that  was  placed  in  his 
hands  for  perusal  before  transmission —  it  is  distinctly  related  that  for  certain 
reasons,  chiefly  military,  General  Johnston  had  left  in  my  hands  for  the 
impending  conflict  the  command  of  the  Confederate  forces.  The  precise  cir 
cumstances  of  my  direct  conduct  of  and  responsibility  for  the  battle  are 
stated  in  such  terms  that,  had  I  not  been  in  actual  direction  of  the  day's 
operations  on  the  part  of  the  Confederates,  General  Johnston  must  have  made 
the  issue  squarely  then  and  there  in  his  own  official  report.  And  all  the  more 
incumbent  upon  him  was  the  making  of  such  an  issue,  it  seems  to  me,  then 
or  never,  in  view  of  the  fact  that  the  Confederate  Secretary  of  War  on  the 
24th  of  July,  1861,  wrote  me  in  these  words : 

"  MY  DEAR  GENERAL  :  Accept  my  congratulations  for  the  glorious  and  most  brilliant  victory 
achieved  by  you.  The  country  will  bless  and  honor  you  for  it.  Believe  me,  dear  General, 

"  Truly  your  friend,  L.  P.  WALKER." 

Further,  General  Lee  thus  addressed  me : 

"  MY  DEAR  GENERAL  :  I  cannot  express  the  joy  I  feel  at  the  brilliant  victory  of  the  21st.  The 
skill,  courage,  and  endurance  displayed  by  yourself  excite  my  highest  admiration.  You  and 
your  troops  have  the  gratitude  of  the  whole  country,  and  I  offer  to  all  my  heartfelt  congratula 
tions  at  their  success.  .  .  .  Very  truly  yours,  R.  E.  LEE." 


THE  FIRST  BATTLE  OF  BULL  RUN. 


227 


Of  the  exact  purport  of  these  two  letters  General  Johnston  could  not  have 
been  ignorant  when  he  wrote  his  report  of  the  battle.  Nor  could  he  have 
been  unaware  that  the  leading  Southern  newspapers  had  in  effect  attributed 
to  me  the  chief  direction  of  that  battle  011  the  Confederate  side.  Therefore, 
if  it  were  the  gross  historical  error  which,  twenty  odd  years  after  the  affair, 
General  Johnston  characterizes  it  to  be,  and  one  that  imputed  to  him  the 
shirking  of  a  duty  which  he  could  not  have  left  unassumed  without  personal 
baseness,  certainly  that  was  the  time  for  him  by  a  few  explicit  words  in  his 
official  report  to  dispose  of  so  affronting  an  error.  In  that  report,  however, 
no  such  exigent,  peremptory  statement  of  his  relation  to  the  battle  is  to  be 
found.  On  the  other  hand,  upon  page  57  of  his  "Narrative"  published  in 
187-4  (D.  Appleton  &  Co.),  may  be  found,  I  fear,  the  clew  to  the  motive  of 
his  actual  waiver  of  command  in  this  curious  paragraph : 

"  If  the  tactics  of  the  Federals  had  been  equal  to  their  strategy,  we  should  have  been  beaten. 
If,  instead  of  being  brought  into  action  in  detail,  their  troops  had  been  formed  in  two  lines, 
with  a  proper  reserve,  and  had  assailed  Bee  and  Jackson  in  that  order,  the  two  Southern 
brigades  must  have  been  swept  from  the  field  in  a  few  minutes,  or  enveloped.  General 
McDowell  would  have  made  such  a  formation,  probably,  had  he  not  greatly  underestimated  the 
strength  of  his  enemy." 

Coupled  with  the  disquieting,  ever-apprehensive  tenor  of  his  whole  corre 
spondence  with  the  Confederate  War  Department,  from  the  day  he  assumed 
command  in  the  Valley  of  Virginia  in  May,  1861,  down  to  the  close  of  the 
struggle  in  1865,  the  fair  inference  from  such  language  as  that  just  cited  from 
his  "  Narrative "  is  that  General  Johnston  came  to  Manassas  beset  with  the 
idea  that  our  united  forces  would  not  be  able  to  cope  with  the  Federal  army, 
and  that  we  should  be  beaten —  a  catastrophe  in  which  he  was  not  solicitous 
to  figure  on  the  pages  of  history  as  the  leading  and  responsible  actor.  Origi 
nally  and  until  1875, 1  had  regarded  it  as  a  generous  though  natural  act  on  the 
part  of  General  Johnston,  in  such  a  juncture,  to  leave  me  in  command  and 
responsible  for  what  might  occur.  The  history  of  military  operations  abounds 
in  instances  of  notable  soldiers  who  have  found  it  proper  to  waive  chief  com 
mand  under  similar  conditions. 


CONFEDERATE  QUAKER  GUXS.   FROM  A  PHOTOGRAPH. 

Confederate  fortifications,  near  Centreville,  after  their  evacuation  in  the  spring  of  1862.    The  muzzle  of  the  log  was 
painted  black  and  the  breech  was  covered  with  brush  to  conceal  its  character  from  observation  by  balloon. 


THE    NEW    HENRY    HOUSE    AND    THE    MONUMENT    OF    THE     FIRST    BATTLE.        FROM    A     PHOTOGRAPH    TAKEN     IN     1884. 


INCIDENTS   OF   THE    FIRST   BULL   RUN. 

BY    JOHN    D.    IMBODEN,    BRIGADIER-GENERAL,    C.   S.   A. 

FROM  the  day  of  his  arrival  at  Winchester  [see  page  124],  General  John 
ston  was  ceaseless  in  his  labors  to  improve  the  efficiency  of  his  little 
army,  in  which  he  was  greatly  assisted  by  several  staff-officers  who  afterward 
rose  to  high  distinction.  The  two  most  active  of  these  subordinates  were 
Majors  W.  H.  C.  "Whiting  and  E.  Kirby  Smith,  the  former  of  whom  as  a 
major-general  fell  mortally  wounded  at  the  capture  of  Fort  Fisher  in  North 
Carolina,  and  the  latter  as  a  lieutenant-general  commanded  the  Trans- 
Mississippi  army  when  the  final  collapse  came.  During  our  withdrawal  from 
Harper's  Ferry,  on  June  16th,  we  were  deflected  from  our  direct  line  of 
march,  and  held  in  line  of  battle  a  day  at  Bunker  Hill,  a  few  miles  north  of 
Winchester,  to  receive  an  expected  assault  from  General  Patterson,  who  had 
crossed  the  Potomac,  but  who  went  back  without  attacking  us.  Again  on 
July  2d  we  were  marched  to  Darksville,  about  midway  to  Martinsburg,  to 
meet  Patterson,  where  we  lay  in  line  of  battle  till  the  5th,  when  General 
Patterson,  after  a  slight  "  brush  "  with  Jackson,  again  recrossed  the  Potomac. 
We  returned  to  Winchester,  and  to  our  arduous  drilling. 

After  midnight  of  July  17th,  General  Bee,  my  brigade  commander,  sent  for 
me  to  go  with  him  to  headquarters,  whither  he  had  been  summoned.  Several 
brigade  commanders  were  assembled  in  a  room  with  General  Johnston,  and  a 
conference  of  one  or  two  hours  was  held.  When  General  Bee  joined  me  on  the 
porch  to  return  to  our  quarters,  I  saw  he  was  excited,  and  I  asked  him,  "  What 
is  up  I "  He  took  my  arm,  and,  as  we  walked  away,  told  me  we  would  march 
next  day  to  the  support  of  General  Beauregard.  He  repeated  a  telegram 
General  Johnston  had  received  from  Adjutant-General  Cooper  about  mid 
night.  This  was  the  famous  dispatch  that  has  led  to  so  much  controversy 
between  Mr.  Davis  and  General  Johnston,  as  to  whether  it  was  a  peremptory 
order,  or  simply  permission  to  Johnston  to  go  to  Beauregard's  support.  I 
quote  it,  and  leave  the  reader  to  his  own  construction : 

"  General  Beauregard  is  attacked  ;  to  strike  the  enemy  a  decisive  blow,  a  junction  of  all  your 
effective  force  will  be  needed.  If  practicable,  make  the  movement,  sending  your  sick  and 
baggage  to  Culpeper  Court  House,  either  by  railroad  or  by  Warrenton.  In  all  the  arrange 
ments  exercise  your  discretion." 


229 


230  INCIDENTS  OF   THE  FIRST  BULL  RUN. 

On  the  next  day,  the  18th  of  July,  we  left  Winchester  for  Manassas.  It 
was  late  in  the  afternoon  before  my  battery  took  up  the  line  of  march — as  I 
now  recollect,  with  the  rear-guard,  as  had  been  the  case  when  we  left  Harper's 
Ferry  a  month  before.  It  was  thought  probable  that  Patterson,  who  was 
south  of  the  Potomac,  and  only  a  few  miles  distant,  would  follow  us.  But  J, 
E.  B.  Stuart  and  Ashby  with  the  cavalry  so  completely  masked  our  movement 
that  it  was  not  suspected  by  Patterson  until  July  20th,  the  day  before  the 
Bull  Run  fight,  and  then  it  was  too  late  for  him  to  interfere. 

On  the  second  day  of  the  march  an  order  reached  me  at  Rectortown. 
Virginia,  through  Brigadier-General  Barnard  E.  Bee,  to  collect  the  four  field- 
batteries  of  Johnston's  army  into  one  column,  and,  as  senior  artillery  captain, 
to  march  them  by  country  roads  that  were  unobstructed  by  infantry  or  trains 
as  rapidly  as  possible  to  Manassas  Junction,  and  to  report  my  arrival,  at  any 
hour,  day  or  night,  to  General  Bee,  who  was  going  forward  by  rail  with  his 
brigade.  Having  assembled  the  batteries  in  the  night,  I  began  the  march  al 
dawn  of  Saturday,  July  20th,  the  day  before  the  battle.  About  8  in  tin 
morning  we  reached  a  village  in  Fauquier  county  —  Salem,  I  think  it  was 
The  whole  population  turned  out  to  greet  us.  Men,  women,  and  children 
brought  us  baskets,  trays,  and  plates  loaded  with  their  own  family  breakfasts 
With  the  improvidence  of  raw  campaigners,  we  had  finished  the  night  before 
our  three  days'  cooked  rations ;  so  I  ordered  a  halt  for  thirty  minutes  to  enjoj 
the  feast.  The  Stauiiton  Artillery,)  (my  own  battery)  was  at  the  head  of  the 
column,  and,  being  largely  composed  of  young  men  of  high  social  standing 
was  especially  honored  by  the  ladies  of  the  village,  conspicuous  among  whon: 
were  the  young  daughters  of  Colonel  John  A.  Washington,  late  of  Mount  Ver- 
non.  I  noticed  that  some  of  the  young  fellows  of  the  battery,  lingering  rounc 
the  baskets  borne  by  these  young  ladies,  who  bade  them  die  or  conquer  in  tin 
fight,  seemed  very  miserable  during  the  remainder  of  the  march.  No  doubl 
many  of  them,  during  the  battle,  felt  that  it  would  be  better  to  die  on  th( 
field  than  retreat  and  live  to  meet  those  enthusiastic  girls  again.  I  make 
special  note  of  that  breakfast  because  it  was  the  last  food  any  of  us  tasted  til 
the  first  Bull  Run  had  been  fought  and  won,  36  hours  later. 

It  was  1  o'clock  that  night  when  the  head  of  my  little  column  reached 
General  Bee's  headquarters,  about  one  mile  north-east  of  Manassas  Junction 
He  was  established  in  the  log-cabin  to  which  afterward  he  was  brought  wher 
he  was  mortally  wounded,  and  to  which  I  shall  again  allude.  General  Bet 
ordered  us  to  unharness  the  horses  and  bivouac  in  the  fence  corners,  adding, 
"  You  will  need  all  the  rest  you  can  get,  for  a  great  battle  will  begin  in  tht 
morning." 

A  little  after  daybreak  we  were  aroused  by  the  sharp,  ringing  report  of  a 
great  Parrott  gun  across  Bull  Run,  two  miles  away,  and  the  whizzing  of  a 
30-pounder  elongated  shell  over  the  tree- tops,  400  or  500  yards  to  our  left, 
Instantly  every  man  was  on  his  feet,  and  in  five  minutes  the  horses  were 

^  It  numbered  140  officers  and  men.   Six  were  col-  chanies,  whose  mechanical  skill  was  of  much  ser- 

lege  graduates,  and  several  had  left  college  to  enter  vice.  I  had  provided  them  with  red  flannel  shirts  at 

the  army.  The  majority  were  young  men  of  leisure  Harper's  Ferry,  because  our  uniforms  were  too  fine 

or  mercantile  clerks.    About  forty  were  young  me-  for  camp  life  and  for  service  in  the  field. — J.  D.  I. 


INCIDENTS  OF  THE  FIRST  BULL  RUN. 


231 


harnessed  and  hitched  to  the  guns  and  caissons.  General  Bee  beckoned  to  me 
to  come  up  to  the  porch,  where  he  was  standing  in  his  shirt-sleeves,  having 
also  been  aroused  by  the  shot.  He  rapidly  informed  me  of  the  disposition  of 
our  troops  of  Johnston's  army  so  far  as  they  had  arrived  at  Manassas.  His 
own  brigade  had  been  brought  forward  by  rail  the  evening  before.  Above 
all,  he  was  dissatisfied  at  the  prospect  of  not  participating  prominently  in  the 
battle,  saying  that  he  had  been  ordered  to  the  Stone  Bridge,  three  or  four 
miles  away  on  our  extreme  left,  to  cover  the  left  flank  of  the  army  from  any 
movement  that  might  be  made  against  it.  And  as  he  had  been  directed  to  take 
a  battery  with  him,  he  had  selected  mine,  and  wished  me  to  move  at  once.  He 
gave  me  a  guide,  and  said  he  would  follow  immediately  with  his  infantry. 
When  I  told  him  we  had  been  24  hours  without  food  for  men  or  horses, 
he  said  he  would  order  supplies  to  follow,  remarking,  "  You  will  have  plenty 
of  time  to  cook  and  eat,  to  the  music  of  a  battle  in  which  we  shall  probably 
take  little  or  no  part." 

Away  we  went,  retracing  our  steps  to  the  Junction,  and  by  a  westerly  detour 
striking  into  the  Sudley  road,  at  a  point  half-way  between  the  Junction  and 
the  scene  of  the  battle.  After  an  hour  or  so  we  ascended  the  hill  to  the  Lewis 
house,  or  "  Portici."  Here  a  courier  at  full  speed  met  us  with  news  that  the 
whole  Federal  army  seemed  to  be  marching  north-westerly  on  the  other  side 
of  Bull  Run.  Halting  my  men,  I  rode  to  the  top  of  the  hill,  and  had  a  full 
view  of  a  long  column  of  glittering  bayonets  moving  up  on  the  north  side  of 
the  creek.  Glancing  down  the  valley,  I  saw  Bee's  brigade  advancing,  and 
galloped  to  meet  him  and  report  what  I  had  seen.  He  divined  the  plans  of 


CONFEDERATE    FORTIFICATIONS    ABOUT    MANASSAS    JUNCTION. 


This  view  is  from  a  photograph  taken  in  March,  186-2.    Tt  represents  the  works  substantially  as 

were  at  the  time  of  the  battle. 


INCIDENTS  OF  THE  FIRST  BULL  RUN. 


THE  STONE   HOUSE 

ON  THE  WARRENTON  TURNPIKE. 

FROM  A  PHOTOGRAPH  TAKEN  IN   MARCH,   1862. 

The  stream  in  the  foreground  is  Young's  Branch. 
The  Sudley  road  crosses  a  little  to  the  left  of 
the  picture.    See  map,  page  204. 

McDowell,  and,  asking  me  to  accompany  him,  rode  rapidly  past  the  Lewis 
house,  across  the  hollow  beyond  it,  and  up  the  next  hill  through  the  pines, 
emerging  on  the  summit  immediately  east  of  the  Henry  house.  As  the  beau 
tiful  open  landscape  in  front  burst  upon  his  vision,  he  exclaimed  with  enthu 
siasm  :  "  Here  is  the  battle-field,  and  we  are  in  for  it !  Bring  up  your  guns  as 
quickly  as  possible,  and  I'll  look  round  for  a  good  position." 

In  less  than  twenty  minutes  I  and  my  battery  had  passed  the  Lewis  house, 
when  I  discovered  Bee  coming  out  of  the  pines.  He  stopped,  and,  placing  his 
cap  on  his  sword-point,  waved  it  almost  frantically  as  a  signal  to  hurry  for 
ward.  We  Vent  at  a  gallop,  and  were  guided  to  a  depression  in  the  ground 
about  one  hundred  yards  to  the  north-east  of  the  Henry  house,  where  we 
unlimbered.  With  his  keen  military  eye,  General  Bee  had  chosen  the  best 
possible  position  for  a  battery  on  all  that  field.  We  were  almost  under  cover 
by  reason  of  a  slight  swell  in  the  ground  immediately  in  our  front,  and  not 
fifty  feet  away.  Our  shot  passed  not  six  inches  above  the  surface  of  the 
ground  on  this  "  swell,"  and  the  recoil  ran  the  guns  back  to  still  lower  ground, 
where  as  we  loaded  only  the  heads  of  my  men  were  visible  to  the  enemy. 

We  went  into  position  none  too  soon ;  for,  by  the  time  we  had  unlimbered, 
Captain  Ricketts,  appearing  on  the  crest  of  the  opposite  hill,  came  beautifully 
and  gallantly  into  battery  at  a  gallop,  a  short  distance  from  the  Matthews 


INCIDENTS  OF  THE  FIRST  BULL  RUN. 


233 


Scale  of  1000  feet 


house  on  our  side  of  the  Sudley  road,  and  about  fifteen  hundred  yards  to  our 
front.  I  wanted  to  open  on  him  while  he  was  unlimbering,  but  General  Bee 
objected  till  we  had  received  a  fire,  and  had  thus  ascertained  the  character 
and  caliber  of  the  enemy's  guns.  Mine,  four  in  number,  were  all  brass  smooth 
bore  6-pounders.  The  first  round  or  two  from  the  enemy  went  high  over 
us.  Seeing  this,  General 
Bee  directed  us  to  fire 
low  and  ricochet  our 
shot  and  shrapnel  on 
the  hard,  smooth,  open 
field  that  sloped  toward 
the  Warrenton  turnpike 
in  the  valley  between 
us.  We  did  this,  and  the 
effect  was  very  destruc 
tive  to  the  enemy. 

The  rapid  massing  of 
Federal  troops  in  our 
front  soon  led  to  very 
heavy  fighting.  My  lit 
tle  battery  was  under  a 
pitiless  fire  for  a  long 
time.  Two  guns  from 
an  Alexandria  battery — 
Latham's,  I  think  — 
took  part  in  the  conflict 
011  the  north  side  of 


'•CHOUSE 


Young's  Branch  to  our 


PLAN    OF    THE    BULL    RUN    RATTLE-FIELD. 

Iinbodeii's  second  position  is  on  the  line  of  the  Confederate  front  as  formed 

by  Jack.son.    Finally  the  Confederate   line  reached  from  behind   the 

Robinson  house  to  the  left  alonff  the  edge  of  the  pines,  and  (as  ree'u- 

forcements  came  up)  made  a  concave  arc  to  a  point  behind  the  Chiun 

house.     General    Imboden  counted  twenty-six  Confederate  guns 

in    the    semicircle  east  of   the   Sudley  road,  when  Griffin  and 

Ricketts  had  taken  position  near  the  Henry  house.—  EDITORS. 


right  and  across  the 
turnpike,  so  long  as  Bee,  Bartow,  Evans,  and  Wheat  were  on  that  side,  we 
firing  over  their  heads ;  and  about  11  o'clock  two  brass  12-pounder  Napoleons 
from  the  New  Orleans  Washington  Artillery  unlimbered  on  our  right,  retiring, 
however,  after  a  few  rounds. 

We  were  hardly  more  than  fairly  engaged  with  Eicketts  when  Griffin's  splen 
did  battery  came  to  his  aid,  and  took  position  full  five  hundred  yards  nearer 
to  us,  in  a  field  011  the  left  of  the  Sudley  road.  Ricketts  had  6  Parrott  guns,  and 
Griffin  had  as  many  more,  and,  I  think,  2  12-pounder  howitzers  besides. 
These  last  hurt  us  more  than  all  the  rifles  of  both  batteries,  since  the  shot 
and  shell  of  the  rifles,  striking  the  ground  at  any  angle  over  15  or  20 
degrees,  almost  without  exception  bored  their  way  in  several  feet  and  did  no 
harm.  It  is  no  exaggeration  to  say  that  hundreds  of  shells  from  these  fine 
rifle-guns  exploded  in  front  of  and  around  my  battery  on  that  day,  but  so 
deep  in  the  ground  that  the  fragments  never  came  out.  After  the  action  the 
ground  looked  as  though  it  had  been  rooted  up  by  hogs.  $ 

&  I  venture  the  opinion,  after  a  good  deal  of  or,  at  1500  to  1800  yards,  a  similar  battery  of  12- 
observation  during  the  war,  that  in  open  ground,  pounder  Napoleons,  well  handled,  will  in  one  hour 
at  1000  yards,  a  G-pounder  battery  of  smooth  guns,  discomfit  double  the  number  of  the  best  rifles  ever 


234  INCIDENTS  OF   THE  FIRST  BULL  RUN. 

For  at  least  a  half -hour  after  our  forces  were  driven  across  Young's  Branch 
no  Confederate  soldier  was  visible  from  our  position  near  the  Henry  house. 
The  Staunton  Artillery,  so  far  as  we  could  see,  was  "  alone  in  its  glory."  Gen 
eral  Bee's  order  had  been,  "  Stay  here  till  you  are  ordered  away."  To  my 
surprise,  no  orders  had  come,  though,  as  I  afterward  learned,  orders  to  with 
draw  had  been  sent  three-quarters  of  an  hour  before  through  Major  Howard, 
of  Bee's  staff,  who  had  fallen,  desperately  wounded,  on  the  way. 

Infantry  was  now  massing  near  the  Stone  house  on  the  turnpike,  not  five 
hundred  yards  away,  to  charge  and  capture  us.  On  making  this  discovery  and 
learning  from  the  sergeants  of  pieces  that  our  ammunition  was  almost  entirely 
exhausted,  there  remained  but  one  way  to  save  our  guns,  and  that  was  to  run 
them  off  the  field.  More  than  half  of  our  horses  had  been  killed,  only  one 
or  two  being  left  in  several  of  my  six-horse  teams.  Those  that  we  had  were 
quickly  divided  among  the  guns  and  caissons,  and  we  limbered  up  and  fled. 
Then  it  was  that  the  Henry  house  was  riddled,  and  the  old  lady,  Mrs.  Henry, 
was  mortally  wounded;|  for  our  line  of  retreat  was  so  chosen  that  for  200  or 
300  yards  the  house  would  conceal  us  from  Griffin's  battery,  and,  in  a 
measure,  shelter  us  from  the  dreaded  fire  of  the  infantry  when  they  should 
reach  the  crest  we  had  just  abandoned.  Several  of  Griffin's  shot  passed 
through  the  house,  scattering  shingles,  boards,  and  splinters  all  around  us. 
A  rifle-shot  from  Ricketts  broke  the  axle  of  one  of  our  guns  and  dropped 
the  gun  in  the  field,  but  we  saved  the  limber.  The  charging  infantry 
gained  the  crest  in  front  of  the  Henry  house  in  time  to  give  us  one  volley, 
but  with  no  serious  damage. 

We  crossed  the  summit  at  the  edge  of  the  pines,  midway  behind  the  Henry 
and  Robinson  houses,  and  there  met  "  Stonewall  "  Jackson  at  the  head  of  his 
brigade,  marching  by  the  flank  at  a  double-quick.  Johnston  and  Beauregard 
had  arrived  upon  the  field,  and  were  hurrying  troops  into  position,  but  we 
had  not  yet  seen  them. 

When  I  met  Jackson  I  felt  very  angry  at  what  I  then  regarded  as  bad  treat 
ment  from  General  Bee,  in  leaving  us  so  long  exposed  to  capture,  and  I 
expressed  myself  with  some  profanity,  which  I  could  see  was  displeasing  to 
Jackson.  He  remarked,  "  I'll  support  your  battery.  Unlimber  right  here." 
We  did  so,  when  a  perfect  lull  in  the  conflict  ensued  for  20  or  30  minutes— 
at  least  in  that  part  of  the  field. 

It  was  at  this  time  that  McDowell  committed,  as  I  think,  the  fatal  blunder 
of  the  day,  by  ordering  both  Ricketts's  and  Griffin's  batteries  to  cease  firing  and 
move  across  the  turnpike  to  the  top  of  the  Henry  Hill,  and  take  position  on  the 
west  side  of  the  house.  The  short  time  required  to  effect  the  change  enabled 
Beauregard  to  arrange  his  new  line  of  battle  on  the  highest  crest  of  the  hill, 

put  in  the  field.     A  smooth-bore  gun  never  buries  the  battle  opened  near  the  Matthews  house,  Mrs. 

its  projectiles  in  the  ground,  as  the  rifle  does  iuva-  Henry  was  carried  into  a  ravine  below  the  Sudley 

riably  when  fired  against  sloping  ground.  Of  course,  road.     A  little  later  the  house   seemed  to   be  the 

this  advantage  of  the  smooth-bore  gun  is  limited  safest  place,  and  she  was  carried  back  to  her  bed. 

to  its  shorter  range,  and  to  an  open  field  fight,  de-  For  a  time  the  house  was  in  the  Hue  of  the  artillery 

fensive  works  not  being  considered.— J.  D.  I.  fire   from  both  sides.     Mrs.    Henry   received  five 

4-  Mrs.  Judith  Henry,  bedridden  from  old  age,  wounds   from   fragments   of  shells,  and  died  two 

was  living  in  the  house  with  her  children.     When  hours  after  the  battle. —  EDITORS. 


INCIDENTS  OF  THE  FIRST  BULL  RUN. 


south-east  of  the  Henry  and  Eobinson 
houses,  in  the  edge  of  the  pines.  If 
one  of  the  Federal  batteries  had  been 
left  north  of  Young's  Branch,  it  could 
have  so  swept  the  hill-top  where  we 
re-formed,  that  it  would  have  greatly 
delayed,  if  not  wholly  have  prevented, 
us  from  occupying  the  position.  And  if 
we  had  been  forced  back  to  the  next 
hill,  on  which  stands  the  Lewis  house, 
Sherman,  who  had  crossed  Bull  Run 
not  far  above  the  Stone  Bridge  at  a 
farm  ford,  would  have  had  a  fail- 
swing  at  our  right  flank,  to  say  noth 
ing  of  the  effect  of  the  artillery  playing 
upon  us  from  beyond  Bull  Bun. 

When  my  retiring  battery  met  Jack 
son,  and  he  assumed  command  of  us, 
I  reported  that  I  had  remaining  only 
three  rounds  of  ammunition  for  a  sin 
gle  gun,  and  suggested  that  the  cais 
sons  be  sent  to  the  rear  for  a  supply. 
He  said,  "Xo,  not  now — wait  till  other 
guns  get  here,  and  then  you  can  with 
draw  your  battery,  as  it  has  been  so  torn  to  pieces,  and  let  your  men  rest." 

During  the  lull  in  front,  my  men  lay  about,  exhausted  from  want  of  water 
and  food,  and  black  with  powder,  smoke,  and  dust.  Lieutenant  Harman  and  I 
had  amused  ourselves  training  one  of  the  guns  on  a  heavy  column  of  the  enemy, 
who  were  advancing  toward  us,  in  the  direction  of  the  Chinn  house,  but  were 
still  1200  to  1500  yards  away.  While  we  were  thus  engaged,  General  Jackson 
rode  up  and  said  that  three  or  four  batteries  were  approaching  rapidly,  and 
that  we  might  soon  retire.  I  asked  permission  to  lire  the  three  rounds  of 
shrapnel  left  to  us,  and  he  said,  "  Go  ahead."  I  picked  up  a  charge  (the  fuse 
was  cut  and  ready)  and  rammed  it  home  myself,  remarking  to  Harman,  "  Tom, 
put  in  the  primer  and  pull  her  off."  I  forgot  to  step  back  far  enough  from  the 
muzzle,  and,  as  I  wanted  to  see  the  shell  strike,  I  squatted  to  be  under  the 
smoke,  and  gave  the  word  "  Fire."  Heavens  !  what  a  report.  Finding  myself 
full  twenty  feet  away,  I  thought  the  gun.  had  burst.  But  it  was  only  the 
pent-up  gas,  that,  escaping  sideways  as  the  shot  cleared  the  muzzle,  had  struck 
my  side  and  head  with  great  violence.  I  recovered  in  time  to  see  the  shell 
explode  in  the  enemy's  ranks.  The  blood  gushed  out  of  my  left  ear,  and  from 
that  day  to  this  it  has  been  totally  deaf.  The  men  fired  the  other  two  rounds, 
and  limbered  up  and  moved  away,  just  as  the  Bockbridge  Artillery,  under 
Lieutenant  Brockenbrough,  came  into  position,  followed  a  moment  later  by  the 
Leesburg  Artillery,  under  Lieutenant  Henry  Heaton.  Pendleton,  supposed  by 
me  still  to  be  captain  of  the  first,  as  Rogers  was  of  the  second,  were  not  with 


BRIG.-GEN.  BARNARD   E.   BEE    (IN*  THE    UNIFORM  OF  A 

CAPTAIN  OF  INFANTRY   OF  THE   OLD  SERVICE;. 

FROM   A  PHOTOGRAPH. 


236  INCIDENTS  OF  THE  FIRST  BULL  RUN. 

their  batteries  when  they  unlimbered.^  But  Heaton  and  Brockenbrough  were 
equal  to  the  occasion.  Heaton  had  been  under  my  command  with  his  battery 
at  the  Point  of  Rocks,  below  Harper's  Ferry,  the  previous  May,  and  was  a 
brave  and  skillful  young  officer.  Several  other  batteries  soon  came  into  line, 
so  that  by  the  time  Griffin  and  Ricketts  were  in  position  near  the  Henry 
house,  we  had,  as  I  now  remember,  26  fresh  guns  ready  for  them. 

The  contest  that  ensued  was  terrific.  Jackson  ordered  me  to  go  from  bat 
tery  to  battery  and  see  that  the  guns  were  properly  aimed  and  the  fuses  cut 
the  right  length.  This  was  the  work  of  but  a  few  minutes.  On  returning 
to  the  left  of  the  line  of  guns,  I  stopped  to  ask  General  Jackson's  permis 
sion  to  rejoin  my  battery.  The  fight  was  just  then  hot  enough  to  make  him 
feel  well.  His  eyes  fairly  blazed.  He  had  a  way  of  throwing  up  his  left 
hand  with  the  open  palm  toward  the  person  he  was  addressing.  And  as  he 
told  me  to  go,  he  made  this  gesture.  The  air  was  full  of  flying  missiles,  and 
as  he  spoke  he  jerked  down  his  hand,  and  I  saw  that  blood  was  streaming 
from  it.  I  exclaimed,  "  General,  you  are  wounded."  He  replied,  as  he  drew 
a  handkerchief  from  his  breast-pocket,  and  began  to  bind  it  up,  "  Only  a 
scratch  —  a  mere  scratch,"  and  galloped  away  along  his  line. 

To  save  my  horse,  I  had  hitched  him  in  a  little  gully  some  fifty  yards  or 
more  in  the  rear.  And  to  reach  him,  I  had  to  pass  the  six  hundred  infantry 
of  Hampton's  Legion,  who  were  lying  down  in  supporting  distance  of  our 
artillery,  then  all  in  full  play.  While  I  was  untying  my  horse,  a  shell  exploded 
in  the  midst  of  Hampton's  infantry,  killing  several  and  stampeding  15  or  20 
nearest  the  spot.  I  tried  to  rally  them ;  but  one  huge  fellow,  musket  in  hand, 
and  with  bayonet  fixed,  had  started  on  a  run.  I  threw  myself  in  his  front 
with  drawn  sword,  and  threatened  to  cut  him  down,  whereupon  he  made  a 
lunge  at  me.  I  threw  up  my  left  arm  to  ward  off  the  blow,  and  the  bayonet- 
point  ran  under  the  wristband  of  my  red  flannel  shirt,  and  raked  the  skin 
of  my  arm  from  wrist  to  shoulder.  The  blow  knocked  me  sprawling  011  the 
ground,  and  the  fellow  got  away.  I  tore  off  the  dangling  shirt-sleeve,  and 
was  bare-armed  as  to  my  left,  the  remainder  of  the  fight. 

I  overtook  my  battery  011  the  hill  near  the  Lewis  house,  which  was  used  as 
a  hospital.  In  a  field  in  front  I  saw  General  Johnston  and  his  staff  grouped 
on  their  horses,  and  under  fire  from  numerous  shells  that  reached  that  hill.  I 
rode  up  to  him,  reported  our  ammunition  all  gone,  and  requested  to  know 
where  I  could  find  the  ordnance  wagons  and  get  a  fresh  supply.  Observing 
the  sorry  plight  of  the  battery  and  the  condition  of  the  surviving  men  and 
horses,  he  directed  me  to  remove  them  farther  to  the  rear  to  a  place  of 
perfect  safety,  and  return  myself  to  the  field,  where  I  might  be  of  some 
service. 

I  took  the  battery  back  perhaps  a  mile,  where  we  found  a  welcome  little 
stream  of  water.  Being  greatly  exhausted,  I  rested  for  perhaps  an  hour,  and 
returned  to  the  front  with  Sergeant  Thomas  Shumate. 

j)  Captain,  afterward  General,  Pendleton  had  the  Eockbridge  Artillery.  Captain  Rogers,  I  also 
recently  been  made  a  colonel  and  chief  of  artillery  learn,  had  a  section  somewhere  lower  down  on 
to  General  Johnston,  which  separated  him  from  Bull  Run  with  the  troops  at  the  fords. —  J.  D.  I. 


INCIDENTS  OF  THE  FIRST  BULL  RUN.  237 

When  we  regained  the  crest  of  the  Henry  plateau,  the  enemy  had  been 
swept  from  it,  and  the  retreat  had  begun  all  along  the  line.  We  gazed  upon 
the  scene  for  a  time,  and,  hearing  firing  between  the  Lewis  house  and  the 
Stone  Bridge,  we  rode  back  to  see' what  it  meant.  Captain  Lindsay  Walker 
had  arrived  from  Fredericksburg  with  his  six-Parrott-gun  battery,  and  from 
a  high  hill  was  shelling  the  fugitives  beyond  Bull  Run  as  they  were  fleeing  in 
wild  disorder  to  the  shelter  of  the  nearest  woods.  Colonel  J.  E.  B.  Stuart, 
at  the  head  of  a  body  of  yelling  cavalry  with  drawn  sabers,  was  sweeping 
round  the  base  of  the  hill  we  were  on,  to  cross  the  Run  and  fall  upon 
the  enemy. 

When  Stuart  disappeared  in  the  distance,  Shumate  and  I  rode  slowly  back 
toward  the  battery.  Xearing  the  Lewis  house,  we  saw  General  Johnston  and 
his  staff  coming  toward  us  slowly,  preceded  a  little  by  a  gentleman  on  horse 
back,  who  was  lifting  his  hat  to  every  one  he  met.  From  the  likeness  I  had 
seen  of  President  Jefferson  Davis,  I  instantly  recognized  him  and  told  Shumate 
who  it  was.  With  the  impulsiveness  of  his  nature,  Shumate  dashed  up  to  the 
President,  seized  his  hand,  and  huzzaed  at  the  top  of  his  voice.  I  could  see 
that  Mr.  Davis  was  greatly  amused,  and  I  was  convulsed  with  laughter.  When 
they  came  within  twenty  steps  of  me,  where  I  had  halted  to  let  the  group 
pass,  Shumate  exclaimed,  to  the  great  amusement  of  all  who  heard  him :  "  Mr. 
President,  there's  my  captain,  and  I  want  to  introduce  you  to  him."  The  Presi 
dent  eyed  me  for  a  moment,  as  if  he  thought  I  was  an  odd-looking  captain. 
I  had  on  a  battered  slouch  hat,  a  red  flannel  shirt  with  only  one  sleeve,  cordu 
roy  trousers,  and  heavy  cavalry  boots,  and  was  begrimed  with  burnt  powder, 
dust,  and  the  blood  from  my  ear  and  arm,  and  must  have  been  about  as 
hard-looking  a  specimen  of  a  captain  as  was  ever  seen.  Nevertheless,  the 
President  grasped  my  hand  with  a  cordial  salutation,  and  after  a  few  words 
passed  on. 

We  found  our  battery  refreshing  themselves  on  fat  bacon  and  bread. 
After  a  hasty  meal,  I  threw  myself  on  a  bag  of  oats,  and  slept  till  broad 
daylight  next  morning,  notwithstanding  a  drenching  rain  which  beat  upon 
me  during  the  night. 

In  fact,  I  was  aroused  in  the  morning  by  a  messenger  from  ex-Governor 
Alston,  of  South  Carolina,  summoning  me  to  the  side  of  my  gallant  com 
mander,  Brigadier-General  Bee,  who  had  been  mortally  wounded  near  the 
Henry  house,  where  Bartow  had  been  instantly  killed  almost  at  the  same 
moment.  When  I  reached  General  Bee,  who  had  been  carried  back  to  the 
cabin  where  I  had  joined  him  the  night  before,  he  was  unconscious ;  in  a  few 
minutes,  while  I  was  holding  his  hand,  he  died.  Some  one  during  the  night 
had  told  him  that  I  had  reflected  on  him  for  leaving  our  battery  so  long 
exposed  to  capture;  and,  at  his  request,  messengers  had  been  for  hours 
hunting  me  in  the  darkness,  to  bring  me  to  him,  that  I  might  learn  from  his 
own  lips  that  he  had  sent  Major  Howard  to  order  me  to  withdraw,  when  he 
was  driven  back  across  Young's  Branch  and  the  turnpike.  I  was  grieved 
deeply  not  to  have  seen  him  sooner.  Possibly  the  failure  of  his  order  to 
reach  me  was  providential.  For  full  three-quarters  of  an  hour  we  had  kept  up 


238  INCIDENTS  OF  THE  FIRST  BULL  RUN. 

a  fire  that  delayed  the  enemy's  movement  across  Young's  Branch.  But  for 
that,  they  might  have  gained  the  Henry  plateau,  before  Jackson  and  Hamp 
ton  came  up,  and  before  Bee  and  Bartow  had  rallied  their  disorganized  troops. 
Minutes  count  as  hours  under  such  circumstances,  and  trifles  often  turn  the 
scale  in  great  battles. 

General  Jackson's  wound  became  very  serious  when  inflammation  set  in. 
On  hearing,  three  days  after  the  fight,  that  he  was  suffering  with  it,  I  rode  to 
his  quarters,  a  little  farm-house  near  Centreville.  Although  it  was  barely 
sunrise,  he  was  out  under  the  trees,  bathing  the  hand  with  spring  water.  It 
was  much  swollen  and  very  painful,  but  he  bore  himself  stoically.  His  wife 
had  arrived  the  night  before.  Of  course,  the  battle  was  the  only  topic  dis 
cussed  at  breakfast.  I  remarked,  in  Mrs.  Jackson's  hearing,  "  General,  how 
is  it  that  you  can  keep  so  cool,  and  appear  so  utterly  insensible  to  danger  in 
such  a  storm  of  shell  and  bullets  as  rained  about  you  when  your  hand  was 
hit  ? "  He  instantly  became  grave  and  reverential  in  his  manner,  and 
answered,  in  a  low  tone  of  great  earnestness :  "  Captain,  my  religious  belief 
teaches  me  to  feel  as  safe  in  battle  as  in  bed.  God  has  fixed  the  time  for 
my  death.  I  do  not  concern  myself  about  that,  but  to  be  always  ready, 
no  matter  when  it  may  overtake  me."  He  added,  after  a  pause,  looking  me 
full  in  the  face :  "  Captain,  that  is  the  way  all  men  should  live,  and  then  all 
would  be  equally  brave." 

I  felt  that  this  last  remark  was  intended  as  a  rebuke  for  my  profanity, 
when  I  had  complained  to  him  on  the  field  of  the  apparent  abandonment  of 
my  battery  to  capture,  and  I  apologized.  He  heard  me,  and  simply  said, 
"Nothing  can  justify  profanity."  \ 

The  battle  was  mainly  fought  by  Johnston's  troops  from  the  Shenandoah. 
Two-thirds  of  the  killed  and  wounded  were  his  men  and  officers.  Beau- 
regard's  troops  were  strung  out  for  several  miles  down  the  valley  of  Bull 
Run,  and  did  not  get  up  to  our  aid  till  near  the  end  of  the  day.  General 
Beauregard  himself,  who  was  in  the  thickest  of  the  fight,  came  upon  the  field 
long  before  any  of  his  troops  arrived,  except  those  he  had  posted  under 
Evans  to  guard  the  Stone  Bridge,  and  which,  with  Bee's  troops,  bore  the 
brunt  of  the  first  attack. 

\IneverknewJacksontoletprofanitypasswith-  of  wagons,  and,  in  the  voice  of  a  stentor,  poured 
out  a  rebuke  but  once.  The  incident  was  reported  to  out  a  volume  of  oaths  that  would  have  excited  the 
me  by  the  chief  actor  in  it,  Major  John  A.  Harman,  admiration  of  the  most  scientific  mule-driver.  The 
who  was  Jackson's  chief  quartermaster.  It  happened  effect  was  electrical.  The  drivers  were  frightened 
at  Edwards  Ferry,  on  the  Potomac,  when  our  ai'my  and  swore  as  best  they  could,  but  far  below  the 
was  crossing  into  Maryland  in  the  Aiitietam  cam-  major's  standard.  The  mules  caught  the  inspira- 
paign.  On  the  march  to  the  river,  for  some  in-  tion  from  a  chorus  of  familiar  words,  and  all  at 
fraction  of  orders  about  the  manner  of  marching  once  made  a  break  for  the  Maryland  shore,  and  in 
his  division,  Major-General  A.  P.  Hill  had  been  five  minutes  the  ford  was  cleared,  Jackson  wit- 
ordered  in  arrest  by  Jackson.  This  probably  had  nessed  and  heard  it  all.  Harman  rode  back  to 
put  Jackson  in  a  niffled  frame  of  mind.  The  day  join  him,  expecting  a  lecture,  and,  touching  his 
was  very  hot,  and  the  ford  was  completely  blocked  hat,  said:  "The  ford  is  clear,  general!  There's 
with  a  wagon  train,  either  of  Hill's  or  some  other  only  one  language  that  will  make  mules  uiider- 
division.  On  seeing  the  state  of  affairs,  Jackson  stand  on  a  hot  day  that  they  must  get  out  of  the 
turned  to  Major  Harman,  and  ordered  him  to  clear  water."  The  general  smiled,  and  said:  "Thank 
the  ford.  Harman  dashed  in  among  the  wagoners,  you,  major,"  and  dashed  into  the  water  at  the  head 
kicking  mules,  and  apparently  inextricable  mass  of  his  staff,  and  rode  across. —  J.  D.  I. 


INCIDENTS  OF  THE  FIRST  BULL   RUN.  239 

The  uninformed,  Xorth  and  South,  have  wondered  why  Johnston  and  Beau- 
regard  did  not  follow  on  to  Washington.  General  Johnston,  in  his  "  Xar- 
rative,"  has  clearly  and  conclusively  answered  that  question.  It  was  simply 
impossible.  We  had  neither  the  food  nor  transportation  at  Manassas  neces 
sary  to  a  forward  movement.  This  subject  was  the  cause  of  sharp  irritation 
between  our  commanding  generals  at  Manassas  on  the  one  hand,  and  Mr. 
Davis  and  his  Secretary  of  War,  Mr.  Benjamin,  on  the  other.  There  was  a 
disposition  in  the  quartermaster's  and  commissary  departments  at  Richmond 
to  deny  the  extent  of  the  destitution  of  our  army  immediately  after  the  bat 
tle.  To  ascertain  the  exact  facts  of  the  case,  General  Johnston  organized  a 
board  of  officers  to  investigate  and  report  the  condition  of  the  transportation 
and  commissariat  of  the  army  at  Manassas  on  the  21st  of  July,  and  their 
daily  condition  for  two  weeks  thereafter.  That  Board  was  composed  of 
Lieutenant-Colonel  Robert  B.  Lee  (a  cousin  of  General  R.  E.  Lee),  represent 
ing  the  commissary  department,  Major  (afterward  Major-General)  W.  L. 
Cabell,  representing  the  quartermaster's  department,  and  myself  from  the 
line.  My  associates  on  this  Board  were  old  United  States  army  officers  of 
acknowledged  ability  and  large  experience.  We  organized  early  in  August, 
and  made  an  exhaustive  investigation  and  detailed  report.  I  have  a  distinct 
recollection  that  we  found  that  on  the  morning  of  the  battle  there  was  not  at 
Manassas  one  full  day's  rations  for  the  combined  armies  of  Johnston  and 
Beauregard,  and  that  on  no  single  day  for  the  succeeding  two  weeks  was 
there  as  much  as  a  three  days'  supply  there.  We  found  that  there  were  not 
wagons  and  teams  enough  at  any  time  to  have  transported  three  days'  sup 
plies  for  the  troops  if  they  had  been  put  in  motion  away  from  the  railroad. 
We  found  that  for  weeks  preceding  the  21st  of  July  General  Beauregard  had 
been  urgent  and  almost  importunate  in  his  demands  on  the  quartermaster 
and  commissary  generals  at  Richmond  for  adequate  supplies.  We  found  that 
Colonel  Xorthrop,  the  commissary  general,  had  not  only  failed  to  send  forward 
adequate  supplies  for  such  an  emergency  as  arose  when  General  Johnston 
brought  his  army  from  the  valley,  but  that  he  had  interfered  with  and  inter 
dicted  the  efforts  of  officers  of  the  department  who  were  with  General  Beau- 
regard  to  collect  supplies  from  the  rich  and  abundant  region  lying  between 
the  hostile  armies.  After  reporting  the  facts,  we  unanimously  concurred  in 
the  opinion  that  they  proved  the  impossibility  of  a  successful  and  rapid 
pursuit  of  the  defeated  enemy  to  Washington.  This  report,  elaborately 
written  out  and  signed,  was  forwarded  to  Richmond,  and  in  a  few  days  was 
returned  by  Mr.  Judah  P.  Benjamin,  Secretary  of  War,  with  an  indorsement 
to  the  effect  that  the  Board  had  transcended  its  powers  by  expressing  an 
opinion  as  to  what  the  facts  did  or  did  not  prove,  and  sharply  ordering  us  to 
strike  out  all  that  part  of  the  report,  and  send  only  the  facts  ascertained  by 
us.  We  met  and  complied  with  this  order,  though  indignant  at  the  repri 
mand,  and  returned  our  amended  report.  This  was  the  last  I  ever  heard  of 
it.  It  never  saw  daylight.  Who  suppressed  it  I  do  not  know.-fr 

$•  See  statement  from  Colonel  Northrop,  page  261 . — EDITORS. 


RESPONSIBILITIES  OF  THE  FIRST  BULL  RUN, 


BY  JOSEPH   E.    JOHNSTON,    GENERAL,  C.  S.  A. 


TTTHEN  the  State  of  Virginia  seceded,  being  a  citizen  of 
T    »  » that  State,  I  resigned  my  office  in  the  United  States 
Army;    and  as  I  had  seen  a  good  deal  of    military 
service,  in  the  Seminole  and  Mexican  wars  and  in  the 
West,  the  President  of  the  Confederacy  offered  me  a 
commission  in  the  highest  grade  in  his  army.    I  ac 
cepted  the  offer  because  the  invasion  of  the  South 
was  inevitable.     But  I  soon  incurred  Mr.  Davis's  dis- 
QU.KER  GUN  FOU-.D  ,N  THE  CONFEDERATE    pleasure  by  protesting  against  an  illegal  act  of  his  by 
which  I  was  greatly  wronged. ,!    Still  he  retained  me  in 

important  positions,  although  his  official  letters  were  harsh.  In  1864,  how 
ever,  he  degraded  me  to  the  utmost  of  his  power  by  summarily  removing 
me  from  a  high  command.  Believing  that  he  was  prompted  to  this  act  by 
animosity,  and  not  by  dispassionate  opinion,  I  undertake  to  prove  this  ani 
mosity  by  many  extracts  from  his  "  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Confederacy "  ( D. 
Appleton  &  Co. :  1881),  and  my  comments  thereon. 

Mr.  Davis  recites  ("B.  and  F.,"  I.,  p.  307)  the  law  securing  to  officers 
who  might  leave  the  United  States  Army  to  enter  that  of  the  Confederacy 
the  same  relative  rank  in  the  latter  which  they  had  in  the  former,  provided 
their  resignations  had  been  offered  in  the  six  months  next  following  the 
14th  of  March,  and  then  adds  : 

"  The  provisions  hereof  are  in  the  view  entertained  that  the  army  was  of  the  States,  not  of 
the  Government,  and  was  to  secure  to  officers  adhering  to  the  Confederate  States  the  same 
relative  rank  which  they  had  before  those  States  had  withdrawn  from  the  Union.  .  .  . 

"  How  well  the  Government  of  the  Confederacy  observed  both  the  letter  and  spirit  of  the 
law  will  be  seen  by  reference  to  its  action  in  the  matter  of  appointments." 

Those  of  the  five  generals  were  the  most  prominent,  of  course.  All  had 
resigned  within  the  time  prescribed.  Their  relative  rank  in  the  United  States 


^  The  letter  of  protest  covered  nine  sheets  of 
letter-paper,  and  the  ninth  sheet  (to  quote  from 
the  original)  sums  up  the  matter  in  these  words : 

"  My  commission  is  made  to  bear  such  a  date  that  my 
once  inferiors  in  the  service  of  the  United  States  and  of 
the  Confederate  States  shall  be  above  me.  But  it  must 
not  be  dated  as  of  the  2lst  of  July  nor  be  suggestive  of 
the  victory  of  Manassas.  I  return  to  my  tirst  position. 
I  repeat  that  my  right  to  my  rank  as  General  is  estab 
lished  by  the  Acts  of  Congress  of  the  14th  of  March,  1861, 
and  the  16th  of  May,  1861.  and  not  by  the  nomination  and 
confirmation  of  the  31st  of  August,  1861.  To  deprive  me  of 
that  rank  it  was  necessary  for  Congress  to  repeal  those 
laws.  That  could  be  done  by  express  legislative  act  alone. 
It  was  not  done,  it  could  not  be  done,  by  a  mere  vote  in 
secret  session  upon  a  list  of  nominations.  If  the  action 
against  which  I  have  protested  be  legal,  it  is  not  for  me 
to  question  the  expediency  of  degrading  one  who  has 
served  laboriously  from  the  commencement  of  the  war 


on  this  frontier,  and  borne  a  prominent  part  in  the 
only  great  event  of  that  war  for  the  benefit  of  persons 
neither  of  whom  has  yet  struck  a  blow  for  this  Con 
federacy.  These  views  and  the  freedom  with  which 
they  are  presented  may  be  unusual.  So  likewise  is  the 
occasion  which  calls  them  forth.  I  have  the  honor  to 
be,  very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

"  J.  E.  JOHNSTON,  General. 

"  To  His  Excellency,  Jefferson  Davis,  President  of  the 
Confederate  States,  Richmond." 

This  ninth  sheet  is  all  of  the  original  letter  that 
can  be  found  by  the  present  owner,  Mrs.  Bledsoe, 
widow  of  Dr.  Albert  T.  Bledsoe,  who,  at  the  time 
the  letter  was  written,  was  Assistant-Secretary  of 
War.  Dr.  Bledsoe  told  his  wife  that  President 
Davis  handed  the  letter  to  him,  with  the  remark 
that  it  would  not  go  upon  the  official  files,  and 
that  he  might  keep  it  if  he  liked. —  EDITORS. 


240 


RESPONSIBILITIES  OF   THE  FIRST  BULL  RUN. 


241 


Army  just  before  secession  had  been :  1st,  J.  E.  Johnston,  Brigadier-General ; 
2d,  Samuel  Cooper,  Colonel ;  3d,  A.  S.  Johnston,  Colonel ;  4th,  R.  E.  Lee,  Lieu 
tenant-Colonel  ;  and  5th,  G.  T.  Beauregard,  Major.  All  of  them  but  the  third 
had  had  previous  appointments,  when,  on  the  31st  of  August,  the  Confederate 
Government  announced  new  ones:  Cooper's  being  dated  May  16th,  A.  S. 

Johnston's  May  28th,  Lee's 
June  14th,  J.  E.  Johnston's 
July  4th,  and  Beauregard's 
July  21st.  So  the  law  was 
violated,  1st,  by  disregard 
ing  existing  commissions ;  2d, 
by  giving  different  instead  of 
the  same  dates  to  commis 
sions;  and  3d,  by  not  recogniz- 
in  g  previous  rank  in  the  United 
States  Army.  The  only  effect 
of  this  triple  violation  of  law 
was  to  reduce  J.  E.  Johnston 
from  the  first  to  the  fourth 
place,  which,  of  course,  must 
have  been  its  object.  Mr. 
Davis  continues : 

"  It  is  a  noteworthy  fact  that  the 
three  highest  officers  in  rank  .  .  . 
were  all  so  indifferent  to  any  ques 
tion  of  personal  interest  that  they 
had  received  their  appointment  be 
fore  they  were  aware  it  was  to  be 
conferred"  (p.  307). 

This  implies  that  the  con 
duct  described  was  unusual. 
On  the  contrary,  it  was  that 
of  the  body  of  officers  who  left 
the  United  States  Army  to  en 
ter  that  of  the  Confederacy. 
It  is  strange  that  the  author 
should  disparage  so  many  honorable  men.  He  states  ("R.  and  F.,"  I.,  309) 
that  General  Lee,  when  ordered  from  Richmond  to  the  South  for  the  first 
time,  asked  what  rank  he  held  in  the  army :  "  So  wholly  had  his  heart  and 
his  mind  been  consecrated  to  the  public  service  that  he  had  not  remembered, 
if  he  ever  knew,  of  his  advancement." 

As  each  grade  has  its  duties,  an  officer  cannot  know  his  duty  if  ignorant  of 
his  rank.  Therefore  General  Lee  always  knew  his  rank,  for  he  never  failed 
in  his  duty.  Besides,  his  official  correspondence  at  the  time  referred  to  shows 
that  he  knew  that  he  was  major-general  of  the  Virginia  forces  until  May 
25th,  1861,  and  a  Confederate  general  after  that  date. 


GENERAL   SAMUEL    COOPER,  ADJUTANT   AND    INSPECTOR-GENERAL, 

C.  S.  A. ,    RANKING  OFFICER    IN    THE    CONFEDERATE    ARMY. 

FROM    A    PHOTOGRAPH. 


VOL.  I.     16 


242  RESPONSIBILITIES  OF   THE  FIRST  BULL  RUN. 

Describing  the  events  which  immediately  preceded  the  battle  of  Manassas, 
Mr.  Davis  says  ("Rise  and  Fall,"  I.,  340) : 

"  The  forces  there  assembled  [in  Virginia]  were  divided  into  three  armies,  at  positions  the 
most  important  and  threatened  :  one,  under  General  J.  E.  Johnston,  at  Harper's  Ferry,  cover 
ing  the  valley  of  the  Sheiiandoah.  .  .  .  Harper's  Ferry  Avas  an  important  position  both  for 
military  and  political  considerations.  .  .  .  The  demonstrations  of  General  Patterson,  com 
manding  the  Federal  army  in  that  region,  caused  General  Johnston  earnestly  to  insist  on 
being  allowed  to  retire  to  a  position  nearer  to  Winchester." 

Harper's  Ferry  is  "2*2  miles  east  of  the  route  into  the  Sheiiandoah  Valley, 
and  could  be  held  only  by  an  army  strong  enough  to  drive  an  enemy  from 
the  heights  north  and  east  of  it.  So  it  is  anything  but  an  important 
position.  These  objections  were  expressed  to  the  Government  two  days  after 
my  arrival,  and  I  suggested  the  being  permitted  to  move  the  troops  as  might 
be  necessary.  All  this  before  Patterson  had  advanced  from  Chambersburg. 

On  page  341,  "R.  and  F.,"  Mr.  Davis  quotes  from  an.  official  letter  to  me 
from  General  Cooper,  dated  June  13th,  1861,  which  began  thus : 

'"  The  opinions  expressed  by  Major  Whiting  in  his  letter  to  you,  and  on  which  you  have 
indorsed  your  concurrence,  have  been  duly  considered.  You  had  been  heretofore  instructed 
to  exercise  your  discretion  as  to  retiring  from  your  position  at  Harper's  Ferry."  ^} 

This  latter  statement  is  incorrect.  Xo  such  instructions  had  been  given. 
The  last  instructions  on  the  subject  received  by  me  were  in  General  Lee's 
letter  of  June  7th.  |  On  page  341  Mr.  Davis  says : 

'•  The  temporary  occupation  [of  Harper's  Ferry]  was  especially  needful  for  the  removal  of 
the  valuable  machinery  and  material  in  the  armory  located  there." 

The  removal  of  the  machinery  was  not  an  object  referred  to  in  General 
Cooper's  letter.  But  the  presence  of  our  army  anywhere  in  the  Valley  within 
a  day's  march  of  the  position,  would  have  protected  that  removal.  That 
letter  (page  341)  was  received  two  days  after  the  army  left  Harper's  Ferry 
to  meet  General  McClellan's  troops,  believed  by  intelligent  people  of  Win 
chester  to  be  approaching  from  the  west. 

On  page  345  Mr.  Davis  says  it  was  a  difficult  problem  to  know  which  army, 
whether  Beauregard's  at  Manassas  or  Johnston's  in  the  Valley,  should  be 
reenforced  by  the  other,  because  these  generals  were  "  each  asking  reenforce- 
ments  from  the  other."  All  that  was  written  by  me  on  the  subject  is  in  the 
letter  (page  345)  dated  July  9th : 

"  I  have  not  asked  for  reinforcements  because  I  supposed  that  the  War  Department,, 
informed  of  the  state  of  affairs  everyAvhere,  could  best  judge  where  the  troops  at  its  disposal 

"fa  This  letter  of  Major  Whiting  to  Genera]  John-  per's  Ferry  giving  him  permission  to  use  his  dis- 

ston,  and  General  Johnston's  letter  (probably  re-  cretion  which  is  to  be  found  in  the  Official  Records, 

f erred  to  as  the  indorsement),  are  both  dated  May  is  the  one  of  June  7th  from  General  Lee,  in  which 

28th,  1861.     The  phrase  of  General  Cooper,  "You  he  says :  "It  is  hoped  that  you  will  be  able  to  be 

had  been  heretofore  instructed,"  should  have  read  timely  informed  of  the  approach  of  troops  against 

either,   "You   had   been    theretofore   [before  May  yon,  and  retire,  provided  they  cannot  be  success- 

28th]  instructed,"  or,  "  You  have  been  heretofore  fully  opposed.     You  must  exercise  your  discretion 

[before  June   13th]   instructed."      The    latter  is  and  judgment  in  this  respect." — EDITORS. 
probably  what  was  meant,  as  the  only  letter  of 

instructions  to  General  Johnston  received  at  Har-  4-''  Official  Records,"  II.,  910. 


RESPONSIBILITIES  OF  THE  FIRST  BULL  RUN  243 

are  roost  required.  .  .  .  If  it  is  proposed  to  strengthen  us  against  the  attack  I  suggest  as 
soon  to  be  made,  it  seems  to  me  that  General  Beauregard  might  with  great  expedition  furnish 
5000  or  6000  men  for  a  few  days." 

Mr.  Davis  says,  after  quoting  from  this  letter : 

"  As  soon  as  I  became  satisfied  that  Manassas  was  the  objective  point  of  the  enemy's  move 
ment,  I  wrote  to  General  Johnston  urging  him  to  make  preparations  for  a  junction  with 
General  Beauregard." 

There  is  abundant  evidence  that  the  Southern  President  never  thought 
of  transferring  the  troops  in  the  "  Valley  "  to  Manassas  until  the  proper  time 
to  do  it  came  —  that  is,  when  McDowell  was  known  to  be  advancing.  This 
fact  is  shown  by  the  anxiety  he  expressed  to  increase  the  number  of  those 
troops.  J)  And  General  Lee,  writing  [from  South  Carolina]  to  Mr.  Davis, 
November  24th,  1861  ("  Official  Records,"  II.,  515),  says  in  regard  to  General 
Beauregard's  suggestion  that  he  be  reenforced  from  my  army : 

"  You  decided  that  the  movements  of  the  enemy  in  and  about  Alexandria  were  not  suf 
ficiently  demonstrative  to  warrant  the  withdrawing  of  any  of  the  forces  from  the  Shenandoah 
Valley.  A  few  days  afterward,  however, —  I  think  three  or  four, —  the  reports  from  General 
Beauregard  showed  so  clearly  the  enemy's  purpose,  that  you  ordered  General  Johnston,  with 
his  effective  force,  to  march  at  once  to  the  support  of  General  Beauregard." 

This  letter  is  in  reply  to  one  from  Mr.  Davis,  to  the  effect  that  statements 

had  been  widely  published  to  show  that  General  Beauregard's  forces  had 

been  held  inactive  by  his  (Mr.  Davis's)  rejection  of  plans  for  vigorous  offen- 

ive  operations  proposed  to  him  by  the  general,  and  desiring  to  know  of 

General  Lee  what  those  plans  were,  and  why  they  were  rejected. 

"On  the  17th  of  July,  1861,"  says  Mr.  Davis  ("R,  and  F."  I.,  346),  "the 
following  telegram  was  sent  by  the  adjutant-general "  to  General  Johnston, 
Winchester,  Va. : 

"  General  Beauregard  is  attacked.  To  strike  the  enemy  a  decisive  blow,  a  junction  of  all 
your  effective  force  will  be  needed.  If  practicable,  make  the  movement,  sending  your  sick  and 
baggage  to  Culpeper  Court  House,  either  by  railroad  or  by  Warrenton.  In  all  the  arrange 
ments  exercise  your  discretion.  S.  COOPER,  Adjutant  and  Inspector- General." 

Mr.  Davis  asserts  that  I  claim  that  discretion  was  given  me  by  the  words 
"  all  the  arrangements."  I  claimed  it  from  what  he  terms  the  only  positive 
part  of  the  order,  viz.,  "If  practicable,  make  the  movement,  sending  your 
sick  to  Culpeper  Court  House."  Mr.  Davis  adds : 

"  The  sending  the  sick  to  Culpeper  Court  House  might  have  been  after  or  before  the  effect 
ive  force  had  moved  to  the  execution  of  the  main  and  only  positive  part  of  the  order." 

"  Make  the  movement "  would  have  been  a  positive  order,  but  "  if  prac 
ticable  "  deprived  it  of  that  character,  and  gave  the  officer  receiving  it  a  cer 
tain  discretion.  But,  as  the  movement  desired  was  made  promptly,  it  was 
surely  idle  to  discuss,  twenty  years  after,  whether  the  officer  could  lawfully 
have  done  what  he  did  not  do.  At  the  time  the  decision  of  such  a  question 
might  have  been  necessary ;  but,  as  Mr.  Davis  will  give  no  more  orders  to 
generals,  and  as  the  officer  concerned  will  execute  no  more,  such  a  discussion 

i  See  "Official  Kecords,"  II.,  924,  935,  9-iO,  973,  976-977. 


244  RESPONSIBILITIES  OF  THE  FIRST  BULL  RUN. 

is  idle  now.  The  use  of  the  wagons  required  in  the  march  of  the  army  would 
have  been  necessary  to  remove  the  sick  to  the  railroad  station  at  Strasburg, 
eighteen  miles  distant ;  so  this  removal  could  not  have  been  made  after  the 
march.  There  being  seventeen  hundred  sick,  this  part  of  their  transportation 
would  have  required  more  time  than  the  transfer  of  the  troops  to  Manas- 
sas,  which  was  the  important  thing.  The  sick  were,  therefore,  properly  and 
quickly  provided  for  in  Winchester.  I  was  the  only  judge  of  the  "  practicable  " ; 
and  "  if  practicable"  refers  to  the  whole  sentence  — as  much  to  sending  the  sick 
to  Culpeper  as  to  "  make  the  movement."  Still  he  says  ("R.  and  F.,"  I.,  347) : 

"His  [my]  letters  of  the  12th  and  loth  expressed  his  doubts  about  his  power  to  retire  from 
before  the  superior  force  of  General  Putteivson.  Therefore,  the  word  '  practicable  '  was  in  that 
connection  the  equivalent  of  l  possible.'  " 

It  is  immaterial  whether  "  if  practicable  "  or  "  if  possible  "  was  written.  I 
was  the  only  judge  of  the  possibility  or  practicability  ;  and,  if  General  Pat 
terson  had  not  changed  his  position  after  the  telegram  was  received,  I  might 
have  thought  it  necessary  to  attack  him,  to  "  make  the  movement  practicable." 
But  as  to  my  power  to  retire.  On  the  15th  General  Patterson's  forces  were 
half  a  day's  march  from  us,  and  on  the  12th  more  than  a  day's  march ;  and, 
as  Stuart's  cavalry  did  not  permit  the  enemy  to  observe  us,  retreat  would 
have  been  easy,  and  I  could  not  possibly  have  written  to  the  contrary.  \ 

As  to  Mr.  Davis's  telegram  ("K.  and  F.,"  I.,  348) ft,  and  the  anxiety  in 
Mr.  Davis's  mind  lest  there  should  be  some  unfortunate  misunderstanding 
between  General  Beauregard  and  me, — my  inquiry  was  intended  and  calcu 
lated  to  establish  beyond  dispute  our  relative  positions.  As  a  Confederate 
brigadier-general  I  had  been  junior  to  General  Beauregard,  but  had  been 
created  general  by  act  of  Congress.  But,  as  this  had  not  been  published  to 
the  army,  it  was  not  certain  that  it  was  known  at  Manassas.  If  it  was  not, 
the  President's  telegram  gave  the  information,  and  prevented  what  he  seems 
to  have  apprehended. 

THE   BATTLE    OF   BULL   RUN. 

ON  page  349,  to  the  end  of  the  chapter,  the  President  describes  his  visit  to 
the  field  of  battle  near  Manassas.  "As  we  advanced,"  he  says,  "  the  storm  of 
battle  was  rolling  westward."  But,  in  fact,  the  fighting  had  ceased  before  he 
left  Manassas.  He  then  mentions  meeting  me  on  a  hill  which  commanded  a 
general  view  of  the  field,  and  proceeding  farther  west,  where  he  saw  a  Federal 
"  column,"  which  a  Confederate  squadron  charged  and  put  to  flight.  But  the 

\  Mr.  Davis  has  a  few  words  of  praise  for  Gen-  "  Richmond,  July  20,  1861.  General  J.  E.  John- 

eral  Johnston,  which,  in  this  connection,  will  be  ston,  Manassas  Junction,  Virginia:  You  are  a  gen- 

of  interest  to  the  reader :  "  It  gives  me  pleasure  era!  in  the  Confederate  Army,  possessed  of  the 

to  state  that,  from  all  the  accounts  received  at  the  power  attaching  to  that  rank.  You  will  know  how 

time,  the  plans  of  General  Johnston  for  masking  to  make  the  exact  knowledge  of  Brigadier-Gen- 

his  withdrawal  to  form  a  junction  with  General  eral  Beauregard,  as  well  of  the  ground  as  of  the 

Beauregard  were  conducted  with  marked  skill"  troops  and  preparation,  avail  for  the  success  of 

("R.  and  F.,"  I.,  347).— EDITORS.  the  object  in  which  you  cooperate.  The  zeal  of 

•&  This  telegram,  sent  in  response  to  an  inquiry  both  assures  rne  of  harmonious  action.  JEFFERSON 

from  General  Johnston,  read  as  follows  :  DAVIS." 


RESPONSIBILITIES  OF  THE  FIRST  BULL  RUN.  245 

captain  in  command  of  this  squadron  $  says  in  his  report  that  the  column  seen 
was  a  party  of  our  troops.  Mr.  Davis  also  dilates  on  the  suffering  of  our 
troops  for  want  of  supplies  and  camp  equipage,  and  on  his  efforts  to  have 
them  provided  for.  After  the  battle  ended,  officers  were  duly  directed  by  me 
to  have  food  brought  to  the  ground  where  the  troops  were  to  pass  the  night. 

I  was  not  in  the  conference  described  by  Mr.  Davis  ("R.  and  F.,"  I.,  353, 
354,  355).  Having  left  the  field  after  10  o'clock,  and  ridden  in  the  dark  slowly, 
it  was  about  half -past  1 1  when  I  found  the  President  and  General  Beauregard 
together,  in  the  latter's  quarters  at  Manassas.  We  three  conversed  an  hour 
or  more  without  referring  to  pursuit  or  an  advance  upon  Washington.  The 
"  conference "  described  by  him  must  have  occurred  before  my  arrival,  and 
Mr.  Davis  may  very  well  have  forgotten  that  I  was  not  present  then. 

But,  when  the  President  wrote,  he  had  forgotten  the  subject  of  the  confer 
ence  he  described ;  for  the  result,  as  he  states  it,  was  an  order,  not  for  pursuit 
by  the  army,  but  for  the  detail  of  two  parties  to  collect  wounded  men  and 
abandoned  property  near  the  field  of  battle.  This  order  (pages  355,  356)  is 
"to  the  same  effect,"  Mr.  Davis  says,  as  the  one  he  wrote,  and  which  he  terms 
a  direction  to  pursue  the  Federal  army  at  early  dawn. 

It  is  asserted  ("  E.  and  F.,"  L,  354)  |  that  I  left  the  command  over  both  Con 
federate  armies  in  General  Beauregard's  hands  during  the  engagement.  Such 
conduct  would  have  been  as  base  as  flight  from  the  field  in  the  heat  of  battle, 
and  would  have  brought  upon  me  the  contempt  of  every  honorable  soldier.  It 
is  disproved  by  the  fact  that  General  Beauregard  was  willing  to  serve  under  me 
there,  and  again  in  North  Carolina,  near  the  close  of  the  war ;  and  that  he 
associated  with  me.  As  this  accusation  is  published  by  the  Southern  Pres 
ident,  and  indorsed  by  Greneral  Beauregard,  it  requires  my  contradiction. 

Instead  of  leaving  the  command  in  General  Beauregard's  hands,  I  assumed 
it  over  both  armies  immediately  after  my  arrival  on  the  20th,  showing  General 
Beauregard  as  my  warrant  the  President's  telegram  defining  my  position. 
The  usual  order  {)  assuming  command  was  written  and  sent  to  General 
Beauregard's  office  for  distribution.  He  was  then  told  that  as  General 
Patterson  would  no  doubt  hasten  to  join  General  McDowell  as  soon  as  he 
discovered  my  movement,  we  must  attack  the  Federal  army  next  morning. 
General  Beauregard  then  pointed  out  on  a  map  of  the  neighborhood  the  roads 
leading  to  the  enemy's  camp  at  Centreville  from  the  different  parts  of  cm- 
line  south  of  the  stream,  and  the  positions  of  the  brigades  near  each  road ; 
and  a  simple  order  of  march,  by  which  our  troops  would  unite  near  the 
Federal  position,  was  sketched.  Having  had  neither  sleep  nor  recumbent 
rest  since  the  morning  of  the  17th,  I  begged  General  Beauregard  to  put  this 
order  of  march  on  paper,  and  have  the  necessary  copies  made  and  sent  to  me 
for  inspection  in  a  grove,  near,  where  I  expected  to  be  resting — this  in  time 

&  Captain  John  F.  Lay.  See  "  Official  Records,"  events,  says :  "  During  the  20th,  General  Johnston 

II.,  573. —  EDITORS.  arrived  at  Manassas  Junction  by  the  railroad,  and 

j  Not  by  Mr.  Davis,  but  in  a  letter  from  Gen-  that  day  we  received  the  order  from  him  assuming 

eral  Thomas  Jordan,  quoted  by  Mr.  Davis  for  an-  command  of  the  combined  armies  of  General 

other  purpose. —  EDITORS.  Beauregard  and  himself." — J.  E.  J. 

j)  General  J.  A.  Early,  in  his  narrative  of  these 


246  RESPONSIBILITIES  OF  THE  FIRST  BULL  RUN. 

for  distribution  before  night.  This  distribution  was  to  be  by  him,  the  imme 
diate  commander  of  most  of  the  troops.  Seeing  that  8  brigades  were  on  the 
right  of  the  line  to  Centreville,  and  but  1  to  the  left  of  it  at  a  distance  of  4 
miles,  I  desired  General  Beauregard  to  have  Bee's  and  Jackson's  brigades 
placed  in  this  interval  near  the  detached  brigade. 

The  papers  were  brought  to  me  a  little  before  sunrise  next  morning.  They 
differed  greatly  from  the  order  sketched  the  day  before ;  but  as  they  would 
have  put  the  troops  in  motion  if  distributed,  it  would  have  been  easy  then 
to  direct  the  course  of  each  division.  By  the  order  sketched  the  day  before, 
all  our  forces  would  have  been  concentrated  near  Centreville,  to  attack  the 
Federal  army.  By  that  prepared  by  General  Beauregard  but  4  brigades 
were  directed  "  to  the  attack  of  Centreville,"  of  which  one  and  a  half  had  not 
yet  arrived  from  the  Valley,  while  6  brigades  were  to  move  forward  to  the 
Union  Mills  and  Centreville  road,  there  to  hold  themselves  in  readiness  to 
support  the  attack  on  Centreville,  or  to  move,  "2  to  Sangster's  cross-roads,  2 
to  Fairfax  Station,  and  2  to  Fairfax  Court  House.  The  two  and  a  half  bri 
gades  on  the  ground,  even  supported  by  the  half  brigade  of  the  reserve  also 
on  the  ground,  in  all  probability  would  have  been  defeated  by  the  whole 
Federal  army  before  the  three  bodies  of  2  brigades  each  could  have  come  to 
their  aid,  over  distances  of  from  3  to  5  miles.  Then,  if  the  enemy  had  provi 
dentially  been  defeated  by  one-sixth  or  one-eighth  of  their  number,  Sangster's 
cross-roads  and  Fairfax  Station  would  have  been  out  of  their  line  of  retreat. 

Soon  after  sunrise  on  the  21st,  it  was  reported  that  a  large  body  of  Federal 
troops  was  approaching  on  the  Warrenton  Turnpike.  This  offensive  move 
ment  of  the  enemy  would  have  frustrated  our  plan  of  the  da u  before,  if  the 
orders  for  it  had  been  delivered  to  the  troops.  It  appears  from  the  reports  of 
the  commanders  of  the  six  brigades  on  the  right  that  but  one  of  them,  General 
Longstreet,  received  it.  Learning  that  Bee's  and  Jackson's  brigades  were 
still  on  the  right,  I  again  desired  General  Beauregard  to  transfer  them  to  the 
left,  which  he  did,  giving  the  same  orders  to  Hampton's  Legion,  just  arrived. 
These,  with  Cocke's  brigade  then  near  the  turnpike,  would  necessarily  receive 
the  threatened  attack. 

General  Beauregard  then  suggested  that  all  our  troops  on  the  right  should 
move  rapidly  to  the  left  and  assail  the  attacking  Federal  troops  in  flank. 
This  suggestion  was  accepted ;  and  together  we  joined  those  troops.  Three 
of  the  four  brigades  of  the  first  line,  at  Mitchell's,  Blackburn's,  and  McLean's 
fords,  reported  strong  bodies  of  L'nited  States  troops  on  the  wooded  heights 
before  them.  This  frustrated  the  second  plan.  Two  Federal  batteries  —  one 
in  front  of  Bonham's  brigade  at  Mitchell's  Ford,  the  other  before  Longstreet's 
at  Blackburn's  Ford  —  were  annoying  us,  although  their  firing  was  slow. 

About  8  o'clock,  after  receiving  such  information  as  scouts  could  give,  I 
left  General  Beauregard  near  Longstreet's  position,  and  placed  myself  on 
Lookout  Hill,  in  rear  of  Mitchell's  Ford,  to  await  the  development  of  the 
enemy's  designs.  About  9  o'clock  the  signal  officer,  Captain  Alexander, 
reported  that  a  column  of  Federal  troops  could  be  seen  crossing  the  valley  of 
Bull  Run,  two  miles  beyond  our  left. 


RESPONSIBILITIES  OF   THE  FIRST  BULL  RUN.  247 

General  McDowell  had  been  instructed  by  his  general-iii-chief  to  pass  the 
Confederate  right  and  seize  the  railroad  in  our  rear.  But,  learning  that  the 
district  to  be  passed  through  was  rugged  and  covered  with  woods,  and  there 
fore  unfavorable  to  a  large  army,  he  determined,  after  devoting  three  days  to 
reconnoissance,  to  operate  on  the  open  and  favorable  ground  to  his  right, 
and  turn  our  left.  He  had  another  object  in  this  second  plan,  and  an  impor 
tant  one — that  this  course  would  place  his  between  the  two  Confederate  armies, 
and  prevent  their  junction ;  and  if  it  had  been  made  a  day  or  two  sooner, 
this  manoeuvre  would  have  accomplished  that  object. 

General  McDowell  inarched  from  Centreville  by  the  Warrenton  Turnpike 
with  three  divisions,  sending  a  fourth  division  to  deceive  us  by  demonstra 
tions  in  front  of  our  main  body.  Leaving  the  turnpike  a  half  mile  from  the 
Stone  Bridge,  he  made  a  long  detour  to  Sudley  Ford,  where  he  crossed  Bull 
Run  and  turned  toward  Manassas.  Colonel  Evans,  who  commanded  fourteen 
companies  near  the  Stone  Bridge,  discovered  this  manoeuvre,  and  moved  with 
his  little  force  along  the  base  of  the  hill  north  of  the  turnpike,  to  place  it 
before  the  enemy  near  the  Sudley  and  Manassas  road.  Here  he  was  assailed 
by  greatly  superior  numbers,  which  he  resisted  obstinately. 

General  Beauregard  had  joined  nie  on  Lookout  Hill,  and  we  could  distinctly 
hear  the  sounds  and  see  the  smoke  of  the  fight.  But  they  indicated  no  hostile 
force  that  Evans's  troops  and  those  of  Bee,  Hampton,  and  Jackson,  which  we 
<;-ould  see  hurnying  toward  the  conflict  in  that  order,  were  not  adequate  to  resist. 

On  reaching  the  broad,  level  top  of  the  hill  south  of  the  turnpike,  Bee, 
appreciating  the  strength  of  the  position,  formed  his  troops  (half  of  his  own 
and  half  of  Bartow's  brigade )  on  that  ground.  But  seeing  Evans  struggling 
against  great  odds,  he  crossed  the  valley  and  formed  on  the  right  and  a  little 
in  advance  of  him.  Here  the  5  or  6  regiments,  with  6  field-pieces,  held  their 
ground  for  an  hour  against  10,000  or  12,000  L'nited  States  troops,\  when,  find 
ing  they  were  overlapped  on  each  flank  by  the  continually  arriving  enemy, 
General  Bee  fell  back  to  the  position  from  which  he  had  moved  to  rescue 
Evans  —  crossing  the  valley,  closely  pressed  by  the  Federal  army. 

Hampton  with  his  Legion  reached  the  valley  as  the  retrograde  movement 
began.  Forming  it  promptly,  he  joined  in  the  action,  and  contributed  greatly 
to  the  orderly  character  of  the  retreat  by  his  courage  and  admirable  soldier 
ship,  seconded  by  the  excellent  conduct  of  the  gentlemen  composing  his 
command.  Imboden  and  his  battery  did  excellent  service  on  this  trying 
occasion.  Bee  met  Jackson  at  the  head  of  his  brigade,  on  the  position  he  had 
first  taken,  and  he  began  to  re-form  and  Jackson  to  deploy  at  the  same  time. 

In  the  mean  time  I  had  been  waiting  with  General  Beauregard  on  Lookout 
Hill  for  evidence  of  General  McDowell's  design.  The  violence  of  the  firing  on 
the  left  indicated  a  battle,  but  the  large  bodies  of  troops  reported  by  chosen 
scouts  to  be  facing  our  right  kept  me  in  doubt.  But  near  11  o'clock  reports 
that  those  troops  were  felling  trees  showed  that  they  were  standing  on  the 

\  General  Fry  (page  185)  states  that  these  troops  Reckoning  by  the  estimate  of  strength  given  by 
were  Andrew  Porter's  and  Buruside's  brigades.  General  Fry  on  page  194  these  would  have  made 
and  one  regiment  of  Heintzelniau's  division,  a  total  of  about  (>500  men. — EDITORS. 


248  RESPONSIBILITIES  OF  THE  FIRST  BULL  RUN. 

defensive ;  and  new  clouds  of  dust  on  the  left  proved  that  a  large  body  of 
Federal  troops  was  arriving  on  the  field.  It  thus  appeared  that  the  enemy's 
great  effort  was  to  be  against  our  left.  I  expressed  this  to  General  Beaure- 
gard,  and  the  necessity  of  reenforcing  the  brigades  engaged,  and  desired  him 
to  send  immediate  orders  to  Early  and  Holmes,  of  the  second  line,  to  hasten 
to  the  conflict  with  their  brigades.  General  Bonharn,  who  was  near  me,  was 
desired  to  send  up  two  regiments  and  a  battery.  I  then  set  off  at  a  rapid 
gallop  to  the  scene  of  action.  General  Beauregard  joined  me  without  a  word. 
Passing  on  the  way  Colonel  Pendleton  with  two  batteries,  I  directed  him  to 
follow  with  them  as  fast  as  possible. 

It  now  seemed  that  a  battle  was  to  be  fought  entirely  different  in  place 
and  circumstance  from  the  two  plans  previously  adopted  and  abandoned  as 
impracticable.  Instead  of  taking  the  initiative  and  operating  in  front  of 
our  line,  we  were  compelled  to  fight  on  the  defensive  more  than  a  mile  in 
rear  of  that  line,  and  at  right  angles  to  it,  011  a  field  selected  by  Bee,— 
with  no  other  plans  than  those  suggested  by  the  changing  events  of  battle. 

While  we  were  riding  forward  General  Beauregard  suggested  to  me  to 
assign  him  to  the  immediate  command  of  the  troops  engaged,  so  that  my 
supervision  of  the  whole  field  might  not  be  interrupted,  to  which  I  assented. 
So  he  commanded  those  troops  under  me ;  as  elsewhere,  lieutenant-generals 
commanded  corps,  and  major-generals  divisions,  under  me. 

When  we  were  near  the  ground  where  Bee  was  re-forming  and  Jackson 
deploying  his  brigade,  I  saw  a  regiment  in  line  with  ordered  arms  and  facing 
to  the  front,  but  200  or  300  yards  in  rear  of  its  proper  place.  On  inquiry 
I  learned  that  it  had  lost  all  its  field-officers ;  so,  riding  on  its  left  flank,  I 
easily  marched  it  to  its  place.  It  was  the  4th  Alabama,  an  excellent  regiment; 
and  I  mention  this  because  the  circumstance  has  been  greatly  exaggerated. 

After  the  troops  were  in  good  battle  order  I  turned  to  the  supervision  of 
the  whole  field.  The  enemy's  great  numerical  superiority  was  discouraging. 
Yet,  from  strong  faith  in  Beauregard's  capacity  and  courage,  and  the  high 
soldierly  qualities  of  Bee  and  Jackson,  I  hoped  that  the  fight  would  be  main 
tained  until  I  could  bring  adequate  reinforcements  to  their  aid.  For  this 
Holmes  and  Early  were  urged  to  hasten  their  march,  and  Ewell  was  ordered  to 
follow  them  with  his  brigade  with  all  speed.  Broken  troops  were  reorganized 
and  led  back  into  the  fight  with  the  help  of  my  own  and  part  of  General 
Beauregard's  staff.  Cocke's  brigade  was  held  in  rear  of  the  right  to  observe  a 
large  body  of  Federal  troops  in  a  position  from  which  Bee's  right  flank  could 
have  been  struck  in  a  few  minutes. 

After  these  additions  had  been  made  to  our  troops  then  engaged,  we  had 
9  regiments  of  infantry,  5  batteries,  and  300  cavalry  of  the  Army  of  the 
Shenandoah,  and  about  2  regiments  and  a  half  of  infantry,  6  companies  of 
cavalry,  and  6  field-pieces  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  holding  at  bay  3 
divisions  of  the  enemy.  The  Southern  soldiers  had,  however,  two  great  advan 
tages  in  the  contest :  greater  skill  in  the  use  of  fire-arms,  and  the  standing 
on  the  defensive,  by  which  they  escaped  such  disorder  as  advancing  under 
fire  produced  in  the  ranks  of  their  adversaries,  undisciplined  like  themselves. 


RESPONSIBILITIES  OF   THE  FIRST  BULL  RUN.  249 

A  report  received  about  2  o'clock  from  General  Beauregard's  office  that 
another  United  States  army  was  approaching  from  the  north-west,  and  but  a 
few  miles  from  us,  caused  me  to  send  orders  to  Bonham,  Longstreet,  and 
Jones  to  hold  their  brigades  south  of  Bull  Run,  and  ready  to  move. 

When  Bonham's  two  regiments  appeared  soon  after,  Cocke's  brigade  was 
ordered  into  action  on  our  right.  Fisher's  North  Carolina  regiment  coming 
up,  Bonham's  two  regiments  were  directed  against  the  Federal  right,  and 
Fisher's  was  afterward  sent  in  the  same  direction ;  for  the  enemy's  strong 
est  efforts  seemed  to  be  directed  against  our  left,  as  if  to  separate  us  from 
Manassas  Junction. 

About  3:30  o'clock,  General  E.  K.  Smith  arrived  with  three  regiments  of 
Elzey's  brigade,  coming  from  Manassas  Junction.  He  was  instructed,  through 
a  staff-officer  sent  forward  to  meet  him,  to  form  on  the  left  of  our  line,  his  left 
thrown  forward,  and  to  attack  the  enemy  in  flank.  At  his  request  I  joined 
him,  directed  his  course,  and  gave  him  these  instructions.  Before  the  forma 
tion  was  completed,  he  fell  severely  wounded,  and  while  falling  from  his 
horse  directed  Colonel  Elzey  to  take  command.  That  officer  appreciated 
the  manoeuvre  and  executed  it  gallantly  and  well.  General  Beauregard 
promptly  seized  the  opportunity  it  afforded,  and  threw  forward  the  whole 
line.  The  enemy  was  driven  from  the  long-contested  hill,  and  the  tide  of 
battle  at  length  turned.  But  the  first  Federal  line  driven  into  the  valley  was 
there  rallied  on  a  second,  the  two  united  presenting  a  formidable  aspect.  In  the 
mean  time,  however,  Colonel  Early  had  come  upon  the  field  with  his  brigade. 
He  was  instructed  by  me  to  make  a  detour  to  the  left  and  assail  the  Federal 
right  in  flank.  He  reached  the  ground  in  time,  accompanied  by  Stuart's  cav 
alry  and  Beckham's  battery,  and  made  his  attack  with  a  skill  and  courage 
which  routed  the  Federal  right  in  a  moment.  General  Beauregard,  charging 
in  front,  made  the  rout  complete.  The  Federal  right  fled  in  confusion  toward 
the  Sudley  Ford,  and  the  center  and  left  marched  off  rapidly  by  the  turnpike. 

Stuart  pursued  the  fugitives  on  the  Sudley  road,  and  Colonel  Radford,  with 
two  squadrons  which  I  had  held  in  reserve  near  me  during  the  day,  was 
directed  to  cross  Bull  Run  at  Ball's  Ford,  and  strike  the  column  on  the  turn 
pike  in  flank.  The  number  of  prisoners  taken  by  these  parties  of  cavalry 
greatly  exceeded  their  own  numbers.  But  they  were  too  weak  to  make  a 
serious  impression  on  an  army,  although  a  defeated  one. 

At  twenty  minutes  before  5,  when  the  retreat  of  the  enemy  toward  Centre- 
ville  began,  I  sent  orders  to  Brigadier-General  Bonham  by  Lieutenant-Col 
onel  Lay,  of  his  staff,  who  happened  to  be  with  me,  to  march  with  his  own 
and  Longstreet's  brigade  (which  were  nearest  Bull  Run  and  the  Stone  Bridge), 
by  the  quickest  route  to  the  turnpike,  and  form  them  across  it  to  intercept 
the  retreat  of  the  Federal  troops.  But  he  found  so  little  appearance  of  rout 
in  those  troops  as  to  make  the  execution  of  his  instructions  seem  impractica 
ble  ;  so  the  two  brigades  returned  to  their  camps.  When  the  retreat  began, 
the  body  of  United  States  troops  that  had  passed  the  day  on  the  Centreville 
side  of  Bull  Run  made  a  demonstration  on  the  rear  of  our  right ;  which  was 
repelled  by  Holmes's  brigade  just  arrived. 


2 so  RESPONSIBILITIES  OF   THE  FIRST  BULL  RUN. 

Soon  after  the  firing  ceased,  General  Ewell  reported  to  me,  saying  that  his 
brigade  was  about  midway  from  its  camp  near  Union  Mills.  He  had  ridden 
forward  to  see  the  part  of  the  field  on  which  he  might  be  required  to  serve,  to 
prepare  himself  to  act  intelligently. 

The  victory  was  as  complete  as  one  gained  in  an  open  country  by  infantry 
and  artillery  can  be.  Our  cavalry  pursued  as  far  as  they  could  effectively ; 
but  when  they  encountered  the  main  column,  after  dispersing  or  capturing 
little  parties  and  stragglers,  they  could  make  no  impression. 

General  Beauregard's  first  plan  of  attack  was  delivered  to  me  by  his  aide- 
de-camp,  Colonel  Chisolm,  when  I  was  thirty-four  miles  from  Manassas.  It 
was,  that  I  should  leave  the  railroad  at  Piedmont  station,  thirty-six  miles 
from  the  enemy  at  Centreville,  and  attack  him  in  rear,  and  when  our  artillery 
announced  that  we  had  begun  the  fight,  General  Beauregard  would  move  up 
from  Bull  Run  and  assail  the  enemy  on  that  side.  I  rejected  the  plan,  because 
such  a  one  would  enable  an  officer  of  ordinary  sense  and  vigor  to  defeat  our 
two  armies  one  after  the  other.  For  McDowell,  by  his  numerical  superiority, 
could  have  disposed  of  my  forces  in  less  than  two  hours ;  that  is  to  say,  before 
Beauregard  could  have  come  up,  when  he  also  could  have  been  defeated  and 
the  campaign  ended. 

An  opinion  seems  to  prevail  with  some  persons  who  have  written  about  the 
battle,  that  important  plans  of  General  Beauregard  were  executed  by  him.  It 
is  a  mistake;  the  first  intention,  announced  to  General  Beauregard  by  me 
when  we  met,  was  to  attack  the  enemy  at  Centreville  as  early  as  possible  on 
the  21st.  This  was  anticipated  by  McDowell's  early  advance.  The  second, 
to  attack  the  Federals  in  flank  near  the  turnpike  with  our  main  force,  sug 
gested  by  General  Beauregard,  was  prevented  by  the  enemy's  occupation  of 
the  high  ground  in  front  of  our  right. 

As  fought,  the  battle  was  made  by  me ;  Bee's  and  Jackson's  brigades  were 
transferred  to  the  left  by  me.  I  decided  that  the  battle  was  to  be  there,  and 
directed  the  measures  necessary  to  maintain  it ;  a  most  important  one  being 
the  assignment  of  General  Beauregard  to  the  immediate  command  of  this 
left,  which  he  held.  In  like  manner  the  senior  officer  on  the  right  would  have 
commanded  there,  if  the  Federal  left  had  attacked. 

These  facts  in  relation  to  the  battle  are  my  defense  against  the  accusation 
indorsed  by  General  Beauregard  and  published  by  Mr.  Davis. 

In  an  account  of  the  battle  published  in  "  The  Century"  for  November,  1884, 
General  Beauregard  mentions  offensive  operations  which  he  "  had  designed 
and  ordered  against  his  [adversary's]  left  flank  and  rear  at  Centreville,"  and 
censures  my  friend  General  R.  S.  Ewell  for  their  failure.  At  the  time  referred 
to,  three  of  the  four  Federal  divisions  were  near  Bull  Run,  above  the  turn 
pike,  and  the  fourth  facing  our  right,  so  that  troops  of  ours,  going  to  Centre 
ville  then,  if  not  prevented  by  the  Federal  division  facing  them,  would  have 
found  no  enemy.  And  General  Ewell  was  not,  as  he  reports,  "  instructed  in 
the  plan  of  attack";  for  he  says  in  his  official  report :  ".  .  .  I  first  received 
orders  to  hold  myself  in  readiness  to  advance  at  a  moment's  notice.  I  next 
received  a  copy  of  an  order  sent  to  General  Jones  and  furnished  me  by  him, 


RESPONSIBILITIES  OF  THE  FIRST  BULL  RUN. 


251 


in  which  it  was  stated  I  had  been  ordered  at  once  to  proceed  to  his  support." 
Three  other  orders,  he  says,  followed,  each  contradictory  of  its  predecessor. 
General  Ewell  knew  that  a  battle  was  raging ;  but  knew,  too,  that  between 
him  and  it  were  other  unengaged  brigades,  and  that  his  commander  was  near 
enough  to  give  him  orders.  But  he  had  no  reason  to  suppose  that  his  com 
mander  desired  him  to  move  to  Centreville,  where  there  was  then  no  enemy. 
There  could  have  been  no  greater  mistake  on  General  Swell's  part  than  mak 
ing  the  movement  to  Centreville. 

A  brief  passage  in  my  official  report  of  this  battle  displeased  President 
Davis.  In  referring  to  his  telegraphic  order  I  gave  its  meaning  very  briefly, 
but  accurately — "directing  me,  if  practicable,  to  go  to  [General  Beauregard's] 
assistance,  after  sending  my  sick  to  Culpeper  Court  House."  Mr.  Davis 
objected  to  the  word  after.  Being  informed  of  this  by  a  friend,  I  cheerfully 
consented  to  his  expunging  the  word,  because  that  would  not  affect  the 
meaning  of  the  sentence.  But  the  word  is  still  in  his  harsh  indorsement.  He 
also  had  this  passage  stricken  out :  "  The  delay  of  sending  the  sick,  nearly 


RESPONSIBILITIES  OF  THE   FIRST  BULL  RUN. 

seventeen  hundred  in  number,  to  Culpeper,  would  have  made  it  impossible  to 
arrive  at  Manassas  in  time.  They  were  therefore  provided  for  in  Winches 
ter  " ;  and  substituted  this :  "  Our  sick,  nearly  seventeen  hundred  in  number, 
were  provided  for  in  Winchester."  Being  ordered  to  send  the  sick  to  Cul 
peper  as  well  as  to  move  to  Manassas,  it  was  necessary  to  account  for 
disobedience,  which  my  words  did,  and  which  his  substitute  for  them  did 
not. 

Mr.  Davis  ( "  R.  and  F.,"  I.,  359 )  expresses  indignation  that,  as  he  says, 
"  among  the  articles  abandoned  by  the  enemy  .  .  .  were  handcuffs,  the 
fit  appendage  of  a  policeman,  but  not  of  a  soldier."  I  saw  none,  nor  did  I 
see  any  one  who  had  seen  them. 

Mr.  Davis  says  (page  359) :  "  On  the  night  of  the  22d,  I  held  a  second  con 
ference  with  Generals  Johnston  and  Beauregard."  I  was  in  no  conference 
like  that  of  which  account  is  given  on  page  360.  And  one  that  he  had  with 
me  on  that  day  proved  conclusively  that  he  had  no  thought  of  sending  our 
army  against  Washington;  for  in  it  he  offered  me  the  command  in  West 
Virginia,  promising  to  increase  the  forces  there  adequately  from  those 
around  us.  He  says  (page  361) : 

*'  What  discoveries  would  have  been  made,  and  what  results  would  have  ensued  from  the 
establishment  of  our  guns  upon  the  south  bank  of  the  river  to  open  fire  upon  the  capital,  are 
speculative  questions  upon  which  it  would  be  useless  to  enter." 

Mr.  Davis  seems  to  have  forgotten  what  was  as  well  known  then  as  now— 
that  our  army  was  more  disorganized  by  victory  than  that  of  the  United 
States  by  defeat ;  that  there  were  strong  f ortifications,  well  manned,  to  cover 
the  approaches  to  Washington  and  prevent  the  establishment  of  our  guns  on 
the  south  bank  of  the  river.  He  knew,  too,  that  we  had  no  means  of  can 
nonading  the  capital,  nor  a  disposition  to  make  barbarous  war.  He  says 
("  R.  and  F.,"  I.,  362) : 

"  When  the  smoke  of  battle  had  lifted  from  the  field  .  .  .  some  .  .  .  censoriously  asked 
why  the  fruits  of  the  victory  had  not  been  gathered  by  the  capture  of  Washington  City.  Then 
some  indiscreet  friends  of  the  generals  commanding  in  that  battle  .  .  .  induced  the  allega 
tion  that  the  President  had  prevented  the  generals  from  making  an  immediate  and  vigorous, 
pursuit  of  the  routed  enemy." 

Mr.  Davis  has  no  ground  for  this  assertion ;  the  generals  were  attacked 
first  and  most  severely.  It  was  not  until  the  newspapers  had  exhausted 
themselves  upon  us  that  some  of  them  turned  upon  him.  On  November  3d 
he  wrote  to  me  that  reports  were  circulated  to  the  effect  that  he 

"  prevented  General  Beauregard  from  pursuing  the  enemy  after  the  battle  of  Manassas,  and 
had  subsequently  restrained  him  from  advancing  upon  Washington  City.  ...  I  call  upon 
you,  as  the  commanding  general,  and  as  a  party  to  all  the  conferences  held  by  me  on  the  21st 
and  22d  of  July,  to  say  whether  I  obstructed  the  pursuit  of  the  enemy  after  the  victory  at 
Manassas,  or  have  ever  objected  to  an  advance  or  other  active  operation  which  it  was  feasible 
for  the  army  to  undertake."  ("  R,  and  F.,"  L,  303.) 

I  replied  on  the  10th,  answering  the  first  question  in  the  negative,  and  added 
an  explanation  which  put  the  responsibility  on  myself.  I  replied  to  the  second 
question,  that  it  had  never  been  feasible  for  the  army  to  advance  farther 


RESPONSIBILITIES  OF  THE  FIRST  BULL  RUN.  2=>3 

toward  Washington  than  it  had  done,  and  referred  to  a  conference  at  Fairfax 
Court  House  [October  1st,  1861]  in  reference  to  leading  the  array  into 
Maryland,  in  which  he  informed  the  three  senior  officers  that  he  had  not 
the  means  of  giving  the  army  the  strength  which  they  considered  necessary 
for  offensive  operations. 

Mr.  Davis  was  displeased  by  my  second  reply,  because  in  his  mind  there 
was  but  one  question  in  his  letter.  I  maintain  that  there  are  two ;  namely, 

(1)  Did  he  obstruct  the  pursuit  of  the  enemy  after  the  victory  at  Manassas  ? 

(2)  Had  he  ever  objected  to  an  advance  or  other  active  operation  which  it 
was  feasible  for  the  army  to  undertake  ? 

The  second  matter  is  utterly  unconnected  with  the  battle  of  Manassas,  and 
as  the  question  of  advance  or  other  active  operation  had  been  discussed 
nowhere  by  him,  to  my  knowledge,  but  at  the  conference  at  Fairfax  Court 
House,  I  supposed  that  he  referred  to  it.  He  was  dissatisfied  with  my  silence 
in  regard  to  the  conferences  which  he  avers  took  place  on  July  21st  and  22d, 
the  first  knowledge  of  which  I  have  derived  from  his  book. 

THE  WITHDRAWAL   FROM    CENTREVILLE   TO    THE   PENINSULA. 

MR.  DAVIS  refers  ("  Rise  and  Fall,"  I.,  444-5)  to  the  instructions  for  the 
reorganization  of  the  army  given  by  him  to  the  three  general  officers  whom 
he  met  in  conference  at  Fairfax  Court  House  on  October  1st,  1861.  But  the 
correspondence  urging  the  carrying  out  of  the  orders  was  carried  on  with 
Generals  Beauregard  and  G.  W.  Smith  (niy  subordinates)  in  that  same 
October.  He  neither  conversed  nor  corresponded  with  me  on  the  subject 
then,  the  letter  to  me  being  dated  May  10th,  1862.  The  original  order  was 
dated  October  22d,  1861,  to  be  executed  "  as  soon  as,  in  the  judgment  of  the 
commanding  general,  it  can  be  safely  done  under  present  exigencies."  As 
the  enemy  was  then  nearer  to  our  center  than  that  center  to  either  flank  of 
our  army,  and  another  advance  upon  us  by  the  Federal  army  was  not 
improbable  on  any  day,  it  seemed  to  me  unsafe  to  make  the  reorganization 
then.  From  May  10th  to  26th,  when  the  President  renewed  the  subject,  we 
were  in  the  immediate  presence  of  the  enemy,  when  reorganization  would 
have  been  infinitely  dangerous,  as  was  duly  represented  by  me.  But,  allud 
ing  to  this  conference  at  Fairfax  Court  House,  he  says  (p.  449) :  "  When, 
at  that  time  and  place,  I  met  General  Johnston  for  conference,  he  called 
in  the  two  generals  next  in  rank  to  himself,  Beauregard  and  Gr.  W.  Smith." 
These  officers  were  with  Mr.  Davis  in  the  quarters  of  General  Beauregard, 
whose  guest  he  was,  when  I  was  summoned  to  him.  I  had  not  power  to 
bring  any  officer  into  the  conference.  If  such  authority  had  belonged  to  my 
office,  the  personal  relations  lately  established  between  us  by  the  President 
would  not  have  permitted  me  to  use  it. 

He  says  (pp.  448-9) :  "  I  will  now  proceed  to  notice  the  allegation  that  I  was 
responsible  for  inaction  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  in  the  latter  part  of  1861 
and  in  the  early  part  of  1862."  I  think  Mr.  Davis  is  here  fighting  a  shadow. 
I  have  never  seen  or  heard  of  the  "  allegation "  referred  to ;  I  believe  that 


2  =,4  RESPONSIBILITIES  OF  THE  FIRST  BULL  RUN. 

that  conference  attracted  no  public  attention,  and  brought  criticism  upon  no 
one.  I  have  seen  no  notice  of  it  in  print,  except  the  merely  historical  one  in 
a  publication  made  by  me  in  187-4,  &  without  criticism  or  comment. 

In  the  same  paragraph .  Mr.  Davis  expresses  surprise  at  the  weakness  of 
the  army.  He  has  forgotten  that  in  Richmond  he  was  well  informed  of  the 
strength  of  the  army  by  periodical  reports,  which  showed  him  the  prevalence 
of  epidemics  which,  in  August  and  part  of  September,  kept  almost  thirty  per 
cent,  of  our  number  sick.  He  must  have  forgotten,  too,  his  anxiety  on  this 
subject,  which  induced  him  to  send  a  very  able  physician,  Dr.  Cartwright,  to 
find  some  remedy  or  preventive. 

He  asserts  also  that  "  the  generals "  had  made  previous  suggestions  of  a 
"purpose  to  advance  into  Maryland."  There  had  been  no  such  purpose.  On 
the  contrary,  in  my  letter  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  suggesting  the  conference, 
I  wrote : 

"  Thus  far  the  numbers  and  condition  of  this  army  have  at  no  time  justified  our  assuming* 
the  offensive.  .  .  .  The  difficulty  of  obtaining  the  means  of  establishing  a  battery  near  Evans- 
port  j  .  .  .  has  given  me  the  impression  that  you  cannot  at  present  put  this  army  in  condition 
to  assume  the  offensive.  If  I  am  mistaken  in  this,  and  you  can  furnish  those  means,  I  think  it 
important  that  either  his  Excellency  the  President,  yourself,  or  some  one  representing  you, 
should  here,  upon  the  ground,  confer  with  me  on  this  all-important  question." 

Ill  a  letter  dated  September  29th,  1861,  the  Secretary  wrote  that  the  Presi 
dent  would  reach  my  camp  in  a  day  or  two  for  conference.  He  came  for  that 
object  September  30th,  and  the  next  evening,  by  It  is  appointment^  he  was  waited 
on  by  Generals  Beauregard,  Gustavus  W.  Smith,  and  myself.  In  discussing 
the  question  of  giving  our  army  strength  enough  to  assume  the  offensive  in 
Maryland,  it  was  proposed  to  bring  to  it  from  the  South  troops  enough  to 
raise  it  to  the  required  strength.  The  President  asked  what  was  that  strength. 
General  Smith  thought  50,000  men,  General  Beauregard  60,000,  and  I  60,000, 
all  of  us  specifying  soldiers  like  those  around  us.  The  President  replied  that 
such  reinforcements  could  not  be  furnished;  he  could  give  only  as  many 
recruits  as  we  could  arm.  This  decided  the  question.  Mr.  Davis  then  pro 
posed  an  expedition  against  Hooker's  division,  consisting,  we  believed,  of 
10,000  men.  It  was  posted  on  the  Maryland  shore  of  the  Potomac,  opposite 
Dumfries.  [See  map,  p.  199.]  But  I  objected  that  we  had  no  means  of 
ferrying  an  equal  number  of  men  across  the  river  in  a  day,  even  if  undis 
turbed  by  ships  of  war,  which  controlled  the  river ;  so  that,  even  if  we  should 
succeed  in  landing,  those  vessels  of  war  would  inevitably  destroy  or  capture 
our  party  returning.  This  terminated  the  conference.  Mr.  Davis  says,  in 
regard  to  the  reinforcements  asked  for  ("R.  and  F.,"  I.,  449):  "I  had  no 
power  to  make  such  an  addition  to  that  army  without  a  total  disregard  of  the 
safety  of  other  threatened  positions."  We  had  no  threatened  positions ;  and 
we  could  always  discover  promptly  the  fitting  out  of  naval  expeditions 
against  us.  And  he  adds  (p.  451),  with  reference  to  my  request  for  a  con 
ference  in  regard  to  reinforcements : 

$•  See  "  Johnston's  Narrative"  (New  York:  D.  Appleton  &  Co.),  pp.  78,  79. 
}  Evansport  is  on  the  Potomac  below  Alexandria,  at  the  mouth  of  Quantico  Creek. 


RESPONSIBILITIES  OF  THE  FIRST  BULL  RUN. 


"  Very  little  experience,  or  a  fair  amount  of  modesty  without  any  experience,  would  serve  to 
prevent  one  from  announcing  his  conclusion  that  troops  could  be  withdrawn  from  a  place  or 
places  without  knowing  how  many  were  there,  and  what  was  the  necessity  for  their  presence." 

The  refutation  of  this  is  in  General  Gr.  "W.  Smith's  memorandum  of  the  dis 
cussion  :  "  General  Johnston  said  that  he  did  not  feel  at  liberty  to  express  an 

opinion  of  the  practica 
bility  of  reducing  the 
strength  of  our  forces 
at  points  not  within  the 
limits  of  his  command." 
On  page  452  [referring  to 
possible  minor  offensive 
operations.  —  EDITOES  ] 
Mr.  Davis  says  he 

"particularly  indicated  the 
lower  part  of  Maryland,  where 
a  small  force  was  said  to  be 
ravaging  the  country." 

He  suggested  nothing 
so  impossible.  Troops  of 
ours  could  not  have  been 
ferried  across  the  broad 
Potomac  then.  "We  had 
no  steamer  on  that  river, 
nor  could  we  have  used 
one.  Mr.  Davis  says  ("  R. 
and  F.,"  I.,  452) : 

" .  .  .  Previously,  General 
Johnston's  attention  had  been 
called  to  possibilities  in  the 
Valley  of  the  Shenandoah,  and 
that  these  and  other  like  things 
were  not  done,  was  surely  due 
to  other  causes  than  '  the  policy 

"  STONEWALL  "  JACKSON  AS    FIRST    LIEUTENANT    OF   ARTILLERY,  U.   8.    A.  Qf  £ne  Administration.'  "... 

FROM    AN    AMBROTYPE    TAKEN    AUGUST    20,    1847. 

Then  he  quotes  from  a  letter  to  me,  dated  August  1st,  1861,  as  follows : 

"...  The  movement  of  Banks  |  will  require  your  attention.  It  may  be  a  ruse,  but  if  a  real 
movement,  when  your  army  has  the  requisite  strength  and  mobility,  you  will  probably  find  an 
opportunity,  by  a  rapid  movement  through  the  passes,  to  strike  him  in  rear  or  flank." 

It  is  matter  of  public  notoriety  that  no  incursion  into  the  "Valley"  worth 
the  notice  of  a  Confederate  company  was  made  until  March,  1862.  That  the 

4  By  orders  dated  July  19th,  1861,  General  N.  P.  Ferry.  General  Patterson  being  by  the  same  orders 

Banks  had  been  assigned  to  the  command  of  the  "  honorably   discharged  from   the   service  of  the 

Department  of  the  Shenandoah,  relieving  General  United  States,"  on  the  expiration  of  his  term  of 

Patterson  in   command  of  the  army  at  Harper's  duty.— EDITORS. 


RESPONSIBILITIES  OF   THE  FIRST  BULL  RUN. 

Confederate  President  should  be  ignorant  of  this  is  inconceivable.    Mr.  Davis 
says  (p.  462) : 

"...  I  received  from  General  Johnston  notice  that  his  position  [at  Centreville]  was  consid 
ered  unsafe.  Many  of  his  letters  to  me  have  been  lost,  and  I  have  thus  far  not  been  able  to  find 
the  one  giving  the  notice  referred  to,  but  the  reply  which  is  annexed  clearly  indicates  the  sub 
stance  of  the  letter  which  was  answered :  t  General  J.  E.  Johnston :  .  .  .  Your  opinion  that 
your  position  may  be  turned  whenever  the  enemy  chooses  to  advance,'  etc."1 

The  sentence  omitted  by  him  after  my  name  in  his  letter  from  which  he 
quotes  as  above  contains  the  dates  of  three  letters  of  mine,  in  neither  of  which 
is  there  allusion  to  the  safety  (or  reverse)  of  the  position.  They  are  dated 
22d,  23d,  and  25th  of  February,  and  contain  complaints  on  my  part  of  the 
dreadful  condition  of  the  country,  and  of  the  vast  accumulation  by  the  Grov- 
ernment  of  superfluous  stores  at  Manassas.  There  is  another  omission  in 
the  President's  letter  quoted,  and  the  omission  is  this : 

"...  with  your  present  force,  you  cannot  secure  your  communications  from  the  enemy,  and 
may  at  any  time,  when  he  can  pass  to  your  rear,  be  compelled  to  retreat  at  the  sacrifice  of  your 
siege  train  and  army  stores.  .  .  .  Threatened  as  we  are  by  a  large  force  on  the  south-east,  you 
must  see  the  hazard  of  your  position,  by  its  liability  to  isolation  and  attack  in  rear." 

By  a  singular  freak  of  the  President's  memory,  it  transferred  the  substance 
of  these  passages  from  his  letter  to  my  three. 

Referring  again  to  the  conference  at  Fairfax  Court  House  [October  1st], 
Mr.  Davis  says  (p.  464) : 

"  Soon  thereafter,  the  army  withdrew  to  Centreville,  a  better  position  for  defense,  but  not  for 
attack,  and  thereby  suggestive  of  the  abandonment  of  an  intention  to  advance." 

The  President  forgets  that  in  that  conference  the  intention  to  advance  was 
abandoned  by  him  first.  He  says  on  the  same  page  : 

"  On  the  10th  of  March  I  telegraphed  to  General  Johnston  :  '  Further  assurance  given  to  me 
this  day  that  you  shall  be  promptly  and  adequately  reenforced,  so  as  to  enable  you  to  maintain 
your  position,  and  resume  first  policy  when  the  roads  will  permit.'  The  first  policy  was  to 
carry  the  war  beyond  our  own  border." 

The  roads  then  permitted  the  marching  of  armies,  so  we  had  just  left 
Manassas.  ^ 

On  the  20th  of  February,  after  a  discussion  in  Richmond,  his  Cabinet  being 
present,  the  President  had  directed  me  to  prepare  to  fall  back  from  Manassas, 
and  do  so  as  soon  as  the  condition  of  the  country  should  make  the  marching 
of  troops  practicable.  I  returned  to  Manassas  February  21st,  and  on  the 
22d  ordered  the  proper  officers  to  remove  the  public  property,  which  was 
begun  on  the  23d,  the  superintendent  of  the  railroad  devoting  himself  to  the 
work  under  the  direction  of  its  president,  the  Hon.  John  S.  Barbour.  The 
Government  had  collected  three  million  and  a  quarter  pounds  of  provisions 
there,  I  insisting  on  a  supply  of  but  a  million  and  a  half.  It  also  had  two 
million  pounds  in  a  meat-curing  establishment  near  at  hand,  and  herds  of 

J)  Between  the  7th  and  llth  of  March,  1  862,  the  the  Rappahamiock.  On  the  11-1 2th  Stonewall 
Confederate  forces  in  north-eastern  Virginia,  under  Jackson  evacuated  Winchester  and  fell  back  to 
General  Johnston,  were  withdrawn  to  the  line  of  Strasburg. —  EDITORS. 


RESPONSIBILITIES  OF  THE  FIRST  BULL  RUN.  257 

live  stock  besides.  On  the  9th  of  March,  when  the  ground  had  become  firm 
enough  for  military  operations,  I  ordered  the  army  to  march  that  night, 
thinking  then,  as  I  do  now,  that  the  space  of  fifteen  days  was  time  enough  in 
which  to  subordinate  an  army  to  the  Commissary  Department.  About  one 
million  pounds  of  this  provision  was  abandoned,  and  half  as  much  more  was 
spoiled  for  want  of  shelter.  This  loss  is  represented  ("R.  and  F.,"  L,  468)  \ 
as  so  great  as  to  embarrass  us  to  the  end  of  the  war,  although  it  was  only 
a  six  days'  supply  for  the  troops  then  in  Virginia.  Ten  times  as  much  was  in 
North  Carolina  railroad  stations  at  the  end  of  the  war.  Mr.  Davis  says  (p.  467) : 

''  It  was  regretted  that  earlier  and  more  effective  means  were  not  employed  for  the  mobiliza 
tion  of  the  army,  .  .  .  or  at  least  that  the  withdrawal  was  not  so  deliberate  as  to  secure  the 
removal  of  our  ordnance,  subsistence,  and  quartermaster's  stores." 

The  quartermaster's  and  ordnance  stores  were  brought  off ;  and  as  to  sub 
sistence,  the  Government,  which  collected  immediately  on  the  frontier  five 
times  the  quantity  of  provisions  wanted,  is  responsible  for  the  losses.  The 
President  suggested  the  time  of  the  withdrawal  himself,  in  the  interview  in  his 
office  that  has  been  mentioned.  The  means  taken  was  the  only  one  available, — 
the  Virginia  Midland  Railroad.  Mr.  Davis  says  ("R.  and  F.,"  I.,  465) : 

"'  To  further  inquiry  from  General  Johnston  as  to  where  he  should  take  position,  I  replied  that 
I  would  go  to  his  headquarters  in  the  field,  and  found  him  on  the  south  bank  of  the  river,  to 
which  he  had  retired,  in  a  position  possessing  great  natural  advantages." 

There  was  110  correspondence  in  relation  to  selecting  a  defensive  position. 
I  was  not  seeking  one;  but,  instead,  convenient  camping-grounds,  from 
which  my  troops  could  certainly  unite  with  other  Confederate  forces  to  meet 
McClellan's  invasion.  I  had  found  and  was  occupying  such  grounds,  one 
division  being  north  of  Orange  Court  House,  another  a  mile  or  two  south  of 
it,  and  two  others  some  six  miles  east  of  that  place ;  a  division  on  the  south 
bank  of  the  Rappahannock,  and  the  cavalry  beyond  the  river,  and  about  13,000 
troops  in  the  vicinity  of  Fredericksburg.  Mr.  Davis's  narrative  [of  a  visit 
to  Fredericksburg  at  this  time,  the  middle  of  March. —  EDITOES]  that  follows 
is  disposed  of  by  the  proof  that,  after  the  army  left  Manassas,  the  President 
did  not  visit  it  until  about  the  14th  of  May.&  But  such  a  visit,  if  made,  could 
not  have  brought  him  to  the  conclusion  that  the  weakness  of  Fredericksburg 
as  a  military  position  made  it  unnecessary  to  find  a  strong  one  for  the  army. 

Mr.  Davis  ("R.  and  F.,"  II.,  81)  credits  me  with  expecting  an  attack 
which  he  shows  General  McClellan  never  had  in  his  mind : 

"  In  a  previous  chapter,  the  retreat  of  our  army  from  Centre ville  has  been  described,  and  ref 
erence  has  been  made  to  the  anticipation  of  the  commanding  general,  J.  E.  Johnston,  that  the 
enemy  would  soon  advance  to  attack  that  position." 

This  refers,  I  suppose,  to  a  previous  assertion  ("  R,  and  F.,"  I.,  462),  my 
comments  upon  which  prove  that  this  "  anticipation "  was  expressed  in  the 

\  Not  by  Mr.  Davis,  but  in  a  statement  quoted  £•  In  "The  Century"  magazine  for  May,  1885, 

at  the  above  page  from  General  J.  A.  Early,  who  General  Johnston,  to  support  his  assertion,  quoted 

said,  "  The  loss  .  .  .  was  a  very  serious  one  to  us,  statements  by  Major  J.  B.  Washington,  Dr.  A.  M. 

and  embarrassed  us  for  the  remainder  of  the  war,  Faimtleroy,  and  Colonel  E.  J.  Harvie,  which  are 

as  it  put  us  at  once  on  a  running  stock."— EDITORS.  no\v  omitted  for  want  of  space.—  EDITORS. 
VOL.  I.   17 


RESPONSIBILITIES  OF  THE  FIRST  BULL  RUN. 

President's  letter  to  me,  dated  February  28th,  1862.     He  says  ("  R.  and  F.," 
II.,  83) : 

"  The  withdrawal  of  our  forces  across  the  Rappahannock  was  fatal  to  the  [Federal]  programme 
of  landing  on  that  river  and  marching  to  Richmond  before  our  forces  could  be  in  position  to 
resist  an  attack  on  the  capital." 

This  withdrawal  was  expressly  to  enable  the  army  to  unite  with  other  Con 
federate  troops  to  oppose  the  expected  invasion.  I  supposed  that  General 
McClellan  would  march  down  the  Potomac  on  the  Maryland  side,  cross  it 
near  the  mouth  of  Aquia  Creek,  and  take  the  Fredericksburg  route  to  Rich 
mond.  The  position  of  Hooker,  about  midway  between  Washington  and 
this  crossing-place,  might  well  have  suggested  that  he  had  this  intention. 

POSTCKIPT. —  In  the  first  paragraph  of  General  Beauregard's  postcript,  it  is 
asserted  that  I  did  not  claim  to  have  commanded  in  the  first  battle  of  Manas- 
sas  until  May,  1885,  and  that  my  official  report  of  that  action  contains  110 
such  claim.  It  is,  nevertheless,  distinctly  expressed  in  that  report  —  thus : 

"In  a  brief  and  rapid  conference,  General  Beauregard  was  assigned  to  the  command  of  the 
left,  which,  as  the  younger  officer,  he  claimed,  while  I  returned  to  that  of  the  whole  field." 

And  iii  "  Johnston's  Narrative,"  published  in  1874,  it  is  expressed  in  these 
words,  on  page  49 : 

"After  assigning  General  Beauregard  to  the  command  of  the  troops  immediately  engaged, 
which  he  properly  suggested  belonged  to  the  second  in  rank,  not  to  the  commander  of  the  army, 
I  returned  to  the  supervision  of  the  whole  field." 

So  much  for  my  not  having  claimed  to  have  commanded  at  the  "  first 
Manassas  "  until  May,  1885. 

General  Beauregard  in  his  official  report  states  the  circumstance  thus : 

" .  .  .1  urged  General  Johnston  to  leave  the  immediate  conduct  of  the  field  to  me,  while 
he,  repairing  to  Portici,  the  Lewis  house,  should  urge  reinforcements  forward." 

This  language  would  certainly  limit  his  command  as  mine  does.  He  did 
not  attempt  to  command  the  army,  while  I  did  command  it,  and  disposed 
of  all  the  troops  not  engaged  at  the  time  of  his  assignment. 

In  his  official  report  of  the  battle,  General  Beauregard  further  states : 

11  Made  acquainted  with  my  plan  of  operations  and  dispositions  to  meet  the  enemy,  he  gave 
them  his  entire  approval,  and  generously  directed  their  execution  under  my  command." 

The  only  "  plan "  that  he  offered  me  [to  move  via  Aldie]  was  rejected  — 
on  the  14th,  before  my  arrival.  The  battle  fought  was  011  McDowell's  plan, 
not  General  Beauregard's.  The  proof  of  this  is,  that  at  its  commencement 
little  more  than  a  regiment  of  Beauregard's  command  w^as  on  the  ground 
where  the  battle  was  fought,  and,  of  his  7  brigades,  1  was  a  mile  and  6  were 
from  4  to  7  or  8  miles  from  it.  The  place  of  the  battle  was  fixed  by  Bee's  and 
Jackson's  brigades,  sent  forward  by  my  direction.  At  my  request  General 
Beauregard  did  write  an  order  of  march  against  the  Federal  army,  finished  a 
little  before  sunrise  of  the  21st.  In  it  I  am  invariably  termed  commander-in- 
chief,  and  he  (to  command  one  of  the  wings)  "  second  in  command,"  or  General 
Beauregard — conclusive  proof  that  the  troops  were  not  "under  his  command." 


GENERAL  EWELL  AT  BULL  RUN. 


259 


Two  letters,  from  General  Lee  and  Mr.  Walker,  Secretary  of  War,  are  cited 
as  evidence  that  General  Beauregard  commanded.  Those  gentlemen  were 
in  a  position  to  know  if  I  relinquished  the  command  or  not.  But  I  had 
this  letter  from  General  Lee : 

"  RICHMOND,  July  24th,  1861.  MY  DEAR  GENERAL  :  I  almost  wept  for  joy  at  the  glorious  victory 
achieved  by  our  brave  troops.  The  feelings  of  my  heart  could  hardly  be  repressed  on  learning 
the  brilliant  share  you  had  in  its  achievement.  I  expected  nothing  else,  and  am  truly  grateful 
for  your  safety.  .  .  ." 

In  conclusion,  I  cannot  discover  that  my  unfavorable  opinion  of  the  Fed 
eral  general's  tactics,  quoted  by  General  Beauregard,  indicates  a  fear  to 
command  against  him. 


GENERAL   EWELL    AT   BULL   RUN. 


BY  MAJOR   CAMPBELL   BROWN,   AIDE-DE-CAMP  AND    ASSISTANT    ADJUTANT-GENERAL    TO    GENERAL    EWELL. 

IN  General  Beauregard's  article  on  Bull  Run,  in  This   contains   at  least  three  errors,  so  serious 

"The   Century"   for  November    [1884],   is   this  that  they  should  not  be  allowed  to  pass  uncor- 

severe  criticism  of  one   of  his  subordinates,  the  rected   among  the   materials  from  which  history 

late  Lieuteuant-General  R.  S.  Ewell  :  will  one  day  be  constructed  : 

1.  That  Ewell  failed  to  do  what  a  good  soldier 
would  have  done  —  namely,  to  move  forward  im 
mediately  on  hearing  from  D.  R.  Jones. 

2.  That  Beauregard  was  made  awai-e  of  this  sup 
posed  backwardness  of  Ewell  by  a  message  from 
D.  R.  Jones. 

3.  That  on  receiving  this  message  he  at  once 
ordered  Ewell  to  advance. 

The  subjoined  correspondence,  4-  now  [March, 
1885]  first  in  print,  took  place  four  days  after 
the  battle.  It  shows  that  Ewell  did  exactly  what 
Beauregard  says  he  ought  to  have  done  —  namely, 
move  forward  promptly  ;  that  his  own  staff-officer, 
sent  to  report  this  forward  movement,  carried  also 
to  headquarters  the  first  intelligence  of  the  failure 


"Meanwhile,  in  rear  of  Mitchell's  Ford,  I  had  been 
waiting  with  General  Johnston  for  the  sound  of  conflict 
to  open  in  the  quarter  of  Centreville  upon  the  Federal 
left  flank  and  rear  (making  allowance,  however,  for  the 
delays  possible  to  commands  unused  to  battle),  when  I 
was  chagrined  to  hear  from  General  D.  R.  Jones  that, 
while  he  had  been  long  ready  for  the  movement  upon 
Ceutreville,  General  Ewell  had  not  come  up  to  form  on 
his  right,  though  he  had  sent  him  between  7  and  8  o'clock 
a  copy  of  his  own  order,  which  recited  that  Ewell  had 
been  already  ordered  to  begin  the  movement.  I  dis 
patched  an  immediate  order  to  Ewell  to  advance ;  but 
within  a  quarter  of  an  hour, .just  as  I  received  a  dispatch 
from  him  informing  me  that  he  had  received  no  order  to 
advance  in  the  morning,  the  firing  on  the  left  began  to 
increase  so  intensely  as  to  indicate  a  severe  attack, 
whereupon  General  Johnston  said  that  he  would  go 
personally  to  that  quarter." 


^  This  article  appeared  substantially  as  here  printed  in 
"The  Century  "  for  March,  1885.—  EDITORS. 

4-  [CORRESPONDENCE.] 

UNION  MILLS,  July  25th,  1861. 
GENERAL  BE.YUREGARD. 

SIR  :  In  a  conversation  with  Major  James,  Louisiana 
6th  Regiment,  he  has  left  the  impression  on  my  mind 
that  you  think  some  of  your  orders  on  the  21st  were 
either  not  carried  out  or  not  received  by  me. 

My  first  order  on  that  day  was  to  hold  myself  in  readi 
ness  to  attack  —  this  at  sunrise.  About  10,  General  Jones 
sent  a  copy  of  an  order  received  by  him  in  which  it  was 
stated  that  I  had  been  ordered  to  cross  and  attack,  and 
on  receipt  of  this  I  moved  on  until  receiving  the  fol 
lowing:  10  &  1-2  A.M. 

On  account  of  the  difficulties  of  the  ground  in  our  front,  it 
is  thought  advisable  to  fall  back  to  our  former  position. 

(Addressed)  General  Ewell.  (Signed)  G.  T.  B. 


If  any  other  order  was  sent  to  me,  I  should  like  to  have 
a  copy  of  it,  as  well  as  the  name  of  the  courier  who 
brought  it. 

Every  movement  I  made  was  at  once  reported  to  you 
at  the  time,  and  this  across  Bull  Run,  as  well  as  the 
advance  in  the  afternoon,  I  thought  were  explained  in 
my  report  sent  in  to-day. 

If  an  order  were  sent  earlier  than  the  copy  through 
General  Jones,  the  courier  should  be  held  responsible, 
as  neither  General  Holmes  nor  myself  received  it.  I 
send  the  original  of  the  order  to  fall  back  in  the  morn 
ing.  The  second  advance  in  the  afternoon  and  recall  to 
Stone  Bridge  were  in  consequence  of  verbal  orders. 

My  chief  object  in  writing  to  you  is  to  ask  you  to  leave 
nothing  doubtful  in  your  report,  both  as  regards  my 
crossing  in  the  morning  and  recall  —  and  not  to  let  it  be 
inferred  by  any  possibility  that  I  blundered  on  that  day. 
I  moved  forward  as  soon  as  notified  by  General  Jones 
that  I  was  ordered  and  he  had  been. 


260 


GENERAL  EWELL  AT  BULL  RUN. 


of  orders  to  reach  him  ;  that  no  such  message  was 
received  from  D.  R.  Jones  as  is  here  ascribed  to 
him  ;  and  that  the  order  sent  back  by  Beauregard 
to  Ewell  was  not  one  to  advance,  but  to  retire  from 
an  advance  already  begun. 

It  is  not  easy  to  understand  these  mistakes,  as 
General  Beauregard  has  twice  given  a  tolerably  ac 
curate  though  meager  account  of  the  matter  —  once 
in  his  official  report,  and  once  in  his  biography  pub 
lished  by  Colonel  Bornan  in  1884.  Neither  of  these 
accounts  can  be  reconciled  with  the  later  attitude. 

Upon  reading  General  Beauregard's  article,  I 
wrote  to  General  Fitzhugh  Lee,  who  was  Ewell's 
assistant  adjutant-general  at  Manassas,  asking  his 
recollection  of  what  took  place.  I  have  liberty  to 
make  the  following  extracts  from  his  reply.  After 
stating  what  troops  composed  the  brigade,  he  goes 
on : 

"  These  troops  were  all  in  position  at  daylight  on  the 
21st  July,  ready  for  any  duty,  and  held  the  extreme 
right  of  General  Beauregard's  line  of  battle  along  Bull 
Run,  at  Union  Mills.  As  hour  after  hour  passed,  General 
Ewell  grew  impatient  at  not  receiving  any  orders  (be 
yond  those  to  be  ready  to  advance,  which  came  at  sun 
rise),  and  sent  me  between  9  and  10  A.  M.  to  see  General 
D.  R.  Jones,  who  commanded  the  brigade  next  on  his 
left  at  McLean's  Ford,  to  ascertain  if  that  officer  had  any 
news  or  had  received  any  orders  from  army  headquar 
ters.  I  found  General  Jones  making  preparations  to 
cross  Bull  Run,  and  was  told  by  him  that,  in  the  order  he 
had  received  to  do  so,  it  was  stated  that  General  Ewell 
had  been  sent  similar  instructions. 

"  Upon  my  report  of  these  facts,  General  Ewell  at 
once  issued  the  orders  for  his  command  to  cross  the  Run 
and  move  out  on  the  road  to  Centreville." 

General  Lee  then  describes  the  recall  across  Bull 
Run  and  the  second  advance  of  the  brigade  to  make 
a  demonstration  toward  Centreville,  and  adds  that 
the  skirmishers  of  Rodes's  5th  Alabama  Regi 
ment,  which  was  in  advance,  had  actually  become 
engaged,  when  we  were  again  recalled  and  ordered 
to  "move  by  the  most  direct  route  at  once,  and  as 
rapidly  as  possible,  for  the  Lewis  house" — the 
field  of  battle  on  the  left.  Ewell  moved  rapidly, 

If  there  was  an  order  sent  me  to  advance  before  the 
one  I  received  through  General  Jones,  it  is  more  than 
likely  it  would  have  been  given  to  the  same  express. 
Respectfully, 

R.  S.  EWELL,  B.  G. 

MANASSAS,  VA.,  July  26th,  1861. 

GENERAL:  Your  letter  of  the  25th  inst.  is  received.  I 
do  not  attach  the  slightest  blame  to  you  for  the  failure 
of  the  movement  on  Centreville,  but  to  the  guide  who 
did  not  deliver  the  order  to  move  forward,  sent  at  about 
8  A.  M.  to  General  Holmes  and  then  to  you  —  correspond 
ing  in  every  respect  to  the  one  sent  to  Generals  Jones, 
Bouham,  and  Longstreet —  only  their  movements  were 
subordinate  to  yours.  Unfortunately  no  copy,  in  the 
hurry  of  the  moment,  was  kept  of  said  orders ;  and  so 
many  guides,  about  a  dozen  or  more,  were  sent  off  in 
different  directions,  that  it  is  next  to  impossible  to  find 
out  who  was  the  bearer  of  the  orders  referred  to.  Our 
guides  and  couriers  were  the  worst  set  I  ever  employed, 
whether  from  ignorance  or  over-anxiety  to  do  well  and 
quickly  I  cannot  say;  but  many  regiments  lost  their 
way  repeatedly  on  their  way  toward  the  field  of  battle, 
and  of  course  I  can  attach  no  more  blame  to  their  com 
manding  officers  than  I  could  to  you  for  not  executing 
an  order  which  I  am  convinced  you  did  not  get. 

I  am  fully  aware  that  you  did  all  that  could  have  been 
expected  of  you  or  your  command.  I  merely  expressed 


sending  General  Lee  and  another  officer  ahead  to 
report  and  secure  orders.  On  his  arrival  near  the 
field  they  brought  instructions  to  halt,  when  he 
immediately  rode  forward  with  them  to  General 
Beauregard,  "and  General  Ewell  begged  General 
Beauregard  to  be  allowed  to  go  in  pursuit  of  the 
enemy,  but  his  request  was  refused." 

As  to  the  real  causes  of  the  miscarriage  of  Gen 
eral  Beauregard's  plan  of  attack  there  need  be 
little  doubt.  They  are  plainly  stated  by  his  imme 
diate  superior  in  command,  General  Joseph  E. 
Johnston,  in  his  official  report,  as  being  the  "  early 
movements  of  the  enemy  on  that  morning  and  the 
non-arrival  of  the  expected  troops  "  from  Harper's 
Ferry.  He  adds :  ' '  General  Beauregard  afterward 
proposed  a  modification  of  the  abandoned  plan, 
to  attack  with  our  right,  while  the  left  stood 
on  the  defensive.  This,  too,  became  impractica 
ble,  and  a  battle  ensued,  different  in  place  and 
circumstances  from  any  previous  plan  on  our  side." 

There  are  some  puzzling  circumstances  con 
nected  with  the  supposed  miscarriage  of  the  order 
for  our  advance.  The  delay  in  sending  it  is  unex 
plained.  General  Beauregard  says  it  was  sent  "at 
about  8  A.  M.,"  but  D.  R.  Jones  had  received  his 
correspondiiig  order  at  10  minutes  past  7,  and  firing 
had  begun  at  half-past  5. 

The  messenger  was  strangely  chosen.  It  was 
the  most  important  order  of  the  day,  for  the  move 
ments  of  the  army  were  to  hinge  on  those  of  our 
brigade.  There  was  no  scarcity  of  competent 
staff-officers;  yet  it  was  intrusted  to  "a  guide," 
presumably  an  enlisted  man,  perhaps  even  a  citi 
zen,  whose  very  name  was  unknown. 

His  instructions  were  peculiar.  Time  was  all- 
important.  He  was  ordered  not  to  go  direct  to 
Ewell,  but  first  to  make  a  detour  to  Holmes,  who 
lay  in  reserve  nearly  two  miles  in  our  rear. 

His  disappearance  is  mysterious.  He  was  never 
heard  of  after  receiving  the  order ;  yet  his  route 
lay  wholly  within  our  lines,  over  well-beaten  roads 
and  far  out  of  reach  of  the  enemy. 

my  regret  that  my  original  plan  could  not  be  carried  into 
effect,  as  it  would  have  been  a  most  complete  victory 
with  only  half  the  trouble  and  fighting. 

The  true  cause  of  countermanding  your  forward  move 
ment  after  you  had  crossed  was  that  it  was  then  too  late, 
as  the  enemy  was  about  to  annihilate  our  left  flank,  and 
had  to  be  met  and  checked  there,  for  otherwise  he  would 
have  taken  us  in  flank  and  rear  and  all  would  have  been 
lost.  Yours  truly, 

G.  T.  BEAUREGARD. 

General  R.  .S.  EWELL,  Union  Mills,  Va. 

P.  8.    Please  read  the  above  to  Major  James. 

N.  B.  The  order  sent  you  at  about  8  A.  M.,  to  com 
mence  the  movement  011  Centreville,  was  addressed  to 
General  Holmes  and  yourself,  as  he  was  to  support  you, 
but  being  nearer  Camp  Pickens,  the  headquarters,  than 
Union  Mills,  where  you  were,  it  was  to  be  communicated 
to  him  first,  and  then  to  you;  but  he  has  informed  me 
that  it  never  reached  him.  With  regard  to  the  order  sent 
you  in  the  afternoon  to  recross  the  Bull  Run  (to  march 
toward  the  Stone  Bridge),  it  was  sent  you  by  General  J. 
E.  Johnston,  as  I  am  informed  by  him,  for  the  purpose 
of  supporting  our  left,  if  necessary.  G.  T.  B. 

Do  not  publish  until  we  know  what  the  enemy  is  going 
to  do — or  reports  are  out — which  I  think  will  make  it 
all  right.  B- 


THE  CONFEDERATE  COMMISSARIAT  AT  MAN  ASS  AS. 


261 


Lastly,  General  Beauregard,  in  his  official  report,     might  have  had  his  orders  by  9.      But  at  9  we  find 
gives  as  his  reason  for  countermanding  the  move-     Beauregard  in  rear  of  Mitchell's   Ford,   waiting 
ment   begun  by  Ewell  at  10  o'clock,  that   in   his 
judgment  it  would  require  quite  three  hours  for  the 


troops  to  get  into  position  for  attack.     Had  the 
messenger   dispatched  at  8  been  prompt,    Ewell 


for  an  attack  which,  by  his  own  figures,  he  should 
not  have  expected  before  12. 

It   is   not   for  me  to  reconcile  these  contradic 
tions. 


THE    CONFEDERATE    COMMISSARIAT    AT    MANASSAS. 

BY    COLONEL    L.    B.    NORTHROP,   COMMISSARY-GENERAL,    C.    S.    A. 


GENERALS  Beauregard,  Iinboden,  and  Johnston 
in  the  foregoing  articles  [see  pages  221,  239,  and 
250]  criticise  the  management  of  my  department 
in  the  matter  of  supplies  for  the  Confederate 
army  at  Manassas  either  before  or  after  the  first 
battle.  In  the  statements  of  these  generals,  there 
is  some  conflict,  but  they  all  concur  in  making  me 
appear  a  preposterous  imbecile,  whom  Mr.  Davis 
was  guilty  of  retaining.  General  Iinboden  in 
effect  charges  Mr.  Benjamin  with  suppressing,  in 
order  to  shield  iny  incapacity,  an  official  report  of 
a  board  of  officers  convened  by  Johnston. 

July  29th,  1861,  General  Beauregard  wrote  to 
his  aides,  Colonels  Chesnut  and  Miles, — the  latter 
read  the  letter  in  the  Confederate  Congress, — 
about  his  vision  of  capturing  Washington,  and 
thus  laid  the  foundation  of  the  cabal  against  Mr. 
Davis  which  made  the  Confederate  Government  a 
"divided  house."  It  produced  a  resolution  of 
inquiry,  followed  soon  by  a  standing  committee, 
and  afterward,  in  January,  1805,  by  a  unanimous 
resolution,  in  secret  session  of  both  honses,  to 
appoint  a  joint  select  committee  to  investigate 
the  condition  and  management  of  all  the  Bureaux 
of  the  War  Department.  The  session  of  this  com 
mittee  on  commissary  affairs  was  held  January 
23d,  1805.  During  the  war  the  investigations 
of  the  standing  committee  into  my  policy  and 
methods  were  frequent ;  several  were  long  taking 
testimony,  for  one  member,  H.  S.  Foote, — who 
when  I  was  myself  in  prison  published  me  as  cruel 
to  Federal  prisoners, — was  ever  zealous  to  attack. 
Every  investigation  ended  in  approval.  I  have  a 
letter  from  Mr.  John  B.  Baldwin,  chairman  of  the 
joint  select  committee,  stating  that  he  had  declared 
in  Congress,  as  the  result  of  their  examination, 
"that  the  commissary  department  of  subsistence, 
under  the  control  of  Colonel  Northrop,  the  Commis 
sary-General,  had  been  managed  with  a  foresight 
and  sagacity,  and  a  far-reaching,  comprehensive 
grasp  of  its  business,  such  as  we  had  found  in  no 
other  bureau  connected  with  the  army  supply, 
with  perhaps  a  single  exception." 

The  facts  are  that  the  engineer,  General  Beau- 
regard,  neglected  his  communications,  so  that 
"troops  for  the  battle"  and  "supplies"  were 
"retarded";  but  the  supplies  were  at  the  depot. 
"Eighteen  heavy  cannon,  called  for  two  weeks 
before,"  occupied  unloaded  cars  at  Fredericksburg, 
where  there  was  a  large  supply  of  flour  that  had 
been  accumulating  since  early  June.  Numerous 
cars  were  retained  as  stationary  storehouses  "for 
provisions,"  "useless  baggage,"  and  "trunks"; 


one  hundred  and  thirty-three  cars  were  abstracted 
by  the  "  military"  power  from  the  use  of  the  rail 
roads  for  two  weeks  and  more  before  the  battle 
until  returned  by  the  Quartermaster-General  and 
Mr.  Ashe,  the  Government  agent.  There  was  plenty 
of  lumber  available  to  construct  a  storehouse.  Gen 
eral  Beauregard  was  not  "  urgent  on  the  Commis 
sary-General  for  adequate  supplies  before  the  bat 
tle,"  for  there  was  no  ground  of  complaint.  It  was 
after  the  battle,  when  the  vision  of  capturing  Wash 
ington  had  seduced  him,  that  he  tried  to  construct 
a  ground  of  complaint  anterior  to  the  battle. 

General  Beauregard  made  but  one  demand  on  me 
(July  8th,  by  a  telegram  which  I  have)  for  a  com 
missary  of  the  old  service.  Lieutenant-Colonel 
Robert  B.  Lee  was  added ;  no  one  was  removed. 
On  the  Gth  day  of  July  I  ordered  Fowle  to  buy  all 
the  corn-meal,  and  soon  after  all  the  bacon,  he 
could.  July  7th,  Beauregard  ordered  him  to  keep 
in  advance  a  two  weeks'  supply  for  25,000  men, 
and  Major  Noland  was  ready  to  supply  any  number 
of  beeves.  The  findings  of  the  Board  (on  which 
Colonel  Lee  sat)  are  incoherent  as  stated  by 
Iinboden.  The  interdictions  alleged  by  him  are 
refuted  by  Colonel  Ruffin  (my  chief  assistant),  and 
by  all  the  letters  sent  officially  to  me  in  August, 
1801.  I  have  Fowle's  detailed  report  of  the  ra 
tions  at  Manassas ;  there  was  plenty  of  provision 
for  a  march  on  Washington.  If  I  had  removed  his 
commissaries  as  he  alleges,  or  had  "  interdicted  " 
them  as  General  Imboden  states,  General  Beau- 
regard  need  not  have  been  hampered,  in  a  country 
which  all  the  generals  have  declared  abounded  in 
the  essentials  of  food. 

General  Johnston's  comments  on  the  commis 
sariat  are  unfounded.  He  "requested"  an  in 
crease  of  provisions  which  his  commissary  alone 
could  determine,  and  allowed  the  accumulation  to 
go  on  for  twelve  days  after  he  knew  that  he  had 
more  than  he  wanted.  When  I  was  informed,  I 
did  what  he  should  have  done  —  telegraphed  the 
shippers  to  stop.  Two  weeks  before  his  move  he 
promised  my  officer.  Major  Noland,  the  transpor 
tation  deemed  sufficient,  and  of  which  he  had  as 
sumed  direct  control.  Empty  trains  passed  the 
meat  which  had  been  laid  in  piles,  ready  for  ship 
ment.  Empty  trains  lay  idle  at  Manassas  for 
days,  in  spite  of  Noland's  efforts  to  get  them. 
General  Johnston  says  the  stores  of  the  other  de 
partments  were  brought  off.  Eight  hundred  new 
army  saddles,  several  thousand  pairs  of  new  shoes, 
and  a  large  number  of  new  blankets  were  burned  — 
Quartermaster's  stores  then  difficult  of  attainment. 


THE    FIRST  YEAR   OF  THE   WAR   IN    MISSOURI. 


BY    COLONEL  THOMAS   L.  SNEAD.  •£ 

SOUTH  CAROLINA  had  just  seceded  and  the  whole  coun 
try  was  in  the  wildest  excitement  when  the  General 
Assembly  of  Missouri  met  at  Jefferson  City  on  the  last 
day  of  the  year  1860.  Responding  to  the  recommenda 
tions  of  Governor  Jackson  and  to  the  manifest  will  of 
the  people  of  the  State,  it  forthwith  initiated  measures 
for  ranging  Missouri  with  the  South  in  the  impending 
conflict.  A  State  Convention  was  called;  bills  to  organize, 
,  arm,  and  equip  the  militia  were  introduced ;  and  the  Fed 
eral  Government  was  solemnly  warned  that  if  it  sent  an 
army  into  South  Carolina,  or  into  any  other  slavehold- 
ing  State,  in  order  to  coerce  it  to  remain  in  the  Union, 
or  to  force  its  people  to  obey  the  laws  of  the  United 
States,  "  the  people  of  Missouri  would  instantly  rally  on 
the  side  of  such  State  to  resist  the  invaders  at  all  hazards 
and  to  the  last  extremity." 

The   most  conspicuous  leader  of  this  movement  was 
Claiborne  F.  Jackson,  who   had  just  been  inaugurated 
Governor.     He  had  for  many  years  been  one  of  the  fore- 
A  VERY  RAW  RECRUCT.          most  leaders  of  the  Democrats  of  Missouri,  and  had  been 
elected  Governor  in  August.     In  the  late  canvass  he  had 
supported  Douglas  for  President,  not  because  he  either  liked  him  or  approved 
his  policy  on  the  slavery  question,  but  because  Douglas  was  the  choice  of 
the  Missouri  Democrats,  and  to  have  opposed  him  would  have  defeated  his 
own  election ;   for  in  August,  1860,  the  people  of  Missouri  were  sincerely 
desirous  that   the   questions   at   issue  between   the   North   and  the  South 
should  be  compromised  and  settled  upon  some  fair  basis,  and  were  opposed 
to  the  election  to  the  Presidency  of  any  man — whether  Lincoln  or  Breck- 
inridge — whose  success  might  intensify  sectional  antipathies  and  imperil  the 
integrity  of  the  Union. 

But  while  loyally  supporting  the  candidacy  of  Douglas,  Jackson  abated 
none  of  his  devotion  to  the  political  principles  which  had  been  the  constant 
guide  of  his  life.  He  was  a  true  son  of  the  South,  warmly  attached  to  the 
land  that  had  given  him  birth,  and  to  her  people,  who  were  his  own  kindred. 
He  was  now  nearly  fifty-five  years  of  age,  tall,  erect,  and  good-looking ;  kind- 
hearted,  brave,  and  courteous ;  a  thoughtful,  earnest,  upright  man ;  a  political 
leader,  but  not  a  soldier. 

The  Governor  urged  the  people  of  Missouri  to  elect  to  the  Convention  men 
who  would  place  Missouri  unequivocally  on  the  side  of  the  South.  He  was 

•fe  Colonel  Snead  was  at  different  times  aide-de-camp  to  Governor  Jackson,  acting  Adjutant-General 
of  the  Missouri  State  Guard,  Chief-of-Staff  of  the  Army  of  the  West,  and  member  of  the  Confederate 
Congress.  He  was  made  by  General  Price  the  custodian  of  his  private  and  official  papers. — EDITORS. 

262 


THE  FIRST  YEAR.  OF  THE  WAR  IN  MISSOURI. 


263 


MAP    OF 
OPERATIONS   IN 


MISSOURI,  1361. 


disappointed.  Francis  P.  Blair,  Jr.,  banded  together 
the  unconditional  Union  men  of  the  State ;  while  the 
St.  Louis  "Republican,"  Sterling  Price,  Hamilton  R. 
Gamble,  James  S.  Rollins,  William  A.  Hall,  and  John  B.  Clark  consolidated 
the  conservatives,  and  together  these  elected  on  the  18th  of  February  a  Con 
vention  not  one  member  of  which  would  say  that  he  was  in  favor  of  the 
secession  of  Missouri.  To  the  courage,  moderation,  and  tact  of  Francis  P. 
Blair  this  result  was  greatly  due. 

Blair  was  just  forty  years  of  age.  His  father,  the  trusted  friend  of  Andrew 
Jackson,  had  taken  him  to  Washington  City  when  he  was  about  seven  years 
old,  and  there  he  had  been  bred  in  politics.  In  1843  he  had  come  to  St.  Louis, 
where  his  brother  Montgomery  was  already  practicing  law.  For  that  profes 
sion,  to  which  he  too  had  been  educated,  Frank  had  no  taste,  and,  having  in 
it  no  success,  quickly  turned  his  attention  to  politics.  In  1852  he  was  elected 
to  the  Legislature  as  a  Benton  Democrat.  Shortly  afterward  he  and  B.  Gratz 
Brown  established  the  St.  Louis  "  Democrat."  When  the  Kansas  conflict 
broke  out  in  1854,  he  identified  himself  with  the  Free-soil  party,  and  in  1856 
supported  Fremont  for  the  Presidency,  though  Senator  Benton,  Fremont's 
father-in-law,  refused  to  do  this.  He  was  elected  to  Congress  that  year,  for 
the  first  time.  In  the  presidential  canvass  of  1860  he  had  been  the  leader  of 
the  Republicans  of  Missouri,  and  it  was  through  him  chiefly  that  Lincoln 
received  17,000  votes  in  the  State.  Immediately  after  the  secession  of  South 


264 


THE  FIRST  YEAR  OF  THE  WAR  IN  MISSOURI. 


Carolina,  he  had  begun  to  organize  his  adherents  as  Home  Guards  and  had 
armed  some  of  them,  and  was  drilling  the  rest  for  the  field,  when  the  election 
of  delegates  to  the  State  Convention  took  place.  To  complete  the  arming  of 
these  men  was  his  first  aim.  In  the  city  of  St.  Louis  the  United  States  had 
an  arsenal  within  which  were  more  than  enough  arms  for  this  purpose — 
60,000  stand  of  arms  and  a  great  abundance  of  other  munitions  of  Avar.  So 
long  as  Buchanan  was  President,  Blair  could  not  get  them,  but  the  4th  of 
March  was  near  at  hand  and  he  could  well  wait  till  then,  for  the  Southern- 
rights  men  had  been  so  demoralized  by  the  defeat  which  they  had  sustained 
in  the  election  of  delegates  to  the  Convention,  that  they  were  in  no  condition 
to  attack  the  arsenal,  as  they  had  intended 
to  do  if  the  election  had  gone  in  their 
favor.  It  was,  indeed,  more  than  a  month 
after  the  inauguration  of  Lincoln  before 
the  Southern-rights  men  ventured  to  make 
any  move  in  that  direction.  The  Governor 
then  came  to  St.  Louis  to  concert  with 
General  D.  M.  Frost  (who  commanded  a 
small  brigade  of  volunteer  militia)  meas 
ures  for  seizing  the  arsenal  in  the  name  of 
the  State.  While  the  matter  was  still  under 
consideration  the  bombardment  of  Fort 
Sumter  took  place,  and  the  President  called 
for  75,000  troops  to  support  the  Govern 
ment.  To  his  call  upon  Missouri  for  her 
quota  of  such  troops,  the  Governor  replied 
that  the  requisition  was,  in  his  opinion, 
"  illegal,  unconstitutional,  and  revolution 
ary  in  its  object,  inhuman  and  diabolical," 
and  that  Missouri  would  not  furnish  one 
man  "to  carry  on  such  an  unholy  crusade." 
A  few  days  later  he  convened  the  General  Assembly,  to  adopt  measures 
for  the  defense  of  the  State. 

In  the  consultation  with  Frost  it  had  been  decided  that  the  Governor,  in 
pursuance  of  an  existing  law  of  the  State,  should  order  all  its  militia  into 
encampment  for  the  purpose  of  drill  and  discipline;  and  that,  under  cover  of 
this  order,  Frost  should  camp  his  brigade  upon  the  hills  adjacent  to  and  com 
manding  the  arsenal,  so  that  when  the  opportunity  occurred  he  might  seize 
it  and  all  its  stores.  A  great  difficulty  in  the  way  of  the  execution  of 
this  plan  was  the  want  of  siege-guns  and  mortars.  To  remove  this  difficulty 
the  Governor  sent  Captains  Colton  Greene  and  Basil  W.  Duke  to  Mont 
gomery,  Alabama,  and  Judge  Cooke  to  Virginia  to  obtain  these  things  By 
Mr.  Davis's  order  the  arms  were  turned  over  to  Duke  and  Greene  at  Baton 
Eouge,  and  were  by  them  taken  to  St.  Louis.  Before  they  arrived  there, 
however,  the  scheme  to  seize  the  arsenal  had  been  completely  frustrated  by 
its  commandant,  Captain  Nathaniel  Lyon,  who  distributed  a  part  of  the 


GOVERNOR    CLAIBORNE    F.    JACKSON. 
FROM  A  PHOTOGRAPH. 


THE  FIRST  YEAR  OF  THE  WAR  IN  MISSOURI. 


26s 


BRIGADIER-GENERAL    D.    M.    FROST,    C.  S.  A. 
FROM   A  PHOTOGRAPH. 


coveted  arms  to  Blair's  Home  Guards  and  removed  the  rest  to  Illinois,  and 
then  occupied  with  his  own  troops  the  hills  around  the  arsenal.  Frost  con 
sequently  established  Camp  Jackson  in  a  grove  in  the  western  part  of 
the  city,  remote  from  the  arsenal,  and  was  drilling  and  disciplining  his 
men  there  in  conformity  to  the  laws  of  the  State  and  under  the  flag  of  the 
Union,  when  Jefferson  Davis's  gift  to 
Missouri  was  taken  into  the  camp. 

Blair  and  Lyon,  to  whom  every  de 
tail  of  the  Governor's  scheme  had  been 
made  known,  had  been  waiting  for  this 
opportunity.  They  had  made  up  their 
minds  to  capture  the  camp  and  to  hold 
the  officers  and  men  as  prisoners  of  war. 
Frost  went  into  camp  on  the  6th  of 
May.  The  arms  from  the  Confederacy 
were  taken  thither  on  the  8th.  On  Sat 
urday,  the  llth,  the  camp  was  to  break 
up.  Lyon  had  no  time  to  lose.  On 
Thursday  he  attired  himself  in  a  dress 
and  shawl  and  other  apparel  of  Blair's 
mother-in-law,  Mrs.  Alexander,  and 
having  completed  his  disguise  by  hid 
ing  his  red  beard  and  weather-beaten 
features  under  a  thickly  veiled  sun-bonnet,  took  on  his  arm  a  basket,  filled, 
not  with  eggs,  but  with  loaded  revolvers,  got  into  a  barouche  belonging  to 
Blair's  brother-in-law,  Franklin  A.  Dick,  and  was  driven  out  to  Camp 
Jackson  and  through  it.  Eeturning  to  the  city,  he  called  the  Union  Safety 
Committee  together,  and  informed  them  that  he  intended  to  capture  the 
camp  the  next  day.  Some  of  the  committee  objected,  but  Blair  and  James 
O.  Broadhead  sustained  him,  and  he  ordered  his  men  to  be  in  readiness  to 
move  in  the  morning.  Just  as  they  were  about  to  march,  Colonel  John 
S.  Bowen  came  to  Lyon  with  a  protest  from  Frost.  Lyon  refused  to 
receive  it,  and,  marching  out  to  the  camp  with  about  7000  men,  surrounded 
it  and  demanded  its  surrender.  Frost,  who  had  only  635  men,  was  obliged 
to  comply. 

While  the  surrender  was  taking  place  a  great  crowd  of  people,  among 
whom  were  L".  S.  Grant  and  "W.  T.  Sherman,  hurried  to  the  scene.  Most  of 
the  crowd  sympathized  with  the  prisoners,  and  some  gave  expression  to  their 
indignation.  One  of  Lyon's  German  regiments  thereupon  opened  fire  upon 
them,  and  twenty-eight  men,  women,  and  children  were  killed.  The  prisoners 
were  then  marched  to  the  arsenal,  and  paroled  the  next  day. 

The  capture  of  Camp  Jackson  and  the  bloody  scenes  that  followed — the 
shooting  down  then  and  the  next  day  of  unoffending  men,  women,  and 
children  —  aroused  the  State.  J  The  General  Assembly,  which  had  reconvened 
in  extra  session,  enacted  instantly  a  law  for  organizing,  arming,  and  equip- 

)  Lyoii  officially  states  that  on  both  days  the  firing  was  in  response  to  attacks  by  mobs. —  EDITORS. 


266  THE  FIRST  YEAR  OF  THE  WAR  IN  MISSOURI. 

ping  the  Missouri  State  Guard,  created  a  military  fund,  and  conferred  dic 
tatorial  power  upon  the  Governor. 

Hardly  less  important  than  these  things  —  for  it  was  what  gave  effect  to 
them  all — was  the  fact  that  the  capture  of  the  camp  caused  ex-Governor 
Sterling  Price,  President  of  the  State  Convention,  and  up  to  that  time  a 
Union  man,  to  tender  his  services  to  the  Governor.  The  General  Assembly 
forthwith  authorized  the  Governor  to  appoint  a  major-general  to  command 
all  the  forces  which  the  State  might  put  into  the  field,  and  Price  was 
appointed  to  that  position.  $ 

In  the  Convention  Price  had  been  opposed  under  all  circumstances  to  the 
secession  of  Missouri,  but  just  as  earnestly  opposed  to  the  invasion  and  con 
quest  of  the  South  by  the  Federal  Government.  To  that  position  he  still 
adhered  even  when  Mr.  Lincoln,  after  the  bombardment  of  Fort  Sumter,  had 
called  for  troops  with  which  to  repossess  the  Federal  forts  and  enforce  the 
laws  of  the  Union  within  the  seceded  States.  But  considering  Lyon's  attack 
upon  the  State  militia  and  his  killing  peaceable  citizens  an  "unparalleled 
insult  and  wrong  to  the  State,"  he  believed  it  was  the  duty  of  Missouri  to 
resent  such  wrongs. 

The  State  now  sprang  to  arms.  Volunteers  began  to  crowd  the  streets  of 
Jefferson  City,  and  everything  indicated  the  opening  of  hostilities.  Blair  and 
Lyon  would  have  met  these  demonstrations  with  force,  would  have  driven 
Jackson  and  Price  from  the  capital,  would  have  dispersed  the  militia  wherever 
it  dared  to  show  itself,  would  have  occupied  the  State  with  Federal  garrisons, 
and  would  have  held  her  in  unresisting  obedience  to  the  Union ;  but,  unfor 
tunately  for  the  execution  of  their  plans,  General  William  S.  Harney,  who 
commanded  the  Military  Department  of  the  West,  of  which  Missouri  was 
part,  had  returned  to  St.  Louis  the  day  after  the  capture  of  Camp  Jackson, 
and  had  resumed  command  there.  Instead  of  using  force  Harney  used  con 
ciliation.  Instead  of  making  war  he  made  a  truce  with  Price. 

Blair  now  caused  Harney  to  be  relieved  of  the  command  of  the  Federal 
troops  in  Missouri,  and  on  the  31st  of  May  he  was  superseded  by  Lyon.  As 
soon  as  this  was  made  known  to  the  Governor  and  General  Price,  they 
ordered  the  militia  to  be  gotten  in  readiness  for  the  field,  for  they  knew  that 

&  Born  in  Prince  Edward  County,  Virginia,  in  ing  presence, — he  was  also  a  parliamentarian  by 

1809,  Price  was  now  fifty-one  years  of  age.  He  had  instinct,    understood    intuitively  the    rules    that 

been  carefully  educated  in  the  schools  of  his  native  govern    deliberative    bodies,    and    knew  how   to 

State  and  at  Hampden-Ridney  College,  and  had  enforce  them   with   promptness   and  vigor.      He 

afterward  attended  the  Law  School  of  one  of  the  occupied  this  position   till  1844,   and  was   then 

most  eminent  jurists   of  Virginia,  the  venerable  elected  to  Congress.  He  took  his  seat  in  December, 

Chancellor  Creed  Taylor.     He  removed  with  his  1845;  but  when  the  war  with  Mexico  broke  out, 

father's  family  to  Chariton  County,   Missouri,  in  a  few  months  later,  he  left  Congress,  returned  to 

1831,  and  had  resided  there  ever  since.    Elected  Missouri,   raised  a  regiment   and   led  it  to  New 

to  the  Legislature  in  1840,  he  was  at  once  chosen  Mexico,  where  he  was  placed  in  command.     For 

Speaker  of  the  House,  an  honor  rarely  conferred  his  good  conduct  and  gallantry  in  several  battles 

upon  so  young  a  man,  and  particularly  upon  one  that  he  fought  and  won  there,  and  in  recognition  of 

who  had  never  before  been  a  member  of  a  delibera-  the  military  and  civic  ability  which  he  displayed 

tive  assembly.    But  he  was  preeminently  fitted  for  in  completing  the  conquest  of  that   part   of  the 

the  position.     Well  born  and  well  bred,  courteous  Mexican   territory,    he  was   appointed   brigadier- 

and  dignified,  well  educated,  and  richly  endowed  general  by  President    Polk.      In  1852    he   was 

with  that  highest  of  all  mental  faculties,  common  elected   Governor  of  Missouri,  and  he   held  that 

sense ;  tall,  straight,  handsome,  and  of  a  command-  office  till  the  beginning  of  1857. — T.  L.  S. 


THE  FIRST  YEAR   OF  THE  WAR  IN  MISSOURI. 


267 


id 


FAC-SIMILE    OF    WAR    SCRIP     ISSUED    BY    THE    CONFEDERATE    LEGISLATURE    OF    MISSOURI. 


Blair  and  Lyon  would  quickly  attack  them.  Some  well-meaning  gentlemen, 
who  vainly  imagined  that  Missouri  could  maintain  her  neutrality  in  the  midst 
of  war,  now  sought  to  establish  a  truce  between  Price  and  Lyon.  Through 
them  a  conference  was  agreed  upon,  and  the  Governor  and  General  Price  came 
to  St.  Louis  under  Lyoii's  safe  conduct.  They  met  him  and  Blair  at  the  Planters' 
House.  Lyon  was  accompanied  by  his  aide-de-camp,  Major  Horace  A.  Conant, 
and  I  was  present  as  the  Governor's  aide.  The  interview,  which  lasted  several 
hours,  was  at  last  terminated  by  Lyon's  saying  that  he  would  see  every  man, 
woman,  and  child  in  Missouri  under  the  sod  before  he  would  consent  that  the 
State  should  dictate  to  "his  Government"  as  to  the  movement  of  its  troops 
within  her  limits,  or  as  to  any  other  matter  however  unimportant.  "This," 
said  he,  "means  war.  One  of  my  officers  will  conduct  you  out  of  my  lines  in 
an  hour."  So  saying,  he  left  without  another  word,  without  even  a  salutation. 

He  had  hardly  left  us  when  he  was  issuing  orders  for  the  movement  of  his 
troops.  Sweeny  and  Sigel  were  sent  with  about  3000  men  to  the  south-west 
to  intercept  the  retreat  of  Jackson  and  Price  if  they  should  undertake  to 
effect  a  junction  with  General  Ben.  McCulloch,  who  was  believed  to  be  con 
centrating  a  Confederate  army  in  north-western  Arkansas  for  the  invasion  of 
Missouri.  Lyon  would  himself  move  up  the  Missouri  after  Jackson. 

The  conference  was  held  on  the  llth  of  June.  On  the  13th  Lyon  was 
on  his  way  to  Jefferson  City  with  about  2000  men.  Arriving  there  the  next 
day,  he  found  that  the  Governor  had  fled  to  Boonville.  Leaving  a  garrison 
at  Jefferson  City,  he  pushed  on  to  Boonville,  where  some  1300  militia  had  ren 
dezvoused.  Attacking  these  on  the  17th,  he  dispersed  them  and  drove  the 
Governor  southward  with  some  two  or  three  hundred  men  who  still  adhered 
to  him  and  to  the  cause  which  he  represented.  General  Price  had  meanwhile 
gone  to  Lexington,  where  several  thousand  militia  had  assembled. 

From  a  military  standpoint  the  affair  at  Boonville  was  a  very  insignificant 
thing,  but  it  did  in  fact  deal  a  stunning  blow  to  the  Southern-rights  men  of 


268  THE  FIRST  YEAR  OF  THE  WAR  IN  MISSOURI. 

Missouri,  and  one  which  weakened  the  Confederacy  during  all  of  its  brief 
existence.  It  was  indeed  the  consummation  of  Blair's  statesmanlike  scheme  to 
make  it  impossible  for  Missouri  to  secede,  or  out  of  her  great  resources  to 
contribute  liberally  of  men  and  material  to  the  South,  as  she  would  have  done 
could  her  people  have  had  their  own  way.  It  was  also  the  most  brilliant 
achievement  of  Lyon's  well-conceived  campaign.  The  capture  of  Camp 
Jackson  had  disarmed  the  State,  and  completed  the  conquest  of  St. 
Louis  and  all  the  adjacent  counties.  The  advance  upon  Jefferson  City  had 
put  the  State  government  to  flight  and  taken  away  from  the  Governor  the 
prestige  which  sustains  established  and  acknowledged  authority.  The  dis 
persion  of  the  volunteers  that  were  flocking  to  Boonville  to  fight  under  Price 
for  Missouri  and  the  South  extended  Lyon's  conquest  at  once  to  the  borders 
of  Iowa,  closed  all  the  avenues  by  which  the  Southern  men  of  North  Missouri 
could  get  to  Price  and  Jackson,  made  the  Missouri  River  a  Federal  highway 
from  its  source  to  its  mouth,  and  put  an  end  to  Price's  hope  of  holding  the 
rich  and  friendly  counties  in  the  vicinity  of  Lexington  till  the  Confederacy 
could  send  an  army  to  his  support,  and  arms  and  supplies  for  the  men  whom 
he  was  concentrating  there. 

Price  had,  indeed,  no  alternative  now  but  to  retreat  in  all  haste  to  the 
south-western  part  of  the  State,  so  as  to  organize  his  army  within  supporting 
distance  of  the  force  which  McCulloch  was  assembling  in  western  Arkansas 
for  the  protection  of  that  State  and  the  Indian  Territory.  He  accordingly 
ordered  Brigadier-General  James  S.  Bains  to  take  command  of  the  militia  at 
and  near  Lexington,  and  to  move  southward  so  as  to  effect  a  junction  with 
the  Governor  in  the  vicinity  of  Lamar,  toward  which  place  the  latter  was 
retreating  with  Generals  M.  M.  Parsons  and  John  B.  Clark  and  what  was 
left  of  their  commands.  General  Price  himself,  accompanied  by  his  staff  and 
a  small  escort,  hastened  rapidly  toward  Arkansas  in  order  to  bring  McCulloch 
to  the  rescue  of  both  the  Governor  and  Rains.  On  the  way  he  was  joined, 
almost  daily,  by  squads  or  companies,  and  by  the  time  he  reached  Cowskin 
Prairie,  in  the  extreme  south-western  corner  of  the  State,  he  had  collected 
about  1200  men. 

On  the  3d  of  July  Rains  reached  Lamar,  near  which  place  the  Governor 
and  his  followers  were  already  encamped.  The  combined  force  amounted  to 
about  6000  men,  of  whom  4000  were  armed,  and  they  had  seven  pieces  of 
artillery.  Halting  until  the  5th  in  order  to  rest  and  organize,  they  pushed  on 
that  morning  toward  Carthage,  having  heard  that  a  Federal  force  had  occu 
pied  that  place,  which  lay  in  their  line  of  retreat.  They  had  marched  but  a 
few  miles  when,  as  they  were  passing  through  the  open  prairie,  they  descried, 
some  three  miles  away,  on  the  declivity  of  a  hill  over  which  they  had  them 
selves  to  pass,  a  long  line  of  soldiers  with  glistening  bayonets  and  bright 
guns.  These  were  part  of  the  force  which  Lyon,  on  marching  against  Jeffer 
son  City,  had  sent  under  General  Sweeny  and  Colonel  Sigel  to  the  south-west 
to  intercept  the  Governor's  retreat  toward  Arkansas.  Sigel,  in  executing 
this  plan,  had  first  attempted  to  intercept  Price.  Failing  in  that,  he  had 
now,  with  more  boldness  than  discretion,  thrown  himself,  with  about  1100 


THE  FIRST  YEAR  OF  THE  WAR  IN  MISSOURI.  269 

men  and  eight  pieces  of  artillery,  in  front  of  the  Governor,  hoping  either  to 
defeat  him  or  to  hold  him  in  check  till  Lyon  could  arrive  and  destroy 
him.  Halting  his  column  in  the  prairie,  and  deploying  his  armed  men 
(about  4000),  the  Governor  awaited  Sigel's  attack.  The  fight  (known  as  the 
battle  of  Carthage)  did  not  last  long,  for  Sigel  was  outnumbered  four  to  one, 
and  the  Missourians  quickly  put  him  to  flight.  He  retreated,  however,  in 
perfect  order,  carrying  off  almost  everything  that  he  had  brought  with  him. 
But  he  did  not  stop  running  till  he  had  made  forty  miles.  That  night  the 
State  troops  rested  in  Carthage.  The  next  day  they  resumed  their  southward 
march,  and  soon  met  Price  and  McCulloch.  Price  now  assumed  command 
of  the  Missourians  and  led  them  to  Cowskin  Prairie,  in  the  south-western 
corner  of  the  State,  while  McCulloch  went  into  camp  near  Maysville  in 
Arkansas. 

Lyon  left  Boonville  in  pursuit  of  the  Governor,  on  the  3d  of  July,  with 
about  2350  men,  and  directed  his  course  toward  Clinton  in  Henry  county, 
where  he  had  ordered  Major  Sturgis,  who  was  following  Rains  with  about 
2500  regulars  and  Kansas  troops,  to  unite  with  him.  The  two  columns  came 
together  near  Clinton  on  the  7th  of  July  and  pushed  on  after  the  Missourians. 
Lyon  did  not  learn  till  the  9th  that  they  had  defeated  Sigel  and  effected  a 
junction  with  McCulloch.  He  then  made  in  all  haste  for  Springfield,  fearing 
that  the  Confederates  would  attack  that  place.  Arriving  there  on  the  13th 
of  July,  he  made  it  his  headquarters. 

Lyon,  on  the  one  hand,  and  Price  on  the  other  now  began  to  get  their 
armies  in  readiness  for  active  operations.  For  Lyon  this  was  a  simple  under 
taking  ;  for  Price  it  was  one  of  great  complexity  and  great  difficulty.  Of  the 
7000  or  8000  men  that  he  had,  only  a  few  had  been  organized  into  regiments. 
Several  thousand  of  them  had  no  arms  of  any  kind.  The  rest  were  for  the 
most  part  armed  with  the  shot-guns  and  rifles  which  they  had  brought 
from  their  homes.  Of  powder  and  lead  they  had  an  abundance,  but  no  fixed 
ammunition  for  either  their  seven  pieces  of  artillery  or  for  their  small-arms. 
Tents  they  had  none,  nor  camp  equipage  of  any  kind.  There  were  no  quar 
termasters'  supplies,  nor  subsistence;  and  neither  the  quartermaster-general 
nor  the  chief  commissary  had  a  dollar  of  funds.  The  men  were  not  fighting 
for  pay,  they  wanted  none,  nor  did  they  get  any;  but  they  and  their  thou 
sands  of  horses  and  mules  had  to  be  fed.  For  their  animals  there  was  nothing 
but  the  grass  of  the  prairies,  and  for  themselves  nothing  but  a  scant  supply 
of  lean  beef  and  coarse  corn-meal.  There  were  enough  good  officers  to 
organize  and  command  the  men ;  but  it  would  have  puzzled  almost  any  one 
to  drill  a  company  of  raw  recruits,  armed,  some  with  shot-guns,  some  with 
rifles,  a  few  with  old-fashioned  flint-lock  muskets,  and  here  and  there  a  man 
with  a  percussion  musket.  Xo  better  proof  could  be  given  of  the  dearth  of 
material  for  the  Staff,  than  the  fact  that  I  was  myself  assigned  to  duty  by  Gen 
eral  Price  as  chief  of  ordnance  of  the  army,  though  I  told  him  at  the  time  that 
I  did  not  know  the  difference  between  a  howitzer  and  a  siege-gun,  and  had 
never  seen  a  musket-cartridge  in  all  my  life ;  and  a  few  days  later  I  was 
assigned  to  the  still  more  important  position  of  acting  Adjutant-General  of 


270  THE  FIRST  YEAR  OF  THE  WAR  IN  MISSOURI. 

the  State  Guard,  though  I  had  never  then  heard  of  a  "  morning  report,"  and 
did  not  know  the  right  of  a  company  from  its  left.  Had  Hardee  or  any  other 
West  Pointer  been  in  command,  he  would  have  kept  us  in  camp  six 
months,  drilling  and  disciplining  us,  getting  together  wagons  and  teams, 
tents  and  cartridge-boxes,  uniforms  and  haversacks,  quartermasters  and  red 
tape,  and  all  the  other  equipments  and  impedimenta  of  an  army  in  the  field, 
and  then  we  would  have  gone  into  winter  quarters ;  Lyon  would  have  had  his 
own  way  in  Missouri,  and  the  Federal  armies  that  were  sent  thither  to  whip 
us  would  have  been  sent  to  fight  in  Virginia  or  in  Tennessee  instead,  and 
the  Confederacy  might  have  been  vanquished  sooner  than  it  was.  But  Price 
had  us  all  ready  for  the  field  in  less  than  three  weeks.  "We  had  no  tents,  it 
is  true,  but  tents  would  only  have  been  in  our  way ;  we  had  no  uniforms,  but 
a  bit  of  flannel  or  calico  fastened  to  the  shoulder  of  an  officer  designated  his 
rank  sufficiently  for  all  practical  purposes ;  the  ripening  corn-fields  were  our 
depots  of  subsistence ;  the  prairies  furnished  forage,  and  the  people  in  defense 
of  whose  homes  we  were  eager  to  fight  gladly  gave  us  of  all  their  stores. 

McCulloch,  one  of  the  bravest  of  men  and  best  of  scouts,  looking  at  us 
through  the  eyes  of  the  young  army  officers  whom  Mr.  Davis  had  sent  to 
teach  him  how  to  organize,  equip,  and  fight  an  army  scientifically,  saw  in  the 
Missourians  nothing  but  a  half-armed  mob,  led  by  an  ignorant  old  militia 
general,  but  he  consented  to  go  with  Price  in  search  of  Lyon,  who  was  at 
Springfield  and  not  hard  to  find.  General  N.  B.  Pearce,  commanding  a 
brigade  of  Arkansas  State  troops,  agreed  to  go  along  with  them. 

Hardee,  who  was  at  Pitman's  Ferry,  Arkansas,  within  a  few  hundred 
yards  of  the  Missouri  line,  and  almost  as  near  to  Springfield  as  were  Price 
and  McCulloch,  and  who  had  with  him  several  thousand  good  soldiers,  was 
begged  by  both  Price  and  McCulloch  to  cooperate  in  the  movement  against 
Lyon,  but  he  replied  that  he  "  did  not  wish  to  march  to  their  assistance  with 
less  than  5000  men,  well  appointed,  and  a  full  complement  of  artillery  " ! 

By  order  of  General  Polk,  made  at  the  earnest  personal  solicitation  of 
Governor  Jackson,  who  had  gone  to  Memphis  for  that  purpose,  General 
Pillow  moved  into  Missouri  from  Tennessee,  with  twelve  thousand  men,  and 
occupied  New  Madrid  on  the  28th  of  July,  with  the  intent  to  unite  in  the 
effort  to  repossess  the  State. 

On  the  same  day,  Price,  McCulloch,  and  Pearce,  relying  upon  the  cooper 
ation  of  both  Hardee  and  Pillow,  concentrated  their  forces  at  Cassville, 
within  about  fifty  miles  of  Springfield.  There  Price  was  reenforced  by 
General  McBride's  command,  consisting  of  two  regiments  of  foot  and  three 
companies  of  mounted  men,  about  700  in  all.  They  had  come  from 
the  hill  country  lying  to  the  south  and  south-east  of  Springfield,  and 
were  a  unique  body  of  soldiers.  Very  few  of  the  officers  had  any  knowledge 
whatever  of  military  principles  or  practices,  and  only  the  most  superficial 
experience  in  company  tactics.  The  staff  was  composed  chiefly  of  country 
lawyers  who  took  the  ways  of  the  court-room  with  them  into  the  field. 
Colonels  could  not  drill  their  regiments,  nor  captains  their  companies;  a 
drum  and  a  fife — the  only  ones  in  the  entire  command — sounded  all  the  calls, 


THE  FIRST   YEAR  OF  THE  WAR  IN  MISSOURI.  271 

and  companies  were  paraded  by  the  sergeant's  calling  out,  "  Oh,  yes !  Oh,  yes ! 
all  you  who  belong  to  Captain  Brown's  company  fall  in  here."  Officers  and 
men  messed  together,  and  all  approached  McBride  without  a  salute,  lounged 
around  his  quarters,  listened  to  all  that  was  said,  and  when  they  spoke 
to  him  called  him  "  Jedge."  Their  only  arms  were  the  rifles  with  which  they 
hunted  the  squirrels  and  other  small  game  that  abounded  in  their  woods,  but 
these  they  knew  how  to  use.  A  powder-horn,  a  cap-pouch,  "  a  string  of 
patchin',"  and  a  hunter's  knife  completed  their  equipment.  I  doubt  whether 
among  them  all  there  was  a  man  that  had  ever  seen  a  piece  of  artillery.  But, 
for  all  this,  they  were  brave  and  intelligent.  Like  all  frontiersmen,  they  were 
shrewd,  quick-witted,  wary,  cunning,  and  ready  for  all  emergencies,  and  like 
all  backwoodsmen,  their  courage  was  serene,  steady,  unconscious.  While  there 
was  no  attempt  at  military  discipline,  and  no  pretense  of  it,  the  most  perfect 
order  was  maintained  by  McBride's  mere  force  of  character,  by  his  great  good 
sense,  and  by  the  kindness  with  which  he  exercised  his  patriarchal  authority. 

Leaving  Cassville  on  the  31st  of  July,  the  combined  Southern  armies,  nearly 
11,000  strong,  advanced  toward  Springfield.  On  the  way  they  encountered 
Lyon,  who  had  come  out  to  meet  them.  McCulloch,  who  could  not  compre 
hend  the  Missourians  or  the  able  soldier  who  commanded  them,  refused  to 
attack  unless  Price  and  Pearce  would  confer  upon  him  the  chief  command. 
Price  had  been  a  brigadier-general  in  Mexico,  when  McCulloch  was  but  a  cap 
tain  of  scouts,  and  had  won  more  battles  there  than  McCulloch  had  ever  wit 
nessed;  he  was  now  a  major-general  with  more  than  5000  men,  and  McCulloch 
had  barely  3000 ;  and  in  intellect,  in  experience,  and  in  generalship  he  was 
worth  a  dozen  McCullochs;  nevertheless,  he  cheerfully  placed  himself  and 
his  army  under  the  Texan's  command.  The  order  to  advance  was  then  given. 
Lyon  had  been  encamped  six  miles  in  front  with  between  5000  and  6000  men. 
McCulloch  moved  at  midnight,  hoping  to  fall  upon  him  unexpectedly,  and  to 
defeat  him.  To  his  amazement  he  learned,  on  approaching  the  spot,  that 
Lyon  had  left  twenty  hours  before,  and  must  now  be  almost  in  sight  of 
Springfield.  The  Confederates  kept  on,  and  on  the  6th  of  August  went  into 
camp  on  "Wilson's  Creek,  within  ten  miles  of  Springfield.  They  were  stih1 
lying  there  on  the  morning  of  the  10th  of  August,  when  they  were  surprised 
and  suddenly  attacked  on  the  north  by  Lyon,  and  on  the  south  by  Sigel.  | 

One  of  the  stubbornest  and  bloodiest  battles  of  the  war  now  took  place. 
Lyon's  main  attack  was  met  by  Price  with  about  3200  Missourians,  and 
Churchill's  regiment  and  Woodruff's  battery,  both  from  Arkansas.  His  left 
was  met  and  driven  back  by  Mclntosh  with  a  part  of  McCulloch's  brigade 
(the  Third  Louisiana  and  Mclntosh's  regiment).  McCulloch  then  took  some 
companies  of  the  Third  Louisiana  and  parts  of  other  commands,  and  with  them 
attacked  and  routed  Sigel  (who  had  been  sent  to  attack  the  rear),  capturing 
five  of  his  guns.  This  done,  Pearce's  Arkansas  brigade,  which  up  to  this 
time  had  not  fired  a  gun,  was  sent  to  reenforce  Price.  Lyon,  seeing  that 

4.  For  maps  and  more  specific  descriptions  of  see  the  papers  by  Generals  Pearce  and  Wherry, 
the  three  chief  engagements  of  this  "first  year,"  Colonel  Mulligan,  and  General  Sigel,  to  follow. — 
—  Wilson's  Creek,  Lexington,  and  Pea  Eidge, —  EDITORS. 


272 


THE  FIRST  YEAR  OF  THE  WAR  IN  MISSOURI. 


MAJOH-GENERAI,    STERLING     PRICK,    C.    8.    A.      FROM    A   PHOTOGRAPH. 

the  supreme  moment  had  come,  and  that  the  day  would  be  surely  lost  if  he 
did  not  overwhelm  Price  before  the  Arkarisans  could  reenforce  him,  now 
brought  forward  every  available  man,  and  was  putting  them  into  the  fight, 
when  his  horse  was  killed,  and  himself  wounded  in  the  head.  Dazed  by  the 
blow,  dazed  and  stunned,  his  heart  gave  way  for  a  moment  under  the  sudden 
shock,  but  quickly  coming  to  his  senses  he  mounted  another  horse,  and, 
swinging  his  hat  in  the  air,  called  on  his  men  to  follow.  Closing  around 
him  they  dashed  with  him  into  the  thick  of  the  fight.  But  a  moment  later 
a  bullet  pierced  his  heart,  and  he  fell  from  his  horse  into  the  arms  of  his 
orderly,  and  in  an  instant  was  dead.  It  was  vain  that .  the  Federals  tried  to 
prolong  the  battle.  Sturgis,  on  whom  the  command  devolved,  ordered  a 
retreat,  and  before  the  Confederates  knew  that  the  battle  was  ended  he 
was  a  mile  away,  having  withdrawn  his  men  unseen  through  the  dense 
undergrowth  of  the  woods  in  which  the  battle  mainly  was  fought.  In  the 


THE  FIRST  YEAR  OF  THE  WAR  IN  MISSOURI.  273 

haste  of  their  retreat,  the  Federals  left  Lyon's  dead  body  on  the  field,  I 
delivered  it  myself  an  hour  or  two  later  to  a  flag-of-truce  party  that  had  been 
sent  to  ask  for  it.  I  saw  it  again  the  next  day  in  Springfield,  where  it  had 
been  again  abandoned  by  his  men.  _[See  foot-note,  page  297.] 

Rarely  have  I  met  so  extraordinary  a  man  as  Lyon,  or  one  that  has 
interested  me  so  deeply.  Coming  to  St.  Louis  from  Kansas  on  the  6th  of 
February,  this  mere  captain  of  infantry,  this  little,  rough-visaged,  red-bearded, 
weather-beaten  Connecticut  captain,  by  his  intelligence,  his  ability,  his  energy, 
and  his  zeal,  had  at  once  acquired  the  confidence  of  all  the  Union  men  of 
Missouri,  and  had  made  himself  respected,  if  not  feared,  by  his  enemies.  In 
less  than  five  months  he  had  risen  to  the  command  of  the  Union  armies  in 
Missouri,  had  dispersed  the  State  government,  had  driven  the  Governor  and 
his  adherents  into  the  extremes!  corner  of  the  State,  had  almost  conquered 
the  State,  and  would  have  completely  conquered  it  had  he  been  supported 
by  his  Government ;  and  now  he  had  given  his  life  willingly  for  the  Union 
which  he  revered,  and  to  the  cause  of  Human  Freedom  to  which  he  was 
fanatically  devoted. 

The  Federal  force  in  the  battle  amounted  to  about  5400  officers  and  men. 
The  Confederates  had  over  10,000  armed  men  on  the  ground,  but  3000  of 
them  took  little  or  no  part  in  the  fight.  The  Confederates  lost  279  killed 
and  951  wounded.  The  Federal  loss  was  258  killed,  873  wounded,  and  186 
captured  or  missing. 

McCulloch  refused  to  pursue,  and  Price  resumed  command  of  the  Missouri 
troops.  The  next  day  he  took  possession  of  Springfield,  and  sent  Rains  with 
a  mounted  force  to  clear  the  western  counties  of  the  State  of  the  marauding 
bands  that  had  come  into  them  from  Kansas.  On  the  25th  of  August  he 
moved  northward  with  his  army.  On  the  2d  of  September  he  met  a  part  of 
Lane's  Kansas  Brigade  under  Colonel  Montgomery  on  the  banks  of  the  Big 
Diy  Wood.  Montgomery  had  about  500  men  and  gave  battle,  but  was  forced 
to  retreat  before  Price's  superior  force.  The  loss  on  either  side  was  trifling. 

Price  now  hastened  toward  Lexington,  joined  at  every  step  by  recruits. 
Reaching  the  city  on  the  12th  of  September  with  his  mounted  men,  he  drove 
Colonel  Mulligan  within  his  intrenchments,  and  as  soon  as  his  main  body 
came  up,  completed  the  investment  of  the  place.  On  the  20th  he  caused  a 
number  of  hemp-bales  saturated  with  water  to  be  rolled  to  the  front  and 
converted  them  into  movable  breastworks,  behind  which  his  men  advanced 
unharmed  against  the  enemy.  Colonel  Mulligan  was  forced  to  surrender  the 
next  day.  Price's  loss  was  25  killed  and  72  wounded.  Fremont  reported  to 
the  War  Department  that  the  Union  loss  was  39  killed  and  120  wounded. 
The  Missourians  captured  about  3500  prisoners,  five  pieces  of  artillery,  two 
mortars,  3000  stand  of  small-arms,  a  large  number  of  sabers,  about  750 
horses,  many  sets  of  cavalry  equipments,  ammunition,  many  wagons  and 
teams,  more  than  $100,000  worth  of  commissary  stores,  and  a  large  amount 
of  other  property.  Price  also  recovered  $900,000  that  had  been  taken  by  the 
enemy  from  the  Bank  at  Lexington,  and  restored  it  to  the  Bank.  His  force 
amounted  to  about  18,000  men,  Mulligan's  to  about  3600. 

VOL.  I.    18 


274 


THE  FIRST  YEAR  OF  THE  WAR  IN  MISSOURI. 


In  order  to  obtain  the  cooperation  of  the  Confederate  armies,  the  Governor 
and  General  Price  sent  me  to  Richmond,  after  the  capture  of  Lexington,  as  a 
special  commissioner  to  explain  to  President  Davis  the  condition  of  affairs  in 
Missouri,  and  to  negotiate  a  treaty  of  alliance  with  the  Confederate  States, 
inasmuch  as  Missouri  had  not  seceded  nor  been  admitted  into  the  Confederacy. 
By  their  direction  I  went  by  way  of 
McCulloch's  headquarters,  in  order 
to  make  one  more  effort  to  secure 
his  cooperation,  and  failing  in  that, 
to  get  from  him  certain  supplies 
which  General  Price  greatly  needed, 
particularly  caps  for  the  muskets 
which  we  had  captured  at  Lexing 
ton.  To  all  my  entreaties  McCulloch 
replied  that  Price  had  gone  to  the 
Missouri  against  his  advice;  that  the 
movement  was  unwise  and  would  re 
sult  in  disaster,  and  that  he  would 
not  endanger  his  own  army  by  going 
to  his  assistance;  and  that  as  for 
musket-caps,  he  had  none  to  spare. 

General  John  C.  Fremont,  who  had 
assumed  command  of  the  Union  ar 
mies  in  the  West  on  the  25th  of  July, 
now  began  to  concentrate  his  forces  against  Price.  Sending  about  40,000 
men,  with  100  pieces  of  artillery,  to  attack  him  in  front,  and  others  to  cut 
off  his  retreat,  he  took  the  field  himself.  His  plan  was  magnificent — to 
capture  or  disperse  Price's  army;  march  to  Little  Rock  and  occupy  the 
place;  turn  the  Confederates  under  Polk,  Pillow,  Thompson,  and  Hardee,  and 
compel  them  to  fall  back  southward;  push  on  to  Memphis  with  his  army 
and  Foote's  flotilla ;  capture  that  city;  and  then  make  straight  for  New  Orleans. 

Price  left  Lexington  on  the  29th  of  September,  after  advising  his  unarmed 
men  to  return  to  their  homes,  and  to  wait  for  a  more  convenient  time  to  rise. 
Marching  as  rapidly  as  his  long  train  would  permit,  he  reached  the  Osage  on 
the  8th  of  October  with  about  7000  men.  To  cross  his  troops  and  trains  over 
that  difficult  river  on  a  single  flat-boat  was  a  tedious  operation,  but  Fremont 
gave  him  all  the  time  that  he  needed,  and  he  got  them  safely  over. 

After  crossing  the  Osage,  Price  marched  quickly  to  Neosho,  where  the 
General  Assembly  had  been  summoned  by  Governor  Jackson  to  meet. 
Fremont  continued  to  follow  till  the  2d  of  November,  when  he  was  super 
seded  by  Major-General  David  Hunter,  who  immediately  stopped  the  pursuit 
and  turned  the  army  back  to  St.  Louis.  On  the  19th  of  November  Major- 
General  Halleck  assumed  command  of  the  Fqderal  Department. 

When  I  returned  from  Richmond,  Price  had  gone  into  winter  quarters  on 
the  Sac  River  near  Osceola.  Many  of  his  men  had  been  f  uiioughed  so  that 
they  might  go  to  their  homes,  where  they  could  subsist  themselves  during 


MAJOK-GKNEKAL   DAVID   HUNTEK.      FROM   A  PHOTOGRAPH. 


THE  FIRST  YEAR  OF  THE  WAR  IN  MISSOURI.  275 

the  winter  and  provide  for  their  families.  McCulloch's  brigade  was  on  the 
Arkansas  River,  and  Pearee's  had  been  disbanded.  Under  the  treaty  which 
had  been  negotiated  at  Richmond,  the  enlistment  of  Missourians  in  the 
Confederate  army  was  at  once  begun  and  was  continued  at  Springfield, 
whither  Price  moved  his  army  just  before  Christmas.  Before  the  end  of 
January,  1862,  two  regiments  of  infantry  (Burbridge's  and  Rives's),  one  regi 
ment  of  cavalry  (Gates's),  and  two  batteries  (Wade's  and  Clark's)  had  been 
mustered  into  the  Confederate  service,  and  on  the  28th  I  started  to  Richmond 
to  deliver  the  muster-rolls  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  and  to  inform  the  President 
as  to  the  strength  and  condition  of  the  army  in  Missouri,  and  to  communi 
cate  to  him  Price's  views  as  to  the  future  conduct  of  the  war  in  that  State. 

On  the  way  I  met  Major-General  Earl  Van  Dorn  at  Jacksonport  in  Arkansas. 
He  had  just  assumed  command  (January  29th)  of  the  District  of  the  Trans- 
Mississippi,  constituting  a  part  of  General  Albert  Sidney  Johnston's  extensive 
department.  He  was  a  dashing  soldier,  and  a  very  handsome  man,  and  his 
manners  were  graceful  and  fascinating.  He  was  slight  of  stature  and  his 
features  were  almost  too  delicatelv  refined  for  a  soldier,  but  this  defect,  if  it 

«/  7 

was  a  defect,  was  converted  into  a  charm  by  the  martial  aspect  of  his  mustache 
and  imperial,  and  by  an  exuberant  growth  of  brownish  hair.  Quitting  the 
United  States  army  when  Mississippi  seceded,  he  first  entered  her  service, 
and  was  afterward  appointed  to  that  of  the  Confederacy  and  placed  in  com 
mand  of  Texas.  Transferred  thence  to  Virginia  in  September,  1861,  he  was 
commissioned  major-general  and  ordered  to  report  to  General  J.  E.  Johnston, 
commanding  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  Johnston  ordered  him  to  Beau- 
regard,  and  Beauregard  assigned  him  to  the  command  of  a  division,  October 
4th,  1861.  He  was  assigned  to  the  command  of  the  Trans-Mississippi  District, 
January  10th,  1862.  We  Missourians  were  delighted;  for  he  was  known  to  be 
a  fighting  man,  and  we  felt  sure  he  would  help  us  to  regain  our  State.  I 
explained  to  him  the  condition  of  affairs  in  Missouri,  and  General  Price's  views. 

Van  Dorn  had  already  decided  upon  a  plan  of  campaign,  and  in  execution 
of  it  ordered  General  Albert  Pike,  a  few  days  afterward,  to  Lawrence  county, 
Missouri,  with  a  mixed  command  of  whites  and  Indians  estimated  at  7000 
men ;  ordered  Mclntosh  to  report  to  Price  at  Springfield  with  McCulloch's 
infantry;  ordered  McCulloch  to  Pocahontas  with  his  mounted  men;  and 
called  upon  Louisiana,  Arkansas,  and  Texas  to  send  reenforceinents.  Hope 
ful  and  enthusiastic  by  nature,  he  believed  that  Price  would  have  15,000 
effective  men  at  Springfield  by  the  last  of  March,  and  himself  18,000  at  Poca 
hontas,  and  that  they  could  then  march  against  St.  Louis.  The  two  col 
umns  were  to  effect  a  junction  north  of  Ironton,  and,  moving  thence  rapidly 
without  tents  or  baggage,  take  the  city  by  assault.  Possession  of  the  city 
would  give  him  possession  of  the  State,  and  the  enemy  would  supply  the 
arms  for  the  thousands  of  volunteers  that  would  flock  to  his  standard. 

From  this  day-dream  he  was  rudely  awakened  a  few  days  later  by  news 
that  Price  had  been  driven  from  Springfield  on  the  12th  of  February,  and  was 
hotly  pursued  by  a  Federal  army  which  Halleck  had  sent  against  him  under 
General  S.  R.  Curtis.  With  this  army  was  Captain  P.  H.  Sheridan,  doing  duty 


276 


THE  FIRST  YEAR  OF  THE  WAR  IN  MISSOURI. 


MAJOR-GENERAL    HENRY    W.    HALLECK.        FROM    A   PHOTOGRAPH. 

as  quartermaster.  Price  sought  refuge  in  the  mountains  of  Arkansas,  and 
February  21st  was  within  thirty  miles  of  Van  Buren,  near  which  place  was 
McCulloch. 

On  learning  all  this  Van  Dorn  hastened  to  Van  Buren  and  thence  to 
Price's  headquarters,  which  he  reached  011  the  1st  of  March.  After  a  hurried 
consultation  with  Price  and  McCulloch,  he  decided  to  instantly  attack  Curtis, 
who  had  taken  a  strong  position  among  the  mountains  near  Bentonville.  He 
moved  on  the  4th  of  March  with  about  16,000  men,  of  whom  6800  were 
Missourians  under  Price,  and  the  rest  Confederates  under  McCulloch  and 
Pike.  When  almost  within  reach  of  Curtis  (who  reported  his  own  strength  at 
10,500  infantry  and  cavalry  and  forty-nine  pieces  of  artillery)  Van  Dorn 
unwisely  divided  his  army,  and  leaving  McCulloch  with  his  own  command 
and  Pike's  to  attack  Curtis  in  front,  himself  made  with  Price  and  the  Mis 
sourians  a  long  circuit  to  the  rear  of  Curtis,  and  out  of  communication  with 
McCulloch.  Both  columns  attacked  about  the  same  time  on  the  7th.  Price 
was  completely  successful  and  carried  everything  before  him,  taking  during 


THE  FIRST  YEAR.  OF  THE  WAR  IN  MISSOURI.  277 

the  afternoon  seven  pieces  of  cannon  and  about  200  prisoners,  and  at  night 
bivouacked  near  Elkhorn  Tavern.  But  morning  revealed  the  enemy  in  a  new 
and  strong  position,  their  forces  united  and  offering  battle.  The  Confederates 
soon  learned  that  McCulloch  and  Mclntosh  had  been  killed  the  day  before 
and  their  force  routed  and  dispersed.  The  battle  was  renewed  nevertheless, 
and  the  Missourians  fought  desperately  and  were  still  holding  their  ground 
when  about  10  o'clock  Van  Dorn  ordered  a  retreat,  and  the  army  leaving 
Missouri  to  her  fate  began  to  fall  back  toward  Van  Buren. 

In  this  battle,  sometimes  called  the  battle  of  Pea  Ridge,  and  at  other 
times  the  battle  of  Elkhorn,  the  Federal  general  reported  his  losses  at  203 
killed,  980  wounded,  and  201  missing.  Van  Dorn's  were  probably  greater, 
and  he  lost  heavily  in  good  officers.  McCulloch  and  Mclntosh  were  killed ; 
General  Price  was  again  wounded  and  narrowly  escaped  death;  General 
W.  Y.  Slack,  whom  his  men  idolized  and  whom  the  whole  army  held  in  honor, 
was  fatally  wounded ;  and  Colonel  B.  A.  Rives,  one  of  the  knightliest  of  sol 
diers  and  bravest  of  gentlemen,  and  Churchill  Clark,  a  heroic  boy,  were  killed. 

Halleck,  who  had  determined  to  make  the  Tennessee  "  the  great  strategic 
line  of  the  Western  campaign,"  now  began  to  concentrate  all  of  his  forces  on 
that  river  and  the  Mississippi,  in  order  "to  fight  a  great  battle  on  the 
Tennessee,"  one  which  would  "settle  the  campaign  in  the  West."  He  con 
sequently  ordered  Curtis  not  to  advance  any.  farther  into  Arkansas;  and 
sent  out  of  Missouri  all  the  troops  that  could  be  safely  taken  thence,  some 
of  them  to  Pope  on  the  Mississippi,  and  others  to  Grant  on  the  Tennessee. 

The  concentration  of  Federal  armies  on  the  Mississippi  portended  such 
danger  to  Beauregard,  who  had  lately  assumed  command  of  the  defenses 
of  that  river,  that  General  Albert  Sidney  Johnston  ordered  Van  Dorn  to  move 
his  army  to  within  supporting  distance  of  Beauregard.  This  Van  Dorn  began 
to  do  on  the  17th  of  March,  on  which  day  he  wrote  to  General  Johnston  that 
he  would  soon  "  relieve  Beauregard  by  giving  battle  to  the  enemy  near  New 
Madrid,"  or,  by  marching  "boldly  and  rapidly  toward  St.  Louis,  between 
Ironton  and  the  enemy's  grand  depot  at  Rolla." 

While  he  was  executing  this  plan,  and  while  the  greater  part  of  the  army 
that  had  survived  Elkhorn  was  on  the  march  across  the  mountains  of  North 
Arkansas  toward  Jacksonport,  Van  Dorn  was  suddenly  ordered  by  General 
Johnston  on  the  23d  of  March  to  move  his  entire  command  by  "  the  best  and 
most  expeditious  route"  to  Memphis.  His  forces,  to  which  he  had  given  the 
name  of  "the  Army  of  the  West,"  were  accordingly  concentrated  in  all  haste 
at  Des  Arc,  on  the  White  River,  whence  they  were  to  take  boats  for  Memphis. 
The  first  division  of  this  army,  to  the  command  of  which  General  Price 
had  been  assigned,  was  the  first  to  move,  Little's  Missouri  Brigade  embark 
ing  on  the  8th  of  April  for  Memphis,  just  as  Pope  was  taking  possession 
of  Island  Xo.  10,  and  Beauregard  was  leading  Johnston's  army  back  to 
Corinth  from  the  fateful  field  of  Shiloh. 


S  v^ 

)     .  1       XL2.        YJlKiVjJi^*'^  -     .  ^-»rf-* -- V_  • 


OFF    TO    THE    WAR. 


IN  COMMAND  IN   MISSOURI. 

BY  JOHN  C.  FREMONT,  MAJOR-GENERAL,  U.  8.  A. 

AT  the  outbreak  of  the  war,  in  the  spring  of  '61,  being  then  in  England,  I 
-£JL  offered  my  services  to  the  Government,  and  was  appointed  one  of  the 
four  major-generals  of  the  regular  army.  General  McClellan  and  myself  were 
commissioned  of  even  date,  ranking  next  after  General  Scott.  On  my  arrival 
I  reported  to  the  President,  using  a  few  days  to  arrange  in  some  order  the 
business  which  had  carried  me  abroad.  There  was  great  confusion  and  indeci 
sion  in  affairs,  and  the  people  in  power  were  slow  to  realize  the  actuality  of 
war ;  it  was  long  before  they  realized  its  magnitude.  Several  commands  in  the 
East  were  suggested  to  me,  but  I  preferred  the  West,  which  I  knew,  and  I  held 
the  opinion  that  the  possession  of  the  immediate  valley  of  the  Mississippi 
river  would  control  the  result  of  the  war.  Who  held  the  Mississippi  would 
hold  the  country  by  the  heart. 

A  command  was  agreed  upon  between  President  Lincoln,  Montgomery 
Blair,  his  Postmaster-General,  who  was  a  graduate  of  West  Point,  and 
myself,  of  which  the  great  object  was  the  descent  of  the  Mississippi  river. 
Necessary  to  this  was  first  the  firm  possession  of  the  State  of  Missouri,  freed 
and  protected  from  the  secession  forces  within  and  around  it.  In  pursuance 
of  this  plan  "  The  Western  Department "  was  created,  comprehending,  with 
Illinois,  the  states  and  territories  west  of  the  Mississippi  river  to  the  Rocky 
Mountains,  including  New  Mexico.  For  reasons  not  wholly  military,  the 
President  reserved  the  State  of  Kentucky,  but  assured  me  that  so  soon  as  I 
had  succeeded  in  raising  and  organizing  an  army  for  the  descent  of  the 
Mississippi  river,  he  would  extend  my  command  over  that  State  and  the  left 
bank  of  the  Mississippi. 

The  President  had  gone  carefully  over  with  me  the  subject  of  my  intended 
campaign,  and  this  with  the  single  desire  to  find  out  what  was  best  to  do  and 


278 


IN  COMMAND  IN  MISSOURI.  279 

how  to  do  it.  This  he  did  in  the  unpretending  and  kindly  manner  which 
invited  suggestion,  and  which  with  him  was  characteristic.  When  I  took 
leave  of  him  he  accompanied  me  down  the  stairs,  coming  out  to  the  steps  of 
the  portico.  I  asked  him  then  if. there  was  anything  further  in  the  way 
of  instruction  that  he  wished  to  say  to  me.  "  No,"  he  answered.  "  I  have 
given  you  carte  blanche.  You  must  use  your  own  judgment  and  do  the 
best  you  can.  I  doubt  if  the  states  will  ever  come  back." 

Governor  Yates,  of  Illinois,  then  in  Washington,  informed  me  fully  of  the 
unarmed  and  unprepared  condition  of  the  West.  I  immediately  began  a 
search  for  arms  at  Washington,  and  out  of  those  at  hand  was  able  to  obtain 
an  order  for  only  seven  thousand  stand. 

Arriving  at  New  York,  I  found  that  the  order  for  the  seven  thousand 
stand  of  arms  had  been  countermanded.  Upon  my  complaint  to  Washing 
ton,  and  through  the  personal  interposition  of  the  President,  Major  Peter 
V.  Hagner  was  sent  to  aid  me  in  procuring  what  I  judged  immediately 
necessary  for  my  department.  With  him  I  arranged  for  gathering  from 
various  arsenals  and  forwarding  to  St.  Louis  arms  and  equipments  for 
23,000  men.  This  detained  me  some  weeks  in  New  York.  Before  leaving, 
I  telegraphed  to  Lieutenant-General  Scott,  to  ask  if  he  had  any  instructions 
to  give  me.  He  replied  that  he  had  none. 

At  Philadelphia  we  heard  the  news  of  the  disaster  of  Bull  Bun.  On 
the  25th  of  July  I  reached  St.  Louis,  and  at  the  start  I  found  myself  in  an 
enemy's  country,  the  enemy's  flag  displayed  from  houses  and  recruiting 
offices.  St.  Louis  was  in  sympathy  with  the  South,  and  the  State  of  Mis 
souri  was  in  active  rebellion  against  the  national  authority.  The  Bull  Run 
defeat  had  been  a  damaging  blow  to  the  prestige  of  the  Union. 

In  this  condensed  sketch  I  can  give  only  the  strong  outline  of  the  threaten 
ing  situation  I  found,  and,  in  part,  the  chief  measures  I  adopted  to  convert 
our  defensive  position  into  one  that  was  vigorously  offensive,  going  into  detail 
only  enough  to  show  some  of  the  difficulties  that  beset  me. 

There  was  a  wide  difference  between  the  situation  here  and  that  at  Wash 
ington.  The  army  of  the  East  was  organized  under  the  eyes  of  the  President 
and  Congress ;  in  the  midst  of  loyal  surroundings  and  loyal  advisers  where 
there  was  no  need  to  go  outside  of  prescribed  military  usage,  or  to  assume 
responsibilities.  But  in  Missouri  all  operations  had  to  be  initiated  in  the 
midst  of  upturned  and  revolutionary  conditions  and  a  rebellious  people, 
where  all  laws  were  set  at  defiance.  In  addition  to  the  bodies  of  armed  men 
that  swarmed  over  the  State,  a  Confederate  force  of  nearly  50,000  men  was 
already  on  the  Southern  frontier:  Pillow,  with  12,000,  advancing  upon 
Cairo ;  Thompson,  with  5000,  upon  Girardeau ;  Hardee,  with  5000,  upon  Iron- 
ton  ;  and  Price,  with  an  estimated  force  of  25,000,  upon  Lyon,  at  Springfield. 
Their  movement  was  intended  to  overrun  Missouri,  and,  supported  by  a 
friendly  population  of  over  a  million,  to  seize  upon  St.  Louis  and  make  that 
city  a  center  of  operations  for  the  invasion  of  the  loyal  States. 

To  meet  this  advancing  force  I  had  23,000  men  of  all  arms.  Of  this  only 
some  15,000  were  available,  the  remainder  being  three-months  men  whose 


280  IN  COMMAND  IN  MISSOURI. 

term  of  service  was  expiring.  General  John  Pope  was  fully  occupied  in  North 
Missouri  with  nearly  all  my  disposable  force,  which  was  required  to  hold  in 
check  rebellion  in  that  quarter.  For  the  defense  of  Cairo  B.  M.  Prentiss  had 
8  regiments,  but  6  were  three-months  men,  at  the  end  of  their  term,  unpaid, 
and  unwilling  to  reenlist.  At  Springfield  General  Lyon  had  about  6000 
men,  unpaid  and  badly  fed,  and  in  need  of  clothing.  In  this  condition  he 
was  in  hourly  expectation  of  being  attacked  by  the  enemy,  who  was  advanc 
ing  in  three  times  his  nominal  strength. 

This  was  the  situation  to  be  met  at  the  outset.  The  arms  and  equipments 
for  23,000  men  which  I  had  gathered  at  New  York  I  now  found  had  been 
diverted  from  my  department  and  sent  to  Virginia.  I  had  no  money  and 
the  Government  no  credit ;  but  the  chief  difficulty  was  the  want  of  arms. 
There  was  no  want  of  men.  The  loyal  population  of  the  North-western 
States  flocked  to  the  Union  standard ;  the  German  population  with  a  noble 
unanimity. 

Having  these  conditions  to  face,  on  the  26th  of  July  I  telegraphed  my  needs 
to  Montgomery  Blair,  whom  I  had  known  intimately.  In  reply  he  telegraphed, 
"I  find  it  impossible  to  get  any  attention  to  Missouri  or  Western  matters 
from  the  authorities  here.  You  will  have  to  do  the  best  you  can  and  take 
all  needful  responsibility  to  defend  and  protect  the  people  over  whom  you 
are  specially  set."  Two  days  afterward  Secretary  Seward  telegraphed  to  ask 
what  disposition  I  had  made  of  the  arms  I  had  purchased  in  Europe,  asking 
for  an  invoice.  I  telegraphed  him  that  I  needed  to  use  these  arms  for  my 
department,  that  I  had  absolutely  no  arms,  and  that  the  situation  of  the  State 
was  critical.  On  the  30th  I  sent  to  the  President,  as  had  been  arranged,  an 
unofficial  letter  setting  forth  the  condition  of  my  command.  I  informed  him 
that  the  treasurer  of  the  United  States  at  St.  Louis  had  $300,000  entirely 
unappropriated,  but  had  refused  my  request  for  $100,000  to  be  delivered  to 
my  paymaster-general.  I  said  to  him  that  there  were  three  courses  open  to 
me  :  "First,  to  let  the  enemy  possess  himself  of  some  of  the  strongest  points 
in  the  State  and  threaten  St.  Louis,  which  is  insurrectionary ;  second,  to  force 
a  loan  from  the  secession  banks  here ;  third,  to  use  the  money  belonging  to 
the  Government  which  is  in  the  treasury.  .  .  .  This  morning  I  will  order 
the  treasurer  to  deliver  the  money  in  his  possession  to  General  Andrews  and 
will  send  a  force  to  the  treasury  to  take  the  money,  and  will  direct  such 
payments  as  the  exigency  requires.  I  will  hazard  everything  for  the  defense 
of  the  department  you  have  confided  to  me,  and  I  trust  to  you  for  support." 
To  the  propositions  of  this  letter  the  President  gave  the  tacit  approval  of  not 
replying,  and  I  acted  upon  it. 

I  had  no  time  to  lose.  The  situation  of  Lyon  at  Springfield  was  critical,  and 
the  small  disintegrating  garrison  at  Cairo  was  hourly  exposed  to  assault  by 
an  overpowering  force.  Among  the  various  points  threatened,  Cairo  was  the 
key  to  the  success  of  my  operations.  The  waterways  and  the  district  around 
Cairo  were  of  first  importance.  Upon  the  possession  of  this  district  depended 
the  descent  and  control  of  the  Mississippi  Valley  by  the  Union  armies,  or 
the  inroad  by  the  Confederate  forces  into  the  loyal  States. 


IN  COMMAND  IN  MISSOURI. 


281 


I  now  sent  within  the  Con 
federate  lines  a  capable  en 
gineer  officer  possessed  of  the 
necessary  military  knowledge, 
with  instructions  to  go  into 
the  States  of  Kentucky  and 
Tennessee  to  observe  the  situ 
ation  of  the  enemy,  ascertain 
his  strength  and  probable 
plans,  and  make  rough  maps 
of  important  localities  occu 
pied  by  troops  or  likely  to  be. 
Five  days  after  my  arrival, 
hearing  that  Pillow  was  mov 
ing  upon  Cairo,  I  left  St. 
Louis  for  that  place,  with  all 
my  available  force,  3800  men. 
I  distributed  my  command 
over  a  transport  fleet  of  eight 
large  steamboats,  in  order  to 
create  in  the  enemy  an  im 
pression  of  greater  strength 
than  I  possessed.  I  found  the 
garrison  demoralized.  From 
the  chief  of  artillery  I  learned 
there  were  only  about  six  hundred  effective  men  under  arms.  These  troops 
had  enlisted  for  three  months,  which  had  now  expired.  They  had  not  been 
paid,  and  there  was  much  sickness  among  them.  The  reenforcement  I 
brought,  and  such  assurances  as  I  was  able  to  give,  restored  confidence ;  and 
I  prevailed  on  one  of  the  garrison  regiments  to  remain. 

Cairo  was  the  most  unhealthy  post  within  my  command.  Fever  and  dysen 
tery  were  prevailing.  The  roomy,  shaded  decks  and  convenient  cabins  of  the 
large  steamboats  which  brought  the  reinforcements,  and  the  breeze  from  the 
water  blowing  through  them,  were  in  strong  contrast  with  the  steaming  heat 
of  the  low,  moist  grounds  of  Cairo.  This  suggested  the  idea  of  floating  hospi 
tals.  Before  the  sun  went  down  the  greater  number  of  the  sick  were  earned  to 
one  of  the  roomiest  boats,  thus  securing  good  ventilation  and  perfect  drainage. 
The  sudden  relief  of  Cairo  and  the  exaggerated  form  in  which  the  news  of 
it  reached  Pillow  had  the  intended  effect.  He  abandoned  his  proposed  attack, 
and  gave  time  to  put  it  effectually  beyond  reach  of  the  enemy,  and  eventually 
to  secure  a  firm  hold  on  the  whole  of  that  important  district. 

Having  secured  the  initial  point  in  my  campaign,  I  returned  to  St.  Louis  on 
August  4th.  Meantime  I  had  ordered  Stevenson's  7th  Missouri  regiment 
from  Boonville,  and  Montgomery's  Kansas  regiment  near  Leavenworth,  to 
the  support  of  Lyon  at  Springfield.  Amidst  incessant  and  conflicting 
demands,  my  immediate  care  was  to  provide  aid  for  him. 


MAJOK-GEXERAL    FRANCIS   P.    BLAIK,  JR.      FROM  A  PHOTOGRAPH. 


282  IN  COMMAND  IN  MISSOURI. 

Governor  Oliver  P.  Morton,  of  Indiana,  answering  my  urgent  request  for 
troops,  telegraphed  that  if  leave  were  granted  from  Washington  he  would  send 
five  regiments  made  up  of  river  boatmen,  well  adapted  for  the  Mississippi 
expedition.  In  answer  to  my  request  they  were  ordered  to  me.  But  the 
order  was  changed,  and  instead  of  joining  me  they  were  sent  to  General 
Robert  Anderson,  then  in  command  at  Louisville.  The  same  day  I  asked 
Senator  Latham,  at  Washington,  to  aid  my  application  for  three  thousand 
men  from  California,  to  be  placed  at  El  Paso,  to  operate  against  Texas  troops 
moving  into  Arkansas.  On  the  5th  Marsh  reported  from  Girardeau  that  the 
enemy  was  close  upon  him,  5000  strong,  and  would  attack  him  before  morning. 
At  midnight  a  heavy  battery  of  6  twenty-four-pounders  and  1000  men  were 
embarked  to  his  aid  under  experienced  officers,  and  Prentiss  further  ree'nf orced 
him  from  below  the  same  morning. 

On  the  6th  General  Scott  telegraphed  me  that  he  had  ordered  all  the 
troops  out  of  New  Mexico,  and  directed  me  to  confer  immediately  with  the 
governor  of  Kansas,  and  arrange  for  the  safety  of  New  Mexico,  sending  two 
regiments  "  without  delay,"  as  the  first  detachment  would  leave  on  the  15th. 

On  the  9th  I  informed  the  Government  that  the  greater  part  of  the  old 
troops  were  going  out  of  service,  while  the  new  levies,  totally  unacquainted 
with  the  rudiments  of  military  training,  would  be  unmanageable  before  an 
enemy.  Therefore,  I  asked  authority  from  the  President  to  collect  through 
out  the  states  educated  officers  who  had  seen  service.  With  them  I  could 
make  a  framework  on  which  to  organize  an  army.  My  request  was  granted, 
and  I  acted  upon  it  at  once. 

On  the  10th  Prentiss  reported  from  Cairo  that  the  enemy  were  again  con 
centrating  and  intrenching  at  New  Madrid  about  ten  thousand  strong. 

Before  my  arrival  at  St.  Louis  General  Lyon  had  borne  a  decisive  and 
important  part  in  Missouri.  Together  with  Francis  P.  Blair,  the  younger,  he 
had  saved  Missouri  from  secession.  For  this  reason  I  had  left  his  movements 
to  his  own  discretion,  but  had  myself  made  every  possible  effort  to  reenforce 
him.  The  defeat  at  Bull  Run  had  made  a  change  in  affairs  from  that  which 
was  existing  when  General  Lyon  left  Boonville  for  Springfield  on  the  5th  of 
July.  To  any  other  officer  in  his  actual  situation,  I  should  have  issued  per 
emptory  orders  to  fall  back  upon  the  railroad  at  Rolla. 

On  the  6th  I  had  sent  an  officer  by  special  engine  to  Rolla,  with  dispatches 
for  Lyon,  and  for  news  of  him.  In  his  letter  of  August  9th,  the  day  before 
the  battle,  Lyon  states,  in  answer  to  mine  of  the  6th,  that  he  was  unable  to 
determine  whether  he  could  maintain  his  ground  or  would  have  to  retire.  At 
a  council  of  war  a  fortnight  before  the  battle,  the  opinion  of  his  officers  was 
unanimous  for  retreating  upon  Rolla. 

On  the  13th  news  reached  me  of  the  battle  fought  at  Wilson's  Creek  on 
the  10th  between  about  6000  Union  troops,  under  Lyon,  and  a  greatly  superior 
force  under  Price  and  McCulloch.  I  was  informed  that  General  Lyon  had  been 
killed,  and  that  the  Union  troops  under  Sigel  were  retreating  unmolested  upon 
Rolla.  In  telegraphing  a  report  of  the  battle  to  Washington,  I  informed  the 
Department  of  the  need  of  some  organized  force  to  repel  the  enemy,  reported 


IN  COMMAND  IN  MISSOURI.  283 

to  be  advancing  on  other  points  in  considerable  strength.  I  again  asked  the 
Secretary  of  War  for  Groesbeck's  39th  Ohio  regiment,  and  to  order  from 
the  governors  of  Indiana,  Illinois,  and  Wisconsin  their  disposable  force. 
I  informed  him  that  we  were  badly  in  want  of  field  artillery  and  that  few 
small-arms  had  arrived.  I  also  asked  the  President  to  read  my  dispatches. 

Dissensions  in  the  camp  of  the  enemy  prevented  them  from  using  their 
success,  and  I  made  and  pushed  forward  as  rapidly  as  possible  dispositions 
for  the  defense  of  the  city  and  State.  I  reenforced  Rolla,  which  was  the 
receiving-place  for  troops  destined  for  the  South-west.  The  plan  of  defense 
adopted  was  to  fortify  Girardeau  and  the  termini  of  the  railroads  at  Iron- 
ton,  Rolla,  and  Jefferson  City,  with  St.  Louis  as  a  base ;  holding  these  places 
with  sufficient  garrisons  and  leaving  the  army  free  for  operations  in  the  field. 
These  points  I  connected  by  telegraph  lines  centering  at  headquarters.  St. 
Louis  was  the  base  and  center  of  operations  and  depot  of  reserves.  Six 
thousand  men,  working  night  and  day,  were  employed  upon  the  fortifications, 
which  commanded  the  city  itself,  as  well  as  the  surrounding  country,  upon  a 
line  of  about  ten  miles.  All  the  railroads  entering  the  city  I  connected  at 
one  depot,  more  cars  were  added,  and  on  twenty-four  hours'  notice  10,000 
men  could  have  been  moved  upon  them  from  any  one  point  to  the  opposite 
side  of  the  State. 

The  officer  who  had  been  sent  within  the  Confederate  lines  had  returned, 
bringing  important  information  concerning  the  position  of  the  enemy, 
together  with  the  rough  maps  required,  indicating,  among  other  points,  the 
positions  of  Forts  Henry  and  Donelsoii,  then  in  course  of  construction.  I 
sent  him  back  immediately  to  make  examinations  of  the  Tennessee  and  Cum 
berland  with  reference  to  the  use  of  those  rivers  by  gun-boats,  and  also  to 
watch  the  enemy's  moves  toward  the  Cairo  district. 

In  answer  to  my  appeal  to  the  loyal  governors  for  troops,  regiment  after 
regiment  arrived  at  St.  Louis  from  the  whole  North-west,  but  they  were 
entirely  without  tents  or  camp  equipage.  The  chief  quartermaster  of  my 
department  was  an  officer  of  the  regular  army,  Major  McKinstry,  experienced, 
able,  and  energetic.  But  there  were  no  supplies  on  hand,  of  any  kind,  to  meet 
the  necessities  of  the  troops  arriving  without  notice,  and  entirely  unpro 
vided.  In  this  exigency  he  made  requisition  on  the  head  of  his  department 
in  Washington,  but  was  informed  in  reply  that  the  department  could  not 
meet  the  requisitions  that  were  being  made  by  the  Army  of  the  Potomac ; 
that  the  preservation  of  the  capital  was  deemed  of  more  importance  than  the 
State  of  Missouri ;  that  their  entire  time  and  attention  was  devoted  to  meet 
ing  requisitions  made  upon  them;  that  General  Fremont  had  full  power, 
and  that  he,  as  Fremont's  chief  quartermaster,  must  use  his  own  judgment 
and  do  the  best  he  could  toward  meeting  the  wants  of  the  department. 

In  July,  at  Washington,  the  subject  of  mortar-boats  for  the  Mississippi 
expedition  had  been  discussed  between  G-eneral  M.  C.  Meigs,  Gustavus  V. 
Fox,  afterward  the  Assistant  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  and  myself,  and  had 
been  referred  to  me  for  decision,  as  having  in  charge  military  operations 
on  the  Mississippi.  On  the  31st  of  July  the  Secretary  of  War  directed 


284 


IN  COMMAND  IN  MISSOURI. 


that  the  16  nine-inch  guns  made 
at  Pittsburg  for  the  navy  should 
be  forwarded  to  me  with  the  great 
est  dispatch,  and  that  30  thirteen- 
inch  mortars  be  made  as  soon  as 
possible  and  forwarded  to  me,  to 
gether  with  shells  for  both  guns 
and  mortars.  On  the  24th  of 
August  I  directed  the  construction 
of  38  mortar-boats,  and  later  of  8 
steam-tugs  to  move  them,  and  the 
purchase  and  alteration  into  gun 
boats  of  two  strongly  built  river 
vessels, — the  New  Era,  a  large 
ferry-boat,  and  the  Submarine,  a 
powerful  snag-boat ;  they  were  re 
named  Essex  and  Ben  ton.  At  my 
suggestion  and  order,  the  sides  of 
all  these  vessels  were  to  be  clad 
with  iron.  On  the  3d  of  September 
General  Meigs  advised  me  to  order 
from  Pittsburg  fifteen-inch  guns 
for  my  gun-boats,  as  "able  to  empty 
any  battery  the  enemy  could  make." 
Work  on  these  gun-boats  was  driv 
en  forward  night  and  day.  As  in 
the  case  of  the  fortifications,  the 
work  was  carried  on  by  torchlight. 

August  25th  an  expedition  was 
ordered  under  Colonel  G.  Waagner 
with  one  regiment,  accompanied 
by  Commander  John  Eodgers  with 
two  gun-boats,  to  destroy  the  enemy's  fortifications  that  were  being  con 
structed  at  Belmont.  [See  map,  page  263.] 

August  28th  I  assigned  Brigadier-General  U.  S.  Grant  to  the  command  of 
South-east  Missouri,  with  headquarters  at  Cairo.  He  was  fully  instructed 
concerning  the  actual  and  intended  movements  on  the  Mississippi  and  the 
more  immediate  movements  upon  the  Kentucky  shore,  together  with  the 
intention  to  hold  the  mouths  of  the  Tennessee  and  Cumberland  rivers.  In  his 
written  instructions  General  Grant  was  directed  to  act  in  concert  with  Com 
mander  Rodgers  and  Colonel  Waagner,  and  to  take  possession  of  points 
threatened  by  the  Confederates  on  the  Missouri  and  Kentucky  shores. 

August  31st  Captain  Neustadter  was  ordered  to  Cairo,  to  select  a  site  opposite 
Paducah  for  a  battery  to  command  the  mouth  of  the  Tennessee  river. 

September  4th  I  sent  heavy  guns  and  an  artillery  officer  to  Cairo,  where 
General  Grant  had  just  arrived  from  Girardeau.  I  telegraphed  the  President 
informing  him  that  the  enemy  was  beginning  to  occupy,  on  the  Kentucky 


BRIGADIER-GENERAL    NATHANIEL    LYON. 
FROM  A  PHOTOGRAPH. 


IN  COMMAND  IN  MISSOURI.  285 

shore,  every  good  point  between  Paducah  and  Hickman,  and  that  Paducah 
should  be  occupied  by  us.  I  asked  him  now  to  include  Kentucky  in  my 
command. 

September  5th  I  sent  to  General  .Grant  a  letter  of  instruction,  in  which  I 
required  him  to  push  forward  with  the  utmost  speed  all  work  on  the  point 
selected  on  the  Kentucky  shore  ten  miles  from  Paducah,  to  be  called  Fort 
Holt.  In  this  letter  I  directed  him  to  take  possession  of  Paducah  if  he  felt 
strong  enough  to  do  so ;  but  if  not,  then  to  plant  a  battery  opposite  Paducah 
on  the  Illinois  side  to  command  the  Ohio  River  and  the  mouth  of  the  Tennes 
see.  On  the  evening  of  the  day  on  which  this  letter  was  sent  to  General  Grant, 
the  officer  who  had  been  sent  by  me  within  the  Confederate  lines  reached 
Cairo  on  his  way  to  St.  Louis  to  let  me  know  that  the  enemy  was  advancing 
on  Paducah.  He  judged  it  right  to  inform  General  Grant,  urging  him  to  take 
Paducah  without  delay.  General  Grant  decided  to  do  so,  and  in  accordance 
with  his  instructions  of  the  28th  immediately  moved  on  Paducah  with  an 
adequate  force  and  two  gun-boats.  He  reached  the  town  on  the  morning  of 
the  6th,  having  only  about  six  hours'  advance  of  the  enemy.  Taking  undis 
puted  possession,  he  returned  to  Cairo  the  same  day. 

In  answer  to  my  persistent  application  for  Colonel  C.  F.  Smith  he  was 
ordered  to  join  me,  having  meantime  been  made  by  the  President  a  brigadier- 
general  at  my  special  request.  I  at  once  sent  him  forward  to  the  command  I 
had  designed  for  him, — Paducah  and  the  Kentucky  shore  of  the  Mississippi. 
His  letter  of  instructions  made  known  to  him  all  the  previous  measures  taken 
to  hold  the  Kentucky  shore  and  the  mouths  of  the  Tennessee  and  Cumber 
land.  The  execution  of  this  part  of  my  plans  broke  in  upon  the  Confederate 
lines,  drove  them  back,  and  dispersed  their  combinations  for  transferring  the 
war  to  the  loyal  States. 

I  now  on  the  8th  of  September  wrote  to  the  President,  giving  him  in  the 
following  extract  the  general  features  of  my  plan  of  campaign  : 

.  .  .  .  "As  the  rebel  forces  outnumber  ours,  and  the  counties  of  Kentucky  between 
the  Mississippi  and  Tennessee  rivers,  as  well  as  those  along  the  latter  and  the  Cumberland, 
are  strongly  secessionist,  it  becomes  imperatively  necessary  to  have  the  cooperation  of  the 
loyal  Union  forces  under  Generals  Anderson  and  Nelson,  as  well  as  of  those  already  encamped 
opposite  Louisville,  under  Colonel  Rousseau.  I  have  reenforced,  yesterday,  Paducah  with  two 
regiments,  and  will  continue  to  strengthen  the  position  with  men  and  artillery.  As  soon  as 
General  Smith,  who  commands  there,  is  reenforced  sufficiently  to  enable  him  to  spread  his 
forces,  he  will  have  to  take  and  hold  Mayfield  and  Lovelaceville,  to  be  in  the  rear  and  flank  of 
Columbus,  and  to  occupy  Smithland,  controlling  in  this  way  the  mouths  of  both  the  Tennessee 
and  the  Cumberland  rivers.  At  the  same  time  Colonel  Rousseau  should  bring  his  force,  in 
creased  if  possible,  by  two  Ohio  regiments,  in  boats  to  Henderson,  and,  taking  the  Henderson 
and  Nashville  railroad,  occupy  Hopkinsville :  while  General  Nelson  should  go  with  a  force  of 
five  thousand  by  railroad  to  Louisville,  and  from  there  to  Bowling  Green.  As  the  population  in 
all  the  counties  through  which  the  above  railroads  pass  are  loyal,  this  movement  could  be  made 
without  delay  or  molestation  to  the  troops.  Meanwhile  General  Grant  would  take  possession 
of  the  entire  Cairo  and  Fulton  railroad,  Piketon,  New  Madrid,  and  the  shore  of  the  Mississippi 
opposite  Hickman  and  Columbus.  The  foregoing  disposition  having  been  effected,  a  combined 
attack  will  be  made  upon  Columbus,  and,  if  successful  in  that,  upon  Hickman.  while  Rousseau 
and  Nelson  will  move  in  concert  by  railroad  to  Nashville,  Tenn.,  occupying  the  State  capital, 
and.  with  an  adequate  force,  New  Providence.  The  conclusion  of  this  movement  would  be  a 
combined  advance  toward  Memphis,  on  the  Mississippi,  as  well  as  the  Memphis  and  Ohio  railroad." 


286 


IN  COMMAND  IN  MISSOURI. 


Meantime  the  untoward  and  obstructing  conduct  of  the  people  of  Missouri 
had  decided  me  to  assert  the  power  of  the  Government.  Accordingly,  on 
the  30th  of  August,  I  issued  a  proclamation  affixing  penalties  to  rebellion 
and  extending  martial  law  over  the  State  of  Missouri.  By  this  proclamation 
the  property  of  persons  in  rebellion  against  the  United  States  was  held  to 
be  confiscated,  and  their  slaves  were  declared  free.  As  a  war  measure  this, 
in  my  opinion,  was  equal  to  winning  a 
deciding  battle.  The  President  disap 
proved  it,  as  likely  to  lose  us  Kentucky, 
the  loyalty  of  which  was  so  strained  and 
the  temper  of  which  was  so  doubtful, 
that  he  had  agreed  to  the  neutral  atti 
tude  Kentucky  demanded.  He  desired 
me  to  withdraw  it  as  of  my  own  motion. 
Unwilling  to  put  myself  in  this  position, 
I  asked  him  to  order  it  withdrawn,  which 
he  did.  Shortly  following  upon  this  act,  I 
was  in  many  ways  made  to  feel  the  with 
drawal  from  me  of  the  confidence  and 
support  of  the  Administration,  but,  ac 
ceding  to  strong  representations  from 
leading  citizens  of  St.  Louis,  I  did  not 
resign  my  command. 

I  had  already  been  brought  into  col 
lision  with  the  intrigues  of  men  who  were 
in  confidential  relations  with  the  President,  and  the  occasion  was  promptly 
seized  by  them  to  urge  misrepresentations  which  were  readily  accepted 
as  reasons  for  my  removal.  The  visits  of  high  officers  charged  with  inquiry 
into  the  affairs  of  my  department,  and  the  simultaneous  and  sustained 
attacks  of  leading  journals,  accumulated  obstructions  and  weakened  my 
authority.  In  fact,  my  command  at  the  end  of  August  had  virtually 
existed  little  over  a  month ;  but  the  measures  which  I  had  initiated  had 
already  taken  enduring  shape,  and  eventually  worked  their  intended  result. 

The  inadequate  space  to  which  I  am  restricted  compels  me  to  pass  over 
here  the  circumstances  which  made  inevitable  the  loss  of  Lexington,  upon 
which  Price  advanced  after  his  victory  at  Wilson's  Creek.  All  possible  efforts 
were  made  to  relieve  Colonel  Mulligan,  but,  notwithstanding  the  large  concen 
tration  of  troops  for  his  relief,  these  efforts  were  baffled  by  absolute  want  of 
transportation  and  by  river  obstructions.  To  the  Confederate  general  it  was 
a  barren  success,  and  he  was  shortly  forced  to  retreat  to  the  south-west.  As 
a  military  position  Lexington  was  of  110  value  to  him.  In  the  midst  of  the 
demand  for  troops  for  Lexington,  I  was  011  the  14th  ordered  by  General  Scott 
to  "  send  five  thousand  well-armed  infantry  to  Washington  without  a  moment's 
delay."  Two  thousand  were  sent. 

At  the  end  of  September  I  left  St.  Louis  to  take  the  field  against  Price.  The 
army  numbered  38,000  men.  To  complete  the  defenses  of  St.  Louis,  after 


MAJOR-GENERAL    FUANZ    SIGKL. 
FROM   A  rilOTOdUAPH. 


IN  COMMAND  IN  MISSOURI.  287 

the  advance  of  the  army,  I  left  5  regiments  of  infantry,  with  1  battalion  of 
cavalry,  and  2  batteries  of  field  artillery.  The  five  divisions  which  com 
posed  it  were  assigned  positions,  their  lines  of  march  converging  to  Spring 
field;  and  in  the  beginning  of  October  I  moved  against  Price.  Transportation 
and,  consequently,  supplies  were  very  inadequate ;  but  in  exigencies  an  army 
sometimes  moves  without  either.  The  September  rains  were  over ;  the  fine 
weather  of  the  Indian  summer  had  come ;  the  hay  was  gathered,  and  the  corn 
was  hardening,  and  we  were  about  to  carry  out  the  great  object  of  the  cam 
paign  with  fewer  hardships  from  exposure,  and  fewer  impediments  from 
want  of  transport,  than  could  have  been  expected  at  any  other  season.  The 
spirit  of  the  army  was  high.  A  finer  body  of  men  could  not  have  been 
brought  together,  and  we  had  every  reason  to  believe  that  the  campaign 
would  open  with  a  signal  victory  in  the  defeat  or  dispersion  of  the  enemy, 
with  a  move  on  Memphis  as  the  immediate  result.  Had  I  possessed  means 
of  transport  when  Price  moved  on  Lexington  I  should  have  compelled  him 
to  give  me  battle  on  the  north  side  of  the  Osage ;  as  he  could  not  cross  the 
Missouri  without  exposing  himself  to  certain  defeat,  no  other  course  would 
have  remained  open  to  him.  In  fact,  when  I  did  go  forward,  the  appearance 
of  my  advance  at  Sedalia  was  the  signal  for  his  precipitate  retreat.  The 
first  contact  now  with  the  enemy  was  at  Fredericktown  and  Springfield, — the 
former  one  of  the  most  admirably  conducted  engagements  of  the  war,  and  the 
latter  action  a  glorious  victory.  Along  the  whole  extent  of  our  lines  we 
were  uniformly  successful  against  the  enemy. 

At  the  end  of  October  I  was  in  Springfield  with  21,000  effective  men. 
Price  had  terminated  his  retreat,  and  his  movements  showed  that  he  had 
decided  to  offer  battle.  This  was  confirmed  by  information  obtained  from 
his  headquarters  that  the  Missourians  were  refusing  to  leave  the  State. 

Recognizing  the  rights  of  humanity,  and  remembering  that  this  conflict  was 
among  our  own  people,  and  that  the  whole  State  of  Missouri  was  a  battle-field, 
General  Price  and  myself  had  been  engaged  in  arranging  the  terms  of  a  con 
vention  which  was  concluded  and  signed  by  us  on  the  1st  of  November.  It 
provided :  1st,  for  an  exchange  of  prisoners,  hitherto  refused  by  our  Govern 
ment  ;  2d,  that  guerrilla  fighting  should  be  suppressed,  and  the  war  confined 
to  the  organized  armies  in  the  field ;  3d,  that  there  should  be  no  arrests  for 
opinion,  the  preservation  of  order  being  left  to  the  State  courts. 

Generals  Asboth  and  Sigel,  division  commanders,  now  reported  that  the 
enemy's  advance-guard  was  at  Wilson's  Creek,  nine  miles  distant,  several 
thousand  strong ;  his  main  body  occupying  the  roads  in  the  direction  of  Cass- 
ville,  at  which  place  General  Price  had  his  headquarters  with  his  reserves. 
On  November  2d  the  dispositions  for  the  expected  battle  were  being  planned, 
when  late  in  the  evening  a  messenger  arrived  bearing  an  order  from  General 
Scott  which  removed  me  from  my  command.  This  order  had  been  hurried 
forward  by  General  Hunter,  who  superseded  me,  and  who  was  behind  with 
his  division.  The  next  day,  Hunter  not  arriving,  the  plan  of  battle  was 
agreed  on,  the  divisions  were  assigned  conformably,  and  in  the  evening 
the  troops  began  to  occupy  their  positions.  About  10  o'clock  at  night 


288 


IN  COMMAND  IN  MISSOURI. 


Hunter  arrived  at  my 
headquarters,  where  the 
officers  were  assembled. 
I  handed  to  him  the  plan 
of  battle  and  turned  over 
my  command. 

The  order  which  gave 
my  command  to  General 
Hunter  was  dated  Octo 
ber  24th,  and  had  been 
sent  to  one  of  my  sub 
ordinate  officers  in  St. 
Louis,  to  be  served  on 
me  at  his  discretion.  Ac 
companying  it  was  a 
letter  from  the  President 
in  which  he  directed  that 
it  should  not  be  served 
on  me  if  I  had  fought  a 
battle  or  was  about  to 
fight  one.  His  intention 
was  disregarded ;  the  or 
der  was  put  in  force 
when  both  ourselves 
and  the  enemy  were 
ready  and  intending  bat 
tle.  In  the  face  of  posi 
tive  knowledge,  General  Hunter  assumed  that  there  was  no  enemy  near 
and  no  battle  possible,  and  withdrew  the  army.  •& 

The  correctness  of  the  operations  in  this  campaign  to  meet  the  intended 
movements  of  the  enemy,  have  all  been  corroborated  and  proved  by  subse 
quent  information.  My  expenditures  to  raise  and  equip  this  army  wTere 
vindicated  and  sustained  by  decisions  of  the  United  States  courts.  The 
establishment  of  martial  law  at  St.  Louis,  which  was  denounced  as  arbitrary 
and  unnecessary,  was  maintained  and  acted  upon  by  all  my  successors  until 
peace  was  declared ;  and  the  fortifications  of  that  city,  upon  which  all  lines  of 
defense  rested,  aided  its  enforcement  and  made  the  dyke  between  the  North 
west  and  the  South.  The  taking  of  Paducah,  for  which  I  was  censured,  has 
since  been  made  the  pivot  of  success  to  others.  And  the  gun-boats,  for  the 
preparation  of  wThich,  also,  I  was  censured,  the  work  being  countermanded  as 
a  "  useless  extravagance,"  became  historic  in  the  progress  of  the  war. 


MAJOR-GENERAL    JOHN    C.    FREMONT.      FROM  A    STEEL    PLATE    IN 
POSSESSION    OF    MRS.     FREMONT. 


ty  In  support  of  the  facts,  I  quote  from  the 
report  of  General  McCulloch  to  his  Secretary  of 
War,  at  the  close  of  this  Missouri  campaign :  "We 
met  next  day  at  a  point  between  the  two  armies 
where  it  was  agreed  upon  by  all  the  Missouri  gen 
erals  that  we  should  wait  an  attack  from  the  enemy, 


the  ground  to  be  selected  by  General  Price  and 
myself."    Official  Kecords,  III.,  748.— J.  C.  F. 

Hunter's  withdrawal  was  in  pursuance  of  in 
structions  of  a  general  nature  from  President  Lin 
coln,  dated  October  24th,  1861,  and  accompanying 
the  orders  relieving  General  Fremont. —  EDITORS. 


WILSON'S  CREEK,  AND  THE  DEATH  OF  LYON. 

BY  WILLIAM    M.  WHERRY,   SIXTH   U.   8.   INFANTRY,    BREVET  BRIGADIER-GENERAL,   U.   8.  V., 
AT  WILSON'S   CREEK  AIDE-DE-CAMP  TO   GENERAL  LYON. 

A  BOUT  the  middle  of  July,  1861,  the  Army  of  the  Union  in 
-£^-  south-west  Missouri,  under  General  Nathaniel  Lyon,  was 
encamped  in  and  near  the  town  of  Springfield,  and  num 
bered  approximately  6200  men,  of  whom  about  500  were 
ill-armed  and  undisciplined  "  Home  Guards."     The  organ 
ized   troops   were   in   all   5868,  in  four  brigades.     By  the 
9th   of   August   these   were   reduced  to   an    aggregate   of 
about  5300  men,  with  the  500  Home  Guards   additional. 
Of  these   troops,  the   1st   Iowa  regiment  was  entitled  to 
discharge   on   the   14th  of  August,   and  the   3d  and  5th 
Missouri,   Sigel's   and   Salomon's,  at  different  periods,  by 
' -.y    companies,   from    the    9th    to    the    18th   of   August.     All 
except  the  regulars  had  been  enrolled  since  the  attack  on 
Sumter  in  April,  and  but  little  time  had  been  possible  for 
drill  and  instruction.     They  had  been  moved  and  marched 
from  St.  Louis  and  points  in  Kansas,  taking  part  in  sev 
eral  spirited  but  minor  engagements,  and  were  ill-provided  with  clothing  and 
food,  but  their  spirits  were  undaunted,  and  they  were  devoted  to  their  leader. 
The  latter  part  of  July  was   spent  by  Lyon  in  drilling  his  troops  and 
procuring  supplies,  the  mills  in  the  neighborhood  having  been  seized  and 
employed  in  grinding  flour  for  the  troops.      He  continued  to  send  urgent 
appeals  to  St.  Louis  for  reinforcements. 

On  the  1st  of  August,  however,  having  received  information  of  an  advance 
by  the  enemy,  in  superior  numbers,  Lyon  moved  down  the  Fayetteville  road 
(also  known  as  the  Cassville  road)  to  meet  and  attack  the  largest  and  most 
advanced  force,  hoping  to  drive  it  back  and  then  strike  the  others  in  detail. 
A  lively  skirmish  with  Price's  advance-guard,  under  Rains,  took  place  at 
Dug  Springs  on  the  2d  of  August ;  and  on  the  3d  a  more  insignificant  affair 
occurred  with  the  rear-guard  of  Rains's  forces  at  McCullah's  farm,  which  had 
been  his  headquarters,  but  from  which  he  retired  without  resistance.  Here 
Lyon  became  convinced  he  was  being  drawn  farther  and  farther  from  his 
base,  without  supplies,  and  he  determined  to  fall  back  to  Springfield,  which 
place  he  reached  on  the  5th.  During  those  blistering  August  days  the  men 
marched  with  bleeding  feet  and  parched  lips,  Lyon  himself  urging  forward 
the  weary  and  footsore  stragglers. 

On  the  8th  a  march  in  force  was  planned  for  the  following  night,  to  make 
an  attack  on  the  enemy's  front  at  Wilson's  Creek  at  daylight.  From  this 
intention  General  Lyon  was  dissuaded,  after  having  called  together  the 
principal  officers  to  receive  their  instructions.  Many  of  the  troops  were 
exhausted,  and  all  were  tired ;  moreover,  some  supplies  having  arrived  from 

VOL.  I.     19  289 


290 


WILSON'S  CREEK,  AND   THE  DEATH  OF  LYON. 


E.B.Stort 


?|lfef 

TOTTEN'S  BAr?l\G*-#- 
position. 


§f;  StGFLS  BATTERY 

Imposition. 


NOTE  TO  THE  MAP. 

The  engagement  began  at  5 : 30  A.  M.,  Lyon's  ad 
vance  driving  Rains  over  Bloody  Hill.    Price's  line 
as  formed  to  confront  the  main  attack  by  Lyoii 
about  6 : 30  was,  from  left  to  right,  as  follows :  Mc- 
Bride,  Parsons  (with  Guibor's battery),  Clark,  Slack, 
and  Rains.    This  force  numbered  3168  men  with  4 
guns,  and  was  opposed  by  nearly  2000  men  with  10 
guns.    The  right  of  the  first  Union  line  was  held  by 
the  1st  Missouri ;  on  its  left  were  Totten's  battery. 
Osterhaus's  battalion,  the  1st  Kansas,  DuBois's  bat 
tery,  and  Steele's  battalion.    Later,  the  1st  Kansas 
was  relieved  by  the  1st  Iowa  (800),  and  the  1st  Mis 
souri  by  the  2d  Kansas  (600),  and  by  Steele.    This 
brought  the  Union  strength  at  this  point  up  to  3550. 
Meanwhile,  Hubert's  3d  Louisiana  and  Mclntosh's 
regiment   and   McRae's   battalion,  together  num 
bering  1320,  moved  down  from  their  encampment 
(marked  "  McCulloch's  bri 
gade"),    crossed   the   road, 
and  repulsed  Plunnner's  300 
in  the  corn-field,  but  were 
driven  back  by  DuBois's  bat 
tery.  By  this  hour  (8  o'clock) 
Sigel  had  attacked  on  the 
rear  and  had  driven  Church 
ill's   infantry    and    Grcer's 
and  Major's  cavalry  out  of 
their     camps.       McCulloch 
now  gathered   up   part  of 
the  3d  Louisiana  and  routed 
Sigel's  troops,  who  were  at 
Sharp's  farm.   He  was  aided 
in  this  by  the  fire  of  Reid's 
and      Bledsoe's      batteries. 
Woodruff's      battery      had 
from   the   start   chiefly  en 
gaged     Totten;    and     nov 
Churchill,  and  next  Greer's 
aud   Carroll's  cavalry,  and 
afterward     Gratiot's    regi 
ment  (of  Pearce's  brigade) 
were  conducted  to  the  aid 
of  Price,  raising  his  force 
to  4231),  exclusive  of  Greer 
and  Carroll,  who  had  been 
quickly  repulsed  by  Totten  ; 
Lyon's     being     as     above, 
3550,    exclusive    of    220    of 
Plummer's  and  350  of   the 
Mounted  Reserve.    General 
Lyoii  was  killed   at   10 : 30. 
just  as  Pearce's  fresh  regi 
ments   (under  Walker   and 
Dockery)  and  the  3d  Loui 
siana  were  coming  up.    At 
11 : 30   Major   Sturgis   with 
drew  the  Union  army,  which 
was  then  outnumbered  two 
to  one. 


BATTLE  OF 

WILSON'S  CREEK 

OR 

OAK  HILLS, 

AUGUST  1O™  7867. 
UNION     cowrcocffATE 


SIGEL' 

/srposition- 


WILSON'S  CREEK,  AND    THE  DEATH  OF  LYON.  291 

Rolla,  it  was  deemed  wise  to  clothe  and  shoe  the  men  as  far  as  practicable, 
and  to  give  them  another  day  for  recuperation. 

On  the  9th  it  was  intended  to  march  that  evening  with  the  whole  force 
united,  as  agreed  upon  the  8th,  and- attack  the  enemy's  left  at  daylight,  and 
Lyon's  staff  were  busied  in  visiting  the  troops  and  seeing  that  all  things  were 
in  order.  During  the  morning  Colonel  Sigel  visited  Lyon's  headquarters,  and 
had  a  prolonged  conference,  the  result  of  which  was  that  Colonel  Sigel  was 
ordered  to  detach  his  brigade,  the  3d  and  5th  Missouri,  one  six-gun  bat 
tery,  one  company  of  the  1st  U.  S.  Cavalry,  under  Captain  Eugene  A.  Carr, 
and  one  company  of  the  2d  Dragoons,  under  Lieutenant  Charles  E.  Farrand, 
for  an  attack  upon  the  enemy  from  the  south,  while  Lyon  with  the  remainder 
of  his  available  force  should  attack  on  the  north. 

The  troops  were  put  in  inarch  in  the  evening;  those  about  Springfield 
immediately  under  General  Lyon  moving  out  to  the  west  on  the  Little  York 
road  until  joined  by  Sturgis's  command  from  their  camps,  when  they  turned 
to  the  south  across  the  prairie.  The  head  of  the  main  column  reached  the 
point  where  the  enemy's  pickets  were  expected  to  be  found,  about  1  A.  M.,  and 
went  into  bivouac.  Sigel's  force,  consisting  of  1200  men  and  six  pieces  of 
artillery,  moved  four  miles  down  the  Fayetteville  road,  and  then,  making  a 
long  detour  to  the  left  by  a  by-road,  arrived  within  a  mile  of  the  enemy's 
camp  and  rear  at  daylight. 

In  the  vicinity  of  the  Fayetteville  road  crossing,  the  creek  acquires  con 
siderable  depth,  and  in  most  places  has  rough,  steep,  and  rather  high  banks, 
rendering  fording  difficult.  On  the  left  side  the  hills  assume  the  proportion 
of  bluffs ;  on  the  right  or  western  bank  the  ground  is  a  succession  of  broken 
ridges,  at  that  time  covered  for  the  most  part  with  trees  and  a  stunted  growth 
of  scrub  oaks  with  dense  foliage,  which  in  places  became  an  almost  impene 
trable  tangle.  Rough  ravines  and  deep  gullies  cut  up  the  surface. 

The  Confederates  were  under  command  of  General  Ben.  McCulloch.  On 
the  west  side  of  the  stream,  "  Old  Pap "  Price,  with  his  sturdy  Missourians, 
men  who  in  many  later  battles  bore  themselves  with  a  valor  and  determina 
tion  that  won  the  plaudits  of  their  comrades  and  the  admiration  of  their 
foes,  was  holding  the  point  south  of  Wilson's  Creek,  selected  by  Lyon  for 
attack.  Price's  command  consisted  of  five  bodies  of  Missourians,  under  Slack, 
Clark,  Parsons,  McBride,  and  Rains,  the  last-named  being  encamped  farther 
up  the  stream.  On  the  bluffs  on  the  east  side  of  the  creek  were  Hebert's 
3d  Louisiana  and  Mclntosh's  Arkansas  regiment,  and,  farther  south,  Pearce's 
brigade  and  two  batteries,  while  other  troops,  under  Greer,  Churchill,  and 
Major,  were  in  the  valley  along  the  Fayetteville  road,  holding  the  extreme 
of  the  Confederate  position. 

Lyon  put  his  troops  in  motion  at  early  dawn  on  the  10th,  and  about  4 
o'clock  struck  Rains's  most  advanced  picket,  which  escaped  and  gave  warning 
of  the  attack,  of  which  General  Price  was  informed  just  as  he  was  about  to 
breakfast.  Captain  Plummer's  battalion  of  regular  infantry  was  the  advance, 
followed  by  Osterhaus's  two  companies  of  the  2cl  Missouri  Volunteers,  and 
Totten's  battery.  A  body  of  200  mounted  Home  Guards  was  on  Plummer's  left. 


292  WILSON'S  CREEK,  AND   THE  DEATH  OF  LYON. 

Having  reached  the  enemy's  pickets,  the  infantry  was  deployed  as  skirmish 
ers,  Plummer  to  the  left  and  Osterhaus  to  the  right,  and  Lieutenant-Colonel 
Andrews,  with  the  1st  Missouri  Infantry,  was  brought  up  in  support  of  the 
battery.  Advancing  a  mile  and  a  half  and  crossing  a  brook  tributary  to  the 
creek,  the  Union  skirmishers  met  and  pushed  the  Confederate  skirmishers  up 
the  slope.  This  disclosed  a  considerable  force  of  the  enemy,  along  a  ridge  per 
pendicular  to  the  line  of  march  and  to  the  valley  of  the  creek,  which  was 
attacked  by  the  1st  Missouri  and  the  1st  Kansas,  assisted  by  Totten's  battery, 
who  drove  back  the  Confederates  on  the  right  to  the  foot  of  the  slope  beyond. 

Plummer  on  the  left  early  became  separated  from  the  main  body  by  a  deep 
ravine  terminating  in  a  swampy  piece  of  ground,  beyond  which  lay  a  corn 
field  which  he  entered,  encountering  a  large  force,  the  main  part  of  which 
was  the  Louisiana  regiment.  These  troops  fought  with  determined  valor 
and  checked  Plummer's  progress.  DuBois's  battery  was  moved  up  to  a  hill 
on  the  left,  supported  by  Osterhaus's  battalion,  the  1st  Iowa,  and  the  2d  Kan 
sas,  and  opened  a  deadly  fire  with  shells  upon  the  corn-field,  with  such 
marked  effect  as  to  throw  the  Confederates  into  disorder  and  enable  Plum 
mer  to  draw  off  his  command  in  good  order  across  the  ravine. 

A  momentary  lull  occurred  at  this  time,  except  on  our  extreme  right,  where 
Price's  Missourians  opposed  the  1st  Missouri  and  attempted  to  turn  that  flank, 
but  the  2d  Kansas  by  its  timely  arrival  and  gallant  attack  bore  back  Price's 
overwhelming  numbers  and  saved  the  flank.  Meanwhile  Totten's  battery, 
which  had  been  brought  into  action  by  section  and  by  piece  as  the  conforma 
tion  of  the  ground  would  admit,  performed  extraordinary  service.  Steele's 
regular  infantry  was  added  to  its  support.  Price's  troops  had  fought  with 
great  bravery  and  determination,  advancing  and  retiring  two  or  three  times 
before  they  were  compelled  to  give  way  on  the  lower  slope  of  the  ridge  they 
had  occupied.  Many  times  the  firing  was  one  continuous  roar. 

The  lull  enabled  the  enemy  to  re-adjust  his  lines  and  bring  up  fresh  troops, 
having  accomplished  which,  Price  made  a  determined  advance  along  nearly 
the  whole  of  Lyon's  front.  He  charged  fiercely  in  lines  of  three  or  four 
ranks,  to  within  thirty  or  forty  yards,  pouring  in  a  galling  fire  and  directing 
his  most  determined  efforts  against  Totten's  battery,  for  which  Woodruff's, 
which  was  pitted  against  it,  was  no  match  at  all.  J 

Every  available  man  of  Lyon's  was  now  brought  into  action  and  the  bat 
tle  raged  with  redoubled  energy  on  both  sides.  For  more  than  an  hour  the 
balance  was  about  even,  one  side  gaining  ground  only  to  give  way  in  its  turn 
to  the  advance  of  the  other,  till  at  last  the  Confederates  seemed  to  yield,  and 
a  suspension  of  the  fury  took  place. 

General  Lyon  had  bivouacked  near  the  head  of  his  column  on  the 
night  of  the  9th,  sharing  a  rubber-coat  with  Major  (now  Major-Greneral) 
John  M.  Schofield,  his  chief  of  staff,  between  two  rows  of  corn  in  a  field  by 
the  roadside,  his  other  staff-officers  near  by.  He  did  not  seem  hopeful,  but  was 

^  Woodruff's  Little  Rock  battery  was  composed  had  been  in  command.  Woodruff  and  his  gun- 
of  guns  which  had  been  captured  at  the  seizure  of  ners  had,  in  fact,  been  drilled  and  instructed  by 
the  Little  Rock  arsenal,  of  which  Captain  Totten  Totteu. —  EDITORS. 


WILSON'S  CREEK,  AND    THE  DEATH  OF  LYON. 


293 


oppressed  with  the  responsibility 
of  his  situation,  with  anxiety  for 
the  cause,  and  with  sympathy  for 
the  Union  people  in  that  section, 
when  he  should  retreat  and  leave 
to  their  fate  those  who  could  not 
forsake  their  homes.  He  repeat 
edly  expressed  himself  as  having 
been  abandoned  by  his  superi 
ors.  When  the  troops  were  put 
in  motion,  he  went  at  the  head 
of  the  column,  and  when  the 
action  opened  he  kept  his  place 
at  the  front,  entering  the  heat 
of  the  engagement  with  the  line, 
near  Totten's  battery.  He  main 
tained  an  imperturbable  cool 
ness,  and  his  eye  shone  with  the 
ardor  of  conflict.  He  directed,  en 
couraged,  and  rallied  his  troops 
in  person,  sending  his  staff  in  all 
directions,  and  was  frequently 
without  an  attendant  except  one 
or  two  faithful  orderlies.  Early 
in  the  attack  while  on  the  line  to  the  left  of  Totten's  battery,  rallying  a  part 
of  the  1st  Missouri  Infantry,  his  horse,  which  he  was  leading,  was  killed 
and  he  received  a  slight  wound  in  the  leg.  Shortly  afterward  he  was  wounded 
in  the  head.  He  continued  dismounted  during  the  contest  above  described, 
and  walking  a  few  paces  toward  the  rear  with  his  chief  of  staff,  Major  Scho- 
field,  who  had  also  lost  his  horse,  shot  under  him,  Lyon  said,  "  I  fear  the  day 
is  lost."  Schofield  encouraged  him  to  take  a  more  hopeful  view  of  the  case, 
assuring  him  that  the  troops  were  easily  rallied  and  were  gaining  confidence, 
and  that  the  disorder  was  only  temporary,  and  then  proceeded  to  another 
part  of  the  line  in  search  of  a  mount. 

About  9  o'clock,  during  a  brief  cessation  in  the  firing,  Lyon  started 
toward  the  top  of  the  ridge,  accompanied  by  an  aide,  who  was  urging  him  to 
accept  his  horse,  when  they  met  Major  Sturgis  and  a  few  troopers.  One  of 
these  was  dismounted,  and  his  horse  was  given  to  General  Lyon.  Lyon  also 
expressed  himself  despondingly  to  Sturgis,  and  was  by  him  encouraged. 
Sturgis  proceeded  to  another  quarter,  and  Lyon  toward  DuBois's  battery. 

About  this  time  great  anxiety  began  to  be  felt  for  the  fate  of  Sigel's  command. 
Shortly  after  Lyon's  attack  the  sound  of  battle  had  been  heard  in  the  rear  of 
the  enemy's  line.  It  continued  but  a  short  time,  and  was  renewed  shortly  after 
ward  for  a  very  brief  period  only,  when  it  ceased  altogether.  Sigel  had  pro 
ceeded  to  within  a  mile  of  the  camps,  and  his  cavalry  had  cut  off  the  enemy's 
small  parties  and  thus  suppressed  information  of  his  coming.  He  then 


MAJOR-GENERAL    JOHN   M.    SCHOFIELD.      FROM   A  PHOTOGRAPH. 


294 


WILSON'S  CREEK,  AND   THE  DEATH  OF  LYON. 


advanced  his  infantry  toward  the  point 
where  the  by-road  crosses  the  creek,  his 
flanks  supported  by  the  cavalry  on  the 
right  and  dragoons  on  the  left,  four 
guns  being  placed  on  a  hill  overlooking 
the  tents.  At  about  5:30  A.M.,  hear 
ing  the  musketry  on  Lyon's  front,  he 
opened  fire  with  his  guns,  pushing  his 
infantry  across  the  creek  and  into  the 
lower  camp,  whence  they  had  fled,  over 
whelmed  by  the  suddenness  of  the  at 
tack.  Sigel  crossed  his  guns  and  pushed 
with  infantry  and  artillery  forward  a 
short  distance  in  pursuit,  meeting  with 
slight  resistance.  He  advanced  from  his 
first  position  near  the  creek,  by  a  road 
west  of  the  deserted  camp,  and  formed 
line  of  battle  in  a  field  between  the 
road  and  the  camp.  Afterward  he 
advanced  to  Sharp's  house.  The  Ar- 
kansans  and  Texans  retired  to  the 
northward,  fell  in  with  Price's  Missouri 
line,  and  assisted  in  the  fight  against 
Lyon.  Meanwhile  McCulloch  called 
upon  a  battalion  of  mounted  Missouri- 
ans,  and  upon  a  part  of  the  Louisiana 
regiment  which  had  been  confronting 
Plummer  in  the  corn-field,  and  with 
these  attacked  Sigel's  men,  who  were 
in  line  at  Sharp's  farm,  and  drove  them 
from  the  field.  When  the  attack  by 
the  Confederates,  from  the  direction  of 
Lyon's  front,  was  made,  the  confusion 
of  Sigel's  men  was  brought  about  by 
the  enfilading  fire  of  Reid's  battery  east 
of  the  creek,  and  by  the  belief  that 
the  infantry  in  their  front  were  friends. 
Sigel  went  back  the  way  he  came  with 
a  part  of  his  command,  including  Carr's 
cavalry.  All  but  the  cavalry,  who  were 
ahead,  were  ambuscaded  and,  for  the 
most  part,  killed  or  captured;  Sigel 
narrowly  escaped  capture.  Colonel  Sal 
omon  with  450  of  the  troops  retreated, 
by  a  detour  to  the  west,  to  the  Little 
York  road,  as  did  also  Lieutenant  Far- 


WILSON'S  CREEK,  AND   THE  DEATH  OF  LYON.  295 

raud,  with  the  dragoons.  The  latter,  finding  himself  with  his  company 
alone,  forcibly  detained  a  guide,  and  made  up  teams  for  one  gun  and  one 
caisson  of  the  abandoned  artillery.  He  was  finally  compelled  to  unhorse 
and  leave  the  caisson,  in  order  to  put  the  animals  to  the  gun.  Thus  by  10 
o'clock  Sigel  was  out  of  the  fight,  and  the  enemy  could  turn  his  whole  force 
upon  Lyon. 

Meantime  a  body  of  troops  was  observed  moving  down  the  hill  on  the  east 
bank  of  Wilson's  Creek  toward  Lyon's  left,  and  an  attack  by  other  troops 
from  that  direction  was  anticipated.  Schofield  deployed  eight  companies  of 
the  1st  Iowa  and  led  them  in  person  to  repel  this.  They  did  so  most  gallantly 
after  a  sanguinary  contest,  effectually  assisted  by  the  fire  from  DuBois's  bat 
tery,  which  alone  drove  back  the  column  on  the  opposite  side  of  the  stream 
before  it  began  a  crossing. 

Lyon,  accompanied  by  an  aide  |  and  his  six  or  eight  orderlies,  followed  closely 
the  right  of  the  Iowa  regiment.  After  proceeding  a  short  distance,  his  atten 
tion  was  called  by  the  aide  to  a  line  of  men  drawn  up  on  the  prolongation  of 
the  left  of  our  main  line  and  nearly  perpendicular  to  the  1st  Iowa  as  it  moved 
to  the  eastward.  A  party  of  horsemen  came  out  in  front  of  this  line  of  the 
enemy  and  proceeded  to  reconnoiter.  General  Price  and  Major  Emmett 
Mac  Donald  (who  had  sworn  that  he  would  not  cut  his  hair  till  the  Confed 
eracy  was  acknowledged)  were  easily  recognized.  General  Lyon  started  as  if  to 
confront  them,  ordering  his  party  to  "  draw  pistols  and  follow"  him,  when  the 
aide  protested  against  his  exposing  himself  to  the  fire  of  the  line,  which  was 
partly  concealed  by  the  mass  of  dense  underbrush,  and  asked  if  he  should 
not  bring  up  some  other  troops.  To  this  Lyon  assented,  and  directed  the 
aide  to  order  up  the  2d  Kansas.  The  general  advanced  a  short  distance, 
joining  two  companies  of  the  1st  Iowa,  left  to  protect  an  exposed  position. 

Colonel  Mitchell  of  the  2d  Kansas,  near  DuBois's  battery,  sent  his  lieutenant- 
colonel,  Blair,  to  Lyon  to  ask  to  be  put  in  action,  and  the  two  messengers 
passed  each  other  without  meeting.  Lyon  repeated  his  order  for  the  regiment 
to  come  forward.  The  regiment  moved  promptly  by  the  flank,  and  as  it 
approached  Lyon  he  directed  the  two  companies  of  Iowa  troops  to  go  forward 
with  it,  himself  leading  the  column,  swinging  his  hat.  A  murderous  fire  was 
opened  from  the  thick  brush,  the  2d  Kansas  deployed  rapidly  to  the  front 
and  with  the  two  companies  of  the  1st  Iowa  swept  over  the  hill,  dislodging 
the  enemy  and  driving  them  back  into  the  next  ravine ;  but  while  he  was  at 
the  head  of  the  column,  and  pretty  nearly  in  the  first  fire,  a  ball  penetrated 
Lyon's  left  breast,  inflicting  a  mortal  wound.  He  slowly  dismounted,  and  as 
he  fell  into  the  anus  of  his  faithful  orderly,  Lehmann,  he  exclaimed,  "  Leh- 
mann,  I  am  killed,"  and  almost  immediately  expired.  Colonel  Mitcheh1  was 
also  severely  wounded  about  the  same  time  and  removed  to  the  rear. 

Lieutenant  Gustavus  Schreyer  and  two  of  his  men  of  the  2d  Kansas  bore 
the  body  of  Lyon  through  the  ranks,  Lehmann  bearing  the  hat  and  loudly 
bemoaning  the  death  of  his  chief.  In  the  line  of  file-closers  the  returning  aide 
was  met,  who,  apprehensive  of  the  effect  upon  the  troops,  stopped  the  clamor 

4.  The  writer.— EDITORS. 


296 


WILSON'S  CREEK,  AND    THE  DEATH  OF  LYON. 


of  the  orderly,  covered  the  general's  features  with  his  coat,  and  had  the  body 
carried  to  a  sheltered  spot  near  DuBois's  battery.  Surgeon  Florence  M.  Cornyn 
was  found  and  called  upon  to  examine  the  lifeless  body  of  the  dead  general, 
and  having  pronounced  life  extinct,  the  aide  went  to  seek  Schofield  and  inform 
him  of  the  calamity.  He  was  met  return 
ing  from  the  successful  charge  he  had 
led,  and  at  once  announced  that  Major 
Sturgis  should  assume  command,  but  vis 
ited  the  remains  of  Lyon  on.  his  way  to 
find  Sturgis.  These  were  taken  charge 
of  by  the  aide,  and  conveyed  to  the  field- 
hospital,  where  the  body  was  placed  in  a 
wagon  and  carefully  covered.  Strict  or 
ders  were  given  that  under  no  circum 
stances  was  the  body  to  be  removed  till 
the  army  returned  to  Springfield,  after 
which  the  aide  returned  to  the  front  to 
report  to  Major  Sturgis  for  duty. 

The  engagement  on  different  parts  of 
the  line  lasted  about  half  an  hour  after 
Lyon's  death,  when  the  Confederates  gave 
way,  and  silence  reigned  for  nearly  the 
same  length  of  time.  Many  of  the  senior 
officers  having  been  disabled,  Sturgis  as 
sumed  command,  and  the  principal  officers  were  summoned  for  consultation. 
This  council  and  the  suspended  hostilities  were  soon  abruptly  terminated 
by  the  appearance  of  the  Confederates  along  our  entire  front,  where  the 
troops  had  been  readjusted  in  more  compact  form  and  were  now  more 
determined  and  cooler  than  ever.  A  battery  planted  on  a  hill  in  the  front 
began  to  use  shrapnel  and  canister,  a  species  of  ammunition  which,  so  far 
as  I  know,  the  enemy  had  not  fired  before  at  the  troops  who  were  with 
General  Lyon. 

DuBois's  battery  continued  on  the  left  supported  by  Osterhaus's  battalion 
and  the  1st  Missouri ;  the  1st  Iowa,  1st  Kansas,  and  the  regular  infantry  sup 
ported  Totten's  battery  in  the  center,  and  the  l2d  Kansas  held  the  extreme 
right.  With  unabated  ardor  and  impetuosity  the  Confederates  assailed  this 
front  and  endeavored  to  gain  the  rear  of  the  right  flank,  but  Totten's  battery 
in  the  center  was  the  main  point  of  assault.  For  the  first  time  during  this 
bloody  day,  the  entire  line  maintained  its  position  without  flinching,  the 
inexperienced  volunteers  vieing  with  the  seasoned  regulars  in  tenacity  and 
coolness.  |)  The  flash  and  roar  were  incessant,  and  the  determined  Southrons 
repeatedly  advanced  nearly  to  the  muzzles  of  the  pieces  of  their  foes,  only  to 

j)  This  engagement  is  considered  one  of  the  se-  fought  upon  American  soil ;  seldom  has  a  bloodier 

verest  of  the  war.     Colonel  Snead  (in  "The  Fight  one  been  fought  on  any  modern  field."     Another 

for  Missouri ")  says:  "Never  before  —  considering  participant,    a    Confederate    officer,    described    it 

the  number  engaged  —  had  so  bloody  a  battle  been  as  "  a  mighty  mean-fowt  fight." — EDITORS. 


BRIGADIER-GENERAL    N.    B.    PKABCE,    C.  S.  A. 
FROM  A  PHOTOGRAPH. 


WILSON'S  CREEK,  AND   THE  DEATH  OF  LYON.  297 

be  hurled  back  before  the  withering  fire  as  from  the  blast  of  a  furnace  and  to 
charge  again  with  a  like  result. 

At  a  moment  when  the  contest  seemed  evenly  balanced,  except  for  the 
overwhelming  numbers  of  the  Confederates  on  the  field,  Captain  Gordon 
Granger,  noted  for  his  daring  and  intrepidity,  rushed  to  the  rear  and  brought 
up  the  supports  of  DuBois's  battery,  hurling  them  upon  the  enemy's  right 
flank,  into  which  they  poured  a  murderous,  deadly  volley,  which  created  a 
perfect  rout  along  the  whole  front.\  Our  troops  continued  to  send  a  galling 
fire  into  the  disorganized  masses  as  they  fled,  until  they  disappeared,  and  the 
battle  was  ended. 

The  order  to  withdraw  was  then  given,  and  DuBois's  battery  with  its  sup 
ports  was  moved  to  a  hill  and  ridge  in  rear  to  cover  the  movement.  Before 
the  withdrawal  of  the  main  body  took  place,  Captain  Granger  and  others 
urged  remaining  on  the  ground,  but  Sturgis  had  received  information  of 
Sigel's  rout,  and  in  view  of  his  depleted,  worn-out  forces  and  exhausted 
ammunition,  persisted  in  a  return  to  Springfield.  The  infantry  and  artillery, 
as  soon  as  Totten's  disabled  horses  were  replaced,  left  the  scene  of  conflict, 
and,  passing  through  the  troops  placed  in  rear,  took  up  the  march  for  Spring 
field.  On  reaching  the  Little  York  road,  a  body  of  horsemen  was  seen  to  the 
west,  which  proved  to  be  Lieutenant  Farrand  with  his  dragoons,  leading  in 
a  remnant  of  Sigel's  brigade,  with  the  one  piece  of  artillery  he  had  saved. 
In  his  hand  he  carried  a  captured  flag,  which  he  trailed  by  his  side.  He  was 
received  with  vociferous  cheering,  and  became  for  the  time  the  admiration 
of  all,  having  marched  around  both  armies  and  brought  his  command  in  safe.  •& 

On  reaching  Springfield,  Sturgis  found  that  Sigel  had  arrived  there  half 
an  hour  earlier.  Regarding  him  as  the  senior,  the  command  was  given  over 
to  him.  On  the  following  morning  the  army  withdrew. 

\  In  his  report  Major  Sturgis  gave  great  praise  the  late  general's  staff,  who  carefully  cared  for  it. 
to  Gordon  Granger,  saying  that  he  was  "now  sight-  The  house  belonged  to  Governor  John  S.  Phelps, 
ing  a  gun  of  DuBois's  battery,  and  before  the  and  as  it  had  been  determined  early  in  the  even- 
smoke  had  cleared  away  sighting  one  of  Totten's ;  ing  that  the  troops  would  take  up  the  retreat  for 
at  one  moment  reconnoitering  the  enemy,  and  the  Eolla  before  daylight  the  next  morning,  Mrs. 
next  either  bringing  up  reinforcements  or  rallying  Phelps,  a  warm  personal  friend  of  General  Lyon 
some  broken  line.  To  whatever  part  of  the  field  during  his  sojourn  in  the  town,  was  communicated 
I  might  direct  my  attention,  there  would  I  find  with  at  her  home  in  the  country,  and  asked  to  have 
Captain  Granger,  hard  at  work  at  some  important  the  remains  buried  on  her  farm  till  they  could  be 
service." — EDITORS.  removed.  To  this  she  gladly  consented.  The  body 

•&  About  this  time,  too,  it  was  discovered  that  was  left  in  custody  of  surgeons  who  were  to  remain 
in  order  to  gather  up  the  wounded  on  the  field  behind,  and  the  next  day  Mrs.  Phelps  took  posses- 
the  body  of  General  Lyon  had  been  taken  from  sion  of  it,  and  General  Lyon  was  laid  to  rest  in  her 
the  wagon  in  which  it  was  placed  and  had  been  garden,  just  outside  the  town.  His  body  was  sub- 
left  at  the  field-hospital.  Lieutenant  Canfield  sequently  removed  to  his  home  in  Connecticut  and 
with  his  company  B,  1st  Cavalry,  was  dispatched  buried  with  military  and  civic  honors. — W.  M.W. 
with  a  wagon  to  recover  the  general's  body,  and  Lyou  was  born  in  Ashfovd,  Conn.,  July  14th, 
the  army  moved  on  into  Springfield,  arriving  1818.  He  was  graduated  at  West  Point  in  1841, 
about  5  P.  M.  Lieutenant  Canfield  proceeded  to  and  served  in  the  army  in  Florida  and  in  the  war 
the  battle-field,  and  before  reaching  there  found  with  Mexico.  He  was  brevetted  captain  for  gallant 
the  Confederates  had  returned  and  engaged  in  gath-  conduct  at  Churubusco  and  Contreras.  From  1849 
ering  their  own  wounded,  and  had  found  General  to  1853  he  served  in  California,  winning  special 
Lyon's  body.  It  was  delivered  by  the  enemy  and  mention  for  his  services  in  frontier  warfare.  He 
was  brought  into  the  town  to  the  house  occupied  as  served  afterward  in  Kansas,  and  from  that  State  was 
Lyon's  headquarters,  and  was  placed  in  charge  of  ordered  to  St.  Louis  in  January,  IS  61. — EDITORS. 


ARKANSAS  TROOPS  IN  THE  BATTLE  OF  WILSON'S  CREEK. 

BY  N.  B.  PEARCE,  BRIGADIER-GENERAL,  C.  S.  A. 

I  STYLE  this  short  account  of  my  personal  recollections  of  the  battle  of 
"Oak  Hills"  (as  the  Confederates  named  the  engagement)  as  above,  because 
I  was  identified  with  the  State  of  Arkansas  and  her  soldiers.  I  also 
believe  that  subsequent  events,  developed  by  the  prominence  of  some  of  the 
commanders  engaged  in  this  fight,  have  had  a  tendency  to  obscure  that  just 
recognition  which  the  Arkansas  troops  so  nobly  earned  in  this,  one  of  the  first 
great  battles  of  our  civil  war. 

The  ninth  day  of  August,  1861,  found  the  Confederate  army  under  General 
Ben.  McCulloch,  camped  on  Wilson's  Creek,  ten  miles  south  of  Springfield, 
in  south-west  Missouri.  It  consisted  of  a  Louisiana  regiment  under  Colonel 
Louis  Hebert  (a  well-drilled  and  well-equipped  organization,  chiefly  from  the 
north  part  of  the  State ) ;  Greer's  Texas  regiment  (mounted) ;  Churchill's 
Arkansas  cavalry,  and  Mclntosh's  battalion  of  Arkansas  mounted  rifles 
(Lieutenant-Colonel  Embry),  under  the  immediate  charge  of  the  commanding 
general ;  General  Price's  command  of  Missouri  State  Guards,  with  Bledsoe's 
and  Guibor's  batteries,  and  my  three  regiments  of  Arkansas  infantry,  with 
Woodruffs  and  Reid's  batteries.  More  than  half  the  Missourians  were 
mounted,  and  but  few  of  the  troops  in  the  whole  command  were  well  armed. 
The  army  numbered  in  all  about  11,500  men, —  perhaps,  6000  to  7000  of 
whom  were  in  semi-fighting  trim,  and  participated  in  the  battle. 

The  Federal  forces  under  General  Nathaniel  Lyon,  between  5000  and  6000 
strong,  occupied  the  town  of  Springfield,  and  General  McCulloch  was  expect 
ing  them  to  advance  and  give  him  battle.  General  McCulloch's  headquarters 
were  011  the  right  of  the  Springfield  road,  east  of  Wilson's  Creek,  rather  in 
advance  of  the  center  of  the  camp.  General  Price  occupied  a  position 
immediately  west,  and  in  the  valley  of  the  creek,  with  his  command  mostly 
north  of  the  Springfield  road.  I  had  established  my  headquarters  on  the 
heights  east  and  south  of  Wilson's  Creek  and  the  Springfield  road,  with  my 
forces  occupying  the  elevated  ground  immediately  adjacent. 

Detailed  reports  as  to  the  strength  and  movements  of  Lyon's  command 
were  momentarily  expected,  through  spies  sent  out  by  General  Price,  as 


298 


ARKANSAS   TROOPS  IN   THE  BATTLE  OF  WILSON'S  CREEK.       299 

McCullocli  relied  upon  the  native  Missourians  to  furnish  such  knowledge; 
but  it  was  not  until  late  in  the  afternoon  that  two  "  loyal "  ladies  succeeded 
in  passing  out  of  the  Federal  lines,  by  permission  of  General  Lyon,  and, 
coming  in  a  circuitous  route  by  Pond  Springs,  reached  General  Price's  head 
quarters  with  the  desired  information.  General  McCulloch  at  once  called  a 
council  of  war  of  the  principal  officers,  where  it  was  decided,  instead  of  wait 
ing  for  the  enemy,  to  march  with  the  whole  command,  at  9  o'clock  that 
night,  and  attack  General  Lyon  at  Springfield.  As  soon  as  the  orders  of 
General  McCulloch  had  been  properly  published  by  his  adjutant-general, 
Colonel  Mclntosh,  the  camp  was  thrown  into  a  ferment  of  suppressed 
excitement.  It  was  ordered  that  the  advance  be  made  in  three  divisions, 
under  the  separate  commands  of  General  Price,  Adjutant-General  Mclntosh, 
and  myself.  The  scene  of  preparation,  immediately  following  the  orders  so 
long  delayed  and  now  so  eagerly  welcomed  by  the  men,  was  picturesque  and 
animating  in  the  extreme.  The  question  of  ammunition  was  one  of  the  most 
important  and  serious,  and  as  the  Ordnance  Department  was  imperfectly 
organized  and  poorly  supplied,  the  men  scattered  about  in  groups,  to  impro 
vise,  as  best  they  could,  ammunition  for  their  inefficient  arms.  Here,  a  group 
would  be  molding  bullets — there,  another  crowd  dividing  percussion-caps,  and, 
again,  another  group  fitting  new  flints  to  their  old  muskets.  They  had  little 
thought  then  of  the  inequality  between  the  discipline,  arms,  and  accouterments 
of  the  regular  United  States  troops  they  were  soon  to  engage  in  battle,  and 
their  own  homely  movements  and  equipments.  It  was  a  new  thing  to  most 
of  them,  this  regular  way  of  shooting  by  word  of  command,  and  it  was,  per 
haps,  the  old-accustomed  method  of  using  rifle,  musket,  or  shot-gun  as  game 
sters  or  marksmen  that  won  them  the  battle  when  pressed  into  close  quarters 
with  the  enemy.  All  was  expectancy,  and  as  the  time  sped  on  to  9 
o'clock,  the  men  became  more  and  more  eager  to  advance.  What  was  their 
disappointment  when,  as  the  hour  finally  arrived,  instead  of  the  order  to 
march,  it  was  announced  that  General  McCulloch  had  decided,  on  account  of 
a  threatened  rain,  which  might  damage  and  destroy  much  of  their  ammuni 
tion,  to  postpone  the  movement.  The  men  did  not  "  sulk  in  their  tents,"  but 
rested  on  their  arms  in  no  amiable  mood.  This  condition  of  uncertainty  and 
suspense  lasted  well  through  the  night,  as  the  commanding  officers  were 
better  informed  than  the  men  of  the  risks  to  be  encountered,  and  of  the  prob 
able  result,  in  case  they  should  make  an  aggressive  fight  against  disciplined 
forces  when  only  half  prepared.  Daybreak,  on  the  10th  of  August,  found 
the  command  still  at  Wilson's  Creek,  cheerlessly  waiting,  many  of  the  troops 
remaining  in  position,  in  line  of  march,  on  the  road,  and  others  returning  to 
camp  to  prepare  the  morning  meal. 

Perhaps  it  was  6  o'clock  when  the  long-roll  sounded  and  the  camp  was 
called  to  arms.  A  few  minutes  before  this,  Sergeant  Hite,  of  my  body-guard, 
dashed  up  to  my  headquarters,  breathless  with  excitement,  hatless,  and  his 
horse  covered  with  foam,  exclaiming  hurriedly,  "  General,  the  enemy  is  com 
ing  ! "  "  Where  ?  "  said  I,  and  he  pointed  in  the  direction  of  a  spring,  up  a 
ravine,  where  he  had  been  for  water.  He  had  been  fired  at,  he  said,  by  a 


300      ARKANSAS  TROOPS  IN   THE  BATTLE  OF  WILSON'S  CREEK. 


picket  of  some  troops  advancing  on  the  right  flank.  I  ordered  the  sergeant 
to  ride  in  haste  to  General  McCulloch  with  this  information,  and  proceeded 
to  place  my  command  in  position.  I  was  the  better  enabled  to  do  this  with 
out  delay,  because  I  had  on  the  day  before,  with  Colonel  R.  H.  Weightman, 
made  a  careful  reconnoissance  of  the  ground  in  the  direction  from  which  the 
enemy  was  said  to  be  approaching.  The  colonels  commanding  were  imme 
diately  notified,  and  the  regiments 
were  formed  and  posted  so  as  to  meet 
his  advance.  Captain  Woodruff's  Lit 
tle  Rock  (Ark.)  battery  was  ordered 
to  occupy  a  hill  commanding  the 
road  to  Springfield,  and  the  3d  Ar 
kansas  Infantry  (Colonel  John  R. 
Gratiot)  was  ordered  to  support  him. 
I  placed  Captain  Reid's  Fort  Smith 
(Ark.)  battery  on  an  eminence  to 
command  the  approaches  to  our  right 
and  rear,  and  gave  him  the  5th  Ar 
kansas  Infantry  (Colonel  T.  P.  Dock- 
ery)  as  a  support.  I  then  advanced 
the  4th  Arkansas  Infantry  (Colonel 
J.  D.  Walker)  north  of  this  battery 
to  watch  the  approach  down  the 
ravine,  through  which  Sergeant  Hite 
had  reported  that  the  enemy  was 
coming.  Thus,  the  Arkansas  troops 
under  my  command  had  all  been 
placed  in  favorable  position,  ready  for  action,  within  a  very  short  time  after 
the  first  alarm. 

While  these  events  were  taking  place  under  my  immediate  notice,  General 
McCulloch  had  been  actively  making  disposition  of  the  troops  more  nearly 
opposed  to  the  first  advance  of  the  enemy,  under  General  Lyon.  He  had 
posted  the  3d  Louisiana  Infantry  (Colonel  Hebert)  and  Macintosh's  2d 
Arkansas  Rifles  (dismounted)  to  meet  the  earliest  demonstration  from  the 
direction  of  Springfield.  General  Price  had  also  been  industriously  engaged 
in  placing  his  troops  to  intercept  the  advancing  foe.  General  Rains's  (Mis 
souri)  command  had  the  honor  of  giving  the  first  reception  to  the  main  col 
umn  under  General  Lyon.  He  was  ably  supported  by  the  gallant  Missouri 
generals,  Slack,  McBride,  Parsons,  and  Clark,  with  their  respective  brigades. 
The  fighting  at  this  juncture  —  perhaps  about  7  o'clock  —  was  confined  to 
the  corn-field  north  of  Wilson's  Creek,  where  the  Louisiana  infantry,  with 
Lieutenant-Colonel  Embry's  2d  Arkansas  Mounted  Rifles  (dismounted),  all 
under  the  immediate  command  of  Colonel  Mclntosh,  effectually  charged  and 
drove  back  the  enemy.  Simultaneously  the  battle  opened  farther  west  and 
south  of  Wilson's  Creek,  where  the  Missouri  troops  were  attacked  by  the  main 
column  or  right  wing  of  the  enemy.  Totten's  (Federal)  battery  was  pushed 


MAJOR-GENERAL  BEN.   Mi'CULLOCH,   C.  8.   A.,    KILLED 
THE  BATTLE  OF  PEA   KIDGE,  MARCH  7,   1862. 
FROM  A  PHOTOGRAPH. 


ARKANSAS   TROOPS  IN  THE  BATTLE  OF  WILSON'S  CREEK.       301 

forward,  and  took  its  first  position  on  the  side  of  Oak  Hill,  north  of  where  the 
main  fight  afterward  took  place.  I  had  directed  Captain  Woodruff,  who  was 
posted  within  easy  range,  to  give  attention  to  Totten,  and  the  two  batteries  were 
soon  engaged  in  a  lively  artillery  duel,  being  well  matched  in  skill  and  mettle. 
Lieutenant  Weaver,  of  Woodruff's  battery,  was  killed,  and  4  of  Totten's  men 
were  killed  and  7  wounded  in  this  engagement.  General  Lyon's  right,  although 
it  had  gained  a  temporary  advantage  in  the  early  morning  by  surprising 
the  Missourians,  was  roughly  handled  when  they  had  recovered  themselves. 
They  were  reenforced  by  Churchill's  regiment,  which  had  moved  up  from  the 
extreme  right,  and  the  battle  raged  several  hours  while  they  held  their  ground. 
At  this  juncture  a  gallant  charge  was  made  by  Greer's  and  Carroll's  mounted 
regiments  on  Totten's  battery,  but  it  was  not  a  complete  success,  as  the 
gunners  turned  about  and  recovered  their  guns. 

In  the  early  morning,  perhaps  simultaneously  with  the  advance  of  Lyon, 
General  Sigel,  commanding  the  left  column  of  the  advance  from  Springfield, 
came  upon  our  right  and  rear,  first  attacking  Colonel  Churchill's  camp,  as  the 
men  were  preparing  for  breakfast,  obliging  them  to  retreat  to  an  adjacent 
wood,  where  they  were  formed  in  good  order.  The  surprise  resulted  from  the 
movement  of  the  night  before,  when  pickets  had  been  withdrawn  that  were 
not  re-posted  in  the  morning.  Sigel  did  not  wait  for  a  fight,  however,  but 
advanced  to,  and  had  his  battery  unlimbered  near,  the  Fayetteville  road,  west 
of  Wilson's  Creek,  opposite  and  within  range  of  Reid's  battery  as  it  was  then 
in  position  as  originally  placed.  Before  he  had  discovered  us,  and  perhaps  in 
ignorance  of  our  position,  Reid  attacked  him,  under  my  personal  orders  and 
supervision.  Sigel's  movement  was  a  bold  one,  and  we  really  could  not  tell, 
on  his  first  appearance  (there  having  been  110  fight  with  Churchill),  whether 
he  was  friend  or  foe.  An  accidental  gust  of  wind  having  unfurled  his  flag, 
we  were  110  longer  in  doubt.  Reid  succeeded  in  getting  his  range  accurately, 
so  that  his  shot  proved  very  effective.  At  this  juncture,  General  McCalloch 
in  person  led  two  companies  of  the  Louisiana  infantry  in  a  charge  and  capt 
ured  five  of  the  guns.-fr  General  Sigel  was  himself  in  command,  and  made  vain 
attempts  to  hold  his  men,  who  were  soon  in  full  retreat,  back  over  the  road 
they  came,  pursued  by  the  Texas  and  Missouri  cavalry.  This  was  the  last  of 
Sigel  for  the  day,  as  his  retreat  was  continued  to  Springfield.  As  a  precau 
tion,  however,  not  knowing  how  badly  we  had  defeated  Sigel,  I  immediately 
posted  the  4th  Arkansas  Infantry  (Colonel  Walker)  along  the  brow  of  the  hill, 
commanding  the  road  over  which  he  had  fled,  which  regiment  remained  on 
duty  until  the  battle  was  over. 

There  seemed  now  to  be  a  lull  in  the  active  fighting ;  the  bloody  contest  in 
the  corn-field  had  taken  place;  the  fight  "mit  Sigel"  had  resulted  satisfac 
torily  to  us,  but  the  troops  more  immediately  opposed  to  General  Lyon  had 
not  done  so  well.  General  Price  and  his  Missouri  troops  had  borne  the  brunt 
of  this  hard  contest,  but  had  gained  110  ground.  They  had  suffered  heavy 

•fr  General  McCulloch's  report  says:   '•  When  we  and  soon  the  Louisianians  were  gallantly  charging 

arrived  near  the  enemy's  battery  we  found  that  among  the  guns  and  swept  the  cannoneers  away. 

Reid's  battery  had  opened  upon  it,  and  it  was  Five  guns  were  here  taken." 
already  in  confusion.     Advantage  was  taken  of  it, 


302       ARKANSAS   TROOPS  IN  THE  BATTLE  OF  WILSON'S  CREEK. 


losses,  and  were  running  short  of  ammunition.  I  had  watched  anxiously  for 
signs  of  victory  to  come  from  the  north  side  of  the  creek,  but  Totten's  bat 
tery  seemed  to  belch  forth  with  renewed  vigor,  and  was  advanced  once  or 
twice  in  its  position.  The  line  of  battle  on  our  left  was  shortening,  and  the 
fortunes  of  war  appeared  to  be  sending  many  of  our  gallant  officers  and  soldiers 
to  their  death.  There  was  no  de 
moralization — no  signs  of  wavering 
or  retreat,  but  it  was  an  hour  of  great 
anxiety  and  suspense.  No  one  then 
knew  what  the  day  would  bring  forth. 
As  the  sun  poured  down  upon  our 
devoted  comrades,  poised  and  rest 
ing,  as  it  were,  between  the  chapters 
of  a  mighty  struggle  not  yet  com 
pleted,  the  stoutest  of  us  almost 
weakened  in  our  anxiety  to  know  the 
outcome. 

Just  at  this  time,  General  Lyon 
appeared  to  be  massing  his  men  for 
a  final  and  decisive  movement.  I 
had  been  relieved  of  Sigel,  and  Reid's 
battery  was  inactive  because  it  could 
not  reach  Totten.  This  was  fortu 
nate,  for  my  command,  in  a  measure 
fresh  and  enthusiastic,  was  about 
to  embrace  an  opportunity — such  a 
one  as  will  often  win  or  lose  a  battle — by  throwing  its  strength  to  the 
weakened  line  at  a  critical  moment  and  winning  the  day.  Colonel  Mcln- 
tosh  came  to  me  from  General  McCulloch,  and  Captain  Greene  from  General 
Price,  urging  me  to  move  at  once  to  their  assistance.  General  Lyon  was 
in  possession  of  Oak  Hill ;  his  lines  were  forward,  his  batteries  aggres 
sive,  and  his  charges  impetuous.  The  fortunes  of  the  day  were  balanced 
in  the  scale,  and  something  must  be  done  or  the  battle  was  lost.  My  men 
were  eager  to  go  forward,  and  when  I  led  the  3d  Arkansas  Infantry  (Colonel 
Gratiot)  and  the  right  wing  of  the  5th  Arkansas  Infantry  (Lieutenant-Colonel 
Neal)  across  the  creek,  and  pushed  rapidly  up  the  hill  in  the  face  of  the  enemy, 
loud  cheers  went  up  from  our  expectant  friends  that  betokened  an  enthusiasm 
which,  no  doubt,  helped  to  win  the  fight.  Colonel  Mclntosh,  with  two  pieces 
of  Reid's  battery,  and  with  a  part  of  Dockery's  5th  Arkansas  Infantry,  sup 
ported  my  right ;  the  Federal  forces  occupied  two  lines  of  battle,  reaching 
across  the  crest  of  Oak  Hill ;  and  at  this  juncture  our  troops  in  front  were 
composed  of  the  Missouri  forces,  under  General  Price  (occupying  the  center) ; 
Texas  and  Louisiana  troops,  under  General  McCulloch  (on  the  right),  and 
my  forces  thrown  forward  (on  the  left),  when  a  combined  advance  was  ordered 
by  General  McCulloch.  This  proved  to  be  the  decisive  engagement,  and  as 
volley  after  volley  was  poured  against  our  lines,  and  our  gallant  boys  were 


URIGADIKH-GENERAL    WM.    Y.    SLACK,    C.   S.    A.,  MORTALLY 
WOUNDED  AT  PEA    RIDGE.      FROM    A    PHOTOGRAPH. 


ARKANSAS    TROOPS  IN   THE  BATTLE  OF  WILSON'S  CREEK.        303 

cut  down  like  grass,  those  who  survived  seemed  to  be  nerved  to  greater  effort 
and  a  determination  to  win  or  die.  At  about  this  time  (11:30  A.M.)  the  first 
line  of  battle  before  us  gave  way.  Our  boys  charged  the  second  line  with  a 
yell,  and  were  soon  in  possession  of- the  field,  the  enemy  slowly  withdrawing 
toward  Springfield.  This  hour  decided  the  contest  and  won  for  us  the  day. 
It  was  in  our  front  here,  as  was  afterward  made  knowrn,  that  the  brave  com 
mander  of  the  Federal  forces,  General  Lyon,  was  killed,  gallantly  leading  his 
men  to  what  he  and  they  supposed  was  victory,  but  which  proved  (it  may  be 
because  they  were  deprived  of  his  enthusiastic  leadership)  disastrous  defeat. 
In  the  light  of  the  present  day,  even,  it  is  difficult  to  measure  the  vast  results 
had  Lyon  lived  and  the  battle  gone  against  us. 

General  McCulloch,  myself,  and  our  staff-officers  now  grouped  ourselves 
together  upon  the  center  of  the  hill.  Woodruff's  battery  was  again  placed  in 
position,  and  Totten,  who  was  covering  the  retreat  of  Sturgis  (who  had 
assumed  command  of  the  Federal  forces  after  the  death  of  General  Lyon), 
received  the  benefit  of  his  parting  shots.  We  watched  the  retreating  enemy 
through  our  field-glasses,  and  icere  glad  to  see  him  go.  Our  ammunition  was 
exhausted,  our  men  undisciplined,  and  we  feared  to  risk  pursuit.  It  was  also 
rumored  that  reinforcements  were  coming  to  the  Federal  army  by  forced 
marches,  but  it  was  found  the  next  day  that  the  disaster  to  the  retreating 
army  was  greater  than  we  had  supposed,  and  a  few  fresh  cavalry  troops  could 
doubtless  have  followed  and  captured  many  more  stragglers  and  army  stores. 
Xext  day  the  enemy  evacuated  Springfield,  and  Price,  with  his  Missouri 
troops,  occupied  it,  and  had  his  supplies  and  wounded  moved  to  that  point. 

The  Arkansans  in  this  battle  were  as  brave,  as  chivalrous,  and  as  successful 
as  any  of  the  troops  engaged.  They  bore  out,  on  many  a  hard-fought  field 
later  011  in  the  struggle,  the  high  hopes  built  upon  their  conduct  here. 

The  body  of  the  army  remained  at  Springfield  tant  one  to  take.  General  Price  left  Springfield  on 
until  the  beginning  of  General  Price's  march  upon  the  25th  of  August,  dispersed  Lane's  forces  at 
Lexington,  on  the  25th  of  August.  A  few  days  Dry  wood,  September  2d,  and  reached  Warrensburg 
after  the  battle  Pearce's  brigade  of  Arkansas  mili-  in  pursuit  of  Colonel  Peabody  at  daybreak,  Sep- 
tia  was  disbanded  on  the  expiration  of  their  term  temberlOth;  Peabody  getting  into  Lexington  first, 
of  enlistment.  General  McCulloch  moved  west-  Price,  after  a  little  skirmishing  with  Mulligan's 
ward  with  his  own  brigade,  and  then  to  Maysville,  outpost,  bivouacked  within  2*4  miles  of  Lexington. 
Arkansas,  being  influenced  in  his  return  by  the  In  the  morning  (12th)  Mulligan  sent  out  a  small 
general  tenor  of  his  instructions  from  the  Confed-  force  which  burnt  a  bridge  in  Price's  path.  Price 
erate  Government  to  avoid,  if  possible,  operating  then  crossed  to  the  Independence  Road,  and 
in  the  State  of  Missouri,  which  had  not  seceded,  waited  for  his  infantry  and  artillery.  These  came 
General  Price,  upon  being  informed  of  his  decision,  up  in  the  afternoon,  and  Price  then  advanced  to- 
issued  an  order  re-assuming  command,  and  the  ward  Lexington,  and  drove  Mulligan  behind  his 
operations  in  the  State  which  followed,  including  defenses.  There  was  a  little  skirmishing  in  a 
the  capture  of  Lexington,  were  conducted  with  corn-field  and  in  a  cemetery  through  which  Price 
Missouri  troops  alone.  At  this  time  the  Federal  advanced,  and  in  the  streets  of  Lexington,  where 
troops  held  the  Missouri  river  by  a  cordon  of  mili-  he  opened  upon  Mulligan  with  7  pieces  of  artil- 
tary  posts.  The  object  of  this  line  was  to  prevent  lery.  Price's  movement  into  Lexington  in  the  af- 
the  crossing  of  the  river  by  the  secessionists  of  ternoon  of  September  12th  was  only  a  reconnois- 
north  Missouri,  who,  to  the  number  of  5000  or  sance  in  force.  Toward  dark  he  retired  to  the  Fair 
6000,  were  armed  and  organized  and  desirous  of  Ground,  and  waited  for  his  trains  to  come  up,  and 
joining  the  army  of  General  Price  in  south-west  for  reinforcements  that  were  hurrying  to  him  from 
Missouri.  To  break  this  blockade  became  the  ob-  all  directions,  including  Harris's  and  Green's  com- 
ject  of  General  Price.  Of  the  four  Federal  posts,  mands  from  north  of  the  Missouri.  The  iuvest- 
Jefferson  City,  Boonville,  Lexington,  and  Kansas  ment  of  Mulligan's  position  was  made  as  shown  on 
City,  Lexington  was  the  easiest  and  most  impor-  the  map,  page  309. — EDITORS. 


THE  FLANKING  COLUMN  AT  WILSON'S  CEEEK. 


BY  FRANZ   SIGEL,  MAJOR-GENERAL,  U.  S.  V. 


ON  August  9th,  1861,  the  day  before  the  battle 
at  Wilson's  Creek,  my  brigade,  consisting  of 
the  3d  and  5th  Missouri  Infantry,  commanded  re 
spectively  by  Lieutenant-Colonel  Anselm  Albert 
and  Charles  E.  Salomon,  and  two  batteries  of  artil- 
lery,  each  of  4  pieces,  under  the  command  of 
Lieutenants  Schaefer  and  Schuetzenbach,  was  en 
camped  on  the  south  side  of  Springfield,  near  the 
Yokermill  road.  On  our  right  was  encamped  the 
1st  Iowa  Infantry,  a  regiment  clad  in  militia  gray. 
The  bulk  of  General  Lyon's  forces  were  on  the 
west  side  of  the  city.  During  the  morning  I  sent 
a  staff-officer  to  General  Lyon's  headquarters  for 
orders,  and  on  his  return  he  reported  to  me  that 
a  forward  movement  would  take  place,  and  that  we 
must  hold  ourselves  in  readiness  to  march  at  a 
moment's  warning  directly  from  our  camp,  toward 
the  south,  to  attack  the  enemy  from  the  rear.  I 
immediately  went  to  General  Lyon,  who  said  that 
we  would  move  in  the  evening  to  attack  the  enemy 
in  his  position  at  Wilson's  Creek,  and  that  I  was  to 
be  prepared  to  move  with  my  brigade ;  the  1st 
Iowa  would  join  the  main  column  with  him,  while 
I  was  to  take  the  Yokermill  (Forsyth)  road,  then 
turn  toward  the  south-west  and  try  to  gain  the  en 
emy's  rear.  At  my  request,  he  said  that  he  would 
procure  guides  and  some  cavalry  to  assist  me  ;  he 
would  also  let  me  know  the  exact  time  when  I 
should  move.  I  then  asked  him  whether,  on  our 
arrival  near  the  enemy's  position,  we  should  attack 
immediately  or  wait  until  we  were  apprised  of  the 
fight  by  the  other  troops.  He  reflected  a  moment 
and  then  said  :  "  Wait  until  you  hear  the  firing  on 
our  side."  The  conversation  did  not  last  longer 
than  about  ten  minutes.  Between  4  and  5  o'clock 
in  the  afternoon  I  received  the  order  to  move  at 
6:30  P.  M.  At  6  o'clock  two  companies  of  cavalry, 
under  Captain  Eugene  A.  Carr  and  Lieutenant 
Charles  E.  Farrand,  joined  us,  also  several  guides. 
My  whole  force  now  consisted  of  8  companies  of 
the  3d  and  9  companies  of  the  5th  Missouri  (912 
men),  G  pieces  of  artillery  (85  men),  and  the  2 
companies  of  cavalry  (121), —  in  all,  1118  men. 

Precisely  at  6  :  30  o'clock  the  brigade  moved  out 
of  its  camp ;  after  following  the  Yokermill  road  for 
about  five  miles  we  turned  south-west  into  the 
woods,  and  found  our  way,  with  difficulty,  to  a  point 
south  of  the  enemy's  camp,  where  we  arrived  be 
tween  11  and  12  o'clock  at  night.  There  we  rested. 
It  was  a  dark,  cloudy  night,  and  a  drizzling  rain  be 
gan  to  fall.  So  far  no  news  of  our  movement  had 
reached  the  enemy's  camp,  as  the  cavalry  in  ad 
vance  had  arrested  every  person  on  the  road,  and 
put  guards  before  the  houses  in  its  neighborhood. 

At  the  first  dawn  of  day  we  continued  our  advance 
for  abcut  a  mile  and  a  half,  the  cavalry  patrols  in 
front  capturing  forty  men  who  had  strolled  into  our 
line  while  looking  for  food  and  water,  and  who  said 
that  twenty  regiments  of  Missouri,  Arkansas,  and 
Louisiana  troops  were  encamped  not  far  distant  in 


the  valley  beyond.  Moving  on,  we  suddenly  found 
ourselves  near  a  hill,  from  which  we  gained  a  full 
view  of  the  camp.  We  halted  a  few  moments, 
when  I  directed  four  pieces  of  our  artillery  to  take 
position  on  the  top  of  the  hill,  commanding  the 
camp,  while  the  infantry,  with  the  other  two  pieces 
and  preceded  by  Lieutenant  Farrand's  cavalry 
company,  continued  its  march  down  the  road  to 
the  crossing  of  Wilson's  Creek. 

It  was  now  5:30  A.  M.  At  this  moment  some 
musket-firing  was  heard  from  the  north-west,  an 
nouncing  the  approach  of  General  Lyon's  troops  ; 
I  therefore  ordered  the  four  pieces  to  open  fire 
against  the  camp,  which  had  a  "stirring"  effect 
on  the  enemy,  who  were  preparing  breakfast. 
The  sin-prise  was  complete,  except  that  one  of 
the  enemy's  cavalrymen  made  good  his  retreat 
from  Lieutenant  Farrand's  dragoons  and  took  the 
news  of  our  advance  to  the  other  side  (General 
Pearce's  headquarters).  I  became  aware  of  his 
escape,  and  believing  that  no  time  should  be  lost 
to  lend  assistance  to  our  friends,  we  crossed  Wil 
son's  Creek,  took  down  the  fences  at  Dixon's 
farm,  passed  through  it  and  crossed  Terrel  (or 
Tyrel)  Creek.  (See  map,  page  290.)  Not  know 
ing  whether  it  would  be  possible  to  bring  all  our 
pieces  along,  I  left  the  four  pieces  on  the  hill,  with 
a  support  of  infantry,  and  continued  our  march 
until  we  reached  the  south  side  of  the  valley,  which 
extends  northward  to  Sharp's  house,  about  3000 
paces,  and  from  west  to  east  about  1000.  We 
took  the  road  on  the  west  side  of  the  valley,  along 
the  margin  of  the  woods,  and  within  a  fence  run 
ning  nearly  parallel  with  the  open  fields. 

During  this  time  a  large  body  of  the  enemy's 
cavalry,  about  2500  strong,  was  forming  across 
the  valley,  not  far  distant  from  its  northern  ex 
tremity  ;  I  therefore  halted  the  column  on  the 
road,  sent  for  the  four  pieces  left  on  the  other 
side  of  the  creek,  and,  as  soon  as  their  approach 
was  reported  to  me,  I  directed  the  head  of  our 
column  to  the  right,  left  the  road,  and  formed  the 
troops  in  line  of  battle,  between  the  road  and  the 
enemy's  deserted  camp, —  the  infantry  on  the  left, 
the  artillery  on  the  right,  and  the  cavalry  on  the 
extreme  right,  toward  Wilson's  Creek.  A  lively 
cannonade  was  now  opened  against  the  dense 
masses  of  the  hostile  cavalry,  which  lasted  about 
twenty  minutes,  and  forced  the  enemy  to  retire  in 
disorder  toward  the  north,  and  into  the  woods.  We 
now  turned  back  into  the  road,  and,  advancing, 
made  our  way  through  a  number  of  cattle  near 
Sharp's  house,  and  suddenly  struck  the  Fayette- 
ville  road,  leading  north  to  that  part  of  the  battle 
field  on  which  General  Lyon's  troops  were  engaged. 
We  were  now  on  the  principal  line  of  retreat  of  the 
enemy,  and  had  arrived  there  in  perfect  order  and 
discipline.  Up  to  this  time  we  had  made  fifteen 
miles,  had  been  constantly  in  motion,  had  had  a  suc 
cessful  engagement,  and  the  troops  felt  encouraged 


THE  FLANKING  COLUMN  AT  WILSON'S  CREEK. 


by  what  they  had  accomplished.  It  is,  therefore, 
totally  false,  as  rumor  had  it  after  the  battle,  that 
"Sigel's  men"  gave  themselves  up  to  plundering 
the  camp,  became  scattered,  and  were  for  this 
reason  surprised  by  the  "  returning  enemy." 

When  we  had  taken  our  position  on  the  plateau 
near  Sharp's,  a  cannonade  was  opened  by  me 
against  a  part  of  the  enemy's  troops,  evidently 
forming  the  left  of  their  line,  confronting  Lyon,  as 
we  could  observe  from  the  struggle  going  on  in  that 
direction.  The  firing  lasted  about  30  minutes.  ^ 

Suddenly  the  firing  on  the  enemy's  side  ceased, 
and  it  seemed  as  if  we  had  directed  our  own  fire 
against  Lyon's  forces.  I  therefore  ordered  the 
pieces  to  cease  firing.  Just  at  this  time  —  it  was 
between  9  and  10  o'clock  —  there  was  a  lull  in  the 
fight  on  the  north  side,  and  not  a  gun  was  heard, 
while  squads  of  the  enemy's  troops,  unarmed,  came 
streaming  up  the  road  from  Skegg's  Branch 
toward  us  and  were  captured.  Meanwhile  a  part 
of  McCulloch's  force  was  advancing  against  us  at 
Sharp's  farm,  while  Reid's  battery  moved  into  po 
sition  on  the  hill  east  of  Wilson's  Creek,  and  oppo 
site  our  right  flank,  followed  by  some  cavalry. 

All  these  circumstances  —  the  cessation  of  the 
firing  in  Lyon's  front,  the  appearance  of  the  ene 
my's  deserters,  and  the  movement  of  Reid's  artil 
lery  and  the  cavalry  toward  the  south  —  led  us  into 
the  belief  that  the  enemy's  forces  were  retreating, 
and  this  opinion  became  stronger  by  the  report  of 
Dr.  Melcher,  who  was  in  advance  on  the  road 
to  Skegg's  Branch,  that  "Lyon's  troops"  were 
coming  up  the  road  and  that  we  must  not  fire. 
So  uncertain  was  I  in  regard  to  the  character  of 
the  approaching  troops,  now  only  a  few  rods  dis 
tant,  that  I  did  not  trust  to  my  own  eyes,  but  sent 
Corporal  Tod,  of  the  3d  Missouri,  forward  to  chal 
lenge  them.  He  challenged  as  ordered,  but  was 
immediately  shot  and  killed.  I  instantly  ordered 
the  artillery  and  infantry  to  fire.  But  it  was 
too  late  —  the  artillery  fired  one  or  two  shots,  but 
the  infantry,  as  though  paralyzed,  did  not  fire  ;  the 
3d  Louisiana,  which  we  had  mistaken  for  the  gray- 
clad  1st  Iowa,  rushed  up  to  the  plateau,  while 
Bledsoe's  battery  in  front  and  Reid's  from  the 
heights  on  our  right  flank  opened  with  canister  at 
point-blank  against  us.  As  a  matter  of  precaution 
I  had  during  the  last  moment  brought  four  of 
our  pieces  into  battery  on  the  right  against  the 
troops  on  the  hill  and  Reid's  battery ;  but  after 
answering  Reid's  fire  for  a  few  minutes,  the  horses 
and  drivers  of  three  guns  suddenly  left  their  posi 
tion,  and  with  their  caissons  galloped  down  the 
Fayetteville  road,  in  their  tumultuous  flight  carry 
ing  panic  into  the  ranks  of  the  infantry,  which 
turned  back  in  disorder,  and  at  the  same  time  re 
ceived  the  fire  of  the  attacking  line. 

On  our  retreat  the  right  wing,  consisting  mostly 
of  the  3d  Missouri  Infantry  and  one  piece  of  artil 
lery,  followed  the  road  we  came,  while  the  left 

i  Colonel  Graves,  commanding  the  First  Brigade,  Mo. 
State  Guards,  says  in  his  report:  "  Colonel  Rosser,  com 
manding  the  1st  Regiment  and  Fourth  Battalion,  with 
Captain  Bledsoe's  artillery,  being  stationed  on  the  ex 
treme  left,  was  attacked  by  Colonel  Sigel's  battery,  and 
his  rnenexposed  to  a  deadly  nreforthirty  minutes. "— F.  8. 

VOL.  I.    20 


wing,  consisting  of  the  5th  Missouri  Infantry  and 
another  piece,  went  down  the  Fayetteville  road, 
then,  turning  to  the  right  (north-west),  made  its 
way  toward  Little  York  and  Springfield ;  on  its 
way  the  latter  column  was  joined  by  Lieutenant 
Farrand's  cavalry  company.  Colonel  Salomon  was 
also  with  this  column,  consisting  in  all  of  about 
450  men,  with  1  piece  and  caisson.  I  remained  with 
the  right  wing,  the  3d  Missouri,  which  was  consid 
erably  scattered.  I  re-formed  the  men  during  their 
retreat  into  4  companies,  in  all  about  250  men,  and, 
turning  to  the  left,  into  the  Fayetteville  road,  was 
joined  by  Captain  Carr's  company  of  cavalry.  After 
considering  that.by  following  the  left  wing  toward 
Little  York,  we  might  be  cut  off  from  Springfield 
and  not  be  able  to  join  General  Lyon's  forces,  we 
followed  the  Fayetteville  road  until  we  reached  a 
road  leading  north-east  toward  Springfield.  This 
road  we  followed.  Captain  Carr,  with  his  cavalry, 
was  leading;  he  was  instructed  to  remain  in  ad 
vance,  keep  his  flankers  out,  and  report  what 
might  occur  in  front.  One  company  of  the  3d 
Missouri  was  at  the  head  of  our  little  column  of 
infantry,  followed  by  the  piece  of  artillery  and  two 
caissons,  behindthem  the  remainder  of  the  infantry, 
the  whole  flanked  on  each  side  by  skirmishers.  So 
we  marched,  or  rather  dragged  along  as  fast  as  the 
exhausted  men  could  go,  until  we  reached  the  ford 
at  James  Fork  of  the  White  River.  Carr  had  al 
ready  crossed,  but  his  cavalry  was  not  in  sight ;  it 
had  hastened  along  without  waiting  for  us  ;  &  a 
part  of  the  infantry  had  also  passed  the  creek  ;  the 
piece  and  caissons  were  just  crossing,  when  the 
rattling  of  musketry  announced  the  presence  of 
hostile  forces  on  both  sides  of  the  creek.  They 
were  detachments  of  Missouri  and  Texas  cavalry, 
under  Lieutenant -Colonel  Major,  Captains  Mabry 
and  Russell,  that  lay  in  ambush,  and  now  pounced 
upon  our  jaded  and  extended  column.  It  was  in 
vain  that  Lieutenant-Colonel  Albert  and  myself 
tried  to  rally  at  least  a  part  of  them ;  they  left  the 
road  to  seek  protection,  or  make  good  their  escape 
in  the  woods,  and  were  followed  and  hunted  down 
by  their  pursuers.  In  this  chase  the  greater  part  of 
our  men  were  killed,  wounded,  or  made  prisoners, 
among  the  latter  Lieutenant-Colonel  Albert  and 
my  orderly,  who  were  with  me  in  the  last  moment 
of  the  affray.  I  was  not  taken,  probably  because 
I  wore  a  blue  woolen  blanket  over  my  uniform  and 
a  yellowish  slouch-hat,  giving  me  the  appearance 
of  a  Texas  Ranger.  I  halted  on  horseback,  pre 
pared  for  defense,  in  a  small  strip  of  corn-field  on 
the  west  side  of  the  creek,  while  the  hostile 
cavalrymen  swarmed  around  and  several  times 
passed  close  by  me.  When  we  had  resumed  our 
way  toward  the  north-east,  we  were  immediately 
recognized  as  enemies,  and  pursued  by  a  few 
horsemen,  whose  number  increased  rapidly.  It  was 
a  pretty  lively  race  for  about  six  miles,  when  our 
pursuers  gave  up  the  chase.  We  reached  Spring- 

&  Colonel  Carr  says  in  his  official  report :  "  It  is 
a  subject  of  regret  with  me  to  have  left  him  [Sigel] 
behind,  but  I  supposed  all  the  time  that  he  was  close 
behind  me  till  I  got  to  the  creek,  and  it  would  have  done 
no  good  for  my  company  to  have  been  cut  to  pieces 
also."— EDITORS. 


306 


THE  OPPOSING  FORCES  AT  WILSON'S  CREEK. 


field  at  4  :  30  in  the  afternoon,  in  advance  of  Stur- 
gis,  who  with  Lyon's  troops  was  retreating  from 
the  battle-field,  and  who  arrived  at  Springfield,  as 
he  says,  at  5  o'clock.  The  circumstance  of  my 
arrival  at  the  time  stated  gave  rise  to  the  insinua 
tion  that  I  had  forsaken  my  troops  after  their  re 
pulse  at  Sharp's  house,  and  had  delivered  them  to 
their  fate.  Spiced  with  the  accusation  of  "  plun 
der,"  this  and  other  falsehoods  were  repeated  be 
fore  the  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War,  and 
a  letter  defamatory  of  me  was  dispatched  to  the 
Secretary  of  War  (dated  February  14th,  1862, 
six  months  after  the  battle  of  Wilson's  Creek). 
I  had  no  knowledge  of  these  calumnies  against  me 
until  long  after  the  war,  when  I  found  them  in  print. 


In  support  of  my  statements,  I  would  direct  at 
tention  to  my  own  reports  on  the  battle  and  to  the 
Confederate  reports,  especially  to  those  of  Lieu 
tenant-Colonel  Hyams  and  Captain  Vigilini,  of  the 
3d  Louisiana  ;  also  to  the  report  of  Captain  Carr, 
in  which  he  frankly  states  that  he  abandoned  me 
immediately  before  my  column  was  attacked  at 
the  crossing  of  James  Fork,  without  notifying 
me  of  the  approach  of  the  enemy's  cavalry.  I 
never  mentioned  this  fact,  as  the  subsequent 
career  of  General  Carr,  his  cooperation  with  me 
during  the  campaigns  of  General  Fre'mont,  and 
his  behavior  in  the  battle  of  Pea  Eidge  vindi 
cated  his  character  and  ability  as  a  soldier  and 
commander. 


THE   OPPOSING    FORCES   AT   WILSON'S   CREEK,    MO. 

The  composition  and  losses  of  each  army  as  here  stated  give  the  gist  of  all  the  data  obtainable  in  the  official  records. 
K  stands  for  killed  ;  w  for  wounded;  m  w  mortally  wounded;  m  for  captured  or  missing  ;  c  for  captured.— EnriOKB. 

COMPOSITION  AND   LOSSES  OF  THE   UNION   ARMY. 

Brig. -Gen.  Nathaniel  Lyon  (k),  Major  Samuel  D.  Sturgis. 


First  Brigade,  Major  Samuel  D.  Sturgis :  Regular  Bat 
talion  (B,  C,  and  I),  1st  Infantry  and  Wood's  company 
Rifle  Recruits),  Capt.  Joseph  B.  Pluiumer;  Battalion  2d 
Mo.  Infantry,  Major  P.  J.  Osterhaus ;  F,  2d  U.  8.  Arty., 
Capt.  James  Totten  ;  Kansas  Rangers,  Capt.  S.  N.  Wood  ; 
B,  1st  U.  S.  Cavalry,  Lieut.  Charles  W.  Canfleld.  Second 
Brigade,  Lieut. -Col.  George  L.  Andrews :  Regular  Bat 
talion  (B  and  E,  2d  Infantry,  Lothrop's  company  General 
Service  Recruits,  and  Morine's  company  Rifle  Recruits), 
Capt.  Frederick  Steele;  DuBois's  Battery  (improvised), 
Lieut.  John  V.  DuBois;  let  Mo.  Infantry,  Lieut. -Col. 
Geo.  L.  Andrews.  Third  Brigade,  Col.  Geo.  W.  Deitzler: 


1st  Kansas,  Col.  Geo.  W.  Deitzler  (w),  Major  J.  A  Halder- 
mau ;  2d  Kansas,  Col.  R.  B.  Mitchell  (w),  Lieut.-Col.  Chas. 
W.  Blair.  Missouri  Volunteers,  Second  Brigade,  Colonel 
FranzSigfl :  3d  Mo.,  Lieut.-Col.  Anselni  Albert ;  5th  Mo., 
CoTTcTET  Salomon ;  I,  1st  U.  S.  Cavalry,  Capt.  Eugene 
A.  Carr;  C,  2d  U.  S.  Dragoons,  Lieut.  C.  E.  Farrand; 
Backof's  Mo.  Arty,  (detachment),  Lieutenants  G.  A. 
Schaefer  and  Edward  Schuetzenbach.  Unattached  Or 
ganizations  :  1st  Iowa  Infantry,  Lieut.-Col.  William  H. 
Merritt ;  Wright's  and  Switzler's  Mo.  Home  Guard  Cav 
alry;  detachment  D,  1st  U.  S.  Cavalry;  Mo.  Pioneers, 
Capt.  J.  D.  Voerster. 


The  Union  loss,  as  officially  reported,  was  223  killed,  721  wounded,  and  291  missing,—  total,  1235.* 

COMPOSITION  AND   LOSSES  OF   THE  CONFEDERATE   ARMY. 


Brig.  -Gen.  Ben.  McJEuIloch. 


MISSOURI  STATE  GDARD,  Major-Gen.  Sterlin  g 


^. 

RAINS'S  DIVISION,  Brig.-Gen.  James  S.  Rains.  FirstBrl- 
gade,  Col.  R.  II.  Weightinan  (m  w),  Col.  John  R.  Graves  : 
1st  Infantry,  Lieut.-Col.  Thomas  H.  Rosser  ;  3d  Infantry, 
Col.  Edgar  V.  Hurst;  4th  Infantry  (battalion),  Major 
Thomas  H.  Murray  ;  5th  Infantry,  Col.  J.  J.  Clarksou  ; 
Graves'B  Infantry,  Col.  John  R.  Graves,  Major  Brashear  ; 
Bledsoe's  Battery,  Capt.  Hiram  Bledsoe.  Second  Bri 
gade,  Col.  Cawthoii  (in  w).  [Composition  of  brigade  not 
given  in  the  official  records.]  PARSONS'S  BRIGADE,  Brig.- 
Gen.  M.  M.  Parsons:  Kelly's  Infantry,  Col.  Kelly  (w)  ; 
Brown's  Cavalry,  Col.  Ben.  Brown  (k)  ;  Guibor's  Battery, 
Capt.  Henry  Guibor.  CLARK'S  DIVISION,  Brig.-Gen.  John 
B.  Clark  :  Bnrbridge's  Infantry,  Col.  J.  Q.  Burbridge 
(w),  Major  John  B.  Clark,  Jr.  ;  1st  Cavalry  (battalion), 
Lieut.-Col.  J.  P.  Major.  SLACK'S  DIVISION,  Brig.-Gen.  W. 
Y.  Slack  (w)  :  Hughes's  Infantry,  Col.  John  T.  Hughes  ; 


Thornton's  Infantry  (battalion),  Major  J.  C.  Thornton ; 
Rives's  Cavalry,  Col.  B.  A.  Rives.  MCBRIDE'S  DIVISION, 
Brig.-Gen.  James  H.  McBride :  Wingo's  Infantry  ;  Fos 
ter's  Infantry,  Col.  Foster  (w) ;  Campbell's  Cavalry, 
Capt.  Campbell. 

ARKANSAS  FORCES,  Brig.-Gen.  N.  B.  Pearce,  1st  Cav 
alry,  Col.  De  Rosey  Carroll ;  Carroll's  Company  Cavalry, 
Capt.  Charles  A.  Carroll;  3d  Infantry,  Col.  John  R. 
Gratiot ;  4th  Infantry,  Col.  J.  D.  Walker ;  5th  Infantry, 
Col.  Tom  P.  Dockery ;  Woodruffs  Battery,  Capt.  W.  E. 
Woodruff;  Reid's  Battery,  Capt.  J.  G.  Reid. 

McCuLLOCH's  BRIGADE  :  1st  Ark.  Mounted  Riflemen, 
Col.  T.  J.  Churchill;  2d  Ark.  Mounted  Riflemen,  Col. 
James  Mclntosh,  Lieut.-Col.  B.  T.  Embry ;  Arkansas 
Infantry  (battalion),  Lieut.-Col.  Dandridge  McRae ; 
South  Kansas-Texas  Mounted  Regiment,  Col.  E.  Greer; 
3d  La.  Infantry,  Col.  Louis  Hebert. 


The  Confederate  loss,  as  officially  reported,  was  265  killed,  800  wounded,  and  30  missing,—  total,  1095.* 

STRENGTH  OF  THE  OPPOSING  FORCES. 


The  Union  forces  are  estimated  from  official  returns 
at  5400  (with  16  guns).  Of  these  1118  were  with  Sigel  and 
350  mounted  reserve.  The  Confederate  forces  are  more 
difficult  to  estimate,  but  Colonel  Snead,  General  Price's 
adjutant-general  during  the  battle,  gives  in  his  volume, 


"  The  Fight  for  Missouri "  (Charles  Scribner's  Sons),  the 
following  estimate,  which  is  doubtless  as  near  the  facts 
as  it  is  possible  to  get:  Price's  force  (Missouri  State 
Guard),  5221 ;  McCulloch's brigade,  2720,  and  Pearce's  bri 
gade,  2234,—  total,  10,175  (with  15  guns). 


THE   SIEGE  OF  LEXINGTON,  MOJ 


BY    COLONEL    JAMES    A.    MULLIGAN. 

OX  the  night  of  the  30th  of  August,  1861,  as  the."  Irish  Brigade"  (23d  Illinois 
Volunteers)  lay  encamped  just  outside  of  Jefferson  City,  Mo.,  I  received 
orders  to  report  to  General  Jefferson  C.  Davis,  commanding  in  the  town. 
On  doing  so,  I  was  informed  by  General  Davis  that  the  cavalry  regiment  of 
Colonel  Thomas  A.  Marshall,  which  had  left  for  the  South-west  some  days 
before,  had  reached  Tipton,  where  it  was  hemmed  in  by  the  enemy,  and 
could  neither  advance  nor  return,  and  that  he  wished  me  to  go  to  Tipton, 
join  Colonel  Marshall,  take  command  of  the  combined  forces,  cut  my  way 
through  the  enemy,  go  to  Lexington,  and  hold  it  at  all  hazards. 

The  next  morning  the  "  Irish  Brigade  "  started  with  forty  rounds  of  ammu 
nition  and  three  days'  rations  for  each  man.  We  marched  for  nine  days 
without  meeting  an  enemy,  foraging  upon  the  country  for  support.  We 
reached  Tipton,  but  found  neither  Colonel  Marshall  nor  the  enemy,  and  we 
passed  on  to  a  pleasant  spot  near  Lexington  where  we  prepared  for  our  entry 
into  the  city.  The  trouble  was  not  so  much  the  getting  into  Lexington  as  the 
getting  out.  At  Lexington  we  found  Colonel  Marshall's  cavalry  regiment  and 
about  350  of  a  regiment  of  Home  Guards.  On  the  10th  of  September  we 
received  a  letter  from  Colonel  Everett  Peabody,  of  the  13th  Missouri  Regi 
ment,  saying  that  he  was  retreating  from  Warrensburg,  34  miles  distant, 
and  that  the  rebel  General  Price  was  in  full  pursuit  with  an  army  of  10,000 
men.  A  few  hours  later  Colonel  Peabody  joined  us. 

There  were  then  at  this  post  the  "  Irish  Brigade,"  Colonel  Marshall's  Illinois 
cavalry  regiment  (full),  Colonel  Peabody's  regiment,  and  a  part  of  the  14th 
Missouri — in  all  about  2780  men,  with  one  six-pounder,  |  forty  rounds  of 


,i  Reprinted,  with  revision,  from  newspaper  re 
ports  of  a  lecture  by  Colonel  Mulligan,  who  was 
killed  during  the  war  (see  page  313).  In  cer 
tain  important  particulars,  the  text  has  been 
altered  to  free  it  from  clearly  demonstrable  er 
rors. —  EDITORS. 


4  This  is  without  doubt  a  mistake.  Colonel  Mul 
ligan  had  7  six-pounders  (Waldsehmidt,  2  ;  Adams, 
3,  and  Pirner,  2) ;  Pirner  also  had  2  brass  mor 
tars  for  throwing  six-inch  spherical  shells,  of  which 
he  had  but  40,  which  were  soon  exhausted.  The 
Confederate  artillery  consisted  of  16  guns  in  five 


307 


3o8  THE  SIEGE  OF  LEXINGTON. 

ammunition,  and  but  few  rations.  We  then  dispatched  a  courier  to  Jefferson 
City  to  inform  General  Davis  of  our  condition,  and  to  pray  for  reinforcements 
or  even  rations,  whereupon  we  would  hold  out  to  the  last.  At  noon  of  the 
llth  we  commenced  throwing  up  intrenchments  on  College  Hill,  an  eminence 
overlooking  Lexington  and  the  broad  Missouri.  All  day  long  the  men  worked 
untiringly  with  the  shovel.  That  evening,  but  six  or  eight  hours  after  we  had 
commenced,  our  pickets  were  driven  in  and  intimation  was  given  that  the 
enemy  were  upon  us.  Colonel  Peabody  was  ordered  out  to  meet  them,  and 
two  six-pounders  were  planted  in  a  position  to  command  a  covered  bridge 
by  which  the  enemy  were  obliged  to  enter  the  town.  It  was  a  night  of 
f earful  anxiety ;  none  knew  at  what  moment  the  enemy  would  be  upon  our 
devoted  little  band,  and  the  hours  passed  in  silence.  We  waited  until  the 
morning  of  the  12th,  vigilantly  and  without  sleep,  when  a  messenger  rushed 
in,  saying,  "  Colonel,  the  enemy  are  pushing  across  the  bridge  in  overwhelm 
ing  force."  With  a  glass  we  could  see  them  as  they  came,  General  Price 
riding  up  and  down  the  lines,  urging  his  men  on.  Two  companies  of  the 
Missouri  13th  were  ordered  out,  and,  with  Company  K  of  the  Irish  Brigade, 
quickly  checked  the  enemy,  drove  him  back,  burned  the  bridge,  and  gallantly 
ended  their  work  before  breakfast. 

The  enemy  now  made  a  detour,  and  approached  the  town  once  more,  by 
the  Independence  road.  Six  companies  of  the  Missouri  13th  and  the  Illinois 
Cavalry  were  ordered  out,  and  met  them  in  the  Lexington  Cemetery,  just 
outside  the  town,  where  the  fight  raged  furiously  over  the  dead.  We  suc 
ceeded  in  keeping  the  enemy  in  check,  and  in  the  mean  time  the  work  with 
the  shovel  went  bravely  on  until  we  had  thrown  up  breastworks  three  or 
four  feet  high. 

At  3  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  the  engagement  opened  with  artillery.  A 
volley  of  grape  from  the  enemy  was  directed  at  a  group  of  our  officers  who 
were  outside  the  breastworks.  Our  men  returned  the  volley.  The  contest 
raged  about  an  hour  and  a  half,  when  we  had  the  satisfaction,  by  a  lucky  shot, 
of  knocking  over  the  enemy's  big  gun,  exploding  a  powder  caisson,  and  other 
wise  doing  much  damage.  The  fight  was  continued  until  dusk,  and,  as  the 
moon  rose,  the  enemy  retired  to  camp  in  the  Fair  Ground,  two  miles  away, 
and  Lexington  was  our  own  again. 

On  Friday,  the  13th,  though  a  drenching  rain  had  set  in,  the  work  of 
throwing  up  intrenchments  went  on,  and  the  men  stood  almost  knee-deep 
in  mud  and  water,  at  their  work.  We  had  taken  the  basement  of  the  Masonic 
College,  a  building  from  which  the  eminence  took  its  name;  powder  was 
obtained,  and  the  men  commenced  making  cartridges.  A  foundry  was  fitted 
up,  and  150  rounds  of  shot  —  grape  and  canister  —  were  cast  for  each  of  our 
six-pounders. 

batteries,  as  follows  :    Bledsoe,  4  guns  ;  Churchill  not  include  in  his  estimate  either  his  officers  or  the 

Clark, 2;  Guibor,  4;  Kelly,  4;  Kneisley,  2. — ("His-  body  of  Home  Guards  who  assisted  in  the  defense. 

tory  of  Lafayette  County,  Missouri.")  Colonel  Snead  states  positively  that,  as  adjutaiit- 

The  lack  of  agreement  between  the  numbers  of  general  of  the  Missouri  troops,  he  paroled  about 

the  Union  forces  as  here  stated,  and  as  given  by  Col-  3500   prisoners.      Among  these  may  have  been 

onel  Snead  on  page  273,  is  accounted  for  by  the  many  not  reckoned  as  effectives  by  Colonel  Mulli- 

latter  on  the  supposition  that  Colonel  Mulligan  did  gan. — EDITORS. 


THE  SIEGE  OF  LEXINGTON. 


309 


SIEGE  OF 
LEXESTGTON.MO. 

SEPT  18, 19.20. 1861. 


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Captain  Joseph  A.  Wilson,  of  Lexington,  thus  describes  the  Union  posi 
tion:  "  The  college  is  on  a  bluff  about  200  feet  above  low-water  mark,  and 
from  15  to  30  feet  higher  than  North  or  Main  street.  Third  street  runs  along 
the  top  of  the  bluff.  Close  to  and  surrounding  the  college  building  was  a 
rectangular  fort  of  sods  and  earth  about  12  feet  thick  and  12  feet  high ;  with 
bastions  at  the  angles  and  embrasures  for  guns.  At  a  distance  of  200  to 
800  feet  was  an  irregular  line  of  earthworks  protected  by  numerous  trav 
erses,  occasional  redoubts,  a  good  ditch,  trous-de-loup,  wires,  etc.,  etc.  Still 
farther  on  the  west  and  north  were  rifle-pits.  The  works  would  have  re 
quired  10.000  or  15,000  men  to  occupy  them  fully.  All  the  ground  from  the 
fortitications  to  the  river  was  then  covered  with  scattering  timber.  The 
spring  just  north  and  outside  of  fortifications,  was  in  a  deep  wooded  ra 
vine,  and  was  the  scene  of  some  sharp  skirmishing  at  night,  owing  to  the 
attempts  of  the  garrison  to  get  water  there  when  their  cisterns  gave  out." 

Explanation  of  the  Diagram  of  the  Hospital  Position  :  "  a  is  the  Anderson  house  or  hospital ;  6  a  smaller  brick 
house  back  of  it ;  c  an  outlying  low  earthwork,  projecting  down  nearly  into  the  ravine,  represented  by  the  dotted 
line,  while  the  inclosed  earthwork  was  built  up  around  the  head  of  the  ravine,  as  shown  by  the  plain  line ;  d  the 
sally-port  in  the  earthworks,  about  one  hundred  yards  from  the  hospital ;  e  a  canal-like  carriageway  leading 
up  to  the  house,  and  in  which  the  sharp-shooters  lay  secure,  only  about  eighty  feet  from  the  front  door  of  the 
hospital;  the  brackets  represent  Federal  picket-guard  stations  with  a  little  dirt  thrown  up  for  protection;  the 
dotted  line  sss  shows  deep  gorge  or  ravine  which  was  full  of  Confederate  sharp-shooters." 

Sunday  had  now  arrived.  We  had  found  no  provisions  at  Lexington,  and 
our  2700  men  were  getting  short  of  rations.  Father  Thaddeus  J.  Butler,  our 
chaplain,  celebrated  mass  on  the  hillside,  and  all  were  considerably  strength 
ened  and  encouraged  by  his  words,  and  after  services  were  over  we  went  back 
to  work,  actively  casting  shot  and  stealing  provisions  from  the  inhabitants 
round  about.  Our  pickets  were  all  the  time  skirmishing  with  the  enemy, 
while  we  were  making  preparations  for  defense  against  the  enemy's  attack, 
which  was  expected  on  the  morrow. 

At  9  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  the  18th  the  enemy  were  seen  approach 
ing.  The  Confederate  force  had  been  increased  to  18,000  men  with  16  pieces 
of  cannon.  They  came  as  one  dark  moving  mass,  their  guns  beaming  in 
the  sun,  their  banners  waving,  and  then-  drums  beating  —  everywhere,  as 
far  as  we  could  see,  were  men,  men,  men,  approaching  grandly.  Our  earth 
works  covered  an  area  of  about  eighteen  acres,  surrounded  by  a  ditch,  and 
protected  in  front  by  what  were  called  "  confusion  pits,"  and  by  mines.  Our 
men  stood  firm  behind  the  breastworks,  none  trembled  or  paled,  and  a  solemn 


3io 


THE  SIEGE  OF  LEXINGTON. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  LEXINGTON,  MO.,  AS  SEEN  FROM  GENERAL  PAKSON8'  POSITION.      AFTER  A  CONTEMPORARY   DRAWING. 

silence  prevailed.  As  Father  Butler  went  round  among  them,  they  asked  his 
blessing,  received  it  with  uncovered  heads,  then  turned  and  sternly  cocked 
their  muskets. 

The  enemy  opened  a  terrible  fire  with  their  cannon  on  all  sides,  which  we 
answered  with  determination  and  spirit.  Our  spies  had  brought  intelligence, 
and  had  all  agreed  that  it  was  the  intention  of  the  enemy  to  make  a  grand 
rush,  overwhelm  us,  and  bury  us  in  the  trenches  of  Lexington. 

At  noon,  word  was  brought  that  the  enemy  had  taken  the  hospital.  We 
had  not  fortified  that ;  it  was  situated  outside  the  intrenchments,  and  I  had 
supposed  that  the  little  white  flag  was  sufficient  protection  for  the  wounded 
and  dying  soldiers  who  had  finished  their  service  and  were  powerless  for  harm. 
The  hospital  contained  our  chaplain,  our  surgeon,  and  a  number  of  wounded. 
The  enemy  took  it  without  opposition,  filled  it  with  their  sharp-shooters,  and 
from  every  window,  every  door,  from  the  scuttles  in  the  roof,  poured  right 
into  our  intrenchments  a  deadly  drift  of  lead.  A  company  of  the  Home 
Guards,  then  a  company  of  the  Missouri  14th,  were  ordered  to  retake  the 
hospital,  but  refused.  The  Montgomery  Guards,  a  company  of  the  Irish 
Brigade,  was  then  ordered  out.  Their  captain  admonished  them  to  uphold 
the  gallant  name  they  bore,  and  the  order  was  given  to  charge.  The  distance 
across  the  plain  from  the  intrenchments  to  the  hospital  was  about  eighty 
yards.  They  started ;  at  first  quick,  then  double-quick,  then  on  a  run,  then 


THE  SIEGE  OF  LEXINGTON.  311 

faster.  Still  the  deadly  fire  poured  into  their  ranks.  But  on  they  went ;  a 
wild  line  of  steel,  and,  what  is  better  than  steel,  irresistible  human  will. 
They  reached  the  hospital,  burst  open  the  door,  without  shot  or  shout,  until 
they  encountered  the  enemy  withii},  whom  they  hurled  out  and  sent  flying 
down  the  hill.  J) 

Our  surgeon  was  held  by  the  enemy,  although  we  had  released  the  Con 
federate  surgeon  on  his  mere  pledge  that  he  was  such.  It  was  a  horrible  thing 
to  see  those  brave  fellows,  mangled  and  wounded,  without  skillful  hands  to 
bind  their  ghastly  wounds ;  and  Captain  David  P.  Moriarty,  who  had  been  a 
physician  in  civil  life,  was  ordered  to  lay  aside  his  sword  and  go  into  the 
hospital.  He  went,  and  through  all  the  siege  worked  among  the  wounded 
with  no  other  instrument  than  a  razor.  Our  supply  of  water  had  given  out 
and  the  scenes  in  the  hospital  were  fearful  to  witness,  wounded  men  suffering 
agonies  from  thirst  and  in  their  frenzy  wrestling  for  the  water  in  which 
the  wounded  had  been  bathed.\ 

On  the  morning  of  the  19th  the  firing  was  resumed,  and  continued  all  day. 
Our  officers  had  told  the  men  that  if  they  could  hold  out  until  the  19th  we 
should  certainly  be  reenforced,  and  all  through  that  day  the  men  watched 
anxiously  for  the  appearance  of  the  friendly  flag  under  which  aid  was  to 
reach  them,  and  listened  eagerly  for  the  sound  of  friendly  cannon.  But  they 
looked  and  listened  in  vain,  and  all  day  long  they  fought  without  water,  their 
parched  lips  cracking,  their  tongues  swollen,  and  the  blood  running  down 
their  chins  when  they  bit  their  cartridges  and  the  saltpeter  entered  their  blis 
tered  lips.  But  not  a  word  of  murmuring. 

The  morning  of  the  20th  broke,  but  no  reinforcements  had  come,  and  still 
the  men  fought  on.  *&  The  enemy  appeared  that  day  with  an  artifice  which 

J)  The  Union  force  held  the  building  an  hour  or  erals  had  no  military  right  to  expect  that  a  strategic 

two,  when  they  were  again  dislodged.     In  regard  position  so  important  to  their  opponents  as  the  Anderson 

J  „  .,      .         ..    ,  ,      ,,      „      „    ,  house  and  premises  manifestly  were,  would  or  should  OR 

to  the  capture  of  the  hospital  by  the  Confederates,  left  in  quiet  p08Se88ion  mereiy  because  they  had  seen  fit 

and  to  its  recapture  by  the  Union  forces,  we  find  to  use  some  part  of  it  for  hospital  purposes.  Nevertheless, 

the  following  in  the  "  History  of  Lafayette  County,  that  first  false  scent  has  been  followed  and  barked  after 

Missouri"    (St.  Louis :  Missouri   Historical   Com-  for  twenty  years -the  Federals  erroneously  claiming 

,       ,  .   ,     .     .,                            «ii,^  an  unjustifiable  attack  on  the  hospital,  and  the  Confed- 

pany,  1881),  a  work  which,  in  its  treatment  of  the  ^J  erroncously  claiming  that  they  were  first  fired 

siege  of  Lexington,    exhibits    impartiality  and   a  on  Dy  Federals  from  inside  the  building,  and  that  for 

painstaking  research,  the  more  valuable  by  reason  that  reason  the  attack  was  made."                EDITORS. 

of  the  meagerness  of  the  official  reports   of  the  <^  After  the  investment,  the  Union  forces  being 

engagement :  entirely  cut  off  from  the  river,  "  Marshall's  cavalry- 

"This  hospital  matter  has  been  much  animadverted  men  an(j  some  of  the  teamsters  had  watered  their 

upon  by  partisan  writers  on  both  sides.      Colonel  Mulli-  Qorseg  Qut    f  th    cisterns  at  the  college,  and  there 

gan  assumed  that  the  Confederates  were  guilty  of  a  ,     . 

breach  of  civilized  warfare  in  firing  on  a  hospital;  and,  was  but   little  water  left,   what  there  was  being 

consequently,  when  his  men  retook  the  building,  having  muddy.     Two  springs  at  the  foot  of  the  bluffs  — 

this  belief  firmly  fixed  in  their  minds,  they  gave  no  one  on  the  north  and   one    on   the   south  —  were 

quarter,  but  killed  every  armed  man  caught  in  the  ciose]v   guarded  by   the   enemy.     .     .     .     One  of 

building,  some  of  the  minor  Confederate  officers  seemed  } >     • •    ^                               .           account  of  the  battle, 
to  labor  under  the  same  impression,  and  claimed,  as  an 

excuse  or  justification  for  the  capture,  that  the  Federals  said:     'On   the   morning   of    the 

had  tired  upon  them  from  inside  the  building ;  but  this  heavily    for     about     two    hours,    saturating    our 

was  positively  denied  at  the  time  by  the  surgeon,  Dr.  Blankets,  which  we  wrung  out  into  our  canteens 

Cooley,  and  the  priest,  Father  Butler,  who  were  in  the  f       drinking'"  ("History   of  Lafayette    Countv, 

hospital,  and  by  Major  Meet,  Mr.  H.  Boothman,   and  ™r           .  ,,  'g        v 

others,  still  living  in  Lexington,  who  were  at  the  time  Missouri     ). — i^DI'  'ORS. 

in  that  part  of  the  intrenchment  nearest  the  hospital.  -&No  reinforcements  reached  Colonel  Mulligan, 

But,  aside  from  this,  the  official  report  of  General  Harris.  th        h  efforts  were  made  to  relieve  him.    Septem- 

made  at  the  time,  shows  that  there  was  no  such  reason  ,          '     ,     0.        .        .,,    -, ..  ~ »              •,     , 

for  the  capture;   but  that  it  was  deliberately  planned  *>er  16th,  Sturgis  with  1100  men,  but  without  ar- 

and  ordered  as  a  rightful  military  movement.    The  Fed-  tillery  or  cavalry,  was  ordered  by  General  Pope  to 


312 


THE  SIEGE  OF  LEXINGTON. 


was  destined  to  overreach  us  and  secure  to  them  the  possession  of  our 
intrenchments.  They  had  constructed  a  movable  breastwork  of  hemp  bales, 
rolled  them  before  their  lines  up  the  hill,  and  advanced  under  this  cover. 
All  our  efforts  could  not  retard  the  advance  of  these  bales.  Bound-shot  and 
bullets  were  poured  against  them,  but  they  would  only  rock  a  little  and  then 
settle  back.  Heated  shot  were  fired 
with  the  hope  of  setting  them  on  fire, 
but  they  had  been  soaked  and  would 
not  burn.  Thus  for  hours  the  fight 
continued.  J  Our  cartridges  were  now 
nearly  used  up,  many  of  our  brave 
fellows  had  fallen,  and  it  was  evident 
that  the  fight  must  soon  cease,  when 
at  3  o'clock  an  orderly  came,  saying 
that  the  enemy  had  sent  a  flag  of 
truce.  With  the  flag  came  a  note 
from  General  Price,  asking  "  why  the 
firing  had  ceased."  I  returned  it,  with 
the  reply  written  on  the  back,  "  Gen 
eral,  I  hardly  know,  unless  you  have 
surrendered."  He  at  once  took  pains 
to  assure  me  that  this  was  not  the 
case.  I  then  discovered  that  the  ma 
jor  of  another  regiment,  in  spite  of 
orders,  had  raised  a  white  flag. 

Our  ammunition  was  about  gone. 
We  were  out  of  rations,  and  had  been 
without  water  for  days,  and  many  of 
the  men  felt  like  giving  up  the  post,  which  it  seemed  impossible  to  hold 
longer.  They  were  ordered  back  to  the  breastworks,  and  told  to  use  up  all 
their  powder,  then  defend  themselves  as  best  they  could,  but  to  hold  their 
place.  Then  a  council  of  war  was  held  in  the  college,  and  the  question  of 


COLONEL    JAMES    A.   MULLIGAN. 


proceed  from  Macon  City  for  the  purpose.  He  did 
so,  but  his  messenger  to  Mulligan  being  intercepted 
by  General  Price,  the  latter,  on  the  19th,  dispatched 
a  force  of  3000  men  or  more  under  General  Par 
sons  and  Colonel  Congreve  Jackson  across  the 
river  to  repel  Sturgis's  advance,  then  within  fifteen 
miles  of  Lexington.  Sturgis,  being  informed  of 
Mulligan's  situation,  retreated  to  Fort  Leaven- 
worth.  Parsons  recrossed  the  river  and  took  part 
in  the  fighting  during  the  afternoon. — EDITORS. 

J  There  are  many  claimants  for  the  credit  of 
having  first  suggested  the  hemp-bale  strategy. 
General  Harris's  official  report  says  : 

"  I  directed  the  bales  to  lie  wet  in  the  river  to  protect 
them  against  the  casualties  of  fire  of  our  troops  and  of 
the  enemy,  but  it  was  soon  found  that  the  wetting  so 
materially  increased  the  weight  as  to  prevent  our  men, 
in  their  exhausted  condition,  from  rolling  it  to  the  crest 
of  the  hill.  I  then  adopted  the  idea  of  wetting  the  hemp 
after  it  had  been  transported  to  its  position." 


As  to  the  date  of  the  use  of  these,  which  is  given 
both  by  Colonel  Mulligan  and  by  Colonel  Snead 
as  the  morning  of  the  20th,  we  quote  the  follow 
ing  circumstantial  account  from  the  official  report 
of  Colonel  Hughes : 

"On  the  morning  of  the  19th,  wo  arose  from  our 
•  bivouac '  upon  the  hills  to  renew  the  attack.  This  day 
we  continued  the  fighting  vigorously  all  day,  holding 
possession  of  the  hospital  buildings,  and  throwing  large 
wings  from  both  sides  of  the  house,  built  up  of  bales  of 
hemp  saturated  with  water,  to  keep  them  from  taking 
fire.  These  portable  hemp-bales  were  extended,  like  the 
wings  of  a  partridge  net,  so  as  to  cover  and  protect 
several  hundred  men  at  a  time,  and  a  most  terrible  and 
galling  and  deadly  fire  was  kept  up  from  them  upon  the 
works  of  the  enemy  by  my  men.  I  divided  my  forces 
into  reliefs  and  kept  some  three  hundred  of  them  pouring 
in  a  heavy  fire  incessantly  upon  the  enemy,  supplying 
the  places  of  the  weary  with  fresh  troops.  On  the  night 
of  the  19th  we  enlarged  and  advanced  our  defensive 
works  very  near  to  the  enemy's  intrenchments,  and  at 
daybreak  opened  upon  their  line  with  most  fatal  effect." 

EDITORS. 


THE  SIEGE  OF  LEXINGTON. 


surrender  was  put  to  the  officers,  and  a  ballot  was  taken,  only  two  out  of  six 
votes  being  cast  in  favor  of  fighting  on.  Then  the  flag  of  truce  was  sent  out 
with  our  surrender. 


Colonel  Snead  (see  page  262)  writes  us  as 
follows  in  regard  to  the  circumstances  of  the 
surrender : 

"  The  surrender  of  Lexington  was  negotiated  on  the 
part  of  Colonel  Mulligan  by  Colonel  Marshall  of  the  1st 
Illinois  Cavalry,  and  on  the  part  of  General  Price  by 
me.  We  met  inside  of  the  Union  lines.  Of  course  I 
demanded  the  unconditional  surrender  of  the  post,  with 
its  officers  and  men  and  material  of  war.  Colonel  Mar 
shall  hesitated,  and  at  last  said  that  he  would  have  to  sub 
mit  the  matter  to  Colonel  Mulligan.  As  we  knew  that 
reinforcements  were  on  the  way  to  Mulligan,  and  as  I 
feared  that  Mulligan  was  only  practicing  a  ruse  in  order 
to  gain  time,  I  said  to  Colonel  Marshall  that  if  the  terms 
which  I  offered  were  not  accepted  within  ten  minutes  I 
should  return  to  our  lines  and  order  fire  to  be  reopened. 
He  left  me,  but  returned  just  as  the  teu  minutes  were 
expiring,  and  said  that  the  surrender  would  be  made  as 
demanded.  I  immediately  sent  one  of  the  officers,  whom 
I  had  taken  with  me,  to  announce  the  fact  to  General 
Price  and  to  ask  when  he  would  accept  the  surrender. 
He  came  over  at  once,  and  notified  Colonel  Mulligan  that 
he  would  himself  accept  the  surrender  of  him  and  his 
field-officers  forthwith,  and  assign  one  of  his  division 
commanders  to  accept  the  surrender  of  the  men  and 
their  company  officers.  Mulligan  and  his  field-officers 
came  forward  immediately,  on  foot,  and  offered  to  sur 
render  their  swords.  General  Price  (next  to  whom  I 
was  sitting)  replied  instantly,  '  You  gentlemen  have 
fought  so  bravely  that  it  would  be  wrong  to  deprive  you 
of  your  swords.  Keep  them.  Orders  to  parole  you  and 
your  men  will  be  issued,  Colonel  Mulligan,  without  un 
necessary  delay.'  The  only  officer  or  man  that  was  not 
paroled,  and  the  only  one  who  was  taken  South,  was 
Colonel  Mulligan." 

Colonel  Mulligan  was  held  as  a  prisoner  until 
the  30th  of  October,  being  accompanied  by  his 
wife,  who  had  been  an  eye-witness  of  the  siege 
from  the  town.  They  journeyed  in  General  Price's 
private  carriage,  and  (Mrs.  Mulligan  says)  received 
"every  possible  courtesy  from  the  general  and  his 
staff."  They  returned  to  St.  Louis  under  escort  of 
forty  men  and  a  flag  of  truce.  In  Chicago  and 
elsewhere  Colonel  Mulligan  was  received  with  en 
thusiastic  honors. 

Colonel  Mulligan,  after  his  exchange,  was  placed 
in  command  along  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio  Rail 
road,  in  western  Virginia.  During  this  period  he 
engaged  in  many  skirmishes  with  the  enemy.  In 
the  battle  of  Winchester,  July  24th,  18  64,  Colonel 
Mulligan  received  three  mortal  wounds.  Some  of 
the  officers,  among  whom  was  his  brother-in-law, 
Lieutenant  James  H.  Nugent,  nineteen  years  of 
age,  attempted  to  carry  him  from  the  field.  Seeing 
the  colors  in  danger  the  colonel  said:  "Lay  me 
down  and  save  the  flag."  Lieutenant  Nugent  res 
cued  the  colors  and  returned  to  the  colonel's  side, 


but  in  a  few  moments  fell,  mortally  wounded.  Col 
onel  Mulligan  died  forty-eight  hours  after,  at  the 
age  of  thirty-four.  After  his  death,  his  widow  re 
ceived  from  President  Lincoln  Colonel  Mulligan's 
commission  of  Brevet  Brigadier-General,  U.  S.  V., 
dated  July  24th,  "for  gallant  and  meritorious  ser 
vices  at  the  battle  of  Winchester." — EDITORS. 

NOTE  :  The  seizure  of  the  money  of  the  Lexing 
ton  Bank  referred  to  by  Colonel  Snead  on  page  273 
is  treated  in  full  in  the  "  History  of  Lafayette 
County,"  from  which  we  condense  the  following 
statement :  Governor  Jackson  having  appropri 
ated  the  school  fund  of  the  State  to  the  arming 
and  equipment  of  the  State  troops,  and  the  pro 
posal  having  been  made  to  force  loans  from  certain 
banks  for  the  same  purpose,  General  Fremont,  in 
order  to  checkmate  this  action  of  the  Governor, 
ordered  the  funds  of  certain  banks  to  be  sent  to 
St.  Louis,  not  for  the  use  of  the  Federal  author 
ities,  but  to  prevent  their  employment  to  aid  the 
enemy.  By  his  order,  Colonel  Marshall  secured 
the  funds  of  the  State  Bank  of  Lexington  against 
the  protest  of  the  officers,  giving  a  receipt  for  the 
amount,  which  was  $960,159.60,  of  which  $165,- 
659.60  was  in  gold.  The  money  was  buried  in  the 
fort  under  Colonel  Mulligan's  tent,  and  upon  the 
surrender  every  dollar  of  the  gold  was  delivered  to 
General  Price,  but  $15,000  in  notes  of  the  bank 
was  missing.  Governor  Jackson  and  General  Price 
ordered  all  the  money  to  be  restored  to  the  bank, 
but  on  the  30th  of  September  made  a  demand 
upon  the  bank  for,  and  under  threat  of  force  re 
ceived,  the  sum  of  $37,337.20  in  gold,  claimed  to 
be  due  to  the  State  under  an  act  of  the  Legislature 
of  Missouri,  which  permitted  of  the  suspension  of 
certain  banks  on  the  condition  that  they  should 
loan  the  State  on  its  bonds  a  certain  portion  of 
their  fund.  At  the  time  of  the  capture  of  Lexing 
ton  the  State  Convention  of  Missouri  had  deposed 
Governor  Jackson  and  elected  in  his  place  Hamil 
ton  R.  Gamble.  The  Union  State  Government 
made  demand  afterward  for  the  same  sum,  which 
was  paid  and  bonds  of  the  State  issued  therefor, 
which  were  redeemed  at  their  face  value  when  due. 
The  sum  given  to  Governor  Jackson  was  charged 
by  the  bank  to  "profit  and  loss."  See  also  page 
280  for  General  Fremont's  declaration  of  policy 
in  this  respect.  "  The  funds  of  other  banks  of  the 
State  were  taken  possession  of  by  the  Federal 
authorities,  transported  to  St.  Louis,  and  in  due 
time  every  dollar  returned." — EDITORS. 


THE    PEA    RIDGE    CAMPAIGN. 

BY  FRANZ  SIGEL,  MAJOR-GENERAL,  U.  S.  V. 

JHE  battle  of  Pea  Ridge  (or  Elkhorn  Tavern,  as  the  Confed 
erates  named  it)  was  fought  on  the  7th  and  8th  of  March, 
1862,  one  month  before  the  battle  of  Shiloh.  It  was  the 
first  clear  and  decisive  victory  gained  by  the  North  in  a 
pitched  battle  west  of  the  Mississippi  River,  and  until  Price's 
invasion  of  1864  the  last  effort  of  the  South  to  carry  the 
war  into  the  State  of  Missouri,  except  by  abortive  raids. 
Since  the  outbreak  of  the  rebellion,  Missouri,  as  a  border 
and  slave  State,  had  represented  all  the  evils  of  a  bitter  civil 
strife.  The  opening  events  had  been  the  protection  of  the 
St.  Louis  arsenal,  the  capture  of  Camp  Jackson,  the  minor 
engagements  at  Boonville  and  Carthage,  the  sanguinary 
struggle  at  Wilson's  Creek  on  the  10th  of  August,  forever 
memorable  by  the  heroic  death  of  General  Lyon.  The  re 
treat  of  our  little  army  of  about  4500  men  to  Rolla,  after 
UNIFORM  OF  THE  UN,TED  STATES  that  battle,  ended  the  first  campaign  and  gave  General 
Sterling  Price,  the  military  leader  of  the  secessionist 
forces  of  Missouri,  the  opportunity  of  taking  possession  of  Springfield,  the 
largest  city  and  central  point  of  south-west  Missouri,  and  of  advancing  with 
a  promiscuous  host  of  over  15,000  men  as  far  as  Lexington,  on  the  Missouri 
River,  which  was  gallantly  defended  for  three  days  by  Colonel  Mulligan. 
Meanwhile,  General  Fremont,  who  on  the  25th  of  July  had  been  placed  in 
command  of  the  Western  Department,  had  organized  and  put  in  motion  an 
army  of  about  30,000  men,  with  86  pieces  of  artillery,  to  cut  off  Price's  forces, 
but  had  only  succeeded  in  surprising  and  severely  defeating  about  a  thousand 
recruits  of  Price's  retiring  army  at  Springfield  by  a  bold  movement  of  250 
horsemen  (Fremont's  body-guard  and  a-  detachment  of  "  Irish  Dragoons ") 
under  the  lead  of  Major  Zagonyi.  Our  army,  in  which  I  commanded  a  divis 
ion,  was  now  concentrated  at  Springfield,  and  was  about  to  follow  and  attack 
the  forces  of  Price  and  McCulloch,  who  had  taken  separate  positions,  the  one 
(Price)  near  Pineville  in  the  south-western  corner  of  Missouri,  the  other 
(McCulloch)  near  Keetsville,  on  the  Arkansas  line.  Although  McCulloch  was 
at  first  averse  to  venturing  battle,  he  finally  yielded  to  the  entreaties  of  Price, 
and  prepared  himself  to  cooperate  in  resisting  the  further  advance  of  Fremont. 
Between  Price  and  McCulloch  it  was  explicitly  understood  that  Missouri 
should  not  be  given  up  without  a  struggle.  Such  was  the  condition  of  things 
when  the  intended  operations  of  General  Fremont  were  cut  short  by  his 
removal  from  the  command  of  the  army  (November  2d),  his  successor  being 
General  David  Hunter.  The  result  of  this  change  was  an  immediate  and 
uncommonly  hasty  retreat  of  our  army  in  a  northerly  and  easterly  direction, 
to  Sedalia  on  the  9th,  and  to  Rolla  on  the  13th ;  in  fact,  the  abandonment  of 
the  whole  south-west  of  the  State  by  the  Union  troops,  and  the  occupation  of 

314 


THE  PEA  RIDGE  CAMPAIGN. 


the  city  of  Springfield  for  the  second  time  by  the  enemy,  who  were  greatly  in 
need  of  more  comfortable  winter  quarters.  They  must  have  been  exceed 
ingly  glad  of  the  sudden  disappearance  of  an  army  which  by  its  numerical 
superiority,  excellent  organization,  and  buoyant  spirit  had  had  a  very  good 
chance  of  at  least  driving  them  out  of  Mis 
souri.  As  it  was,  the  new-fledged  "  Confed 
erates  "  ^  utilized  all  the  gifts  of  good  for 
tune,  organized  a  great  portion  of  their 
forces  for  the  Confederate  service,  and 
provided  themselves  with  arms,  ammuni 
tion,  and  equipments  for  the  field,  while 
the  Northern  troops  were  largely  reduced 
by  the  hardships  of  miserable  winter 
quarters,  and  the  Union  refugees  who  had 
left  their  homes  were  in  great  part  huddled 
together  in  tents  in  the  public  places  and 
streets  of  Eolla  and  St.  Louis,  and  were  de 
pendent  on  the  charity  of  their  sympathiz 
ing  friends  or  on  municipal  support.  The 
whole  proceeding  was  not  only  a  most 
deplorable  military  blunder,  but  also  a 
political  mistake.  To  get  rid  of  Fremont, 
the  good  prospects  and  the  honor  of  the 
army  were  sacrificed.  It  would  be  too  mild 
an  expression  to  say  that  the  Union  peo 
ple  of  Missouri,  or  rather  of  the  whole  West,  felt  disappointed;  there  was 
deep  and  bitter  indignation,  even  publicly  manifesting  itself  by  demonstra 
tions  and  protests  against  the  policy  of  the  Administration,  and  especially 
against  its  political  and  military  advisers  and  intriguers,  who  sacrificed  the 
welfare  of  the  State  to  their  jealousy  of  an  energetic  and  successful  rival. 

To  regain  what  was  lost,  another  campaign  —  the  third  in  the  course  of  eight 
months  —  was  resolved  upon.  It  was  undertaken  by  the  very  same  army, 
but  under  a  different  commander,  and  greatly  reduced  on  account  of  the 
prevalence  of  diseases  and  the  extraordinary  mortality  in  the  different  camps 
during  the  months  of  inactivity ;  in  truth,  the  campaign  from  September  to 
November  had  "  to  be  done  over  again "  in  January,  February,  and  March, 
in  the  midst  of  a  very  severe  winter,  and  with  the  relations  of  numerical 
strength  reversed.  Toward  the  end  of  December,  '61,  when  not  fully  restored 
from  a  severe  illness,  I  was  directed  by  General  Halleck  (who,  on  November  9th, 
had  succeeded  General  Hunter,  the  command  now  being  called  the  Depart 
ment  of  the  Missouri)  to  proceed  to  Rolla,  to  take  command  of  the  troops 
encamped  there,  including  my  own  division  (the  Third,  afterward  the  First) 

&  On  the  29th  of  October,  when  I  was  engaged  federate   Congress  by  the   Eump   Legislature   of 

in  a  reconnoissance  on   Bloody  Hill,  at  Wilson's  Missouri. —  F.  S. 

Creek,  I  heard   the  salute  of   one  hundred  guns  This  body  was  composed  of  39  representatives 

fired  at  Xeosho  in  celebration  of  the  act  of  seces-  and  10  senators  —  each  number  being  far  short  of 

sion,  and  of  the  sending  of  delegates  to  the  Con-  a  lawful  quorum. —  EDITORS. 


MAJOR-GENERAL    SAMUEL    R.    CURTIS. 
FROM  A  PHOTOGRAPH. 


3i6  THE  PEA  RIDGE  CAMPAIGN. 

and  General  Asboth's  (the  Fourth,  afterward  the  Second),  and  to  prepare 
them  for  active  service  in  the  field.  I  arrived  at  Rolla  on  the  23d  of  December, 
and  on  the  27th,  when  the  organization  was  completed,  I  was  superseded  by 
General  Samuel  R.  Curtis,  who  had  been  appointed  by  Halleck  to  the  com 
mand  of  the  District  of  South-west  Missouri,  including  the  troops  at  Rolla. 
The  campaign  was  opened  by  the  advance  of  a  brigade  of  cavalry  under 
Colonel  E.  A.  Can*  on  the  29th  of  December  from  Rolla  to  Lebanon,  for  the 
purpose  of  initiating  a  concentration  of  forces,  and  to  secure  a  point  of  sup 
port  for  the  scouting  parties  to  be  pushed  forward  in  the  direction  of  Spring 
field,  the  supposed  headquarters  of  the  enemy.  (See  map,  p.  263.) 

On  January  9th,  after  toilsome  marching,  all  the  disposable  forces  were 
assembled  at  Lebanon.  Here,  by  order  of  General  Curtis,  the  army  was 
organized  into  4  divisions  of  2  brigades  each,  besides  a  special  reserve.  | 

Before  we  reached  Lebanon  I  was  doubtful  about  my  personal  relations  to 
General  Curtis,  which  had  been  somewhat  troubled  by  his  sudden  appearance 
at  Rolla  and  the  differences  in  regard  to  our  relative  rank  and  position,  but 
the  fairness  he  showed  in  the  assignment  of  the  commands  before  we  left 
Lebanon,  and  his  frankness  and  courtesy  toward  me,  dispelled  all  appre 
hensions  on  my  part,  and  with  a  light  heart  and  full  confidence  in  the  new 
commander,  I  entered  into  the  earnest  business  now  before  us. 

The  army  left  Lebanon  on  the  10th  of  February,  arrived  at  Marshfield  on 
the  llth,  at  McPherson's  Creek,  about  12  miles  from  Springfield,  on  the 
12th,  where  a  light  engagement  with  the  rear-guard  of  the  enemy's  troops 
occurred,  and  took  possession  of  Springfield  on  the  13th.  Price's  army  of 
Missourians,  about  8000  strong,  had  retired  and  was  on  its  way  to  Cassville. 
On  entering  Springfield  we  found  it  pitifully  changed, — the  beautiful  "Gar 
den  City "  of  the  South-west  looked  desolate  and  bleak ;  most  of  the  houses 
were  empty,  as  the  Union  families  had  followed  us  to  Rolla  after  the  retreat 
of  General  Hunter  in  November,  1861,  and  the  secessionists  had  mostly  fol 
lowed  Price.  The  streets,  formerly  lined  with  the  finest  shade  trees,  were 
bereft  of  their  ornament,  and  only  the  stumps  were  left.  General  Price  had 
applied  his  vacation-time  well  in  organizing  two  brigades  under  Colonel  Little 
and  General  Slack  for  the  Southern  Confederacy,  had  spread  out  his  com 
mand  as  far  as,  and  even  beyond,  the  Osage  River,  and  would  have  been 
reenforced  by  several  thousand  recruits  from  middle  Missouri,  if  they  had 
not  been  intercepted  on  their  way  South  by  Northern  troops.  As  it  was,  he 
took  whatever  he  found  to  his  purpose,  destroyed  what  he  could  not  use,  and 
feeling  himself  not  strong  enough  to  venture  battle,  withdrew  to  Arkansas  to 
seek  assistance  from  McCulloch.  We  followed  him  in  two  columns,  the  left 
wing  (Third  and  Fourth  Divisions)  by  the  direct  road  to  Cassville,  the  right 
wing  (First  and  Second  Divisions),  under  my  command,  by  the  road  to  Little 
York,  Marionsville,  and  Verona,  both  columns  to  unite  at  McDowell's,  north 
of  Cassville. 

I  advanced  with  the  Benton  Hussars  during  the  night  of  the  13th  to  Lit 
tle  York,  and  as  it  was  a  very  cold  night,  the  road  being  covered  with  a 

4.  For  details  of  the  composition  and  losses  of  both  armies,  see  page  337. —  EDITORS. 


THE  PEA  RIDGE  CAMPAIGN.  317 

crust  of  ice,  we  had  to  move  slowly.  On  this  night  march  about  eighteen 
horsemen,  including  myself,  had  their  feet  frozen.  In  the  neighborhood  of 
Marionsville  we  captured  a  wagon  train  and  150  stragglers  of  the  enemy,  and 
arrived  at  McDowell's  just  at  the  moment  when,  after  a  short  engagement, 
the  left  wing  had  driven  Price's  rear-guard  out  of  the  place.  From  this 
time  our  army  moved,  united,  to  Cassville  and  Keetsville,  forced  without 
great  trouble  Cross  Timber  Hollows,  a  defile  of  about  ten  miles  in  length 
across  the  Missouri-Arkansas  State  line,  leading  to  Elkhorn  Tavern,  and 
arrived  at  Sugar  Creek  on  the  18th  of  February.  We  were  now  over  320  miles 
from  St.  Louis,  and  210  miles  from  our  base  at  Rolla.  The  Third  and  Fourth 
Divisions  advanced  from  this  position  12  miles  farther  south  to  Cross  Hol 
lows,  where  also  the  headquarters  of  General  Curtis  were  established,  and 
the  First  and  Second  to  Bentonville,  12  miles  to  the  south-west,  while  a 
strong  cavalry  force  under  General  Asboth  went  to  Osage  Springs.  On  the 
23d  General  Asboth  made  a  dash  into  Fayetteville,  twenty  miles  in  advance, 
found  the  city  evacuated,  and  planted  the  Union  flag  on  the  court-house. 
To  balance  things  somewhat,  a  raiding  party  of  the  enemy  surprised  our 
foragers  near  Huntsville,  and  another  party  ventured  as  far  as  Keetsville, 
in  our  rear,  playing  havoc  with  the  drowsy  garrison  of  the  place. 

On  March  1st  Colonel  Jeff.  C.  Davis's  division  withdrew  from  Cross  Hollows 
and  took  position  immediately  behind  Little  Sugar  Creek,  covering  the  road 
which  leads  from  Fayetteville,  Arkansas,  by  Elkhorn  Tavern  to  Springfield, 
and  as  an  approach  of  J?he  enemy  was  expected  to  take  place  on  that  road  from 
the  south,  Colonel  Davis  made  his  position  as  strong  as  possible  by  crowning 
the  hills  north  of  the  creek  with  abatis  and  parapets  of  felled  trees ;  he  also 
protected  one  of  his  batteries  in  the  rear  of  the  bridge  with  intrenchments. 
As  we  shall  see,  these  works  never  became  of  any  practical  value. 

On  the  2d  of  March  the  First  and  Second  Divisions  moved  4£  miles  south 
of  Bentonville  to  McKissick's  farm.  Colonel  Schaefer,  with  the  2d  Missouri 
Infantry  and  a  detachment  of  cavalry,  was  sent  to  Smith's  Mills  (Osage 
Mills),  7  miles  east  of  McKissick's  farm,  as  a  post  of  observation  toward  Elm 
Springs,  and  for  the  purpose  of  protecting  and  working  the  mill  —  at  that 
time  and  under  our  circumstances  a  very  important  "  strategic  object." 

Another  detachment  of  cavalry  was  stationed  at  Osage  Springs  to  hold 
connection  with  the  division  at  Cross  Hollows  (south  of  Elkhorn  Tavern), 
and  to  scour  the  country  toward  Fayetteville  and  Elm  Springs.  On  the  5th, 
a  detachment  under  Major  Conrad  was  on  its  way  from  McKissick's  farm  to 
Maysville,  30  miles  west  of  McKissick's  farm;  by  order  of  General  Curtis, 
another  detachment  under  Major  Meszaros  went  to  Pineville,  25  miles  north 
west,  while  from  Carr's  division  a  detachment  under  Colonel  Vandever  had 
been  sent  as  far  east  as  Huntsville,  40  miles  from  Cross  Hollows,  making  the 
line  of  our  front  about  seventy  miles  from  Maysville  in  the  west  to  Hunts 
ville  in  the  east.  Since  the  18th  of  February,  when  we  took  our  first  position 
at  Sugar  Creek,  Price  had  made  his  way  to  the  Boston  Mountains  (Cove 
Creek),  between  Fayetteville  and  the  Arkansas  Eiver,  where  he  united 
with  McCulloch. 


318 


THE  PEA  RIDGE  CAMPAIGN. 


Although  serving  the  same  cause,  there  never  existed  an  entente  cordiale 
between  the  two  champions  of  Missouri  and  Arkansas;  the  two  men  were  too 
different  in  their  character,  education,  and  military  policy  to  understand  each 
other  perfectly,  to  agree  in  their  aims  and  ends,  and  to  subordinate  them 
selves  cheerfully  one  to  the  other.  McCulloch  was  a  "  rough-and-ready  "  man, 
not  at  all  speculative,  but  very 
practical,  to  the  point,  and  rich 
in  resources  to  reach  it.  In  his 
youth  he  was  a  hunter  and  trap 
per;  he  served  under  Sam  Hous 
ton,  with  the  artillery,  in  the 
battle  of  San  Jacinto,  partici 
pated  in  the  Mexican  war  as 
captain  of  a  company  of  Texas 
rangers,  and  when  the  war  for 
the  Union  broke  out,  he  was 
very  active  in  Texas  in  secur 
ing  much  war  material  from 
the  United  States,  and  forcing 
United  States  troops  to  surren 
der.  He  was  a  good  fighter, 
energetic  in  battle,  and  quick 
in  discerning  danger  or  espying 
the  weak  point  of  his  antagon 
ist;  an  excellent  organizer,  dis 
ciplinarian,  and  administrator, 
indefatigable  in  recruiting  and 
equipping  troops.  His  care  for 
them  was  proverbial,  and  his 
ability  in  laying  out  encampments  was  extraordinary,  and  challenged  the 
admiration  of  our  troops. 

In  a  strategical  point  of  view,  McCulloch  was  more  bent  to  the  defense  of 
the  Trans-Mississippi  region,  especially  Arkansas  and  the  Indian  Territory, 
which  district  had  been  put  under  his  command,  than  to  aggressive  move 
ments  beyond  the  borders  of  Arkansas.  Price  had  also  had  military  experience 
in  the  Mexican  war,  which  circumstance,  combined  with  his  political  position, 
his  irreproachable  personal  character  and  sincere  devotion  to  the  cause 
which  he  embraced,  after  the  catastrophe  of  Camp  Jackson,  had  made  him  the 
military  head  of  the  secession  forces  in  the  State.  Brave,  and  gifted  with  the 
talent  of  gaining  the  confidence  and  love  of  his  soldiers,  he  was  undoubtedly 


MAJOR-GENERAL    EARL    VAN    DORN,    C.    S.    A. 
FROM  A  PHOTOGRAPH. 


THE  PEA  RIDGE  CAMPAIGN.  319 

the  proper  man  to  gather  around  him  and  hold  together  the  heterogeneous 
military  forces;  but,  having  no  organized  State  or  Government  to  back 
him,  he  seldom  could  rise  above  the  effectiveness  of  a  guerrilla  chief,  doing 
business  on  a  large  scale  and  almost  on  his  own  account.  His  army  was 
an  ever-changing  body,  varying  from  week  to  week,  advancing  and  retreat 
ing,  without  stability  of  quarters  and  security  of  resources,  and  therefore 
not  disciplined  in  a  manner  to  be  desired.  Sometimes  there  were  men  and 
no  arms  for  them,  or  muskets  without  caps  and  horses  without  riders ;  at 
other  times  the  army  of  camp-followers  and  poorly  mounted  infantry  was 
almost  as  large  as  the  fighting  force  of  infantry.  No  wonder  then  that  in 
spite  of  the  great  popularity  of  the  champion  of  Missouri,  McCulloch 
became  disgusted  in  meeting  the  half-starved  "State  Guards"  of  Missouri 
with  their  "  huckleberry  "  cavalry  and  their  great  crowd  of  unarmed,  noisy 
camp-followers. 

It  was  therefore  fortunate  for  the  Confederates  that  on  the  10th  of  Jan 
uary,  1862,  Major-General  Earl  Van  Dora,  was  appointed  by  Jefferson 
Davis  to  the  command  of  the  Trans-Mississippi  Department,  and  that  he 
took  charge  of  the  combined  forces  about  to  confront  Curtis.  He  was  a 
graduate  of  West  Point  and  had  served  with  honors  in  the  Mexican  war  as 
lieutenant  of  infantry,  and  was  in  the  United  States  service  as  major  at  the 
opening  of  the  war.  Having  joined  the  Confederacy,  he  was  appointed 
colonel,  and  already  in  Texas  had  been  of  great  service  to  his  cause.  On  the 
14th  of  February,  1862, — the  very  day  when  the  Army  of  the  South-west 
took  possession  of  Springfield, —  he  wrote  to  Price  from  his  headquarters 
at  Pocahontas,  stating  in  detail  his  plan  for  "  attempting  St.  Louis  and  car 
rying  the  war  into  Illinois."  Our  appearance  in  Arkansas  suddenly  changed 
the  situation.  Van  Dorn  at  once  hastened  from  Jacksonport  to  Van  Buren 
on  the  24th  of  February,  issued  a  very  nourishing  proclamation  on  the  2d  of 
March,  and  on  the  3d  the  Confederate  army  was  on  its  way  from  the  Boston 
Mountains  to  Fayetteville  and  Elm  Springs,  at  which  latter  place  its  advance 
arrived  on  the  evening  of  the  5th.  On  this  march  Price's  troops  were  lead 
ing,  followed  by  the  division  of  McCulloch,  while  General  Albert  Pike,  who 
had  come  from  the  Indian  Territory  by  way  of  Evansville  with  a  brigade  of 
Indians,  brought  up  the  rear.  The  secrecy  of  the  movement  was  so  well  kept 
that  positive  news  did  not  reach  us  until  the  5th,  when  the  Confederates 
were  about  a  day's  march  from  my  position  at  McKissick's  farm.  It  was  the 
intention  of  Van  Dorn  to  move  early  on  the  6th  and  "  gobble  up "  my  two 
di visions  before  they  could  prepare  for  defense  or  make  good  their  retreat ; 
I  had,  however,  ample  time  to  guard  myself  against  the  attempted  cap 
ture,  as  I  had  not  only  been  advised  by  General  Curtis  on  the  5th,  after 
nightfall,  of  the  advance  of  the  enemy,  but  also  had  received  positive  proof 
of  the  movement  from  Colonel  Schaefer  at  Smith's  Mill,  whose  outposts  had 
been  attacked  on  the  evening  of  the  same  day,  which  fact  he  immediately 
reported.  It  was  now  necessary  for  us  to  concentrate  to  meet  the  enemy's 
advance,  and  Colonel  Schaefer  was  then  directed  to  fall  back  during  the 
night  to  Bentonville  and  await  further  instructions.  The  time  for  the  two 


320  THE  PEA  RIDGE  CAMPAIGN. 

divisions  to  leave  McKissick's  farm  and  march  by  Bentonville  to  Sugar 
Creek  was  fixed  for  2  o'clock  A.  M.  of  the  6th,  but,  before  the  movement 
began,  the  commanders  of  divisions  and  brigades,  with  their  staff-officers, 
met  at  my  headquarters  at  1  o'clock  A.  M.  of  that  day,  to  be  informed 
of  the  enemy's  movements  and  to  receive  verbal  instructions  respecting 
the  order  of  march,  and  the  precautions  to  be  taken  during  the  retreat. 
At  precisely  2  o'clock  A.  M.  of  the  6th,  G-eneral  Asboth's  division  left 
McKissick's  farm  with  the  whole  train,  followed  by  the  division  of  Colonel 
Osterhaus.  They  passed  through  Bentonville  from  4  to  8  o'clock  A.  M.,  and 
arrived  at  the  camp  behind  Sugar  Creek  at  2  P.  M.,  where  the  Union  army 
was  to  concentrate. 

For  the  purpose  of  defending  the  main  column  on  its  retreat,  and  with  the 
intention  of  finding  out  whether  the  enemy  was  approaching  in  strong  force, 
and  whether  he  was  advancing  from  Smith's  Mill  on  the  road  to  Bentonville, 
or  by  Osage  Springs,  or  on  both  roads  at  the  same  time,  I  remained  at 
Bentonville  with  about  600  men,  and  a  battery  of  6  pieces,  after  all  the 
troops  had  left  the  place.  J) 

During  this  time  Colonel  Nemett,  who  had  been  sent  out  with  the 
Benton  Hussars  to  reconnoiter,  reported  to  me  that  he  had  met  the  enemy's 
cavalry,  and  that  several  thousand  men,  cavalry,  and  infantry  were  forming 
in  line  of  battle  about  a  mile  from  Bentonville  on  the  open  fields  south  of 
the  village.  From  personal  observation  I  found  out  that  this  was  correct, 
and,  therefore,  had  not  the  least  doubt  that  we  had  the  advance  of  an  army 
before  us.  This  was  at  precisely  10  o'clock.  I  state  these  facts  to  show 
how  egregiously  Van  Dorn  was  mistaken  in  supposing  that  if  he  had  arrived 
an  hour  sooner — Maury  says  30  minutes  sooner — "he  would  have  cut  me  off 
with  my  whole  force  [of  7000  men],  and  certainly  have  beaten  the  enemy 
[our  army  at  Sugar  Creek]  the  next  day."  As  it  really  was,  he  only  found 
my  rear-guard  of  600  men  in  his  front,  because  at  the  hour  when  his  troops 
advanced  against  Bentonville,  the  leading  division  (Asboth's)  of  our  retreating 
column  crossed  Sugar  Creek,  10  miles  from  Bentonville.  Van  Dorn  officially 
says,  "We  followed  him  [Sigel],  our  advance  skirmishing  with  his  rear 
guard,  which  was  admirably  handled,  until  we  gained  a  point  on  Sugar  Creek, 
about  7  miles  beyond  Bentonville,  and  within  1  or  2  miles  of  the  strongly 
intrenched  camp  of  the  enemy."  Van  Dorn  then  ascertained,  in  a  conference 
with  McCulloch  and  Mclntosh,  that  by  making  a  detour  of  eight  miles  he  could 
outflank  our  position  on  Sugar  Creek,  and  reach  the  Telegraph  road  in  our 
rear,  which  movement  he  commenced  soon  after  dark,  Price's  division  leading. 
He  expected  to  reach  the  point  in  our  rear,  north  of  Elkhorn  Tavern,  before 
daylight,  but  011  account  of  obstructions  placed  on  the  road  by  Colonel 
Dodge's  Iowa  regiment  his  march  was  so  impeded  that  Price's  division  did 
not  gain  the  Telegraph  road  until  nearly  10  A.  M.  of  the  7th,  the  first  day 
of  the  battle,  while  McCulloch's  division,  and  the  Indian  brigade  under  Pike, 

|  Colonel  Frederick  Schaefer's  2d  Missouri  regi-  lowed  the  division  of  Colonel  Osterhaus  toward 
ment  was  also  to  be  retained,  to  form  a  part  of  the  Sugar  Creek ;  he  was  ambuscaded  on  the  way, 
rear-guard,  but  by  some  misunderstanding  he  fol-  and  lost  thirty-seven  men. — F.  S. 


THE  PEA  RIDGE  CAMPAIGN.  321 

had  only  reached  a  point  opposite  Leetown,  about  five  miles  distant  from 
where  Price  struck  the  Telegraph  road.     (See  map,  p.  322.) 

During  the  night  of  the  6th  our  army  rested  quietly  in  its  position  behind 
Sugar  Creek.  General  Asboth's  division  held  the  extreme  right,  on  the 
entrance  of  the  Bentonville  road,  Colonel  Osterhaus's  was  on  his  left,  Colonel 
Davis's  in  the  center,  and  Colonel  Carr's,  which  during  the  5th  had  retreated 
from  Cross  HoUows  (Camp  Halleck)  behind  Sugar  Creek,  was  posted  on  the 
extreme  left.  Asboth's  division  was  facing  west  and  south-west ;  the  other 
two  divisions  were  facing  toward  the  south.  Curtis  expected  to  be  attacked 
from  the  south,  and  had  made  all  his  preparations  accordingly.  I  was, 
however,  doubtful  whether  the  enemy  would  knock  his  head  against  a 
position  naturally  so  strong,  and  for  this  reason  expected  the  main  attack 
from  the  direction  of  Bentonville  against  Asboth's  division,  i.  e.,  against  our 
right  flank  and  rear.  To  ascertain,  therefore,  what  was  going  on  during  the 
night  in  the  direction  mentioned,  I  sent  out  two  of  my  scouts  (Brown  and 
Pope)  with  some  cavalry,  to  proceed  as  far  as  possible  toward  the  west  and 
north-west,  and  report  any  movement  of  hostile  troops  immediately.  Toward 
morning  they  reported  that  during  the  night  troops  and  trains  were  moving 
on  the  back  road,  around  our  position  toward  Cross  Timber;  that  they 
had  heard  the  noise  of  wagons  or  artillery,  but  they  had  not  seen  the 
troops.  I  then  ordered  Lieutenant  Schramm,  of  my  staff,  to  go  out  with 
an  escort  and  bring  in  more  information.  This  was  at  5  o'clock  in  the 
morning.  His  report,  made  a  little  after  6  o'clock,  left  no  doubt  in  my 
mind  that  the  enemy  was  moving  around  our  position  toward  the  north 
east  (Springfield  road).  I  now  went  out  myself  and  saw  clearly  trains  and 
troops  moving  in  the  direction  mentioned.  At  about  the  same  time  when 
the  flanking  movement  of  the  enemy  was  discovered  on  our  right,  Major 
Weston  of  the  24th  Missouri  Infantry,  who  was  posted  in  our  rear,  at  Elk- 
horn  Tavern,  was  informed  by  his  outposts  of  the  advance  of  some  of  the 
enemy's  cavalry  on  the  roads  from  Bentonville  and  Cassville,  toward  his 
position.  Between  6  and  7  in  the  morning,  skirmishing  had  begun  near  the 
tan-yard,  on  the  Cassville  road,  north  of  Elkhorn  Tavern,  so  that  his  reports 
and  those  sent  in  by  myself  reached  General  Curtis  during  the  early  morning 
of  the  7th.  A  meeting  of  the  division  commanders  was  called  by  him  for 
8  o'clock  at  Pratt's  store,  and  after  a  short  consultation  he  directed  Colonel 
Carr  to  take  position  at  Elkhorn  Tavern,  while  Colonel  Bussey  was  directed  to 
proceed  with  the  cavalry  of  the  different  commands  (except  the  3d  Illinois),  and 
with  three  pieces  of  Elbert's  battery  to  move  by  Leetown  against  the  enemy, 
supposed  to  be  advancing  in  that  direction.  Colonel  Osterhaus  was  also 
requested  to  accompany  Colonel  Bussey  for  the  purpose  of  taking  control  of 
the  movement.  As  up  to  that  time  not  even  a  demonstration  had  been  made 
against  our  front  on  Little  Sugar  Creek,  and  there  was  no  doubt  in  my  mind 
that  the  main  forces  of  the  enemy  were  working  around  our  flank,  I  suggested 
the  necessity  of  supporting  our  cavalry  by  at  least  a  brigade  of  infantry  and 
another  battery  of  my  command,  because  a  repulse  of  the  cavalry  might 
lead  to  serious  consequences.  The  proposition  was  immediately  accepted, 

VOL.  I.    21 


THE  PEA  RIDGE  CAMPAIGN. 


323 


[Mr.  Hunt  P.  Wilson,  who  was  a  member  of  Gui 
bor's  Confederate  battery,  has  given  the  following 
description  in  the  "St.  Louis  Republican"  of  the 
contest  011  the  Confederate  right  in  the  first  day's 
fight.  He  also  describes  the  ground  where  the 
principal  fighting  on  both  days  took  place,  'for 
which  reason  his  account  is  useful  in  connection 
with  the  map  on  the  preceding  page  and  the  cut 
on  page  330 : 

"  The  Missouri  army  by  a  long  night  march  had  passed 
completely  around  the  Federal  right  flank,  marching  to 
the  north-east  of  Big  Mountain,  then  forming  line  of  bat 
tle  facing  south  on  the  Keetsville  and  Fayetteville  or 
'  Wire '  road,  directly  in  General  Curtis's  rear.  The 
country  on  this  side  of  the  hill  is  broken  with  high 
ridges  and  deep  hollows  through  which  the  Wire  road 
runs.  The  column  entered  by  what  is  called  Cross 
Timber  Hollow.  Some  of  the  ridges  are  loO  feet  high. 
In  the  valley  of  this  defile  is  located  what  is  known  as 
the  tan-yard,  three-quarters  of  a  mile  from  Elkhorn 
Tavern.  From  the  tan-yard  there  is  a  gradual  ascent, 
and  alongside  the  road  runs  a  deep  hollow  reaching  up 
to  the  spring  near  the  tavern.  At  the  head  of  this  and 
crossing  it  is  a  'bench'  along  the  base  of  the  mountain. 
Along  this  bench  was  the  United  States  Cavalry  under 
General  Carr.  Along  the  road  leading  down  from  the 
tavern  were  the  Iowa  troops  with  artillery,  and  on  their 
right,  reaching  to  the  east  of  the  Van  Winkle  road,  on 
which  there  are  a  few  clearings,  General  Curtis  pro 
longed  his  line  of  battle.  Another  hollow  leads  from  the 
tan-yard  to  the  south-east,  and  at  the  head  of  this  hollow 
rested  the  Federal  right.  .  .  .  The  battle  was  opened 
by  the  Iowa  Battery  [Hayden's]  of  4  guns,  on  the  Wire 
road,  supported  by  the  Iowa  troops  with  2  guns  150  feet 
further  up  the  road,  to  which  Guibor's  battery  re 
sponded  from  the  opposite  ridge  at  a  distance  of  250 
yards.  The  other  Confederate  batteries  with  the  infan 
try  arriving  by  the  same  road,  took  position  further  to 
the  left,  and  opened  on  the  enemy's  right  wing." 

Mr.  Wilson  says  of  the  first  Confederate  line  : 
"  Some  State  Guard  Cavalry  under  Bob  McCulloch 
and  Congreve  Jackson  formed  on  the  extreme  left.  Then 
on  their  right  came  Bledsoe's  and  Clark's  and  McDonald's 
batteries,  Raius's  infantry,  Wade's  battery,  a  regiment 
of  infantry,  and  then  Guibor's  battery.  This  filled  out 
the  ridge.  Little's  Confederate  brigade  was  on  the  right 
across  the  tan-yard  hollow.  Within  an  hour  the  Iowa 
Battery  was  obliged  to  withdraw.  Soon  after,  Gates 's 
regiment  of  cavalry  came  up  the  hollow  in  front  of  the 
guns,  and  went  half-way  up  the  slope,  dismounted,  every 
fourth  man  holding  the  horses,  then  formed  and  moved 
up  the  brow  of  the  hill.  At  the  same  time,  Little's  Con 
federate  brigade,  which  had  by  this  time  come  into  line, 
opened  on  the  Iowa  troops  in  their  rear,  with  Gates  in 
their  front.  After  a  fierce  contest  of  musketry,  Little's 
brigade  swung  around  and  cut  off  part  of  the  Federal 
line,  the  remainder  retreating  up  to  the  tavern.  Guibor's 
battery  now  moved  around  to  the  position  which  had 
been  held  by  the  Iowa  Battery.  Guibor's  battery  had 
gone  up  with  Little's  line  and  the  fight  was  renewed  on 
the  ne\v  line." 

He  thus  describes  the  Confederate  advance  : 
"  The  fire  in  front  began  to  lull,  and  Slack's  brigade 
with  Rives's  and  Burbridge's  regiments  came  up  on  a 
left-wheel,  with  Rains  on  their  left,  across  to  the  hollow, 
and  the  whole  line  charged  up  with  a  wild  cheer.  Cap 
tain  Guibor,  who  well  understood  how  to  fight  artillery 
in  the  brush,  took  all  the  canister  he  could  lay  his  hands 
on,  and  with  two  guns  went  up  in  the  charge  with  the 
infantry.  General  Rains's  brigade  on  the  left,  led  by 
Colonel  Walter  Scott  O'Kane,  and  Major  Rainwater  made 
a  brilliant  dash  at  the  redoubt  and  battery  which  had 
been  throwing  on  them  for  an  hour  or  more  from  its 
position  in  an  old  field.  Eight  guns  were  captured  along 
the  line.  The  Federal  troops  being  dislodged  from  the 
woods  began  forming  in  the  fields  and  planted  some  new 


batteries  back  of  the  knobs  in  the  rear.  And  now  the 
fight  grew  furious.  Gorham's  battery  could  not  hold  its 
position,  and  fell  back  to  its  old  place.  Guibor  planted 
his  two  guns  directly  in  front  of  the  tavern  and  opened 
at  close  quarters  with  grape  and  canister  on  the  Federal 
line,  in  which  great  confusion  was  evident,  as  officers 
could  be  seen  trying  to  rally  and  re-form  their  men. 

"The  entire,  Confederate  line  was  charging  up  to  the 
Elkhorn  Tavern ;  Colonel  Carr,  the  Federal  cavalry  com 
mander,  had  withdrawn  hrs  command  from  the  bench 
of  the  mountain  on  the  Confederate  right.  The  Illinois 
Battery,  at  first  planted  in  the  horse-lot  west  of  the 
tavern,  had  limbered  to  the  rear  and  taken  a  new  posi 
tion  in  the  fields.  The  Federal  Mountain  Howitzer  Bat 
tery  had  also  moved  away.  The  3d  Iowa  Battery,  which 
had  poured  such  a  hot  fire  down  the  road  upon  Guibor 
and  Gorham,  had  by  this  time  lost  the  use  of  two  of  its 
guns,  dismounted  by  the  fire  of  Guibor's  battery,  but 
continued  to  fight  its  two  remaining  guns  until  the  Con 
federate  regiment  of  Colonel  Clint  Burhridge  was  upon 
them;  when,  their  horses  being  killed,  that  regiment 
took  them  in,  and  at  nightfall  brought  them  down  the 
road.  To  the  left  on  the  Van  Winkle  road  the  [Confeder 
ate]  batteries  of  McDonald,  Bledsoe,  and  Wade  had  been 
engaged  in  a  severe  artillery  duel  in  which  the  Federal 
batteries  held  their  own  until  the  Confederate  infantry 
got  within  range,  when  they  were  forced  back,  leaving 
two  guns  captured  by  Rains's  men  led  by  the  gallant 
O'Kane.  The  cavalry  on  the  extreme  left,  under  General 
John  B.  Clark  and  Colonel  Robert  McCulloch,  had 
turned  the  Federal  right  wing,  and  the  latter's  entire 
line  was  falling  back  to  meet  reinforcements  hurrying 
to  their  assistance  from  Sugar  Creek  on  their  left  rear. 
The  Federals  placed  18  or  20  guns  to  command  the 
tavern.  Guibor  moved  up  with  the  Confederate  line, 
or  a  little  in  advance,  and  formed  in  battery  in  the  nar 
row  road  in  front  of  the  tavern,  losing  several  horses  in 
the  movement.  And  now  commenced  a  hot  fight.  The 
rapid  fire  of  the  twenty  pieces  of  Federal  artillery  .  .  . 
commenced  waving  and  blazing  in  his  front,  while  the 
two  guns  were  replying  with  grape  and  canister.  Xow 
came  the  crisis.  A  regiment  of  United  States  infantry 
moved  out  of  the  timber  on  the  left  front  of  the  guns,  about 
one  hundred  yards  distant,  with  a  small  field  intervening, 
the  fences  around  it  leveled  to  the  ground.  On  Guibor's 
right  was  the  tavern,  on  his  left  a  blacksmith's  shop, 
and  in  the  lot  some  corn-cribs.  Behind  these  buildings 
'Rock'  Champion  had  placed  his  company  of  cavalry 
to  protect  their  horses  from  thickly  flying  bullets.  Rock's 
quick  eye  saw  the  bright  bayonets  as  they  were  pushing 
through  the,  brush,  and,  riding  up,  he  yelled  in  his  rough- 
and-ready  style, '  Guibor,  they're  flankin'  you ! '  '  I  know 
it,  but  I  can't  spare  a  gun  to  turn  on  them,'  was  the  reply. 
There  was  no  supporting  infantry  on  his  left.  Said  Rock, 
'  I'll  charge  them ! '  This  meant  to  attack  a  full  regiment 
of  infantry  advancing  in  line,  700  or  800  strong,  with  22 
men.  .  .  .  Galloping  back  a  few  paces  to  his  little 
band,  his  clear,  ringing  voice  could  be  heard  by  friend 
and  enemy.  '  Battalion,  forward,  trot,  inarch,  gallop, 
march,  charge ! '  and  with  a  wild  yell  in  they  went,  their 
gallant  chief  in  the  lead,  closely  followed  by  '  Sabre  Jack ' 
Murphy,  an  old  regular  dragoon;  Fitzsimmons.Coggins, 
O'Flaherty,  Pomeroy,  and  the  others.  The  last  named 
were  old  British  dragoons ;  three  of  them  had  ridden  with 
the  heavy  squadrons  at  Balaklava  and  all  well  knew 
what  was  in  front  of  them.  .  .  .  Within  thirty  seconds 
they  were  right  in  the  midst  of  the  surprised  Federal 
infantry,  shouting,  slashing,  shooting.  Corporal  Casey 
charged  on  foot.  Guibor's  two  guns  were  at  the  same 
time  turned  left  oblique  and  deluged  the  Federal  left 
with  canister.  The  result  was  precisely  what  Champion 
had  foreseen,  and  proved  his  reckless  courage  was  di 
rected  by  good  judgment.  The  attack  was  a  clear  sur 
prise,  the  result  a  stampede;  the  infantry  fired  an  aimless, 
scattering  volley,  then,  expecting  a  legion  of  horsemen 
to  fall  on  them,  fled  in  confusion.  Champion  did  not 
follow.  Knowing  when  to  stop  as  well  as  to  commence, 
he  secured  their  flag  and  quickly  returned  to  the  battery 
which  he  had  saved,  with  a  loss  of  only  three  of  his  gal 
lant  rough-riders."] 


THE  PEA  RIDGE  CAMPAIGN. 


and  so  it  happened  that  after  the  disaster  which  befell  our  cavalry, \  the 
advance  and  onslaught  of  McCulloch's  troops  were  checked  by  the  command 
of  Osterhaus.  The  speedy  arrival  of  Colonel  Jeff.  C.  Davis's  division  on  the 
right  of  Osterhaus,  and  its  energetic  advance,  turned  a  very  critical  moment 
into  a  decisive  victory  of  our  arms.  McCulloch  and  Mclntosh  fell  while 
leading  their  troops  in  a  furious  attack  against  Osterhaus  and  Davis.  Hebert 
and  a  number  of  his  officers  and  men 
were  captured  by  pickets  of  the  36th 
Illinois  (cavalry)  under  Captain  Smith 
and  of  the  44th  Illinois  infantry  under 
Captain  Russell.  Thus  the  whole  of  Mc 
Culloch's  column,  deprived  of  its  leaders 
and  without  unity  of  command,  was 
thrown  into  confusion  and  beaten  back. 
During  the  night  of  the  7th  scarcely 
two-thirds  of  it  reached  the  wing  under 
Price,  near  Elkhorn  Tavern,  ft 

Though  a  great  advantage  was  gained 
on  our  side  by  the  death  or  capture  of 
those  leaders,  the  principal  cause  of 
our  success  was  rather  the  quick  ral 
lying  and  the  excellent  manoeuvring  of 
Osterhaus's  and  Davis's  forces,  as  well 
as  the  coolness  and  bravery  of  their 
infantry,  supported  by  Welfley's,  Hoff 
mann's,  and  Davidson's  batteries.  Os 
terhaus  changed  his  front  twice  under  the  fire  of  the  enemy,  to  meet  the 
dangerous  flank  attack  and  pressure  of  Hebert's  Louisiana  and  Arkansas 
infantry,  while  the  brigades  of  Davis,  by  striking  the  left  of  McCulloch's 
advancing  column,  threw  it  into  disorder  and  forced  it  to  retreat.  It  was 
during  this  conflict  that  two  officers,  Major  John  C.  Black  of  the  37th  Illinois 
and  Major  Sidney  Post  of  the  59th  Illinois,  although  both  severely  wounded 
in  the  right  arm,  refused  to  leave  the  field  until  peremptorily  ordered  to 
do  so.  Here  fell  Lieutenant-Colonel  John  A.  Hendricks  of  the  22d  Indiana, 
receiving  two  mortal  wounds. 

While  our  left  wing  was  thus  successful  against  about  11,500  of  the  enemy, 
the  right  wing  under  Carr  had  been  sorely  pressed  by  the  6500  Missourians 
under  Van  Dorn  and  Price.  In  spite  of  the  heroic  resistance  of  the  two  bri 
gades  of  Dodge  and  Vandever,  and  the  reinforcements  sent  to  them  during 


MAJOR-GENERAL    PETER    J.    OSTERHAUS. 
FROM  A  PHOTOGRAPH. 


\  Elbert,  Bussey,  and  the  Hussars  were  repulsed 
by  Pike  with  Drew's  and  Stand  Watie's  Indian 
regiments,  and  Sims's  and  Welch's  cavalry.  Mc 
Culloch  was  farther  to  the  left  with  Hebert  and 
Mclntosh,  who  became  engaged  with  Davis's  di 
vision  —  at  first  with  the  brigade  of  Julius  White, 
who  retired  a  short  distance  when  Pattisou 
came  up  and  aided  him  in  flanking  McCulloch's 
line. — EDITORS. 


•&  Of  McCulloch's  column,  Drew  retreated  to  the 
south-west  toward  Bentonville.  Watie,  Welch,  and 
Greer  joined  Van  Dorn  in  the  night,  but  Watie 
retreated  to  Bentonville  during  the  next  day's 
fight.  Pike  himself  remained.  Greer,  who  suc 
ceeded  McCulloch  in  command  of  the  wing,  moved 
with  the  remainder  of  the  force  and  joined  Van 
Dorn,  taking  position  on  the  left,  as  shown  on  the 
map,  page  322. —  EDITORS. 


THE  PEA  RIDGE  CAMPAIGN. 


325 


the  afternoon,  ,1  they  were  forced  back  from  position  to  position,  until  Elk- 
horn  Tavern  was  taken  by  the  enemy,  and  our  crippled  forces,  almost  without 
ammunition,  their  artillery  reduced  by  losses  of  guns,  men,  and  horses,  their 
infantry  greatly  reduced,  had  to  seek  a  last  shelter  in  the  woods  and  behind 
the  fences,  separated  from  the  enemy's  position  by  open  fields,  but  not  farther 
than  a  mile  from  our  trains.  There  they  formed  a  contracted  and  curved 
line,  determined  to  resist,  not  dis 
heartened,  but  awaiting  with  some 
apprehension  another  attack.  Fortu 
nately,  the  enemy  did  not  follow  up 
his  success,  and  night  fell  in,  closing 
this  terrible  conflict.  While  this  en 
gagement  of  our  right  wing  was  in 
progress,  I  received  an  order  from 
General  Curtis  at  2  o'clock  p.  M.  to 
reenforce  Colonels  Osterhaus  and 
Davis  with  the  remainder  of  the 
troops  of  the  First  and  Second  Di 
visions,  held  in  reserve  near  our  orig 
inal  position,  between  Sugar  Creek 
and  Elkhorn  Tavern.  Before  receiv 
ing  this  order  I  sent  Major  Poten  with 
the  17th  Missouri,  2  companies  of  the 
15th,  2  companies  of  the  3d  Missouri, 
a  section  of  artillery  (Elbert's  2  pieces), 
and  a  squadron  of  Bent  on  Hussars  un 
der  Major Heinrichs,  toward  the  south 
west,  to  try  to  gain  the  rear  of  a  hostile  force  stationed  there.  Leaving  a 
small  detachment  as  a  guard  in  our  camp,  I  moved  with  all  the  other  troops 
by  Leetowii  to  the  battle-field,  north  of  the  town.  We  arrived  just  in  time 
to  give  a  send-off  to  the  retreating  hostile  forces,  and,  joined  by  Osterhaus's 
brigade,  advanced  toward  the  east,  parallel  with  the  curve  formed  by  the 
chain  of  hills  called  Pea  Ridge,  with  the  intention  of  bringing  assistance 
to  our  right  wing,  where  the  noise  of  the  engagement  with  Van  Dorn  and 
Price  was  unabating. 

We  had  to  move  slowly  and  cautiously,  as  a  part  of  the  enemy's  forces 
evidently  tried  to  rally  on  our  left  flank  but  withdrew  after  some  little  skir 
mishing  with  the  44th  Illinois.  Reaching  finally  an  open  field  about  half  a 
mile  from  the  last  spur  of  the  hills,  looking  down  upon  Elkhorn  Tavern,  we 
halted,  and  report  was  sent  to  General  Curtis's  headquarters,  describing  our 
position  and  asking  for  orders.  At  that  time  it  had  become  dark,  firing  on 
the  right  had  almost  ceased,  and  as  we  had  not  sufficient  knowledge  of 
the  position  of  the  enemy,  or  our  own  troops  on  the  right,  I  concluded  to 

J  Five  companies  of  the  8th  Indiana  and  3  pieces  Chapman's  battery,  5  companies  of  the  25th  Illi- 
of  Klauss's  Indiana  battery;  part  of  the  Second  Di-  nois,  a  section  of  Hoffmann's  battery.  Bowen's  cav- 
vision,  -i  companies  of  the  2d  Missouri,  4  pieces  of  airy  battalion,  and  moiintain  howitzers. —  F.  S. 


MAJOR-GENERAL  EfGEXE  A.  CARR. 
FROM  A  PHOTOGRAPH. 


326 


THE  PEA  RIDGE  CAMPAIGN. 


stay  where  we  were,  and  took  the 
necessary  precautions  to  make  our 
position  secure.  To  conceal  it  as 
much  as  possible,  no  camp-fires  were 
allowed,  and  the  troops  lay  silently 
on  the  field  resting  on  their  arms. 
Between  12  and  1  o'clock  the  out 
posts  reported  some  noise  at  a  dis 
tance  from  our  left,  as  if  troops  were 
moving  toward  the  north-east.  I 
therefore  went  out  with  one  of  my 
staff-officers  as  far  as  our  line  of  out 
posts,  and  remained  there  about  half 
an  hour,  but  could  hear  nothing.  I, 
however,  saw  distinctly  the  camp-fires 
of  Price's  troops  extending  from  the 
heights  near  Elkhorn  Tavern  far  down 
toward  the  south-east.  Toward  the 
west  and  south-west  the  sky  was  illu 
mined  by  two  large,  isolated  camp- 
fires,  one  about  midway  between  Elk- 
horn  Tavern  and  Leetown,  and  the 
other  four  or  five  miles  farther  off  in 
the  direction  of  Bentonville.  This,  in 
connection  with  what  we  had  seen  during  the  afternoon,  when  some  of  the 
enemy's  troops  were  moving  along  the  heights  of  Pea  Ridge  toward  Elk- 
horn  Tavern,  and  others  toward  the  south-west,  and  with  what  the  outposts 
had  reported,  made  it  clear  to  my  mind  that  the  enemy  would  not  venture 
battle  again  near  Leetown,  but  that  McCulloch's  troops  would  join  those 
of  Price,  and  by  a  united  effort  try  to  overwhelm  our  right  wing  at  Elk- 
horn  Tavern.  For  this  reason,  and  to  give  our  worn-out  and  hungry  troops 
something  to  eat,  good  camp-fires  and  rest,  I  resolved  to  withdraw  them 
from  their  position,  move  them  back  to  our  camp,  and  lead  them  forward 
again  in  the  morning  to  the  same  ground,  to  fall  upon  the  enemy's  right  flank 
and  rear,  as  soon  as  he  should  begin  his  attack.  Leaving  the  Benton  Hussars 
and  a  line  of  outposts  with  a  reserve  of  infantry  on  the  field,  to  guard  our 
position,  I  marched  off  from  the  left,  called  in  all  the  detachments  from 
wherever  they  were,  and  formed  the  two  divisions  in  such  a  manner  on  the 
road  leading  from  my  headquarters  to  the  ground  we  had  left,  that,  by  reach 
ing  it  with  the  head  of  our  column,  we  could  bring  it  in  the  shortest  possible 
time  on  the  right  into  line,  and  come  into  action  at  the  very  moment  the  first 
regiment  and  battery  had  taken  their  position.  All  these  preparations  were 
completed  before  daybreak  of  the  8th. 

During  the  night  of  the  7th  the  division  of  Colonel  Davis  had  been  called 
in  by  General  Curtis  from  Leetown,  and  in  the  morning  it  took  position 
on  the  Telegraph  road,  in  place  of  Carr's  division,  which  had  borne  the  brunt 


BRIGADIER-GENKRAL    JAMES    M'INTOSH. 
FROM    A    PHOTOGRAPH. 


THE  PEA  RIDGE  CAMPAIGN.  327 

of  the  battle  of  the  day  before,  and  was  now  withdrawn,  and  the  greater  part 
of  it  held  in  reserve.  Pattison's  brigade,  of  Davis's  division,  formed  on  the 
right  of  the  Telegraph  road,  with  Klauss's  battery  before  the  center  of  the 
line;  the  second  brigade  (the  37th. and  59th  Illinois),  under  Colonel  White, 
formed  on  the  left  of  the  road,  supported  by  Davidson's  batteiy.  Colonel 
Carr,  although  wounded,  assisted  in  placing  these  troops. 

It  was  a  little  after  6  o'clock  in  the  morning  when  I  sent  out  Colonel  Oster- 
haus  with  Captain  Asmussen  of  my  staff  to  reconnoiter  the  ground  on  which 
I  intended  to  deploy,  and  to  find  the  nearest  road  leading  to  it.  The  44th 
Illinois  followed  the  two  officers  for  the  purpose  of  marking  the  right  of  the 
position  to  be  taken,  but  with  orders  to  keep  concealed  as  much  as  possible, 
and  not  to  enter  into  an  engagement  unless  attacked.  Half  an  hour  later,  I  was 
standing  in  front  of  my  tent,  ready  to  mount,  and  anxiously  awaiting  the 
return  of  the  staff-officers,  when  suddenly  a  few  cannon-shots  in  our  front, 

/  */ 

from  Davidson's  Union  battery,  announced  the  conflict.  At  this  moment  Gen 
eral  Curtis,  to  whom  I  had  sent  word  during  the  night  where  my  two  divisions 
were  assembling,  and  that  they  would  be  ready  for  action  in  the  morning, 
rode  toward  me  from  the  direction  where  the  firing  had  begun,  and,  some 
what  excitedly,  said :  "  General,  I  have  opened  the  battle ;  it  will  be  a  hard 
fight ;  Davis  is  already  there.  Please  bring  your  troops  in  line  as  quickly  as 
possible."  I  confess  that  I  did  not  understand  the  reason  why  a  cannonade 
was  commenced  on  our  side  when  we  were  not  ready  to  meet  a  counter-attack 
of  the  enemy  with  a  good  chance  of  success,  the  more  so,  as  I  had  been  out 
in  our  front  before  General  Curtis  met  me,  and  had  found  that  our  line  was 
weak,  stretched  out  in  an  open  field,  the  Telegraph  road  obstructed  by  artil 
lery,  ammunition-wagons,  and  other  vehicles,  and  that  there  was  no  room  to 
deploy  my  divisions,  except  behind  the  first  line  and  masked  by  it ;  nor  on 
the  left,  unless  immediately  exposed  to  and  raked  by  the  fire  of  the  enemy, 
whose  batteries  were  supposed  to  be  posted  in  the  margin  of  the  woods,  whence 
they  could  reach  my  troops  at  point-blank  range.  I  explained  this  to  General 
Curtis,  made  him  acquainted  with  the  object  in  view,  told  him  that  I  expected 
Colonel  Osterhaus  and  Captain  Asmussen  back  every  moment,  and  finally 
asked  him  to  give  me  ten  minutes'  time  to  wait  for  them,  when  I  would  move 
immediately  to  the  position  selected  and  commence  the  attack.  Even  if  our 
troops  on  the  right  should  be  compelled  to  yield,  it  could  only  be  momenta 
rily,  as  the  enemy  would  have  to  direct  his  whole  attention  to  my  attack  on 
his  flank  and  rear.  I  never  felt  more  relieved  than  when  General  Curtis,  evi 
dently  encouraged  by  this  proposition,  said :  "Well,  General,  do  what  you  pro 
pose."  I  must  add  here  that  I  had  not  seen  General  Curtis  during  the  night 
and  before  I  met  him  near  my  tent ;  he  could,  therefore,  not  have  been  fully 
aware  of  what  I  had  experienced  in  my  position  away  from  him  on  the  left, 
and  what  my  intention  was  to  do  in  the  morning,  although  I  had  sent  Captain 
Asmussen  to  his  headquarters  to  report  to  him,  receiving,  however,  no  orders 
from  him  in  return.  After  our  conversation,  which  lasted  only  a  few  minutes, 
the  two  officers  came  back  in  all  haste,  and  reported  that  they  had  found  an 
excellent  position ;  that  no  enemy  was  in  sight,  and  that  Colonel  Knobels- 


328 


THE  PEA  RIDGE  CAMPAIGN. 


dorff,  with  his  regiment,  was  posted  as  directed.  G-eneral  Curtis  declared 
himself  satisfied  and  rode  off,  but  scarcely  had  he  left  me  when  the  can 
nonade  in  front  became  very  brisk,  some  of  the  hostile  missiles  bursting 
over  our  heads. 

I  mounted,  told  Colonel  Osterhaus  to  take  charge  of  our  column  and  move 
it  to  the  position  to  be  occupied ;  then,  accompanied  by  Captain  Asmussen, 
I  rode  to  the  front,  where  Davis's 
division  had  formed  into  line,  to 
see  what  was  going  on.  I  found 
one  of  our  batteries  hotly  engaged, 
but  compelled  to  withdraw,  which 
exposed  the  infantry  on  the  right 
to  an  enfilading  fire,  and  also 
forced  it  to  change  its  position. 
One  of  the  regiments — I  think  it 
was  the  22d  or  the  8th  Indiana — 
was  thrown  into  momentary  dis 
order  by  this  surprise,  and  the  men 
fell  back  toward  an  eminence  on 
the  right  of  the  road  on  which  I 
was  halting.  I  assisted  their  brave 
commander  to  rally  them,  which 
did  not  take  long,  and  spoke  a  few 
words  to  them,  saying  that  if  the 
right  could  hold  out  for  half  an 
hour,  assistance  would  come,  and 
all  would  be  well.  Meanwhile  an 
other  regiment  had  formed  on  the 
left,  the  battery  had  taken  position 
again  and  was  supported  by  four 
other  guns  (of  White's  brigade), 
farther  to  the  left,  diverting  the 
enemy's  fire.  The  line  stood  firm, 
and  as  no  hostile  infantry  appeared,  I  took  leave  of  the  commander  of  the 
"  Indiana  boys,"  and  hastened  to  my  own  troops.  I  reached  the  head  of  the 
column  when  it  wTas  just  debouching  from  the  woods,  and  the  first  battery 
that  arrived  took  position  on  the  left  of  the  44th  Illinois,  which  was  kneeling 
behind  a  fence.  In  about  15  minutes  the  First  Division  (Osterhaus's)  was 
formed  into  line,  with  the  artillery  in  the  intervals  between  the  infantry, 
the  Second  Division  in  reserve,  about  250  paces  behind  our  right,  with 
General  Asboth  at  its  head,  who,  in  spite  of  his  wound  received  on  the  7th, 
was  again  in  the  saddle.  Our  position,  in  full  view  of  the  open  fields,  which 
sloped  gently  down  toward  the  long  skirt  of  woods,  where  the  enemy's  artil 
lery  and  infantry  were  posted,  was  excellent,  and  allowed  the  full  develop 
ment  of  our  forces.  The  enemy's  batteries  received  us  well,  but  many  of  their 
shots  were  either  aimed  too  high,  or  struck  the  ground  and  were  buried  a  short 


S 


,«D    IOWA    C» 


THE   UNION    RIGHT    UNDER  GENERAL  CARR    AT    FRATT'S 

STORE,    SECOND   DAY   OF  THE   BATTLE. 
FROM    A    PANEL    TO    THE    PICTURE    ON    PAGE    330. 


THE  PEA  RIDGE  CAMPAIGN.  329 

distance  in  front  of  us.  When  well  in  action,  we  advanced  slowly  from  posi 
tion  to  position,  at  the  same  time  contracting  our  line,  the  infantry  following, 
rising  quickly,  and  as  soon  as  they  had  reached  a  new  position  lying  down 
again.  During  this  time  the  whole  cavalry  force  of  the  two  divisions  had 
formed  behind  the  extreme  left  of  our  line,  supported  by  the  2d  Missouri  and 
Elbert's  flying  battery  of  General  Asboth's  command.  The  17th  Missouri, 
under  Major  Poten,  also  came  up  from  the  Bentonville  road,  and  was  posted 
on  the  left.  On  our  right,  communication  was  established  with  the  right 
wing,  and  the  two  batteries  of  Klauss  and  Davidson  were  brought  into  line 
with  our  own,  while  the  two  brigades  of  Colonels  Julius  White  and  Thomas 
Pattison  held  the  left  of  the  enemy's  line  in  check  until  our  whole  line  advanced. 
It  was  now  a  little  after  11  o'clock ;  most  of  the  enemy's  batteries  (about 
fifty  guns)  were  silenced  one  after  another,  by  our  concentric  fire ;  his  infantry, 
not  venturing  out  of  the  woods  into  the  open  fields,  was  now  treated  with  a 
shower  of  shell  and  shrapnel.  Opposite  our  extreme  left,  however,  near 
Elkhorn  Tavern,  Van  Dorn  made  a  determined  effort  to  hold  the  high  spur  of 
hills,  the  top  of  which  was  crowned  and  protected  by  rocks  and  bowlders. 
Some  of  Price's  infantry  had  already  taken  possession  of  it,  and  a  battery  was 
being  placed  in  position,  when  Hoffmann's  and  Elbert's  batteries  were  ordered 
to  direct  their  fire  against  them  chiefly  with  solid  shot.  Xot  more  than 
fifteen  minutes  elapsed  before  the  enemy  evacuated  this  last  stronghold, 
while  our  infantry  on  the  left  —  the  36th  Illinois,  and  the  2d,  3d,  and  17th 
Missouri  —  rushed  up  the  steep  hill  and  forced  the  remnants  of  the  enemy's 
troops  down  into  Cross  Timber  Hollow.  Almost  simultaneously  the  12th 
Missouri,  the  25th  and  the  44th  Illinois  advanced  in  double-quick  from  the 
center  and  right  into  the  woods,  engaged  the  enemy's  infantry,  drove  it  backy 
and  one  of  our  regiments  (the  12th  Missouri)  captured  the  "  Dallas  Battery." 
On  the  extreme  right,  where  General  Curtis  had  directed  the  movements  of 
the  troops,  Davis's  division  and  a  part  of  Carr's,  assisted  by  Hayden's  and 
Jones's  batteries  (the  latter  commanded  by  Lieutenant  David),  pushed  forward 
against  the  left  wing  of  the  enemy  and  forced  it  to  leave  the  field.  The  army 
of  Van  Dorn  and  Price,  including  about  two-thirds  of  McCulloch's  troops 
under  Churchill  and  Greer,  and  one-third  of  Pike's  Indian  Brigade,  all  of 
whom  had  joined  Price  during  the  night,  were  now  in  precipitate  retreat  in 
all  directions,  pursued  by  the  First  and  Second  Divisions  as  far  as  Keets- 
ville,  9  miles  to  the  north,  and  by  a  cavalry  force  under  Colonel  Bussey  with 
2  tfiountain  howitzers  to  the  south-west  beyond  Bentonville.  So  ended  the 
battle  of  Pea  Ridge,  and  our  little  army,  instead  of  being  "  beaten  and  com 
pelled  to  surrender,"  had  gained  a  decisive  victory.  $ 

&  The  picture  011  the  next  page  shows  Big  across  the  fields  from  east  to  west,  with  its  highest 
Mountain  in  the  right  background,  as  it  appeared  elevation  in  the  center,  and  on  which  my  artillery 
in  March,  1862.  When  I  visited  the  battle-field  a  was  posted,  shows  at  once  how  great  our  advan- 
few  weeks  ago  (July  6th,  1887)  the  whole  range  tage  must  have  been  against  the  hostile  batteries, 
of  mountains  was  covered  by  a  dense  forest,  and  which  were  planted  behind  the  margin  of  the  woods 
the  rocky  summits  of  Big  Mountain  were  not  dis-  in  the  lower  ground.  The  surface  of  the  cultivated 
cernible  from  the  fields  below,  where  our  troops  fields  is  now  widened  by  the  clearing  of  the  adjacent 
had  been  posted.  In  other  respects  there  were  not  woods,  so  that  the  whole  interior  space  of  the  bat- 
great  changes.  The  rising  ground  stretching  tie-field  seems  much  larger.  The  house  and  barn 


330 


THE  PEA  RIDGE  CAMPAIGN.  331 

The  losses  of  our  army  were :  killed,  203 ;  wounded,  980 ;  missing,  201, — 
total,  1384.  The  enemy's  losses  on  the  battle-field  were  about  equal,  if  not 
greater  than,  ours,  but  they  have  never  been  accurately  stated.  On  the  7th 
we  lost  more  on  our  right,  against  Price,  than  he  did ;  the  enemy  (McCul- 
loch's  troops)  more  on  his  right  against  our  left.  On  the  8th,  when  our 
forces  were  concentrated  against  Van  Dorn  and  Price,  the  enemy's  loss  was 
much  more  severe  than  ours. 

Ix  reviewing  the  period  from  the  13th  of  June,  1861,  when  the  first  expedi 
tions  started  from  St.  Louis  to  the  north-west  and  south-west  of  Missouri,  and 
comprising  the  three  campaigns  under  Generals  Lyon,  Fremont,  and  Curtis, 
we  must  acknowledge  the  extraordinary  activity  represented  in  these  move 
ments.  As  war  in  its  ideal  form  is  nothing  else  than  a  continuous  series 
of  action  and  reaction,  that  side  which  develops  the  greater  energy  will, 
other  conditions  being  equal,  become  master  of  the  situation.  It  was  the 
energy  of  the  South  in  the  first  period  of  the  War  of  the  Rebellion  which  in 
less  than  three  months  organized  a  powerful  insurrection  and  threatened  the 
existence  of  the  Union.  And  so,  on  a  smaller  scale,  isolated  and  left  almost 
to  its  own  resources  at  the  beginning  of  the  conflict,  the  Union  element  of 
Missouri,  led  by  a  few  energetic  men,  saved  the  city  of  St.  Louis,  then  the 
chief  city  of  the  West,  and  by  successive,  rapid  blows  became  master  of 
the  whole  State.  In  no  other  State  of  the  North  was  greater  activity  shown, 
or  more  undertaken,  endured,  or  accomplished.  There  were  regiments  which 
traversed  the  State  three  times  in  8  months,  forward  and  backward,  a  distance 
of  over  1200  miles  (the  line  of  railroad  from  St.  Louis  to  Rolla  not  taken  into 
account),  and  this,  especially  during  the  first  few  months,  with  the  most  miser 
able  outfit, — without  tents,  without  knapsacks  and  other  accouterments, 
the  men  carrying  their  cartridges  in  their  pockets  and  sleeping  on  the  bare 
ground,  braving  hunger  and  disease. 

The  battle  of  Pea  Ridge  was  the  first  respite  gained  by  the  almost  incessant 
activity  and  the  unflinching  courage  of  our  little  army, —  the  Army  of  the 
South-west.  It  was  not  a  "  great "  battle,  like  that  of  Gettysburg  or  Chatta 
nooga;  it  was  not  of  such  preponderating  national  importance;  it  did  not 
"  break  the  backbone  of  the  Rebellion,"  but  it  virtually  cleared  the  South-west 
of  the  enemy,  gave  peace  to  the  people  of  Missouri,  at  least  for  the  next  two 
years,  and  made  it  possible  for  our  veterans  to  reenforce  the  armies  under 
Buell,  Rosecrans,  Grant,  and  Sherman.  It  was  a  battle  of  all  kinds  of  sur 
prises  and  accidents,  of  good  fighting  and  good  manoeuvring.  Van  Dorn 
was  evidently  "  surprised "  when  he  found  that  his  plan  to  take  St.  Louis, 
and  to  carry  the  war  into  Illinois  in  April,  1862,  was  anticipated  by  our 

to  which  our  extreme  left  extended  on  the  second  the  plan  of  the  old  one,  and  still  lives  there.  He 
day  (March  8th)  are  still  standing,  and  even  the  is,  of  course,  familiar  with  the  battle-field,  and 
new  Elkhorn  Tavern  stands  on  the  old  site.  Mr.  tramped  over  it  with  me  and  my  driver.  Pratt's 
Cox,  who  lived  there  in  1862,  was  obliged,  with  his  store,  near  which  General  Curtis's  headquarters 
mother  and  his  young  wife,  to  seek  protection  in  tent  was  pitched,  is  still  there. — F.  S. 
the  cellar,  where  they  remained  for  two  days,  NOTE. — The  cut  opposite,  the  reader  may  be  re- 
being  under  fire  thirteen  hours.  Late  in  the  war  minded,  represents  also  the  ground  of  the  first  day's 
the  tavern  was  burned,  but  Mr.  Cox  rebuilt  it  after  fighting  by  Price's  troops.— EDITORS. 


332 


THE  PEA  RIDGE  CAMPAIGN. 


unexpected  appearance ;  he  was  badly 
"surprised"  when  on  the  6th  of  March, 
instead  of  "  gobbling  up  "  my  two  di 
visions  at  McKissick's  farm,  as  he 
confidently  expected,  he  only  met  a 
rear-guard  of  600  men,  which  he  could 
not  gobble  up  during  nearly  6  hours 
of  its  march  of  6  miles ;  he  was  also 
surprised  to  find,  on  his  detour  around 
our  left  flank  and  rear,  that  the  road 
was  at  different  places  so  blocked  up, 
that  instead  of  arriving  in  our  rear,  on 
the  road  to  Springfield,  with  the  divis 
ions  of  Price,  at  daylight  of  the  7th, 
he  did  not  reach  that  point  before  10 
o'clock  in  the  morning,  by  which  delay 
Price's  and  McCulloch's  forces  became 
separated  and  could  not  assist  each 
other  at  the  decisive  moment,  while 
we  gained  time  to  make  our  prep 
arations  for  the  reception  of  both. 
Finally,  on  the  8th,  Van  Dorn  was 

greatly  "  surprised  to  find  himself  suddenly  confronted  by  a  new,  unexpected 
force,"  attacked  in  flank  and  rear,  and  compelled  to  retreat.  On  the  other 
hand,  Curtis  was  "surprised"  by  the  sudden  turn  things  had  taken,  and  much 
disappointed  because  the  enemy  did  not  make  the  attack  against  our  front,  a 
position  not  only  very  strong  by  nature,  presenting  a  chain  of  high  hills,  but 
also  strengthened  by  intrenchments  and  abatis,  the  access  to  it  being  also 
protected  and  impeded  by  a  deep  creek  running  along  our  line  of  defense. 
He  would  have  been  much  more  "  surprised "  had  it  not  been  for  the  dis 
covery,  by  our  scouting  parties,  of  the  enemy's  flanking  movement.  | 


BRIGADIER-GENERAL    ALBERT    PIKE,    C.  8.  A., 

COMMANDER  OF  THE   INDIAN  FORCES  AT  PEA  RIDGE. 

FROM  A   PHOTOGRAPH. 


4.  The  reports  of  Generals  Van  Dorn  and  Price 
make  it  evident  that  they  intended  and  were  pre 
pared  to  renew  the  battle,  or,  as  Van  Dorn  says, 
"to  accept  the  gage,"  on  the  morning  of  the  8th; 
the  determination  to  retreat  was  therefore  forced 
upon  them  during  the  course  of  the  morning  by  the 
advantages  we  gained.  The  results  obtained  in  this 
three-days  struggle  consisted  not  only  in  the  imme 
diate  losses,  which,  as  mentioned  before,  were  about 
equal,  but  also,  and  much  more  so,  in  the  condition 
into  which  the  Southern  forces  were  thrown  at  the 
beginning  of  and  after  their  retreat  from  the  battle 
field;  their  separation  by  folio  whig  diverging  lines, 
the  disorganization  of  their  artillery,  the  dissolution 
of  the  "Indian  Brigade,"  and  of  a  part  of  the  Ar 
kansas  troops,  and  finally  by  the  impossibilty  of  re 
storing  order  and  bringing  together  all  their  forces 
north  of  the  Boston  Mountains.  A  report  of  the  ac 
tual  strength  of  McCulloch's  division  on  March  1 1  th , 
three  days  after  the  battle,  shows  only  2  894  men  out 


of  a  total  effective  of  8384,  present  at "  Strickler's," 
March  2d,  four  days  before  the  battle.  On  the  12th 
of  March  Van  Dora  wrote  or  telegraphed  from  Van 
Buren  to  Colonel  B.  W.  Stone,  Gth  Texas  Cavalry, 
to  join  "  the  army  "  at  its  encampment  on  the  Frog 
Bayou  road,  about  seven  miles  from  that  town  (Van 
Buren),  which  shows  that  the  Southern  army  was 
very  considerably  scattered  for  several  days  after 
the  battle,  and  that  Curtis  could  have  followed  it 
as  far  as  the  Boston  Mountains  without  meeting  any 
serious  resistance.  If  Van  Dorn  had  succeeded  in 
his  bold  manoeuvre  against  us,  had  "cornered"  our 
army  and  forced  it  to  surrender,  he  would  have  come 
into  possession  of  such  material  of  war  as  would 
have  enabled  him  to  move  with  thirty  thousand  men 
to  Springfield  and  Eolla,  and,  by  at  least  "  threat 
ening"  St.  Louis,  he  might  have  seriously  dis 
concerted  the  plans  of  Halleck.  The  consideration 
of  such  an  exigency  lends  additional  importance  to 
the  success  of  the  Union  forces  at  Pea  Ridge. —  F.  S. 


THE  PEA   RIDGE  CAMPAIGN. 


333 


In  a  strategical  and  tactical  point  of  view,  the  battle  of  Pea  Ridge  forms 
a  counterpart  to  the  battle  of  Wilson's  Creek.  In  the  latter  battle  we  were 
the  outflanking  party,  approaching  the  camp  of  McCulloch  and  Price,  by  a 
night  inarch,  completely  surprising  and  attacking  their  forces  in  the  morning, 
but  making  our  attack  in  front  and  rear,  without  being  able  to  communicate 
with  and  assist  each  other.  My  own  brigade  of  1118  men,  which  had  gained 
the  enemy's  rear,  was  beaten  first,  and  then  the  forces  of  General  Lyon,  4282 
men,  after  a  heroic  resistance  were  compelled  to  leave  the  field.  The  enemy 
held  the  "  interior  lines,"  and  could  throw  readily  his  forces  from  one  point 
to  the  other.  At  Pea  Ridge  the  same  advantage  was  with  our  army,  although 
the  enemy  had  better  facilities  of  communication  between  his  left  and  right 
wing,  by  the  road  leading  from  Bentonville 
to  Elkhorn  Tavern,  than  we  had  had  at 
Wilson's  Creek.  There  we  had  had  to  meet 
substantially  the  same  troops  we  encoun 
tered  at  Pea  Ridge,  with  the  exception  of 
the  Indian  Brigade  under  Pike. 

From  the  result  of  the  battles  of  Wilson's 
Creek  and  Pea  Ridge,  it  will  be  seen  that 
the  manoeuvre  of  outflanking  and  "  march 
ing  into  the  enemy's  rear"  is  not  always 
successful.  It  was  not  so  at  Wilson's  Creek, 
when  we  had  approached,  unobserved,  within 
cannon-shot  of  the  enemy's  lines ;  however, 
we  were  only  5400  against  about  11,000, 
while  at  Pea  Ridge  the  enemy  had  16,202 
men  in  action  against  our  10,500.  In  a 
manoeuvre  of  that  kind,  the  venture  of  a 
smaller  army  to  surprise  and  "bag"  an 
enemy,  whose  forces  are  concentrated  and 
who  holds  the  "  interior  lines  "  or  "  inside  track,"  will  always  be  great,  unless 
the  enemy's  troops  are  inferior  in  quality,  or  otherwise  at  a  disadvantage.  ^ 


BRIGADIER-GENERAL    STAND    WATIE,  C.  8.   A., 
OF  THE   INDIAN  FORCES.      FROM  A  PHOTOGRAPH. 


|  During  the  war  there  was  not,  I  believe,  a  single 
case  where  an  army  tried  such  a  "bagging"  proc 
ess  and  succeeded  in  it,  except  in  the  attack  of 
posts  and  intrenched  positions,  as,  for  instance,  at 
Harper's  Ferry  during  the  advance  of  Lee  into 
Maryland  in  September,  1862,  and  with  partial 
success  at  Winchester,  June  loth,  1863.  There 
are  instances  where  flanking  manoeuvres  of  great 
detachments  from  the  main  army  have  been  success 
ful,  but  more  through  non-interference  with  them 
than  for  other  reasons.  Jackson's  detour  into  the 
rear  of  the  Army  of  Virginia,  in  August,  1  862,  was 
a  strategical  surprise,  that  was  only  successfully 
executed  because  it  was  not  discovered  in  time, 
or  rather  because,  when  discovered,  it  was  not 
properly  met.  The  flanking  movement  and  attack 
by  Jackson,  against  the  Eleventh  Corps  at  the 
battle  of  Chancellorsville,  was  very  successful 
from  a  strategical  and  tactical  point  of  view,  as 


the  enemy  not  only  gained  the  right  flank  of  our 
army  without  being  interfered  with,  but  also  fell 
on  the  Eleventh  Corps  before  proper  arrangements 
were  made  to  meet  the  attack.  It  may  therefore 
be  said,  that  in  all  such  manoeuvres  going  on  at  a 
reaching  distance  from  our  own  position,  we  are 
as  much  on  the  flank  of  the  enemy  as  he  is  on 
ours.  The  case  is  similar,  when  an  army  has  suc 
ceeded  in  gaining  the  rear  of  another,  at  the  same 
time  giving  up  its  own  base  ;  because  the  two  par 
ties  have  then  simply  exchanged  their  positions 
and  are  in  each  other's  rear.  So  it  was  at  Pea 
Ridge,  when,  after  the  defeat  of  McCulloch,  Van 
Dorn  and  Price  had  "  settled  down  "  on  our  line 
of  communication  with  Springfield,  while  we 
held  theirs  to  Fayetteville.  The  chances  were 
equal,  relative  to  position,  and  it  was  only  by 
good  fortune  that  the  Confederates  came  off  as 
well  as  they  did.— F.  S. 


334  THE  PEA  RIDGE  CAMPAIGN. 

The  movement  of  Van  Dorn  during  the  night  of  the  6th  was  bold,  well 
conceived,  and  would  probably  have  been  more  successful  if  it  had  not 
been  pushed  too  far  out.  If  Van  Dorn  had  formed  his  line  with  the  left  of 
Price's  forces  resting  on  the  heights,  west  of  Elkhorn  Tavern,  and  McCul- 
loch's  immediately  on  its  right,  he  would  have  gained  three  or  four  hours' 
time,  and  could  have  swept  down  upon  us  before  8  o'clock  in  the  morning, 
when  no  preparations  had  been  made  to  receive  him ;  his  two  wings  (Price's 
and  McCulloch's)  would  not  have  been  separated  from  each  other  by  an 
interval  of  several  miles,  and  his  communications  between  Bentonville  and  his 
position  would  have  been  protected.  Instead  of  following  this  course  of  action 
demanded  by  the  unforeseen  impediment  on  the  road,  he  passed  several  miles 
farther  to  the  north-east,  and  after  gaining  the  Springfield  road,  he  shifted  the 
whole  of  Price's  forces  around  to  the  south-east  (toward  the  Huntsville  road), 
consuming  again  much  valuable  time.  In  fact,  instead  of  commencing  his  attack 
by  the  left  at  daylight  on  the  7th,  as  he  expected  to  do,  he  did  not  commence 
it  earnestly  before  2  p.  M.,  and  instead  of  gaining  the  desirable  position  on  the 
heights  and  fields  which  my  divisions  occupied  the  next  day,  he  made  his 
attack  in  Cross  Timber  Hollow,  where  our  inferior  forces  had  the  advantage 
of  defense  and  of  concealing  their  weakness  in  the  woods,  ravines,  and  gullies 
of  that  wilderness.  Price's  troops  fought  very  bravely,  but  so  did  ours ;  it 
therefore  happened  that  when  Carr's  division  had  been  forced  back,  even  half 
a  mile  beyond  Elkhorn  Tavern,  the  assailants  had  spent  so  much  of  their 
force  and  sustained  so  great  a  loss,  that  they  were  unable  to  follow  up  their 
success  by  a  last  assault  on  our  reduced  and  contracted  line.  Price's  6500 
men  with  38  guns  could  not  overwhelm  about  4500  with  23  guns  (including  the 
reinforcements  from  the  First  and  Second  Divisions).  The  fight  on  this  part 
of  the  field  was,  at  the  beginning,  a  wild,  isolated,  irregular  struggle  of  single 
batteries  and  their  supports,  sometimes  almost  hand  to  hand,  instead  of  in  ser 
ried  and  well-defined  lines; — this  accounts  for  the  great  losses  on  both  sides. 
It  was  here  that  the  two  brigades  of  Vandever  and  Dodge,  with  the  9th  and 
4th  Iowa,  the  35th  Illinois,  the  24th  and  Phelps's  Missouri  regiment,  Hayden's 
and  Jones's  batteries,  and  two  mountain  howitzers  of  Bowen's  battalion, 
assisted  by  a  part  of  the  1st  Missouri  and  3d  Illinois  Cavalry,  withstood  the 
incessant  onslaught  of  the  two  Confederate  brigades  of  Colonel  Little  and 
General  Slack  and  the  Missouri  State  Guards  with  the  greatest  tenacity,  yield 
ing  only  step  by  step,  when  exhausted  by  losses  and  without  ammunition. 

The  death  of  McCulloch  was  not  only  fatal  to  his  troops,  but  also  a  most 
serious  blow  to  Van  Dorn.  Until  2  o'clock  on  the  7th,  the  latter  had  confidently 
expected  to  hear  of  successful  action  against  our  left  wing ;  but  he  received 
no  answer  to  the  dispatch  he  had  sent,  and  began  to  push  forward  his  own 
wing.  He  succeeded,  and  when  night  fell  made  his  headquarters  at  Elkhorn 
Tavern,  where  Carr  and  Major  Weston  of  our  army  had  been  in  the  morning. 
But  here  he  stopped.  He  says  that  by  some  misunderstanding  the  troops  in 
the  advance  were  called  back  (as  they  were  at  Shiloh) ;  the  true  reason  for 
their  withdrawal,  however,  seems  to  have  been  their  satisfaction  with  what 
they  had  done,  and  the  assurance  of  completing  the  work  in  the  morning. 


UNION   AND   CONFEDERATE  INDIANS   IN   THE   CIVIL  WAR, 


BY   WILEY   BRITTOX. 


ELKHORN    TWER 


Cherokee,  Creek, 
Choctaw,  Chickasaw, 
and  Seminole  tribes 
were  the  only  In 
dian  tribes  who 
took  an  active  part 
in  the  civil  war. 
Before  the  Avar  very 
few  of  the  Indians 
of  these  tribes  mani 
fested  any  interest 
in  the  question  of 

slavery,  and  only  a  small  number  owned  slave  prop 
erty.  Slavery  among  them  was  not  regarded  in 
the  same  light  as  among  the  whites,  for  in  many 
instances  the  slaves  acted  as  if  they  were  011  an 
equality  with  their  masters.  But  the  tribes  named 
occupied  valuable  territory,  and  the  Confederate 
authorities  lost  no  time  in  sending  agents  among 
them  to  win  them  over.  When  the  Confederate 
agents  first  approached  the  full-blood  leaders  of 
the  Cherokee  and  Creek  tribes  on  the  subject  of 
severing  their  relations  with  the  United  States, 
the  Indians  expressed  themselves  cautiously  but 
decidedly  as  preferring  to  remain  neutral. 

Conspicuous  among  those  who  took  a  decided 
stand  against  organizing  the  Indians  to  oppose  the 
Federal  Government  was  Hopoeithleyohola,  the 
old  chief  of  the  Creek  tribe.  The  Confederate 
agents  had  succeeded  in  winning  over  ex-Chief 
Mclntosh,  by  appointing  him  colonel,  but,  per 
haps,  two-thirds  of  the  people  preferred  to  be 
guided  by  the  advice  of  their  venerable  old  chief, 
Hopoeithleyohola. 

In  the  fall  of  1861,  Colonel  Douglas  H.  Cooper, 
commanding  the  department  of  Indian  operations 
under  authority  from  the  Confederate  Govern 
ment,  made  several  ineffectual  efforts  to  have  a 
conference  with  the  old  chief  for  the  purpose  of 
effecting  a  peaceful  settlement  of  the  difficulties 
that  were  dividing  the  nation  into  two  hostile 
camps.  Finding  Hopoeithleyohola  unwavering  in 
his  loyalty  to  the  United  States,  Colonel  Cooper 
determined  to  force  him  into  submission,  destroy 
his  power,  or  drive  him  out  of  the  country,  and 
at  once  commenced  collecting  forces,  composed 
mostly  of  white  troops,  to  attack  him.  In  Novem 
ber  and  December,  1861,  the  battles  of  Chusto 
Talasah  and  Chustenahlah  were  fought,  and  the 
loyal  Indians  finally  were  defeated  and  forced  to 
retire  to  Kansas  in  midwinter. 

In  the  spring  of  1862  the  United  States  Govern 
ment  sent  an  expedition  of  five  thousand  men 
under  Colonel  William  Weer.  10th  Kansas  In 
fantry,  into  the  Indian  Territory  to  drive  out  the 
Confederate  forces  of  Pike  and  Cooper,  and  to  re 
store  the  refugee  Indians  to  their  homes.  After 


a  short  action  at  Locust  Grove,  near  Grand  Sa 
line,  Cherokee  Nation,  July  2d,  Colonel  Weer's 
cavalry  captured  Colonel  Clarkson  and  part  of  his 
regiment  of  Missourians.  On  the  16th  of  July 
Captain  Greeno,  6th  Kansas  Cavalry,  captured 
Tahlequah,  the  capital  of  the  Cherokee  Nation, 
and  on  the  19th  of  July  Colonel  Jewell,  6th  Kan 
sas  Cavalry,  captured  Fort  Gibson,  the  most  im 
portant  point  in  the  Indian  Territory. 

The  Confederate  forces  were  now  driven  out  of 
all  that  part  of  the  Indian  country  north  of  the 
Arkansas  River,  and  the  loyal  Indians  of  the  Cher 
okee,  Creek,  and  Seminole  nations  were  organized, 
by  authority  of  the  United  States  Government, 
into  three  regiments,  each  fully  a  thousand  strong, 
for  the  defense  of  their  country.  The  colonel  and 
part  of  the  field  and  line  officers  of  each  regiment 
were  white  officers.  Most  of  the  captains  of  com 
panies  were  Indians.  Colonel  William  A.  Phillips, 
of  Kansas,  who  was  active  in  organizing  these  In 
dian  regiments,  commanded  the  Indian  brigade 
from  its  organization  to  the  close  of  the  war.  He 
took  part  with  his  Indian  troops  in  the  action  at 
Locust  Grove,  C.  N.,  and  in  the  battles  of  New- 
tonia,  Mo.,  Maysville,  Ark.,  Prairie  Grove,  Ark., 
Honey  Springs,  C.  N.,  Perryville,  C.  N.,  besides 
many  other  minor  engagements. 

In  all  the  operations  in  which  they  participated 
they  acquitted  themselves  creditably,  and  to  the 
satisfaction  of  the  Federal  commander  in  the  In 
dian  Territory. 

On  the  Confederate  side,  General  Albert  Pike  and 
Colonel  Douglas  H.  Cooper,  in  the  fall  and  winter 
of  1861,  organized  three  regiments  of  Indians 
from  the  Choctaw,  Chickasaw,  Cherokee,  Creek, 
and  Seminole  nations  or  tribes,  for  service  in  the 
Indian  Territory.  These  regiments,  under  Gen 
eral  Pike,  participated  in  the  battle  of  Pea  Ridge, 
Ark.,  on  the  7th  and  8th  of  March,  1862.  In  the 
five  tribes  named  a  battalion  and  parts  of  four 
regiments  were  raised  for  the  Confederate  service, 
but  these  amounted  in  all  to  perhaps  not  over 
3500  men. 

At  the  close  of  Mr.  Buchanan's  administration 
nearly  all  the  United  States  Indian  agents  in  the 
Indian  Territory  were  secessionists,  and  the  mo 
ment  the  Southern  States  commenced  passing 
ordinances  of  secession,  these  men  exerted  their 
influence  to  get  the  five  tribes  committed  to  the 
Confederate  cause.  Occupying  territory  south  of 
the  Arkansas  River,  and  having  the  secessionists 
of  Arkansas  on  the  east  and  those  of  Texas  on  the 
south  for  neighbors,  the  Choctaws  and  Chickasaws 
offered  no  decided  opposition  to  the  scheme.  With 
the  Cherokees.  the  most  powerful  and  most  civilized 
of  the  tribes  of  the  Indian  Territory,  it  was  differ 
ent.  Their  chief,  John  Ross,  was  opposed  to 


335 


336         UNION  AND  CONFEDERATE  INDIANS  IN   THE  CIVIL  WAR. 


hasty  action,  and  at  first  favored  neutrality,  and 
in  the  summer  of  1861  issued  a  proclamation, 
enjoining  his  people  to  observe  a  strictly  neutral 
attitude  during  the  war  between  the  United  States 
and  the  Southern  States.  In  June,  1861,  Albert 
Pike,  a  commissioner  of  the  Confederate  States, 
and  General  Ben.  McCulloch,  commanding  the 
Confederate  forces  in  western  Arkansas  and  the 
Department  of  Indian  Territory,  visited  Chief . 
Boss  with  the  view  of  having  him  make  a  treaty 
with  the  Confederacy.  But  he  declined  to  make 
a  treaty,  and  in  the  conference  expressed  himself 
as  wishing  to  occupy,  if  possible,  a  neutral  po 
sition  during  the  war.  A  majority  of  the  Cher- 
okees,  nearly  all  of  whom  were  full-bloods,  were 
known  as  Pin  Indians,  and  were  opposed  to  the 
South. 

Commissioner  Pike  went  away  to  make  treaties 
with  the  less  civilized  Indian  tribes  of  the  plains, 
and  in  the  mean  time  the  battle  of  Wilson's  Creek 
was  fought,  General  Lyon  killed,  and  the  Union 
army  defeated  and  forced  to  fall  back  from  Spring 
field  to  Rolla. 

Chief  Boss  now  thought  that  the  South  would 
probably  succeed  in  establishing  her  independ 
ence,  and  expressed  a  willingness  to  enter  into 
a  treaty  with  the  Confederate  authorities.  On 
his  return  from  the  West  in  September,  1861, 
Commissioner  Pike,  at  the  request  of  Mr.  Ross, 
went  to  Park  Hill  and  made  a  treaty  with  the 
Cherokees.  The  treaties  made  with  each  tribe 
provided  that  the  troops  it  raised  should  be  used 
for  home  protection,  and  should  not  be  taken  out 
of  the  Indian  Territory.  Even  before  the  treaty 
with  Commissioner  Pike,  Chief  Ross  had  com 
menced  to  organize  a  regiment  composed  nearly 
altogether  of  Pin  Indians.  John  Drew,  a  stanch 
secessionist,  was  commissioned  colonel,  and 
William  P_Ross  lieutenant-colonel,  of  this  reg 
iment.  Colonel  Stand  Watie,  the  leader  of  the 
secession  party,  had  also  commenced  to  raise  a 
regiment  of  half-breeds  for  General  McCulloch's 
division.  As  already  stated,  there  were  two 
factions  among  the  Creeks,  one  of  which  was  led 
by  Hopoeithleyohola  and  the  other  by  D.  N.  and 
Chitty  Mclntosh,  who  were  sons  of  General  Will 
iam  Mclntosh,  killed  in  1825  by  Hopoeithleyohola 
and  his  followers  in  Georgia,  for  making  the 
treaty  of  Indian  Springs.  It  is  asserted  by  General 
Pike  and  others  that  with  Hopoeithleyohola  it 
was  not  a  question  of  loyalty  or  disloyalty  to  the 
United  States,  but  simply  one  of  self-preservation  ; 

\  The  position  chosen  by  Hopoeithleyohola  at  Chusto 
Talasah,  where  he  determined  to  make  a  stand  and  fight 
the  Confederate  forces,  was  naturally  a  very  strong  one 
to  resist  an  attack  made  with  small-arms.  It  was  at  a 
gorge  of  a  bend  of  Bird  Creek,  the  bend  being  in  the 
form  of  a  horse-shoe,  and  four  hundred  yards  in  length. 
The  creek  made  up  to  the  prairie  on  the  side  approached 
by  the  Confederate  forces  in  an  abrupt  and  precipitous 
bank  about  thirty  feet  high.  On  the  opposite  side  of 
this  precipitous  bank  was  the  inside  of  the  horse-shoe 
or  bend,  which  was  densely  covered  with  heavy  tim 
ber,  cane,  and  tangled  thickets.  The  position  was  also 
strengthened  by  felled  trees  and  by  the  creek  forming  the 
bend  or  horse-shoe.  The  creek  was  deep  and  was  ford- 
able  only  at  certain  places  known  to  the  Union  Indians. 


that  when  he  found  the  Confederate  authorities 
had  commissioned  D.  N.  Mclntosh  as  colonel  of  a 
Creek  regiment,  and  Chitty  Mclntosh  as  lieu 
tenant-colonel  of  a  battalion  of  Creeks,  he  felt 
certain  that  the  Indian  troops  thus  being  raised 
would  be  used  to  persecute  and  destroy  him  and 
his  followers.  In  November,  1861,  he  started 
for  Kansas,  and  was  pursued  and  overtaken  by 
the  Confederate  Creeks,  Choc  taws,  Chickasaws, 
Cherokees,  and  Texans  under  Colonel  Douglas  H. 
Cooper.  A  fight  took  place  in  the  night,  and 
Colonel  Drew's  regiment  of  Cherokees,  which  had 
been  raised  by  Chief  Ross,  went  over  to  Hopoeith 
leyohola,  and  fought  with  him  in  the  next  day's 
desperate  battle  (known  as  the  battle  of  Chusto 
Talasah),  in  which  five  hundred  of  the  Union  In 
dians  were  reported  by  Colonel  Cooper  to  have 
been  killed  and  wounded.  \  The  Confederate 
Indians  of  Colonel  Stand  Watie's  regiment,  and 
those  of  Colonel  Drew's  regiment  who  had  re 
turned  to  the  Confederate  service  under  Pike 
and  Cooper,  also  participated  in  the  battle  of 
Pea  Ridge  in  March,  1862,  where  they  were 
charged  with  scalping  and  mutilating  the  Federal 
dead  on  the  field.  General  Pike,  hearing  of  the 
scalping,  called  on  the  surgeon  and  assistant- 
surgeon  of  his  field-hospital  for  reports,  and  in 
their  reports  they  stated  that  they  found  one  of 
the  Federal  dead  who  had  been  scalped.  General 
Pike  then  issued  an  order,  denouncing  the  outrage 
in  the  strongest  language,  and  sent  a  copy  of  the 
order  to  General  Curtis.  General  Pike  claimed 
that  part  of  the  Indians  were  in  McCulloch's 
corps  in  the  first  day's  battle  ;  and  that  the  scalp 
ing  was  done  at  night  in  a  quarter  of  the  field  not 
occupied  by  the  Indian  troops  under  his  immediate 
command.  After  Pea  Ridge  the  operations  of  the 
Confederate  Indians  under  General  Cooper  and 
Colonel  Stand  Watie  were  confined,  with  a  few 
exceptions,  to  the  Indian  Territory.  In  connec 
tion  with  white  troops  from  Texas,  they  partici 
pated  in  several  engagements  with  the  Federal 
Indian  brigade  under  Colonel  Phillips,  after  he 
recaptured  Fort  Gibson  in  the  spring  of  1863; 
and  they  made  frequent  efforts  to  capture  Federal 
supply  trains  from  Fort  Scott  to  Fort  Gibson  and 
Fort  Smith,  but  were  always  unsuccessful.  They 
fought  very  well  when  they  had  an  opportunity  to 
take  shelter  behind  trees  and  logs,  but  could  not 
easily  be  brought  to  face  artillery,  and  a  single 
shell  thrown  at  them  was  generally  sufficient  to 
demoralize  them  and  put  them  to  flight. 

In  this  bond  Ilopoelthleyohola's  forces  were  posted  after 
they  were  obliged  to  fall  back  in  the  preliminary  skir 
mish.  A  house  and  crib  at  the  mouth  of  the  bend  served 
as  a  shelter  for  a  while,  from  which  his  sharp-shooters 
kept  back  the  Confederates.  The  Union  Indians,  how 
ever,  were  finally  driven  from  this  position  back  into 
the  bend,  contesting  the  ground  with  much  obstinacy. 
The  Confederate  troops  made  repeated  efforts  to  dislodge 
them  from  the  bend,  but  without  success.  Every  time 
a  detachment  of  Hopoeithleyohola's  warriors  showed 
themselves  in  an  opening  or  in  the  prairie,  the  Confed 
erates  charged  them  to  the  timber,  when  a  volley  from 
the  concealed  Union  Indians  threw  the  charging  column 
into  confusion  and  sent  it  back  in  a  hasty  retreat.  Night 
coining  on  put  an  end  to  the  fight. — W.  B. 


THE   OPPOSING    FORCES    AT   PEA    RIDGE,  ARK. 

The  composition  anil  losses  of  each  army  as  here  stated  give  the  gist  of  all  the  data  obtainable  in  the  Official  Records. 
K  stands  for  killed  ;  w  for  wounded  ;  m  w  for  mortally  wounded  ;  in  for  captured  or  missing ;  c  for  captured.— EDITORS. 

COMPOSITION  AND  LOSSES  OF   THE  UNION  ARMY. 

Brig.-Gen.  Samuel  R.  Curtis. 


FIRST  AND  SECOND  DIVISIONS,  Brig.-Gen.  Frjni/  Sig-el. 
First  Division,  Col.  Peter  J.  Osterhaus.  First  Briyade  : 
25th  111.,  Col.  William  N.  Coler ;  44th  111.,  Col.  Charles 
Knobelsdorff;  17th  Mo.,  Major  August  H.  Poten.  Bri 
gade  loss  :  k,  4 ;  w,  22  ;  m,  11  =  37.  Second  Brigade,  Col. 
Nicholas  Greusel.  36th  111.,  Col.  Nicholas  Greusel;  12th 
Mo.,  Major  Hugo  Wangelin;  Illinois  Cavalry  (2  Cos.), 
Captains  Albert  Jenks  and  Henry  A.  Smith.  Brigade 
loss:  k,  7;  w,  66;  m,  36  =109.  Artillery:  Mo.  Battery, 
Capt.  Martin  Welfley;  4th  Ohio  Battery,  Capt.  Louis 
Hoffmann.  Loss:  w,  6;  m,  4  =  10.  Second  Division, 
Brig.-Gen.  Alexander  Asboth  (w).  Staff  loss  :  w,  I.  First 
Brigade,  Col.  Frederick  Schaefer:  2d  Mo.,  Lieut. -Col. 
Bernard  Laiboldt ;  15th  Mo.,  Col.  Francis  J.  Joliat. 
Brigade  loss  :  k,  8  ;  w,  34 ;  m,  22  =  64.  Unattached  :  Fre 
mont  Hussars  Mo.  Cavalry,  Major  Emeric  Meszaros; 
5th  Mo.  Cavalry  (Benton  Hussars),  Col.  Joseph  Neniett; 
1st  Mo.  Horse  Battery,  Capt.  G.  M.  Elbert ;  2d  Ohio 
Battery,  Lieut.  W.  B.  Chapman.  Loss  :  k,  12  ;  w,  29  :  m, 

14  =  5r>. 

THIRD  DIVISION,  Col.  Jefferson  C.  Davis.  First  Briyade, 
Col.  Thomas  Pattisou  :  8th  Ind.,  Col.  William  P.  Benton; 
18th  Ind.,  Lieut.-Col.  Henry  D.  Washburn;  22d  Ind., 
Lieui.-Col.  John  A.  Hendricks  (in  w>,  Major  David  W. 


Daily,  Jr. ;  1st  Ind.  Battery,  Capt.  Martin  Klause.  Bri 
gade  loss  :  k,  17 ;  w,  88  ;  m,  6  =  111.  Second  Brigade,  Col. 
Julius  White :  37th  111.,  Lieut.-Col.  M.  S.  Barnes;  59th  111., 
Lieut.-Col.  C.  H.  Frederick;  Peoria  111.  Battery,  Capt.  P. 
Davidson.  Brigade  loss:  k,  29;  w,  195  ;  in,  3  =  227.  Cav 
alry  :  1st  Mo.,  Col.  C.  A.  Ellis.  Loss :  k,  2 ;  w,  2 ;  m,  2  =  6. 
FOURTH  DIVISION,  Col.  Eugene  A.  Carr  (w).  Staff  loss: 
w,  1.  First  Briyade,  Col.  Grenville  M.  Dodge:  35th  111., 
Col.  Gustavus  A.  Smith  (w),  Lieut.-Col.  William  P.  Chand 
ler  (c);  4th  Iowa, 'Lieut.-Col.  John  Galligan  (w)  ;  1st 
Iowa  Battery,  Capt.  Juuius  A.  Jones  (w),  Lieut.  V.  J. 
David.  Brigade  loss:  k,  35  ;  w,  200;  m,  55  =  290.  Second 
Bi-igade,  Col.  William  Vandever:  9th  Iowa,  Lieut.-Col. 
Francis  J.  Herron  (w  and  c),  Major  William  H.  Coyl  (w) ; 
Phelps's  Mo.,  Col.  John  S.  Phelps  (w);  3d  111.  Cavalry, 
Major  John  McConnell ;  3d  Iowa  Battery,  Captain  Mor 
timer  M.  Hayden.  Brigade  loss  :  k,  61 ;  w,  300;  m,  30  = 
391.  Unattached;  3d  Iowa  Cavalry,  Col.  Cyrus  Bussey 
(during  a  part  of  the  battle  Col.  Bussey  had  command 
of  other  troops  in  addition  to  his  own  regiment),  Lieut.- 
Col.  Henry  H.  Trimble  (w) ;  Bowen's  Battalion  Mo. 
Cavalry,  Major  Win.  D.  Boweu;  3d  Mo.  Infantry,  Major 
Joseph  Conrad;  24th  Mo.  Infantry,  Major  Eli  W.  Wes- 
ton.  Loss:  k,  28 ;  w,  36 ;  m,  18  =  82. 


Total  loss  in  the  Union  Army  (revised  returns) :  203  killed,  980  wounded,  and  201  captured  or  missing,— total,  1384. 

COMPOSITION  AND  LOSSES  OF  THE  CONFEDERATE  ARMY. 

....  Major-General  Earl  Van  Pom. 


MISSOURI  STATE  GUARD,  Major-General  Sterling  Price. 
CONFEDERATE  VOLUNTEERS  :  Escort,  Ceafnars~~Bat- 
talion  Cavalry,  Lieut.-Col.  J.  T.  Cearnal  (w).  First  Bri 
gade,  Col.  Henry  Little  :  1st  Cavalry,  Col.  Elijah  Gates ; 
1st  Infantry,  Col.  John  Q.  Burbridge  ;  2d  Infantry,  Col. 
Benjamin  A.  Rives  (m  w»,  Lieut.-Col.  J.  A.  Pritchard ; 
1st  Battery,  Capt.  William  Wade ;  2d  Battery,  Capt.  S. 
Churchill  Clark  (k),  Lieut.  James  L.  Farris.  Second  Bri 
gade,  Brig.-Geu.  William  Y.  Slack  (m  w),  Col.  Thomas  H. 
Rosser:  Battalion  Infantry,  Col.  John  T.  Hughes;  Bat 
talion  Infantry,  Major  R.  S.  Bevier ;  Battalion  Infantry, 
Col.  Thomas  H.  Rosser;  Battalion  Cavalry.  Col.  G.  W. 
Riggius :  Light  Battery,  Capt.  Wm.  Lucas.  Brigade 
loss  :  k,  5 ;  w,  37  =  42.  Third  Brigade,  Col.  Colton  Greene. 
Brigade  loss :  k,  6 ;  w,  59  =  65.  STATE  TROOPS,  Second 
Division,  Brig.-Gen.  Martin  E.  Green.  Third  Division, 
Col.  John  B.  Clark,  Jr. :  1st  Infantry,  Major  Rucker  (w) ; 
2d  Infantry,  Col.  Congreve  Jackson;  3d  Infantry,  Major 
Hutchinson  ;  4thaud5th  Infantry  (consolidated),  Col.  J. 
A.  Poindexter  (w)  ;  6th  Infantry,  Lieut.-Col.  Peacher. 
Division  loss :  k,  11 ;  w,  101 ;  m,  35  =  147.  Fifth  Division, 
Col.  James  P.  Saunders :  detachments  of  infantry, 
cavalry,  and  Kelly's  battery  of  artillery.  Division  loss : 
k,  9 ;  w,  32  =  41.  Sixth  Division,  Major  D.  H.  Lindsay : 
detachments  of  infantry  and  Gorham's  battery  of  artil 
lery.  Division  loss:  w,  13;  m.  34  =  47.  Seventh  and 
Xinth  Divisions,  Brig.-Gen.  D.  M.  Frost :  detachments 
of  infantry  and  cavalry  and  Guibor's  .and  MacDonald's 
batteries  of  artillery ;  also  included  the  Third  Brigade 


of  Volunteers  given  above.  Eighth  Division,  Brig.- 
Gen.  James  S.  Rains :  Infantry  under  Col.  William  H. 
Erwin,  Lieut.-Cols.  John  P.  Bowman,  A.  J.  Pearcy.  and 
Steinmoiis  ;  Bledsoe's  battery,  and  Shelby's  company  of 
cavalry.  Division  loss :  k,  2 ;  w,  26  =  28. 

McCuLLOCH's  DIVISION,  Brig.-Gen.  Ben.  MjcCiUloch 
(k),  Col.  E.  Greer.  Infantry  Briyade,  Col*"  Louis"HeT5rrt 
(c),  Col.  Evander  McNair:  4th  Ark.,  Col.  Evander  Mc- 
Nair,  Lieut.-Col.  Samuel  Ogden;  14th  Ark.,  Col.  M.  C. 
Mitchell;  16th  Ark.,  Col.  J.  .F  Hill;  17th  Ark.,  Col.  F.  A. 
Rector;  21st  Ark.,  Col.  D.  McRae  ;  3d  Louisiana,  Major 
W.  F.  Tunnard  (c),  Capt.  W.  S.  Gunnell.  Cavalry  Bri 
gade,  Brig.-Geu.  James  Mclntosh  (k) :  1st  Ark.  Mounted 
Rifles,  Col.  T.  J.  Churchill;  2d  Ark.  Mounted  Rifles,  Col. 
B.  T.  Embry ;  3d  Texas,  Col.  E.  Greer,  Lieut.-Col.  Walter 
P.  Lane;  4th  Texas,  Col.  Win.  B.  Sims  (w),  Lieut.-Col. 
William  Quayle  ;  6th  Texas,  Col.  B.  W.  Stone ;  llth  Texas, 
Lieut.-Col.  James  J.  Diuiond.  Artillery.-  Hart's,  Pro 
vence's,  Gaines's,  and  Good's  batteries. 

PIKE'S  COMMAND,  Brig.-Geu.  Albert  Pike.  Cherokee 
Regiment,  Col.  Stand  Watie ;  Cherokee  Regiment,  Col. 
John  Drew ;  Creek  Regiment,  Col.  D.  N.  Mclntosh ; 
Squadron  Texas  Cavalry,  Capt.  O.  G.  Welch. 

OTHER  TROOPS  (not  included  in  preceding  roster) : 
1st  Battalion  Ark.  Cavalry,  Major  W.  H.  Brooks ;  Bat 
talion  Texas  Cavalry,  Major  R.  P.  Crump;  Battalion 
Texas  Mounted  Rifles,  Major  J.  W.  Whitfleld;  Teel's 
Texas  Battery;  19th  Ark.  Infantry,  Lieut.-Col.  P.  R. 
Smith  ;  22d  Ark.  Infantry,  Col.  G.  W.  King. 


The  Confederate  loss  is  reported  at  800  to  1000  killed  and  wounded,  and  between  200  and  300  prisoners. 


STRENGTH  OF  THE  OPPOSING  FORCES. 


The  effective  force  of  the  Union  Army  did  not  exceed 
10,500  infantry  and  cavalry,  with  49  pieces  of  artillery. 
(See  "  Official  Records,"  VIII.,  p.  196.) 

The  effective  strength  of  the  Confederate  Army  was 
as  follows :  Price's  command,  6818,  with  8  batteries  of 

VOL.  I.    22  337 


artillery  ("Official  Records,"  VIII.,  p. 305);  McCulloch's 
command,  8384,  with  4  batteries  of  18  pieces  ("Official 
Records,"  VIII.,  p.  763) ;  and  Pike's  command,  1000  ("  Of 
ficial  Records,"  VIII.,  p.  288),  making  an  aggregate  of 
16.202  infantry  and  cavalry. 


.^Hfc^S 

siilrsis 


SEs^v/lj  \\  &re/ 1  ^  '  NX^ 


RECOLLECTIONS  OF  FOOTE  AND  THE  GUN-BOATS. 


BY    CAPTAIN    JAMES    B.    EADS. 


SOON  after  the  surrender  of  Fort  Sumter,  while  in  St.  Louis,  I  received  a 
letter  from  Attorney-General  Bates,  dated  Washington,  April  17th,  in 
which  he  said  :  "Be  not  surprised  if  you  are  called  here  suddenly  by  telegram. 
If  called,  come  instantly.  In  a  certain  contingency  it  will  be  necessary  to 
have  the  aid  of  the  most  thorough  knowledge  of  our  Western  rivers  and  the 
use  of  steam  on  them,  and  in  that  event  I  have  advised  that  you  should  be 
consulted."  The  call  by  telegraph  followed  close  upon  the  letter.  I  hurried 


^  Of  the  services  of  Captain  Eads  to  the  Western 
flotilla,  the  Eeverend  C.  B.  Boynton  says,  in  his 
"  History  of  the  Navy  "  : 

"  During  the  month  of  July,  1861,  the  Quartermaster- 
General  advertised  for  proposals  to  construct  a  number 
of  iron-clad  gun-boats  for  service  on  the  Mississippi 
River.  The  bids  were  opened  on  the  5th  of  August,  and 
Mr.  Eads  was  found  to  be  the  best  bidder  for  the  whole 
number,  both  in  regard  to  the  time  of  completion  and 
price.  ...  On  the  7th  of  August,  1861,  Mr.  Eads 
signed  a  contract  with  Quartermaster-General  Meigs  to 
construct  these  seven  vessels  ready  for  their  crews  and 
armaments  in  sixty-five  days.  At  this  early  period  the 
people  in  the  border  States,  especially  in  the  slave  States, 
had  not  yet  learned  to  accommodate  themselves  to  a 
state  of  war.  The  pursuits  of  peace  were  interrupted ; 
but  the  energy  and  enterprise  which  were  to  provide 
the  vast  material  required  for  an  energetic  prosecution 
of  the  war  had  not  then  been  aroused.  None  could  fore 
see  the  result,  and  a  spirit  of  doubt  and  distrust  per 
vaded  financial  and  commercial  circles.  It  was  at  this 
time  that  the  contractor  returned  to  St.  Louis  with  an 
obligation  to  perform  what,  under  ordinary  circum 
stances,  would  have  been  deemed  by  most  men  an  im 
possibility.  Rolling-mills,  machine-shops,  foundries, 
forges,  and  saw-mills  were  all  idle.  The  demands  of 
peace  had  ceased  for  months  before,  and  the  working- 
men  were  enlisting,  or  seeking  in  States  more  quiet  their 
accustomed  employment.  The  engines  that  were  to 
drive  this  our  first  iron-clad  fleet  were  yet  to  be  built. 
The  timber  to  form  their  hulls  was  uncut  in  the  forests, 


and  the  huge  rollers  and  machinery  that  were  to  form 
their  iron  armor  were  not  yet  constructed.  The  rapidity 
with  which  all  these  various  parts  were  to  be  supplied 
forbade  depending  alone  on  any  two  or  three  establish 
ments  in  the  country,  no  matter  how  great  were  their 
resources.  The  signatures  were  scarcely  dry  upon  this 
important  contract  before  persons  in  different  parts  of 
the  country  were  employed  upon  the  work  through  tele 
graphic  orders  issued  from  Washington.  Special  agents 
were  dispatched  in  every  direction,  and  saw-mills  were 
simultaneously  occupied  in  cutting  the  timber  required 
in  the  construction  of  the  vessels,  in  Kentucky,  Ten 
nessee,  Illinois,  Indiana, Ohio,  Minnesota,  and  Missouri; 
and  railroads,  steamboats,  and  barges  were  engaged 
for  its  immediate  transportation.  Nearly  all  of  the 
largest  machine-shops  and  foundries  in  St.  Louis,  and 
many  small  ones,  were  at  once  set  at  work  day  and 
night,  and  the  telegraph  lines  between  St.  Louis  and 
Pittsburgh  and  Cincinnati  were  occupied  frequently  for 
hours  in  transmitting  instructions  to  similar  establish 
ments  in  those  cities  for  the  construction  of  the  twenty- 
one  steam-engines  and  the  five-and-thirty  steam-boilers 
that  were  to  propel  the  fleet.  .  .  .  Within  two  weeks 
not  less  than  four  thousand  men  were  engaged  in 
the  various  details  of  its  construction.  Neither  the 
sanctity  of  the  Sabbath  nor  the  darkness  of  night  was 
permitted  to  interrupt  it.  The  workmen  on  the  hulls 
were  promised  a  handsome  bonus  in  money  for  each  one 
who  stood  steadfastly  at  the  work  until  it  was  com 
pleted,  and  many  thousands  of  dollars  were  thus  gratui 
tously  paid  by  Mr.  Eads  when  it  was  finished.  On  the 
12th  of  October,  1861,  the  first  United  States  iron-clad, 


338 


RECOLLECTIONS  OF  FOOTE  AND   THE  GUN-BOATS. 


339 


to  Washington,  where  I  was  introduced  to  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  the 
Hon.  Gideon  Welles,  and  to  Captain  Gr.  V.  Fox,  afterward  Assistant  Secretary. 
In  the  August  following  I  was  to  construct  7  gun-boats,  which,  according  to 
the  contract,  were  to  draw  6  feet  of  water,  carry  13  heavy  guns  each,  be  plated 
with  2£-inch  iron,  and  have  a  speed  of  9  miles  an  hour.  The  De  Kail)  (at 
first  called  the  St.  Louis)  was  the  type  of  the  other  six,  named  the  Caron 
delet,  Cincinnati,  Louisville,  3Iound  City,  Cairo,  and  Pittsburqli.  They  were 
175  feet  long,  51£  feet  beam;  the  flat  sides  sloped  at  an  angle  of  about 
thirty-five  degrees,  and  the  front  and  rear  casemates  corresponded  with  the 
sides,  the  stern-wheel  being  entirely  covered  by  the  rear  casemate.  Each 
was  pierced  for  three  bow  guns,  eight  broadside  guns  (four  on  a  side),  and 
two  stern  giuis.  Before  these  seven  gun-boats  were  completed,  I  engaged  to 
convert  the  snag-boat  Benton  into  an  armored  vessel  of  still  larger  dimensions. 

After  completing  the  seven  and  dispatching  them  down  the  Mississippi  to 
Cairo,  I  was  requested  by  Foote  (who  then  went  by  the  title  of  "  flag-officer," 
the  title  of  admiral  not  being  recognized  at  that  time  in  our  navy),  as  a  special 
favor  to  him,  to  accompany  the  Benton,  the  eighth  one  of  the  fleet,  in  her 
passage  down  to  Cairo.  It  was  in  December,  and  the  water  was  falling  rapidly. 

The  Benton  had  been  converted  from  the  U.  S.  snag-boat  Benton  into  the 
most  powerful  iron-clad  of  the  fleet.  She  was  built  with  two  hulls  about 
twenty  feet  apart,  very  strongly  braced  together.  She  had  been  purchased 
by  General  Fremont  while  he  was  in  command  of  the  Western  Department, 
and  had  been  sent  to  my  ship-yard  for  alteration  into  a  gun-boat.  I 
had  the  space  between  the  two  hulls  planked,  so  that  a  continuous  bottom 
extended  from  the  outer  side  of  one  hull  to  the  outer  side  of  the  other.  The 
upper  side  was  decked  over  in  the  same  manner ;  and  by  extending  the  outer 
sides  of  the  two  hulls  forward  until  they  joined  each  other  at  a  new  stem, 
which  received  them,  the  twin  boats  became  one  wide,  strong,  and  substan 
tial  hull.  The  new  bottom  did  not  extend  to  the  stern  of  the  hull,  but  was 
brought  up  to  the  deck  fifty  feet  forward  of  the  stern,  so  as  to  leave  a  space  for 


with  her  boilers  and  engines  on  board,  was  launched  in 
Carondelet,  Missouri,  in  forty-live  days  from  the  laying 
of  her  keel.*  She  was  named  the  St.  Louis,  by  Rear- 
Admiral  Foote,  in  honor  of  the  city.  When  the  fleet  was 
transferred  from  the  War  Department  to  the  Navy,  this 
name  was  changed  to  Baron  de  Kalb,  there  being  at 
that  time  a  vessel  commissioned  in  the  Xavy  called  the 
St.  Louis.  In  ten  days  after  the  De  Kalb  the  Carondelet 
was  launched,  and  the  Cincinnati,  Louisville,  Mound 
City.  Cairo,  and  Pittsburgh  followed  in  rapid  succession. 
An  eighth  vessel  [the  Benton],  larger,  more  powerful 
and  superior  in  every  respect,  was  also  undertaken 
before  the  hulls  of  the  first  seven  had  fairly  assumed 
shape.  .  .  .  Tims  one  individual  put  in  construc 
tion  and  pushed  to  completion  within  one  hundred  days 
a  powerful  squadron  of  eight  steamers,  aggregating  five 
thousand  tons,  capable  of  steaming  at  nine  knots  per 
hour,  each  heavily  armored,  fully  equipped,  and  all 
ready  for  their  armament  of  one  hundred  and  seven 
large  guus.  The  fact  that  such  a  work  was  done  is 
nobler  praise  than  any  that  can  be  bestowed  by  words. 

It  was  stipulated  in  the  contract  that  the  gun-boats  sliould 
be  delivered,  October  10th,  at  Cairo.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  they 
were  not  sent  to  Cairo  until  the  latter  part  of  November,  and 
considerable  work  still  remained  to  be  done  before  their  com 
pletion.  They  were  finished  and  accepted.  January  15th, 
1SG2,  and  put  in  commission  the  next  day.  The  delay  was  in 


It  is  to  be  regretted,  however,  that  the  promptness  and 
energy  of  the  man  who  thus  created  an  iron-clad  navy 
on  the  Mississippi  were  not  met  on  the  part  of  the  Gov 
ernment  with  an  equal  degree  of  faithfulness  in  per 
forming  its  part  of  the  contract.  On  one  pretext  or 
another,  the  stipulated  payments  for  the  work  were 
delayed  by  the  War  Department  until  the  default  as 
sumed  such  magnitude  that  nothing  but  the  assistance 
rendered  by  patriotic  and  confiding  friends  enabled  the 
contractor,  after  exhausting  his  own  ample  means,  to 
complete  the  fleet.  Besides  the  honorable  reputation 
which  flows  from  success  in  such  a  work,  he  has  the 
satisfaction  of  reflecting  that  it  was  with  vessels  at  the 
time  his  own  property  that  the  brilliant  capture  of  Fort 
Henry  was  accomplished,  and  the  conquest  of  Donelson 
and  Island  Xumber  Ten  achieved.  The  ever-memorable 
midnight  passage  of  Number  Ten  by  the  Pittsburgh  and 
Carondelet,  which  compelled  the  surrender  of  that  pow 
erful  stronghold,  was  performed  by  vessels  furnished 
four  or  five  months  previous  by  the  same  contractor, 
and  at  the  time  unpaid  for."  EDITORS. 

part  due  to  lack  of  funds  and  in  part  to  the  necessity  of  alter 
ation  in  the  design  of  the  vessels.  Had  they  been  completed 
in  the  time  specified,  the  Mississippi  campaign,  from  Island 
Number  Ten  to  Vicksburg,  would  probably  have  been  over 
before  Farragut  passed  the  forts  at  New  Orleans. 

EDITORS. 


0*  THE 

BR5ITY: 


340 


RECOLLECTIONS  OF  FOOTE  AND   THE  GUN-BOATS. 


THE  "  DE  KALB,"  FORMERLY  THE  "ST.  LOUIS"   (TYPE  OF  THE  "  CARONDKLET,"  "CINCINNATI,"  "LOUISVILLE," 
"MOUND  CITY,"  "CAIRO,"  AND  "PITTSBURGH").   FROM  A  PHOTOGRAPH. 

a  central  wheel  with  which  the  boat  was  to  be  propelled.  This  wheel  was 
turned  by  the  original  engines  of  the  snag-boat,  each  of  the  engines  having 
formerly  turned  an  independent  wheel  on  the  outside  of  the  twin  boat.  In 
this  manner  the  Benton  became  a  war  vessel  of  about  seventy-five  feet  beam, 
a  greater  breadth,  perhaps,  than  that  of  any  war  vessel  then  afloat.  She  was 
about  two  hundred  feet  long.  A  slanting  casemate,  covered  with  iron  plates, 
was  placed  on  her  sides  and  across  her  bow  and  stern ;  and  the  wheel  was 
protected  in  a  similar  manner.  The  casemate  on  the  sides  and  bow  was  cov 
ered  with  iron  3%  inches  thick ;  the  wheel-house  and  stern  with  lighter  plates, 
like  the  first  seven  boats  built  by  me.  She  carried  16  guns, — 7  32-pounders, 
2  9-inch  guns,  and  7  army  42-pounders. 

The  wish  of  Admiral  Foote  to  have  me  see  this  boat  safely  to  Cairo  was 
prompted  by  his  knowledge  that  I  had  had  experience  in  the  management  of 
steamboats  upon  the  river,  and  his  fear  that  she  would  be  detained  by 
grounding.  Ice  had  just  begun  to  float  in  the  Mississippi  when  the  Benton 
put  out  from  my  ship-yard  at  Carondelet  for  the  South.  Some  30  or  40  miles 
below  St.  Louis  she  grounded.  Under  the  direction  of  Captain  Winslow,  who 
commanded  the  vessel,  Lieutenant  Bishop,  executive  officer  of  the  ship,  an 
intelligent  and  energetic  young  man,  set  the  crew  at  work.  An  anchor  was 
put  out  for  the  purpose  of  hauling  her  off.  My  advice  was  not  asked  with 
reference  to  this  first  proceeding,  and  although  I  had  been  requested  by 
Admiral  Foote  to  accompany  the  vessel,  he  had  not  instructed  the  captain, 
so  far  as  I  knew,  to  be  guided  by  my  advice  in  case  of  difficulty. .  After  they 
had  been  working  all  night  to  get  the  boat  afloat,  she  was  harder  on  than 
ever ;  moreover,  the  water  had  fallen  about  six  inches.  I  then  volunteered 
the  opinion  to  Captain  Winslow  that  if  he  would  run  hawsers  ashore  in  a  cer- 


RECOLLECTIONS  OF  FOOTE  AND    THE  GUN-BOATS. 


tain  direction,  directly  opposite  to  that  in  which  he  had  been  trying  to  move 
the  boat,  she  could  be  got  off.  He  replied,  very  promptly,  "  Mr.  Eads,  if  you 
will  undertake  to  get  her  off,  I  shall  be  very  willing  to  place  the  entire  crew 
under  your  direction."  I  at  once  accepted  the  offer ;  and  Lieutenant  Bishop 
was  called  up  and  instructed  to  obey  my  directions.  Several  very  large  haw 
sers  had  been  put  on  board  of  the  boat  for  the  fleet  at  Cairo.  One  of  the  larg 
est  was  got  out  and  secured  to  a  large 
tree  on  the  shore,  and  as  heavy  a  strain 
was  put  upon  it  as  the  cable  would  be 
likely  to  bear.  As  the  water  was  still 
falling,  I  ordered  out  a  second  one,  and 
a  third,  and  a  fourth,  until  five  or 
six  eleven-inch  hawsers  were  heavily 
strained  in  the  effort  to  drag  the  broad- 
bottomed  vessel  off  the  bar.  There  were 
three  steam  capstans  on  the  bow  of  the 
vessel,  and  these  were  used  in  tighten 
ing  the  strain  by  luffs  upon  the  hawsers. 
One  of  the  hawsers  was  led  through  a 
snatch-block  fastened  by  a  large  chain 
to  a  ring-bolt  in  the  side  of  the  vessel. 
I  was  on  the  upper  deck  of  the  vessel 
near  Captain  Winslow  when  the  chain 
which  held  this  block  broke.  It  was 
made  of  iron  one  and  one-eighth  inches 
in  diameter,  and  the  link  separated  into 
three  pieces.  The  largest,  being  one-half 
of  the  link,  was  found  on  the  shore  at  a 
distance  of  at  least  five  hundred  feet. 
Half  of  the  remainder  struck  the  iron 
plating  on  the  bow  of  the  boat,  making  an  indentation  half  the  thickness 
of  one's  finger  in  depth.  The  third  piece  struck  Captain  Winslow  on  the 
fleshy  part  of  the  arm,  cutting  through  his  coat  and  the  muscles  of  his 
arm.  The  wound  was  a  very  painful  one,  but  he  bore  it  as  might  be  expected. 
The  iron  had  probably  cut  an  inch  and  a  half  into  the  arm  between  the 
shoulder  and  the  elbow.  In  the  course  of  the  day  the  Ben  ton  was  floated, 
and  proceeded  on  her  voyage  down  the  river  without  further  delay.  Captain 
Winslow  soon  after  departed  for  his  home  on  leave  of  absence.  On  his  recov 
ery  he  was  placed  in  command  of  the  Kearsarye,  and  to  that  accident  he 
owed,  perhaps,  the  fame  of  being  the  captor  of  the  Alalxtfna. 

When  the  Bent  on  arrived  at  Cairo  she  was  visited  by  all  the  officers  of  the 
army  and  navy  stationed  there,  and  was  taken,  on  that  or  the  following  day, 
on  a  trial  trip  a  few  miles  down  the  river.  The  Essex,  in  command  of  Captain 
William  D.  Porter,  was  lying  four  or  five  miles  below  the  mouth  of  the  Ohio  on 
the  Kentucky  shore.  As  the  Benton  passed  up,  on  her  return  from  this  little 
expedition.  Captain  Porter  offered  his  congratulations  to  Foote  on  the  apparent 
excellence  of  the  boat.  "  Yes,"  replied  Foote,  "  but  she  is  almost  too  slow." 


342 


RECOLLECTIONS  OF  FOOTE  AND   THE  GUN-BOATS. 


"  Plenty  fast  enough  to'  fight  with,"  was  Porter's  rejoinder. 
Very  soon  after  this  (early  in  the  spring  of  1862)  I  was  called  to  Washing 
ton,  with  the  request  to  prepare  plans  for  still  lighter  iron-clad  vessels,  the 
draught  of  those  which  I  had  then  completed  being  only  about  six  feet.  The 
later  plans  were  for  vessels  that  should  be  capable  of  going  up  the  Tennes 
see  and  the  Cumberland.  As  rapidly  as  possible  I  prepared  and  presented 
for  the  inspection  of  Secretary  Welles  and  his  able  assistant,  Captain 

Fox,  plans  of  ves 
sels  drawing  five 
feet.  They  were 
not  acceptable  to 
Captain  Fox,  who 
said :  "  We  want 
vessels  much 
lighter  than  that." 
"  But  you  want 
them  to  carry  a 
certain  thickness 


THE  "OSAGE"  (TWIN  OF 

TIIK  "XEOSHO"). 
FROM  A  PHOTOGRAPH. 

of  iron ! "   I  re 
plied. 

"Yes,  we  want 
them  to  be  proof 
against  heavy 
shot — to  be  plat 
ed  and  heav 
ily  plated, — but 
they  must  be 
of  much  lighter 
draught." 

After  the  interview  I  returned  with  the  plans  to  my  hotel,  and 
commenced  a  revision  of  them;  and  in  the  course  of  a  few  days  I  pre 
sented  the  plans  for  the  Osaye  and  the  Neoslio.  These  vessels,  accord 
ing  to  my  recollection,  were  about  forty-five  feet  beam  on  deck,  their 
sides  slanting  outward,  and  the  tops  of  the  gunwales  rising  only  about 
six  inches  above  the  surface  of  the  water,  so  as  to  leave  very  little 
space  to  be  covered  with  the  plating,  which  extended  two  and  a  half  feet 
down  under  water  on  these  slanting  sides.  The  deck  of  the  vessel,  rising 
from  six  inches  above  water,  curved  upward  about  four  feet  higher  at 
center ;  and  this  was  covered  all  over  with  iron  an  inch  thick.  The  plating 
on  the  sides  was  two  and  a  half  inches  thick.  Each  vessel  had  a  rotating 


THE  "CHICKASAW"  (TYPE   OF  THE  "  MILWAUKEE,"  "  WINNEBAGO,"  AND  "  KICKAPOO  "). 
FROM  A  PHOTOGRAPH. 


RECOLLECTIONS  OF  FOOTE  AND   THE  GUN-BOATS.  343 

turret,  carrying  two  eleven-inch  guns,  the  turret  being  six  inches  thick,  but 
extending  only  a  few  feet  above  the  deck  of  the  vessel.  I  was  very  anxious 
to  construct  these  turrets  after  a  plan  which  I  had  devised,  quite  different 
from  the  Ericsson  or  Coles  systems,  and  in  which  the  guns  should  be  oper 
ated  by  steam.  But,  within  a  month  after  the  engagement  at  Fort  Donelson, 
the  memorable  contest  between  the  Merrimac  and  the  Monitor  occurred, 
whereupon  the  Navy  Department  insisted  on  Ericsson  turrets  being  placed 
upon  these  two  vessels. 

At  the  same  time  the  department  was  anxious  to  have  four  larger  vessels 
for  operations  on  the  lower  Mississippi  Eiver,  which  should  have  two  turrets 
each,  and  it  consented  that  I  should  place  one  of  my  turrets  on  each  of  two 
of  these  vessels  (the  Chickasaw  and  the  Milwaukee)  at  my  own  risk,  to  be  re 
placed  with  Ericsson's  in  case  of  failure.  These  were  the  first  turrets  in  which 
the  guns  were  manipulated  by  steam,  and  they  were  fired  every  forty-five 
seconds.  The  Osage  and  Xeosho,  with  their  armaments,  stores,  and  everything 
011  board,  drew  only  three  and  a  half  feet  of  water,  and  steamed  about  nine 
miles  an  hour.  While  perfecting  those  plans,  I  prepared  the  designs  for  the 
larger  vessels  (the  Chickasaw,  Milwaukee,  Winnebago,  and  Kickapoo),  and 
Avhen  these  were  approved  by  Captain  Fox  and  the  officers  of  the  navy  to 
whom  they  were  submitted  at  Washington,  Mr.  Welles  expressed  the  wish 
that  I  should  confer  with  Admiral  Foote  about  them  before  proceeding  to 
build  them,  inasmuch  as  the  experience  which  he  had  had  at  Forts  Henry  and 
Donelson  and  elsewhere  would  be  of  great  value,  and  might  enable  him  to 
suggest  improvements  in  them.  I  therefore  hastened  from  Washington  to 
Island  Number  Ten,  a  hundred  miles  below  Cairo,  on  the  Mississippi  River, 
where  Foote's  flotilla  was  then  engaged. 

In  the  railway  train  a  gentleman  who  sat  in  front  of  me,  learning  that  I 
had  constructed  Foote's  vessels,  introduced  himself  as  Judge  Foote  of  Cleve 
land,  a  brother  of  the  Admiral.  Among  other  interesting  matters,  he  related 
an  anecdote  of  one  of  his  little  daughters  who  was  just  learning  to  read. 
After  the  capture  of  Fort  Henry  the  squadron  was  brought  back  to  Cairo  for 
repairs,  and,  on  the  Sunday  following,  the  crews,  with  their  gallant  flag-officer, 
attended  one  of  the  churches  in  Cairo.  Admiral  Foote  was  a  thorough  Chris 
tian  gentleman  and  an  excellent  impromptu  speaker.  Upon  this  occasion, 
after  the  congregation  had  assembled,  some  one  whispered  to  him  that  the  min 
ister  was  ill  and  would  be  unable  to  officiate ;  whereupon  the  admiral  went  up 
into  the  pulpit  himself,  and  after  the  usual  prayer  and  hymn  he  selected  as 
the  text  John  xiv.  1,  "  Let  not  your  heart  be  troubled :  ye  believe  in  God, 
believe  also  in  me."  Upon  this  text  he  delivered  what  was  declared  to  be  an 
excellent  sermon,  or  exhortation,  after  which  he  dismissed  the  congregation. 
An  account  of  the  sermon  was  widely  published  in  the  papers  at  the  time, 
and  came  into  the  hands  of  the  little  niece  just  referred  to.  After  she  had 
read  it,  she  exclaimed  to  her  father :  "  Uncle  Foote  did  not  say  that  right." 
"  Say  what  right  ? "  asked  the  father.  "  Why,  when  he  preached."  "  What 
did  he  say  ? "  "  He  said,  '  Let  not  your  heart  be  troubled :  ye  believe  in 


ROM    A    PHOTOGRAPH. 


EEAR-AD.MIKAL  ANDKEW    HULL    FOOTE. 


RECOLLECTIONS  OF  FOOTE  AND   THE  GUN-BOATS.  345 

Glod,  believe  also  in  meS  "  "  Well,  what  should  he  have  said  ? "  inquired  the 
father.  "  Why,  he  ought  to  have  said,  '  Let  not  your  heart  be  troubled :  ye 
believe  in  Glod,  believe  also  in  the  gun-boats?" 

On  arriving  at  Cairo,  I  found  Representative  Elihu  B.  Washburne,  after 
ward  our  minister  to  France,  waiting  for  an  opportunity  to  visit  the  army, 
then  in  Missouri,  in  the  neighborhood  of  Island  Number  Ten,  cooperating 
with  Admiral  Foote  in  the  reduction  of  that  stronghold.  We  embarked 
together  on  a  small  tug-boat  which  carried  the  mail  down  to  the  fleet.  We 
arrived  and  landed  alongside  the  flag-ship  Bent  on,  and  were  cordially  greeted 
by  Admiral  Foote.  I  presented  a  letter  which  I  had  brought  from  the  Secre 
tary  of  the  Navy.  We  withdrew  to  his  cabin  to  consider  the  plans  of  the 
four  new  gun-boats.  Mr.  Washburne  was  sent  to  the  Missouri  shore.  After 
discussing  the  plans  of  the  new  boats  for  fifteen  or  twenty  minutes,  we 
returned  to  the  deck. 

At  the  time  we  landed,  the  Benton  and  the  other  boats  of  the  fleet  were 
anchored  between  two  and  three  miles  above  the  Confederate  forts,  and  were 
then  throwing  their  shells  into  the  enemy's  works.  When  we  boarded  the 
Benton  Admiral  Foote  had  his  lorgnette  in  his  hand,  and  through  it  was 
watching  the  flight  of  each  shell  discharged  from  the  guns  of  his  ship.  He 
resumed  this  occupation  when  we  came  up  on  deck,  until,  after  a  shot  or  two 
had  been  fired,  one  of  his  officers  approached  and  handed  him  a  dozen  or 
more  letters  which  had  been  brought  down  in  the  mail.  While  still  convers 
ing  with  me,  his  eye  glanced  over  them,  as  he  held  them  in  his  hand,  and  he 
selected  one  which  he  proceeded  to  open.  Before  reading  probably  four  lines, 
he  turned  to  me  with  great  calmness  and  composure,  and  said,  "  Mr.  Eads, 
I  must  ask  you  to  excuse  me  for  a  few  minutes  while  I  go  down  to  my  cabin. 
This  letter  brings  me  the  news  of  the  death  of  my  son,  about  thirteen  years 
old,  who  I  had  hoped  would  live  to  be  the  stay  and  support  of  his  mother." 

Without  further  remark,  and  without  giving  the  slightest  evidence  of  his 
feelings  to  any  one,  he  left  me  and  went  to  his  cabin.  I  was,  of  course, 
deeply  grieved;  and  when  he  returned  after  an  absence  of  not  more  than 
fifteen  minutes,  still  perfectly  composed,  I  endeavored  to  divert  his  mind 
from  his  affliction  by  referring  to  the  plans  and  to  my  interview  with  his 
brother.  I  told  him  also  the  anecdote  of  his  little  niece  which  his  brother 
had  related,  and  this  served  to  clothe  his  face  with  a  temporary  smile.  I 
then  asked  him  if  he  would  be  kind  enough  to  assign  me  some  place  where 
I  could  sleep  on  the  Benton  that  night.  It  was  then  probably  3  o'clock  in 
the  day.  He  replied  that  I  must  not  stay  011  board.  I  said  that  I  had  come 
down  for  that  very  purpose,  since  I  wanted  to  see  how  the  Benton  and  the 
other  boats  worked  under  fire.  I  was  not  particular  where  I  slept ;  any  place 
would  do  for  me ;  I  did  not  want  to  turn  any  of  the  officers  out  of  their  rooms. 

With  a  look  of  great  gravity  and  decision,  he  replied : 

"  Mr.  Eads,  I  cannot  permit  you  to  stay  here  a  moment  after  the  tug  is 
ready  to  return.  There  is  no  money  in  the  world  which  would  justify  me 
in  risking  my  life  here ;  and  you  have  no  duty  here  to  perform,  as  I  have, 
which  requires  you  to  risk  yours.  You  must  not  stay,"  emphasizing  the 


346 


RECOLLECTIONS  OF  FOOTE  AND   THE  GUN-BOATS. 


words  very  distinctly !    "  You  must  return,  both  you  and  Mr.  Washburne,  as 
soon  as  the  tug  is  ready  to  go." 

I  felt  somewhat  disappointed  at  this,  for  I  had  fully  expected  to  spend  a  day 
at  least  on  board  the  Benton,  and  to  visit  the  other  vessels  of  the  fleet,  with 
many  of  the  officers  of  which  I  was  well  acquainted.  I  did  not  believe  there  was 
much  danger  in  remaining,  for  the  shells  of  the  enemy  seemed  to  fall  short; 

but,  within  fifteen  minutes  after 
this,  one  of  these  interesting 
missiles  struck  the  water  fifty 
or  a  hundred  feet  from  the  side 
of  the  Benton.  This  satisfied 
me  that  Foote  was  right,  and  I 
did  not  insist  on  staying. 

The  Admiral  was  a  great  suf 
ferer  from  sick  headache.  I  re 
member  visiting  him  in  his  room 
at  the  Planter's  House  in  St. 
Louis,  a  day  or  two  after  the 
battle  of  Belmont,  when  he  was 
suffering  very  severely  from  one 
of  these  attacks,  which  lasted 
two  days.  He  was  one  of  the 
most  fascinating  men  in  com 
pany  that  I  have  ever  met,  being 
full  of  anecdote,  and  having  a 
graceful,  easy  flow  of  language. 
He  was  likewise,  ordinarily,  one 
of  the  most  amiable-looking  of 
men;  but  when  angered,  as  I 
once  saw  him,  his  face  impressed  me  as  being  most  savage  and  demoniacal, 
and  I  can  imagine  that  at  the  head  of  a  column  or  in  an  attack  he  would  have 
been  invincible.  Some  idea  of  the  moral  influence  that  he  possessed  over  men 
may  be  gained  from  the  fact  that,  long  before  the  war,  when  commanding  the 
United  States  fleet  of  three  vessels  in  Chinese  waters,  he  converted  every 
officer  and  man  in  the  fleet  to  the  principles  of  temperance,  and  had  every  one 
of  them  sign  the  pledge.  I  believe  that  this  was  the  beginning  of  the  reform 
movement  in  the  navy  which  led  to  the  disuse  of  the  rations  of  grog  which 
used  to  be  served  to  the  sailors  on  shipboard  at  stated  hours  every  day. 

From  my  knowledge  of  Foote,  I  think  that  there  is  no  doubt  that  if  his 
health  had  not  given  way  so  early  in  the  war,  he  would  have  gained  laurels 
like  those  so  gallantly  won  by  Farragut.  And,  aside  from  his  martial  charac 
ter,  no  officer  ever  surpassed  him  in  those  evidences  of  genuine  refinement 
and  delicacy  which  mark  the  true  gentleman. 


REAR-ADMIRAL    HKXKY    \VALKE,    COMMANDER    OF  THE 

"TYLER,"   AND  AFTERWARD  OF  THE   "  CARON- 

DELET."     FROM  A  PHOTOGRAPH. 


NOTES   ON   THE   LIFE   OF   ADMIRAL   FOOTE. 


BY  HIS  BROTHER,  JOHN  A.  FOOTE. 


THERE  were  six  boys  and  no  girls  in  my  father's 
family.  I  was  the  eldest  and  am  the  only  sur 
vivor.  The  Admiral  was  next  to  me  in  age.  We 
were  brought  up,  I  think,  upon  purely  patriarchal 
and  Puritan  principles,  so  I  was  surprised  that  my 
father,  on  taking  me  to  the  law  school  at  Litch- 
field,  should  so  far  unbend  as  to  say  to  me,  "John, 
I  think  I  have  been  able  to  control  my  family 
pretty  well,  all  except  Andrew — I  have  never  tried 
to  do  more  than  to  guide  him."  In  subsequent  life 
I  have  thought  that  in  that  avowal  I  find  the 
secret  of  the  Admiral's  unconquerable  will  and  of 
his  success  as  a  naval  commander.  He  was  very 
genial  and  good-natured,  and  as  a  subaltern  im 
plicitly  obedient.  His  interest  in  the  Christian 
religion  transformed  him  by  subduing  his  will. 
There  never  was  any  cant  about  him,  and  he 
seemed  to  enjoy  life  and  to  get  much  out  of  it. 
A  younger  brother  of  ours  said  to  me,  "  The 
world  is  a  clog  to  me,  but  it  seems  to  be  a  help 
to  Andrew."  This  justly  expressed  my  opinion  of 
his  very  decided  and  cheerful  Christian  character. 
I  once  visited  him  when  he  was  stationed  at  the 
Naval  Asylum  at  Philadelphia.  Asking  of  the  sen 
tinel  before  the  door  for  Lieutenant  Foote,  I  was 
answered  that  he  was  in  his  church,  which  proved 
to  be  only  a  large  room,  at  the  end  of  the  hall, 
where  I  halted  to  catch  his  earnest  entreaties  to 
his  hearers  to  become  good  men.  Such  meetings, 
or  a  Sunday-school,  or  both,  he  sustained  at  all  his 
stations  ashore  or  afloat.  At  one  time  he  doubted 
whether  he  could  conscientiously  continue  in  the 
navy.  My  father  having  asked  him  if  he  did  not 
think  a  navy  necessary,  he  replied,  "  Certainly,  the 
seas  must  be  policed."  Then  added  my  father, 
"  Should  the  navy  be  in  charge  of  good  or  bad 
men  ?  "  "  Of  good  men,"  he  replied  —  and  declared 
that  this  view  removed  his  doubts. 

Later  in  life  he  got  bravely  over  such  doubts. 
It  was  enough  for  him  that  as  an  officer  of  the 
Government  he  was  bound  to  do  and  dare  every 
thing  to  put  down  the  rebellion.  I  was  trying  still 
further  to  intensify  him,  by  other  reasons,  when 
he  turned  on  me  and  said :  "John,  will  you  fight  ?" 
He  saw  that  I  hesitated,  and  at  once  added :  "  I 
will  fight  —  my  life  is  in  my  hand  for  this  cause ; 
and  if  you  won't  fight,  don't  talk  quite  so  loud." 

When  he  began  to  descend  the  Mississippi  I 
noticed  that  he  went  very  slowly,  and  lay  off  at  a 
distance  when  attacking  any  position.  I  informed 
him  that  I  thought  the  people  wanted  dash  and 
close  fighting  —  something  sharp  and  decisive. 
He  replied :  "  Don't  you  know  that  my  boats  are 
the  only  protection  you  have  upon  your  rivers 
against  the  rebel  gun-boats  —  that  without  my  flo 
tilla  everything  on  your  rivers,  your  cities  and 
towns  would  be  at  the  mercy  of  the  enemy  ?  My 
first  duty  then  is  to  care  for  my  boats,  if  I  am  to 


protect  you.  Now  when  I  ran  up  the  Tennessee 
and  the  Cumberland,  and  attacked  Fort  Henry  and 
Fort  Donelson,  if  my  boats  were  rendered  un 
manageable  as  my  flag-ship  was  at  Donelson,  the 
current  took  care  of  me  by  carrying  me  away 
from  the  enemy's  works.  But  all  this  is  changed 
when  I  descend  the  Mississippi.  Then  my  boats, 
if  they  become  unmanageable,  are  carried  directly 
into  the  hands  of  the  enemy."  I  saw  the  point 
and  had  to  give  in.  As  to  the  comparative  value 
of  the  two  arms  of  the  service  —  the  Army  and 
the  Navy  —  in  clearing  the  Western  rivers  of  the 
Confederates,  my  brother  said  they  werelike  blades 
of  shears  —  united,  invincible;  separated,  almost 
useless. 

About  the  middle  of  May,  1862,  being  much 
enfeebled  by  his  wounds  received  at  Fort  Donel 
son  and  by  illness,  he  made  his  home  at  my  house 
in  Cleveland,  Ohio,  until  about  midsummer  of  that 
year.  During  this  time  he  retained  his  command, 
and  was  in  constant  receipt  of  reports  from  the  fleet. 

June  17th  he  wrote  to  the  Navy  Department: 

"If  it  will  not  be  considered  premature,  I  wish  fur 
ther  to  remark,  that  when  this  rebellion  is  crushed 
and  a  squadron  is  fitted  out  to  enforce  the  new  treaty 
for  the  suppression  of  the  African  slave-trade,  I  should 
be  pleased  to  have  command.  But  so  long  as  the  re 
bellion  continues,  it  will  be  my  highest  ambition  to  be 
actively  employed  in  aiding  its  suppression." 

His  interest  in  Africa  was  intense.  His  one 
book  was  called  ''Africa  and  the  American  Flag." 

In  a  message  to  Congress,  dated  July  6th,  1862, 
President  Lincoln  recommended  a  vote  of  thanks 
to  Admiral  Foote,  which  was  given.  After  his 
return  to  duty  he  was  for  several  months  at  the 
head  of  one  of  the  new  bureaus  of  the  Navy  De 
partment,  and  notwithstanding  the  state  of  his 
health,  after  the  failure  of  the  attack  with  mon 
itors  and  iron-dads  upon  the  Charleston  defenses, 
Admiral  Foote  was  appointed,  June  4th,  1863,  to 
the  command  of  the  South  Atlantic  Squadron ; 
but  he  was  stricken  down  on  his  way  to  his  com 
mand.  I  was  told  that  Professor  Bache  —  of  the 
Medical  Staff  at  the  New  York  Navy  Yard,  where 
Foote  had  been  stationed  at  the  commencement 
of  the  war  —  said  that  he  dreaded  to  tell  the  Ad 
miral  that  his  attack  was  a  fatal  one,  as  he  thought 
his  heart  was  set  upon  attempting  to  take  Charles 
ton.  But,  instead  of  his  being  affected  by  the 
solemn  intelligence,  Foote  replied  that  he  felt  he 
was  prepared  and  that  he  was  glad  to  be  through 
with  guns  and  war.  He  died  at  the  Astor  House, 
in  the  city  of  New  York,  on  the  26th  of  the  same 
mouth.  The  mother  of  General  Tilghman,  who  sur 
rendered  Fort  Henry,  was  at  the  hotel,  and,  learning 
of  his  illness,  tendered  her  sympathies.  His  native 
city  of  New  Haven  gave  a  public  funeral,  which 
was  attended  by  the  governor  and  legislature. 


GENERAL  POLK  AND  THE  BATTLE  OF  BELMONT. 

BY  HIS  SOX,   DR.   WILLIAM  M.  POLK,   CAPTAIN,   C.   S.   A. 

ON  the  1st  of  November,  1861,  General  Fremont  ordered  General  Grant  at 
Cairo,  and  General  C.  F.  Smith  at  Paducah,  to  hold  their  commands 
in  readiness  for  a  demonstration  upon  Columbus,  Kentucky,  a  strong  posi 
tion  then  occupied  by  about  ten  thousand  Confederate  troops  under  General 
Leonidas  Polk.  The  object  of  the  proposed  demonstration  was  to  cover  an 
effort.to  be  made  to  drive  General  Jeff.  Thompson  from  south-east  Missouri ; 
and  at  the  same  time  to  check  the  sending  of  reinforcements  to  Price.  In 
accordance  with  this  general  plan,  on  the  4th  and  6th  Grant  moved  Colonels 
R.  J.  Oglesby,  W.  H.  L.  Wallace,  and  J.  B.  Plummer  in  the  direction  of  the 
town  of  Sikeston,  Mo.  Next  he  ordered  the  garrison  at  Fort  Holt  opposite 
Cairo  to  advance  in  the  direction  of  Columbus,  and  early  on  the  morning 
of  the  7th,  with  a  force  of  about  3500  men  of  all  arms,  convoyed  by  the  gun 
boats  Lexington  and  Tyler,  he  steamed  down  the  Mississippi  River  toward  the 
same  objective  point.  Smith  meanwhile  from  the  direction  of  Paducah  threw 
forward  his  column  of  2000  men. 

The  mobilization  of  these  various  commands,  some  12,000  men  in  all,  was 
duly  reported  to  Polk,  and  with  the  report  came  rumors  of  the  enemy's 
designs.  Polk,  however,  did  not  believe  that  so  extensive  a  movement  was 
directed  against  Thompson,  whose  entire  force  numbered  not  more  than  1500 
men,  then  encamped  far  down  toward  Arkansas.  Nor  could  he  think  that 
the  plea  of  preventing  the  sending  of  reinforcements  to  Price  was  genuine, 
as  he  knew  that  there  were  no  troops  then  (nor  were  there  likely  to  be  any) 
in  motion  to  join  Price.  On  the  other  hand,  having  for  some  weeks  had 
every  reason  to  expect  a  determined  effort  011  Grant's  part  to  dislodge  him, 
he  naturally  supposed  that  the  looked-for  attack  was  at  hand. 

The  force  at  his  disposal,  including  the  garrison  of  Columbus,  was  then 
about  10,000  men  of  all  arms.  At  Belmont,  opposite  Columbus,  Polk  had 
established  a  camp  of  observation,  which  was  then  occupied  by  one  regiment 
of  infantry,  a  battery  of  artillery,  and  a  squadron  of  cavalry.  In  order  to 
command  the  approaches  to  this  position  by  the  batteries  on  the  high  ground 
at  Columbus,  the  trees  had  been  felled  for  some  distance  along  the  west  bank, 
and  the  fallen  timber  had  been  so  placed  as  to  form  an  abatis  capable  of 
obstructing  the  advance  of  an  enemy.  This  camp  Grant  decided  to  attack. 

Accordingly,  at  about  8  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  the  7th  he  disembarked 
his  force  on  the  Missouri  shore,  some  five  miles  above  Belmont,  and  ordered 
the  gun-boats  to  drop  below  and  engage  the  batteries  at  Columbus.  Quickly 
forming  his  column,  Grant  pushed  for  the  Confederate  camp. 

Polk  meanwhile  sent  General  McCown  with  a  force  of  infantry  and  artil 
lery  up  the  east  bank  of  the  river,  and,  learning  of  the  landing  of  the  enemy 
on  the  west  shore,  dispatched  General  Pillow  with  four  regiments  to  the  aid 
of  the  camp,  thus  providing  this  officer  with  a  force  (2700  of  all  arms)  but  little 

348 


GENERAL  POLK  AND   THE  BATTLE  OF  BELMONT. 


349 


PORTRAITS    OF    CONFEDERATE    PRIVATES    OF   THE     WEST.— I. 

From  ambrotypes  found  at  the  close  of  the  war  in  the  dead-letter  office,  Richmond.  Letters  accompanying  the  por 
traits  suggest  that  the  warlike  attitude  was  a  favorite  pose  for  pictures  intended  for  sisters  and  sweethearts. 

inferior  to  that  which  was  about  to  attack  him.  Anxious,  however,  to  give  Pil 
low  all  the  men  that  he  deemed  necessary,  Polk  moved  over  another  regiment 
(five  hundred  men),  which  landed  on  the  Missouri  shore  just  as  the  battle 
began  (10:30  A.  M.)  Thus  in  all  fairness  it  must  be  stated,  that  when  the  bat 
tle  of  Belmont  commenced  the  opposing  forces  were  virtually  equal.  The 
engagement  became  general  a  few  minutes  before  11  o'clock.  With  his  line 
well  extended  Grant  bore  down  upon  the  Confederate  position,  and,  though 
stubbornly  resisted,  he  gradually  fought  his  way  forward,  driving  the  Con 
federates  to  the  river  bank  and  capturing  the  camp. 

Polk  had  been  deterred  from  sending  in  the  first  instance  a  larger  force  to 
meet  Grant's  attack  by  the  reports  which  his  scouts  made  of  the  movements 
of  the  transports  upon  the  river,  and  of  the  position  and  numbers  of  the 
columns  from  Fort  Holt  and  Paducah, —  all  tending  to  show  that  the  landing 
upon  the  opposite  side  of  the  river  was  a  mere  feint,  while  the  real  design 
was  an  attack  upon  Columbus.  In  spite  of  this,  however,  as  we  have  seen, 
he  placed  at  Belmont  a  force  fully  equal  to  that  with  which  Grant  was  acting. 
Finding  now  that  this  force  was  being  defeated,  and  learning  at  the  same 
time  that  there  was  110  enemy  upon  the  Kentucky  shore  near  enough  to 
threaten  seriously  his  position,  he  promptly  moved  over  to  Belmont  additional 
reinforcements.  Striking  Grant  upon  the  flank  and  rear,  he  drove  him  from 


PORTRAITS    OF    CONFEDERATE    PRIVATES    OF    THE    WEST.— II. 


350 


GENERAL  POLK  AND   THE  BATTLE  OF  BELMONT. 


the  field  and  pursued  him  to  his  transports.  The  heavy  guns  upon  the  high 
ground  at  Columbus  aided  materially  in  Grant's  discomfiture ;  as,  after  the 
Confederates  were  driven  to  the  river  bank,  they  were  able  to  rake  the  Fed 
eral  position.  ^  These  batteries  also  had  an  opportunity  to  test  their  fire  upon 
gun-boats,  and  the  ease  with  which  they  repulsed  the  two  attacks  which  the 


&  General  Grant,  in  his  "Personal  Memoirs" 
(New  York:  C.  L.  Webster  &  Co.),  says:  "The 
officers  and  men  engaged  at  Belmont  were  then 
under  fire  for  the  first  time.  Veterans  could  not 
have  behaved  better  than  they  did  up  to  the  mo 
ment  of  reaching  the  rebel  camp.  At  this  point 
they  became  demoralized  from  their  victory  and 
failed  to  reap  its  full  reward.  The  enemy  had  been 
followed  so  closely  that  when  he  reached  the  clear 
ground  on  which  his  camp  was  pitched  he  beat  a 
hasty  retreat  over  the  river  bank,  which  protected 
him  from  our  shots  and  from  view.  This  precipi 
tate  retreat  at  the  last  moment  enabled  the  Na 
tional  forces  to  pick  their  way  without  hindrance 
through  the  abatis  —  the  only  artificial  defense 
the  enemy  had.  The  moment  the  camp  was  reached 
our  men  laid  down  their  arms  and  commenced 
rummaging  the  tents  to  pick  up  trophies.  Some 
of  the  higher  officers  were  little  better  than  the 
privates.  They  galloped  about  from  one  cluster 
of  men  to  another,  and  at  every  halt  delivered  a 
short  eulogy  upon  the  Union  cause  and  the  achieve 
ments  of  the  command.  All  this  time  the  troops 
we  had  been  engaged  with  for  four  hours  lay 
crouched  under  cover  of  the  river  bank,  ready  to 
come  up  and  surrender  if  summoned  to  do  so ;  but, 


finding  that  they  were  not  pursued,  they  worked 
their  way  up  the  river  and  came  up  on  the  bank 
between  us  and  our  transports.  I  saw  at  the  same 
time  two  steamers  coming  from  the  Columbus  side 
toward  the  west  shore,  above  us,  black,  or  gray, 
with  soldiers  from  boiler-deck  to  roof.  Some 
of  my  men  were  engaged  in  firing  from  captured 
guns  at  empty  steamers  down  the  river,  out  of 
range,  cheering  at  every  shot.  I  tried  to  get  them 
to  turn  their  guns  upon  the  loaded  steamers  above 
and  not  so  far  away.  My  efforts  were  in  vain.  At 
last  I  directed  my  staff-officers  to  set  fire  to  the 
camps.  This  drew  the  fire  of  the  enemy's  guns 
located  on  the  heights  of  Columbus.  They  had 
abstained  from  firing  before,  probably  because  they 
were  afraid  of  hitting  their  own  men  ;  or  they  may 
have  supposed,  until  the  camp  was  on  fire,  that  it 
was  still  in  the  possession  of  their  friends.  About 
this  time,  too,  the  men  we  had  driven  over  the 
bank  were  seen  in  line  up  the  river  between  us 
and  our  transports.  The  alarm  '  surrounded ' 
was  given.  The  guns  of  the  enemy  and  the  report 
of  being  surrounded  brought  officers  and  men  com 
pletely  under  control.  At  first  some  of  the  officers 
seemed  to  think  that  to  be  surrounded  was  to  be 
placed  in  a  hopeless  position,  where  there  was 


MAPOFTHE 

BATTLEFIELD  NEAR  BELMONT. 

MISSOURI. 


GENERAL  POLK  AND   THE  BATTLE  OF  BELMONT. 


boats  attempted  argued 
well  for  the  efficiency  of 
tlieir  service.  In  closing 
his  report  of  this  battle, 
General  Polk  says : 

u  On  landing  I  was  met  by 
General  Pillow  and  General 
Cheatham,  whom  I  directed, 
with  the  regiments  of  Gener 
al  Cheatham's  command  and 
portions  of  others,  to  press 
the  enemy  to  his  boats.  This 
order  was  executed  with  alac 
rity  and  in  double-quick  time. 
The  route  over  which  we 
passed  was  strewn  with  the 
dead  and  wounded  of  the  con 
flicts  of  Colonel  Marks  and 
General  Cheatham,  already 
alluded  to,  and  with  arms, 
knapsacks,  overcoats,  etc.  On 
arriving  at  the  point  where 
his  transports  lay,  I  ordered 
the  column,  headed  by  the 
154th  Regiment  of  Tennessee 
Volunteers,  under  cover  of  a 
field  thickly  set  with  corn,  to 
be  deployed  along  the  river  bank  within  easy  range  of  the  boats.  This  being  accomplished, 
a  heavy  fire  was  opened  upon  them  simultaneously,  riddling  them  with  balls,  and,  as  we  have 
reason  to  believe,  with  heavy  loss  to  the  enemy.  Under  this  galling  fire  he  cut  his  lines  and 
retreated  from  the  shore,  many  of  his  soldiers  being  driven  overboard  by  the  rush  of  those 
behind  them.  Our  fire  was  returned  by  heavy  cannonading  from  his  gun-boats,  which  dis 
charged  upon  our  lines  showers  of  grape,  canister  and  shell,  as  they  retired  with  their,  convoy 
in  the  direction  of  Cairo." 

General  Polk  was  mistaken  in  concluding  that  all  the  Federal  force  had 
reembarked.  The  27th  Illinois  regiment,  whose  colonel,  N.  B.  Buford,  was 
one  of  Polk's  old  West  Point  friends,  had  been  separated  from  the  rest  of  the 
command  in  the  hurry  of  the  retreat,  and,  taking  a  road  that  lay  some  little 
distance  from  the  river,  made  its  way  northward.  Coming  back  to  the  river 
at  a  point  above  that  at  which  General  Grant  had  so  precipitately  taken  to 
his  boats,  it  succeeded,  at  about  dark,  in  getting  on  board  a  transport  without 
molestation.  The  absence  of  the  Confederate  cavalry  and  the  confusion  of 
the  pursuit  alone  prevented  the  discovery  and  capture  of  this  force.  | 


GENERAL    LEONID  AS    POLK,    BISHOP    OF    LOUISIANA     (KILLED    NEAR 
KENESAW,    JUNE,    1864).      FROM  A  PHOTOGRAPH. 


nothing  to  do  but  surrender.  But  when  I  announced 
that  we  had  cut  our  way  in  and  could  cut  our  way 
out  just  as  well,  it  seemed  a  new  revelation  to  of 
ficers  and  soldiers.  They  formed  line  rapidly  and 
we  started  back  to  our  boats,  with  the  men  deployed 
as  skirmishers  as  they  had  been  on  entering  camp. 
The  enemy  was  soon  encountered,  but  his  resist 
ance  this  time  was  feeble." 

4-  General  Grant  thus  describes  the  return  to  the 


boats  :  "  The  corn-field  in  front  of  our  transports 
terminated  at  the  edge  of  a  dense  forest.  Before  I 
got  back  the  enemy  had  entered  this  forest  and  had 
opened  a  brisk  fire  upon  the  boats.  Our  men,  with 
the  exception  of  details  that  had  gone  to  the  front 
after  the  wounded,  were  now  either  aboard  the 
transports  or  very  near  them.  Those  who  were 
not  aboard  soon  got  there,  and  the  boats  pushed 
off.  I  was  the  only  man  of  the  National  army  be- 


GENERAL  POLK  AND   THE  BATTLE  OF  BELMONT. 


BRIGADIER-GENERAL    U.     S.    GRANT.     FROM    A    PHOTOGRAPH    TAKEN    IN    1861. 


In  a  note  to  the  editors  Colonel  Frederick  D.  Grant 
says  of  this  picture :  "  It  was  taken  in  Cairo,  111.,  in  1861, 
and  is  a  remarkably  good  picture  of  General  Grant  as 
he  looked  at  that  time.  He  had  always  worn  his  beard 
trimmed  short  until  he  was  appointed  colonel  of  the 
21st  Illinois  ;  but  during  the  time  that  he  was  serving  in 
Missouri  he  did  not  trim  his  beard,  nor  did  he  do  so  on 
being  stationed  at  Cairo  after  his  appointment  as  briga 
dier-general.  After  he  had  fought  the  battle  of  Belmont, 
he  sent  for  his  family  to  come  on  from  Galena  and  make 


him  a  visit.  This  picture  had  been  taken  just  before 
the  visit,  and  one  of  the  first  things  that  my  mother 
said  to  him  was,  that  she  did  not  like  the  length  of 
his  beard.  Later  in  the  winter,  and  a  short  time  after 
our  arrival  in  Cairo,  General  Grant  got  permission 
to  go  to  St.  Louis  on  business  connected  with  his  com 
mand.  During  that  visit  he  was  shaved  —  the  first 
time  in  my  recollection  that  he  ever  was  shaved; 
the  second  and  only  other  instance  was  when  he  was 
President. " 


The  battle  of  Belmont  was  long  and  severe.  Beginning  at  half-past  10 
o'clock  in  the  morning,  it  did  not  end  until  sunset.  The  losses  on  both  sides 
bear  evidence  of  the  character  of  the  fighting.  The  Confederate  loss  was 


tween  the  rebels  and  our  transports.  The  captain 
of  a  boat  that  had  just  pushed  out,  but  had  not 
started,  recognized  me  and  ordered  the  engineer 
not  to  start  the  engine ;  he  then  had  a  plank  run 
out  for  me.  My  horse  seemed  to  take  in  the  sit 
uation.  There  was  no  path  down  the  bank,  and 
every  one  acquainted  with  the  Mississippi  Eiver 


knows  that  its  banks,  in  a  natural  state,  do  not 
vary  at  any  great  angle  from  the  perpendicular. 
My  horse  put  his  fore  feet  over  the  bank  without 
hesitation  or  urging,  and,  with  his  hind  feet  well 
under  him,  slid  down  the  bank  and  trotted  aboard 
the  boat,  twelve  or  fifteen  feet  away,  over  a  single 
gang-plank." — ["  Personal  Memoirs."] 


GENERAL  POLK  AND   THE  BATTLE  OF  BELMONT. 


353 


642  in  killed,  wounded,  and  missing.  That  of  the  Federals,  owing  to  the 
differences  in  their  figures,  is  more  difficult  to  determine ;  but,  accepting  the 
reports  of  the  brigade  and  regimental  commanders  as  correct,  it  must  be 
placed  at  about  six  hundred  [see  page  355].  It  is,  however,  not  easy  to 
place  entire  confidence  in  these  figures.  One  thing  is  certain :  the  Federal 
dead  and  nearly  all  their  wounded  were  left  upon  the  field.  General  Pillow 
reports  that  he  buried  295  of  them,  and  that,  under  a  flag  of  truce,  the 
Federals  were  similarly  engaged  "  a  good  part  of  the  day."  General  Grant 
states  that  he  carried  175  prisoners  from  the  field,  and  General  Polk,  that 
after  a  liberal  exchange,  by  which  he  recovered  all  of  his  own  men,  he  had 
still  100  prisoners  in  his  hands.  The  substantial  fruits  of  victory  were,  there 
fore,  with  the  Confederates,  and  their  Congress,  in  acknowledgment  of  the 
fact,  passed  resolutions  commending  Polk,  his  commanders,  and  the  troops 
for  the  service  rendered. 

The  chief  objects  of  General  Grant's  attack,  as  stated  by  himself,  had 
been,  first  to  assist  a  movement  against  General  Thompson's  command,  and 
second,  to  break  up  the  camp  at  Belmont.  He  failed  in  both,  for  the  camp 
was  continued,  and  the  disaster  to  his  command  caused  him  to  recall  the 
troops  sent  after  Thompson.  He  carried  off  two  cannon  and  a  number 
of  the  sick  and  wounded  Confederates  found  in  their  camp ;  but  he  fled 
the  field,  virtually  abandoning  one  of  his  regiments,  leaving  his  dead 
and  wounded,  a  large  preponderance  of  prisoners,  a  stand  of  his  colors, 
one  thousand  stand  of  arms,  and  the  caissons  of  his  battery  in  the 
hands  of  the  Confederates.  His  fight  had,  however,  been  a  gallant  one, 
and,  at  one  time,  the  entire  Confederate  line  was  swept  before  his  onset. 


THE   GUN-BOATS  "TYLER"   AND    "LEXINGTON"    FIGHTING    THE    COLUMBUS    BATTERIES    DURING    THE 
BATTLE    OF    BELMONT.      FROM    A    DRAWING    BY    REAR-ADMIRAL    WALKE. 

VOL.  I.     23 


354 


GENERAL  POLK  AND   THE  BATTLE  OF  BELMONT. 


He  lias  estimated  his  force  at  3114  men,  while  the  commander  of  his  First 
Brigade  states  it  as  3500.  The  discrepancy  is,  no  doubt,  accounted  for 
by  the  fact  that  five  companies  were  left  to  guard  the  transports,  thus 
leaving,  for  the  actual  engagement,  the  number  of  troops  stated  by  himself. 
When  the  battle  began  General  Pillow  had  in  line  2500  men,  exclusive  of  a 
squadron  of  cavalry  and  a  battery,  and  by  11  o'clock  he  was  joined  by  Walker's 
regiment,  numbering  about  500,  thus  giving  the  Confederates  a  force  fully 
equal  to  that  of  their  antagonists ;  and  yet  they  were  driven  in  much  con 
fusion  from  their  position.  To  account  for  this  three  reasons  have  been 
assigned :  It  has  been  said,  first,  that  the  Federal  force  was  largely  superior 
in  numbers ;  secondly,  that  the  Confederates  were  insufficiently  supplied  with 
ammunition;  and  thirdly,  that  they  were  at  a  disadvantage  owing  to  the 

exposed  position  in 
which  their  line  was 
formed.  The  first  of 
these  reasons  is,  as 
has  just  been  shown, 
clearly  incorrect;  the 
second  is  equally  so, 
as  regards  the  in 
fantry,  although  the 
field-battery  certain 
ly  was  short  of  pow 
der  and  ball.  Proof 
of  this  may  be  found 
in  the  reports  of 
the  several  regiment 
al  commanders  who 
took  part  in  the  en 
gagement.  On  the 
third  point  the  evi 
dence  shows  that 
most  of  the  line  of  battle,  especially  the  center,  was  placed  in  an  exposed 
position,  in  an  open  field,  with  a  heavy  wood  only  about  eighty  yards  distant 
in  its  front.  Under  the  cover  of  this  wood  the  Federal  force  moved  for 
ward  its  line  of  battle  and,  halting  at  the  timber's  edge,  raked  the  field 
with  its  fire.  The  Confederates  had  been  on  the  ground  for  several  weeks, 
and  the  advantageous  positions  should  have  been  familiar  to  them.  The 
force  sent  over  to  aid  in  opposing  Grant  was  on  the  ground  quite  long 
enough  before  the  battle  began  to  have  found  out  a  better  position  on  which 
to  form,  and  it  stood  in  line  of  battle  one  hour  before  the  Federal  attack  was 
made.  There  were  several  positions  at  hand,  any  one  of  which  would  have 
been  better.  This  was  especially  the  case  with  the  ground  in  the  rear  of  the 
abatis  of  felled  trees.  It  is  difficult  to  account  for  this  error,  without  taking 
into  consideration  the  characteristics  of  General  Pillow,  the  officer  command 
ing  upon  the  field.  Pillow  was  a  man  of  unlimited  personal  courage,  and 


CONFEDERATE    FORTIFICATIONS  AT  COLUMBUS,  KT. 
FROM    A    WAK-TIME    SKETCH. 


GENERAL  POLK  AND   THE  BATTLE  OF  BELMONT. 


355 


upon  this  occasion,  the  first, 
in  this  war,  in  which  he  had 
had  an  opportunity  to  come 
to  blows  with  his  enemy, 
he  no  doubt  mentally  in 
vested  his  soldiers  with  the 
same  capacity  for  resist 
ance  that  he  felt  within 
himself,  overlooking  the 
fact  that  they  were  fresh 
levies  and  that  it  was  their 
first  engagement.  Be  this 
as  it  may,  he  soon  found 
that  he  was  unable  to  hold 
his  position  and  therefore 
attempted  to  dislodge  the 
concealed  foe  by  a  series 
of  gallant  charges.  These 
proved  of  no  avail,  and, 
after  losing  heavily,  he  had 
to  give  way.  In  the  mean 
time  he  must  have  in 
flicted  heavy  loss  upon  the 
enemy,  for  it  required  the 
pressure  of  but  two  addi 
tional  regiments,  which  ar 
rived  about  12  o'clock,  and  numbered  together  but  1000  men,  to  drive  Grant 
from  the  field.  The  force  which  won  the  battle  of  Belmont  was,  then,  about 
4000  men.  It  is  true  that  an  additional  reinforcement  of  2  regiments  of 
about  500  men  each  was  sent  across  the  river,  but  they  arrived  after  the 
Federal  force  had  been  defeated,  and  took  part  only  in  the  pursuit. 

In  short,  it  maybe  said  that  the  battle  was  fought  by  3114  Federals  against 
4000  Confederates,  the  result  being  a  victory  for  the  latter ;  and  that,  subse 
quently,  the  Confederates  were  reenf orced  by  1000  men  with  whom  they  took 
up  the  pursuit,  thus  bringing  the  total  upon  the  field  to  5000  of  all  arms.])  In 


CAPTAIN    JOHN    A.    RAWLINS,   ASSISTANT-ADJUTANT-GENERAL    ON    BRIG- 
GEN.   GRANT'S    STAFF.      FROM    A    PHOTOGRAPH    TAKEN    IN   1861. 


Jj  A  recent  revision  of  the  official  tables  of  losses 
shows  that  the  estimates  as  given  in  the  official 
records  are  under  the  mark.  The  official  records 
and  the  officially  revised  estimates  furnish  the 
following  data: 

The  Union  forces  engaged  at  Belmont,  Mo.,  un 
der  Brig. -Gen.  U.  S.  Grant,  were  composed  of  the 
First  Brigade,  Brig. -Gen.  John  A.  McClernand; 
27th  Illinois,  Col.  N.  B.  Buford  ;  30th  Illinois,  Col. 
Philip  B.  Fouke  ;  31st  Illinois,  Col.  John  A.  Lo 
gan  ;  Dollins'  Co.  Illinois  Cavalry,  Capt.  J.  J. 
Dollins  ;  Delano's  Co.  Illinois  Cavalry,  Lieut.  J.  K. 
Catlin  ;  Battery  B,  1  st  Illinois  Lt.  Artillery,  Capt, 
Ezra  Taylor.  Second  Brigade,  Col.  Henry  Dough 
erty  :  22d  Illinois,  Lieut.-Col.  H.  E.  Hart,  and  7th 


Iowa,  Col.  J.  G.  Lauman, —  the  whole  command 
numbering  3114  men. 

The  gun-boats  Tyler,  Capt.  Henry  Walke,  and  Lex 
ington,  Capt.  E.  N.  Stembel,  also  bore  a  part  in  the 
engagement. 

The  loss  sustained  by  the  Union  troops,  accord 
ing  to  the  revised  official  returns,  was  120  killed, 
383  wounded,  and  10-i  captured  or  missing, — 
total,  007.  The  navy  lost  1  killed  and  2  wounded. 

The  superior  officer  on  the  Confederate  side  was 
Maj.-Gen.  Leonidas  Polk,  with  Brig.-Gens.  G.  J. 
Pillow  and  B.  F.  Cheatham  in  subordinate  com 
mand.  The  troops  under  them  immediately  en 
gaged  consisted  of  the  13th  Arkansas,  Col.  James 
C.  Tappan  ;  llth  Louisiana,  Col.  S.  F.  Marks  (com- 


356  GENERAL  POLK  AND   THE  BATTLE  OF  BELMONT. 

comparing  this  engagement  with  other  battles  of  the  war  the  points  of 
resemblance  between  it  and  that  of  Shiloh,  fought  six  months  later  and 
upon  a  much  more  extended  scale,  must  strike  every  observer.  If  Shiloh 
was  a  defeat  for  the  Confederates,  then,  by  a  similar  chain  of  occurrences 
and  conclusions,  Grant  was  defeated  at  Belmoiit.\ 

Soon  after  the  battle  of  Belmont  a  painful  accident  occurred  at  Columbus 
by  which  the  commanding  general  nearly  lost  his  life.  During  the  progress 
of  the  battle  a  128-pounder  rifled  gun  had  been  charged  while  hot ;  but,  no 
opportunity  offering  to  use  it  to  advantage,  it  was  allowed  to  cool  and  remain 
charged  four  days.  When  fired  it  burst.  This  caused  the  explosion  of  its 
magazine,  killing  seven  persons  and  severely  wounding  General  Polk  and 
other  officers. 

In  a  letter  to  his  wife,  dated  November  12th,  General  Polk  says  : 

"  I  and  others  of  my  officers  have  spent  pretty  much  the  whole  day  in  my  boat  on  the  river 
with  Buford  [Colonel  N.  B.  Buford,  27th  Illinois]  and  his  officers,  discussing-  the  principles 
of  exchange,  and  other  matters  connected  with  the  war.  He  is  as  good  a  fellow  as  ever  lived, 
and  most  devotedly  my  friend  —  a  true  Christian,  a  true  soldier,  and  a  gentleman  every  inch 
of  him.  He  said  it  did  him  good  to  come  down  and  talk  with  me,  and  hoped  it  might  be  the 
means  of  peace  and  so  on.  I  was  very  plain  and  clear  in  my  position,  as  you  may  know,  but 
very  kind. 

" After  completing  my  exchange,  I  had  still  about  100  of  their  prisoners  in  my  keeping,  and 
among  them  15  or  20  of  his  regiment.  These  he  was  very  anxious  I  should  let  him  take  back. 
He  urged  me  in  every  way,  even  on  the  score  of  our  friendship,  but  I  could  not  yield,  especially 
to  such  a  plea,  which  would  have  subjected  me  to  the  charge  of  consulting  individual  preference 
to  public  duty.  He  admitted  it,  and  was  obliged  to  leave  without  them,  but  we  had  a  very 
pleasant  day.  I  went  up  with  him  nearly  to  Cairo.  He  wanted  me  to  go  and  spend  the  night 
with  him ;  so  you  see  how  much  we  have  done  on  this  line  toward  ameliorating  the  severities  of 
this  unfortunate  and  wretched  state  of  things." 

In  another  letter  to  Mrs.  Polk,  dated  November  15th,  he  says : 

"  Since  the  accident  I  have  been  up  the  river  on  two  occasions  to  meet  flags  of  truce  ;  once  to 
meet  Grant,  and  to-day  to  meet  my  friend  Buford.  My  interview  with  General  Grant  was,  on 
the  whole,  satisfactory.  It  was  about  an  exchange  of  prisoners.  He  looked  rather  grave,  I 
thought,  like  a  man  who  was  not  at  his  ease.  We  talked  pleasantly  and  I  succeeded  in  getting 
a  smile  out  of  him  and  then  got  on  well  enough.  I  discussed  the  principles  on  which  I  thought 

manding    brigade),    Lieut. -Col.     E.    H.    Barrow ;  Gown's   command   on  the   Kentucky  side   of  the 

Blythe's  Mississippi,  Col.  A.  K.  Blythe ;    2d  Ten-  river,  also  participated. 

nessee,Col.  J.Knox  Walker  (commanding  brigade),  The    Confederate    loss   was    105    killed,    419 

Lieut-Col.  W.  B.  Boss;    12th  Tennessee,  Col.  R.  wounded,  and  117  missing, — in  all,  641. 

M.Russell  (commanding  brigade),  Lieut.-Col.  T.  The  whole  number  of  Confederates  on  the  field  is 

H.   Bell;    13th  Tennessee,   Col.  John  V.  Wright ;  not  officially  reported.    The  5  regiments  originally 

15th  Tennessee,    Maj.    J.   W.    Hambleton ;    21st  engaged  numbered  about   2500  men.     Allowing 

Tennessee,  Col.  Ed.  Pickett,  Jr.  ;    22d  Tennessee,  the  same   average  of  strength  for  the  reenforce- 

Col.  Thomas  J.  Freeman;    154th  Senior  Tennes-  ments   subsequently   sent   across    the  river,    and 

see,   Col.   Preston  Smith   (commanding  brigade),  more  or  less  engaged,  the  Confederates  may  be 

Lieut.-Col.  Marcus  J.Wright;  Watson  (La.)  Bat-  estimated  atnot  less  than  five  thousand. — EDITORS. 

tery,  Lieut.-Col.  D.  Beltzhoover ;    Mississippi  and  \  Of  the  result  of  the  battle,  General  Grant  says : 

Tennessee  Cavalry,  Lieut-Cols.  John  H.  Miller  and  "  Belmont  was   severely  criticised  in   the   North 

T.  H.  Logwood.  as  a  wholly  unnecessary  battle,  barren  of  results 

The  Point  Coupe'e  (Louisiana)  Battery,  Captain  or  the  possibility  of  them  from  the  beginning.     If 

R.  A.  Stewart ;  Mississippi  Battery,  Captain  Me-  it  had   not  been  fought,  Colonel  Oglesby   would 

lancthon  Smith  ;  Siege  Battery,  Captain  S.  H.  D.  probably  have  been  captured  or  destroyed  with  his 

Hamilton,   and   the   Fort   Artillery,   Major  A.   P.  three  thousand  men.     Then   I   should  have  been 

Stewart,    all   of  Brigadier-General   John    P.    Me-  culpable  indeed." — ["Personal  Memoirs."] 


GENERAL  POLK  AND    THE  BATTLE  OF  BELMONT. 


357 


REEMBARKATION    OF    GRANT'S    TROOPS    AFTER    THE    BATTLE.      FROM    A   DRAWING    BY    REAR-ADMIRAL    WALKE. 

the  war  should  be  conducted ;  denounced  all  barbarity,  vandalism,  plundering,  and  all  that, 
and  got  him  to  say  that  he  would  join  in  putting  it  down.  I  was  favorably  impressed  with  him ; 
he  is  undoubtedly  a  man  of  much  force.  We  have  now  exchanged  five  or  six  flags,  and  he 
grows  more  civil  and  respectful  every  time." 

It  was  at  one  of  these  conferences  that  an  amusing  incident  occurred  which, 
so  far  from  marring  the  harmony  of  the  occasion,  afforded  much  merriment 
to  all  present.  The  jest  chanced  to  be  at  Colonel  Buford's  expense.  The 
matters  of  the  flag  of  truce  had  all  been  discussed,  and  the  party  had  ad 
journed  to  partake  of  a  simple  luncheon  which  the  Confederates  had  provided. 
As  the  company  rose  from  the  table  the  gallant  colonel,  raising  his  glass, 
proposed :  "  George  Washington,  the  Father  of  his  Country."  General  Polk, 
with  a  merry  twinkle  in  his  eye,  quickly  added :  "And  the  first  Rebel ! "  The 
Federal  officers,  caught  in  their  own  trap,  gracefully  acknowledged  it  by 
drinking  the  amended  toast. 

A  little  later  General  Cheatham,  who  was  an  ardent  follower  of  the  turf, 
discovered  symptoms  of  a  like  weakness  in  General  Grant.  After  they  had 
been  conversing  for  some  time  upon  official  matters,  the  conversation  drifted 
upon  the  subject  of  horses.  This  congenial  topic  was  pursued  to  the  satisfac 
tion  of  each  until  it  finally  ended  in  a  grave  proposition  from  Cheatham 
to  Grant  that,  as  this  thing  of  fighting  was  a  troublesome  affair,  they  had 
best  settle  the  vexing  questions  about  which  they  had  gone  to  war,  by  a 
grand,  international  horse-race  over  on  the  Missouri  shore.  Grant  laughingly 
answered  that  he  wished  it  might  be  so. 


i-OFFICER     FOO 
THE   "  C1NCINI 


AT     FORT    HENRY 


THE  GUN-BOATS  AT  BELMONT  AND  FORT  HENRY. 

BY  HENRY  WALKE,  REAR-ADMIRAL,  U.  8.  N. 

\  T  the  beginning  of  the  war,  the  army  and  navy 
-£^-  were  mostly  employed  in  protecting  the  loyal 
people  who  resided  on  the  borders  of  the  disaffected 
States,  and  in  reconciling  those  whose  sympathies 
were  opposed.  But  the  defeat  at  Manassas  and  other 
reverses  convinced  the  Government  of  the  serious 
character  of  the  contest,  and  of  the  necessity  of  more 
vigorous  and  extensive  preparations  for  war.  Our 
navy  yards  were  soon  filled  with  workmen ;  recruit 
ing  stations  for  unemployed  seamen  were  established,  and  we  soon  had  more 
sailors  than  were  required  for  the  ships  that  could  be  fitted  for  service.  Artil 
lerymen  for  the  defenses  of  Washington  being  scarce,  five  hundred  of  these 
sailors,  with  a  battalion  of  marines  (for  guard  duty),  were  sent  to  occupy 
the  forts  on  Shuter's  Hill,  near  Alexandria.  The  Pensacola  and  the  Potomac 
flotilla  and  the  seaboard  navy  yards  required  nearly  all  of  the  remaining 
unemployed  seamen. 

While  Foote  was  improvising  a  flotilla  for  the  Western  rivers  he  was  mak 
ing  urgent  appeals  to  the  Government  for  seamen.  Finally  some  one  at  the 
Navy  Department  thought  of  the  five  hundred  tars  stranded  on  Shuter's  Hill, 
and  obtained  an  order  for  their  transfer  to  Cairo,  where  they  were  placed  on 
the  receiving  ship  Maria  Denning.  There  they  met  fresh-water  sailors  from 
our  great  lakes,  and  steamboat  hands  from  the  Western  rivers.  Of  the  sea- 


358 


THE  GUN-BOATS  AT  BELMONT  AND  FORT  HENRY.  359 

men  from  the  East,  there  were  Maine  lumbermen,  New  Bedford  whalers,  New 
York  liners,  and  Philadelphia  sea-lawyers.  The  foreigners  enlisted  were 
mostly  Irish,  with  a  few  English  and  Scotch,  French,  Germans,  Swedes, 
Norwegians,  and  Danes.  The  Northmen,  considered  the  hardiest  race  in  the 
world,  melted  away  in  the  Southern  sun  with  surprising  rapidity. 

On  my  gun-boat,  the  Carondelet,  were  more  young  men  perhaps  than  on  any 
other  vessel  in  the  fleet.  Philadelphians  were  in  the  majority;  Bostonians 
came  next,  with  a  sprinkling  from  other  cities,  and  just  enough  men-o'- war's 
men  to  leaven  the  lump  with  naval  dis 
cipline.  The  De  Kail)  had  more  than  its 
share  of  men-o'-war's  men,  Lieutenant-Com 
mander  Leonard  Paulding  having  had  the 
first  choice  of  a  full  crew,  and  having  se 
cured  all  the  frigate  Sabine's  reenlisted  men 
who  had  been  sent  West. 

During  the  spring  and  summer  of  1861,  WHARF-BOAT  AT  CAIRO. 

Commander  John  Bodgers  purchased,  and 

he,  with  Commander  Roger  N.  Stembel,  Lieutenant  S.  L.  Phelps,  and  Mr. 
Eads,  altered,  equipped,  and  manned,  for  immediate  service  on  the  Ohio 
and  Mississippi  rivers,  3  wooden  gun-boats — the  Tyler,  of  6  8-inch  shell-guns 
and  2  32-pounders ;  the  Lexington,  of  4  8-inch  shell-guns  and  2  32-pounders, 
and  the  Conestoya,  of  4  32-pounder  guns.  This  nucleus  of  the  Mississippi 
flotilla  (like  the  fleets  of  Perry,  Macdonough,  and  Chauncey  in  the  war  of  1812) 
was  completed  with  great  skill  and  dispatch ;  they  soon  had  full  possession  of 
the  Western  rivers  above  Columbus,  Kentucky,  and  rendered  more  important 
service  than  as  many  regiments  could  have  done.  On  October  12th,  1861,  the 
St.  Louis,  afterward  known  as  the  De  Kail,  the  first  of  the  seven  iron-clad  gun 
boats  ordered  of  Mr.  Eads  by  the  Government,  was  launched  at  Carondelet, 
near  St.  Louis.  The  other  iron-clads,  the  Cincinnati,  Carondelet,  Louisville, 
Hound  City,  Cairo,  and  Pittsburgh,  were  launched  soon  after  the  St.  Louis, 
Mr.  Eads  having  pushed  forward  the  work  with  most  commendable  zeal  and 
energy.  Three  of  these  were  built  at  Mound  City,  111.  To  the  fleet  of  iron 
clads  above  named  were  added  the  Sent  on  (the  largest  and  best  vessel  of  the 
Western  flotilla),  the  Essex,  and  a  few  smaller  and  partly  armored  gun-boats. 

Flag-Officer  Foote  arrived  in  St.  Louis  on  September  6th,  and  assumed 
command  of  the  Western  flotilla.  He  had  been  my  fellow-midshipman  in  1827, 
on  board  the  L'nited  States  ship  A 'at cliez,  of  the  West  India  squadron,  and  was 
then  a  promising  young  officer.  He  was  transferred  to  the  Hornet,  of  the 
same  squadron,  and  was  appointed  her  sailing-master.  After  he  left  the  Satcliez, 
we  never  met  again  until  February,  1861,  at  the  Brooklyn  Navy  Yard,  where 
he  was  the  executive  officer.  Foote,  Schenck,  and  myself  were  then  the  only 
survivors  of  the  midshipmen  of  the  Xatcliez,  in  her  cruise  of  1827,  and  now 
I  am  the  only  officer  left. 

During  the  cruise  of  1827,  while  pacing  the  deck  at  night,  on  the  lonely  seas, 
and  talking  with  a  pious  shipmate,  Foote  became  convinced  of  the  truth  of 
the  Christian  religion,  of  which  he  was  an  earnest  professor  to  the  last.  He 


360 


THE  GUN-BOATS  AT  BELMONT  AND  FORT  HENRY. 


THE    GUN-BOATS   "TYLER"  AND   "LEXINGTON"   ENGAGING    THE    BATTERIES    OF    COLUMBUS,    KV.,    IM  KINti 
THE    BATTLE    OF    BELMONT.       AFTEK    A    SKETCH    BY    REAR-ADMIRAL    WALKE. 


In  a  letter  written  early  in  January,  1862,  General  Polk 
says  of  the  works  at  Columbus:  "We  are  still  quiet 
here.  I  am  employed  in  making  more  and  more  difficult 
the  task  to  take  this  place.  ...  I  have  now,  mounted 
and  in  position,  all  round  my  works,  140  cannon  of 


various  calibers,  and  they  look  not  a  little  formidable. 
Besides  this,  I  am  paving  the  bottom  of  the  river  with 
submarine  batteries,  to  say  nothing  of  a  tremendous, 
heavy  chain  across  the  river.  I  am  planting  mines  out 
in  the  roads  also." 


rendered  important  service  while  in  command  of  the  brig  Perry,  on  the  coast 
of  Africa,  in  1849,  in  suppressing  the  slave-trade,  and  he  greatly  distinguished 
himself  by  his  skill  and  gallantry  in  the  attack  upon  the  Barrier  Forts,  near 
Canton  (1856),  which  he  breached  and  carried  by  assault,  leading  the  assailing 
column  in  person.  He  was  slow  and  cautious  in  arriving  at  conclusions,  but 
firm  and  tenacious  of  purpose.  He  has  been  called  "  the  Stonewall  Jackson 
of  the  Navy."  He  often  preached  to  his  crew  on  Sundays,  and  was  always 
desirous  of  doing  good.  He  was  not  a  man  of  striking  personal  appearance, 
but  there  was  a  sailor-like  heartiness  and  frankness  about  him  that  made  his 
company  very  desirable. 

Flag-Officer  Foote  arrived  at  Cairo  September  12th,  and  relieved  Commander 
John  Rodgers  of  the  command  of  the  station.  The  first  operations  of  the 
Western  flotilla  consisted  chiefly  of  reconnoissances  on  the  Mississippi,  Ohio, 
Cumberland,  and  Tennessee  rivers.  At  this  time  it  was  under  the  control  of 
the  War  Department,  and  acting  in  cooperation  with  the  army  under  General 
Grant,  whose  headquarters  were  at  Cairo. 

On  the  evening  of  the  6th  of  November,  1861,  I  received  instructions  from 
General  Grant  to  proceed  down  the  Mississippi  with  the  wooden  gun-boats 
Tyler  and  Lexington  on  a  reconnoissance,  and  as  convoy  to  some  half- 
dozen  transport  steamers ;  but  I  did  not  know  the  character  of  the  service 
expected  of  me  until  I  anchored  for  the  night,  seven  or  eight  miles  below 
Cairo.  Early  the  next  morning,  while  the  troops  were  being  landed  near 
Belmont,  Missouri,  opposite  Columbus,  Kentucky,  I  attacked  the  Confederate 
batteries,  at  the  request  of  General  Grant,  as  a  diversion,  which  was  done 


THE  GUN-BOATS  AT  BELMONT  AND  FORT  HENRY. 


361 


with  some  effect.  But  the  superiority  of  the  enemy's  batteries  on  the  bluffs 
at  Columbus,  both  in  the  number  and  the  quality  of  his  guns,  was  so  great 
that  it  would  have  been  too  hazardous  to  have  remained  long  under  his  fire 
with  such  frail  vessels  as  the  Tyler  and  Lexington,  which  were  only  expected 
to  protect  the  land  forces  in  case  of  a  repulse.  Having  accomplished  the 
object  of  the  attack,  the  gun-boats  withdrew,  but  returned  twice  during  the 
day  and  renewed  the  contest.  During  the  last  of  these  engagements  a 
cannon-ball  passed  obliquely  through  the  side,  deck,  and  scantling  of  the 
Tyler,  killing  one  man  and  wounding  others.  This  convinced  me  of  the 
necessity  of  withdrawing  my  vessels,  which  had  been  moving  in  a  circle  to 
confuse  the  enemy's  gunners.  We  fired  a  few  more  broadsides,  therefore, 
and,  perceiving  that  the  firing  had  ceased  at  Belrnont,  an  ominous  circum 
stance,  I  returned  to  the  lauding,  to  protect  the  army  and  transports.  In  fact, 
the  destruction  of  the  gun-boats  would  have  involved  the  loss  of  our  army 
and  our  depot  at  Cairo,  the  most  important  one  in  the  West. 

Soon  after  we  returned  to  the  landing-place  our  troops  began  to  appear,  and 
the  officers  of  the  gun-boats  were  warned  by  General  McClernand  of  the 
approach  of  the  enemy.  The  Confederates  came  en  masse  through  a  corn 
field,  and  opened  with  musketry  and  light  artillery  upon  the  transports, 
which  were  filled  or  being  filled  with  our  retreating  soldiers.  A  well-directed 
fire  from  the  gun-boats  made  the  enemy  fly  in  the  greatest  confusion. 

Flag-Officer  Foote  was  at  St.  Louis  when  the  battle  of  Belmont  was  fought, 
and  made  a  report  to  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  of  the  part  which  the 
gun-boats  took  in  the  action,  forwarding  my  official  report  to  the  Navy 
Department.  The  officers  of  the  vessels  were  highly  complimented  by 
General  Grant  for  the  important  aid  they  rendered  in  this  battle;  and 

in  his  second  official  report  of  the  ac 
tion  he  made  references  to  my  report. 
It  was  impossible  for  me  to  inform  the 
flag-officer  of  the  general's  intentions, 
which  were  kept  perfectly  secret. 

During  the  winter  of  1861-62,  an  ex 
pedition  was  planned  by  Flag-Officer 
Foote  and  Generals  Grant  and  Mc 
Clernand  against  Fort  Henry,  situ 
ated  on  the  eastern  bank  of  the 
Tennessee  River,  a  short  distance 
south  of  the  line  between  Kentucky 
and  Tennessee.  In  January  the  iron 
clads  were  brought  down  to  Cairo, 
and  great  efforts  were  made  to  pre 
pare  them  for  immediate  service,  but 
only  four  of  the  iron-clads  could  be 
made  ready  as  soon  as  required. 

On  the  morning  of  the  2d  of  Febru 
ary  the  flag-officer  left  Cairo  with  the 


MAP    OF    THE    REGION    OF    FOOTE'S    OPERATIONS. 


362 


THE  GUN-BOATS  AT  BELMONT  AND  FORT  HENRY. 


four  armored  vessels  above  named,  and  the  wooden  gun-boats  Tyler,  Lexington, 
and  Conestoga,  and  in  the  evening  reached  the  Tennessee  River.  On  the  4th 
the  fleet  anchored  six  miles  below  Fort  Henry.  The  next  day,  while  recon- 
noitering,  the  Essex  received  a  shot  which  passed  through  the  pantry  and  the 
officers'  quarters  and  visited  the  steerage.^-  On  the  5th  the  flag-officer  inspected 
the  officers  and  crew  at  quarters,  addressed  them,  and  offered  a  prayer. 

Heavy  rains  had  been 
falling,  and  the  river  had 
risen  rapidly  to  an  un 
usual  height;  the  swift 
current  brought  down 
an  immense  quantity  of 
heavy  drift-wood,  lum 
ber,  fences,  and  large 
trees,  and  it  required  all 
the  steam-power  of  the 
Carondelet,  with  both  an 
chors  down,  and  the  most 
strenuous  exertions  of 
the  officers  and  crew, 
working  day  and  night, 
to  prevent  the  boat  from 
being  dragged  down 
stream.  This  adversity  appeared  to  dampen  the  ardor  of  our  crew,  but  when  the 
next  morning  they  saw  a  large  number  of  white  objects,  which  through  the  fog 
looked  like  polar  bears,  coming  down  the  stream,  and  ascertained  that  they  were 
the  enemy's  torpedoes  forced  from  their  moorings  by  the  powerful  current,  they 
took  heart,  regarding  the  freshet  as  providential  and  as  a  presage  of  victory. 
The  overflowing  river,  which  opposed  our  progress,  swept  away  in  broad  day 
light  this  hidden  peril ;  for  if  the  torpedoes  had  not  been  disturbed,  or  had 
broken  loose  at  night  while  we  were  shoving  the  drift-wood  from  our  bows, 
some  of  them  would  surely  have  exploded  near  or  under  our  vessels. 

The  6th  dawned  mild  and  cheering,  with  a  light  breeze,  sufficient  to  clear 
away  the  smoke.  At  10:20  the  flag-officer  made  the  signal  to  prepare  for 
battle,  and  at  10:50  came  the  order  to  get  under  way  and  steam  up  to  Panther 
Island,  about  two  miles  below  Fort  Henry.  At  11 : 35,  having  passed  the  foot 
of  the  island,  we  formed  in  line  and  approached  the  fort  four  abreast, —  the 
Essex  on  the  right,  then  the  Cincinnati,  Carondelet,  and  St.  Louis.  For  want 
of  room  the  last  two  were  interlocked,  and  remained  so  during  the  fight. 


UNITED    STATES    GUN-BOAT  "  TYI.ER.'       FKOM    A    DRAWING    BY 
BEAR-ADMIRAL    WALKE. 


•fc  Composition  and  losses  of  the  Union  fleet  at 
Fort  Henry :  Flag-Officer  A.  H.  Foote,  command 
ing.  First  Division :  Flagship  Cincinnati,  Com 
mander  R.  N.  Stembel :  0  32-pounders,  3  8-inch, 
4  rifled  army  42-pounders,  1  12-pounder  boat- 
howitzer;  Essex,  Commander  W.  I).  Porter:  1 
32-pounder,  3  11-inch,  1  10-inch,  1  12-pounder 
boat-howitzer  ;  Carondelet,  Commander  H.  Walke 
(same  armament  as  the  Cincinnati);  St.  Louis, 
Lieut. -Commanding  L.  Paulding:  7  32-pounders, 


2  8-inch,  4  rifled  42-pounders,  1  rifled  boat- 
howitzer.  Second  Division  :  Lieut.  S.  L.  Phelps, 
commanding  :  Conestoga,  Lieut. -Commanding  S.L. 
Phelps:  4  32-pounders;  Tyler,  Lieut. -Command 
ing  William  G  win:  1  32-pounder,  0  8-inch;  Lexing 
ton,  Lieut.-Commanding  J.  W.  Shirk  :  2  32-pound 
ers,  4  8-inch.  The  Union  loss  as  officially  reported 
was :  Cincinnati,  killed,  1  ;  wounded,  9.  Essex, 
killed,  6  ;  wounded,  1  8  ;  missing,  5.  Total  killed, 
7;  wounded,  27;  missing,  5.  Total, 39. — EDITORS. 


THE  GUN-BOATS  AT  BELMONT  AND  FORT  HENRY. 


As  we  slowly  passed  up  this  narrow  stream,  not  a  sound  could  be  heard  nor 
a  moving  object  seen  in  the  dense  woods  which  overhung  the  dark  and  swollen 
river.  The  gun-crews  of  the  Carondelet  stood  silent  at  their  posts,  impressed 
with  the  serious  and  important  character  of  the  service  before  them.  About 
noon  the  fort  and  the  Confederate  flag  came  suddenly  into  view,  the  barracks, 
the  new  earth-works,  and  the  great  guns  well  manned.  The  captains  of  our 
guns  were  inen-of- war's  men,  good  shots,  and  had  their  men  well  drilled. 

The  flag-steamer,  the  Cincinnati,  fired  the  first  shot  as  the  signal  for  the 
others  to  begin.  At  once  the  fort  was  ablaze  with  the  flame  of  her  eleven 
heavy  guns.  The  wild  whistle  of  their  rifle-shells  was  heard  on  every  side 
of  us.  On  the  Carondelet  not  a  word  was  spoken  more  than  at  ordinary 
drill,  except  when  Matthew  Arthur,  captain  of  the  starboard  bow-gun,  asked 
permission  to  fire  at  one  or  two  of  the  enemy's  retreating  vessels,  as  he 
could  not  at  that  time  bring  his  gun  to  bear  on  the  fort.  He  fired  one  shot, 
which  passed  through  the  upper  cabin  of  a  hospital-boat,  whose  flag  was  not 
seen,  but  injured  no  one.  The  Carondelet  was  struck  in  about  thirty  places 
by  the  enemy's  heavy  shot  and  shell.  Eight  struck  within  two  feet  of  the 
bow-ports,  leading  to  the  boilers,  around  which  barricades  had  been  built  — 
a  precaution  which  I  always  took  before  going  into  action,  and  which  on 
several  occasions  prevented  an  explosion.  The  Carondelet  fired  107  shell  and 
solid  shot ;  none  of  her  officers  or  crew  was  killed  or  wounded. 

The  firing  from  the  armored  vessels  was  rapid  and  well  sustained  from  the 
beginning  of  the  attack,  and  seemingly  accurate,  as  we  could  occasionally 

see  the  earth  thrown  in 
great  heaps  over  the  en 
emy's  guns.  Nor  was  the 
fire  of  the  Confederates  to 
be  despised ;  their  heavy 
shot  broke  and  scattered 
our  iron-plating  as  if  it 
had  been  putty,  and  often 
passed  completely  through 
the  casemates.  But  our  old 
men-of-war's  men,  captains 
of  the  guns,  proud  to  show 
their  worth  in  battle,  in 
fused  life  and  courage  into 
their  young  comrades. 
When  these  experienced 
gunners  saw  a  shot  coming 
toward  a  port,  they  had 
the  coolness  and  discretion 
to  order  their  men  to  bow 
down,  to  save  their  heads. 
After  nearly  an  hour's 

MAP    OF    FOBX    HENRY,   FEBRUARY    6,   1862.  hai'd      figlltillg,     tllC     Captahl 


364 


THE  GUN-BOATS  AT  BELMONT  AND  FORT  HENRY. 


of  the  Essex,  going  below,  and  complimenting  the  First  Division  for  their 
splendid  execution,  asked  them  if  they  did  not  want  to  rest  and  give  three 
cheers,  which  were  given  with  a  will.  But  the  feelings  of  joy  on  board  the 
Essex  were  suddenly  changed  by  a  calamity  which  is  thus  described  in  a 
letter  to  me  from  James  Laning,  second  master  of  the  Essex : 

"  A  shot  from  the  enemy  pierced  the  casemate  just  above  the  port-hole  on  the  port  side,  then 
through  the  middle  boiler,  killing  in  its  flight  Acting  Master's  Mate  S.  B.  Brittan,  Jr.,  and  opening 
a  chasm  for  the  escape  of  the  scalding  steam  and  water.  The  scene  which  followed  was  almost 
indescribable.  The  writer,  who  had  gone  aft  in  obedience  to  orders  only  a  few  moments  before 
(and  was  thus  providentially  saved),  was  met  by  Fourth  Master  Walker,  followed  by  a  crowd 
of  men  rushing  aft.  Walker  called  to  me  to  go  back ;  that  a  shot  from  the  enemy  had  carried 
away  the  steam-pipe.  I  at  once  ran  to  the  stern  of  the  vessel,  and,  looking  out  of  the  stern- 
port,  saw  a  number  of  our  brave  fellows  struggling  in  the  water.  The  steam  and  hot  water  in 
the  forward  gun-deck  had  driven  all  who  were  able  to  get  out  of  the  ports  overboard,  except  a 
few  who  were  fortunate  enough  to  cling  to  the  casemate  outside.  When  the  explosion  took 
place  Captain  Porter  was  standing  directly  in  front  of  the  boilers,  with  his  aide,  Mr.  Brittan, 
at  his  side.  He  at  once  rushed  for  the  port-hole  on  the  starboard  side,  and  threw  himself 
out,  expecting  to  go  into  the  river.  A  seaman,  John  Walker,  seeing  his  danger,  caught  him 
around  the  waist,  and  supporting  him  with  one  hand,  clung  to  the  vessel  with  the  other,  until, 
with  the  assistance  of  another  seaman,  who  came  to  the  rescue,  they  succeeded  in  getting  the 
captain  upon  a  narrow  guard  or  projection  which  ran  around  the  vessel,  and  thus  enabled  him 
to  make  his  way  outside  to  the  after-port,  where  I  met  him.  Upon  speaking  to  him,  he  told  me 
he  was  badly  hurt,  and  that  I  must  hunt  for  Mr.  Riley, 
the  First  Master,  and  if  he  was  disabled  I  must  take 
command  of  the  vessel,  and  man  the  battery  again.  Mr. 
Riley  was  unharmed,  and  already  in  the  discharge  of  his 
duties  as  Captain  Porter's  successor.  In  a  very  few  min 
utes  after  the  explosion  our  gallant  ship  (which,  in  the 
language  of  Flag-Officer  Foote,  had  fought  most  effect 
ively  through  two-thirds  of  the  engagement)  was  drift 
ing  slowly  away  from  the  scene  of  action  ;  her  commander 
badly  wounded,  a  number  of  her  officers  and  crew  dead 
at  their  post,  while  many  others  were  writhing  in  their 
last  agony.  As  soon  as  the  scalding  steam  would  admit, 
the  forward  gun- deck  was  explored.  The  pilots,  who  were 
both  in  the  pilot-house,  were  scalded  to  death.  Marshall 
Ford,  who  was  steering  when  the  explosion  took  place, 
was  found  at  his  post  at  the  wheel,  standing  erect,  his 
left  hand  holding  the  spoke  and  his  right  hand  grasp 
ing  the  signal-bell  rope.  A  seaman  named  James  Coffey, 
who  was  shot-man  to  the  No.  2  gun,  was  on  his  knees,  in 
the  act  of  taking  a  shell  from  the  box  to  be  passed  to  the 
loader.  The  escaping  steam  and  hot  water  had  struck 
him  square  in  the  face,  and  he  met  death  in  that  position. 
When  I  told  Captain  Porter  that  we  were  victorious,  he 
immediately  rallied,  and,  raising  himself  on  his  elbow, 
called  for  three  cheers,  and  gave  two  himself,  falling  ex 
hausted  on  the  mattress  in  his  effort  to  give  the  third. 
A  seaman  named  Jasper  P.  Breas,  who  was  badly  scalded, 
sprang  to  his  feet,  exclaiming :  '  Surrender !  I  must  see 
that  with  my  own  eyes  before  I  die.'  Before  any  one 
could  interfere,  he  clambered  up  two  short  flights  of  stairs 
to  the  spar-deck.  He  shouted  '  Glory  to  God  ! '  and  sank 
exhausted  on  the  deck.  Poor  Jasper  died  that  night." 


CKOSS-SECTION  OF  A  CONFEDERATE  TORPEDO 
FOUND    IN   THE    TENNESSEE   RIVEH. 

A,  iron  rod  armed  with  prongs  to  fasten 
upon  the  bottom  of  boats  going  up-stream 
and  act  upon  B,  a  lever  connecting  •with 
trigger  to  explode  a  cap  and  ignite  the  pow 
der.  C,  canvas  bag  containing  70  Ibs.  of 
powder.  D,  anchors  to  hold  torpedo  in  place. 

This  torpedo  consisted  of  a  stout  sheet- 
iron  cylinder,  pointed  at  both  ends,  about 
5}£  feet  long  and  1  foot  in  diameter.  The 
iron  lever  was  3^  feet  long,  and  armed  with 
prongs  to  catch  in  the  bottom  of  a  boat. 
This  lever  was  constructed  to  move  the  iron 
rod  on  the  inside  of  the  cylinder,  thus  acting 
upon  the  trigger  of  the  lock  to  explode  the  cap 
and  fire  the  powder.  The  machine  was  an 
chored,  presenting  the  prongs  in  such  away 
that  boats  going  down-stream  should  slide 
over  them,  but  those  coming  up  should  catch. 


THE  GUN-BOATS  AT  BELMONT  AND  FORT  HENRY. 


365 


BETWEEN    DECKS  — SEKVIXG    THE    GDNS.      AFTER    A    SKETCH    BV    REAR-ADMIRAL    WALKE. 

The  Essex  before  the  accident  had  fired  seventy  shots  from  her  two 
9-inch  guns.  A  powder  boy,  Job  Phillips,  fourteen  years  of  age,  coolly 
marked  down  upon  the  casemate  every  shot  his  gun  had  fired,  and  his 
account  was  confirmed  by  the  gunner  in  the  magazine.  Her  loss  in  killed, 
wounded,  and  missing  was  thirty-two. 

The  St.  Louis  was  struck  seven  times.  She  fired  one  hundred  and  seven 
shots  during  the  action.  No  one  on  board  the  vessel  was  killed  or 
wounded. 

Flag-Officer  Foote  during  the  action  was  in  the  pilot-house  of  the  Cincin 
nati,  which  received  thirty-two  shots.  Her  chimneys,  after-cabin,  and  boats 
were  completely  riddled.  Two  of  her  guns  were  disabled.  The  only  fatal 
shot  she  received  passed  through  the  larboard  front,  killing  one  man  and 
wounding  several  others.  I  happened  to  be  looking  at  the  flag-steamer 
when  one  of  the  enemy's  heavy  shot  struck  her.  It  had  the  effect,  appar 
ently,  of  a  thunder-bolt,  ripping  her  side-timbers  and  scattering  the  splinters 
over  the  vessel.  She  did  not  slacken  her  speed,  but  moved  on  as  though 
nothing  unexpected  had  happened. 

From  the  number  of  times  the  gun-boats  were  struck,  it  would  appear  that 
the  Confederate  artillery  practice,  at  first,  at  least,  was  as  good,  if  not  better, 
than  ours.  This,  however,  was  what  might  have  been  expected,  as  the  Con 
federate  gunners  had  the  advantage  of  practicing  on  the  ranges  the  gun-boats 
would  probably  occupy  as  they  approached  the  fort.  The  officers  of  the  gun 
boats,  on  the  contrary,  with  guns  of  different  caliber  and  unknown  range, 


366 


THE  GUN-BOATS  AT  BELMONT  AND  FORT  HENRY. 


and  without  practice,  could  not  point  their  guns  with  as  much  accuracy.  To 
counterbalance  this  advantage  of  the  enemy,  the  gun-boats  were  much  better 
protected  by  their  casemates  for  distant  firing  than,  the  fort  by  its  fresh  earth 
works.  The  Confederate  soldiers  fought  as  valiantly  and  as  skillfully  as  the 
Union  sailors.  Only  after  a  most  determined  resistance,  and  after  all  his 
heavy  guns  had  been  silenced,  did  Gen 
eral  Tilghman  lower  his  flag.  The  Con 
federate  loss,  as  reported,  was  5  killed, 
11  wounded,  and  5  missing.  The  pris 
oners,  including  the  general  and  his 
staff,  numbered  78  in  the  fort  and  16  in 
a  hospital-boat;  the  remainder  of  the 
garrison,  a  little  less  than  2600,  having 
escaped  to  Fort  Donelson. 

Our  gun-boats  continued  to  approach 
the  fort  until  General  Tilghman,  with 
two  or  three  of  his  staff,  came  off  in  a 
small  boat  to  the  Cincinnati  and  sur 
rendered  the  fort  to  Flag-Officer  Foote, 
who  sent  for  me,  introduced  me  to 
General  Tilghman,  and  gave  me  orders 
to  take  command  of  the  fort  and  hold 
it  until  the  arrival  of  General  Grant. 

General  Tilghman  was  a  soldierly- 
looking  man,  a  little  above  medium 
height,  with  piercing  black  eyes  and  a 
resolute,  intelligent  expression  of  coun 
tenance.  He  was  dignified  and  courte 
ous,  and  won  the  respect  and  sympathy 
of  all  who  became  acquainted  with  him. 
In  his  official  report  of  the  battle  he 
said  that  his  officers  and  men  fought 
with  the  greatest  bravery  until  1:50 
p.  M.,  when  seven  of  his  eleven  guns 
were  disabled;  and,  finding  it  impos 
sible  to  defend  the  fort,  and  wishing  to  spare  the  lives  of  his  gallant  men, 
after  consultation  with  his  officers  he  surrendered  the  fort. 

It  was  reported  at  the  time  that,  in  surrendering  to  Flag-Officer  Foote, 
the  Confederate  general  said, "  I  am  glad  to  surrender  to  so  gallant  an  offi 
cer,"  and  that  Foote  replied,  "  You  do  perfectly  right,  sir,  in  surrendering, 
but  you  should  have  blown  my  boat  out  of  the  water  before  I  would  have 
surrendered  to  you."  I  was  with  Foote  soon  after  the  surrender,  and  I  can 
not  believe  that  such  a  reply  was  made  by  him.  He  was  too  much  of  a  gentle 
man  to  say  anything  calculated  to  wound  the  feelings  of  an  officer  who  had 
defended  his  post  with  signal  courage  and  fidelity,  and  whose  spirits  were 
clouded  by  the  adverse  fortunes  of  war. 


GENERAL    LLOYD    TILGHMAN.      FROM    A   PHOTOGRAPH. 


THE  GUN-BOATS  AT  BELMONT  AND  FORT  HENRY.  367 

When  I  took  possession  of  the  fort  the  Confederate  surgeon  was  laboring 
with  his  coat  off  to  relieve  and  save  the  wounded ;  and  although  the  officers 
and  crews  of  the  gun-boats  gave  three  hearty  cheers  when  the  Confederate 
flag  was  hauled  down,  the  first  inside  view  of  the  fort  sufficed  to  suppress 
every  feeling  of  exultation  and  to  excite  our  deepest  pity.  On  every  side  the 
blood  of  the  dead  and  wounded  was  intermingled  with  the  earth  and  their 
implements  of  war.  Their  largest  gun,  a  128-pounder,  was  dismounted  and 
filled  with  earth  by  the  bursting  of  one  of  our  shells  near  its  muzzle;  the 
carriage  of  another  was  broken  to  pieces,  and  two  dead  men  lay  near  it, 
almost  covered  with  heaps  of  earth ;  a  rifled  gun  had  burst,  throwing  its 
mangled  gunners  into  the  water.  But  few  of  the  garrison  escaped  unhurt. 

General  Grant,  with  his  staff,  rode  into  the  fort  about  3  o'clock  on  the 
same  day,  and  relieved  me  of  the  command.  The  general  and  staff  then 
accompanied  me  on  board  the  Carondelet  (anchored  near  the  fort),  where  he 
complimented  the  officers  of  the  flotilla  in  the  highest  terms  for  the  gallant 
manner  in  which  they  had  captured  Fort  Henry.  He  had  expected  his  troops 
to  take  part  in  a  land  attack,  but  the  heavy  rains  had  made  the  direct  roads 
to  the  fort  almost  impassable. 

The  wooden  gun-boats  Conestoga,  Commander  S.  L.  Phelps,  Tyler,  Lieu 
tenant-Commander  William  Gwin,  and  Lexington,  Lieutenant  J.  W.  Shirk, 
engaged  the  enemy  at  long  range  in  the  rear  of  the  iron-clads.  After  the 
battle  they  pursued  the  enemy's  transports  up  the  river,  and  the  Cones  toy  a 
captured  the  steamer  East-port.  The  news  of  the  capture  of  Fort  Henry  was 
received  with  great  rejoicing  all  over  the  North. 

Following  upon  the  capture  of  Fort  Henry  (Feb-  gether  with  the  necessity  he  was  under  to  gather 

ruary  6th,  1862)  and  of  Fort  Donelson  (February  as  large  a  force  as  possible  with  which  to  meet  the 

16th),  the  fortifications  at  Columbus  on  the  Mis-  enemy's  movement  up  the  Tennessee,  convinced 

sissippi  were  evacuated  February  20th.  In  January  him  that  Columbus  should  be  evacuated,  and  the 

General  Halleck  reached  the  conclusion  that  the  defense  of  the  river  made  at  Island  Number  Ten  and 

object  for  which  General  Polk  had  labored  in  Fort  Pillow.  These  points  he  considered  not  only 

fortifying  Columbus  had  been  accomplished,  for  more  defensible  than  Columbus,  but  defensible 

on  the  20th  he  wrote  General  McClellan  :  "  Colum-  with  a  smaller  force,  which  would  enable  him  to 

bus  cannot  be  taken  without  an  immense  siege-  take  a  part  of  the  command  then  holding  the  river 

train  and  a  terrible  loss  of  life.  I  have  thoroughly  for  operations  in  conjunction  with  the  troops  he 

studied  its  defenses  —  they  are  very  strong ;  but  was  gathering  along  the  line  of  the  Memphis  and 

it  can  be  turned,  paralyzed,  and  forced  to  surren-  Charleston  railroad.  When,  in  the  conference  at 

der."  In  accordance  with  the  idea  suggested  in  Jackson,  Beauregard  unfolded  these  views  to  Gen- 

this  dispatch,  the  Federal  movement  upon  Forts  eral  Polk,  the  latter  was  not  disposed  to  yield  a 

Henry  and  Donelsoii  was  decided  upon.  ready  assent  to  all  of  them.  He  recognized  the 

In  the  latter  part  of  January  General  Beaure-  necessity  for  gathering  a  force  for  field  operations, 

gard  was  ordered  to  report  to  General  Johnston  It  was,  indeed,  exactly  what  he  and  every  other 

for  assignment  to  duty  at  Columbus.  He  arrived  prominent  officer  in  the  department  had,  for  six 

at  Jackson,  Tennessee,  about  the  middle  of  Feb-  months,  been  urging  upon  the  authorities.  He, 

ruary,  but,  being  too  ill  to  proceed  to  Columbus,  however,  questioned  the  advisability  of  giving  up 

he  requested  General  Polk  to  visit  him  at  Jackson.  Columbus.  The  works  had  been  accepted  by 

The  fall  of  Forts  Henry  and  Donelson,  and  the  de-  Colonel  Gilmer,  the  chief  engineer  of  the  depart- 

clared  purpose  of  the  Federals  to  push  their  forces  ment,  an  officer  who  subsequently  became  the 

up  the  Tennessee  River,  made  the  further  occu-  head  of  the  Corps  of  Engineers  in  the  Confed- 

pation  of  Columbus  a  serious  question.  General  eracy.  In  spite  of  the  strategical  fault  which 

Beauregard  had  sent  his  chief  of  staff,  Colonel  might  be  committed  in  an  attempt  to  hold  it, 

Jordan,  and  his  engineer  officer,  Captain  Harris,  up  General  Polk  maintained  that,  just  at  that  time, 

to  Columbus,  and  they  had  made  such  reports  to  the  moral  effect  of  a  determined  stand  at  Colum- 

him  concerning  the  nature  of  the  works  that  he  bus  would  be  of  great  service  to  the  Confederate 

was  inclined  to  doubt  their  efficiency.  This,  to-  arms. —  DR.  WM.  M.  POLK. 


THE  DEFENSE  OF  FORT  HENRY. 

BY   CAPTAIN   JESSE  TAYLOR,   C.   S.   A. 

ABOUT  the  1st  of  September,  1861,  while  I  was  in  command  of  a  Confederate 
-£A-  "camp  of  artillery  instruction,"  near  Nashville,  Tenn.,  I  received  a  visit 
from  Lieutenant-Colonel  Milton  A.  Haynes  of  the  1st  Regiment  Tennessee 
Artillery,  who  informed  me  of  the  escape  of  a  number  of  our  steamers  from  the 
Ohio  River  into  the  Tennessee,  and  of  their  having  sought  refuge  under  the 
guns  of  Fort  Henry ;  that  a  "cutting-out "  expedition  from  Paducah  was  antici 
pated,  and  that  as  there  was  no  experienced  artillerist  at  the  fort  the  gover 
nor  (Isham  G.  Harris)  was  anxious  that  the  deficiency  should  immediately  be 
supplied ;  that  he  had  no  one  at  his  disposal  unless  I  would  give  up  my  light 
battery  (subsequently  Porter's  and  later  still  Morton's),  and  take  command 
at  Fort  Henry.  Anxious  to  be  of  service,  and  convinced  that  the  first  effort  of 
the  Federals  would  be  to  penetrate  our  lines  by  the  way  of  the  Tennessee  River, 
I  at  once,  in  face  of  the  loudly  expressed  disapproval  and  wonder  of  my 
friends,  consented  to  make  the  exchange. 

Arriving  at  the  fort,  I  was  convinced  by  a  glance  at  its  surroundings  that 
extraordinarily  bad  judgment,  or  worse,  had  selected  the  site  for  its  erection. 
I  found  it  placed  on  the  east  bank  of  the  river  in  a  bottom  commanded  by  high 
hills  rising  on  either  side  of  the  river,  and  within  good  rifle  range.  This  cir 
cumstance  was  at  once  reported  to  the  proper  military  authorities  of  the  State 
at  Nashville,  who  replied  that  the  selection  had  been  made  by  -competent 
engineers  and  with  reference  to  mutual  support  with  Fort  Donelson  on  the 
Cumberland,  twelve  miles  away ;  and  knowing  that  the  crude  ideas  of  a  sailor  in 
the  navy  concerning  fortifications  would  receive  but  little  consideration  when 
conflicting  with  those  entertained  by  a  "  West  Pointer,"  I  resolved  quietly  to 


THE  DEFENSE  OF  FORT  HENRY.  369 

acquiesce,  but  the  accidental  observation  of  a  water-mark  left  on  a  tree 
caused  me  to  look  carefully  for  this  sign  above,  below,  and  in  the  rear  of  the 
fort ;  and  my  investigation  convinced  me  that  we  had  a  more  dangerous  force 
to  contend  with  than  the  Federals,— namely,  the  river  itself.  Inquiry  among 
old  residents  confirmed  my  fears  that  the  fort  was  not  only  subject  to  overflow, 
but  that  the  highest  point  within  it  would  be —  in  an  ordinary  February  rise  — 
at  least  two  feet  under  water.  This  alarming  fact  was  also  communicated  to 
the  State  authorities,  only  to  evoke  the  curt  notification  that  the  State  forces 
had  been  transferred  to  the  Confederacy,  and  that  I  should  apply  to  General 
Polk,  then  in  command  at  Columbus,  Ky.  This  suggestion  was  at  once  acted 
on, — not  once  only,  but  with  a  frequency  and  urgency  commensurate  with  its 
seeming  importance, —  the  result  being  that  I  was  again  referred,  this  time  to 
General  A.  S.  Johnston,  who  at  once  dispatched  an  engineer  (Major  Jeremy 
F.  Gilmer)  to  investigate  and  remedy;  but  it  was  now  too  late  to  do  so  effect 
ually,  though  an  effort  was  made  looking  to  that  end,  by  beginning  to 
fortify  the  heights  on  the  west  bank  (Fort  Heimaii).  The  armament  of  the 
fort  at  the  time  I  assumed  command  consisted  of  6  smooth-bore  32-pounders 
and  1  6-pounder  iron-gun;  February  1st,  1862,  by  the  persistent  efforts  of 
General  Lloyd  Tilghraan  and  Colonel  A.  Heirnan,  this  had  been  increased  to 
8  32-,  2  42-,  1  128-pounders  (Columbiad),  5  18-pounder  siege  guns,  all  smooth 
bore,  and  1  6-inch  rifle ;  we  also  had  6  12-pounders,  which  looked  so  much  like 
pot-metal  that  it  was  deemed  best  to  subject  them  to  a  test,  and  as  two  of  them 
burst  with  an  ordinary  charge,  the  others  were  set  aside  as  useless  incum- 
brances.  The  powder  supplied  was  mostly  of  a  very  inferior  quality,  so  much 
so  that  it  was  deemed  necessary  to  adopt  the  dangerous  expedient  of  adding 
to  each  charge  a  proportion  of  quick-burning  powder.  That  this  was  necessary 
will,  I  think,  be  admitted  when  it  is  understood  that  with  the  original  charge 
it  was  almost  impossible  to  obtain  a  random  shot  of  a  little  over  one  mile 
(that  being  the  distance  to  a  small  island  below  the  fort). 

During  the  winter  of  1861  and  1862  the  Federal  gun-boats,  notably  the  Lex 
ington  and  Conestoya,  made  frequent  appearances  in  the  Tennessee,  and  coming 
up  under  the  cover  of  this  island  would  favor  the  fort  with  an  hour  or  more 
of  shot  and  shell,  but,  as  their  object  was  to  draw  our  fire  and  thus  obtain 
the  position  of  our  guns,  we,  though  often  sorely  tempted  by  the  accuracy  of 
their  fire,  deemed  it  best  not  to  gratify  them.  On  the  4th  of  February  the 
Federal  fleet  of  gun-boats,  followed  by  countless  transports,  appeared  below 
the  fort.  Far  as  eye  could  see,  the  course  of  the  river  could  be  traced  by  the 
dense  volumes  of  smoke  issuing  from  the  flotilla  —  indicating  that  the  long- 
threatened  attempt  to  break  our  lines  was  to  be  made  in  earnest.  The  gun 
boats  took  up  a  position  about  three  miles  below  and  opened  a  brisk  fire,  at 
the  same  time  shelling  the  woods  on  the  east  bank  of  the  river,  thus  covering 
the  debarkation  of  their  army.  The  5th  was  a  day  of  unwonted  animation 
on  the  hitherto  quiet  waters  of  the  Tennessee ;  all  day  long  the  flood-tide  of 
arriving  and  the  ebb  of  returning  transports  continued  ceaselessly.  Late  in 
the  afternoon  three  of  the  gun-boats,  two  on  the  west  side  and  one  on  the 
east  at  the  foot  of  the  island,  took  position  and  opened  a  vigorous  and  well- 

VOL.  I.    24 


370  THE  DEFENSE  OF  FORT  HENRY. 

directed  fire,  which  was  received  in  silence  until  the  killing  of  one  man  and 
the  wounding  of  three  provoked  an  order  to  open  with  the  Columbiad  and  the 
rifle.  Six  shots  were  fired  in  return, — three  from  each  piece, — and  with  such 
effect  that  the  gun-boats  dropped  out  of  range  and  ceased  firing. 

At  night  General  Tilghman  called  his  leading  officers  in  consultation  - 
Colonels  Heiman,  Forrest,  and  Drake  are  all  that  I  can  now  recall  as  having 
been  present.  The  Federal  forces  were  variously  estimated  by  us,  25,000  being, 
I  think,  the  lowest.  To  oppose  this  force  General  Tilghman  had  less  than  four 
thousand  men, —  mostly  raw  regiments  armed  with  shot-guns  and  hunting- 
rifles;  in  fact,  the  best-equipped  regiment  of  his  command,  the  10th  Ten 
nessee,  was  armed  with  old  flint-lock  "  Tower  of  London  "  muskets  that  had 
"done  the  state  some  service"  in  the  war  of  1812.  The  general  opinion  and 
final  decision  was  that  successful  resistance  to  such  an  overwhelming  force 
was  an  impossibility,  that  the  army  must  fall  back  and  unite  with  Pillow  and 
Buckner  at  Fort  Donelson.  General  Tilghman,  recognizing  the  difficulty  of 
withdrawing  undisciplined  troops  from  the  front  of  an  active  and  superior 
opponent,  turned  to  me  with  the  question,  "  Can  you  hold  out  for  one  hour 
against  a  determined  attack  ?  "  I  replied  that  I  could.  "  Well,  then,  gentle 
men,  rejoin  your  commands  and  hold  them  in  readiness  for  instant  motion." 
The  garrison  left  at  the  fort  to  cover  the  withdrawal  consisted  of  part  of 
Company  B,  1st  Tennessee  Artillery,  Lieutenant  Watts,  and  fifty-four  men. 

The  forenoon  of  February  6th  was  spent  by  both  sides  in  making  needful 
preparations  for  the  approaching  struggle.  The  gun-boats  formed  line  of 
battle  abreast  under  the  cover  of  the  island.  The  Essex,  the  Cincinnati,  the 
Carondelet,  and  the  St.  Louis,  the  first  with  4  and  the  others  each  with  13 
guns,  formed  the  van ;  the  Tyler,  Conestotja,  and  Lexinyton,  with  15  guns 
in  all,  formed  the  second  or  rear  line.  Seeing  the  formation  of  battle  I 
assigned  to  each  gun  a  particular  vessel  to  which  it  was  to  pay  its  especial 
compliments,  and  directed  that  the  guns  be  kept  constantly  trained  on  the 
approaching  boats.  Accepting  the  volunteered  services  of  Captain  Hayden 
(of  the  engineers)  to  assist  at  the  Columbiad,  I  took  personal  supervision  of 
the  rifle.  When  they  were  out  of  cover  of  the  island  the  gun-boats  opened 
fire,  and  as  they  advanced  they  increased  the  rapidity  of  their  fire,  until  as  they 
swung  into  the  main  channel  above  the  island  they  showed  one  broad  and 
leaping  sheet  of  flame.  At  this  point,  the  van  being  a  mile  distant,  the  com 
mand  was  given  to  commence  firing  from  the  fort ;  and  here  let  me  say  that 
as  pretty  and  as  simultaneous  a  "broadside"  was  delivered  as  I  ever  saw  flash 
from  the  sides  of  a  frigate.  The  action  now  became  general,  and  for  the  next 
twenty  or  thirty  minutes  was,  on  both  sides,  as  determined,  rapid,  and  accurate 
as  heart  could  wish,  and  apparently  inclined  in  favor  of  the  fort.  The  iron-clad 
Essex,  disabled  by  a  shot  through  her  boiler,  dropped  out  of  line ;  the  fleet 
seemed  to  hesitate,  when  a  succession  of  untoward  and  unavoidable  acci 
dents  happened  in  the  fort;  thereupon  the  flotilla  continued  to  advance. 
First,  the  rifle  gun,  from  which  I  had  just  been  called,  burst,  not  only  with 
destructive  effect  to  those  working  it,  but  with  disabling  effect  on  those  in 
its  immediate  vicinity.  Going  to  the  Columbiad  as  the  only  really  effective 


THE  DEFENSE  OF  FORT  HENRY.  371 

gun  left,  I  met  General  Tilghman  and  for  the  first  time  knew  that  he  had 
returned  to  the  fort;  I  supposed  that  he  was  with  his  retreating  army. 
While  consulting  with  him  a  sudden  exclamation  drew  me  to  the  Columbiad, 
which  I  found  spiked  with  its  own  priming  wire,  completely  disabled  for  the 
day  at  least.  The  Federal  commander,  observing  the  silence  of  these  two 
heavy  guns,  renewed  his  advance  with  increased  precision  of  fire.  Two  of 
the  32-pounders  were  struck  almost  at  the  same  instant,  and  the  flying  frag 
ments  of  the  shattered  guns  and  bursted  shells  disabled  every  man  at  the  two 
guns.  His  rifle  shot  and  shell  penetrated  the  earth-works  as  readily  as  a  ball 
from  a  navy  Colt  would  pierce  a  pine  board,  and  soon  so  disabled  other  guns 
as  to  leave  us  but  four  capable  of  being  served. 

General  Tilghman  now  consulted  with  Major  Gilmer  and  myself  as  to  the 
situation,  and  the  decision  was  that  further  resistance  would  only  entail  a 
useless  loss  of  life.  He  therefore  ordered  me  to  strike  the  colors,  now  a 
dangerous  as  well  as  a  painful  duty.  The  flag-mast,  which  had  been  the 
center  of  fire,  had  been  struck  many  times  ;  the  top-mast  hung  so  far  out  of 
the  perpendicular  that  it  seemed  likely  to  fall  at  any  moment ;  the  flag  hal 
yards  had  been  cut  by  shot,  but  had  fortunately  become  "  foul "  at  the  cross- 
trees.  I  beckoned — for  it  was  useless  to  call  amid  the  din — to  Orderly- 
Sergeant  Jones,  an  old  "  man-o'-war's  man,"  to  come  to  my  assistance,  and  we 
ran  across  to  the  flag-staff  and  up  the  lower  rigging  to  the  cross-trees,  and 
by  our  united  efforts  succeeded  in  clearing  the  halyards  and  lowering  the 
flag.  The  view  from  that  elevated  position  at  the  time  was  grand,  exciting, 
and  striking.  At  our  feet  the  fort  with  her  few  remaining  guns  was  sullenly 
hurling  her  harmless  shot  against  the  sides  of  the  gun-boats,  which,  now 
apparently  within  two  hundred  yards  of  the  fort,  were,  in  perfect  security, 
and  with  the  coolness  and  precision  of  target  practice,  sweeping  the  entire  fort ; 
to  the  north  and  west,  on  both  sides  of  the  river,  were  the  hosts  of  "  blue 
coats,"  anxious  and  interested  spectators,  while  to  the  east  the  feeble  forces 
of  the  Confederacy  could  be  seen  making  their  weary  way  toward  Donelson. 

On  the  morning  of  the  attack,  we  were  sure  that  the  February  rise  of  the 
Tennessee  had  come ;  when  the  action  began,  the  lower  part  of  the  fort  was 
already  flooded,  and  when  the  colors  were  hauled  down,  the  water  was  waist- 
deep  there  ;  and  when  the  cutter  came  with  the  officers  to  receive  the  formal 
surrender,  she  pulled  into  the  "sally-port";  between  the  fort  and  the  posi 
tion  which  had  been  occupied  by  the  infantry  support  was  a  sheet  of  water  a 
quarter  of  a  mile  or  more  wide,  and  "  running  like  a  mill-race."  If  the  attack 
had  been  delayed  forty-eight  hours,  there  would  hardly  have  been  a  hostile 
shot  fired;  the  Tennessee  would  have  accomplished  the  work  by  drowning  the 
magazine. 

The  fight  was  over ;  the  little  garrison  were  prisoners ;  but  our  army  had 
been  saved.  We  had  been  required  to  hold  out  an  hour ;  we  had  held  out 
for  over  two. 

We  went  into  the  fight  with  nine  guns  bearing  on  the  river  approach, — we 
had  two  more  42-pounders,  but  neither  shot  nor  shell  for  them ;  of  these  all 
were  disabled  but  four.  Of  the  54  men  who  went  into  action  [see  General 


372  THE  DEFENSE  OF  FORT  HENRY. 

Tilghman's  report],  5  were  killed,  11  wounded  or  disabled,  and  5  missing. 
When  the  Essex  dropped  out  of  the  fight  I  could  see  her  men  wildly  throwing 
themselves  into  the  swollen  river.  Admiral  Foote  reported  that  his  flag-ship 
was  struck  thirty-eight  times,  and  the  commanding  officers  of  gun-boats  (with 
several  of  whom  I  had  enjoyed  a  warm  personal  acquaintance)  complimented 
me  highly  on  what  they  termed  the  extraordinary  accuracy  of  the  fire.  I 
believe  that  with  effective  guns  the  same  precision  of  fire  would  have  sunk  or 
driven  back  the  flotilla. 

The  formal  surrender  was  made  to  the  naval  forces ;  Lieutenant-Commander 
Phelps  acting  for  Flag-Officer  Foote,  and  I  representing  General  Tilghmari. 
The  number  captured,  including  Tilghman  and  staff,  hospital  attendants  and 
some  stragglers  from  the  infantry,  amounted  to  about  seventy. 

During  the  evening  a  large  number  of  army  officers  came  into  the  fort,  to 
whom  I  was  introduced  by  my  old  messmates,  Lieutenant-Commanders 
Gwin  and  Shirk.  Here  I  first  saw  General  Grant,  who  impressed  me,  at  the 
time,  as  a  modest,  amiable,  kind-hearted  but  resolute  man.  While  we  were  at 
headquarters  an  officer  came  in  to  report  that  he  had  not  as  yet  found  any 
papers  giving  information  of  our  forces,  and,  to  save  him  further  looking,  I 
informed  him  that  I  had  destroyed  all  the  papers  bearing  on  the  subject,  at 
which  he  seemed  very  wroth,  fussily  demanding,  "  By  what  authority  ? "  Did 
I  not  know  that  I  laid  myself  open  to  punishment,  etc.,  etc.  Before  I  could 
reply  fully,  General  Grant  quietly  broke  in  with,  "  I  would  be  very  much  sur 
prised  and  mortified  if  one  of  my  subordinate  officers  should  allow  informa 
tion  which  he  could  destroy  to  fall  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy." 

We  were  detained  for  several  days  at  the  fort  and  were  confined  to  the 
same  steamer  on  which  General  Grant  had  established  his  headquarters,  and 
as  the  officers,  Confederate  and  Federal,  messed  together,  I  saw  much  of  the 
general  during  that  time.  We  were  treated  with  every  courtesy ;  so  our  con 
finement  was  less  irksome  than  we  had  anticipated  and  was  only  marred  by 
one  incident.  Two  of  the  younger  Confederate  officers  having  obtained 
liquor  became  vociferous.  At  dinner  General  Grant  did  not  take  his  seat  with 
the  rest,  and  this  restraint  being  removed,  the  young  men,  despite  frowns  and 
nudges,  persisted  in  discussing  politics,  military  men  and  movements,  etc. 
While  they  were  thus  engaged  General  Grant,  unobserved  by  them,  entered, 
took  his  seat,  and  dined  without  appearing  to  notice  their  conversation,  but 
when  the  youngsters  left  the  table  they  were  dumfounded  to  meet  a  corporal 
and  file  of  men,  who  ceremoniously  conducted  them  to  the  "  nursery "  and 
left  them  under  guard,  where  I  shortly  visited  them.  At  last  I  promised  to 
intercede,  which  I  did,  carrying  with  me  regrets,  explanations,  and  apologies. 
The  general  smiled  and  said  that  he  had  confined  them  partly  for  their  own 
sakes,  lest  they  might  fall  in  with  some  of  his  own  men  in  a  similar  condi 
tion  ;  that  he  did  not  believe  the  young  men  knew  of  his  presence,  and 
that  he  would  order  their  release  so  soon  as  they  became  sober,  which  he  did. 


HOLDING    KENTUCKY    FOR    THE    UNION. 


ATER-SLED. 

SKETCH 


BY  E.   M.   KELLY,   COLONEL,   I".  S.  V. 

THE  military  situation  in  Kentucky  in  September, 
1861,  cannot  be  properly  understood  without  a 
brief  sketch  of  the  initial  political  struggle  which 
resulted  in  a  decisive  victory  for  the  friends  of  the 
Union.  The  State  Legislature  had  assembled  on  the 
17th  of  January  in  called  session.  The  governor's 
proclamation  convening  it  was  issued  immediately 
after  he  had  received  commissioners  from  the  States 
of  Alabama  and  Mississippi,  and  was  followed  by  the 
publication  of  a  letter  from  Vice-President  Breckinridge  advising  the  calling  of 
a  State  convention  and  urging  that  the  only  way  to  prevent  war  was  for  Ken 
tucky  to  take  her  stand  openly  with  the  slave  States.  About  this  time  the 
latter's  uncle,  the  Rev.  Dr.  Robert  J.  Breckinridge,  an  eminent  Presbyterian 
minister,  addressed  a  large  meeting  at  Lexington  in  favor  of  the  Union.  The 
division  of  sentiment  is  further  illustrated  by  the  fact  that  one  of  his  sons, 
Colonel  W.  C.  P.  Breckinridge,  followed  his  cousin  into  the  Confederate  army, 
while  another  son,  Colonel  Joseph  C.  Breckinridge,  fought  for  the  Union. 
The  position  of  the  Union  men  was  very  difficult.  They  knew  that  Governor 
Magoffin  was  in  sympathy  with  the  secession  movement  and  that  the  status 
of  the  Legislature  on  the  question  was  doubtful.  The  governor  had  under 
his  orders  a  military  force  called  the  State  Guard,  well  armed  and  disciplined, 
and  under  the  immediate  command  of  General  Simon  B.  Buckner,  a  graduate 
of  West  Point.  There  was  a  small  Union  element  in  it,  but  a  large  majority  of 
its  membership  was  known  to  be  in  favor  of  secession.  Suspicious  activity 
in  recruiting  for  this  force  began  as  soon  as  the  governor  issued  his  call  for 
the  Legislature,  and  it  was  charged  that  new  companies  of  known  secession 
proclivities  could  get  arms  promptly  from  the  State  arsenal,  while  those 
supposed  to  be  inclined  toward  the  Union  were  subjected  to  annoying  delays. 
The  State  Guard  at  its  strongest  numbered  only  about  four  thousand  men, 
but  it  was  organized  and  ready  while  the  Union  men  had  neither  arms  nor 
organization  to  oppose  it. 

When  the  Legislature  assembled  it  was  soon  ascertained  that  it  was  very 
evenly  divided  in  sentiment.  Old  party  lines  promptly  disappeared,  and 
members  were  classed  as  "Union"  or  "Southern  Rights."  In  the  Senate  there 
was  a  safe  majority  against  calling  a  convention.  In  the  house  on  a  test 
question  the  Union  men  prevailed  by  only  one  vote.  There  were  some  half- 
dozen  waverers  who  always  opposed  any  decisive  step  toward  secession  but 
were  equally  unwilling  to  give  any  active  support  to  the  Government.  Out 
side  pressure  was  brought  to  bear.  Large  delegations  of  secessionists 
assembled  at  Frankfort,  to  be  speedily  confronted  by  Union  men,  just  as 
determined,  summoned  by  telegraph  from  all  parts  of  the  State.  Argument 


374 


HOLDING  KENTUCKY  FOR.    THE  UNION. 


was  met  by  argument,  threat  by  threat,  appeals  to  sentiment  and  prejudice 
on  one  side  by  similar  appeals  on  the  other.  The  leading  public  men  of  the 
State,  however,  had  been  trained  in  a  school  of  compromises,  and  they  long 
cherished  themselves,  and  kept  alive  in  the  people,  the  hope  that  some  settle 
ment  would  be  reached  that  would  avert  war  and  save  Kentucky  from  becom 
ing  the  battle-field  of  contending  armies.  This  hope  accounts  in  a  large 
degree  for  the  infrequency  of  personal  affrays  during  those  exciting  days. 

The  struggle,  kept  up  during  three  sessions  of  the  Legislature,  demonstrated 
that  the  State  could  not  be  carried  out  of  the  Union  by  storm,  and  terminated 
in  adopting  the  policy  of  neutral 
ity  as  a  compromise.  The  Union 
men,  however,  had  gained  some 
decided  advantages.  They  had  con 
sented  to  large  appropriations  for 
arming  the  State,  but  on  condition 
that  the  control  of  military  affairs 
should  be  taken  from  the  governor 
and  lodged  in  a  military  board  of 
five  members,  the  majority  being 
Union  men ;  they  provided  for  or 
ganizing  and  arming  Home  Guards, 
outside  of  the  militia  force,  and 
not  subject,  as  such,  to  the  gov 
ernor's  orders,  and  they  passed  an 
act  requiring  all  the  State  Guard 
to  take  the  oath  required  of  offi 
cers,  this  measure  being  mainly 
for  the  purpose  of  allowing  the 
Union  members  of  that  organiza 
tion  to  get  rid  of  the  stringent 
obligations  of  their  enlistment. 

As  in  most  compromises,  the  terms  of  the  neutrality  compromise  were  dif 
ferently  interpreted  by  the  parties,  but  with  both  the  object  was  to  gain  time. 
The  secessionists  believed  that  neutrality,  as  they  interpreted  it,  would  educate 
the  people  to  the  idea  of  a  separation  from  the  Union  and  result  in  alliance 
with  the  new  Confederacy ;  the  Union  men  expected  to  gain  time  to  organize 
their  forces,  elect  a  new  legislature  in  sympathy  with  their  views,  and  put  the 
State  decisively  on  the  side  of  the  Government.  Events  soon  showed  that 
the  Union  men  best  understood  the  temper  of  the  people.  The  Legislature 
adjourned  May  24th,  four  days  after  the  governor  had  issued  his  neutrality 
proclamation.  At  the  special  congressional  election,  June  20th,  nine  Union 
representatives  were  chosen  to  one  secessionist  by  an  aggregate  majority  of 
over  54,000  votes.  The  legislative  election  in  August  resulted  in  the  choice 
of  a  new  body  three-fourths  of  whose  members  in  each  house  were  Union  men. 

Under  the  first  call  for  troops,  Kentucky  was  required  to  furnish  four  regi 
ments  for  the  United  States  service.  These  Governor  Magoffin  indignantly 


THK  REV.  KOBERT  J.  KRECKINRIDGK,  D.  D. 
FROM  A  STEEL  PORTRAIT. 


HOLDING  KENTUCKY  FOR   THE  UNION.  375 

refused  to  furnish.  Shortly  afterward  he  was  asked  by  the  Secretary  of 
War  of  the  Confederacy  for  a  regiment.  He  declined  this  request  as  beyond 
his  power  to  grant.  His  course  did  not  suit  the  more  ardent  of  the  young- 
men  on  either  side.  Blanton  Duncan  had  already  procured  authority  to 
recruit  for  the  Confederacy,  and  in  various  portions  of  the  State  men  were 
publicly  engaged  in  raising  companies  for  him.  Before  the  end  of  April  he 
had  started  with  a  regiment  for  Harper's  Ferry  by  way  of  Nashville.  An 
incident  connected  with  this  movement  shows  how  strong  the  belief  still 
was  that  the  war  was  to  be  short,  and  that  Kentucky  might  keep  out  of  it. 
As  Desha's  company  of  Duncan's  regiment  was  leaving  Cynthiana,  Ky.,  by 
rail,  one  of  the  privates  said  to  a  friend  who  was  bidding  him  farewell: 
"Be  sure  to  vote  for  Crittenden  [then  the  Union  candidate  for  delegate 
to  the  Border  State  Conference]  and  keep  Kentucky  out  of  the  fuss.  We 
are  just  going  to  Virginia  on  a  little  frolic  and  will  be  back  in  three  months." 
On  the  other  side,  immediately  after  Magomn's  refusal  to  furnish  troops, 
J.  V.  Guthrie,  of  Covington,  went  to  Washington  and  got  authority  for 
himself  and  W.  E.  Woodruff,  of  Louisville,  to  raise  two  regiments.  They 
established  a  camp  just  above  Cincinnati,  on  the  Ohio  side  of  the  river,  and 
began  recruiting  in  Kentucky.  They  soon  filled  two  regiments,  afterward 
known  as  the  1st  and  2d  Kentucky,  which  were  sent  early  in  July  to  take 
part  in  the  West  Virginia  campaign. 

The  Union  Club  in  Louisville  was  an  important  factor  in  organizing  Union 
sentiment.  Originating  in  May,  in  six  weeks  it  numbered  six  thousand 
members  in  that  city,  and  spread  rapidly  through  the  State  and  into  East 
Tennessee.  It  was  a  secret  society,  the  members  of  which  were  bound  by  an 
oath  to  be  true  to  the  flag  and  Government  of  the  United  States. 

One  of  the  most  striking  figures  of  the  period  was  Lieutenant  William 
Nelson  of  the  navy.  He  was  a  man  of  heroic  build,  six  feet  four  inches 
high,  and  carrying  lightly  his  weight  of  three  hundred  pounds  ;  he  had  many 
accomplishments,  spoke  several  languages,  and  was  endowed  with  a  strong 
intellect  and  a  memory  which  enabled  him  to  repeat,  verbatim,  page  after 
page  of  his  favorite  authors.  A  fluent  and  captivating  talker,  when  he 
wished  to  please,  no  man  could  be  more  genial  and  companionable,  but  he 
had  a  quick  and  impetuous  temper  arid  an  overbearing  disposition,  and 
when  irritated  or  opposed  was  offensively  dictatorial  and  dogmatic.  A 
native  of  Kentucky  and  an  ardent  friend  of  the  Union,  he  visited  the  State 
several  times  in  the  course  of  the  spring  to  watch  the  course  of  events.  As 
a  result  of  his  observations  he  reported  to  Mr.  Lincoln  that  the  arms  of  the 
State  were  in  the  hands  of  the  secessionists,  and  that  the  Union  men  could 
not  maintain  themselves  unless  they  were  also  furnished  with  arms.  Mr. 
Lincoln  placed  at  his  disposal  ten  thousand  muskets  with  means  for  their 
transportation.  Toward  the  end  of  April  he  met  in  consultation  at  Frank 
fort  a  number  of  the  leading  Union  men  of  the  State  and  arranged  for  the 
distribution  of  the  arms.  When,  shortly  afterward,  the  organization  of  the 
Union  Home  Guards  began,  it  was  from  this  source  they  were  armed.  In 
Louisville,  on  the  initiative  of  J.  M.  Delph,  the  Union  mayor,  a  brigade  of 


376 


HOLDING  KENTUCKY  FOR   THE  UNION. 


MAJOR-GENERAL    WILLIAM    NELSON.       FROM    A  PHOTOGRAPH. 

On  the  morning  of  Sept.  29th,  1862,  General  Nelson  had  an  altercation  with  General  Jefferson  C.  Davis  in  the 
Gait  House,  Louisville.    General  Davis  shot  General  Nelson,  who  died  almost  instantly.— EDITORS. 

two  full  regiments  and  a  battery  were  organized,  which  were  destined  to  play 
a  very  useful  part. 

When  the  Legislature  of  Avhich  he  was  a  member  had  finally  adjourned, 
Lovell  H.  Eousseau  went  to  Washington  and  obtained  authority  to  recruit  a 
brigade,  and,  in  order  to  avoid  possibly  injurious  effects  on  the  approaching 
election,  established  his  camp  on  the  Indiana  shore,  opposite  Louisville. 

Nelson,  after  making  arrangements  for  the  distribution  of  guns  to  the  Union 
men  of  the  State,  was  authorized  by  the  President  to  do  a  similar  service  for 


HOLDING  KENTUCKY  FOR    THE  UNION. 


377 


the  Union  men  of  East  Tennessee,  and  for  an  escort  was  empowered  to  recruit 
three  regiments  of  infantry  and  one  of  cavalry  in  eastern  Kentucky.  He 
selected  his  colonels,  commissioning -them  "for  the  Tennessee  expedition"  and 
appointing  a  rendezvous  at  Hoskin's  Cross  Roads,  in  Grarrard  county,  on  the 
farm  of  Richard  M.  Robinson,  a  stanch  Union  man,  for  the  day  after  the  legis 
lative  elections  in  August. 

During  this  period  of  neutrality  Kentucky  history  seemed  to  be  repeating 
itself.  As  before  its  occupation  by  white  men  it  was  the  common  hunting- 
ground  for  the  Indian  of  the  North  and  of 
the  South  on  which  by  tacit  agreement 
neither  was  to  make  a  permanent  home. 
so  now  it  had  become  the  common  re 
cruiting-ground  of  Northern  and  South 
ern  armies  on  which  neither  was  to 
establish  a  camp.  The  Kentucky  seces 
sionists  had  opened  a  recruiting  rendez 
vous  near  Clarksville,  Tennessee,  a  few 
miles  from  the  Kentucky  border,  which 
they  called  Camp  Boone,  and  recruits 
began  to  gather  there  early  in  July. 
Buckner  resigned  from  the  State  Gruard 
a  few  days  after  the  battle  of  Bull  Run 
and  soon  took  his  way  southward.  J  His 
example  was  followed  by  most  of  the 
higher  officers,  and  the  State  Guard  be 
gan  rapidly  to  disintegrate.  It  was  no 
uncommon  sight  in  Louisville,  shortly 
after  this,  to  see  a  squad  of  recruits  for 
the  Union  service  marching  up  one  side 
of  a  street  while  a  squad  destined  for  the 
Confederacy  was  moving  down  the  other. 
In  the  interior,  a  train  bearing  a  company  destined  for  Nelson's  camp  took 
aboard  at  the  next  county  town  another  company  which  was  bound  for 
Camp  Boone.  The  officers  in  charge  made  a  treaty  by  which  their  men  were 
kept  in  separate  cars. 

On  the  day  after  the  August  election  Nelson's  recruits  began  to  gather  at 
his  rendezvous.  Camp  Dick  Robinson  was  situated  in  a  beautiful  blue-grass 
country,  near  where  the  pike  for  Lancaster  and  Crab  Orchard  leaves  the  Lex 
ington  and  Danville  Pike,  between  Dick's  River  and  the  Kentucky.  By  Sep 
tember  1st,  there  had  gathered  at  this  point  four  full  Kentucky  regiments  and 
nearly  two  thousand  East  Tennesseeans,  who  had  been  enlisted  by  Lieutenant 


JOHN  C.  BRECKINRIDGE,  MAJOK-GKNEKAL,  C.  S.  A. 

VICE-PRESIDENT     OF     THE      UNITED      STATES, 

1857-61  ;      CONFEDERATE    SECRETARY    OF 

WAR,     APPOINTED      JAN.     28,     18fio. 
FROM   A   DAGUERREOTYPE  TAKEN    ABOUT  1850. 


}  During  the  neutrality  period  it  would  appear 
that  the  Union  authorities  were  in  doubt  as  to 
which  side  General  Buckner  would  espouse,  since 
on  August  17th,  18 01,  President  Lincoln  wrote 
to  the  Secretary  of  War :  "  Unless  there  be  reason 
to  the  contrary,  not  known  to  me,  make  out  a  com 
mission  for  Simon  [B.  ]  Buckner,  of  Kentucky,  as 


a  brigadier-general  of  volunteers.  It  is  to  be  put 
into  the  hands  of  General  Anderson,  and  delivered 
to  General  Buckner  or  not,  at  the  discretion  of 
General  Anderson.  Of  course  it  is  to  remain  a 
secret  unless  and  until  the  commission  is  de 
livered."  This  letter  bears  the  indorsement,  "this 
dav  made." — EDITORS. 


378 


HOLDING  KENTUCKY  FOR.   THE  UNION. 


S.  P.  Carter.  This  officer,  like  Nelson,  belonging  to  the  navy,  was  a  native  of 
East  Tennessee,  and  it  was  part  of  the  original  plan  of  the  East  Tennessee 
expedition  that  he  should  enter  that  section  and  organize  men  to  receive  the 
arms  that  Nelson  was  to  bring.  This  was  found  to  be  impracticable,  and  he 
opened  his  camp  at  Barboursville  and  the  men  began  to  come  to  him. 

In  August,  W.  T.  Ward,  a  prominent  lawyer  of  Greensburg,  commenced  re 
cruiting  a  brigade  and  soon  had  twenty-two  companies  pledged  to  rendezvous 
when  he  should  obtain  the  necessary  authority  from  Washington.  In  Chris 
tian  county,  Colonel  J.  F.  Buckner,  a  wealthy  lawyer  and  planter,  recruited 
a  regiment  from  companies  which  organized  originally  as  Home  Guards,  but 
soon  determined  to  enter  the  volunteer  service.  He  established  a  camp  five 
miles  north  of  Hopkinsville,  where  a  few  companies  remained  at  a  time. 
Christian  county  was  strongly  Unionist,  while  all  the  counties  west  of  it  were 
overwhelmingly  secessionist.  Camp  Boone  was  only  a  few  miles  from  its 
southern  border,  and  Fort  Donelson  about  twenty  miles  south-west.  Colonel 
Buckner  had  a  6-pounder  cannon,  which  could  be  heard  at  Camp  Boone  and 
made  his  vicinity  additionally  disagreeable  to  those  neighbors. 

The  neutrality  proclaimed  by  Governor  Magoffin  on  the  20th  of  May  had 
been  formally  recognized  by  the  Confederate  authorities  and  treated  with 
respect  by  those  of  the  United  States,  but  it  was  destined  to  speedy  termina 
tion.  It  served  a  useful  purpose  in  its  time,  and  a  policy  that  had  the  respect 
ful  consideration  of  the  leading  men  of  that  day  could  not  have  been  so 
absurd  as  it  seems  now. 

On  the  3d  of  September  General  Polk,  who  was  in  command  in  western 
Tennessee,  caused  Columbus,  Kentucky,  to  be  occupied,  on  account  of  the 
appearance  of  a  body  of  Union  troops  on  the  opposite  side  of  the  Missis- 


HOLDING  KENTUCKY  FOR   THE  UNION.  379 

sippi.  $.  Hearing  of  this,  on  the  5th  General  Grant  moved  from  Cairo  and 
occupied  Paducah.  A  few  days  afterward  General  Zollicoffer  advanced  with 
four  Confederate  regiments  through  Cumberland  Gap  to  Cumberland  Ford. 
The  Union  Legislature  had  met  on  the  2d.  Resolutions  were  passed  on  the 
llth  requiring  the  governor  to  issue  a  proclamation  ordering  the  Confederate 
troops  to  leave  the  State.  They  were  promptly  vetoed  and  promptly  passed 
over  the  veto,  and  the  proclamation  was  issued.  In  spite  of  the  governor's 
opposition,  acts  were  passed  putting  the  State  in  active  support  of  the  Gov 
ernment.  The  governor  was  reduced  to  a  nullity.  General  Robert  Anderson, 
who  was  assigned  on  May  28th  to  command  the  Department  of  Kentucky, 
was  invited  to  remove  his  headquarters  to  Louisville,  and  the  State's  full 
quota  of  volunteers  was  called  for.  Recruiting  was  pushed  with  energy, 
and  by  the  end  of  the  year  28  regiments  of  infantry,  6  of  cavalry,  and  3 
batteries  had  been  organized. 

On  September  15th  General  Albert  Sidney  Johnston  assumed  command  of 
the  Confederate  forces  in  the  West,  and  at  once  ordered  General  Buckner  with 
five  thousand  men  from  Camp  Boone  and  another  camp  in  the  vicinity  to 
proceed  by  rail  and  occupy  Bowling  Green.  Buckner  reached  that  point 
early  on  the  18th,  having  sent  in  advance  one  detachment  by  rail  to  seize  the 
bridge  over  Green  River  at  Munfordville,  and  another  to  go  as  far  as  Eliza- 
bethtown  and  bring  back  all  the  rolling-stock  possible.  This  was  success 
fully  accomplished,  a  part  of  the  advance  detachment  going  as  far  as  the 
bridge  over  the  Rolling  Fork  of  Salt  River,  within  thirty-three  miles  of  Louis 
ville,  and  burning  the  bridge. 

Buckner's  movement  was  supposed  in  Louisville  to  have  that  city  for  its 
objective,  and  great  excitement  prevailed  there.  Rumor  magnified  his  forces, 
but  there  was  abundant  ground  for  apprehension  without  that.  General 
Anderson  was  in  command,  but  he  was  without  troops.  The  only  forces  in 
his  department  in  Kentucky  were  the  unorganized  regiment  of  Colonel  Buck 
ner  near  Hopkinsville,  the  few  hundred  recruits  gathered  at  Greensburg  by 
General  Ward,  and  Nelson's  forces  at  Camp  Dick  Robinson, —  none  of  which 
were  ready  for  service, —  the  Home  Guard  Brigade  of  Louisville,  and  the  scat 
tered  companies  of  Home  Guards  throughout  the  State.  Opposite  Louisville 
was  Rousseau's  camp,  in  which  were  some  two  thousand  men  not  yet  prepared 
for  the  field.  Very  few  troops  were  in  reach.  Owing  to  the  neutrality  of 
Kentucky,  the  regiments  recruited  in  Ohio,  Indiana,  and  the  North-west  gen 
erally  had  been  sent  as  fast  as  organized  to  the  Potomac  or  Missouri  armies. 
Fortunately,  Governor  Oliver  P.  Morton,  of  Indiana,  had  received  infor 
mation,  about  the  1st,  which  had  led  him  to  reserve  a  few  regiments  for 
Kentucky,  and  in  response  to  General  Anderson's  appeal  he  hurried  them 
forward.  Anderson  had  learned  of  Buckner's  intended  advance  the  day  it 
was  made,  and  the  non-arrival  of  the  regular  train  from  the  south  showed  him 
that  it  had  begun.  The  Home  Guards  of  Louisville  were  at  once  ordered  out 
for  ten  days,  and,  assembling  at  midnight,  eighteen  hundred  of  them  under 
Colonel  A.  Y,  Johnson,  Chief  of  the  Fire  Department,  started  by  rail  for  Mul- 

3>  Thus  the  neutrality  of  Kentucky  was  first  broken  by  the  Confederates. — EDITORS. 


380 


HOLDING  KENTUCKY  FOR   THE  UNION. 


JOHN    J.  CRITTENDEN,    DURING    FOUR    TERMS    UNITED    STATES    SENATOR    FROM    KENTUCKY;    TWICE 
ATTORNEY-GENERAL    OF    THE    UNITED    STATES;    EX-GOVERNOR    OF    KENTUCKY. 
FROM    A    DAGUERREOTYPE    TAKEN    ABOUT    1851. 

In  the  session  of  1860-61  Senator  Crittenden  intro-  and  never  interfered  with  by  Congress  south  of  that 

duced  resolutions  called  the  "  Crittenden  Compromise,"  line.     Though  this  was  tho  most  promising  of  the  uu- 

proposiug  as  an  unalterable  Constitutional  Amendment  merous  plans  for  a  compromise,  the  resolutions  failed 

that  slavery  be  prohibited  north  of  the  parallel  of  3C°  30',  for  want  of  agreement.—  EDITORS. 

draugh's  Hill.  Rousseau,  with  twelve  hundred  men,  followed  in  a  few  hours. 
The  whole  force  was  under  Brigadier-General  W.  T.  Sherman,  who  had  shortly 
before,  at  Anderson's  request,  been  assigned  to  duty  with  him.  On  arriving 
at  Lebanon  Junction  Sherman  learned  that  Rolling  Fork  Bridge,  a  few  miles 
farther  on,  had  just  been  destroyed.  The  Home  Guards  debarked  at  the  junc 
tion,  and  Rousseau  moved  forward  to  the  bridge,  finding  it  still  smoking.  A 
reconnoissance  in  force,  carried  for  some  distance  beyond  the  river,  found  no 
enemy,  and  the  burning  of  the  bridge  indicated  that  no  farther  advance  was 
intended  immediately. 

General  Sherman's  army  was  rather  a  motley  crew.  The  Home  Guards  did 
not  wear  regulation  uniforms,  and  Rousseau's  men  were  not  well  equipped. 
Muldraugh's  Hill  had  been  occupied  for  six  weeks  or  more  during  the  summer 
by  a  regiment  of  the  State  Guard,  and  the  people  in  the  vicinity  were  gener- 


HOLDING  KENTUCKY  FOR   THE  UNION. 


381 


ally  in  sympathy  with  the  rebellion.  Sherman's  attention  was  attracted  to  a 
young  man,  without  any  uniform,  who  was  moving  around  with  what  he  con 
sidered  suspicious  activity,  and  he  called  him  up  for  question.  The  young  fellow 
gave  a  prompt  account  of  himself.  His  name  was  Griffiths,  he  was  a  medical 
student  from  Louisville  acting  as  hospital  steward,  and  he  had  been  called  out  in 
such  a  hurry  that  he  had  had  no  time  to  get  his  uniform.  As  he  moved  away  he 
muttered  something  in  a  low  tone  to  an  officer  standing  by,  and  Sherman  at 
once  demanded  to  know  what  it  was.  "Well,  General,"  was  the  reply,  "he  said 
that  a  general  with  such  a  hat  as  you  have  on  had  no  right  to  talk  to  him 
about  a  uniform."  Sherman  was  wearing  a  battered  hat  of  the  style  known  as 
"stovepipe."  Pulling  it  -^u, 

off,  he  looked  at  it,  and,  -:,(Mi( 

bursting  into  a  laugh, 
called  out:  "Young  man, 
you  are  right  about  the 
hat,  but  you  ought  to 
have  your  uniform." 

On 'the  20th,  the  38th 
Indiana  (Colonel  B.  F. 
Scribner)  arrived,  and 
soon  after  four  other 
regiments.  Sherman 
moved  forward  to  Eliz- 
abethtown,  not  finding 
any  available  position 
at  Muldraugh's  Hill.  A 
few  days  afterward,  hav 
ing  on  October  8th  suc 
ceeded  Anderson,  who  had  been  relieved  by  General  Scott  in  these  terms,  "To 
give  you  rest  necessary  to  restoration  of  health,  call  Brigadier-General  Sher 
man  to  command  the  Department  of  the  Cumberland,"  Sherman  ordered 
Rousseau  to  advance  along  the  railroad  to  Nolin,  fifty-three  miles  from  Louis 
ville,  and  select  a  position  for  a  large  force. 

While  Sherman  was  at  Elizabethtown,  Buckner,  with  several  thousand  men, 
moved  rapidly  to  Rochester,  on  Green  River,  and  destroyed  the  locks  there,  and 
then  moved  against  Colonel  Buckner's  camp  near  Hopkinsville.  Warned  of  his 
approach,  Colonel  Buckner  directed  his  men,  who  had  not  yet  been  regularly 
enrolled,  to  disperse  and  make  their  way  to  the  Union  camp  near  Owensboro'. 
They  succeeded,  but  Colonel  Buckner  himself  was  taken  prisoner.  Occupy 
ing  Hopkinsville  after  a  slight  skirmish  with  the  Home  Guards,  Buckner  left 
a  garrison  there  under  General  Alcorn  and  returned  to  Bowling  Green. 

Rousseau's  advance  to  Nolin  and  the  arrival  of  large  reinforcements  there 
induced  Johnston  to  move  his  headquarters  from  Columbus  to  Bowling  Green, 
and  on  October  15th  he  sent  Hardee  with  1200  men  from  that  place  against 
Ward  at  Greensburg,  who,  hearing  of  Hardee's  approach,  fell  back  with  his 
recruits  20  miles  to  Campbellsville. 


CAMP    DICK    ROBINSON  — THE    FAKM-HOUSK. 
FROM    A    WAR-TIME    SKETCH. 


HOLDING  KENTUCKY  FOR    THE  UNION. 


No  material  change  in  this  position  of  affairs  in  western  Kentucky  occurred 
while  General  Sherman  remained  in  command,  though  there  were  several 
sharp  skirmishes  between  bodies  of  Kentucky  recruits  and  Confederate  scout 
ing  parties  in  the  Lower  Green  River  country. 

In  the  mean  time  the  East  Tennessee  expedition  was  not  progressing.  Nel 
son,  whose  arbitrary  temper  had  made  him  enemies  among  influential  politi 
cians,  was  sent  to  eastern  Kentucky 
to  superintend  recruiting  camps,  and 
Brigadier-General  George  H.  Thomas 
took  command  at  Camp  Dick  Robinson. 
Thomas  was  an  ardent  advocate  of  the 
movement  on  East  Tennessee  and  bent 
all  his  energies  to  getting  ready  for  it, 
but  his  command  was  not  half  equip 
ped  and  was  wholly  without  transpor 
tation;  staff-officers  were  scarce,  and 
funds  were  not  furnished.  More  pa 
tient  than  Nelson,  he  was  yet  greatly 
tried  by  the  importunities  of  the  East 
Tennessee  troops,  and  of  the  promi 
nent  politicians  from  that  region,  who 
made  his  camp  their  rendezvous,  as  well 
as  by  military  suggestions  from  civil 
ians  more  zealous  than  wise  in  such 
matters.  The  speech-making  of  dis 
tinguished  visitors  became  a  burden  to 
him.  On  one  occasion,  when  General  Sherman  visited  his  camp,  Ex-Senator 
J.  J.  Crittenden,  Senator  Andrew  Johnson,  and  Horace  Maynard  were  there. 
A  band  came  from  the  camp  to  serenade  them,  and  the  soldiers,  not  yet  rid  of 
their  civilian  characteristics,  began  calling  for  speeches  from  one  after  another. 
Thomas  withdrew  from  the  orators  to  the  seclusion  of  a  little  room  used  as 
an  office,  on  one  side  of  the  piazza  from  which  they  were  speaking.  One  of 
his  aides  was  writing  in  a  corner,  but  Thomas  did  not  see  him,  and  began 
striding  up  and  down  the  floor  in  growing  irritation.  At  last  Sherman,  who 
was  not  then  such  an  orator  as  he  is  now,  finished  speaking,  and  cries  arose  for 

"Thomas."   He  blurted  out,  " this  speech-making!    I  won't  speak!  What 

does  a  man  want  to  make  a  speech  for,  anyhow  I "  Observing  that  he  had 
an  auditor,  he  strode  from  the  room  slamming  the  door  behind  him,  and  kept 
his  own  quarters  for  the  rest  of  the  evening. 

Accustomed  to  the  discipline  of  the  regular  army,  and  fresh  from  the  well- 
organized  army  of  General  Patterson  on  the  upper  Potomac,  Thomas  had 
little  confidence  in  the  raw  recruits  whom,  for  lack  of  a  mustering  officer,  he 
mustered  in  himself.  He  was  willing  to  advance  into  East  Tennessee  with 
half  a  dozen  well-drilled  regiments,  and  asked  for  and  obtained  them,  but 
they  came  without  transportation,  and  he  had  none  for  them.  While  he  was 
struggling  to  get  ready  for  an  advance,  Zollicoffer  had  made  several  demon 
strations,  and  to  oppose  him  Garrard's  regiment  had  been  thrown  forward  to 


MAJOR-GENERAL    LOVELL    II.    ROUSSEAU. 
FROM    A    PHOTOGRAPH. 


HOLDING  KENTUCKY  FOR    THE  UNION. 


383 


a  strong  position  on  Wild  Cat  Mountain  just  beyond  Rockcastle  River,  sup 
ported  by  a  detachment  of  Wolford's  cavalry.  On  the  17th  of  October, 
Garrard  reported  that  Zollicoffer  was  advancing  in  force,  and  asked  for 
reinforcements.  Thomas  hurried  forward  several  regiments  under  General 
Schoepf,  who  had  reported  to  him  shortly  before.  Schoepf  arrived  with  the 
33d  Indiana,  in  time  to  help  in  giving  Zollicoffer,  who  had  attacked  vigorously 
with  two  regiments,  a  decisive  repulse.  Zollicoffer  retired,  apparently  satisfied 
with  developing  Garrard's  force,  and  Thomas  moved  Schoepf  with  Carter's 
East  Tennesseeans  and  several  other  regiments  forward  in  pursuit,  till  stopped 
by  order  of  General  Sherman,  at  London. 

On  the  12th  of  November,  Sherman,  having  received  information  from  his 
advance  that  a  large  force  was  moving  between  him  and  Thomas,  apparently 
toward  Lexington,  ordered  the  latter  to  withdraw  all  his  forces  north  of  the 
Kentucky  River.  Making  arrangements  to  obey,  Thomas  at  the  same  time 
sent  an  officer  to  Sherman,  urging  the  impolicy  of  the  move  unless  absolutely 
necessary,  and  controverting  the  information  on  which  it  was  based.  The 
order  was  revoked,  but  the  revocation  did  not  reach  Schoepf  until  his  troops 
had  begun  the  movement.  The  East  Tennessee  regiments  had  received  it 
with  an  indignation  that  carried 
them  to  the  verge  of  mutiny.  They 
threw  their  guns  to  the  ground  and 
swore  they  would  not  obey.  Many 
actually  left  the  command,  though 
they  returned  in  a  few  days.  It 
required  all  of  Carter's  influence  to 
keep  them  to  their  standards,  and 
hundreds  of  them  wept  as  they 
turned  their  backs  on  their  homes. 
Andrew  Johnson  was  with  them, 
and  his  indignation  had  added  fuel 
to  their  discontent.  He  was  so  in 
discreet  that  Thomas  seriously  con 
templated  his  arrest.  On  the  rev 
ocation  of  the  order  Carter  returned 
to  London,  while  Schoepf  took  po 
sition  soon  after  at  Somerset. 

In  September  Colonel  John  S. 
Williams  had  begun  to  gather  a 
Confederate  force  at  Prestonburg, 
in  eastern  Kentucky,  threatening 
incursions  into  the  central  part  of 
the  State.  On  the  8th  of  November 
General  Nelson,  who  had  advanced  against  him  with  two  Ohio  and  detach 
ments  of  several  Kentucky  regiments,  with  a  part  of  his  force  encountered  a 
large  detachment  thrown  forward  by  Williams  to  cover  his  retreat,  in  a  strong 
position  on  Ivy  Creek.  After  a  well-contested  engagement  Williams  was 
forced  from  his  position,  and  retired  through  Pound  Gap  [see  map,  page  394] 


MAJOR-GENERAL    GEORGE    B.    CRITTEXDEX,    C.  S.   A. 
FROM    A   PHOTOGRAPH. 

General  Crittendeu  was  a  son  of  Senator  John  J.  Critteiiden. 
His  brother,  Thomas  L.  Crittenden,  was  a  major- 
general  in  the  Union  army. 


384 


HOLDING  KENTUCKY  FOR    THE  UNION. 


into  Virginia.  Nelson  with  the  Ohio  regiments  was  then  ordered  to  join  the 
column  in  front  of  Louisville,  where  he  was  assigned  to  command  the  Fourth 
Division.  On  this  expedition  Nelson  reported  as  part  of  his  force,  "  thirty- 
six  gentlemen  volunteers,"  probably  the  latest  appearance  in  history  of  that 
description  of  soldier.  One  of  them,  of  strong  bibulous  propensities,  acting 
as  his  private  secretary,  brought  about  an  altercation  between  Nelson  and  a 
wagoner  nearly  as  large,  which  narrowly  missed  fatal  results.  He  was 
anxious  to  get  the  driver  away  from  his  wagon  in  which  there  was  a  jug  of 
whisky,  and  directed  him  to  Nelson's  tent  to  find  a  big  fellow  who  was 
employed  to  unhitch  teams  for  tired  drivers.  He  warned  him  that  the  big 
fellow  was  cross,  but  told  him  he  must  insist  on  his  rights.  The  driver  was 
just  tipsy  enough  to  be  reckless,  and  he  roused  Nelson  with  little  ceremony. 


HOLDING  KENTUCKY  FOR    THE  UNION.  385 

There  was  a  terrible  outburst  of  fury  on  both  sides,  which  brought  inter 
ference  just  in  time  to  prevent  a  conflict  between  the  two  giants,  one  armed 
with  a  sword,  and  the  other  with  a  loaded  whip-handle.  The  aide,  riot 
reporting  next  morning,  was,  after  some  search,  found  sound  asleep  in  a 
wagon  with  the  jug  beside  him.  He  was  a  noted  wag,  and  Nelson,  recognizing 
him  at  once  as  the  author  of  the  trick,  dismissed  him  to  his  home. 

A  visit  from  Secretary  Cameron  and  Adjutant-General  Lorenzo  Thomas, 
on  their  return  from  St.  Louis  in  the  latter  part  of  October,  resulted  in  the 
removal  of  General  Sherman.  In  explaining  the  needs  of  his  department  to 
the  Secretary,  Sherman  expressed  the  opinion  that  two  hundred  thousand  men 
would  be  required  for  successful  operations  on  his  line.  This  estimate,  which, 
as  events  showed,  evinced  remarkable  foresight,  then  discredited  his  judgment. 
On  their  way  to  St.  Louis,  on  the  same  tour,  the  Secretary  had  ordered  General 
O.  M.  Mitchel  to  take  charge  of  the  East  Tennessee  expedition,  superseding 
General  Thomas,  but  General  Sherman  succeeded  in  having  the  order  recalled. 

On  November  15th,  General  Don  Carlos  Buell  assumed  command  of  the 
Department  of  the  Ohio,  enlarged  so  as  to  include  the  States  of  Ohio,  Mich 
igan,  and  Indiana.  |  He  was  given  the  advantage,  not  enjoyed  by  his  prede 
cessors,  of  controlling  the  new  troops  organized  in  those  States.  By  one  of 
his  first  orders,  General  Thomas  was  directed  to  concentrate  his  command  at 
Lebanon.  The  new  commander  began  at  once  the  task  of  creating  an  efficient 
army  out  of  the  raw  material  at  hand.  He  organized  the  regiments  into  bri 
gades  and  divisions,  and  subjected  them  to  a  system  of  drill  and  discipline 
the  beneficial  effects  of  which  endured  throughout  the  war. 

The  advance  into  East  Tennessee  remained  a  favorite  project  with  the  author 
ities  at  Washington.  Buell's  instructions  presented  Knoxville  as  the  objective 
of  his  first  campaign.  McClellan  wrote  several  times  urging  that  the  seizing 
of  the  East  Tennessee  and  Virginia  railroad  was  essential  to  the  success  of  his 
plans,  and  that  the  political  results  likely  to  follow  success  in  that  direction 
made  the  movement  of  the  first  importance.  Buell  did  not  consider  East 
Tennessee  important  enough  to  be  his  principal  objective ;  he  wanted  it  to 
be  a  subordinate  feature  in  a  great  campaign.  He  submitted  his  plans  to 
McClellan  in  a  personal  letter.  They  were  comprehensive  and  required  a  large 
force,  and  it  was  already  seen  that  Sherman's  estimate  was  not  so  far  out  of 
the  way.  Buell  proposed  that  a  heavy  column  should  be  moved  up  the  Ten 
nessee  and  Cumberland  rivers  by  steamer,  to  unite  with  another  moving  on 
Nashville,  to  the  eastward  of  Bowling  Green.  Demonstrations  were  to  be 
made  in  front  of  Columbus  and  Bowling  Green,  sufficient  to  keep  the  forces 
holding  them  fully  occupied  until  their  retreat  was  cut  off  by  the  marching 
columns.  At  the  same  time  an  expedition  from  Lebanon,  moving  by  way 
of  Somerset,  was  to  be  directed  against  East  Tennessee.  Until  he  was  ready 
to  move,  he  desired  to  do  nothing  to  put  the  enemy  on  the  alert.  His  bri 
gades  and  regiments  were  allowed  to  remain  in  apparently  objectless  disper- 

f  General  Buell  was  a  graduate  of  West  Point,  severely  wounded.    May  20th,  1861,  to  August 

In  the  Mexican  war  he  twice  received  promotion  9th  he  was  on  duty  in  California,  and  from  Sept. 

for  gallant    and   meritorious    conduct,    and   was  14th  to  Nov.  9th  in  the  defenses  of  Washington. 
VOL.  i.   25  EDITORS. 


386  HOLDING  KENTUCKY  FOR   THE  UNION. 

sion.  He  did  not  care  if  some  isolated  posts  were  occasionally  raided  by  the 
enemy.  But  his  regiments  were  frequently  inspected  and  required  to  keep 
constantly  ready  for  a  movement  the  day  and  hour  of  which  he  proposed  to 
keep  to  himself.  The  notion  that  Buckner  or  Zollicoffer  contemplated  an 
advance,  which  so  frequently  agitated  the  military  mind  before  he  came,  was 
dismissed  by  him  as  idle.  "  I  would  as  soon,"  he  wrote  to  McClellan,  "  expect 
to  meet  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  marching  up  the  road,  as  Johnston." 

His  policy  of  quiet  had  to  be  laid  aside  when,  early  in  December,  Morgan 
and  Helm  burned  the  Bacon  Creek  bridge  in  his  front.  He  advanced  his 
lines  to  Munfordville  and  threw  forward  a  small  force  beyond  Green  River. 
This  resulted  in  a  skirmish  between  a  portion  of  the  32d  Indiana,  deployed 
as  skirmishers,  and  Terry's  Texas  Cavalry — notable  as  one  of  the  few  fights 
of  the  war  between  infantry  skirmishers  in  the  open  and  cavalry. 

Nothing  else  of  moment  occurred  on  Buell's  main  line  until  the  capture  of 
Forts  Henry  and  Donelson  compelled  Johnston  to  retire  from  Bowling  Green 
and  leave  the  road  to  Nashville  open.J)  During  November  Buell  reviewed 
Thomas's  command  at  Lebanon,  and  advised  with  him  about  an  attack  on 
Zollicoffer,  who  to  meet  a  rumored  advance  had  left  Cumberland  Gap  in 
charge  of  a  strong  garrison,  had  made  his  appearance  on  the  Cumberland  at 
Mill  Springs,  a  few  miles  south-west  of  Somerset,  had  crossed  the  river,  and 
after  some  picket-firing  with  Schoepf  had  intrenched  himself  on  the  north  side. 

General  Thomas  left  Lebanon  on  the  1st  of  January.  As  far  as  Colum 
bia  there  was  a  good  turnpike;  beyond,  only  mud  roads.  It  rained  incessantly, 
and  artillery  carriages  and  wagons  sank  to  their  axles  in  the  soft  soil.  On  one 
part  of  the  route  eight  days  were  consumed  in  advancing  forty  miles. 

|  The  letter  which  follows  shows  Mr.  Lincoln's  want  of  perfect  knowledge  of  the  enemy's  movements, 

ideas  of  what  was  demanded  bv  the  situation :  This  had  its  part  in  the  Bull  Run  case ;  but  worse  in 

that  case  was  the  expiration  of  the  terms  of  the  three- 

"  Executive  Mansion,  Washington,  January  13th,  1862.  months  men.  Applying  the  principle  to  your  case,  my 
BRIGADIER-GENERAL  BUELL:  My  dear  sir,— Your  clis-  idea  is  that  Halleck  shall  menace  Columbus,  and  'down- 
patch  of  yesterday  is  received,  in  which  you  say, '  I  have  river '  generally,  while  you  menace  Bowling  Green  and 
received  your  letter  and  General  McClellan's,  and  will  East  Tennessee.  If  the  enemy  shall  concentrate  at 
at  once  devote  all  my  efforts  to  your  views  and  his.'  In  Bowling  Green,  do  not  retire  from  his  front,  yet  do  not 
the  midst  of  my  many  cares,  I  have  not  seen  or  asked  to  tight  him  there  either,  but  seize  Columbus  and  East 
see  General  McClellan's  letter  to  you.  For  my  own  Tennessee,  one  or  both,  left  exposed  by  the  conccntra- 
views,  I  have  not  offered,  and  do  not  now  offer  them,  as  tion  at  Bowling  Green.  It  is  a  matter  of  no  small 
orders;  and  while  I  am  glad  to  have  them  respectfully  anxiety  to  me,  and  one  which  I  am  sure  you  will  not 
considered,  I  would  blame  you  to  follow  them  contrary  overlook,  that  the  East  Tennessee  line  is  so  long  and 
to  your  own  clear  judgment,  unless  I  should  put  them  over  so  bad  a  road.  Yours,  very  truly,  A.  LINCOLN. 
in  the  form  of  orders.  As  to  General  McClellan's  views,  [Indorsement] :  January  13th,  1862.  Having  to-day  writ- 
you  understand  your  duty  in  regard  to  them  better  than  ten  General  Buell  a  letter,  it  occurs  to  me  to  send  Gen- 
I  do.  With  this  preliminary  I  state  my  general  idea  of  eral  Halleck  a  copy  of  it.  A.  LINCOLN." 
thin  war  to  be  that  we  have  the  greater  numbers  and 

the  enemy  has  the  greater  facility  of   concentrating  On  February  5th,  the  day  before  the  capture  of 
forces  upon  points  of  collision  ;  that  we  must  fail  unless  Fort  Henry,  General  Buell  wrote  thus  to  General 
we  can  find  some  way  of  making  our  advantage  an  over-  Halleck  in  a  correspondence  with  regard  to  co- 
match  for  his ;  and  that  this  can  only  be  done  by  menac-  ,  • 
ing  him  with  superior  forces  at  different  points  at  the  opel 

same  time,  so  that  we  can  safely  attack  one  or  both  if  he  "  I  think  it  is  quite  plain  that  the  center  of  the  ene- 

makes  no  change ;  and  if  he  weakens  one  to  strengthen  my's   line  — that   part    which    you    are   now   moving 

the  other,  forbear  to  attack  the  strengthened  one,  but  against  —  is  the  decisive  point  of  his  whole  front,  as  it 

seize  and  hold  the  weakened  one,  gaining  so  much.    To  is  also  the  most  vulnerable.     If  it  is  held,  or  even  the 

illustrate:  Suppose  last  summer,  when  Winchester  ran  bridges  on  the  Cumberland  and  Tennessee  rivers  de- 

away  to  reenforce  Manassas,  we  had  forborne  to  attack  stroyed,   and  your  force    maintains  itself   near  those 

Manassas,  but  had  seized  and  held  AVinchester.    I  men-  points..  Bowling  Green  will  speedily  fall,  and  Columbus 

tion  this  to  illustrate,  and  not  to  criticise.    I  did  not  lose  will  soon  follow.  The  work  which  you  have  undertaken 

confidence  in  McDowell,  and  I  think  less  harshly  of  Pat-  is  therefore  of  the  very  highest  importance,  without 

terson  than  some  others  seem  to.    In  application  of  the  reference  to  the  injurious  effects  of  a  failure.  There  is  not 

general  rule  I  am  suggesting,  every  particular  case  will  in  the  whole  field  of  operations  a  point  at  which  every 

have  its  modifying  circumstances,  among  which  the  most  man  you  can  raise  can  be  employed  with  more  effect  or 

constantly  present  and  most  difficult  to  meet  will  be  the  with  the  prospect  of  as  important  results."     EDITORS. 


HOLDING  KENTUCKY  FOR    THE  UNION.  387 

On  the  17th  of  January  Thomas  reached  Logan's  Cross  Roads,  ten  miles 
north  of  Zollicoffer's  intrenched  camp  (on  the  north  side  of  the  Cumberland, 
opposite  Mill  Springs)  and  about  the  same  distance  west  of  Somerset,  with  the 
9th  Ohio  and  2d  Minnesota  of  Robert  L.  McCook's  brigade,  the  10th  Indiana  of 
Man  son's  brigade,  Kenny's  battery,  and  a  battalion  of  Wolford's  cavalry.  The 
4th  Kentucky,  10th  Kentucky,  the  14th  Ohio,  Wetmore's  battery,  and  the  18th 
regulars  were  still  detained  in  the  rear  by  bad  roads.  Halting  at  the  cross 
roads,  Thomas  communicated  with  Schoepf  and  ordered  him  to  send  across 
Fishing  Creek  to  his  camp  the  12th  Kentucky,  the  1st  and  2d  East  Tennessee 
regiments,  and  Standart's  battery,  to  remain  until  the  arrival  of  his  delayed 
force.  Hearing  that  a  large  wagon  train,  sent  on  a  foraging  expedition  by 
Zollicoffer,  was  on  a  road  about  six  miles  from  the  camp  of  Steedman,  of  the 
14th  Ohio,  he  ordered  that  officer  to  take  his  own  regiment  and  Harlan's  10th 
Kentucky  and  attempt  its  capture.  On  the  evening  of  the  18th  the  4th  Ken 
tucky,  the  battalion  of  Michigan  Engineers,  and  the  battery  arrived  and  went 
into  camp  near  the  10th  Indiana. 

THE   BATTLE    OF   LOGAN'S    CROSS   ROADS    (MILL    SPRINGS). 

A  FEW  days  before  this  General  George  B.  Crittenden  had  arrived  at  Zolli- 
<?offer's  camp  and  assumed  command.  Hearing  of  the  arrival  of  Thomas 
with  part  of  his  command,  and  believing  that  Fishing  Creek,  which  was  a 
troublesome  stream  at  any  stage  of  water,  was  unfordable  from  recent  rains, 
he  called  a  council  of  his  brigade  and  regimental  commanders  to  consider 
the  propriety  of  making  an  attack  on  Thomas  before  he  could  be  reached  by 
Schoepf  or  his  regiments  in  the  rear.  There  was  little  delay  in  coming  to  a 
decision.  Their  camp  on  the  north  side  of  the  river  was  not  tenable  against 
a  strong  attack,  and  the  means  of  crossing  the  river  were  so  insufficient  that 
a  withdrawal  without  great  loss  could  not  have  been  effected,  in  the  face  of 
an  enterprising  enemy.  The  only  chance  for  a  satisfactory  issue  was  to 
attack  Thomas  before  he  could  concentrate.  Crittenden  ordered  a  move 
ment  to  begin  at  midnight  on  the  18th  in  the  following  order :  General  Zolli 
coffer's  brigade,  consisting  of  two  cavalry  companies,  a  Mississippi  regiment, 
three  Tennessee  regiments,  and  a  battery  in  front;  next,  the  brigade  of  General 
Carroll,  composed  of  three  Tennessee  regiments  and  a  section  of  artillery. 
An  Alabama  regiment  and  two  cavalry  regiments,  intended  as  a  reserve, 
closed  the  column.  After  a  march  of  nine  miles  over  muddy  roads  and 
through  the  rain,  his  cavalry  about  daylight  encountered  Wolford's  pickets, 
who  after  firing  fell  back  on  the  reserve,  consisting  of  two  companies  of  the 
10th  Indiana,  and  with  them  made  a  determined  stand,  in  which  they  were 
promptly  supported  by  Wolford  with  the  rest  of  his  battalion,  and  soon 
after  by  the  rest  of  the  10th  Indiana,  ordered  up  by  Manson,  who  had  been 
advised  by  courier  from  Wolford  of  the  attack.  Colonel  Manson  proceeded 
in  person  to  order  forward  the  4th  Kentucky  and  the  battery  of  his  brigade 
and  to  report  to  General  Thomas.  On  his  way  he  notified  Colonel  Van 
Cleve,  of  the  2d  Minnesota.  As  Manson  dashed  through  the  camp  of  the 
4th  Kentucky  shouting  for  Colonel  Speed  S.  Fry,  and  giving  warning  of  the 


388 


HOLDING  KENTUCKY  FOR   THE  UNION. 


UNION  CONFEDERATE 

Cavalry 


attack,  the  men,  wearied  with  the  muddy  march  of  the  day  before,  were  just 
beginning  to  crawl  out  of  their  tents  to  roll-call.  Forming  rapidly,  Fry  led 
them  at  double-quick  in  the  direction  of  the  firing.  Having  no  one  to  place 
him,  on  coming  in  sight  of  the  enemy,  he  took  position  along  a  fence  in 
the  edge  of  the  woods,  with  his  right  resting  near  the  Mill  Springs  road.  In 
front  of  him  was  an  open  field,  across  which  the  enemy  were  advancing  from 
the  shelter  of  woodland  on  the  opposite  side.  A  ravine  ran  through  the  open 
field  parallel  to  Fry's  front,  heading  near  the  road  on  his  right,  with  steep 
sides  in  his  front,  but  sloping  gradually  beyond  his  left.  Before  Fry's  arrival 
Zollicoffer  had  deployed  his  brigade,  and  had  forced  Wolford  and  the  10th 
Indiana  to  fall  back,  almost  capturing  the  horses  of  Wolford's  men,  who  were 
fighting  on  foot.  A  portion  of  Wolford's  command,  under  his  immediate 
charge,  and  Vanarsdall's  company  of  the  10th  Indiana,  rallied  on  the  4th 
Kentucky  when  it  appeared,  the  remainder  of  the  10th  falling  back  to  its 
encampment,  where  it  re-formed  its  lines.  Fry  was  at  once  subjected  to  a 
severe  attack.  The  enemy  in  his  front  crawled  up  under  shelter  of  the 

ravine  to  within  a  short  dis 
tance  of  his  lines  before  deliver 
ing  their  fire,  and  Fry,  mounting 
the  fence,  in  stentorian  tones  de 
nounced  them  as  dastards,  and 
defied  them  to  stand  up  on  their 
feet  and  come  forward  like  men. 
A  little  lull  in  the  firing  oc 
curring  at  this  juncture,  Fry 
rode  a  short  distance  to  the 
right  to  get  a  better  view  of  the 
movement  of  the  enemy  in  that 
direction.  The  morning  was  a 
lowering  one,  and  the  woods 
were  full  of  smoke.  As  Fry 
turned  to  regain  his  position  he 
encountered  a  mounted  officer 
whose  uniform  was  covered 
with  a  water-proof  coat.  After 
approaching  till  their  knees 
touched,  the  stranger  said  to 
Fry :  "  We  must  not  fire  on  our 
own  men " ;  and  nodding  his 
head  to  his  left,  he  said,  "  Those 
are  our  men."  Fry  said,  "Of 
course  not.  I  would  not  do  so 
intentionally";  and  he  began 
to  move  toward  his  regiment, 
when  turning  he  saw  another 
mounted  man  riding  from  the 


£38 


iff/  x    JJ--.J 

•^•fi^/^."^ 


BATTLE  OF 
LOGAN'S  CROSS  ROADS    -. 

OR  \ 


MILL  SPRINGS, KY.  Wx\? 

V      \.  _,< 


HOLDING  KENTUCKY  FOR    THE  UNION. 


389 


trees  who  fired  and  wounded  Fry's  horse.  Fry  at  once  fired  on  the  man 
who  had  accosted  him,  and  several  of  his  men,  observing  the  incident, 
fired  at  the  same  time.  The  shots  were  fatal,  and  the  horseman  fell  dead, 
pierced  by  a  pistol-shot  in  his  breast  and  by  two  musket-balls.  It  was 
soon  ascertained  that  it  was  Zollicoffer  himself  who  had  fallen.  In  the 
mean  time,  the  enemy  were  pressing  Fry  in  front  and  overlapping  his 
right.  On  his  right  front  only  the  fence  separated  the  combatants.  The  left 
of  his  regiment  not  being  assailed,  he  moved 
two  companies  from  that  flank  to  his  right. 
As  he  was  making  this  change  General 
Thomas  appeared  on  the  field,  and  at  once 
placed  the  10th  Indiana  in  position  to  cover 
Fry's  exposed  flank. 

The  fall  of  Zollicoffer  and  the  sharp  firing 
that  followed  caused  two  of  his  regiments  to 
retreat  in  confusion.  Crittenden  then  brought 
up  Carroll's  brigade  to  the  support  of  the  other 
two,  and  ordered  a  general  advance.  Thomas 
met  this  by  placing  a  section  of  Kenny's  bat 
tery  on  the  left  of  the  4th  Kentucky,  which 
was  overlapped  by  Carroll's  line,  ordered  the 
12th  Kentucky  to  the  left  of  Kenny's  two 
guns,  and  Carter  with  the  two  East  Tennessee 
regiments,  and  Wetmore's  battery  still  farther 
to  the  left,  in  front  of  the  Somerset  road. 
Standart's  battery  and  Kenny's  remaining 
guns  were  held  in  the  rear  of  the  center,  and  McCook's  two  regiments  were 
ordered  up,  the  9th  Ohio  on  the  right  of  the  10th  Indiana,  and  the  2d  Minne 
sota  in  reserve  behind  the  latter  regiment  and  the  4th  Kentucky.  During 
these  movements  Kenny's  section  was  so  threatened  that  it  was  withdrawn 
some  distance  to  the  rear.  There  was  little  opportunity  for  the  effective  use 
of  artillery  011  either  side,  and  that  arm  played  an  insignificant  part  in  the 
engagement,  Thomas's  superiority  in  that  particular  availing  him  little.  Car 
roll's  attack  was  pressed  with  great  courage,  and  the  ammunition  of  the  4th 
Kentucky  and  l()th  Indiana  beginning  to  fail,  the  2d  Minnesota  was  ordered 
to  relieve  them,  which  it  did  under  severe  fire.  Both  of  McCook's  regiments 
were  admirably  drilled  and  disciplined,  and  moved  to  the  attack  with  the 
order  and  steadiness  of  veterans.  Thomas's  disposition  of  his  troops  had 
begun  to  tell.  The  advance  of  the  12th  Kentucky  on  the  left,  the  firing  of 
AVetmore's  battery,  and  the  movement  of  Carter's  East  Tennesseeans  checked 
the  enemy's  right,  and  it  soon  began  to  give  back.  The  2d  Minnesota  was 
slowly  pushing  forward  over  the  ground  that  had  been  the  scene  of  the  most 
persistent  fighting  from  the  first,  and  the  9th  Ohio,  on  the  right,  was  forcing 
back  the  enemy  through  open  ground,  when,  slightly  changing  direction,  it 
made  a  bayonet  charge  against  the  enemy's  left,  which  gave  way  in  confusion. 
Their  whole  line  then  broke  into  a  disorderly  retreat.  After  replenishing 


BRIG.-GEN.   FEI.IX  K.  ZOLLICOFFER,  C.  8.  A. 
FROM    A    PHOTOGRAPH. 


HOLDING  KENTUCKY  FOR   THE  UNION. 


cartridge-boxes,  Thomas  pushed  forward  in  pursuit.  Within  a  few  miles,  a 
small  body  of  the  enemy's  cavalry  attempted  to  make  a  stand,  but  were  scat 
tered  by  a  few  shells  from  Standart.  The  road  which  the  retreating  force 
followed  was  strewn  with  evidences  that  the  retreat  had  degenerated  into  a 
panic.  A  piece  of  artillery  was  found  abandoned  in  a  mud  hole,  hundreds 

of  muskets  were  strewn  along  the  road  and 
in  the  fields,  and,  most  convincing  proof  of 
all,  the  flying  foe  had  thrown  away  their 
haversacks  filled  with  rations  of  corn  pone 
and  bacon.  Those  were  the  days  when  sto 
ries  of  "rebel  atrocities"  in  the  way  of  poison 
ing  wells  and  food  were  current,  and  the 
pursuers,  who  had  gone  into  the  fight  break- 
f astless,  were  doubtful  about  tasting  the  con 
tents  of  the  first  haversacks  they  observed. 
Their  great  number,  however,  soon  became 
a  guarantee  of  good  faith,  and  the  hungry 
soldiers  seized  on  them  with  avidity.  As 
Crittenden  in  his  report  mentioned  the  loss 
of  all  the  cooked  rations  carried  to  the  field 
as  enhancing  the  distress  of  his  subsequent 
retreat,  the  abundance  of  the  supply  obtained 
by  the  pursuing  force  may  be  inferred.  On 
arriving  near  the  enemy's  intrenchments 
the  division  was  deployed  in  line  of  battle, 
advancing  to  the  summit  of  the  hill  at  Moulden's,  which  commanded  the 
enemy's  intrenchments.  From  this  point  Standart  and  Wetmore's  batteries 
kept  up  a  cannonade  till  dark,  while  Kenny's  on  the  left,  at  Russell's  house, 
fired  upon  their  ferry  to  keep  them  from  crossing.  The  14th  Ohio  and  the 
10th  Kentucky  had  come  up  during  the  pursuit,  and  were  placed  in  advance 
for  the  assault  ordered  for  daybreak.  General  Schoepf  arrived  about  dark 
with  the  17th,  31st,  and  38th  Ohio.  [See  also  pp.  546,  547.] 

At  daybreak  next  morning  Wetmore's  Parrott  guns,  which  had  been  moved 
to  Russell's,  began  firing  on  the  steamer  which  was  evidently  engaged  in 
crossing  troops,  and  it  was  soon  abandoned  and  set  on  fire  by  the  enemy. 
The  assaulting  columns  moved  forward,  the  10th  Kentucky  and  the  14th 
Ohio  in  advance,  and  reaching  the  intrenchments  found  them  abandoned. 
In  the  bottom  near  the  ferry-crossing  were  found  11  pieces  of  artillery,  with 
their  caissons,  battery-wagons,  and  forges,  hitched  up  and  ready  to  move 
but  abandoned  by  the  artillerymen,  more  than  150  wagons,  and  over  1000 
horses  and  mules.  All  the  troops  had  escaped.  The  steep  road  on  the  other 
bank  was  strewn  with  abandoned  baggage  and  other  evidences  of  disorderly 
flight.  The  boats  used  for  crossing  having  been  destroyed  by  the  retreating 
enemy,  no  immediate  pursuit  was  possible ;  but  during  the  day  means  were 
improvised  for  getting  the  14th  Ohio  across  for  a  reconnoissance  and  to 
secure  abandoned  property. 


BRIGADIER-GENERAL    STEED    S.    FRY. 
FROM    A   PHOTOGRAPH. 


HOLDING  KENTUCKY  FOR    THE  UNION. 


391 


Thomas  reported  his  loss  in  action  as  39  killed  and  207  wounded,  the 
casualties  being  confined  entirely  to  the  10th  Indiana,  4th  Kentucky,  2d 
Minnesota,  9th  Ohio,  and  Wolford's  cavalry.  Colonels  McCook  and  Fry 
were  among  the  wounded.  The  enemy's  loss  he  reported  as  192  killed,  89 
prisoners  not  wounded,  and  68  prisoners  wounded.  Crittenden's  report 
stated  his  own  loss  at  125  killed,  309  wounded,  and  99  missing,  much  the 
heaviest  loss  being  in  the  15th  Mississippi  (Lieutenant-Colonel  E.  C.  Wal- 
thall),  of  Zollicoffer's  brigade,  which  had  led  the  attack  on  Fry  and  fought 
through  the  whole  engagement. 

Besides  the  property  mentioned  above,  a  large  amount  of  ammunition,  com 
missary  stores,  intrenching  tools,  camp  and  garrison  equipage  and  muskets, 
and  five  stands  of  colors  were  found  in  the  camp.  The  demoralization  was 
acknowledged  by  Critteriden  in  his  report,  in  which  he  says :  "  From  Mill 
Springs  and  on  the  first  steps  of  my  march  officers  and  men,  frightened  by 
false  rumors  of  the  movements  of  the  enemy,  shamefully  deserted,  and,  steal 
ing  horses  and  mules  to  ride,  fled  to  Knoxville,  Nashville,  and  other  places 
in  Tennessee."  Of  one  cavalry  battalion,  he  reported  that  all  had  deserted 
except  twenty-five.  On  his  retreat  his  sick-list  increased  greatly  from  lack  of 
food  and  fatigue,  and  the  effective  force  of  his  army  was  practically  destroyed. 

After  entrance  into  his  intrenchments  had  demonstrated  the  panic  that  ex 
isted  in  the  enemy's 
forces,  Fry  said 
to  Thomas :  "Gen 
eral,  why  didn't 
you  send  in  a  de 
mand  for  surren 
der  last  night  ? " 
Looking  at  him  a 
moment  as  if  re 
flecting,  Thomas 
replied :  "  Hang  it, 
Fry,  I  never  once 
thought  of  it."  At 
this  time  origina 
ted  a  saying  often 
heard  in  the  West 
ern  army  after 
ward.  A  sprightly 

young  prisoner  slightly  wounded  was  allowed  the  freedom  of  the  camp.  To 
some  soldiers  chaffing  him  about  his  army  being  in  such  a  hurry  as  even  to 
throw  away  their  haversacks,  he  replied:  "Well,  we  were  doing  pretty 
good  fighting  till  old  man  Thomas  rose  up  in  his  stirrups,  and  we  heard 
him  holler  out :  '  Attention,  Creation  !  By  kingdoms  right  wheel ! '  and  then 
we  knew  you  had  us,  and  it  was  no  time  to  carry  weight." 

Thomas's  victory  was  complete,  and  the  road  was  opened  for  the  advance  into 
East  Tennessee  which  he  had  so  long  endeavored  to  make  and  which  was 


NATIONAL  CEMETERY  AT  LOGAN'S  CKOSS   ROAD* 
FKOM  A  PHOTOGRAPH  TAKEN   IN  1887. 


3Q2 


HOLDING  KENTUCKY  FOR    THE  UNION. 


pj^™^-.^ 

-  ••••^|^^ 


VIEW    ON    THE    BATTLE-FIELD    OF    LOGAN'S    CROSS    ROADS.       FROM    A    PHOTOGRAPH,   1887. 

contemplated  by  his  instructions,  but  the  scarcity  of  provisions,  the  badness 
of  the  roads,  and  the  difficulty  of  crossing  the  river  made  progress  on  that 
line  impracticable,  and  shortly  afterward  Carter  was  ordered  with  his  brigade 
against  Cumberland  Gap  and  Thomas  to  rejoin  Buell's  main  column,  and  the 
East  Tennessee  expedition,  which  Nelson  had  devised  and  McClellan  had 
strongly  urged  and  Thomas  had  labored  so  to  put  in  motion,  was  definitively 
abandoned. 

While  Thomas  was  marching  against  Zollicoffer,  Colonel  Garfield  was 
driving  Humphrey  Marshall  from  the  mountainous  region  along  the  Virginia 
border.  With  Marshall's  retreat  the  last  Confederate  force  was  driven  from 
the  State,  and  Garfield  with  his  brigade  joined  the  army  in  Tennessee. 


THE  OPPOSING  FORCES  AT  LOGAN'S  CROSS  ROADS,  KNOWN  AS  MILL  SPRINGS 
AND  ALSO  AS  FISHING  CREEK,  KY. 

The  composition  and  losses  of  each  army  as  here  stated  give  the  gist  of  all  the  data  obtainable  in  the  Official  Records. 
K  stands  for  killed  ;  w  for  wounded  ;  m  w  for  mortally  wounded  ;  m  for  captured  or  missing  ;  c  for  captured.— KDITOUS. 


THE  UNION  ARMY,  Brig.-Gen.  George  II.  Thomas. 
Second  Brigade,  Col.  Mahlon  D.  Manson:  10th  Ind., 
Lt.-Col.  William  C.  Kise ;  4th  Ky.,  Col.  Speed  S.  Fry  (w) ; 
10th  Ky..  Col.  John  M.  Harlan  ;  14th  Ohio,  Col.  James  B. 
Steedman.  [The  two  latter  regiments  were  engaged 
only  in  the  pursuit  of  the  enemy.]  Brigade  loss:  k,  19; 
•w.  127  =  146.  TJiird  Brigade,  Col.  Robert  L.  McCook  (w) : 
2d  Minn.,  Col.  Horatio  P.  Van  (leve ;  9th  Ohio,  Major 
Gustave  Kammeiiing.  Brigade  loss  :  k,  18;  w,  61  =  79; 
Tirelft/t  Brigade,  Acting  Brig.-Gen.  Samuel  P.  Carter: 
12th  Ky.,  Col.  William  A.  Hoskins;  1st  Tennessee,  Col. 


Robert  K.  Byrd ;  2d  Tennessee,  Col.  J.  P.  T.  Carter; 
1st  Ky.  Cavalry,  Col.  Frank  Wolford.  Brigade  loss: 
k,  3;  w,  19;  m,  15  =37.  Artillery :  Battery  B,  1st  Ohio, 
Capt.  William  E.  Standart ;  Battery  C,  1st  Ohio,  Capt. 
Dennis  Kenny,  Jr. ;  9th  Ohio  Battery,  Capt.  Henry  S. 
Wetmore.  Camp  Guard:  D,  F,  and  K,  Michigan  En 
gineers  and  Mechanics,  Lieut.-Col.  K.  A.  Iluntou;  A, 
38th  Ohio,  Capt.  Charles  Greenwood. 

Brig.-Gen.  A.  Sehoepf  joined  Thomas  on  the  evening 
of  the  battle,  after  the  fighting  had  ceased,  with  the 
17th,  31st,  and  38th  Ohio. 


The  total  loss  of  the  Union  forees  was  40  killed,  207  wounded,  and  15  captured  or  missing,— aggregate,  262. 

In  the  Official  Records,  vol.  VII.,  p.  86,  Col.  Manson  reports  that  "  the  Federal  force  actually  engaged  did  not 
exceed  at  any  time  over  2500."  Gen.  Thomas's  entire  command  on  the  field  during  the  engagement  probably 
numbered  about  four  thousand  effectives. 


THE  CONFEDERATE  ARMY,  Major-Gen.  George  B. 
.frittenden.  First  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  F.  K.  Zolli coffer  (k). 
Col.  DTFTTCummings :  isth  Miss.,  Lieut  .-Col.  E.  CVfral- 
thall;  19th  Tenn.,  Col.  D.  H.  Cnminings,  Lieut.-Col. 
Francis  M.  Walker ;  20th  Tenn.,  Col.  Joel  A.  Battle  ;  25th 
Tenn.,  Col.  S.  S.  Stanton  (w);  Tenn.  Battery,  Capt.  A.  M. 
Rutledge;  Ind'p't  Co.  Tenn.  Cav.,  Capt.  W.  S.  Bledsoe; 
Ind'p't  Co.  Tenn.  Cav.,  Capt.  T.  C.  Sanders.  Brigade 


loss  :  k,  98  ;  w,  265 :  m,  66  -  429.  Second  Brif/rtde,  Brig.- 
Gen.  Wm.  H.  Carroll :  Ifith  Ala.,  Col.  Win.  B.  Wood;  17th 
Tenn.,  Lieut.-Col.  T.  C.  H.  Miller  ;  28th  Tenn.,  Col.  J.  P. 
Murray;  20th  Tenn..  Col.  Saml.  Powell  (w).  Major  Horace 
Rice ;  Tenn.  Battery  (2  guns),Capt.  Hugh  L. W.  McClung; 
4th  Battalion  Tenn.  Cav.,  Lieut. -Col.  B.  M.  Brainier. 
Brigade  loss :  k,  28:  w,  46;  m.  29-103.  Reserve:  5th 
Battalion  Tenn.  Cav.,  Lieut.-Col.  George  R.  McClellan. 


The  total  Confederate  loss  was  125  killed,  309  wounded,  and  99  captured  or  missing,— aggregate,  533. 

Gen.  Crittenden  says :  "  In  the  then  condition  of  my  command  I  could  array  for  battle  about  4000  effective  men." 


MARSHALL  AND  GARFIELD  IN  EASTERN  KENTUCKY. 


BY  THE  REV.  EDWARD   O.  GUERRANT,  ASSISTANT  ADJUTANT-GENERAL  TO  GENERAL  MARSHALL. 

X  the  10th  of  September,  1861,  General  Albert  Sidney 
Johnston,  one  of  the  five  officers  who  then  held  the  rank 
of  "  General "  in  the  Confederate  army,  was  assigned 
to  the  command  of  Department  Xo.  2,  embracing  the 
States  of  Tennessee  and  Arkansas,  and  that  part  of 
the  State  of  Mississippi  west  of  the  New  Orleans,  Jack 
son  and  Great  Northern  and  Central  Railroad;  also, 
the  military  operations  in  Kentucky,  Missouri,  Kansas, 
and  the  Indian  country  immediately  west  of  Missouri 
and  Arkansas.  Tennessee  had  entered  into  a  league 
with  the  Confederacy  on  the  7th  of  May,  1861,  and 
although  the  efforts  of  the  Confederates  to  take  Ken 
tucky  out  of  the  Union  had  been  defeated,  the  State 
ROTYPE.  containeci  a  large  element  friendly  to  secession,  from 
which  was  recruited  at  an  early  day  a  number  of  regiments.  In  order  to 
afford  securer  opportunities  for  such  enlistments,  it  was  necessary  to  make 
an  effort  to  occupy  eastern  Kentucky.  This  was  desirable,  also,  in  order  to 
protect  vital  interests  of  the  Confederacy  in  south-western  Virginia,  where 
were  situated  the  great  salt-works  and  lead-mines  of  the  South,  and  where 
ran  the  chief  line  of  railway,  connecting  Virginia  with  the  Gulf  States. 

With  these  objects  in  view,  on  the  1st  of  November,  1861,  Brigadier-Gen 
eral  Humphrey  Marshall  was  sent  by  the  Confederate  Government  to  take 
command  of  certain  troops  at  Prestonburg,  Ky.,  then  under  command  of 
Colonel  (afterward  General)  John  S.  Williams.  These  consisted  of  a  regi 
ment  and  a  battalion  in  a  camp  on  the  Big  Sandy,  which  had  been  organ 
ized  in  the  fall  of  1861,  by  Colonel  Williams.  The  regiment  was  the  5th  Ken 
tucky,  the  famous  "  Ragamuffin  Regiment,"  composed  almost  exclusively  of 
mountain  men,  and  one  of  the  finest  corps  of  soldiers  ever  enlisted  in  the 
army.  They  were  hardy,  raw-boned,  brave  mountaineers,  trained  to  hard 
ships,  and  armed  with  long  rifles.  Colonel  Williams  had  also  organized  a 
battalion  of  mounted  riflemen  from  the  famous  "  Blue  Grass  "  country  in 
central  Kentucky,  composed  of  young  men  of  education  and  fortune, — the 
class  of  men  who  afterward  made  John  Morgan  famous  as  a  raider.  This 
force  was  further  increased  by  the  54th  Virginia,  under  Colonel  Robert  C. 
Trigg,  the  29th  Virginia,  under  Colonel  A.  C.  Moore,  and  a  battery  of  field 
artillery,  under  Captain  W.  C.  Jeffress.  In  General  Marshall's  official  reports, 
he  states  that  during  the  campaign  of  1861-62  his  force  never  exceeded  1800 
effective  men  of  all  arins.rl  The  force  assigned  to  him  was  very  small, 
considering  the  interests  involved  and  the  objects  to  be  attained.  The 

J  Yet,  on  the  30th  of  December,  1861,  General  Marshall  had  reported  his  force  as  "equal  to  3000," 
including  ••  battery  of  four  pieces,  equal  to  600  men." — EDITORS. 

393 


394 


MARSHALL  AND  GARFIELD  IN  EASTERN  KENTUCKY. 


occupation  of  eastern  Kentucky  would  have 
required  an  army  of  several  thousand  men. 
In  response  to  his  request  for  reinforcements, 
President  Davis  wrote  to  General  Marshall  that 
they  "  were  sorely  pressed  on  every  side,"  and 
were  unable  to  send  him  any  troops. 

It  was  a  very  severe  winter,  and  Marshall's 
men  were  poorly  clad,  and  many  of  the  soldiers 
were  nearly  naked.  One  regiment  had  350  bare 
footed  men  and  not  over  100  blankets  for  700 
men.  General  Albert  Sidney  Johnston,  observ 
ing  their  condition,  sent  them  one  thousand  suits 
of  clothes,  including  hats  and  shoes.  These  sup 
plies  reached  the  army  at  Whitesburg,  Ky.  An 
incident  connected  with  the  distribution  of  them 
will  serve  to  illustrate  the  poverty  of  the  Quar 
termaster's  Department,  and  the  ready  genius  of 
General  Marshall.  When  the  quartermaster  dis 
tributed  the  clothing  among  the  soldiers,  it  was 
noticed  that  they  examined  with  suspicion  the 
peculiar  color  and  texture  of  the  cloth.  General 
Marshall  discovering  that  it  was  cotton,  and 
fearing  the  result  of  such  a  discovery  by  his 
men,  rose  to  the  occasion  with  a  stirring  speech, 
in  which  he  eulogized  the  courage,  endurance, 
and  patriotism  of  his  men,  and  commended  the 
Government  for  its  thoughtful  care  of  them,  and 
relieved  their  fears  as  to  the  quality  of  the  goods 
by  assuring  them  that  they  were  "  woven  out  of  the  best  quality  of  Southern 
wool,  witli  ivliicli,  doubtless,  many  of  the  Xentuckians  were  not  acquainted." 
The  men  took  the  general's  word  for  it  (with  a  grain  of  salt)  and  walked 
off  to  their  quarters  with  their  cottonade  suits.  The  general  often  remarked 
afterward  that  the  deception  nearly  choked  him,  adding,  "but  something  had 
to  be  done." 

The  army  was  not  only  badly  clothed,  but  in  general  badly  armed.  Many 
of  the  men  had  only  shot-guns  and  squirrel  rifles.  Requisitions  on  the  Wai- 
Department  were  not  filled  for  want  of  supplies;  and  General  Lee  wrote 
that  owing  to  the  scarcity  of  arms  he  was  having  pikes  made,  which  he 
offered  to  furnish  General  Marshall  for  his  unarmed  troops. 

The  field  of  operations  lay  in  the  Cumberland  Mountains,  along  the  sources 
of  the  Big  Sandy  River, — a  poor,  wild,  thinly  settled  country.  The  roads  ran 
along  the  water-courses  between  the  mountains,  and  were  often  rendered 
impassable  by  the  high  waters,  and  during  this  winter  were  ruined  by  the 
passage  of  cavalry,  wagons,  and  artillery.  Captain  Jeffress  was  three  days 
moving  his  battery  from  Gladesville  to  Pound  Gap,  only  sixteen  miles.  Gen 
eral  Marshall's  report  states  that  his  wagons  were  sometimes  unable  to  make 


MAP    OF    BIG    SANDY    RIVER    AND 

MIDDLE-CREEK   BATTLE-FIELD 

(JANUARY  10,  1862). 


MARSHALL  AND  GARFIELD  IN  EASTERN  KENTUCKY. 

over  four  miles  a  day.  An  unusual  amount  of  rain  fell,  drenching  the  unpro 
tected  soldiers,  most  of  them  raw  recruits,  and  keeping  the  roads  deep  and 
the  waters  high.  This  first  winter  was  the  worst  of  the  war,  and  the  scanty 
rations  and  great  hardships  made  hundreds  of  the  men  sick.  Besides,  the 
measles  and  mumps  broke  out  in  the  camps,  and  many  died  from  these 
diseases  and  from  exposure.  The  command  at  Prestonburg  was  over  one 
hundred  miles  from  its  base  of  supplies  at  Abingdon,  Va.,  with  the  Cumber 
land  Mountains  between.  The  farms  were  generally  small  and  poor,  lying 
along  the  mountain-sides  or  in  narrow 
valleys.  During  January,  1862,  corn  was 
worth  ten  dollars  per  barrel,  and  had  to 
be  hauled  thirty  miles  over  desperate 
roads.  For  weeks  they  subsisted  upon 

mountain  beef  and  parched  corn.   These  5SP  S^-v^^I^ 

privations  General  Marshall  shared,  giv 
ing  up  his  tent  to  the  sick  and  wounded, 
and  sleeping  beneath  a  wagon. 

On  the  17th  of  December,  1861,  Gen 
eral  Don  Carlos  Buell,  then  in  com 
mand  of  the  Department  of  the  Ohio, 
including  Kentucky,  assigned  Colonel 
(afterward  General  and  President)  James 
A.  Garfield,  of  Ohio,  to  command  his 
Eighteenth  Brigade,  and  sent  him 
against  General  Marshall.  Colonel  Gar- 
field  concentrated  his  forces  at  Louisa, 
at  the  forks  of  the  Sandy,  from  which  place  he  began  his  advance  movement 
on  the  23d  of  December.  His  army  consisted  of  his  own  regiment,  the  42d 
Ohio,  under  Lieutenant-Colonel  L.  A.  Sheldon,  the  1st  Squadron  Ohio  Cav 
alry,  Major  William  McLaughlin,  the  14th  Kentucky,  Colonel  L.  T.  Moore, 
the  22d  Kentucky,  Colonel  D.  W.  Lindsey,  2d  Virginia  Cavalry  (6  companies), 
Lieutenant-Colonel  W.  M.  Bolles,  the  40th  Ohio,  Colonel  Jonathan  Cranor, 
and  300  of  the  1st  Kentucky  Cavalry,  Lieutenant-Colonel  J.  W.  Letch er, 
numbering  in  all  some  three  thousand  men.  Garfield  having  found  the  road 
up  the  river  impassable  for  wagons,  many  were  taken  to  pieces  and  con 
veyed  on  boats ;  others,  that  were  empty,  were  pulled  by  the  men.  His  sup 
plies  were  brought  up  on  steam-boats  and  push-boats. 

On  the  6th  of  January,  1862,  Garfield  arrived  within  seven  miles  of  Paints 
ville,  where  Marshall  had  established  his  camp  and  headquarters.  It  had 
been  Marshall's  intention  to  offer  battle  at  Hagar's  farm,  near  Paintsville, 
but  he  had  intercepted  a  letter  from  Garfield  to  Cranor,  who,  with  his  regi 
ment  and  some  400  cavalry,  was  advancing  upon  Marshall's  left  and  rear 
from  the  direction  of  Salyersville.  He  then  decided  to  fall  back  to  the  forks 
of  Middle  Creek,  where  he  awaited  the  approach  of  the  Federal  forces.  Gar- 
field  and  Cranor  made  a  junction  near  Paintsville,  and  all  moved  up  to 
Marshall's  front  on  the  10th  of  Januarv. 


ENERAi.  JAMES  A.  GARFTELD. 

WAR-TIME    PHOTOGRAPH. 


396 


MARSHALL  AND  GARFIELD  IN  EASTERN  KENTUCKY. 


General  Marshall  had  selected  a  strong  position  along  a  high  ridge  south 
of  Middle  Creek,  and  covering  the  road  to  Virginia  by  way  of  Beaver  Creek. 
Jeffress's  battery  was  placed  in  a  gorge  of  the  left  fork  of  Middle  Creek;  the 
5th  Kentucky  and  29th  Virginia  regiments  and  part  of  the  Kentucky  Bat 
talion  of  Mounted  Riflemen  occupied  the  spurs  and  heights  to  the  right  of 
the  artillery;  the  54th  Virginia  occupied  a  height  covering  the  battery,  with  two 
cavalry  companies  in  reserve ;  two  other  cavalry  companies  (dismounted  and 
armed  with  Belgian  rifles)  were  placed  across  Middle  Creek,  on  a  height  com 
manding  the  valley.  Skirmishing  between  the  two  commands  began  about 
10  A.  M.,  but  the  action  began  in.  earnest 
about  noon  by  a  charge  of  Federal  cav 
alry,  supported  by  infantry.  This  at 
tack  was  repulsed,  the  artillery  putting 
the  cavalry  to  flight,  and  it  appeared 
no  more  during  the  engagement. 
The  men  probably  dismounted  and 
fought  on  foot,  as  the  ground  was  not 
suitable  for  cavalry  operations.  Col 
onel  Garfield  then  endeavored  to  take 
the  ridge  occupied  by  the  5th  Ken-  ' 
tucky  and  29th  Virginia,  on  the  right 
wing  of  General  Marshall's  position. 
He  moved  his  infantry  up  the  side 
of  the  mountain,  above  Spurlock's 
Branch,  and  made  a  desperate  attempt 
to  dislodge  the  Confederate  forces, 
commanded  by  Colonel  Williams,  but 
was  repulsed.  The  attack  was  renewed 
three  times,  with  the  same  result.  The  ascent  was  steep,  the  top  of  the 
mountain  was  covered  with  trees  and  rocks  affording  good  protection  to  the 
Confederate  forces.  The  engagement  lasted  until  dark,  both  sides  claiming 
the  victory,  and  both  withdrawing  from  the  field  of  battle. 

General  Marshall  estimated  Colonel  Garfield's  forces  at  5000,  $.  and  states 
his  own  at  not  over  1500.  In  his  official  report  to  the  War  Department  he 
gives  his  losses  at  11  killed  and  15  wounded. 

General  Marshall  withdrew  his  forces  next  day,  taking  three  days  to  reach 
Martin's  Mill  on  Beaver  Creek, — sixteen  miles  from  the  battle-field.  This  was 
the  nearest  point  at  which  he  could  get  provisions  for  his  men,  some  of  whom 
had  fasted  for  thirty  hours  before  the  action. 

Colonel  Garfield  withdrew  his  forces,  February  22d,  to  the  Big  Sandy  River, 
where  he  remained  until  March.  This  was  the  only  engagement  between  the 


BRIGADIER-GENERAL    HUMPHREY    MARSHALL. 
FROM   A   PHOTOGRAPH. 


&  Garfield's  strength  on  the  field  did  not  exceed 
1700  men.  He  says  in  his  report :  "Not  more  than 
900  of  my  force  were  actually  engaged."  Mar 
shall's  estimate  of  his  own  (1  r>00)  is  probably  cor 
rect.  The  Union  loss  was  2  killed  and  25  wounded. 
Garfield's  reports  exhibit  no  doubt  of  his  success 
in  the  engagement.  He  says  :  "At  4.30  he  ordered 


a  retreat.  My  men  drove  him  down  the  slopes  of 
the  hills,  and  at  5  o'clock  he  had  been  driven  from 

every  point It  was    growing  dark,  and  I 

deemed  it  unsafe  to  pursue  him."  Garfield  with 
drew  to  Paintsville  on  the  1 2th  and  1 3th,  to  pi'ocure 
supplies,  having  on  the  llth  occupied  Preston- 
burg,  which  the  enemy  had  abandoned.' — EDITORS. 


MARSHALL  AND  GARFIELD  IN  EASTERN  KENTUCKY.  397 

two  forces.  The  next  month  General  Marshall  sent  the  bulk  of  his  command 
south  of  the  Cumberland  Mountains,  to  go  into  winter  quarters,  because  all 
supplies  were  exhausted  in  the  mountains  of  Kentucky.  General  Marshall's 
forces  would  probably  have  been  compelled  to  return  to  Virginia  in  order  to 
secure  supplies,  even  if  they  had  not  been  opposed  by  an  enemy.  The 
occupation  of  the  Sandy  Valley  by  a  largely  superior  force  so  crippled 
his  resources  that  he  could  hardly  have  subsisted  his  troops  among  the 
impoverished  mountains.  Indeed,  Colonel  Garfield  could  not  have  main 
tained  his  position  a  week,  without  the  aid  of  the  river,  by  which  sup 
plies  were  brought  on  steamboats.  On  the  16th  of  March,  1862,  Garfield 
with  750  men  made  an  attack  on  a  battalion  of  Virginia  militia,  occupying 
Pound  Gap,  and  drove  them  away  and  burned  the  log-huts  built  for  win 
ter  quarters.  Soon  after  this  he  was  ordered  to  report  to  General  Buell, 
who  had  gone  to  the  relief  of  General  Grant  at  Pittsburg  Landing.  This 
he  did  on  the  7th  of  April,  1862,  in  time  to  take  part  in  the  second  day's 
contest. 

General  Marshall  was  born  January  13th,  1812,  in  Frankfort,  Ky.,  and 
came  of  a  most  distinguished  family,  which  included  Chief-Justice  John 
Marshall  of  Virginia,  the  historian  Humphrey  Marshall  of  Kentucky,  and  the 
orator  and  lawyer  Thomas  F.  Marshall.  He  was  four  times  elected  to  Congress 
from  the  Louisville  District,  and  was  Minister  to  China  under  President  Fill- 
more.  In  his  profession  of  law  Humphrey  Marshall  had  probably  no  superior 
and  few  equals  among  the  jurists  of  Kentucky.  As  an  orator  he  fully  inherited 
the  talent  of  a  family  which  was  famous  in  the  forum.  As  a  soldier  he  enjoyed 
the  confidence  of  General  Lee,  who  wrote  him  frequently  in  reference  to  mili 
tary  operations,  and  earnestly  opposed  his  retirement  from  the  army.  He 
was  a  graduate  of  West  Point,  and  both  he  and  General  Williams  had  won 
distinction  in  the  Mexican  war — Marshall  at  Buena  Vista  and  Williams  at 
Cerro  Gordo. 

General  Marshall  personally  was  not  adapted  to  mountain  warfare,  owing  to 
his  great  size ;  nor  was  he  qualified  to  command  volunteers,  being  the  most 
democratic  of  men.  Moreover,  his  heart  was  tender  as  a  woman's.  For  these 
reasons  he  could  not  enforce  the  rigorous  discipline  of  an  army.  So  well 
known  was  his  leniency,  that  an  officer  of  his  staff  made  a  standing  offer  to 
eat  the  first  man  the  general  should  shoot  for  any  crime.  Speaking  to  Col 
onel  Leigh  about  military  dignity  and  discipline,  Marshall  said  he  "  regarded 
these  things  as  the  decrepitudes  of  the  military  art."  General  Williams,  who 
was  his  ablest  lieutenant,  was  a  man  of  very  different  mold,  proud,  imperi 
ous,  a  born  soldier,  who  believed  in  discipline  to  its  last  extremity. 

With  his  little  command  Marshall  afterward  successfully  defended  the  vital 
interests  of  the  Confederacy  in  south-west  Virginia,  so  long  as  he  remained 
in  the  service.  In  the  summer  of  1863  he  was  transferred  to  the  Mississippi 
Department,  but  resigned  his  commission  because  he  believed  that  he  had 
been  badly  treated  by  President  Davis  in  not  having  received  the  govern 
mental  support  which  he  thought  he  deserved  and  which  the  necessities  of 
his  command  required. 


THE  CAPTURE  OF  FORT  DONELSON 


HY   LEW   WALLACE,    MAJOR-GENERAL,   II.   S.   V. 


THE   village  of   Dover  was- 
for  that  matter  yet  is — what  our 
English  cousins  would  call  the  "  shire- 
town  "  of  the  county  of  Stewart,  Tennessee.    In  1860  it 
was  a  village  unknown  to  fame,  meager  in  population, 
architecturally  poor.     There  was  a  court-house  in  the 
place,  and  a  tavern,  remembered  now  as  double-storied, 
unpainted,  and  with  windows  of   eight-by-ten    glass, 

which,  if  the  panes  may  be  likened  to  eyes,  were  both  squint  and  cataractous. 
Looking  through  them  gave  the  street  outside  the  appearance  of  a  sedgy 
slough  of  yellow  backwater.  The  entertainment  furnished  man  and  beast 
was  good  of  the  kind  ;  though  at  the  time  mentioned  a  sleepy  traveler,  espe 
cially  if  he  wTere  of  the  North,  might  have  been  somewhat  vexed  by  the 
explosions  which  spiced  the  good  things  of  a  debating  society  that  nightly 
took  possession  of  the  bar-room,  to  discuss  the  relative  fighting  qualities  of 
the  opposing  sections. 

If  there  was  a  little  of  the  romantic  in  Dover  itself,  there  was  still  less  of 
poetic  quality  in  the  country  round  about  it.  The  only  beautiful  feature  was 
the  Cumberland  River,  which,  in  placid  current  from  the  south,  poured  its 
waters,  ordinarily  white  and  pure  as  those  of  the  springs  that  fed  it,  past  the 
village  on  the  east.  Northward  there  was  a  hill,  then  a  small  stream,  then  a 
bolder  hill  round  the  foot  of  which  the  river  swept  to  the  west,  as  if  court 
eously  bent  on  helping  Hickman's  Creek  out  of  its  boggy  bottom  and  cheer 
less  ravine.  North  of  the  creek  all  was  woods.  Taking  in  the  ravine  of  the 
creek,  a  system  of  hollows,  almost  wide  and  deep  enough  to  be  called  valleys, 
inclosed  the  town  and  two  hills,  their  bluffest  ascents  being  on  the  town  ward 
side.  Westward  of  the  hollows  there  were  woods  apparently  interminable. 
From  Fort  Henry,  twelve  miles  north-west,  a  road  entered  the  village,  stop 
ping  first  to  unite  itself  with  another  wagon-way,  now  famous  as  the  Wynn's 
Ferry  road,  coming  more  directly  from  the  west.  Still  another  road,  leading 


398 


THE  CAPTURE  OF  FORT  DONELSON.  399 

off  to  Charlotte  and  Nashville,  had  been  cut  across  the  low  ground  near  the 
river  on  the  south.  These  three  highways  were  the  chief  reliances  of  the 
people  of  Dover  for  communication  with  the  country,  and  as  they  were  more 
than  supplemented  by  the  river  and  its  boatage,  the  three  were  left  the  year 
round  to  the  guardianship  of  the  winds  and  rains. 

However,  when  at  length  the  Confederate  authorities  decided  to  erect  a  mil 
itary  post  at  Dover,  the  town  entered  but  little  into  consideration.  The  real 
inducement  was  the  second  hill  on  the  north  —  more  properly  a  ridge.  As  it 
rose  about  a  hundred  feet  above  the  level  of  the  inlet,  the  reconnoitering  engi 
neer,  seeking  to  control  the  navigation  of  the  river  by  a  fortification,  adopted  it 
at  sight.  And  for  that  purpose  the  bold  bluff  was  in  fact  a  happy  gift  of  nature, 
and  we  shall  see  presently  how  it  was  taken  in  hand  and  made  terrible. 

It  is  of  little  moment  now  who  first  enunciated  the  idea  of  attacking  the 
rebellion  by  way  of  the  Tennessee  River ;  most  likely  the  conception  was 
simultaneous  with  many  minds.  The  trend  of  the  river ;  its  navigability  for 
large  steamers ;  its  offer  of  a  highway  to  the  rear  of  the  Confederate  hosts  in 
Kentucky  and  the  State  of  Tennessee ;  its  silent  suggestion  of  a  secure  pas 
sage  into  the  heart  of  the  belligerent  land,  from  which  the  direction  of  move 
ment  could  be  changed  toward  the  Mississippi,  or,  left,  toward  Richmond ; 
its  many  advantages  as  a  line  of  supply  and  of  general  communication,  must 
have  been  discerned  by  every  military  student  who,  in  the  summer  of  1861, 
gave  himself  to  the  most  cursory  examination  of  the  map.  It  is  thought 
better  and  more  consistent  with  fact  to  conclude  that  its  advantages  as  a 
strategic  line,  so  actually  obtrusive  of  themselves,  were  observed  about  the 
same  time  by  thoughtful  men  on  both  sides  of  the  contest.  With  every 
problem  of  attack  there  goes  a  counter  problem  of  defense. 

A  peculiarity  of  the  most  democratic  people  in  the  world  is  their  hunger  for 
heroes.  The  void  in  that  respect  had  never  been  so  gaping  as  in  1861.  Gen 
eral  Scott  was  then  old  and  passing  away,  and  the  North  caught  eagerly  at 
the  promise  held  out  by  George  B.  McClellan ;  while  the  South,  with  as  much 
precipitation,  pinned  its  faith  and  hopes  on  Albert  Sidney  Johnston.  There 
is  little  doubt  that  up  to  the  surrender  of  Fort  Donelson  the  latter  was  con 
sidered  the  foremost  soldier  of  all  who  chose  rebellion  for  their  part.  When 
the  shadow  of  that  first  great  failure  fell  upon  the  veteran,  President  Davis 
made  haste  to  reassure  him  of  his  sympathy  and  unbroken  confidence.  In 
the  official  correspondence  which  has  survived  the  Confederacy  there  is 
nothing  so  pathetic,  and  at  the  same  time  so  indicative  of  the  manly  great 
ness  of  Albert  Sidney  Johnston,  as  his  letter  in  reply  to  that  of  his  chief.  J 

;  In  this  letter  dated  Decatur,  Ala.,  March  18th,  but  convinced  that  it  was  better  to  endure  them  for  the 

1862,  General  Johnston  savs  in  part :  present,  and  defer  to  a  more  propitious  time  an  hives- 

tigation  of  the  conduct  of  the  generals  ;  for  in  the  mean 

"The  blow  [Fort  Donelson]  was  most  disastrous  and  time  their  services  were  required  and  their  influence 
almost  without  remedy.  I  therefore  in  my  first  report  useful.  For  these  reasons  Generals  Floyd  and  Pillow 
remained  silent.  This  silence  you  were  kind  enough  to  were  assigned  to  duty,  for  I  still  felt  confidence  in  their 
attribute  to  my  generosity.  I  will  not  lay  claim  to  the  gallantry,  their  energy,  and  their  devotion  to  the  Con- 
motive  to  excuse  my  course.  I  observed  silence,  as  it  federacy.  .  .  .  The  test  of  merit,  in  my  profession,  with 
seemed  to  me  the  best  way  to  serve  the  cause  and  the  the  people,  is  success.  It  is  a  hard  rule,  but  I  think  it 
country.  The  facts  were  not  fully  known,  discontent  right.  If  I  join  this  corps  to  the  forces  of  Beauregard 
prevailed,  and  criticism  or  condemnation  were  more  (I  confess  a  hazardous  experiment),  those  who  are  now 
likely  to  augment  than  to  cure  the  evil.  I  refrained,  declaiming  against  me  will  be  without  an  argument." 
well  knowing  that  heavy  censures  would  fall  upon  me,  EDITORS. 


400 


THE  CAPTURE  OF  FORT  DONELSON. 


THE    TOWN    OF    DOVER    FROM    ROBINSON'S    HILL. 
FROM    A    PHOTOGRAPH    TAKEN    IN    1884. 

This  view  was  taken  from  the  site  of  a  house  on  McClernand's  right,  which  was  destroyed  for  camp  purposes  after 

the  surrender.    The  house  is  said  to  have  been  used  by  McClernand  as  headquarters.     It  was  near  the 

Wynn's  ferry  road,  which  reaches  the  river  perhaps  a  quarter  of  a  mile  to  the  right  of  the  picture. 

When  General  Johnston  assumed  command  of  the  Western  Department, 
the  war  had  ceased  to  be  a  new  idea.  Battles  had  been  fought.  Prepara 
tions  for  battles  to  come  were  far  advanced.  Already  it  had  been  accepted 
that  the  North  was  to  attack  and  the  South  to  defend.  The  Mississippi  River 
was  a  central  object ;  if  opened  from  Cairo  to  Fort  Jackson  (New  Orleans), 
the  Confederacy  would  be  broken  into  halves,  and  good  strategy  required 
it  to  be  broken.  The  question  was  whether  the  effort  would  be  made  directly 
or  by  turning  its  defended  positions.  Of  the  national  gun-boats  afloat  above 
Cairo,  some  were  formidably  iron-clad.  Altogether  the  flotilla  was  strong 
enough  to  warrant  the  theory  that  a  direct  descent  would  be  attempted ;  and 
to  meet  the  movement  the  Confederates  threw  up  powerful  batteries,  notably 
at  Columbus,  Island  Number  Ten,  Memphis,  and  Vicksburg.  So  fully  were 
they  possessed  of  that  theory  that  they  measurably  neglected  the  possibili 
ties  of  invasion  by  way  of  the  Cumberland  and  Tennessee  rivers.  Not  until 
General  Johnston  established  his  headquarters  at  Nashville  was  serious 
attention  given  to  the  defense  of  those  streams.  A  report  to  his  chief  of  engi 
neers  of  November  21st,  1861,  establishes  that  at  that  date  a  second  battery 
on  the  Cumberland  at  Dover  had  been  completed ;  that  a  work  on  the  ridge 
had  been  laid  out,  and  two  guns  mounted;  and  that  the  encampment  was  then 
surrounded  by  an  abatis  of  felled  timber.  Later,  Brigadier-General  Lloyd 
Tilghman  was  sent  to  Fort  Donelson  as  commandant,  and  on  January  25th 
he  reports  the  batteries  prepared,  the  entire  field-works  built  with  a  trace  of 
2900  feet,  and  rifle-pits  to  guard  the  approaches  were  begun.  The  same  offi 
cer  speaks  further  of  reinforcements  housed  in  four  hundred  log-cabins,  and 


THE  CAPTURE  OF  FORT  DONELSON.  401 

adds  that  while  this  was  being  done  at  Fort  Donelson,  Forts  Henry  and 
Heiman,  over  on  the  Tennessee,  were  being  thoroughly  strengthened.  Janu 
ary  30th,  Fort  Donelson  was  formally  inspected  by  Lieutenant-Colonel  Gil- 
mer,  chief  engineer  of  the  Western  Department,  and  the  final  touches  were 
ordered  to  be  given  it. 

It  is  to  be  presumed  that  General  Johnston  was  satisfied  with  the  defenses 
thus  provided  for  the  Cumberland  River.  From  observing  General  Buell  at 
Louisville,  and  the  stir  and  movement  of  multiplying  columns  under  General 
U.  8.  Grant  in  the  region  of  Cairo,  he  suddenly  awoke  determined  to  fight 
for  Nashville  at  Donelson.  To  this  conclusion  he  came  as  late  as  the  begin 
ning  of  February;  and  thereupon  the  brightest  of  the  Southern  leaders 
proceeded  to  make  a  capital  mistake.  The  Confederate  estimate  of  the  Union 
force  at  that  time  in  Kentucky  alone  was  119  regiments.  The  force  at  Cairo, 
St.  Louis,  and  the  towns  near  the  mouth  of  the  Cumberland  River  was  judged 
to  be  about  as  great.  It  w~as  also  known  that  we  had  unlimited  means  of 
transportation  for  troops,  making  concentration  a  work  of  but  few  hours. 
Still  General  Johnston  persisted  in  fighting  for  Nashville,  and  for  that 
purpose  divided  his  thirty  thousand  men.  Fourteen  thousand  he  kept  in 
observation  of  Buell  at  Louisville.  Sixteen  thousand  he  gave  to  defend  Fort 
Donelson.  The  latter  detachment  he  himself  called  "  the  best  part  of  his 
army."  It  is  difficult  to  think  of  a  great  master  of  strategy  making  an  error 
so  perilous. 

Having  taken  the  resolution  to  defend  Nashville  at  Donelson,  he  intrusted 
the  operation  to  three  chiefs  of  brigade  —  John  B.  Floyd,  Gideon  J.  Pillow, 
and  Simon  B.  Buckner.  Of  these,  the  first  was  ranking  officer,  and  he 
was  at  the  time  under  indictment  by  a  grand  jury  at  Washington  for  mal 
versation  as  Secretary  of  War  under  President  Buchanan,  and  for  complicity 
in  an  embezzlement  of  public  funds.  As  will  be  seen,  there  came  a  crisis 
when  the  recollection  of  the  circumstance  exerted  an  unhappy  influence  over 
his  judgment.  The  second  officer  had  a  genuine  military  record ;  but  it  is 
said  of  him  that  he  was  of  a  jealous  nature,  insubordinate,  and  quarrelsome. 
His  bold  attempt  to  supersede  General  Scott  in  Mexico  was  green  in  the 
memories  of  living  men.  To  give  pertinency  to  the  remark,  there  is  reason 
to  believe  that  a  personal  misunderstanding  between  him  and  General  Buck 
ner,  older  than  the  rebellion,  was  yet  unsettled  when  the  two  met  at  Donelson. 
All  in  all,  therefore,  there  is  little  doubt  that  the  junior  of  the  three  com 
manders  was  the  fittest  for  the  enterprise  intrusted  to  them.  He  was  their 
equal  in  courage;  while  in  devotion  to  the  cause  and  to  his  profession  of 
arms,  in  tactical  knowledge,  in  military  bearing,  in  the  faculty  of  getting  the 
most  service  out  of  his  inferiors,  and  inspiring  them  with  confidence  in  his 
ability, — as  a  soldier  in  all  the  higher  meanings  of  the  word, — he  was  greatly 
their  superior. 

The  6th  of  February,  1862,  dawned  darkly  after  a  thunder-storm.  Pacing 
the  parapets  of  the  work  on  the  hill  above  the  inlet  formed  by  the  junction 
of  Hickman's  Creek  and  the  Cumberland  River,  a  sentinel,  in  the  serviceable 
butternut  jeans  uniform  of  the  Confederate  army  of  the  West,  might  that 

VOL.  I.    26 


4O2 


THE  CAPTURE  OF  FORT  DONELSON. 


i.  GRANT'S 

HEADQUARTERS 

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McwmwjMwrrws    ^^^^^.^^^'^\^^^^'^      Cl    F  p^VV' 'l:\'\  -&-*^^V% 

^      a     MMTS  >i:r^£-*l£^-^ 


MAP  OF   FOKT    DONELSON,    AS    INVESTED    BY    GENERAL,    GRANT;     BASED    ON    THE    OFFICIAL   MAP 
BY    GENERAL  J.    B.    Mi'PHERSON. 

day  have  surveyed  Fort  Donelson  almost  ready  for  battle.  In  fact,  very 
little  was  afterward  done  to  it.  There  were  the  two  water-batteries  sunk 
in  the  northern  face  of  the  bluff,  about  thirty  feet  above  the  river ;  in  the 
lower  battery  9  32-pounder  guns  and  1  10-inch  Columbiad,  and  in  the 
upper  another  Columbiad,  bored  and  rifled  as  a  32-pounder,  and  2  32- 
pounder  carronades.  These  guns  lay  between  the  embrasures,  in  snug 
revetment  of  sand  in  coffee-sacks,  flanked  right  and  left  with  stout  traverses. 
The  satisfaction  of  the  sentry  could  have  been  nowise  diminished  at  seeing 
the  backwater  lying  deep  in  the  creek ;  a  more  perfect  ditch  against  assault 
could  not  have  been  constructed.  The  fort  itself  was  of  good  profile,  and 
admirably  adapted  to  the  ridge  it  crowned.  Around  it,  on  the  landward  side, 
ran  the  rifle-pits,  a  continuous  but  irregular  line  of  logs,  covered  with  yellow 
clay.  From  Hickman's  Creek  they  extended  far  around  to  the  little  run  just 
outside  the  town  on  the  south.  If  the  sentry  thought  the  pits  looked  shallow, 


THE   CAPTURE  OF  FORT  DONELSON.  403 

he  was  solaced  to  see  that  they  followed  the  coping  of  the  ascents,  seventy  or 
eighty  feet  in  height,  up  which  a  foe  must  charge,  and  that,  where  they  were 
weakest,  they  were  strengthened  by.  trees  felled  outwardly  in  front  of  them, 
so  that  the  interlacing  limbs  and  branches  seemed  impassable  by  men  under 
fire.  At  points  inside  the  outworks,  on  the  inner  slopes  of  the  hills,  defended 
thus  from  view  of  an  enemy  as  well  as  from  his  shot,  lay  the  huts  and  log- 
houses  of  the  garrison.  Here  and  there  groups  of  later  comers,  shivering  in 
their  wet  blankets,  were  visible  in  a  bivouac  so  cheerless  that  not  even  morn 
ing  fires  could  relieve  it.  A  little  music  would  have  helped  their  sinking 
spirits,  but  there  was  none.  Even  the  picturesque  effect  of  gay  uniforms  was 
wanting.  In  fine,  the  Confederate  sentinel  on  the  ramparts  that  morning, 
taking  in  the  whole  scene,  knew  the  jolly,  rollicking  picnic  days  of  the  war 
were  over. 

To  make  clearer  why  the  6th  of  February  is  selected  to  present  the  first 
view  of  the  fort,  about  noon  that  day  the  whole  garrison  was  drawn  from 
their  quarters  by  the  sound  of  heavy  guns,  faintly  heard  from  the  direction 
of  Fort  Henry,  a  token  by  which  every  man  of  them  knew  that  a  battle  was 
on.  The  occurrence  was  in  fact  expected,  for  two  days  before  a  horseman 
had  ridden  to  General  Tilghman  with  word  that  at  4:30  o'clock  in  the  morn 
ing  rocket  signals  had  been  exchanged  with  the  picket  at  Bailey's  Landing, 
announcing  the  approach  of  gun-boats.  A  second  courier  came,  and  then  a 
third;  the  latter,  in  great  haste,  requesting  the  general's  presence  at  Fort 
Henry.  There  was  quick  mounting  at  headquarters,  and,  before  the  camp 
could  be  taken  into  confidence,  the  general  and  his  guard  were  out  of  sight. 
Occasional  guns  were  heard  the  day  following.  Donelson  gave  itself  up  to 
excitement  and  conjecture.  At  noon  of  the  6th,  as  stated,  there  was  continuous 
and  heavy  cannonading  at  Fort  Henry,  and  greater  excitement  at  Fort  Donel 
son.  The  polemicists  in  Dover  became  uneasy  and  prepared  to  get  away.  In  the 
evening  fugitives  arrived  in  groups,  and  told  how  the  gun-boats  ran  straight 
upon  the  fort  and  took  it.  The  polemicists  hastened  their  departure  from 
town.  At  exactly  midnight  the  gallant  Colonel  Heiman  marched  into  Fort 
Donelson  with  two  brigades  of  infantry  rescued  from  the  ruins  of  Forts 
Henry  and  Heiman.  The  officers  and  men  by  whom  they  were  received  then 
knew  that  their  turn  was  at  hand  ;  and  at  daybreak,  with  one  mind  and  firm 
of  purpose,  they  set  about  the  final  preparation. 

Brigadier-General  Pillow  reached  Fort  Donelson  on  the  9th;  Brigadier- 
General  Buckner  came  in  the  night  of  the  llth ;  and  Brigadier-General  Floyd 
on  the  13th.  The  latter,  by  virtue  of  his  rank,  took  command. 

The  morning  of  the  13th  —  calm,  spring-like,  the  very  opposite  of  that  of 
the  6th  —  found  in  Fort  Donelson  a  garrison  of  28  regiments  of  infantry :  13 
from  Tennessee,  2  from  Kentucky,  6  from  Mississippi,  1  from  Texas,  2  from 
Alabama,  4  from  Virginia.  There  were  also  present  2  independent  battalions, 
1  regiment  of  cavalry,  and  artillerymen  for  6  light  batteries,  and  17  heavy 
guns,  making  a  total  of  quite  18,000  effectives.  [See  page  430.] 

General  Buckner's  division  —  6  regiments  and  2  batteries  —  constituted 
the  right  wing,  and  was  posted  to  cover  the  land  approaches  to  the  water-bat- 


404 


THE  CAPTURE  OF  FORT  DONELSON. 


teries.  A  left  wing  was  or 
ganized  into  six  brigades, 
commanded  respectively 
by  Colonels  Heiman,  Da 
vidson,  Drake,  Wharton, 
McCausland,  and  Baldwin, 
and  posted  from  right  to 
left  in  the  order  named. 
Four  batteries  were  dis 
tributed  amongst  the  left 
wing.  General  Bushrod  R. 
Johnson,  an  able  officer, 
served  the  general  com 
manding  as  chief-of-staft'. 
Dover  was  con  verted  into  a 
depot  of  supplies  and  ord 
nance  stores.  These  dispo 
sitions  made,  Fort  Donel- 
son  was  ready  for  battle. 

It  may  be  doubted  if 
General  Grant  called  a 
council  of  war.  The  near 
est  approach  to  it  was  a 
convocation  held  on  the 

New  Uncle  8am,  a  steamboat  that  was  afterward  trans 
formed  into  the  gun-boat  Slackhawk.    The  morning  of  the 
^•^T?  '#--"  :^fcf>r^<      llth  of  February,  a  staff-officer  visited  each  commandant 
-*sK^  of  division  and  brigade  with  the  simple  verbal  message: 

"General  Grant  sends  his  compliments,  and  requests  to  see 
you  this  afternoon  on  his  boat."     Minutes  of  the  proceedings 
were  not  kept;  there  was  no  adjournment;  each  person  retired  when  he 
got  ready,  knowing  that  the  march  would  take  place   next  day,  probably 
in  the  forenoon. 

There  were  in  attendance  on  the  occasion  some  officers  of  great  subsequent 
notability.  Of  these  Ulysses  S.  Grant  was  first.  The  world  knows  him  now; 
then  his  fame  was  all  before  him.  A  singularity  of  the  volunteer  service  in 
that  day  was  that  nobody  took  account  of  even  a  first-rate  record  of  the  Mex 
ican  War.  The  battle  of  Belmont,  though  indecisive,  was  a  much  better  ref 
erence.  A  story  was  abroad  that  Grant  had  been  the  last  man  to  take  boat 
at  the  end  of  that  affair,  and  the  addendum  that  he  had  lingered  in  face  of 
the  enemy  until  he  was  hauled  aboard  with  the  last  gang-plank,  did  him  great 
good.  From  the  first  his  silence  was  remarkable.  He  knew  how  to  keep  his 
temper.  In  battle,  as  in  camp,  he  went  about  quietly,  speaking  in  a  conver 
sational  tone ;  yet  he  appeared  to  see  everything  that  went  on,  and  was  al 
ways  intent  on  business.  He  had  a  faithful  assistant  adjutant-general,  and 
appreciated  him ;  he  preferred,  however,  his  own  eyes,  word,  and  hand.  His 


(LIMPSE  OF  THE  CUMBERLAND  RIV- 
ER  WHERE  THE  GUN-BOATS  FIRST 
APPEARED,      LOOKING      NORTH 
FROM    THE    HIGHEST    EARTH 
WORKS  OF  FORT  DONELSON. 
FROM    A    PHOTOGRAPH 
TAKEN  IN  1884. 


THE  CAPTURE  OF  FORT  DONELSON. 


405 


aides  were  little  more  than  messengers.  In  dress  he  was  plain,  even  negligent ; 
in  partial  amendment  of  that  his  horse  was  always  a  good  one  and  well  kept. 
At  the  council — calling  it  such  by  grace — he  smoked,  but  never  said  a  word. 
In  all  probability  he  was  framing  the  orders  of  march  which  were  issued  that 
night. 

Charles  F.  Smith,  of  the  regular  army,  was  also  present.  He  was  a  person 
of  superb  physique,  very  tall,  perfectly  proportioned,  straight,  square-shoul 
dered,  ruddy-faced,  with 
eyes  of  perfect  blue,  and 
long  snow-white  mus 
taches.  He  seemed  to  know 
the  army  regulations  by 
heart,  and  caught  a  tac 
tical  mistake,  whether  of 
command  or  execution,  by 
a  kind  of  mental  coup 
(Pceil.  He  was  naturally 
kind,  genial,  communica 
tive,  and  never  failed  to 
answer  when  information 
was  sought  of  him ;  at  the 
same  time  he  believed  in 
"  hours  of  service  "  regu 
larly  published  by  the 
adjutants  as  a  rabbi  be 
lieves  in  the  Ten  Tables, 
and  to  call  a  court-martial 
on  a  "  bummer  "  was  in  his 
eyes  a  sinful  waste  of  sta 
tionery.  On  the  occasion 
of  a  review  General  Smith  had  the  bearing  of  a  marshal  of  France.  He 
could  ride  along  a  line  of  volunteers  in  the  regulation  uniform  of  a  briga 
dier-general,  plume,  chapeau,  epaulets  and  all,  without  exciting  laughter — 
something  nobody  else  could  do  in  the  beginning  of  the  war.  He  was  at  first 
accused  of  disloyalty,  and  when  told  of  it  his  eyes  flashed  wickedly ;  then  he 
laughed,  and  said,  "  Oh,  never  mind !  They'll  take  it  back  after  our  first 
battle."  And  they  did.  At  the  time  of  the  meeting  on  the  New  Uncle  Sam 
he  was  a  brigadier-general,  and  commanded  the  division  which  in  the  land 
operations  against  Fort  Henry  had  marched  up  the  left  bank  of  the  river 
against  Fort  Heiman. 

Another  officer  worthy  of  mention  was  John  A.  McClernand,  also  a  briga 
dier.  By  profession  a  lawyer,  he  was  in  his  first  of  military  service.  Brave, 
industrious,  methodical,  and  of  unquestioned  cleverness,  he  was  rapidly 
acquiring  the  art  of  war. 

There  was  still  another  in  attendance  on  the  New  Uncle  Sam  not  to  be 
passed — a  young  man  who  had  followed  General  Grant  from  Illinois,  and 


MAJOR-GENERAL    JOHN*    A.    MCCLERNAND.      FROM    A    PHOTOGRAPH. 


406  THE  CAPTURE  OF  FORT  DONELSON. 

was  seeing  his  first  of  military  service.  No  soldier  in  the  least  familiar  with 
headquarters  on  the  Tennessee  can  ever  forget  the  slender  figure,  large  black 
eyes,  hectic  cheeks,  and  sincere,  earnest  manner  of  John  A.  Rawlins,  then 
assistant  adjutant-general,  afterward  major-general  and  secretary  of  war. 
He  had  two  special  devotions — to  the  cause  and  to  his  chief.  He  lived  to  see 
the  first  triumphant  and  the  latter  first  in  peace  as  well  as  in  war.  Probably 
no  officer  of  the  Union  was  mourned  by  so  many  armies. 

Fort  Henry,  it  will  be  remembered,  was  taken  by  Flag-Officer  Foote  on 
the  6th  of  February.  The  time  up  to  the  12th  was  given  to  reconnoitering 
the  country  in  the  direction  of  Fort  Donelson.  Two  roads  were  discovered : 
one  of  twelve  miles  direct,  the  other  almost  parallel  with  the  first,  but,  on 
account  of  a  slight  divergence,  two  miles  longer. 

By  8  o'clock  in  the  morning,  the  First  Division,  General  McClernand  com 
manding,  and  the  Second,  under  General  Smith  [see  page  429],  were  in  full 
march.  The  infantry  of  this  command  consisted  of  twenty-five  regiments  in 
all,  or  three  less  than  those  of  the  Confederates.  Against  their  six  field-bat 
teries  General  Grant  had  seven.  In  cavalry  alone  he  was  materially  stronger. 
The  rule  in  attacking  fortifications  is  five  to  one ;  to  save  the  Union  com 
mander  from  a  charge  of  rashness,  however,  he  had  also  at  control  a  fighting 
quality  ordinarily  at  home  on  the  sea  rather  than  the  land.  After  receiving 
the  surrender  of  Fort  Henry,  Flag-Officer  Foote  had  hastened  to  Cairo  to 
make  preparation  for  the  reduction  of  Fort  Donelson.  With  six  of  his  boats, 
he  passed  into  the  Cumberland  River ;  and  on  the  12th,  while  the  two  divis 
ions  of  the  army  were  marching  across  to  Donelson,  he  was  hurrying,  as 
fast  as  steam  could  drive  him  and  his  following,  to  a  second  trial  of  iron 
batteries  afloat  against  earth  batteries  ashore.  The  Carondelet,  Commander 
Walke,  having  preceded  him,  had  been  in  position  below  the  fort  since  the 
12th.  By  sundown  of  the  12th,  McClernand  and  Smith  reached  the  point 
designated  for  them  in  orders. 

On  the  morning  of  the  13th  of  February  General  Grant,  with  about  twenty 
thousand  men,  was  before  Fort  Donelson.  ;&  We  have  had  a  view  of  the  army 
in  the  works  ready  for  battle ;  a  like  view  of  that  outside  and  about  to  go  into 
position  of  attack  and  assault  is  not  so  easily  to  be  given.  At  dawn  the  latter 
host  rose  up  from  the  bare  ground,  and,  snatching  bread  and  coffee  as  best 
they  could,  fell  into  lines  that  stretched  away  over  hills,  down  hollows,  and 
through  thickets,  making  it  impossible  for  even  colonels  to  see  their  regi 
ments  from  flank  to  flank. 

Pausing  to  give  a  thought  to  the  situation,  it  is  proper  to  remind  the 
reader  that  he  is  about  to  witness  an  event  of  more  than  mere  historical 
interest ;  he  is  about  to  see  the  men  of  the  North  and  North-west  and  of  the 
South  and  South-west  enter  for  the  first  time  into  a  strife  of  arms ;  on  one 
side,  the  best  blood  of  Tennessee,  Kentucky,  Alabama,  Mississippi,  and  Texas, 
aided  materially  by  fighting  representatives  from  Virginia;  on  the  other,  the 
best  blood  of  Illinois,  Ohio,  Indiana,  Iowa,  Missouri,  and  Nebraska. 

&  General  Grant  estimates  his  available  forces  at  this  time  at  about  15,000,  and  on  the  last  day  at 
27,000,  5000  or  6000  of  whom  were  guarding  transportation  trains  in  the  rear. —  EDITORS. 


THE  CAPTURE  OF  FORT  DONELSON.  407 

We  have  now  before  us  a  spectacle  seldom  witnessed  in  the  annals  of 
scientific  war — an  army  behind  field-works  erected  in  a  chosen  position  wait 
ing  quietly  while  another  army  very  little  superior  in  numbers  proceeds  at 
leisure  to  place  it  in  a  state  of  siege.  Such  was  the  operation  General  Grant 
had  before  him  at  daybreak  of  the  13th  of  February.  Let  us  see  how  it  was 
accomplished  and  how  it  was  resisted. 

In  a  clearing  about  two  miles  from  Dover  there  was  a  log-house,  at  the 
time  occupied  by  a  Mrs.  Crisp.  As  the  road  to  Dover  ran  close  by,  it  was 
made  the  headquarters  of  the  commanding  general.  All  through  the  night 
of  the  12th,  the  coming  and  going  was  incessant.  Smith  was  ordered  to  find 
a  position  in  front  of  the  enemy's  right  wing,  which  would  place  him  face 
to  face  with  Buckner.  McClernand's  order  was  to  establish  himself  on  the 
enemy's  left,  where  he  would  be  opposed  to  Pillow. 

A  little  before  dawn  Birge's  sharp-shooters  were  astir.  Theirs  was  a 
peculiar  service.  Each  was  a  preferred  marksman,  and  carried  a  long-range 
Henry  rifle,  with  sights  delicately  arranged  as  for  target  practice.  In  action 
each  was  perfectly  independent.  They  never  manoeuvred  as  a  corps.  When 
the  time  came  they  were  asked,  "Canteens  full?"  "Biscuits  for  all  day?" 
Then  their  only  order,  "All  right;  hunt  your  holes,  boys."  Thereupon  they 
dispersed,  and,  like  Indians,  sought  cover  to  please  themselves  behind  rocks 
and  stumps,  or  in  hollows.  Sometimes  they  dug  holes;  sometimes  they 
climbed  into  trees.  Once  in  a  good  location,  they  remained  there  the  day. 
At  night  they  would  crawl  out  and  report  in  camp.  This  morning,  as  I  have 
said,  the  sharp-shooters  dispersed  early  to  find  places  within  easy  range  of 
the  breastworks. 

The  movement  by  Smith  and  McClernand  was  begun  about  the  same  time. 
A  thick  wood  fairly  screened  the  former.  The  latter  had  to  cross  an  open 
valley  under  fire  of  two  batteries,  one  on  Buckner's  left,  the  other  on  a  high 
point  jutting  from  the  line  of  outworks  held  by  Colonel  Heiman  of  Pillow's 
command.  Graves  commanded  the  first  (Kentucky),  Maney  the  second  (Ten 
nessee)  ;  both  were  of  Tennessee.  As  always  in  situations  where  the  advancing 
party  is  ignorant  of  the  ground  and  of  the  designs  of  the  enemy,  resort  was 
had  to  skirmishers,  who  are  to  the  main  body  what  antennae  are  to  insects. 
Theirs  it  is  to  unmask  the  foe.  Unlike  sharp-shooters,  they  act  in  bodies. 
Behind  the  skirmishers,  the  batteries  started  out  to  find  positions,  and  through 
the  brush  and  woods,  down  the  hollows,  up  the  hills  the  guns  and  caissons 
were  hauled.  Nowadays  it  must  be  a  very  steep  bluff  in  face  of  which  the  good 
artillerist  will  stop  or  turn  back.  At  Donelson,  however,  the  proceeding  was 
generally  slow  and  toilsome.  The  officer  had  to  find  a  vantage-ground  first ; 
then  with  axes  a  road  to  it  was  hewn  out ;  after  which,  in  many  instances,  the 
men,  with  the  prolongs  over  their  shoulders,  helped  the  horses  along.  In 
the  gray  of  the  dawn  the  sharp-shooters  were  deep  in  their  deadly  game ;  as 
the  sun  came  up,  one  battery  after  another  opened  fire,  and  was  instantly 
and  gallantly  answered ;  and  all  the  time  behind  the  hidden  sharp-shooters, 
and  behind  the  skirmishers,  who  occasionally  stopped  to  take  a  hand  in  the 
fray,  the  regiments  marched,  route-step,  colors  flying,  after  their  colonels. 


408 


THE  CAPTURE  OF  FORT  DONELSON. 


About  11  o'clock  Com 
mander  Walke,  of  the 
Carondelet,  engaged  the 
water-batteries.  The  air 
was  then  full  of  the 
stunning  music  of  bat 
tle,  though  as  yet  not 
a  volley  of  musketry 
had  been  heard.  Smith, 
nearest  the  enemy  at 
starting,  was  first  in 
place;  and  there,  leav 
ing  the  fight  to  his 
sharp-shooters  and  skir 
mishers  and  to  his  bat 
teries,  he  reported  to 
the  chief  in  the  log- 
house,  and,  like  an  old 
soldier,  calmly  waited 
orders.  McClernand,  fol 
lowing  a  good  road, 
pushed  on  rapidly  to 
the  high  grounds  on  the 
right.  The  appearance 
of  his  column  in  the 
valley  covered  by  the 
two  Confederate  batter 
ies  provoked  a  furious 
shelling  from  them.  On 
the  double-quick  his 
men  passed  through  it ;  and  when,  in  the  wood  beyond,  they  resumed  the 
route-step  and  saw  that  nobody  was  hurt,  they  fell  to  laughing  at  them 
selves.  The  real  baptism  of  fire  was  yet  in  store  for  them. 

When  McClernand  arrived  at  his  appointed  place  and  extended  his  brigades, 
it  was  discovered  that  the  Confederate  outworks  offered  a  front  too  great  for 
him  to  envelop.  To  attempt  to  rest  his  right  opposite  their  extreme  left  would 
necessitate  a  dangerous  attenuation  of  his  line  and  leave  him  without  reserves. 
Over  on  their  left,  moreover,  ran  the  road  already  mentioned  as  passing  from 
Dover  on  the  south  to  Charlotte  and  Nashville,  which  it  was  of  the  highest 
importance  to  close  hermetically  so  that  there  would  be  no  communication 
left  General  Floyd  except  by  the  river.  If  the  road  to  Charlotte  were  left  to 
the  enemy,  they  might  march  out  at  their  pleasure. 

The  insufficiency  of  his  force  was  thus  made  apparent  to  General  Grant, 
and  whether  a  discovery  of  the  moment  or  not,  he  set  about  its  correction. 
He  knew  a  reenf orcement  was  coming  up  the  river  under  convoy  of  Foote ; 
besides  which  a  brigade,  composed  of  the  8th  Missouri  and  the  llth  Indiana 


I.IEUT.-GENERAL    SIMON    B.    BUCKNER,  C.   S.    A.      FROM    A  PHOTOGRAPH. 


THE  CAPTURE  OF  FORT  DONELSON. 


409 


infantry  and  Battery  A,  Illinois,  had  been  left  behind  at  Forts  Henry  and 
Herman  under  myself.  A  courier  was  dispatched  to  me  with  an  order  to 
bring  my  command  to  Donelson.  I  .ferried  my  troops  across  the  Tennessee 
in  the  night,  and  reported  with  them  at  headquarters  before  noon  the  next 
day.  The  brigade  was  transferred  to  General  Smith;  at  the  same  time  an 
order  was  put  into  my  hand  assigning  me  to  command  the  Third  Division, 
which  was  conducted  to  a  position  between  Smith  and  McClernand,  enabling 
the  latter  to  extend  his  line  well  to  the  left  and  cover  the  road  to  Charlotte. 

Thus  on  the  14th  of  February  the  Confederates  were  completely  invested, 
except  that  the  river  above  Dover  remained  to  them.  The  supineness  of 
General  Floyd  all  this  while  is  to  this  day  incomprehensible.  A  vigorous 
attack  on  the  morning  of  the  13th  might  have  thrown  Grant  back  upon  Fort 
Henry.  Such  an  achievement  would  have  more  than  offset  Foote's  conquest. 
The  morale  to 
be  gained  would 
have  alone  justi 
fied  the  attempt. 
But  with  McCler- 
nand's  strong  di 
vision  on  the 
right,  my  own  in 
the  center,  and  C. 
F.  Smith's  on  the 
left,  the  opportu 
nity  was  gone.  On 
the  side  of  Gen 
eral  Grant,  the 
possession  of  the 
river  was  all  that 
was  wanting ; 
with  that  Grant 
could  force  the 
fighting,  or  wait 
the  certain  ap 
proach  of  the 
grimmest  enemy 
of  the  besieged 
—  starvation. 

It  is  now  —  morning  of  the  14th  —  easy  to  see  and  understand  with  some 
thing  more  than  approximate  exactness  the  oppositions  of  the  two  forces. 
Smith  is  on  the  left  of  the  Union  army  opposite  Buckner.  My  division,  in 
the  center,  confronts  Colonels  Heiman,  Drake,  and  Davidson,  each  with  a 
brigade.  McClernand,  now  well  over  on  the  right,  keeps  the  road  to  Char 
lotte  and  Nashville  against  the  major  part  of  Pillow's  left  wing.  The  infantry 
on  both  sides  are  in  cover  behind  the  crests  of  the  hills  or  in  thick  woods, 
listening  to  the  ragged  fusillade  which  the  sharp-shooters  and  skirmishers 


DOVER  TAVERN — GENERAL  BDCKNER'S  HEADQUARTERS  AND  THE  SCENE  OF 
THE  SURRENDER.   FROM  A  PHOTOGRAPH  TAKEN  IN  1884. 


THE  CAPTURE  OF  FORT  DONELSON. 


MAJOR-GENERAL  MORGAN    L.    SMITH.      FROM  A  PHOTOGRAPH. 


maintain  against  each  other  al 
most  without  intermission.  There 
is  little  pause  in  the  exchange  of 
shells  and  round  shot.  The  care 
ful  chiefs  have  required  their  men 
to  lie  down.  In  brief,  it  looks  as 
if  each  party  were  inviting  the 
other  to  begin. 

These  circumstances,  the  sharp- 
shooting  and  cannonading,  ugly 
as  they  may  seem  to  one  who 
thinks  of  them  under  comfort 
able  surroundings,  did  in  fact 
serve  a  good  purpose  the  day  in 
question  in  helping  the  men  to 
forget  their  sufferings  of  the 
night  before.  It  must  be  remem 
bered  that  the  weather  had 
changed  during  the  preceding 
afternoon :  from  suggestions  of 
spring  it  turned  to  intensified 
winter.  From  lending  a  gentle  hand  in  bringing  Foote  and  his  iron-clads 
up  the  river,  the  wind  whisked  suddenly  around  to  the  north  and  struck 
both  armies  with  a  sform  of  mixed  rain,  snow,  and  sleet.  All  night  the 
tempest  blew  mercilessly  upon  the  unsheltered,  tireless  soldier,  making 
sleep  impossible.  Inside  the  works,  nobody  had  overcoats;  while  thou 
sands  of  those  outside  had  marched  from  Fort  Henry  as  to  a  summer  fete, 
leaving  coats,  blankets,  and  knapsacks  behind  them  in  the  camp.  More 
than  one  stout  fellow  has  since  admitted,  with  a  laugh,  that  nothing  was  so 
helpful  to  him  that  horrible  night  as  the  thought  that  the  wind,  which  seemed 
about  to  turn  his  blood  into  icicles,  was  serving  the  enemy  the  same  way ; 
they,  too,  had  to  stand  out  and  take  the  blast.  Let  us  now  go  back  to  the 
preceding  day,  and  bring  up  an  incident  of  McClernand's  swing  into  position. 
About  the  center  of  the  Confederate  outworks  there  was  a  V-shaped  hill, 
marked  sharply  by  a  ravine  on  its  right  and  another  on  its  left.  This  Col 
onel  Heiman  occupied  with  his  brigade  of  five  regiments  —  all  of  Tennessee 
but  one.  The  front  presented  was  about  2500  feet.  In  the  angle  of  the  V,  on 
the  summit  of  the  hill,  Captain  Maney's  battery,  also  of  Tennessee,  had  been 
planted.  Without  protection  of  any  kind,  it  nevertheless  completely  swept 
a  large  field  to  the  left,  across  which  an  assaulting  force  would  have  to  come 
in  order  to  get  at  Heiman  or  at  Drake,  next  on  the  south. 

Maney,  on  the  point  of  the  hill,  had  been  active  throughout  the  preceding 
afternoon,  and  had  succeeded  in  drawing  the  fire  of  some  of  McClernand's 
guns.  The  duel  lasted  until  night.  Next  morning  it  was  renewed  with 
increased  sharpness,  Maney  being  assisted  on  his  right  by  Graves's  battery 
of  Buckner's  division,  and  by  some  pieces  of  Drake's  on  his  left. 


THE  CAPTURE  OF  FORT  DONELSON. 


411 


McClemand's  advance  was  necessarily  slow  and  trying.  This  was  not 
merely  a  logical  result  of  uiiacquaintance  with  the  country  and  the  disposi 
tions  of  the  enemy ;  he  was  also  unde.r  an  order  from.  General  Grant  to  avoid 
everything  calculated  to  bring  on  a  general  engagement.  In  Maney's  well- 
served  guns  he  undoubtedly  found  serious  annoyance,  if  not  a  positive 
obstruction.  Concentrating  guns  of  his  own  upon  the  industrious  Confeder 
ate,  he  at  length  fancied  him  silenced  and  the  enemy's  infantry  on  the  right 
thrown  into  confusion  —  circumstances  from  which  he  hastily  deduced  a 
favorable  chance  to  deliver  an  assault.  For  that  purpose  he  reenforced  his 
Third  Brigade,  which  was  nearest  the  offending  battery,  and  gave  the  neces 
sary  orders. 

Up  to  this  time,  it  will  be  observed,  there  had  not  been  any  fighting  involv 
ing  infantry  in  line.  This  was  now  to  be  changed.  Old  soldiers,  rich  with 
experience,  would  have  regarded  the 
work  proposed  with  gravity ;  they 
would  have  shrewdly  cast  up  an  ac 
count  of  the  chances  of  success,  not 
to  speak  of  the  chances  of  coming  out 
alive ;  they  would  have  measured  the 
distance  to  be  passed,  every  foot  of 
it,  under  the  guns  of  three  batteries, 
Maney's  in  the  center,  Graves's  on  their 
left,  and  Drake's  on  their  right  —  a 
direct  line  of  fire  doubly  crossed.  Xor 
would  they  have  omitted  the  recep 
tion  awaiting  them  from  the  rifle-pits. 
They  were  to  descend  a  hill  entangled 
for  two  hundred  yards  with  under 
brush,  climb  an  opposite  ascent  partly 
shorn  of  timber;  make  way  through  an  abatis  of  tree-tops;  then,  sup 
posing  all  that  successfully  accomplished,  they  would  be  at  last  in  face  of 
an  enemy  whom  it  was  possible  to  reenforce  with  all  the  reserves  of  the 
garrison  —  with  the  whole  garrison,  if  need  be.  A  veteran  would  have 
surveyed  the  three  regiments  selected  for  the  honorable  duty  with  many 
misgivings.  Not  so  the  men  themselves.  They  were  not  old  soldiers. 
Recruited  but  recently  from  farms  and  shops,  they  accepted  the  assign 
ment  heartily  and  with  youthful  confidence  in  their  prowess.  It  may  be 
doubted  if  a  man  in  the  ranks  gave  a  thought  to  the  questions,  whether 
the  attack  was  to  be  supported  while  making,  or  followed  up  if  successful, 
or  whether  it  was  part  of  a  general  advance.  Probably  the  most  they  knew 
was  that  the  immediate  objective  before  them  was  the  capture  of  the  bat 
tery  on  the  hill. 

The  line  when  formed  stood  thus  from  the  right :  the  49th  Illinois,  then  the 
17th,  and  then  the  48th,  Colonel  Hay  me.  At  the  last  moment,  a  question  of 
seniority  arose  between  Colonels  Morrison  and  Haynie.  The  latter  was  of 
opinion  that  he  was  the  ranking  officer.  Morrison  replied  that  he  would 


MAJOR-GENKRAL  C.   I".    SMITH.      FROM   A  J'HOTOGRAl'H. 


4i2  THE  CAPTURE  OF  FORT  DONELSON. 

conduct  the  brigade  to  the  point  from  which  the  attack  was  to  be  made,  after 
which  Haynie  might  take  the  command,  if  he  so  desired. 

Down  the  hill  the  three  regiments  went,  crashing  and  tearing  through  the 
undergrowth.  Heiman,  on  the  lookout,  saw  them  advancing.  Before  they 
cleared  the  woods,  Maney  opened  with  shells.  At  the  foot  of  the  descent,  in 
the  valley,  Graves  joined  his  fire  to  Maney's.  There  Morrison  reported  to 
Haynie,  who  neither  accepted  nor  refused  the  command.  Pointing  to  the 
hill,  he  merely  said,  "  Let  us  take  it  together."  Morrison  turned  away,  and 
rejoined  his  own  regiment.  Here  was  confusion  in  the  beginning,  or  worse, 
an  assault  begun  without  a  head.  Nevertheless,  the  whole  line  went  forward. 
On  a  part  of  the  hillside  the  trees  were  yet  standing.  The  open  space  fell  to 
Morrison  and  his  49th,  and  paying  the  penalty  of  the  exposure,  he  outstripped 
his  associates.  The  men  fell  rapidly ;  yet  the  living  rushed  on  and  up,  firing 
as  they  went.  The  battery  was  the  common  target.  Maney's  gunners,  in 
relief  against  the  sky,  were  shot  down  in  quick  succession.  His  first  lieuten 
ant  (Burns)  was  one  of  the  first  to  suffer.  His  second  lieutenant  (Massie)  was 
mortally  wounded.  Maney  himself  was  hit;  still  he  staid,  and  his  guns 
continued  their  punishment ;  and  still  the  farmer  lads  and  shop  boys  of  Illi 
nois  clung  to  their  purpose.  With  marvelous  audacity  they  pushed  through 
the  abatis  and  reached  a  point  within  forty  yards  of  the  rifle-pits.  It  actu 
ally  looked  as  if  the  prize  were  theirs.  The  yell  of  victory  was  rising  in  their 
throats.  Suddenly  the  long  line  of  yellow  breastworks  before  them,  covering 
Heiman's  five  regiments,  crackled  and  turned  into  flame.  The  forlorn-hope 
stopped  —  staggered  —  braced  up  again  —  shot  blindly  through  the  smoke  at 
the  smoke  of  the  new  enemy,  secure  in  his  shelter.  Thus  for  fifteen  minutes 
the  Illinoisans  stood  fighting.  The  time  is  given  on  the  testimony  of  the 
opposing  leader  himself.  Morrison  was  knocked  out  of  his  saddle  by  a  mus 
ket-ball,  and  disabled ;  then  the  men  went  down  the  hill.  At  its  foot  they 
rallied  round  their  flags  and  renewed  the  assault.  Pushed  down  again,  again 
they  rallied,  and  a  third  time  climbed  to  the  enemy.  This  time  the  battery 
set  fire  to  the  dry  leaves  on  the  ground,  and  the  heat  and  smoke  became 
stifling.  It  was  not  possible  for  brave  men  to  endure  more.  Slowly,  sullenly, 
frequently  pausing  to  return  a  shot,  they  went  back  for  the  last  time ;  and 
in  going  their  ears  and  souls  were  riven  with  the  shrieks  of  their  wounded 
comrades,  whom  the  flames  crept  down  upon  and  smothered  and  charred 
where  they  lay. 

Considered  as  a  mere  exhibition  of  courage,  this  assault,  long  maintained 
against  odds, — twice  repulsed,  twice  renewed, — has  been  seldom  excelled. 
One  hundred  and  forty-nine  men  of  the  17th  and  49th  were  killed  and 
wounded.  Haynie  reported  1  killed  and  8  wounded. 

There  are  few  things  connected  with  the  operations  against  Fort  Donelsori 
so  relieved  of  uncertainty  as  this :  that  when  General  Grant  at  Fort  Henry 
became  fixed  in  the  resolution  to  undertake  the  movement,  his  primary  object 
was  the  capture  of  the  force  to  which  the  post  was  intrusted.  To  effect  their 
complete  environment,  he  relied  upon  Flag-Officer  Foote  and  his  gun-boats, 
whose  astonishing  success  at  Fort  Henry  justified  the  extreme  of  confidence. 


THE  CAPTURE  OF  FORT  DONELSON. 


413 


THE    CHISP    FARM — GENERAL   GHANT'8 
HEADQUARTERS. 


FRONT   VIEW    OF    MRS.   CRISP'S    HOUSE. 
FROM  PHOTOGRAPHS  TAKEN  IN  1884. 


Foote  arrived  011  the  14th,  and 
made  haste  to  enter  upon  his  work. 
The  Carondelet  (Commander  Walke) 
had  been  in  position  since  the  12th. 
Behind  a  low  output  of  the  shore, 
for  two  days,  she  maintained  a  fire 
from  her  rifled  guns,  happily  of 
greater  range  than  the  best  of  those 
of  the  enemy. 

At  9  o'clock  on  the  14th,  Captain 
Culbertson,  looking  from  the  para 
pet  of  the  upper  battery,  beheld  the  river  below  the  first  bend  full  of  transports, 
landing  troops  under  cover  of  a  fresh  arrival  of  gun-boats.  The  disembarka 
tion  concluded,  Foote  was  free.  He  waited  until  noon.  The  captains  in  the 
batteries  mistook  his  deliberation  for  timidity.  The  impinging  of  their  shot 
on  his  iron  armor  was  heard  distinctly  in  the  fort  a  mile  and  a  half  away. 
The  captains  began  to  doubt  if  he  would  come  at  all.  But  at  3  o'clock 
the  boats  took  position  under  fire :  the  Louisville  011  the  right,  the  St.  Louis 
next,  then  the  Pittsburgh,  then  the  Carondelet,  all  iron-clad. 

Five  hundred  yards  from  the  batteries,  and  yet  Foote  was  not  content !  In 
the  Crimean  war  the  allied  French  and  English  fleets,  of  much  mightier  ships, 
undertook  to  engage  the  Russian  shore  batteries,  but  little  stronger  than  those 
at  Donelson.  The  French  on  that  occasion  stood  off  1800  yards.  Lord  Lyons 
fought  his  Agamemnon  at  a  distance  of  800  yards.  Foote  forged  ahead  within 
400  yards  of  his  enemy,  and  was  still  going  on.  His  boat  had  been  hit 
between  wind  and  water;  so  with  the  Pittsburgh  and  Carondelet.  About  the 
guns  the  floors  were  slippery  with  blood,  and  both  surgeons  and  carpenters 
were  never  so  busy.  Still  the  four  boats  kept  on,  and  there  was  great  cheer 
ing;  for  not  only  did  the  fire  from  the  shore  slacken;  the  lookouts  reported 
the  enemy  running.  It  seemed  that  fortune  would  smile  once  more  upon  the 
fleet,  and  cover  the  honors  of  Fort  Henry  afresh  at  Fort  Donelson.  Unhap 
pily,  when  about  350  yards  off  the  hill  a  solid  shot  plunged  through  the  pilot 
house  of  the  flag-ship,  and  carried  away  the  wheel.  Near  the  same  time  the 


414 


THE  CAPTURE  OF  FORT  DONELSON. 


tiller-ropes  of  the  Louisville  were  disabled.  Both  vessels  became  unmanage 
able  and  began  floating  down  the  current.  The  eddies  turned  them  round  like 
logs.  The  Pittsburgh  and  Carondelet  closed  in  and  covered  them  with  their  hulls. 

Seeing  this  turn  in  the  fight,  the  captains  of  the  batteries  rallied  their  men, 
who  cheered  in  their  turn,  and  renewed  the  contest  with  increased  will  and 
energy.  A  ball  got  lodged  in  their  best  rifle.  A  corporal  and  some  of  his 
men  took  a  log  fitting  the  bore,  leaped  out  on  the  parapet,  and  rammed  the 
missile  home.  "  Now,  boys,"  said  a  gunner  in  Bid  well's  battery,  "see  me  take 
a  chimney ! "  The  flag  of  the  boat  and  the  chimney  fell  with  the  shot. 

When  the  vessels  were  out  of  range,  the  victors  looked  about  them.  The 
fine  form  of  their  embrasures  was  gone ;  heaps  of  earth  had  been  cast  over 
their  platforms.  In  a  space  of  twenty-four  feet  they  had  picked  up  as  many 
shot  and  shells.  The  air  had  been  full  of  flying  missiles.  For  an  hour  and  a 
half  the  brave  fellows  had  been  rained  upon ;  yet  their  losses  had  been  trifling 
in  numbers.  Each  gunner  had  selected  a  ship  and  followed  her  faithfully 
throughout  the  action,  now  and  then  uniting  fire  on  the  Carondelet.  The  Con 
federates  had  behaved  with  astonishing  valor.  Their  victory  sent  a  thrill  of 
joy  through  the  army.  The  assault  on  the  outworks,  the  day  before,  had 
been  a  failure.  With  the  repulse  of  the  gun-boats  the  Confederates  scored 
success  number  two,  and  the  communication  by  the  river  remained  open  to 
Nashville.  The  winds  that  blew  sleet  and  snow  over  Donelson  that  night 
were  not  so  unendurable  as  they 
might  have  been. 

The  night  of  the  14th  of  Febru- 
ary  fell  cold  and  dark,  and  under 
the  pitiless  sky  the  armies  re 
mained  in  position  so  near  to  each 
other  that  neither  dared  light 
fires.  Overpowered  with  watching, 


THE    POSITION    OF  THE    GUN-BOATS    AND    THE    WEST    BANK.      FROM  A   PHOTOGRAPH    TAKEN    IN    1884. 

Fort  Donelson  is  in  the  farther  distance  on  the  extreme  left  —  Hickman's  Creek  empties  into  the  Cumberland  in 

the  middle  distance  —  midway  are  the  remains  of  the  obstructions  placed  in  the  river  by  the  Confederates. 

The  upper  picture,  showing  Isaac  Williams's  house,  is  a  continuation  of  the  right  of  the  lower  view. 


THE  CAPTURE  OF  FORT  DONELSON.  415 

fatigue,  and  the  lassitude  of  spirits  which  always  follows  a  strain  upon 
the  faculties  of  men  like  that  which  is  the  concomitant  of  battle,  thousands 
on  both  sides  lay  down  in  the  elite Jies  and  behind  logs  and  whatever  else 
would  in  the  least  shelter  them  from  the  cutting  wind,  and  tried  to  sleep- 
Very  few  closed  their  eyes.  Even  the  horses,  after  their  manner,  betrayed 
the  suffering  they  were  enduring. 

That  morning  General  Floyd  had  called  a  council  of  his  chiefs  of  brigades 
and  divisions.  He  expressed  the  opinion  that  the  post  was  untenable,  except 
with  fifty  thousand  troops.  He  called  attention  to  the  heavy  reinforcements 
of  the  Federals,  and  suggested  an  immediate  attack  upon  their  right  wing  to 
reopen  land  communication  with  Nashville,  by  way  of  Charlotte.  The  pro 
posal  was  agreed  to  unanimously.  General  Buckner  proceeded  to  make  dis 
positions  to  cover  the  retreat,  in  the  event  the  sortie  should  be  successful. 
Shortly  after  noon,  when  the  movement  should  have  begun,  the  order  was 
countermanded  at  the  instance  of  Pillow.  Then  came  the  battle  with  the 
gun-boats. 

In  the  night  the  council  was  recalled,  with  general  and  regimental  officers 
in  attendance.  The  situation  was  again  debated,  and  the  same  conclusion 
reached.  According  to  the  plan  resolved  upon,  Pillow  was  to  move  at  dawn 
with  his  whole  division,  and  attack  the  right  of  the  besiegers.  General 
Buckner  was  to  be  relieved  by  troops  in  the  forts,  and  with  his  command  to 
support  Pillow  by  assailing  the  right  of  the  enemy's  center.  If  he  succeeded, 
he  was  to  take  post  outside  the  intrenchments  on  the  Wynn's  Ferry  road  to 
cover  the  retreat.  He  was  then  to  act  as  rear-guard.  Thus  early,  leaders  in 
Donelson  were  aware  of  the  mistake  into  which  they  were  plunged.  Their 
resolution  was  wise  and  heroic.  Let  us  see  how  they  executed  it. 

Preparations  for  the  attack  occupied  the  night.  The  troops  for  the  most 
part  were  taken  out  of  the  rifle-pits  and  massed  over  on  the  left  to  the 
number  of  ten  thousand  or  more.  The  ground  was  covered  with  ice  and 
snow;  yet  the  greatest  silence  was  observed.  It  seems  incomprehensible 
that  columns  mixed  of  all  arms,  infantry,  cavalry,  and  artillery,  could  have 
engaged  in  simultaneous  movement,  and  not  have  been  heard  by  some  listener 
outside.  One  would  think  the  jolting  and  rumble  of  the  heavy  gun-carriages 
would  have  told  the  story.  But  the  character  of  the  night  must  be  remem 
bered.  The  pickets  of  the  Federals  were  struggling  for  life  against  the  blast, 
and  probably  did  not  keep  good  watch. 

Oglesby's  brigade  held  McClernand's  extreme  right.  Here  and  there  the 
musicians  were  beginning  to  make  the  woods  ring  with  reveille,  and  the 
numbed  soldiers  of  the  line  were  rising  from  their  icy  beds  and  shaking  the 
snow  from  their  frozen  garments.  As  yet,  however,  not  a  company  had 
"fallen  in."  Suddenly  the  pickets  fired,  and  with  the  alarm  on  their  lips 
rushed  back  upon  their  comrades.  The  woods  on  the  instant  became  alive. 

The  regiments  formed,  officers  mounted  and  took  their  places ;  words  of 
command  rose  loud  and  eager.  By  the  time  Pillow's  advance  opened  fire  on 
Oglesby's  right,  the  point  first  struck,  the  latter  was  fairly  formed  to  receive 
it.  A  rapid  exchange  of  volleys  ensued.  The  distance  intervening  between 


416 


THE  CAPTURE  OF  FORT  DONELSON.  417 

the  works  on  one  side  and  the  bivouac  on  the  other  was  so  short  that  the 
action  began  before  Pillow  could  effect  a  deployment.  His  brigades  came 
up  in  a  kind  of  echelon,  left  in  front,. and  passed  "  by  regiments  left  into  line," 
one  by  one,  however;  the  regiments  quickly  took  their  places,  and  advanced 
without  halting.  Oglesby's  Illirioisans  were  now  fully  awake.  They  held 
their  ground,  returning  in  full  measure  the  fire  that  they  received.  The 
Confederate  Forrest  rode  around  as  if  to  get  in  their  rear,  Ji  and  it  was  then 
give  and  take,  infantry  against  infantry.  The  semi-echelon  movement  of  the 
Confederates  enabled  them,  after  an  interval,  to  strike  W.  H.  L.  AVallace's 
brigade,  on  Oglesby's  left.  Soon  Wallace  was  engaged  along  his  whole  front, 
now  prolonged  by  the  addition  to  his  command  of  Morrison's  regiments. 
The  first  charge  against  him  was  repulsed ;  whereupon  he  advanced  to  the 
top  of  the  rising  ground  behind  which  he  had  sheltered  his  troops  in  the 
night.  A  fresh  assault  followed,  but,  aided  by  a  battery  across  the  valley  to 
his  left,  he  repulsed  the  enemy  a  second  time.  His  men  were  steadfast,  and 
clung  to  the  brow  of  the  hill  as  if  it  were  theirs  by  holy  right.  An  hour 
passed,  and  yet  another  hour,  without  cessation  of  the  fire.  Meantime  the 
woods  rang  with  a  monstrous  clangor  of  musketry,  as  if  a  million  men  were 
beating  empty  barrels  with  iron  hammers. 

Buckner  flung  a  portion  of  his  division  on  McClernand's  left,  and  sup 
ported  the  attack  with  his  artillery.  The  enfilading  fell  chiefly  on  W.  H.  L. 
Wallace.  McClernand,  watchful  and  full  of  resources,  sent  batteries  to  meet 
Buckner's  batteries.  To  that  duty  Taylor  rushed  with  his  Company  B ;  and 
McAllister  pushed  his  three  24-pounders  into  position  and  exhausted  his 
ammunition  in  the  duel.  The  roar  never  slackened.  Men  fell  by  the  score, 
reddening  the  snow  with  their  blood.  The  smoke,  in  pallid  white  clouds, 
clung  to  the  underbrush  and  tree-tops  as  if  to  screen  the  combatants  from 
each  other.  Close  to  the  ground  the  flame  of  musketry  and  cannon  tinted 
everything  a  lurid  red.  Limbs  dropped  from  the  trees  on  the  heads  below, 
and  the  thickets  were  shorn  as  by  an  army  of  cradlers.  The  division  was 
under  peremptory  orders  to  hold  its  position  to  the  last  extremity,  and 
Colonel  Wallace  was  equal  to  the  emergency. 

It  was  now  10  o'clock,  and  over  on  the  right  Oglesby  was  beginning  to  fare 
badly.  The  pressure  on  his  front  grew  stronger.  The  "rebel  yell,"  after 
ward  a  familiar  battle-cry  on  many  fields,  told  of  ground  being  gained  against 
him.  To  add  to  his  doubts,  officers  were  riding  to  him  with  a  sickening  story 
that  their  commands  were  getting  out  of  ammunition,  and  asking  where  they 
could  go  for  a  supply.  All  he  could  say  was  to  take  what  was  in  the  boxes 
of  the  dead  and  wounded.  At  last  he  realized  that  the  end  was  come.  His 
right  companies  began  to  give  way,  and  as  they  retreated,  holding  up  their 
empty  cartridge-boxes,  the  enemy  were  emboldened,  and  swept  more  fiercely 
around  his  flank,  until  finally  they  appeared  in  his  rear.  He  then  gave  the 
order  to  retire  the  division. 

])  Colonel  John  McArthur,  originally  of  General  comfited,  his  men  beat  the  cavalry  off,  and  after- 

C.  F.  Smith's  division,  but  then  operating  with  ward  shared  the  full  shock  of  the  tempest  with 

McClernand,  was  there,  and  though  at  first  dis-  Oglesby's  troops. —  L.  W. 
VOL.  I.    27 


THE  CAPTURE  OF  FORT  DONELSON. 


W.  H.  L.  Wallace  from  his  position  looked  off  to  his  right  and  saw  but  one 
regiment  of  Oglesby's  in  place,  maintaining  the  fight,  and  that  was  John  A. 
Logan's  31st  Illinois.  Through  the  smoke  he  could  see  Logan  riding  in  a  gal 
lop  behind  his  line ;  through  the  roar  in  his  front  and  the  rising  yell  in  his 
rear,  he  could  hear  Logan's  voice  in  fierce  entreaty  to  his  "  boys."  Near  the 
31st  stood  W.  H.  L.  Wallace's  regiment,  the  llth  Illinois,  under  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  Ransom.  The  gaps  in  the  ranks  of  the  two  were  closed  up  always 
toward  the  colors.  The  ground  at  their  feet  was  strewn  with  their  dead  and 
wounded ;  at  length  the  common  misfortune  overtook  Logan.  To  keep  men 
without  cartridges  under  fire  sweeping  them  front  and  flank  would  be  cruel, 
if  not  impossible ;  and  seeing  it,  he  too  gave  the  order  to  retire,  and  followed 
his  decimated  companies  to  the  rear.  The  llth  then  became  the  right  of  the 
brigade,  and  had  to  go  in  turn.  Nevertheless,  Ransom  changed  front  to  rear 
coolly,  as  if  on  parade,  and  joined  in  the  general  retirement.  Forrest  charged 
them  and  threw  them  into  a  brief  confusion.  The  greater  portion  clung  to 
their  colors,  and  made  good  their  retreat.  By  11  o'clock  Pillow  held  the  road 

to  Charlotte  and  the 
whole  of  the  position 
occupied  at  dawn  by 
the  First  Division,  and 
with  it  the  dead  and 
all  the  wounded  who 
could  not  get  away. 

Pillow's  part  of  the 
programme,  arranged 
in  the  council  of  the 
night  before,  was  ac 
complished.  The  coun 
try  was  once  more 
open  to  Floyd.  Why 
did  he  not  avail  him 
self  of  the  dearly 
bought  opportunity, 
and  march  his  army 
out? 

Without  pausing  to 
consider  whether  the 
Confederate  general 
could  now  have  es 
caped  with  his  troops, 
it  must  be  evident  that 
he  should  have  made  the  effort.  Pillow  had  discharged  his  duty  well.  With 
the  disappearance  of  W.  H.  L.  Wallace's  brigade,  it  only  remained  for  the 
victor  to  deploy  his  regiments  into  column  and  march  into  the  country. 
The  road  was  his.  Buckner  was  in  position  to  protect  Colonel  Head's  with 
drawal  from  the  trenches  opposite  General  Smith  on  the  right ;  that  done, 


BRANCH    OF    HICKMAN'S    CREEK    NEAR   JAMES    CRISP'S   HOUSE  —  THE    LEFT 
OF  GENERAL  C.  F.  SMITH'S  LINE.      FROM  A  PHOTOGRAPH  TAKEN  IN  1884. 


THE  CAPTURE  OF  FORT  DON  ELS  ON. 


MCALLISTER'S  BATTERY  is  ACTION'. 


Captain  Edward  McAllister's  Illinois  battery  did  good 
service  on  the  13th.  In  his  report  he  describes  the  man 
ner  of  working  the  battery :  "  I  selected  a  point,  and 
about  noon  opened  on  the  four-gun  battery  [see  map, 
page  402]  through  an  opening  in  which  I  could  see  the 
foe.  Our  lire  was  promptly  returned  with  such  preci 
sion  that  they  cut  our  right  wheel  on  howitzer  number 


three  in  two.  I  had  no  spare  wheel,  and  had  to  take  one 
off  the  limber  to  continue  the  tight.  I  then  moved  all  nay 
howitzers  over  to  the  west  slope  of  the  ridge  and  loaded 
under  cover  of  it,  and  ran  the  pieces  up  by  hand  until  I 
could  get  the  exact  elevation.  The  recoil  would  throw 
the  guns  back  out  of  sight,  and  thus  we  continued  the 
fight  until  the  enemy's  battery  was  silenced." 


he  was  also  in  position  to  cover  the  retreat.     Buckner  had  also  faithfully 
performed  his  task. 

On  the  Union  side  the  situation  at  this  critical  time  was  favorable  to  the 
proposed  retirement.  My  division  in  the  center  was  weakened  by  the  dis 
patch  of  one  of  my  brigades  to  the  assistance  of  General  McClernand;  in 
addition  to  which  my  orders  were  to  hold  my  position.  As  a  point  of  still 
greater  importance,  General  Grant  had  gone  on  board  the  St.  Louis  at  the 
request  of  Flag-Officer  Foote,  and  he  was  there  in  consultation  with  that 
officer,  presumably  uninformed  of  the  disaster  which  had  befallen  his  right. 
It  would  take  a  certain  time  for  him  to  return  to  the  field  and  dispose  his 
forces  for  pursuit.  It  may  be  said  with  strong  assurance,  consequently,  that 
Floyd  could  have  put  his  men  fairly  en  route  for  Charlotte  before  the  Federal 
commander  could  have  interposed  an  obstruction  to  the  movement.  The  real 
difficulty  was  in  the  hero  of  the  morning,  who  now  made  haste  to  blight  his 
laurels.  General  Pillow's  vanity  whistled  itself  into  ludicrous  exaltation. 
Imagining  General  Grant's  whole  army  defeated  and  fleeing  in  rout  for  Fort 
Henry  and  the  transports  on  the  river,  he  deported  himself  accordingly.  He 
began  by  ignoring  Floyd.  He  rode  to  Buckner  and  accused  him  of  shameful 


420  THE  CAPTURE  OF  FORT  DONELSON. 

conduct.  He  sent  an  aide  to  the  nearest  telegraph  station  with  a  dispatch  to 
Albert  Sidney  Johnston,  then  in  command  of  the  Department,  asseverating, 
"  on  the  honor  of  a  soldier,"  that  the  day  was  theirs.  Nor  did  he  stop  at  that. 
The  victory,  to  be  available,  required  that  the  enemy  should  be  followed  with 
energy.  Such  was  a  habit  of  Napoleon.  Without  deigning  even  to  consult 
his  chief,  he  ordered  Buckner  to  move  out  and  attack  the  Federals.  There 
was  a  gorge,  up  which  a  road  ran  toward  our  central  position,  or  rather  what 
had  been  our  central  position.  Pointing  to  the  gorge  and  the  road,  he  told 
Buckner  that  was  his  way  and  bade  him  attack  in  force.  There  was  nothing 
to  do  but  obey ;  and  when  Buckner  had  begun  the  movement,  the  wise  pro 
gramme  decided  upon  the  evening  before  was  wiped  from  the  slate. 

When  Buckner  reluctantly  took  the  gorge  road  marked  out  for  him  by 
Pillow,  the  whole  Confederate  army,  save  the  detachments  on  the  works,  was 
virtually  in  pursuit  of  McClernand,  retiring  by  the  Wynn's  Ferry  road  — 
falling  back,  in  fact,  upon  my  position.  My  division  was  now  to  feel  the 
weight  of  Pillow's  hand ;  if  they  should  fail,  the  fortunes  of  the  day  would 
depend  upon  the  veteran  Smith. 

When  General  McClernand  perceived  the  peril  threatening  him  in  the 
morning,  he  sent  an  officer  to  me  with  a  request  for  assistance.  This  request 
I  referred  to  General  Grant,  who  was  at  the  time  in  consultation  with  Foote. 
Upon  the  turning  of  Oglesby's  flank,  McClernand  repeated  his  request,  with 
such  a  representation  of  the  situation  that,  assuming  the  responsibility,  I 
ordered  Colonel  Cruft  to  report  with  his  brigade  to  McClernand.  Cruft  set 
out  promptly.  Unfortunately  a  guide  misdirected  him,  so  that  he  became 
involved  in  the  retreat,  and  was  prevented  from  accomplishing  his  object. 

I  was  in  the  rear  of  my  single  remaining  brigade,  in  conversation  with 
Captain  Rawlins,  of  Grant's  staff,  when  a  great  shouting  was  heard  behind 
me  on  the  Wynn's  Ferry  road,  whereupon  I  sent  an  orderly  to  ascertain  the 
cause.  The  man  reported  the  road  and  woods  full  of  soldiers  apparently  in 
rout.  An  officer  then  rode  by  at  full  speed,  shouting,  "All's  lost!  Save  your 
selves  ! "  A  hurried  consultation  was  had  with  Rawlins,  at  the  end  of  which 
the  brigade  was  put  in  motion  toward  the  enemy's  works,  on  the  very  road 
by  which  Buckner  was  pursuing  under  Pillow's  mischievous  order.  It  hap 
pened  also  that  Colonel  W.  H.  L.  Wallace  had  dropped  into  the  same  road 
with  such  of  his  command  as  staid  by  their  colors.  He  came  up  riding  and 
at  a  walk,  his  leg  over  the  horn  of  his  saddle.  He  was  perfectly  cool,  and 
looked  like  a  farmer  from  a  hard  day's  plowing.  "  Good-morning,"  I  said. 
"  Good-morning,"  was  the  reply.  "Are  they  pursuing  you  1 "  "  Yes."  "  How 
far  are  they  behind ! "  That  instant  the  head  of  my  command  appeared  on 
the  road.  The  colonel  calculated,  then  answered :  "  You  will  have  about 
time  to  form  line  of  battle  right  here."  "  Thank  you.  Good-day."  "  Good- 
day." 

At  that  point  the  road  began  to  dip  into  the  gorge ;  on  the  right  and  left 
there  were  woods,  and  in  front  a  dense  thicket.  An  order  was  dispatched  to 
bring  Battery  A  forward  at  full  speed.  Colonel  John  M.  Thayer,  command 
ing  the  brigade,  formed  it  on  the  double-quick  into  line ;  the  1st  Nebraska 


THE  CAPTURE  OF  FORT  DONELSON. 


421 


and  the  58th  Illinois  011  the  right,  and  the  58th  Ohio,  with  a  detached  com 
pany,  on  the  left.  The  battery  came  up  on  the  run  and  swung  across  the  road, 
which  had  been  left  open  for  it.  Hardly  had  it  unlimbered,  before  the  enemy 
appeared,  and  firing  began.  For  ten  minutes  or  thereabouts  the  scenes  of  the 
morning  were  reenacted.  The  Confederates  struggled  hard  to  perfect  their 
deployments.  The  woods  rang  with  musketry  and  artillery.  The  brush  on 
the  slope  of  the  hill  was  mowed  away  with  bullets.  A  great  cloud  arose  and 


VIEW  ON  THE   LINE  OF  PILLOW'S  DEFENSES  IN  FRONT  OF  MCCLERNAND,   SHOWING  WATER  IN  THE  OLD  TRENCHES. 

FROM    A    PHOTOGRAPH    TAKEN    IN   1884. 

shut  out  the  woods  and  the  narrow  valley  below.  Colonel  Thayer  and  his 
regiments  behaved  with  great  gallantry,  and  the  assailants  fell  back  in  con 
fusion  and  returned  to  the  intrenchnients.  W.  H.  L.  Wallace  and  Oglesby 
re-formed  their  commands  behind  Thayer,  supplied  them  with  ammunition, 
and  stood  at  rest  waiting  for  orders.  There  was  then  a  lull  in  the  battle. 
Even  the  cannonading  ceased,  and  everybody  was  asking,  What  next  ? 

Just  then  General  Grant  rode  up  to  where  General  McClernand  and  I  were 
in  conversation.     He  was  almost  unattended.     In  his  hand  there  were  some 


422  THE  CAPTURE  OF  FORT  DONELSON. 

papers,  which  looked  like  telegrams.  Wholly  uiiexcited,  he  saluted  and 
received  the  salutations  of  his  subordinates.  Proceeding  at  once  to  busi 
ness,  he  directed  them  to  retire  their  commands  to  the  heights  out  of  cannon 
range,  and  throw  up  works.  Reinforcements  were  en  route,  he  said,  and  it 
was  advisable  to  await  their  coming.  He  was  then  informed  of  the  mishap 
to  the  First  Division,  and  that  the  road  to  Charlotte  was  open  to  the  enemy. 

In  every  great  man's  career  there  is  a  crisis  exactly  similar  to  that  which 
now  overtook  General  Grant,  and  it  cannot  be  better  described  than  as  a 
crucial  test  of  his  nature.  A  mediocre  person  would  have  accepted  the  news 
as  an  argument  for  persistence  in  his  resolution  to  enter  upon  a  siege.  Had 
General  Grant  done  so,  it  is  very  probable  his  history  would  have  been  then 
and  there  concluded.  His  admirers  and  detractors  are  alike  invited  to  study 
him  at  this  precise  juncture.  It  cannot  be  doubted  that  he  saw  with  painful 
distinctness  the  effect  of  the  disaster  to  his  right  wing.  His  face  flushed 
slightly.  With  a  sudden  grip  he  crushed  the  papers  in  his  hand.  But  in  an 
instant  these  signs  of  disappointment  or  hesitation  —  as  the  reader  pleases — 
cleared  away.  In  his  ordinary  quiet  voice  he  said,  addressing  himself  to  both 
officers,  "Gentlemen,  the  position  on  the  right  must  be  retaken."  With  that 
he  turned  and  galloped  off. 

Seeing  in  the  road  a  provisional  brigade,  under  Colonel  Morgan  L.  Smith, 
consisting  of  the  llth  Indiana  and  the  8th  Missouri  Infantry,  going,  by  order 
of  General  C.  F.  Smith,  to  the  aid  of  the  First  Division,  I  suggested  that  if 
General  McClernand  would  order  Colonel  Smith  to  report  to  me,  I  would 
attempt  to  recover  the  lost  ground;  and  the  order  having  been  given,  I 
reconnoitered  the  hill,  determined  upon  a  place  of  assault,  and  arranged  my 
order  of  attack.  I  chose  Colonel  Smith's  regiments  to  lead,  and  for  that  pur 
pose  conducted  them  to  the  crest  of  a  hill  opposite  a  steep  bluff  covered  by 
the  enemy.  The  two  regiments  had  been  formerly  of  my  brigade.  I  knew 
they  had  been  admirably  drilled  in  the  Zouave  tactics,  and  my  confidence  in 
Smith  and  in  George  F.  McGinnis,  colonel  of  the  llth,  was  implicit.  I  was 
sure  they  would  take  their  men  to  the  top  of  the  bluff.  Colonel  Cruf t  was  put 
in  line  to  support  them  on  the  right.  Colonel  Eoss,  with  his  regiments,  the 
17th  and  49th,  and  the  46th,  57th,  and  58th  Illinois,  were  put  as  support  on 
the  left.  Thayer's  brigade  was  held  in  reserve.  These  dispositions  filled  the 
time  till  about  2  o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  when  heavy  cannonading,  mixed  with 
a  long  roll  of  musketry,  broke  out  over  on  the  left,  whither  it  will  be  necessary 
to  transfer  the  reader. 

The  veteran  in  command  on  the  Union  left  had  contented  himself  with 
allowing  Buckner  no  rest,  keeping  up  a  continual  sharp-shooting.  Early  in 
the  morning  of  the  14th  he  made  a  demonstration  of  assault  with  three  of  his 
regiments,  and  though  he  purposely  withdrew  them,  he  kept  the  menace 
standing,  to  the  great  discomfort  of  his  vis-a-vis.  With  the  patience  of  an 
old  soldier,  he  waited  the  pleasure  of  the  general  commanding,  knowing  that 
when  the  time  came  he  would  be  called  upon.  During  the  battle  of  the  gun 
boats  he  rode  through  his  command  and  grimly  joked  with  them.  He  who 
never  permitted  the  slightest  familiarity  from  a  subordinate,  could  yet  indulge 


THE  CAPTURE  OF  FORT  DONELSON.  423 

in  fatherly  pleasantries  with  the  ranks  when  he  thought  circumstances  jus 
tified  them.  He  never  for  a  moment  doubted  the  courage  of  volunteers ; 
they  were  not  regulars  —  that  was  all.  If  properly  led,  he  believed  they  would 
storm  the  gates  of  his  Satanic  Majesty.  Their  hour  of  trial  was  now  come. 

From  his  brief  and  characteristic  conference  with  McClernaud  and  myself, 
General  Grant  rode  to  General  C.  F.  Smith.  What  took  place  between  them 
is  not  known,  further  than  that  he  ordered  an  assault  upon  the  outworks  as  a 
diversion  in  aid  of  the  assault  about  to  be  delivered  on  the  right.  General 
Smith  personally  directed  his  chiefs  of  brigade  to  get  their  regiments  ready. 
Colonel  John  Cook  by  his  order  increased  the  number  of  his  skirmishers 
already  engaged  with  the  enemy. 

Taking  Lauman's  brigade,  General  Smith  began  the  advance.  They  were 
under  fire  instantly.  The  guns  in  the  fort  joined  in  with  the  infantry  who 
were  at  the  time  in  the  rifle-pits,  the  great  body  of  the  Confederate  right  wing 
being  with  General  Buckner.  The  defense  was  greatly  favored  by  the  ground, 
which  subjected  the  assailants  to  a  double  fire  from  the  beginning  of  the 
abatis.  The  men  have  said  that  "it  looked  too  thick  for  a  rabbit  to  get 
through."  General  Smith,  on  his  horse,  took  position  in  the  front  and  center 
of  the  line.  Occasionally  he  turned  in  the  saddle  to  see  how  the  alignment  was 
kept.  For  the  most  part,  however,  he  held  his  face  steadily  toward  the  enemy. 
He  was,  of  course,  a  conspicuous  object  for  the  sharp-shooters  in  the  rifle-pits. 
The  air  around  him  twittered  with  minie-bullets.  Erect  as  if  on  review,  he 
rode  on,  timing  the  gait  of  his  horse  with  the  movement  of  his  colors.  A 
soldier  said :  "  I  was  nearly  scared  to  death,  but  I  saw  the  old  man's  white 
mustache  over  his  shoulder,  and  went  on." 

On  to  the  abatis  the  regiments  moved  without  hesitation,  leaving  a  trail  of 
dead  and  wounded  behind.  There  the  fire  seemed  to  get  trebly  hot,  and  there 
some  of  the  men  halted,  whereupon,  seeing  the  hesitation,  General  Smith  put 
his  cap  on  the  point  of  his  sword,  held  it  aloft,  and  called  out,  "  No  flinching 
now,  my  lads  ?  —  Here  —  this  is  the  way  !  Come  on  ! "  He  picked  a  path 
through  the  jagged  limbs  of  the  trees,  holding  his  cap  all  the  time  in  sight; 
and  the  effect  was  magical.  The  men  swarmed  in  after  him,  and  got  through 
in  the  best  order  they  could  —  not  all  of  them,  alas  !  On  the  other  side  of  the 
obstruction  they  took  the  semblance  of  re-formation  and  charged  in  after 
their  chief,  who  found  himself  then  between  the  two  fires.  Up  the  ascent  he 
rode ;  up  they  followed.  At  the  last  moment  the  keepers  of  the  rifle-pits 
clambered  out  and  fled.  The  four  regiments  engaged  in  the  feat  —  the  25th 
Indiana,  and  the  2d,  7th,  and  14th  Iowa  —  planted  their  colors  on  the  breast 
work.  Later  in  the  day,  Buckner  came  back  with  his  division ;  but  all  his 
efforts  to  dislodge  Smith  were  vain. 

We  left  my  division  about  to  attempt  the  recapture  of  the  hill,  which  had 
been  the  scene  of  the  combat  between  Pillow  and  McClernand.  If  only  on 
account  of  the  results  which  followed  that  assault,  in  connection  with  the 
heroic  performance  of  General  C.  F.  Smith,  it  is  necessary  to  return  to  it. 

Riding  to  my  old  regiments, —  the  8th  Missouri  and  the  llth  Indiana, —  I 
asked  them  if  they  were  ready.  They  demanded  the  word  of  me.  Waiting 


424 


THE  CAPTURE  OF  FORT  DONELSON. 


a  moment  for  Mor 
gan  L.  Smith  to  light 
a  cigar,  I  called 
out,  "  Forward  it  is, 
then  ! "  They  were 
directly  in  front  of 
the  ascent  to  be 
climbed.  Without 
stopping  for  his  sup 
ports,  Colonel  Smith 
led  them  down  into 
a  broad  hollow,  and 
catching  sight  of  the 
advance,  Cruft  and 
Ross  also  moved  for 
ward.  As  the  two 
regiments  began  the 
climb,  the  8th  Mis 
souri  slightly  in  the 
lead,  a  line  of  fire 
ran  along  the  brow 
of  the  height.  The 
flank  companies 
cheered  while  de 
ploying  as  skirmish 
ers.  Their  Zouave 
practice  proved  of 
excellent  service  to  them.  Now  on  the  ground,  creeping  when  the  fire  was  hot 
test,  running  when  it  slackened,  they  gained  ground  with  astonishing  rapidity, 
and  at  the  same  time  maintained  a  fire  that  was  like  a  sparkling  of  the  earth. 
For  the  most  part  the  bullets  aimed  at  them  passed  over  their  heads  and 
took  effect  in  the  ranks  behind  them.  Colonel  Smith's  cigar  was  shot  off 
close  to  his  lips.  He  took  another  and  called  for  a  match.  A  soldier  ran  and 
gave  him  one.  "  Thank  you.  Take  your  place  now.  We  are  almost  up,"  he 
said,  and,  smoking,  spurred  his  horse  forward.  A  few  yards  from  the  crest 
of  the  height  the  regiments  began  loading  and  firing  as  they  advanced.  The 
defenders  gave  way.  On  the  top  there  was  a  brief  struggle,  which  was  ended 
by  Cruft  and  Ross  with  their  supports. 

The  whole  line  then  moved  forward  simultaneously,  and  never  stopped 
until  the  Confederates  were  within  the  works.  There  had  been  no  occasion 
to  call  on  the  reserves.  The  road  to  Charlotte  was  again  effectually  shut,  and 
the  battle-field  of  the  morning,  with  the  dead  and  wounded  lying  where  they 
had  fallen,  was  in  possession  of  the  Third  Division,  which  stood  halted  within 
easy  musket-range  of  the  rifle-pits.  It  was  then  about  half -past  3  o'clock  in 
the  afternoon.  I  was  reconnoitering  the  works  of  the  enemy  preliminary 
to  charging  them,  when  Colonel  Webster,  of  General  Grant's  staff,  came  to 


MAJOR-GENERAL    GIDEON    J.    PILLOW,    C.   S.    A.       FROM  A  PHOTOGRAPH. 


THE  CAPTURE  OF  FORT  DONELSON. 


42? 


me  and  repeated  the  order  to  fall  back  out  of  cannon  range  and  throw  up 
breastworks.  "  The  general  does  not  know  that  we  have  the  hill,"  I  said. 
Webster  replied :  "  I  give  you  the  order  as  he  gave  it  to  me."  "  Very  well," 
said  I,  "  give  him  my  compliments,  and  say  that  I  have  received  the  order." 
Webster  smiled  and  rode  away.  The  ground  was  not  vacated,  though  the 
assault  was  deferred.  In  assuming  the  responsibility,  I  had  no  doubt  of  my 
ability  to  satisfy  General  Grant  of  the  correctness  of  my  course ;  and  it  was 
subsequently  approved. 

When  night  fell,  the  command  bivouacked  without  fire  or  supper.  Fatigue 
parties  were  told  off  to  look  after  the  wounded ;  and  in  the  relief  given  there 
was  no  distinction  made  between  friend  and  foe.  The  labor  extended  through 
the  whole  night,  and  the  surgeons  never  rested.  By  sunset  the  conditions 
of  the  morning  were  all  restored.  The  Union  commander  was  free  to  order 
a  general  assault  next  day  or  resort  to  a  formal  siege. 

A  great  discouragement  fell  upon  the  brave  men  inside  the  works  that 
night.  Besides  suffering  from  wounds  and  bruises  and  the  dreadful  weather, 
they  were  aware  that  though  they  had  done  their  best  they  were  held  in  a 
close  grip  by  a  superior  enemy.  A  council  of  general  and  field  officers  was 
held  at  headquarters,  which  re 
sulted  111  a  unanimous  resolution 
that  if  the  position  in  front  of 
General  Pillow  had  not  been 
reoccupied  by  the  Federals  in 
strength,  the  army  should  effect 
its  retreat.  A  reconnoissance  was 
ordered  to  make  the  test.  Colonel 
Forrest  conducted  it.  He  report 
ed  that  the  ground  was  not  only 
reoccupied,  but  that  the  enemy 
were  extended  yet  farther  around 
the  Confederate  left.  The  council 
then  held  a  final  session. 

General  Simon  B.  Buckner,  as 
the  junior  officer  present,  gave 
his  opinion  first ;  he  thought  he 
could  not  successfully  resist  the 
assault  which  would  be  made  by 
daylight  by  a  vastly  superior  force. 
But  he  further  remarked,  that 
as  he  understood  the  principal 
object  of  the  defense  of  Donelson  was  to  cover  the  movement  of  General 
Albert  Sidney  Johnston's  army  from  Bowling  Green  to  Nashville,  if  that 
movement  was  not  completed  he  was  of  opinion  that  the  defense  should  be 
continued  at  the  risk  of  the  destruction  of  the  entire  force.  General  Floyd 
replied  that  General  Johnston's  army  had  already  reached  Nashville,  where 
upon  General  Buckner  said  that  "  it  would  be  wrong  to  subject  the  army 


KOWLETT'S  MILL  (SEE  MAP,  PAGE  402). 
FROM  A  PHOTOGKAPH  TAKEN  IN"  1884. 


426  THE  CAPTURE  OF  FORT  DONELSON. 

to  a  virtual  massacre,  when  no  good  could  result  from  the  sacrifice,  and  that 
the  general  officers  owed  it  to  their  men,  when  further  resistance  was  una 
vailing,  to  obtain  the  best  terms  of  capitulation  possible  for  them." 

Both  Generals  Floyd  and  Pillow  acquiesced  in  the  opinion.  Ordinarily 
the  council  would  have  ended  at  this  point,  and  the  commanding  general 
would  have  addressed  himself  to  the  duty  of  obtaining  terms.  He  would 
have  called  for  pen,  ink,  and  paper,  and  prepared  a  note  for  dispatch  to  the 
commanding  general  of  the  opposite  force.  But  there  were  circumstances 
outside  the  mere  military  situation  which  at  this  juncture  pressed  themselves 
into  consideration.  As  this  was  the  first  surrender  of  armed  men  banded 
together  for  war  upon  the  general  government,  what  would  the  Federal 
authorities  do  with  the  prisoners  ?  This  question  was  of  application  to  all 
the  gentlemen  in  the  council.  It  was  lost  to  view,  however,  when  General 
Floyd  announced  his  purpose  to  leave  with  two  steamers  which  were  to  be 
down  at  daylight,  and  to  take  with  him  as  many  of  his  division  as  the 
steamers  could  carry  away. 

General  Pillow  then  remarked  that  there  were  no  two  persons  in  the  Con 
federacy  whom  the  Yankees  would  rather  capture  than  himself  and  General 
Floyd  (who  had  been  Buchanan's  Secretary  of  War,  and  was  under  indict 
ment  at  Washington).  As  to  the  propriety  of  his  accompanying  General 
Floyd,  the  latter  said,  coolly,  that  the  question  was  one  for  every  man  to 
decide  for  himself.  Buckner  was  of  the  same  view,  and  added  that  as  for 
himself  he  regarded  it  as  his  duty  to  stay  with  his  men  and  share  their  fate, 
whatever  it  might  be.  Pillow  persisted  in  leaving.  Floyd  then  directed  Gen 
eral  Buckner  to  consider  himself  in  command.  Immediately  after  the  council 
was  concluded,  General  Floyd  prepared  for  his  departure.  His  first  move 
was  to  have  his  brigade  drawn  up.  The  peculiarity  of  the  step  was  that, 
with  the  exception  of  one,  the  20th  Mississippi  regiment,  his  regiments  were 
all  Virginians.  A  short  time  before  daylight  the  two  steamboats  arrived. 
Without  loss  of  time  the  general  hastened  to  the  river,  embarked  with  his 
Virginians,  and  at  an  early  hour  cast  loose  from  the  shore,  and  in  good  time, 
and  safely,  he  reached  Nashville.  He  never  satisfactorily  explained  upon 
what  principle  he  appropriated  all  the  transportation  on  hand  to  the  use  of 
his  particular  command. 

Colonel  Forrest  was  present  at  the  council,  and  when  the  final  resolution 
was  taken,  he  promptly  announced  that  he  neither  could  nor  would  surren 
der  his  command.  The  bold  trooper  had  no  qualms  upon  the  subject.  He 
assembled  his  men,  all  as  hardy  as  himself,  and  after  reporting  once  more  at 
headquarters,  he  moved  out  and  plunged  into  a  slough  formed  by  backwater 
from  the  river.  An  icy  crust  covered  its  surface,  the  wind  blew  fiercely, 
and  the  darkness  was  unrelieved  by  a  star.  There  was  fearful  floundering 
as  the  command  followed  him.  At  length  he  struck  dry  land,  and  was  safe. 
He  was  next  heard  of  at  Nashville. 

General  Buckner,  who  throughout  the  affair  bore  himself  with  dignity, 
ordered  the  troops  back  to  their  positions  and  opened  communications 
with  General  Grant,  whose  laconic  demand  of  "  unconditional  surrender,'' 


THE  CAPTURE  OF  FORT  DONELSON. 


427 


F AC-SIMILE    OF    THE    ORIGINAL    "  UNCONDITIONAL    SURRENDER"   DISPATCH. 


The  original  of  the  dispatch  was  obtained  by  Charles 
L,.  Webster  <fc  Co.,  publishers  of  General  Grant's  "  Mem 
oirs,"  from  Dr.  James  K.  Wallace,  of  Litchfield,  Conn., 
•who  received  it,  November  28th,  1868,  from  his  relative 
by  marriage,  General  John  A.  Rawlins,  -who,  as  chief  of 
staff  to  General  Grant,  had  the  custody,  after  the  cap 
ture,  of  General  Buckner's  papers.  General  Rawlins  told 


Dr.  Wallace  that  it  was  the  original  dispatch.  The 
above  is  an  exact  reproduction  of  the  original  dispatch 
in  every  particular,  except  that,  in  order  to  adapt  it 
to  the  width  of  the  page,  the  word,  "  Sir,"  has  been 
lowered  to  the  line  beneath,  and  the  words,  "I  am, 
sir,  very  respectfully,"  have  been  raised  to  the  line 
above.— EDITORS. 


428 


THE  CAPTURE  OF  FORT  DONELSON. 


in  his  reply  to  General  Buckner's  overtures,  became  at  once  a  watchword 
of  the  war. 

The  Third  Division  was  astir  very  early  on  the  16th  of  February.  The 
regiments  began  to  form  and  close  up  the  intervals  between  them,  the  inten 
tion  being  to  charge  the  breastworks  south  of  Dover  about  breakfast-time. 
In  the  midst  of  the  preparation  a  bugle  was  heard  and  a  white  flag  was  seen 
coining  from  the  town  toward  the  pickets.  I  sent  my  adjutant-general  to 
meet  the  flag  half-way  and  inquire  its  purpose.  Answer  was  returned  that 
General  Buckner  had  capitulated  during  the  night,  and  was  now  sending 
information  of  the  fact  to  the  commander  of  the  troops  in  this  quarter,  that 
there  might  be  no  further  bloodshed.  The  division  was  ordered  to  advance 
and  take  possession  of  the  works  and  of  all  public  property  and  prisoners. 
Leaving  that  agreeable  duty  to  the  brigade  commanders,  I  joined  the  officer 
bearing  the  flag,  and  with  my  staff  rode  across  the  trench  and  into  the  town, 
till  we  came  to  the  door  of  the  old  tavern  already  described,  where  I  dis 
mounted.  The  tavern  was  the  headquarters  of  General  Buckner,  to  whom  I 
sent  my  name ;  and  being  an  acquaintance,  I  was  at  once  admitted. 

I  found  General  Buckner  with  his  staff  at  breakfast.  He  met  me  with 
politeness  and  dignity.  Turning  to  the  officers  at  the  table,  he  remarked : 
"  General  Wallace,  it  is  not  necessary  to  introduce  you  to  these  gentle 
men  ;  you  are  acquainted  with  them  all."  They  arose,  came  forward  one  by 
one,  and  gave  their  hands  in  salutation.  I  was  then  invited  to  breakfast, 
which  consisted  of  corn  bread  and  coffee,  the  best  the  gallant  host  had  in  his 
kitchen.  We  sat  at  the  table  about  an  hour  and  a  half,  when  General 
Grant  arrived  and  took  temporary  possession  of  the  tavern  as  his  head 
quarters.  Later  in  the  morning  the  army  marched  in  and  completed  the 
possession. 


VIEW    FROM    THE    NATIONAL    CEMETERY,   WITHIN    THE    HEDGE    ON    THE    KIGIIT,    ACROSS    TO    THE    HILL 

WHERE    WERE    SITUATED    THE    INTERIOR    WORKS    OF    FORT    DONELSON   (SEE    MAP,   PAGE    402). 

FROM    A    PHOTOGRAPH    TAKEN    IN    1884. 


THE  OPPOSING   FORCES   AT   FORT   DONELSON,  TENN. 

The  composition  and  losses  of  each  army  as  here  stated  give  the  gist  of  all  the  data  obtainable  iu  the  Official  Records. 
K  stands  for  killed  ;  w  for  wounded ;  in  w  for  mortally  wounded ;  in  for  captured  or  missing  ;  c  for  captured.— EDITORS. 

COMPOSITION  AND   LOSSES  OF  THE   UNION  ARMY. 

Brig.-Gen.  UlyssesjLlicjjit. 


FIRST  DIVISION,  Brig.-Geu.  John  A.  McCleriiaiid.  First 
Brigade,  Col.  Richard  J.  Oglesby :  8Th  111.,  Lieut.-Col. 
Frank  L.  Rhoads;  18th  111.,  Col.  Michael  K.  Lawler  (w>, 
Capt.  Daniel  H.  Brush  (w),  Capt.  Samuel  B.  Marks;  29th 
III,  Col.  James  S.  Reardeu ;  30th  111.,  Lieut.-Col.  Elias 
S.  Dennis;  31st  111.,  Col.  John  A.  Logan  (w) ;  Battery  D, 
2d  111.  Lt.  Arty.,  Capt.  Jasper  M.  Dresser;  Battery  E,  2d 
111.  Lt.  Artillery,  Lieut.  G.  C.  Gumbart ;  A  and  B,  2d 
111.  Cavalry,  Capts.  John  R.  Hotaling  and  Thomas  J. 
Larrison;  C,  2d,  and  I,  4th  U.  S.  Cavalry,  Lieut.  James 
Powell ;  Ind'p't  companies  111.  Cavalry,  Capts.  E.  Car- 
michael,  James  J.  Dollins,  M.  J.  O'Haruett,  and  Lieut. 
Ezra  King.  Brigade  loss:  k,  184;  w,  603;  m,  66=853. 
Second  Brigade,  Col.  AV.  II. JL^ Wallace:  llth  111.,  Lieut.- 
Col.  T.  E.  G.  Ransom  7w~),  Major  Garrett  Nevins  (tem 
porarily)  :  20th  111.,  Col.  C.  Carroll  Marsh  ;  45th  111.,  Col. 
John  E.  Smith :  48th  111.,  Col.  Ishani  N.  Haynie  (tempo 
rarily  commanding  Third  Brigade),  Lieut.-Col.  Thomas 
H.  Smith  (k) ;  Battery  B,  1st  111.  Lt.  Artillery,  Capt.  Ezra 
Taylor ;  Battery  D,  1st  111.  Lt.  Artillery,  Capt.  Edward 
McAllister ;  4th  111.  Cavalry,  Col.  T.  Lyle  Dickey.  Bri 
gade  loss :  k,  99 ;  w,  350  ;  m,  98  =  547.  Th  ird  Brigade,  Col. 
Win.  R.  Morrison  (w),  Col.  Leonard  F.  Ross :  17th  111., 
Major  Francis  M.  Smith,  Capt.  Henry  H.  Bush;  49th  111., 
Lieut.-Col.  Phiueas  Pease.  Brigade  loss  :  k,  28  ;  w,  105; 
m,  19  =  152. 

SECOND  DIVISION,  Brig.-Gen.  Charles  F.  Smith.  First 
Brigade,  Col.  John  Mi-Arthur  :  9th  HI.,  Lieut.-Col.  Jesse 
J.  Phillips;  12th  111.,  Lieut.-Col.  Augustus  L.  Chetlain; 
41st  111.,  Col.  Isaac  C.  Pugh.  Brigade  loss  :  k,  69;  w,  340 ; 
m,  20  =  429.  Third  Brigade,  Col.  John  Cook :  7th  III., 
Lieut.-Col.  Andrew  J.  Babcock ;  50th  111.,  Col.  Moses  M. 
Bane  ;  52d  Ind.,  Col.  James  M.  Smith  ;  12th  Iowa,  Col.  J. 
J.  Woods  ;  13th  Mo.,  Col.  Crafts  J.  Wright ;  Batteries  D, 
H,  and  K,  1st  Mo.  Lt.  Artillery,  Capts.  Henry  Richardson, 
F.  Welker,  and  George  H.  Stone.  Brigade  loss  :  k,  10;  w, 

The  total  loss  of  the  Union  forces  (army  and  navy)  was 


109 ;  m,  2  =  121.  Fourth  Brigade,  Col.  Jacob  G.  Lauman : 
25th  1ml.,  Col.  James  C.  Veatch;  2d  Iowa,  Col.  James  M. 
Tuttle ;  7th  Iowa,  Lieut.-Col.  James  C.  Parrott ;  14th 
Iowa,  Col.  William  T.  Shaw ;  Birge's  Mo.  Sharp-shooters. 
Brigade  loss  :  k,  55  ;  w,  301 ;  m,  1  =  357.  Fifth  Brigade, 
Col.  Morgan  L.  Smith:  llth  Ind.,  Col.  George  F.  McGin- 
nis ;  8th  Mo.,  Major  John  McDonald.  Brigade  loss :  k,  11 ; 
w,  69  =  80. 

THIRD  DIVISION,  Brig.-Gen.  Lew  Wallacj.  First 
Brigade,  Col.  Charles  Cruft :  31st  Ind.,  Lieut.-Col.  John 
Osborn,  Major  Fred.  Arn ;  44th  Ind.,  Col.  Hugh  B.  Reed ; 
17th  Ky.,  Col.  John  H.  McIIenry,  Jr.;  25th  Ky.,  Col.  James- 
M.  Shackelford.  Brigade  loss  :  k,  35 ;  w,  182 ;  m,  16  =  233. 
Second  Brigade  [attached  to  the  Third  Brigade]:  46th 
111.,  Col.  John  A.  Davis;  57th  111.,  Col.  Silas  D.  Baldwin ; 
58th  111.,  Col.  William  F.  Lynch;  20th  Ohio,  Col.  Charles 
Whittlesey.  Brigade  loss  :  k,  6  ;  w,  15  ;  m,  1  =22.  Third 
Brigade,  Col.  John  M.  Thayer:  1st  Neb.,  Lieut.-Col. 
Win.  D.  McCord;  58th  Ohio,  Lieut.-Col.  F.  F.  Rempel; 
68th  Ohio,  Col.  S.  H.  Steedman ;  76th  Ohio,  Col.  Wm. 
B.  Woods.  Brigade  loss:  k,  3;  w,  24;  m,  1=28.  Unat 
tached:  Battery  A,  1st  111.  Lt.  Artillery,  Lieut  P.  P. 
Wood;  A,  32d  111.  Infantrj',  Capt.  Henry  Davidson. 
Loss :  w,  10. 

IRON-CLADS  AND  GCN-BOATS,  Flag-Officer  Andrew  IL 
Foote^  (wi.  St.  Louis  (flag-ship),  Lieut.  Leonard  Paul- 
(TmgTk,  2;  w,  8;  Carondelet,  Commander  Henry  Walke, 
k,  5;  w,  28;  Louisville,  Commander  Benjamin  M.  Dove, 
k,  4;w,  5;  Pittsburgh,  Lieut.  Egbert  Thompson,  w,  2; 
Tyler,  Lieut. -Corn.  William  Gwin ;  Conestoga,  Lieut. -Com. 
S.  L.  Phelps.  Total  loss :  k,  11 ;  w,  43  =  54.  The  vessels 
which  had  been  in  action  at  Fort  Henry  (see  page  362) 
carried  the  same  armament  at  Fort  Donelson.  The  Louis 
ville  and  Pittsburgh  were  each  armed  with  6  32-pounders, 
3  8-iuch,  and  4  rifled  42-pouuders.  The  Louisville  had  also- 
1 12-pouuder  boat-howitzer. 
510  killed,  2152  wounded,  224  captured  or  missing  =  2886. 


COMPOSITION   AND   LOSSES   OF   THE  CONFEDERATE   ARMY. 

1  Brig.-Gen.  Gideon  J.  Pillow,  2  Brig-Gen.  John  B.  Floyd.  3  Brig-Gen.  Simon  B.  Buckner  (c). 


BUCKNER'S  DIVISION.  Second  Brigade,  Col.  Wm.  E. 
Baldwin  :  2d  Ken.,  Col.  R.  W.  Hanson ;  14th  Miss.,  Maj. 
W.  L.  Doss;  20th  Miss.,  Maj.  W.  X.  Brown;  26th  Miss., 
Col.  A.  E.  Reynolds  ;  26th  Teiin.,  Col.,  John  M.  Lillard  ; 
41st  Tenn.,  Col.  Robert  Farquharsou.  Third  Brigade, 
Col.  John  C.  Brown  :  3d  Tenn.,  Lieut.-Col.  T.  M.  Gordon 
(W),  Maj.  N.  F.  Cheairs  ;  18th  Term.,  Col.  J.  B.  Palmer; 
32d  Tenn.,  Col.  E.  C.  Cook.  Artillery:  Kentucky  Bat 
tery,  Capt.  R.  E.  Graves ;  Teun.  Battery,  Capt.  T.  K. 
Porter  <w),  Lieut.  John  W.Morton;  Jackson's  Va.  Bat 
tery.  Division  loss:  k  and  w,  577  (approximate). 

JOHNSON'S  COMMAND  deft  wiugi,  Brig-Gen.  BushrodR. 
Johnson.  Heiman's  Brigade,  Col.  A.  Heiiuan :  27th  Ala., 
Col.  A.  A.  Hughes;  10th  Tenu.,  Lieut.-Col.  R.  W.  Mac- 
Gavock  ;  42d  Tenn.,  Col.  W.  A.  Quarles  ;  48th  Tenn.,  Col. 
W.  M.  Voorhies;  53d  Tenn.,  Col.  A.  H.  Abernathy, 
Lieut.-Col.  Thomas  F.  Winston;  Teun.  Battery,  Capt. 
Frank  Maney  'w).  Davidson's  Brigade.  Col.  T.  J*.  David 
son,  Col.  J.  M.  Simonton:  8th  Ky.,  Lieut-Col.  H.  B. 
Lyon  :  1st  Miss.,  Col.  J.  M.  Simonton,  Lieut-Col.  A.  S. 
Hamilton;  3d  Miss.,  Lieut.-Col.  J.  M.  Wells;  7th  Texas, 


Col.  John  Gregg.  Brigade  loss  :  k,  68 ;  w.  218  =  286. 
Drake's  Brigade,  Col.  Joseph  Drake :  Ala.  Battalion, 
Maj.  John  S.  Garvin ;  15th  Ark.,  Col.  J.  J..Gee  ;  4th  Miss.,. 
Maj.  T.  N.  Adair;  Tenn.  Battalion,  Col.  B.  M.  Browder. 

FLOYD'S  DIVISION.  First  Brigade,  Col.  G.  C.  Whartoii  r 
51st  Va.,  Lieut-Col.  J.  M.  Massie ;  56th  Va.,  Capt.  G.  W. 
Davis.  Brigade  loss  :  k,  17 ;  w,  80  ;  m,  120  =  217.  Second 
Brigade,  Col.  John  McCauslaud:  36th  Va.,  Lieut.-Col. 
L.  W.  Reid;  50th  Va.,  Maj.  Thomas  Smith.  Brigade  loss: 
k,  24 ;  w,  91  =  115.  Artillery :  Va.  Batteries,  Captains  D. 
A.  French  and  J.  H.  Guy;  Green's  Ken.  Battery. 

GARRISON  FORCES,  Col.  J.  W.  Head,  Col.  J.  E.  Bailey: 
30th  Tenn.,  Maj.  J.  J.  Turner;  49th  Tenn.,  Col.  J.  E. 
Bailey ;  50th  Tenn.,  Col.  C.  A.  Sugg.  Fort  Batteries,  Capt, 
Joseph  Dixon  (k),  Capt.  Jacob  Culbertsou :  A,  30th 
Tenn.,  Capt.  B.  G.  Bidwell ;  A,  50th  Tenn.,  Capt.  T.  W. 
Beaumont;  Maury  (Tenn.)  Battery,  Capt.  R.  R.  Ross. 

CAVALRY:  Teun.  Regiment,  Col.  N.  B.  Forrest;  9th 
Tenn.  Battalion,  Lieut.-Col.  George  Gantt ;  Milton'* 
Company  Tennessee,  rnattached:  Tennessee  Battalion 
Infantry,  Major  S.  H.  Colms. 


The  total  loss  of  the  Confederate  army  is  not  definitely  stated.  General  Gideon  J.  Pillow  says,  in  his  report,  that 
in  killed  and  wounded  it  was  about  two  thousand.  With  regard  to  the  number  of  Confederates  captured,  General 
Grant  says  in  his  "  Memoirs  "  :  "I  asked  General  Buckner  about  what  force  he  had  to  surrender.  He  replied  that 
he  could  not  tell  with  any  degree  of  accuracy :  that  all  the  sick  and  weak  had  been  sent  to  Nashville  while  we  were 
about  Fort  Henry  ;  that  Floyd  and  Pillow  had  left  during  the  night,  taking  many  men  with  them ;  and  that  Forrest, 
and  probably  others,  had  also  escaped  during  the  preceding  night ;  the  number  of  casualties  he  could  not  tell ;  but 
he  said  I  would  not  find  fewer  than  12,000,  nor  more  than  15,000."  But  General  Buckner  says,  in  his  official  report, 
that  "  the  aggregate  of  the  army,  never  greater  than  12,000,  was  now  reduced  to  less  than  9000  after  the  departure 
of  General  Floyd's  brigade." 

429 


THE   WESTERN    FLOTILLA  AT    FORT    DONELSON,  ISLAND 
NUMBER  TEN,   FORT   PILLOW    AND    MEMPHIS. 

BY  HENRY  WALKE,  REAR-ADMIRAL,  U.  S.  X. 

ON  the  7th  of  February,  the  day  after  the  capture  of  Fort  Henry,  I  received 
on  board  the  Carondelet  Colonels  Webster,  Rawlins,  and  McPherson,  with 
a  company  of  troops,  and  under  instructions  from  General  Grant  proceeded 
up  the  Tennessee  River,  and  completed  the  destruction  of  the  bridge  of  the 
Memphis  and  Bowling  Green  Railroad. 

On  returning  from  that  expedition  General  Grant  requested  me  to  hasten 
to  Fort  Donelson  with  the  Carondelet,  Tyler,  and  Lexington,  and  announce 
my  arrival  by  firing  signal  guns.  The  object  of  this  movement  was  to  take 
possession  of  the  river  as  soon  as  possible,  to  engage  the  enemy's  attention 
by  making  formidable  demonstrations  before  the  fort,  and  to  prevent  it 
from  being  reenforced.  On  February  10th  the  Carondelet  alone  (towed  by  the 
transport  Alps)  proceeded  up  the  Cumberland  River,  and  on  the  12th  arrived 
a  few  miles  below  the  fort. 

Fort  Donelson  occupied  one  of  the  best  defensive  positions  on  the  river. 
It  was  built  on  a  bold  bluff  about  120  feet  in  height,  on  the  west  side  of  the 
river,  where  it  makes  a  slight  bend  to  the  eastward.  It  had  3  batteries, 
mounting  in  all  15  guns :  the  lower,  about  twenty  feet  above  the  water ;  the 
second,  about  fifty  feet  above  the  water ;  the  third,  on  the  summit.  J 

\  The  armament  of  the  fort  consisted  of  "ten  Captain  Jacob  Culbertson,  with  Captains  Boss, 
32-pounder  guns  (two  of  them  ship  carronades), 
one  8-inch  howitzer,  two  nondescript  9-pounders, 
one  1 0-inch  Columbiad,  and  one  rifled  gun  throwing 
a  conical  shell  of  128  pounds."  The  garrison  was 
commanded  by  Colonel  J.  E.  Bailey,  the  artillery 
by  Captain  Joseph  Dixon,  and  after  his  death  by 


Beaumont,  and  Bidwell  in  separate  command  of 
the  guns  of  the  lower  batteries.  Captain  Dixon 
was  killed  in  the  action  of  the  13th  with  the  Caron 
delet  by  a  shot  which  dismounted  one  of  his  guns  — 
"the  only  damage  done  to  the  batteries  during  the 
siege."  (Captain  Culbertsou's  report.)  —  EDITORS. 


430 


THE  WESTERN  FLOTILLA.  431 

When  the  Carondelet,  her  tow  being  cast  off,  came  in  sight  of  the  fort  and 
proceeded  up  to  within  long  range  of  the  batteries,  not  a  living  creature 
could  be  seen.  The  hills  and  woods  -on  the  west  side  of  the  river  hid  part  of 
the  enemy's  formidable  defenses,  which  were  lightly  covered  with  snow ;  but 
the  black  rows  of  heavy  guns,  pointing  down  on  us,  reminded  me  of  the  dis- 
mal-lookiiig  sepulchers  cut  in  the  rocky  cliffs  near  Jerusalem,  but  far  more 
repulsive.  At  12 : 50  P.  M.,  to  unmask  the  silent  enemy,  and  to  announce  my 
arrival  to  General  Grant,  I  ordered  the  bow-guns  to  be  fired  at  the  fort. 
Only  one  shell  fell  short.  There  was  no  response  except  the  echo  from  the 
hills.  The  fort  appeared  to  have  been  evacuated.  After  firing  ten  shells 
into  it,  the  Carondelet  dropped  down  the  river  about  three  miles  and  anchored. 
But  the  sound  of  her  guns  aroused  our  soldiers  on  the  southern  side  of  the 
fort  into  action ;  one  report  says  that  when  they  heard  the  guns  of  the  avant- 
courrier  of  the  fleet,  they  gave  cheer  upon  cheer,  and  rather  than  permit  the 
sailors  to  get  ahead  of  them  again,  they  engaged  in  skirmishes  with  the  en 
emy,  and  began  the  battle  of  the  three  days  following.  On  the  Carondelet.we 
were  isolated  and  beset  with  dangers  from  the  enemy's  lurking  sharp-shooters. 

On  the  13th  a  dispatch  was  received  from  General  Grant,  informing  me 
that  he  had  arrived  the  day  before,  and  had  succeeded  in  getting  his  army  in 
position,  almost  entirely  investing  the  enemy's  works.  "  Most  of  our  bat 
teries,"  he  said,  "  are  established,  and  the  remainder  soon  will  be.  If  you 
will  advance  with  your  gun-boat  at  10  o'clock  in  the  morning,  we  will  be 
ready  to  take  advantage  of  any  diversion  in  our  favor." 

I  immediately  complied  with  these  instructions,  and  at  9:05,  with  the 
Carondelet  alone  and  under  cover  of  a  heavily  wooded  point,  fired  139 
70-pound  and  64-pound  shells  at  the  fort.  We  received  in  return  the 
fire  of  all  the  enemy's  guns  that  could  be  brought  to  bear  on  the  Caron 
delet,  which  sustained  but  little  damage,  except  from  two  shots.  One,  a 
128-pound  solid,  at  11 : 30  struck  the  corner  of  our  port  broadside  casemate, 
passed  through  it,  and  in  its  progress  toward  the  center  of  our  boilers 
glanced  over  the  temporary  barricade  in  front  of  the  boilers.  It  then  passed 
over  the  steam-drum,  struck  the  beams  of  the  upper  deck,  carried  away  the 
railing  around  the  engine-room  and  burst  the  steam-heater,  and,  glancing 
back  into  the  engine-room,  "  seemed  to  bound  after  the  men,"  as  one  of  the 
engineers  said,  "  like  a  wild  beast  pursuing  its  prey."  I  have  preserved  this 
ball  as  a  souvenir  of  the  fight  at  Fort  Donelson.  When  it  burst  through  the 
side  of  the  Carondelet,  it  knocked  down  and  wounded  a  dozen  men,  seven  of 
them,  severely.  An  immense  quantity  of  splinters  was  blown  through  the 
vessel.  Some  of  them,  as  fine  as  needles,  shot  through  the  clothes  of  the 
men  like  arrows.  Several  of  the  wounded  were  so  much  excited  by  the  sud 
denness  of  the  event  and  the  sufferings  of  their  comrades,  that  they  were  not 
aware  that  they  themselves  had  been  struck  until  they  felt  the  blood  run 
ning  into  their  shoes.  Upon  receiving  this  shot  we  ceased  firing  for  a  while. 

After  dinner  we  sent  the  wounded  on  board  the  Alps,  repaired  damages, 
and,  not  expecting  any  assistance,  at  12:15  we  resumed,  in  accordance  with 
General  Grant's  request,  and  bombarded  the  fort  until  dusk,  when  nearly  all 


432 


THE  WESTERN  FLOTILLA.  433 

our  10-inch  and  15-inch  shells  were  expended.     The  firing  from  the  shore 
having  ceased,  we  retired. 

At  11:30  on  the  night  of  the  13th  Flag-Officer  Foote  arrived  below  Fort 
Donelsoii  with  the  iron-clads  St.  Louis,  Louisville,  and  Pittsburgh,  and  the 
wooden  gun -boats  Tyler  and  Conestoga.  On  the  14th  all  the  hard  materials 
in  the  vessels,  such  as  chains,  lumber,  and  bags  of  coal,  were  laid  on  the  upper 
decks  to  protect  them  from  the  plunging  shots  of  the  enemy.  At  3  o'clock  in  the 
afternoon  our  fleet  advanced  to  attack  the  fort,  the  Louisville  being  on  the 
west  side  of  the  river,  the  St.  Louis  (flag-steamer)  next,  then  the  Pittsburgh 
and  Carondelet  on  the  east  side  of  the  river.  The  wooden  gun-boats  were 
about  a  thousand  yards  in  the  rear.  When  we  started  in  line  abreast  at  a 
moderate  speed,  the  Louisville  and  Pittsburgh,  not  keeping  up  to  their  posi 
tions,  were  hailed  from  the  flag-steamer  to  "  steam  up."  At  3 : 30,  when  about 
a  mile  and  a  half  from  the  fort,  two  shots  were  fired  at  us,  both  falling  short. 
When  within  a  mile  of  the  fort  the  St.  Louis  opened  fire,  and  the  other  iron 
clads  followed,  slowly  and  deliberately  at  first,  but  more  rapidly  as  the  fleet 
advanced.  The  flag-officer  hailed  the  Carondelet,  and  ordered  us  not  to  fire 
so  fast.  Some  of  our  shells  went  over  the  fort,  and  almost  into  our  camp 
beyond.  As  we  drew  nearer,  the  enemy's  fire  greatly  increased  in  force  and 
effect.  But,  the  officers  and  crew  of  the  Carondelet  having  recently  beeii 
long  under  fire,  and  having  become  practiced  in  fighting,  her  gunners  were  as 
cool  and  composed  as  old  veterans.  We  heard  the  deafening  crack  of  the 
bursting  shells,  the  crash  of  the  solid  shot,  and  the  whizzing  of  fragments  of 
?hell  and  wood  as  they  sped  through  the  vessel.  Soon  a  128-pounder  struck 
our  anchor,  smashed  it  into  flying  bolts,  and  bounded  over  the  vessel,  taking 
away  a  part  of  our  smoke-stack ;  then  another  cut  away  the  iron  boat-davits 
as  if  they  were  pipe-stems,  whereupon  the  boat  dropped  into  the  water. 
Another  ripped  up  the  iron  plating  and  glanced  over ;  another  went  through 
the  plating  and  lodged  in  the  heavy  casemate;  another  struck  the  pilot-house, 
knocked  the  plating  to  pieces,  and  sent  fragments  of  iron  and  splinters  into 
the  pilots,  one  of  whom  fell  mortally  wounded,  and  was  taken  below ;  another 
shot  took  away  the  remaining  boat-davits  and  the  boat  with  them;  and  still 
they  came,  harder  and  faster,  taking  flag-staffs  and  smoke-stacks,  and  tearing 
off  the  side  armor  as  lightning  tears  the  bark  from  a  tree.  Our  men  fought 
desperately,  but,  under  the  excitement  of  the  occasion,  loaded  too  hastily,  and 
the  port  rifled  gun  exploded.  One  of  the  crew,  in  his  account  of  the  explosion 
soon  after  it  occurred,  said:  "I  was  serving  the  gun  with  shell.  When  it 
exploded  it  knocked  us  all  down,  killing  none,  but  wounding  over  a  dozen  men 
and  spreading  dismay  and  confusion  among  us.  For  about  two  minutes  I  was 
stunned,  and  at  least  five  minutes  elapsed  before  I  could  tell  what  was  the 
matter.  When  I  found  out  that  I  was  more  scared  than  hurt,  although  suffering 
from  the  gunpowder  which  I  had  inhaled,  I  looked  forward  and  saw  our  gun 
lying  on  the  deck,  split  in  three  pieces.  Then  the  cry  ran  through  the  boat 
that  we  were  on  fire,  and  my  duty  as  pump-man  called  me  to  the  pumps. 
While  I  was  there,  two  shots  entered  our  bow-por+s  and  killed  four  men  and 
wounded  several  others.  They  were  borne  past  me,  three  with  their  heads 

VOL    I.     28 


434  THE  WESTERN  FLOTILLA. 

off.  The  sight  almost  sickened  me,  and  I  turned  my  head  away.  Our  master's 
mate  came  soon  after  and  ordered  us  to  our  quarters  at  the  gun.  I  told  him 
the  gun  had  burst,  and  that  we  had  caught  fire  on  the  upper  deck  from  the 
enemy's  shell.  He  then  said:  'Never  mind  the  fire;  go  to  your  quarters.' 
Then  I  took  a  station  at  the  starboard  tackle  of  another  rifled  bow-gun  and 
remained  there  until  the  close  of  the  fight."  The  carpenter  and  his  men  extin 
guished  the  flames. 

When  within  four  hundred  yards  of  the  fort,  and  while  the  Confederates 
were  running  from  their  lower  battery,  our  pilot-house  was  struck  again  and 
another  pilot  wounded,  our  wheel  was  broken,  and  shells  from  the  rear  boats 
were  bursting  over  us.  All  four  of  our  boats  were  shot  away  and  dragging 
in  the  water.  On  looking  out  to  bring  our  broadside  guns  to  bear,  we  saw 
that  the  other  gun-boats  were  rapidly  falling  back  out  of  line.  The  Pittsburgh 
in  her  haste  to  turn  struck  the  stern  of  the  Carondelet,  and  broke  our  star 
board  rudder,  so  that  we  were  obliged  to  go  ahead  to  clear  the  Pittsburgh  and 
the  point  of  rocks  below.  The  pilot  of  the  St.  Louis  was  killed,  and  the  pilot 
of  the  Louisville  was  wounded.  Both  vessels  had  their  wheel-ropes  shot 
away,  and  the  men  were  prevented  from  steering  the  Louisville  with  the 
tiller-ropes  at  the  stern  by  the  shells  from  the  rear  boats  bursting  over  them. 
The  St.  Louis  and  Louisville,  becoming  unmanageable,  were  compelled  to 
dropout  of  battle,  and  the  Pittsburgh  followed;  all  had  suffered  severely 
from  the  enemy's  fire.  Flag- Officer  Foote  was  wounded  while  standing  by 
the  pilot  of  the  St.  Louis  when  he  was  killed.  We  were  then  about  350  yards 
from  the  fort. 

There  was  no  alternative  for  the  Carondelet  in  that  narrow  stream  but  to 
keep  her  head  to  the  enemy  and  fire  into  the  fort  with  her  two  bow-guns,  to 
prevent  it,  if  possible,  from  returning  her  fire  effectively.  The  enemy  saw 
that  she  was  in  a  manner  left  to  his  mercy,  and  concentrated  the  fire  of  all 
his  batteries  upon  her.  In  return,  the  Carondelefs  guns  were  well  served  to 
the  last  shot.  Our  new  acting  gunner,  John  Hall,  was  just  the  man  for  the 
occasion.  He  came  forward,  offered  his  services,  and  with  my  sanction  took 
charge  of  the  starboard-bow  rifled  gun.  He  instructed  the  men  to  obey  his 
warnings  and  follow  his  motions,  and  he  told  them  that  when  he  saw  a  shot 
coming  he  would  call  out  "  Down  "  and  stoop  behind  the  breech  of  the  gun  as 
he  did  so ;  at  the  same  instant  the  men  were  to  stand  away  from  the  bow- 
ports.  Nearly  every  shot  from  the  fort  struck  the  bows  of  the  Carondelet. 
Most  of  them  were  fired  on  the  ricochet  level,  and  could  be  plainly  seen  skip 
ping  on  the  water  before  they  struck.  The  enemy's  object  was  to  sink  the 
gun-boat  by  striking  her  just  below  the  water-line.  They  soon  succeeded  in 
planting  two  32-pound  shots  in  her  bow,  between  wind  and  water,  which  made 
her  leak  badly,  but  her  compartments  kept  her  from  sinking  until  we  could 
plug  up  the  shot-holes.  Three  shots  struck  the  starboard  casemating ;  four 
struck  the  port  casemating  forward  of  the  rifle-gun ;  one  struck  on  the  star 
board  side,  between  the  water-line  and  plank-sheer,  cutting  through  the 
planking ;  six  shots  struck  the  pilot-house,  shattering  one  section  into  pieces 
and  cutting  through  the  iron  casing.  The  smoke-stacks  were  riddled. 


THE  WESTERN  FLOTILLA. 


435 


THE    GUN-BOATS   AT    FOBT    DOKELSON   (FEBRUARY   14,    1862) 

THE    LAND    ATTACK  IN    THE    DISTANCE. 
AFTER  A   SKETCH  BY  REAR-ADMIRAL  WAI.KE. 


Our  gunners  kept  up  a  constant  firing 
while  we  were  falling  back ;  and  the  warn 
ing  words,  "  Look  out ! "  "  Down  ! "  w^ere 

often  heard,  and  heeded  by  nearly  all  the  gun-crews.  On  one  occasion,  while 
the  men  were  at  the  muzzle  of  the  middle  bow-gun,  loading  it,  the  warning 
came  just  in  time  for  them  to  jump  aside  as  a  32-pounder  struck  the  lower 
sill,  and  glancing  up  struck  the  upper  sill,  then,  falling  on  the  inner  edge  of 
the  lower  sill,  bounded  on  deck  and  spun  around  like  a  top,  but  hurt  no  one. 
It  was  very  evident  that  if  the  men  who  were  loading  had  not  obeyed  the 
order  to  drop,  several  of  them  would  have  been  killed.  So  I  repeated  the 
instructions  and  warned  the  men  at  the  guns  and  the  crew  generally  to  bow 
or  stand  off  from  the  ports  when  a  shot  was  seen  coming.  But  some  of  the 
young  men,  from  a  spirit  of  bravado  or  from  a  belief  in  the  doctrine  of  fatal 
ism,  disregarded  the  instructions,  saying  it  was  useless  to  attempt  to  dodge 
a  cannon-ball,  and  they  would  trust  to  luck.  The  warning  words,  "  Look 
out!"  "Down!"  were  again  soon  heard;  down  went  the  gunner  and  his  men, 
as  the  whizzing  shot  glanced  on  the  gun,  taking  off  the  gunner's  cap  and  the 
heads  of  two  of  the  young  men  who  trusted  to  luck,  and  in  defiance  of  the 
order  were  standing  up  or  passing  behind  him.  This  shot  killed  another  man 
also,  who  was  at  the  last  gun  of  the  starboard  side,  and  disabled  the  gun.  It 
came  in  with  a  hissing  sound ;  three  sharp  spats  and  a  heavy  bang  told  the 
sad  fate  of  three  brave  comrades.  Before  the  decks  were  well  sanded,  there 
was  so  much  blood  on  them  that  our  men  could  not  work  the  guns  without 
slipping. 

We  kept  firing  at  the  enemy  so  long  as  he  was  within  range,  to  prevent 
him  from  seeing  us  through  the  smoke. 


436 


THE  WESTERN  FLOTILLA. 


MAP  OF  THE  REGION  OF  THE  FLOTILLA 
OPERATION'S. 


The  Carondelet  was  the  first  in  and 
the  last  out  of  the  fight,  and  was  more 
damaged  than  any  of  the  other  gun 
boats,  as  the  boat-carpenters  who  re 
paired  them  subsequently  informed 
me.  She  was  much  longer  under  fire 
than  any  other  vessel  of  the  flotilla; 
and,  according  to  the  report  of  the 
Secretary  of  the  Navy,  her  loss  in 
killed  and  wounded  was  nearly  twice 
as  great  as  that  of  all  the  other  gun 
boats  together.  She  fired  more  shot 
and  shell  into  Fort  Donelson  than 
any  other  gun-boat,  and  was  struck 
fifty -four  times.  These  facts  are  given 
because  a  disposition  was  shown  by 
correspondents  and  naval  historians 
to  ignore  the  services  of  the  Caroii- 
dclct  on  this  and  other  occasions. 

In  the  action  of  the  14th  all  of  the 
armored  vessels  were  fought  with  the  greatest  energy,  skill,  and  courage,  until 
disabled  by  the  enemy's  heavy  shot.  In  his  official  report  of  the  battle  the  flag- 
officer  said:  "  The  officers  and  men  in  this  hotly  contested  but  unequal  fight  be 
haved  with  the  greatest  gallantry  and  determination."  [For  losses,  see  p.  429.]  ^ 
Although  the  gun-boats  were  repulsed  in  this  action,  the  demoralizing 
effect  of  their  cannonade,  and  of  the  heavy  and  well-sustained  fire  of  the 
Carondelet  on  the  day  before,  must  have  been  very  great,  and  contributed  in 
no  small  degree  to  the  successful  operations  of  the  army  on  the  following  day. 
After  the  battle  I  called  upon  the  flag-officer,  and  found  him  suffering 
from  his  wounds.  He  asked  me  if  I  could  have  run  past  the  fort,  something 
I  should  not  have  ventured  upon  without  permission. 

The  15th  was  employed  in  the  burial  of  our  slain  comrades.  I  read  the 
Episcopal  service  on  board  the  Carondelet^  under  our  flag  at  half-mast;  and 
the  sailors  bore  their  late  companions  to  a  lonely  field  within  the  shadows  of 

&  From  the  report  of  Captain  B.  G.  Bidwell, 
"  the  only  officer  connected  with  the  heavy  batter 
ies  of  Fort  Donelson  who  was  fortunate  enough  to 
escape,"  we  take  this  account  of  the  engagement : 

"  All  was  quiet  until  the  evening  of  the  14th  (Friday), 
when  4  boats  came  around  the  point,  arranged  them 
selves  in  line  of  battle,  and  advanced  slowly,  but  stead 
ily,  up  the  river  to  within  200  yards  of  our  battery,  and 
halted,  when  a  most  incessant  fire  was  kept  up  for 
some  time.  We  were  ordered  to  hold  our  fire  until  they 
got  within  range  of  our  32-pounders.  We  remained  per 
fectly  silent,  while  they  came  over  about  one  and  a  half 
miles,  pouring  a  heavy  fire  of  shot  and  shell  upon  us  all 
the  time.  Two  more  boats  came  around  the  point  and 
threw  shell  at  us.  Our  gunners  were  inexperienced  and 
knew  very  little  of  the  firing  of  heavy  guns.  They, 
however,  did  some  excellent  shooting.  The  rifled  gun 
was  disabled  by  the  ramming  of  a  cartridge  while  the 
wire  was  in  the  vent,  it  being  left  in  there  by  a  careless 


gunner, — being  bent,  it  could  not  be  got  out, —  but  the 
two  center  boats  were  both  disabled,  the  left-center  (I 
think)  by  a  ricochet  shot  entering  one  of  the  port-holes, 
which  are  tolerably  large.  The  right-center  boat  was 
very  soou  injured  by  a  ball  striking  her  on  top,  and  also 
a  direct  shot  in  the  port  hole,  when  she  fell  back,  the 
two  flank  boats  closing  in  behind  them  and  protecting 
them  from  our  fire  in  retreat.  I  think  these  two  were 
not  seriously  injured.  They  must  have  fired  near  two 
thousand  shot  and  shell  at  us.  Our  Columbiad  tired 
about  27  times,  the  rifled  gun  very  few  times,  and  the 
32-pounders  about  45  or  50  rounds  each.  A  great  many 
of  our  balls  took  effect,  beiug  well  aimed.  I  am  confi 
dent  the  efficiency  of  the  gun-boat  is  in  the  gun  it  carries 
rather  than  in  the  boat  itself.  We  can  whip  them  always 
if  our  men  will  only  stand  to  their  guns.  Not  a  man 
of  all  ours  was  hurt,  notwithstanding  they  threw  grape 
at  us.  Their  fire  was  more  destructive  to  our  works  at 
2  miles  than  at  200  yards.  They  over-fired  us  from  that 
distance." 


THE  WESTERN  FLOTILLA. 


437 


the  hills.  When  they  were  about  to  lower  the  first  coffin,  a  Roman  Catholic 
priest  appeared,  and  his  services  being  accepted,  he  read  the  prayers  for  the 
dead.  As  the  last  service  was  ended',  the  sound  of  the  battle  being  waged  by 
General  Grant,  like  the  rumbling  of  distant  thunder,  was  the  only  requiem 
1'or  our  departed  shipmates. 

On  Sunday,  the  16th,  at  dawn,  Fort  Donelson  surrendered  and  the  gun 
boats  steamed  up  to  Dover.  After  religious  services  the  Carondelet  proceeded 
back  to  Cairo,  and  arrived  there  on  the  morning  of  the  17th,  in  such  a  dense  fog 
that  she  passed  below  the  town  unnoticed,  and  had  great  difficulty  in  finding 
the  landing.  There  had  been  a  report  that  the  enemy  was  coming  from 
Columbus  to  attack  Cairo  during  the  absence  of  its  defenders ;  and  while  the 
Carondelet  was  cautiously  feeling  her  way  back  and  blowing  her  whistle,  some 
people  imagined  she  was  a  Confederate  gun-boat  about  to  land,  and  made 
hasty  preparations  to  leave  the  place.  Our  announcement  of  the  victory  at 
Fort  Donelson  changed  their  dejection  into  joy  and  exultation.  On  the  fol 
lowing  morning  an  order  congratulating  the  officers  and  men  of  the  Carondelet 
was  received  from  Flag-Officer  Foote. 

A  few  days  later  the  Carondelet  was  taken  up  on  the  ways  at  Mound 
City,  Illinois, —  six  or  seven  miles  above  Cairo  on  the  Ohio  River, —  for 
repairs ;  and  a  crowd  of  carpenters  worked  on  her  night  and  day.  After  the 
repairs  were  completed,  she  was  ordered  to  make  the  experiment  of  backing 


tfl*-  JPSTlCKMAN 
?Wi    \» 


mijr  m   R|^y 


VV*T  /  x  .v*  \c  A, 

4r^^>    .^C 

trr,  ^lA'.i"    X  .  ; — «.  v\y. 


W$/;M&          "'"::*s 

^XJIPTONVILLE. 


MAP    OF   MILITARY    A>T)    NAVAL    OPERATIONS    ABOUT    ISLAND    NUMBER    TEN.       (BASED    ON    THE    TWO    MAPS 

BY    CAPTAIN   A.    B.    GRAY,   C.   S.   A.,    MADE    IN    MARCH,    1862,    AND    ON    OFFICIAL    REPORTS.) 

FOR    CORRECTION    OF    THE    LINE    OF  THE    CANAL,    SEE    PAGE    461. 


438 


THE  WESTERN  FLOTILLA. 


up-stream,  which  proved  a  laughable  failure.  She  would  sheer  from  one  side 
of  the  river  to  the  other,  and  with  two  anchors  astern  she  could  not  be  held 
steady  enough  to  fight  her  bow-guns  down-stream.  She  dragged  both  anchors 
alternately,  until  they  came  together,  and  the  experiment  failed  completely. 

On  the  morning  of  the  23d  the  flag-officer  made  a  reconnoissance  to  Colum 
bus,  Kentucky,  with  four  gun-boats  and  two  mortar-boats,  accompanied  by 


the  wooden  gun-boat  Cones- 
ports.     The  fortifications 
than  ever.  The  enemy 
sent  up  a  transport 
was  said,  of  effect 
ing  an    exchange 


toga,  convoying  five  trans- 
looked    more    formidable 
fired    two 
with    the 


guns,     and 
pretext,   it 


MOHTAB-BOAT8    AT    ISLAND 
NUMBER   TKN. 


of  prisoners.  | 
at  that  time,  as  we 
learned  afterward  from 
a  credible  source,  the  evac 
uation  of  the  fort  (which 
General  Grant's  successes  at 
Forts  Henry  and  Donelson  had  made  necessary)  was  going  on,  and  the  last 
raft  and  barge  loads  of  all  the  movable  munitions  of  war  were  descending 
the  river,  which,  with  a  large  quantity  previously  taken  away,  could  and 
would  have  been  captured  by  our  fleet  if  we  had  received  this  information 
in  time.  On  the  4th  of  March  another  reconnoissance  in  force  was  made 
with  all  the  gun-boats  and  four  mortar-boats,  and  the  fortress  had  still  a  for 
midable,  life-like  appearance,  though  it  had  been  evacuated  two  days  before.  Jl 

4-  The  ostensible  object  was  a  request  to  permit 
the  families  of  officers  captured  at  Fort  Donelson 
to  pass  through  the  Union  lines.  The  request  was 
granted  on  the  following  day,  but  General  George  W. 
Cullum  (General  Halleck's  chief  of  staff)  and  Flag- 
Officer  Foote  remonstrated  with  General  Polk  for 
the  use  made  of  the  flag  of  truce.—  EDITORS. 

j)  On  the  3d  of  March  the  evacuated  works  had 
been  occupied  by  a  scouting  party  of  the  2d  Illi 
nois  Cavalry,  sent  from  Paducali  by  Brigadier- 
General  W.  T.  Sherman,  who  had  succeeded  Briga 


dier-General  Grant  in  command  of  the  District  of 
Cairo  (February  14,  18  02)  on  the  assignment  of 
General  Grant  to  the  command  of  the  District  of 
West  Tennessee.  The  fact  of  the  occupation  was 
not  known  at  the  time  of  the  gun-boat  reconnois 
sance,  which  included  a  land  force  accompanied 
by  General  Sherman  and  by  Brigadier-General 
Cullum.  This  detachment  landed  and  took  formal 
possession.  In  his  report  of  the  occupation,  Gen 
eral  Cullum  speaks  of  Columbus  as  "the  Gibraltar 
of  the  West."  See  also  note,  p.  367. —  EDITORS. 


THE  WESTERN  FLOTILLA.  439 

On  the  5th  of  March,  while  we  were  descending  the  Mississippi  in  a  dense 
fog,  the  flag-steamer  leading,  the  Confederate  gun-boat  Grampus,  or  Dare-devil 
Jack,  the  sauciest  little  vessel  on  the  river,  suddenly  appeared  across  our  track 
and  "  close  aboard."  She  stopped  her  engines  and  struck  her  colors,  and  we 
all  thought  she  was  ours  at  last.  But  when  the  captain  of  the  Grampus  saw 
how  slowly  we  moved,  and  as  no  gun  was  fired  to  bring  him  to,  he  started  off 
with  astonishing  speed  and  was  out  of  danger  before  the  flag-steamer  could 
fire  a  gun.  She  ran  before  us  yawing  and  flirting  about,  and  blowing  her 
alarm- whistle  so  as  to  announce  our  approach  to  the  enemy  who  had  now  re 
tired  to  Island  Number  Ten,  a  strong  position  sixty  miles  below  Columbus 
(and  of  the  latitude  of  Forts  Henry  and  Donelson),  where  General  Beauregard, 
who  was  now  in  general  command  of  our  opponents,  had  determined  to  con 
test  the  possession  of  the  river. 

On  March  15th  the  flotilla  and  transports  continued  on  their  way  to  Island 
Number  Ten,  arriving  in  its  vicinity  about  nine  in  the  morning.  The  strong 
and  muddy  current  of  the  river  had  overflowed  its  banks  and  carried  away 
every  movable  thing.  Houses,  trees,  fences,  and  wrecks  of  all  kinds  were 
being  swept  rapidly  down-stream.  The  twists  and  turns  of  the  river  near 
Island  Number  Ten  are  certainly  remarkable.  Within  a  radius  of  eight 
miles  from  the  island  it  crosses  the  boundary  line  of  Kentucky  and  Tennessee 
three  times,  running  on  almost  every  point  of  the  compass.  We  were  greatly 
surprised  when  we  arrived  above  Island  Number  Ten  and  saw  on  the  bluffs 
a  chain  of  forts  extending  for  four  miles  along  the  crescent-formed  shore,  with 
the  white  tents  of  the  enemy  in  the  rear.  And  there  lay  the  island  in  the 
lower  corner  of  the  crescent,  with  the  side  fronting  the  Missouri  shore  lined 
with  heavy  ordnance,  so  trained  that  with  the  artillery  on  the  opposite  shore 
almost  every  point  on  the  river  between  the  island  and  the  Missouri  bank 
could  be  reached  at  once  by  all  the  enemy's  batteries. 

On  the  17th  an  attack  was  made  on  the  upper  battery  by  all  the  iron-clads 
and  mortar-boats.  The  Benton  (flag-steamer),  lashed  between  the  Cincinnati 
and  St.  Louis,  was  on  the  east  side  of  the  river ;  the  Mound  City,  Carondelet, 
and  Pittsburgh  were  on  the  west  side ;  the  last,  however,  changed  her  position 
to  the  east  side  of  the  river  before  the  firing  began.  We  opened  fire  on  the 
upper  fort  at  1 : 20,  and  by  order  of  the  flag-officer  fired  one  gun  a  minute. 
The  enemy  replied  promptly,  and  some  of  his  shot  struck  the  Benton,  but, 
owing  to  the  distance  from  which  they  were  fired,  did  but  little  damage.  We 
silenced  all  the  guns  in  the  upper  fort  except  one.  During  the  action  one  of 
the  rifled  guns  of  the  St.  Louis  exploded,  killing  and  wounding  several  of  the 
gunners, — another  proof  of  the  truth  of  the  saying  that  the  guns  furnished 
the  Western  flotilla  were  less  destructive  to  the  enemy  than  to  ourselves. 

From  March  17th  to  April  4th  but  little  progress  was  made  in  the  reduc 
tion  of  the  Confederate  works  —  the  gun-boats  firing  a  few  shot  now  and 
then  at  long  range,  but  doing  little  damage.  The  mortar-boats,  however, 
were  daily  throwing  13-inch  bombs,  and  so  effectively  at  times  that  the 
Confederates  were  driven  from  their  batteries  and  compelled  to  seek  refuge 
in  caves  and  other  places  of  safety.  But  it  was  very  evident  that  the 


440 


THE  WESTERN  FLOTILLA. 


THE    "CAROXDELET"    RUNNING     THE    CONFEDERATE 

BATTERIES  AT  ISLAND  NUMBER  TEN  (APRIL  4,  1862). 

AFTER  A   SKETCH  BY  REAR-ADMIRAL    WALKE. 


great  object  of  the  expedition  —  the 
reduction  of  the  works  and  the  cap 
ture  of  the  Confederate  forces— 
could  not  be  effected  by  the  gun-boats  alone,  owing  to  their  mode  of 
structure  and  to  the  disadvantage  under  which  they  were  fought  in  the 
strong  and  rapid  current  of  the  Mississippi.  This  was  the  opinion  not  only 
of  naval  officers,  but  also  of  General  Pope  and  other  army  officers. 

On  the  23d  of  March  the  monotony  of  the  long  and  tedious  investment 
was  unfortunately  varied  in  a  very  singular  manner.  The  Carondelet  being 
moored  nearest  the  enemy's  upper  fort,  under  several  large  cottonwood  trees, 
in  order  to  protect  the  mortar-boats,  suddenly,  and  without  warning,  two  of 
the  largest  of  the  trees  fell  across  her  deck,  mortally  wounding  one  of  the 
crew  and  severely  wounding  another,  and  doing  great  damage  to  the  vessel. 
This  was  twelve  days  before  I  ran  the  gauntlet  at  Island  Number  Ten  with 
the  Carondelet. 

To  understand  fully  the  importance  of  that  adventure,  some  explanation 
of  the  military  situation  at  and  below  Island  Number  Ten  seems  necessary. 
After  the  evacuation  of  New  Madrid,  which  General  Pope  had  forced  by 
blockading  the  river  twelve  miles  below,  at  Point  Pleasant,  the  Confederate 
forces  occupied  their  fortified  positions  on  Island  Number  Ten  and  the  east 
ern  shore  of  the  Mississippi,  where  they  were  cut  off  by  impassable  swamps 
on  the  land  side.  They  were  in  a  cul-de-sac,  and  the  only  way  open  for  them 
to  obtain  supplies  or  to  effect  a  retreat  was  by  the  river  south  of  Island 
Number  Ten.  General  Pope,  with  an  army  of  twenty  thousand  men,  was  on 


THE  WESTERN  FLOTILLA. 


441 


the  western  side  of  the  river  below  the  island.  Perceiving  the  defect  in  the 
enemy's  position,  he  proceeded  with  great  promptness  and  ability  to  take 
advantage  of  it.  It  was  his  intention  to  cross  the  river  and  attack  the  enemy 
from  below,  but  he  could  not  do  this  without  the  aid  of  a  gun-boat  to  silence 
the  enemy's  batteries  opposite  Point  Pleasant  and  protect  his  army  in  cross 
ing.  He  wrote  repeatedly  to  Flag-Officer  Foote,  urging  him  to  send  down  a 
gun-boat  past  the  enemy's  batteries  on  Island  Number  Ten,  and  in  one  of  his 
letters  expressed  the  belief  that  a  boat  could  pass  down  at  night  under  cover 
of  the  darkness.  But  the  flag-officer  invariably  declined,  saying  in  one  of  his 
letters  to  General  Pope  that  the  attempt  "  would  result  in  the  sacrifice  of  the 
boat,  her  officers  and  men,  which  sacrifice  I  would  not  be  justified  in  making." 

During  this  correspondence  the  bombardment  still  went  on,  but  was 
attended  with  such  poor  results  that  it  became  a  subject  of  ridicule  among 
the  officers  of  Pope's  army,  one  of  whom  (Colonel  Grilmore,  of  Chillicothe, 
Ohio)  is  reported  to  have  said  that  often  when  they  met,  and  inquiry  was 
made  respecting  the  operations  of  the  flotilla,  the  answer  would  generally  be : 
"  Oh !  it  is  still  bombarding  the  State  of  Tennessee  at  long  range."  And  a 
Confederate  officer  said  that  no  casualties  resulted  and  no  damage  was  sus 
tained  at  Island  Number  Ten  from  the  fire  of  the  gun-boats. 

On  March  20th  Flag-Officer  Foote  consulted  his  commanding  officers, 
through  Commander  Sternbel,  as  to  the  practicability  of  taking  a  gun-boat 
past  the  enemy's  forts  to  New  Madrid,  and  all  except  myself  were  opposed 
to  the  enterprise,  believing  with  Foote  that  the  attempt  to  pass  the  batteries 
would  result  in  the  almost  certain  destruction  of  the  boat.  I  did  not  think 
so,  but  believed  with  General  Pope  that,  under  the  cover  of  darkness  and 
other  favorable  circumstances,  a  gun-boat  might  be  run  past  the  enemy's 


THE    LEVEE    AT    NEW    MADRID.       FROM    A    SKETCH    MADE    SOON    AFTER    THE    CAPTURE    OF  ISLAND  NCMBEK    TEX. 


442  THE  WESTERN  FLOTILLA. 

batteries,  formidable  as  they  were  with  nearly  fifty  guns.  And  although 
fully  aware  of  the  hazardous  nature  of  the  enterprise,  I  knew  that  the  aid  of 
a  gun-boat  was  absolutely  necessary  to  enable  General  Pope  to  succeed  in 
his  operations  against  the  enemy,  and  thought  the  importance  of  this  success 
would  justifiy  the  risk  of  running  the  gauntlet  of  the  batteries  on  Island 
Number  Ten  and  on  the  left  bank.  The  army  officers  were  becoming  impa 
tient,  and  it  was  well  known  that  the  Confederates  had  a  number  of  small 
gun-boats  below,  and  were  engaged  in  building  several  large  and  powerful 
vessels,  of  which  the  renowned  Arkansas  was  one.  And  there  was  good 
reason  to  apprehend  that  these  gun-boats  would  ascend  the  river  and  pass 
or  silence  Pope's  batteries,  and  relieve  the  Confederate  forces  on  Island 
Number  Ten  and  the  eastern  shore  of  the  Mississippi.  That  Pope  and 
Foote  apprehended  this,  appeal's  from  the  correspondence  between  them.  J 

The  flag-officer  now  called  a  formal  council  of  war  of  all  his  commanding 
officers.  It  was  held  on  board  the  flag-steamer,  on  the  28th  or  29th  of  March, 
and  all  except  myself  concurred  in  the  opinion  formerly  expressed  that  the 
attempt  to  pass  the  batteries  was  too  hazardous  and  ought  not  to  be  made. 
When  I  was  asked  to  give  my  views,  I  favored  the  undertaking,  and  advised 
compliance  with  the  requests  of  General  Pope.  When  asked  if  I  was  willing 
to  make  the  attempt  with  the  Carondelet,  I  replied  in  the  affirmative.  Foote 
accepted  my  advice,  and  expressed  himself  as  greatly  relieved  from  a  heavy 
responsibility,  as  he  had  determined  to  send  none  but  volunteers  on  an  expedi 
tion  which  he  regarded  as  perilous  and  of  very  doubtful  success. 

Having  received  written  orders  from  the  flag-officer,  under  date  of  March 
30th,  I  at  once  began  to  prepare  the  Carondelet  for  the  ordeal.  All  the  loose 
material  at  hand  was  collected,  and  on  the  4th  of  April  the  decks  were  cov 
ered  with  it,  to  protect  them  against  plunging  shot.  Hawsers  and  chain 
cables  were  placed  around  the  pilot-house  and  other  vulnerable  parts  of  the 
vessel,  and  every  precaution  was  adopted  to  prevent  disaster.  A  coal-barge 
laden  with  hay  and  coal  was  lashed  to  the  part  of  the  port  side  011  which 
there  was  no  iron  plating,  to  protect  the  magazine.  It  was  truly  said  that 
the  Carondelet  at  that  time  resembled  a  farmer's  wagon  prepared  for  mar 
ket.  The  engineers  led  the  escape-steam,  through  the  pipes  aft,  into  the 
wheel-house,  to  avoid  the  puffing  sound  it  made  when  blown  through  the 
smoke-stacks. 

All  the  necessary  preparations  having  been  made,  I  informed  the  flag-offi 
cer  of  my  intention  to  run  the  gauntlet  that  night,  and  received  his  approval. 
Colonel  N.  B.  Buford,  who  commanded  the  land  forces  temporarily  with  the 
flotilla,  assisted  me  in  preparing  for  the  trip,  and  on  the  night  of  the  4th 
brought  on  board  Captain  Hottenstein,  of  the  42d  Illinois,  and  twenty-three 
sharp-shooters  of  his  command,  who  volunteered  their  services,  which  were 
gratefully  accepted.  Colonel  Buford  remained  on  board  until  the  last  moment, 
to  encourage  us.  I  informed  the  officers  and  crew  of  the  character  of  the 

j  An  interesting  and  important  enterprise  in  to  complete  a  water-way  for  the  Union  transports 
this  campaign  was  the  sawing  out,  under  great  across  Madrid  Bend.  See  paper  by  Colonel  J.  W. 
difficulties,  of  a  channel,  twelve  miles  in  length,  Bissell  and  corrected  map,  page  460. —  EDITORS. 


THE  WESTERN  FLOTILLA. 


undertaking,  and 
all  expressed  a 
readiness  to  make 
the  venture.  In  or 
der  to  resist  board 
ing  parties,  in  case 
of  being  disabled, 
the  sailors  were 
well  armed,  and 
pistols,  cutlasses, 
muskets,  board 
ing-pikes,  and 
hand-grenades 
were  within  reach. 
Hose  was  attached 
to  the  boilers  for 
throwing  scalding 
water  over  any 
who  might  at 
tempt  to  board. 
If  it  should  be 
found  impossible 
to  save  the  vessel, 
it  was  designed  to 
sink  rather  than 
burn  her.  Dur 
ing  the  afternoon 
there  was  a  prom 
ise  of  a  clear, 
moonlight  night, 

and  it  was  determined  to  wait  until  the  moon  was  down,  and  then  to  make 
the  attempt,  whatever  the  chances.  Having  gone  so  far,  we  could  not  abandon 
the  project  without  an  effect  on  the  men  almost  as  bad  as  failure. 

At  10  o'clock  the  moon  had  gone  down,  and  the  sky,  the  earth,  and  the 
river  were  alike  hidden  in  the  black  shadow  of  a  thunder-storm,  which  had 
now  spread  itself  over  all  the  heavens.  As  the  time  seemed  favorable,  I 
ordered  the  first  master  to  cast  off.  Dark  clouds  now  rose  rapidly  over  us  and 
enveloped  us  in  almost  total  darkness,  except  when  the  sky  was  lighted  up  by 
the  welcome  flashes  of  vivid  lightning,  to  show  us  the  perilous  way  we  were 
to  take.  Now  and  then  the  dim  outline  of  the  landscape  could  be  seen,  and 
the  forest  bending  under  the  roaring  storm  that  came  rushing  up  the  river. 

With  our  bow  pointing  to  the  island,  we  passed  the  lowest  point  of  land 
without  being  observed,  it  appears,  by  the  enemy.  All  speed  was  given  to 
the  vessel  to  drive  her  through  the  tempest.  The  flashes  of  lightning  con 
tinued  with  frightful  brilliancy,  and  "  almost  every  second,"  wrote  a  corre 
spondent,  "every  brace,  post,  and  outline  could  be  seen  with  startling 


MAJOR-GENERAL  JOHN  POPE. 
FROM  A  PHOTOGRAPH  TAKEN  EARLY  IX  THE  WAR. 


444 


THE  WESTERN  FLOTILLA. 


distinctness,  enshrouded  by  a  bluish 
white  glare  of  light,  and  then  her 
form  for  the  next  miimte  would  be 
come  merged  in  the  intense  darkness." 
When  opposite  Battery  No.  2,  on  the 
mainland, \  the  smoke-stacks  blazed 
up,  but  the  fire  was  soon  subdued.  It 
was  caused  by  the  soot  becoming  dry, 
as  the  escape-steam,  which  usually 
kept  the  stacks  wet,  had  been  sent 
into  the  wheel-house,  as  already  men 
tioned,  to  prevent  noise.  With  such 
vivid  lightning  as  prevailed  during 
the  whole  passage,  there  was  no  pros 
pect  of  escaping  the  vigilance  of  the 
enemy,  but  there  was  good  reason  to 
hope  that  he  would  be  unable  to 
point  his  guns  accurately.  Again 
the  smoke-stacks  took  fire,  and  were 
soon  put  out ;  and  then  the  roar  of 
the  enemy's  guns  began,  and  from 
Batteries  Nos.  2,  3,  and  4  on  the 
mainland  came  the  continued  crack 
and  scream  of  their  rifle-shells,  which 
seemed  to  unite  with  the  electric  bat 
teries  of  the  clouds  to  annihilate  us. 

While  Hearing  the  island  or  some  shoal  point,  during  a  few  minutes  of 
total  darkness,  we  were  startled  by  the  order,  "  Hard  a-port ! "  from  our 
brave  and  skillful  pilot,  First  Master  William  R.  Hoel.  We  almost  grazed  the 
island,  and  it  appears  were  not  observed  through  the  storm  until  we  were 
close  in,  and  the  enemy,  having  no  time  to  point  his  guns,  fired  at  random. 
Iii  fact,  we  ran  so  near  that  the  enemy  did  not,  probably  could  not,  depress 
his  guns  sufficiently.  While  close  under  the  lee  of  the  island  and  during  a 
lull  in  the  storm  and  in  the  firing,  one  of  our  pilots  heard  a  Confederate  officer 
shout,  "  Elevate  your  guns  ! "  It  is  probable  that  the  muzzles  of  those  guns 
had  been  depressed  to  keep  the  rain  out,  and  that  the  officers  ordered  the  guns 
elevated  just  in  time  to  save  us  from  the  direct  fire  of  the  enemy's  heaviest 
fort ;  and  this,  110  doubt,  was  the  cause  of  our  remarkable  escape. 


BRIGADIER-GENERAL   W.   W.     MACKALL,    0.   S.   A.,    IN 
COMMAND  AT  ISLAND  NUMKER  TEN,  PREVIOUSLY 
ASSISTANT  ADJUTANT-GENERAL  TO    GEN 
ERAL  ALBERT  SIDNEY  JOHNSTON. 
FROM    A    PHOTOGRAPH. 


\  The  Confederate  land  batteries  above  New 
Madrid  were  ten  in  number — five  on  the  eastern 
side  of  Island  Number  Ten  ;  four  (Batteries  No.  5, 
4,  3,  and  2)  opposite  the  island  on  the  mainland, 
as  shown  on  the  map  (p.  437),  besides  Battery  No. 
1,  two  miles  above  the  island. — EDITORS. 

During  the  dark  and  stormy  night  of  April  1st 
Colonel  George  W.  Eoberts,  of  the  42d  Illinois  Reg 
iment,  executed  a  brilliant  exploit.  Forty  picked 
men,  in  five  barges,  with  muffled  oars,  left  for  Bat 


tery  No.  1 .  They  proceeded  in  silence,  and  were  un 
observed  until  within  a  few  rods  of  the  fort,  when  a 
flash  of  lightning  discovered  them  to  the  sentries, 
who  fired.  Our  men,  who  did  not  reply,  were  soon 
climbing  up  the  slippery  bank,  and  in  three  min 
utes  more  the  six  guns  were  spiked,  Colonel  Eob 
erts  himself  spiking  a  huge  80-pounder  pivot-gun. 
Some  of  these  guns  had  been  previously  dismount 
ed  by  our  fleet,  and  were  now  rendered  doubly  use 
less.  — H.  W. 


THE  WESTERN  FLOTILLA.  445 

Having  passed  the  principal  batteries,  we  were  greatly  relieved  from  sus 
pense,  patiently  endured,  however,  by  the  officers  and  crew.  But  there  was 
another  formidable  obstacle  in  the  way —  a  floating  battery,  which  was  the 
great  "war  elephant"  of  the  Confederates,  built  to  blockade  the  Mississippi 
permanently.  As  we  passed  her  she  fired  six  or  eight  shots  at  us,  but  without 
effect.  One  ball  struck  the  coal-barge,  and  one  was  found  in  a  bale  of  hay ; 
we  found  also  one  or  two  musket-bullets.  We  arrived  at  New  Madrid  about 
midnight  with  no  one  hurt,  and  were  most  joyfully  received  by  our  army. 
At  the  suggestion  of  Paymaster  Nixon,  all  hands  "  spliced  the  main  brace." 

On  Sunday,  the  6th,  after  prayers  and  thanksgiving,  the  Carondelet,  with 
General  Gordon  Granger,  Colonel  J.  L.  Kirby  Smith  of  the  43d  Ohio,  and 
Captain  Louis  H.  Marshall  of  General  Pope's  staff  on  board,  made  a  recon- 
noissance  twenty  miles  down,  nearly  to  Tiptonville,  the  enemy's  forts  firing 
on  her  all  the  way  down.  We  returned  their  fire,  and  dropped  a  few  shells 
into  their  camps  beyond.  On  the  way  back,  we  captured  and  spiked  the  guns 
of  a  battery  of  one  32-pounder  and  one  24-pounder,  in  about  twenty-five  min 
utes,  opposite  Point  Pleasant.  Before  we  landed  to  spike  the  guns,  a  tall  Con 
federate  soldier,  with  cool  and  deliberate  courage,  posted  himself  behind  a 
large  cottonwood  tree,  and  repeatedly  fired  upon  us,  until  our  Illinois  sharp 
shooters  got  to  work  on  him  from  behind  the  hammock  nettings.  He  had 
two  rifles,  which  he  soon  dropped,  fleeing  into  the  woods  with  his  head  down. 
The  next  day  he  was  captured  and  brought  into  camp  at  Tiptonville,  with 
the  tip  of  his  nose  shot  off.  After  the  capture  of  this  battery,  the  enemy 
prepared  to  evacuate  his  positions  on  Island  Number  Ten  and  the  adja 
cent  shores,  and  thus,  as  one  of  the  historians  of  the  civil  war  says,  the 
Carondelet  struck  the  blow  that  secured  that  victory. 

Returning  to  New  Madrid,  we  were  instructed  by  General  Pope  to  attack 
the  enemy's  batteries  of  six  64-pounders  which  protected  his  rear ;  and  besides, 
another  gun-boat  was  expected.  The  Pittsluryk  (Lieutenant-Commander 
Thompson)  ran  the  gauntlet  without  injury,  during  a  thunder-storm,  at  2  in 
the  morning  of  April  7th,  and  arrived  at  5  o'clock ;  but  she  was  not  ready 
for  service,  and  the  Carondelet  attacked  the  principal  batteries  at  Watson's 
Landing  alone  and  had  nearly  silenced  them  when  the  Pittsburgh  came  up 
astern  and  fired  nearly  over  the  CarondeleVs  upper  deck,  after  she  and  the  Con 
federates  had  ceased  firing.  I  reported  to  General  Pope  that  we  had  cleared  the 
opposite  shores  of  the  enemy,  and  were  ready  to  cover  the  crossing  of  the 
river  and  the  landing  of  the  army.  Seeing  themselves  cut  off,  the  garrison  at 
Island  Number  Ten  surrendered  to  Foote  on  the  7th  of  April,  the  day  of  the 
Confederate  repulse  at  Shiloh.  The  other  Confederates  retreating  before 
Pope's  advance,  were  nearly  all  overtaken  and  captured  at  4  o'clock  on  the 
morning  of  the  8th ;  and  about  the  same  time  the  cavalry  under  Colonel  W.  L. 
Elliott  took  possession  of  the  enemy's  deserted  works  on  the  Tennessee  shore. 

The  result  of  General  Pope's  operations  in  connection  with  the  services 
of  the  Carondelet  below  Island  Number  Ten  was  the  capture  of  three  generals 
(including  General  W.  W.  Mackall,  who  ten  days  before  the  surrender  had 
succeeded  General  John  P.  McCown  in  the  command  at  Madrid  Bend),  over 


446 


THE  WESTERN  FLOTILLA. 


THE  "CARONDELET"  AM> 


"PITTSBURGH"  CAPTURING    TIIK    CONFEDERATE    BAT 
AFTER    A    DRAWING   BY   REAR-ADMIRAL   WALKE. 


:>  BELOW  NEW  MADRID. 


5000  men,  20  pieces  of  heavy  artillery,  7000  stand  of  arms,  and  a  large  quan 
tity  of  ammunition  and  provisions,  without  the  loss  of  a  man  on  our  side. 

On  the  12th  the  Benton  (flag-steamer),  with  the  Cincinnati,  Mound  City, 
Cairo,  and  St.  Louis,  passed  Tiptonville  and  signaled  the  Carondelet  and  Pitts 
burgh  to  follow.  Five  Confederate  gun-boats  came  up  the  next  day  and 
offered  battle ;  but  after  the  exchange  of  a  few  shots  at  long  range  they  retired 
down  the  river.  We  followed  them  all  the  way  to  Craighead's  Point,  where 
they  were  under  cover  of  their  fortifications  at  Fort  Pillow.  I  was  not  aware 
at  the  time  that  we  were  chasing  the  squadron  of  my  esteemed  shipmate  of 
the  U.  S.  Frigates  Cumberland  and  Merrimac,  Colonel  John  W.  Dunnington, 
who  afterward  fought  so  bravely  at  Arkansas  Post. 

On  the  14th  General  Pope's  army  landed  about  six  miles  above  Craighead's 
Point,  near  Osceola,  under  the  protection  of  the  gun-boats.  While  he  was  pre 
paring  to  attack  Fort  Pillow,  Foote  sent  his  executive  officer  twice  to  me  on 
the  Carondelet  to  inquire  whether  I  would  undertake,  with  my  vessel  and  two 
or  three  other  gun-boats,  to  pass  below  the  fort  to  cooperate  with  General 
Pope,  to  which  inquiries  I  replied  that  I  was  ready  at  any  time  to  make  the 
attempt.  But  Pope  and  his  army  (with  the  exception  of  1500  men)  were  or 
dered  away,  and  the  expedition  against  Fort  Pillow  was  abandoned.  Between 
the  14th  of  April  and  the  10th  of  May  two  or  three  of  the  mortar-boats  were 
towed  down  the  river  and  moored  near  Craighead's  Point,  with  a  gun-boat  to 
protect  them.  They  were  employed  in  throwing  13-inch  bombs  across  the 
point  into  Fort  Pillow,  two  miles  distant.  The  enemy  returned  our  bombard 
ment  with  vigor,  but  not  with  much  accuracy  or  effect.  Several  of  their  bombs 
fell  near  the  gun-boats  when  we  were  three  miles  from  the  fort. 


THE  WESTERN  FLOTILLA.  447 

The  Confederate  fleet  called  the  u  River  Defense  "  having  been  reenforced, 
they  determined  upon  capturing  the  mortar-boats  or  giving  us  battle.  On  the 
8th  three  of  their  vessels  canie  to  the  -point  from  which  the  mortar-boats  had 
thrown  their  bombs,  but,  finding  none,  returned.  Foote  had  given  special 
orders  to  keep  up  steam  and  be  ready  for  battle  any  moment,  day  or  night. 
There  was  so  much  illness  at  that  time  in  the  flotilla  that  about  a  third  of  the 
officers  and  men  were  under  medical  treatment,  and  a  great  many  were  unfit 
for  duty.  On  the  9th  of  May,  at  his  own  request,  our  distinguished  com- 
mander-in-chief,  Foote,  was  relieved  from  his  arduous  duties.  He  had  become 
very  much  enfeebled  from  the  wounds  received  at  Fort  Donelson  and  from 
illness.  He  carried  with  him  the  sympathy  and  regrets  of  all  his  command. 
He  was  succeeded  by  Flag-Officer  Charles  Henry  Davis,  a  most  excellent  officer. 

This  paper  would  not  be  complete  without  some  account  of  the  naval 
battles  fought  by  the  flotilla  immediately  after  the  retirement  of  Flag-Officer 
Foote,  under  whose  supervision  and  amid  the  greatest  embarrassments  it  had 
been  built,  organized,  and  equipped.  On  the  morning  of  the  10th  of  May  a 
mortar-boat  was  towed  down  the  river,  as  usual,  at  5  A.  M.,  to  bombard  Fort 
Pillow.  The  Cincinnati  soon  followed  to  protect  her.  At  6:35  eight  Con 
federate  rams  came  up  the  river  at  full  speed,  ft  The  Carondelet  at  once 
prepared  for  action,  and  slipped  her  hawser  to  the  "  bare  end,"  ready  for 
orders  to  "  go  ahead."  No  officer  was  on  the  deck  of  the  Benton  (flag-steamer) 
except  the  pilot,  Mr.  Birch,  who  informed  the  flag-officer  of  the  situation,  and 
passed  the  order  to  the  Carondelet  and  Pittsburgh  to  proceed  without  waiting 
for  the  flag-steamer.  General  signal  was  also  made  to  the  fleet  to  get  under 
way,  but  it  was  not  visible  on  account  of  the  light  fog. 

The  Carondelet  started  immediately  after  the  first  verbal  order;  the  others, 
for  want  of  steam  or  some  other  cause,  were  not  ready,  except  the  Mound 
City,  which  put  off  soon  after  we  were  fairly  on  our  way  to  the  rescue  of  the 
Cincinnati.  We  had  proceeded  about  a  mile  before  our  other  gun-boats  left 
their  moorings.  The  rams  were  advancing  rapidly,  and  we  steered  for  the 
leading  vessel,  General  Bragg,  a  brig-rigged,  side-wheel  steam  ram,  far  in 
advance  of  the  others,  and  apparently  intent  on  striking  the  Cincinnati.  When 
about  three-quarters  of  a  mile  from  the  General  Bragg,  the  Carondelet  and 
Mound  City  fired  on  her  with  their  bow-guns,  until  she  struck  the  Cincinnati 
on  the  starboard  quarter,  making  a  great  hole  in  the  shell-room,  through 
which  the  water  poured  with  resistless  force.  The  Cincinnati  then  retreated 
up  the  river  and  the  General  Bragg  drifted  down,  evidently  disabled.  The 
General  Price,  following  the  example  of  her  consort,  also  rammed  the  Cincin 
nati.  We  fired  our  bow-guns  into  the  General  Price,  and  she  backed  off, 
disabled  also.  The  Cincinnati  was  again  struck  by  one  of  the  enemy's  ranis, 
the  General  Sumter.  Having  pushed  on  with  all  speed  to  the  rescue  of  the 
Cincinnati,  the  Carondelet  passed  her  in  a  sinking  condition,  and,  rounding  to, 
we  fired  our  bow  and  starboard  broadside  guns  into  the  retreating  General 
Bragg  and  the  advancing  rams,  General  Jeff.  Thompson,  General  Beauregard, 


mortar-boat,  No.  1C,  which  was  the  first  object  of  attack,  was  defended  with  great  spirit  by 
Acting-Master  Gregory,  who  fired  his  mortar  eleven  times,  reducing  the  charge  and  diminishing  the 
elevation.  (See  cut,  p.  450.)  —  EDITORS. 


448 


THE  WESTERN  FLOTILLA. 


and  General  Lore//.  Heading  up-stream,  close  to  a  shoal,  the  Carondelet 
brought  her  port  broadside  guns  to  bear  on  the  Sumter  and  Price,  which  were 
dropping  down-stream.  At  this  crisis  the  Van  Dorn  and  Little  Rebel  had  run 

above  the  Carondelet ;  the  Bra(ff),  Jeff. 
Thompson,  Beauregard,  and  Lovell 
were  below  her.  The  last  three,  com 
ing  up,  fired  into  the  Carondelet;  she 
returned  their  fire  with  her  stern  - 
guns ;  and,  while  in  this  position,  I 
ordered  the  port  rifled  50-pounder 
Dahlgren  gun  to  be  leveled  and  fired 
at  the  center  of  the  Sumter.  The  shot 
struck  the  vessel  just  forward  of  her 
wheel-house,  and  the  steam  instantly 
poured  out  from  her  ports  arid  all 
parts  of  her  casemates,  and  we  saw 
her  men  running  out  of  them  and  fall 
ing  or  lying  down  on  her  deck.  None 
of  our  gun-boats  had  yet  come  to  the 
assistance  of  the  Carondelet.  The  Ben- 
ton  and  Pittsburgh  had  probably  gone 
to  aid  the  Cincinnati,  and  the  <S7. 
Louis  to  relieve  the  Mound  City,  which 
had  been  badly  rammed  by  the  Van 
Dorn.  The  smoke  at  this  time  was  so 
dense  that  we  could  hardly  distinguish  the  gun- boats  above  us.  The  upper 
deck  of  the  Carondelet  was  swept  with  grape-shot  and  fragments  of  broken 
shell ;  some  of  the  latter  were  picked  up  by  one  of  the  sharp-shooters,  who 
told  me  they  were  obliged  to  lie  down  under  shelter  to  save  themselves  from 
the  grape  and  other  shot  of  the  Pittsburgh  above  us,  and  from  the  shot  and 
broken  shell  of  the  enemy  below  us.  Why  some  of  our  gun-boats  did  not  fire 
into  the  Van  Dorn  and  Little  Rebel  while  they  were  above  the  Carondelet, 
and  prevent  their  escape,  if  possible,  I  never  could  make  out.  J 

As  the  smoke  rose  we  saw  that  the  enemy  was  retreating  rapidly  and  in 
great  confusion.  The  Carondelet  dropped  down  to  within  half  a  mile  above 
Craighead's  Point,  and  kept  up  a  continual  fire  upon  their  vessels,  which  were 
very  much  huddled  together.  When  they  were  nearly,  if  not  quite,  beyond 
gunshot,  the  Benton,  having  raised  sufficient  steam,  came  down  and  passed 
the  Carondelet ;  but  the  Confederates  were  under  the  protection  of  Fort  Pil 
low  before  the  Benton  could  reach  them.  Our  fleet  returned  to  Plum  Point, 
except  the  Carondelet,  which  dropped  her  anchor  on  the  battle-field,  two 
miles  or  more  below  the  point,  and  remained  there  two  days  on  voluntary 

\ Flag-Officer  Davis  says  in  his  report:  "All  of  so  disproportionate  to  the  bulk  of  the  vessels  that 

these  vessels  might  easily  have  been  captured  if  they  can  accomplish  but  little  beyond  overcom- 

we  had  possessed  the  means  of  towing  them  out  ing  the  strength  of  the  current,  even  when  uniu- 

of  action ;  but  the  steam-power  of  our  gun-boats  is  cumbered." —  EDITORS. 


FLAG-OFFICER     CHARLES     HENRY      DAVIS     (AFTERWARD 

REAR-ADMIRAL  AND    CHIEF  OF    THE  BUREAU  OF 

NAVIGATION).       FROM   A  PHOTOGRAPH. 


THE  WESTERN  FLOTILLA. 


449 


guard  duty.  This  engagement  was  sharp,  but  not  decisive.  From  the  first  to 
the  last  shot  fired  by  the  Carondelet,  one  hour  and  ten  minutes  elapsed.  After 
the  battle,  long-range  firing  was  kept  up  until  the  evacuation  of  Fort  Pillow. 

On  the  25th  seven  of  Colonel  Ellet's  rams  arrived, — a  useful  acquisition  to 
our  fleet.  During  the  afternoon  of  June  4th  heavy  clouds  of  smoke  were 
observed  rising  from  Fort  Pillow,  followed  by  explosions,  which  continued 
through  the  night ;  the  last  of  which,  much  greater  than  the  others,  lit  up 
the  heavens  and  the  Chickasaw  bluffs  with  a  brilliant  light,  and  convinced 
us  that  this  was  the  parting  salute  of  the  Confederates  before  leaving  for  the 
lower  Mississippi.  At  dawn  next  morning  the  fleet  was  all  astir  to  take  pos 
session  of  Fort  Pillow,  the  flag-steamer  leading.  We  found  the  casemates, 
magazines,  and  breastworks  blown  to  atoms. 

On  our  way  to  Memphis  the  enemy's  steamer  Sovereign  was  intercepted  by 
one  of  our  tugs.  She  was  ran  ashore  by  her  crew,  who  attempted  to  blow 
her  up,  but  were  foiled  in  their  purpose  by  a  boy  of  sixteen  whom  the  enemy 
had  pressed  into  service,  who,  after  the  abandonment  of  the  vessel,  took  the 
extra  weights  from  the  safety-valves,  opened  the  fire-doors  and  flue-caps, 
and  put  water  011  the  fires,  and,  having  procured  a  sheet,  signaled  the  tug, 
which  came  up  and  took  possession.  It  may  be  proper  to  say  that  on  our 
way  down  the  river  we  respected  private  property,  and  did  not  assail  or 
molest  any  except  those  who  were  in  arms  against  us. 

The  morning  of  the  6th  of  June  we  fought  the  battle  of  Memphis,  which 
lasted  one  hour  and  ten  minutes.  It  was  begun  by  an  attack  upon  our  fleet  by 
the  enemy,  whose  vessels  were  in  double  line  of  battle  opposite  the  city.  We 
were  then  at  a  distance  of  a  mile  and  a  half  or  two  miles  above  the  city.  Their 
fire  continued  for  a  quarter  of  an  hour,  when  the  attack  was  promptly  met  by 


FORT   PILLOW   AND  THE    \\ATER-BATTERY.      AFTER  A  SKETCH  BY   REAR-ADMIRAL   WALKE. 
VOL.   I.     29 


4=)° 


THE  WESTERN  FLOTILLA. 


"  MOUND  CITY."  CARONDELET."  CINCINNATI."  PRICE."  BRAGG."  SUMTER." 

MORTAR   NO.    16.  "  VAN    DORN."  "  LITTLE  REBEL." 

THE    BATTLE    OF  FORT  PILLOW,   MAY    10,    1862   (LOOKING  NORTH).      AFTER  A   SKETCH    BY    REAR-ADMIRAL   WALKE. 

two  of  our  ram  squadron,  the  Queen  of  the  West  (Colonel  Charles  Ellet)  lead 
ing,  and  the  Monarch  (Lieutenant-Colonel  A.  W.  Ellet,  younger  brother  of  the 
leader).  These  vessels  fearlessly  dashed  ahead  of  our  gun-boats,  ran  for  the 
enemy's  fleet,  and  at  the  first  plunge  succeeded  in  sinking  one  vessel  and  dis 
abling  another.  The  astonished  Confederates  received  them  gallantly  and 
effectively.  The  Queen  of  the  West  and  Monarch  were  followed  in  line  of  battle 
by  the  gun-boats,  under  the  lead  of  Flag-Ofncer  Davis,  and  all  of  them  opened 
fire,  which  was  continued  from  the  time  we  got  within  good  range  until  the 
end  of  the  battle — two  or  three  tugs  keeping  all  the  while  a  safe  distance  astern. 
The  Queen  of  the  West  was  a  quarter  of  a  mile  in  advance  of  the  Monarch, 
and  after  having  rammed  one  of  the  enemy's  fleet,  she  was  badly  rammed 
by  the  Beauref/ard,  which  then,  in  company  with  the  General  Price,  made  a 
dash  at  the  Monarch  as  she  approached  them.  The  Beaureyard,  however, 
missed  the  Monarch  and  struck  the  General  Price  instead  on  her  port  side, 
cutting  her  down  to  the  water-line,  tearing  off  her  wheel  instantly,  and 
placing  her  hors  de  combat.  The  Monarch  then  rammed  the  Beauregard, 
which  had  been  several  times  raked  fore  and  aft  by  the  shot  and  shell  of 
our  iron-clads,  and  she  quickly  sank  in  the  river  opposite  Memphis.  The 
General  Lovell,  after  having  been  badly  rammed  by  the  Queen  of  the  West, 
was  struck  by  our  shot  and  shell,  and,  at  about  the  same  time  and  place 
as  the  Beauref/ard,  sank  to  the  bottom  so  suddenly  as  to  take  a  consider 
able  number  of  her  officers  arid  crew  down  with  her,  the  others  being  saved 
by  small  boats  and  our  tugs.  The  Price,  Little  Rebel  (with  a  shot-hole 


THE  WESTERN  FLOTILLA. 


451 


through  her  steam-chest),  and  our  Queen  of  the  West,  all  disabled,  were  run 
on  the  Arkansas  shore  opposite  Memphis ;  and  the  Monarch  afterward  ran 
into  the  Little  Eebel  just  as  our  fleet  was  passing  her  in  pursuit  of  the 
remainder  of  the  enemy's  fleet,  then  retreating  rapidly  down  the  river.  The 
Jeff.  Thompson,  below  the  point  and  opposite  President's  Island,  was  the  next 
boat  disabled  by  our  shot.  She  was  run  ashore,  burned,  and  blown  up.  The 
Confederate  ram  Sumter  was  also  disabled  by  our  shell  and  captured.  The 
Bragg  soon  after  shared  the  same  fate  and  was  run  ashore,  where  her  officers 
abandoned  her  and  disappeared  in  the  forests  of  Arkansas.  All  the  Con 
federate  rams  which  had  been  run  on  the  Arkansas  shore  were  captured. 
The  Van  Dorn,  having  a  start,  alone  escaped  down  the  river.  The  rams 


THE    BATTLE    OF    MEMPHIS   (JUNK  (i,   1862),    LOOKING    SOUTH.      AFTER    A    DRAWING    BY    REAK-ADMIRAL  WALKB. 

Monarch  and  Switzerland  were  dispatched  in  pursuit  of  her  and  a  few  trans 
ports,  but  returned  without  overtaking  them,  although  they  captured  another 
steamer.  & 

The  scene  at  this  battle  was  rendered  most  sublime  by  the  desperate  nature 
of  the  engagement  and  the  momentous  consequences  that  followed  very 
speedily  after  the  first  attack.  Thousands  of  people  crowded  the  high  bluffs 
overlooking  the  river.  The  roar  of  the  cannon  and  shell  shook  the  houses  on 
shore  on  either  side  for  many  miles.  First  wild  yells,  shrieks,  and  clamors, 
then  loud,  despairing  murmurs,  filled  the  affrighted  city.  The  screaming, 
plunging  shell  crashed  into  the  boats,  blowing  some  of  them  and  their  crews 
into  fragments,  and  the  rams  rushed  upon  each  other  like  wild  beasts  in 

&  See  paper  on  "  Ellet  and  his  Steam-rams  at  Memphis,"  page  453. — EDITORS. 


4'->2 


THE  WESTERN  FLOTILLA. 


deadly  conflict.  Blinding  smoke  hov 
ered  about  the  scene  of  all  this  con 
fusion  and  horror ;  and,  as  the  battle 
progressed  and  the  Confederate  fleet 
was  destroyed,  all  the  cheering  voices 
011  shore  were  silenced.  When  the  last 
hope  of  the  Confederates  gave  way,  the 
lamentations  which  went  up  from  the 
spectators  w^ere  like  cries  of  anguish. 

Boats  were  put  off  from  our  vessels 
to  save  as  many  lives  as  possible.  No 
serious  injury  was  received  by  any 
one  011  board  the  United  States  fleet. 
Colonel  Ellet  received  a  pistol-shot  in 
the  leg ;  a  shot  struck  the  Carondelet 
in  the  bow,  broke  up  her  anchor 
and  anchor-stock,  and  fragments  were 
scattered  over  her  deck  among  her 
officers  and  crew,  wounding  slightly 
Acting-Master  Gibson  and  two  or  three 
others  who  were  standing  at  the  time 
on  the  forward  deck  with  me.  The 
heavy  timber  which  was  suspended  at 
the  water-line,  to  protect  the  boats  from 
the  Confederate  rams,  greatly  impeded  our  progress,  and  it  was  therefore 
cut  adrift  from  the  Carondelet  when  that  vessel  was  in  chase  of  the  Brayg 
and  Sumter.  The  latter  had  just  landed  a  number  of  her  officers  and  crew, 
some  of  whom  were  emerging  from  the  bushes  along  the  bank  of  the  river, 
unaware  of  the  Carondelefs  proximity,  when  I  hailed  them  through  a  trum 
pet,  and  ordered  them  to  stop  or  be  shot.  They  obeyed  immediately,  and  by 
my  orders  were  taken  on  board  a  tug  and  delivered  011  the  Benton. 

General  Jeff.  Thompson,  noted  in  partisan  or  border  warfare,  having  sig 
nally  failed  with  those  rams  at  Fort  Pillow,  now  resigned  them  to  their 
fate.  It  was  said  that  he  stood  by  his  horse  watching  the  struggle,  and  seeing 
at  last  his  rams  all  gone,  captured,  sunk,  or  burned,  he  exclaimed,  philosoph 
ically,  "  They  are  gone,  and  I  am  going,"  mounted  his  horse,  and  disappeared. 
An  enormous  amount  of  property  was  captured  by  our  squadron  ;  and,  in 
addition  to  the  Confederate  fleet,  we  captured  at  Memphis  six  large  Missis 
sippi  steamers,  each  marked  "  C.  S.  A."  We  also  seized  a  large  quantity  of 
cotton  in  steamers  and  011  shore,  and  the  property  at  the  Confederate  Navy 
Yard,  and  caused  the  destruction  of  the  Tennessee,  a  large  steam-ram,  on  the 
stocks,  which  was  to  have  been  a  sister  ship  to  the  renowned  Arkansas. 
About  one  hundred  Confederates  were  killed  and  wounded  and  one  hundred 
and  fifty  captured.  Chief  of  all  results  of  the  work  of  the  flotilla  was  the 
opening  of  the  Mississippi  River  once  for  all  from  Cairo  to  Memphis,  and  the 
complete  possession  of  Western  Tennessee  by  the  Union  forces. 


BRIGADIER-GENERAL  M.    JEFF.    THOMPSON. 
FROM    A    PHOTOGRAPH. 


ELLET   AND    HIS    STEAM-RAMS    AT    MEMPHIS. 

BY  ALFRED  W.  ELLET,  BRIGADIER-GENERAL,  U.  S.  V.  | 

ON  the  8th  of  March,  1862,  occurred  the  memorable  catastrophe  at  Hamp 
ton  Roads.  The  possibility  of  such  a  disaster  had  been  repeatedly  urged 
in  warning  terms  by  a  gentleman  who  had  vainly  endeavored  to  avert  it.  I 
refer  to  the  late  eminent  civil  engineer,  Charles  Ellet,  Jr.,  the  inventor  of  the 
steam-ram  as  a  vehicle  of  war  destruction.  On  the  6th  of  February,  1862, 
Mr.  Ellet  wrote  in  a  pamphlet  as  follows : 

"  It  is  not  generally  known  that  the  rebels  now  have  five  steam-rams  nearly  ready  for  use.  Of 
these  five,  two  are  on  the  lower  Mississippi,  two  are  at  Mobile,  and  one  is  at  Norfolk.  The 
last  of  the  five,  the  one  at  Norfolk,  is  doubtless  the  most  formidable,  being  the  United  States 
steam-frigate  Merrimac,  which  has  been  so  strengthened  that,  in  the  opinion  of  the  rebels,  it 
may  be  used  as  a  ram.  But  we  have  not  yet  a  single  vessel  at  sea,  nor,  so  far  as  I  know,  in 
course  of  construction,  able  to  cope  at  all  with  a  well-built  ram.  If  the  Merrimac  is  permitted 
to  escape  from  Elizabeth  River,  she  will  be  almost  certain  to  commit  great  depredations  on  our 
armed  and  unarmed  vessels  in  Hampton  Roads,  and  may  even  be  expected  to  pass  out  under 
the  guns  of  Fortress  Monroe  and  prey  upon  our  commerce  in  Chesapeake  Bay.  Indeed,  if  the 
alterations  have  been  skillfully  made,  and  she  succeeds  in  getting  to  sea,  she  will  not  only  be  a 
terrible  scourge  to  our  commerce,  but  may  prove  also  to  be  a  most  dangerous  visitor  to  our 
blockading  squadrons  off  the  harbors  of  the  southern  coasts.  I  have  attempted  to  call  the 
attention  of  the  Navy  Department  and  the  country  so  often  to  this  subject  during  the  last  seven 
years,  that  I  almost  hesitate  to  allude  to  it  again  ;  and  I  would  not  do  so  here  but  that  I  think 
the  danger  fi-om  these  tremendous  engines  is  very  imminent  but  not  at  all  appreciated.  Experience, 

4  After  the  death  of  Colonel  Ellet,  the  command  of  the  ram-fleet  was  conferred  upon  the  writer,  by 
order  of  the  Secretary  of  War. — EDITORS. 

453 


454 


ELLET  AND  HIS  STEAM-RAMS  AT  MEMPHIS. 


COLONEL    CHARLES   ELLET,  JK.      FROM  A  PHOTOGRAPH. 


derived  from  accidental  collisions, 
shows  that  a  vessel  struck  in  the  waist 
by  a  steam-ram  at  sea  will  go  down 
almost  instantaneously,  and  involve, 
as  has  often  happened,  the  loss  of 
nearly  all  on  board." 

Upon  the  startling  verifica 
tion  of  his  neglected  admoni 
tions  afforded  by  the  Merrimac, 
Mr.  Ellet  was  called  to  the  Wai- 
Department,  and,  after  a  short 
conference  with  Secretary 
Stantoii,  was  given  authority 
to  purchase,  refit,  man,  and 
command,  with  the  rank  of 
colonel,  any  number  of  vessels 
deemed,  in  his  judgment,  neces 
sary  to  meet  and  defeat  the 
fleet  of  iron-clad  rams  then 
known  to  be  in  process  of  con 
struction  on  the  lower  Missis 
sippi  River. 

Never  was  work  more  promptly  or  more  effectually  performed.  Colonel 
Ellet  purchased  a  number  of  steamboats  at  different  points  on  the  Ohio  River, 
the  best  he  could  find  in  the  short  time  at  his  disposal.  He  took  some  old 
and  nearly  worn-out  boats,  strengthened  their  hulls  and  bows  with  heavy 
timbers,  raised  bulkheads  of  timber  around  the  boilers,  and  started  them  down 
the  river  to  Cairo  as  fast  as  they  could  be  got  off  the  ways.  They  were  the 
Dick  Fulton,  Lancaster,  Lioness,  Minyo,  Monarch,  Queen  oftlie  West,  Samson, 
Switzerland,  and  T.  D.  Homer. 

While  the  work  was  progressing,  and  before  any  one  of  the  rams  was  nearly 
completed,  information  was  received  that  the  Confederate  fleet  had  come  out 
from  under  the  batteries  of  Fort  Pillow,  had  attacked  our  fleet  of  gun-boats 
lying  near  Craighead's  Point,  and  had  disabled  two  of  them.  J)  Colonel 
Ellet  received  most  urgent  telegrams  from  the  Secretary  of  War  to  hurry 
the  rams  forward  at  the  earliest  possible  moment.  In  consequence  of  these 
demands,  five  of  them  were  immediately  dispatched  down  the  river  under  my 
command,  work  upon  them  being  continued  as  they  proceeded  and  for  several 
days  after  their  arrival  at  Fort  Pillow.  The  other  rams  followed,  and  about 
the  25th  of  May  Colonel  Ellet  joined  the  fleet  on  board  the  Switzerland,  and 
the  ram-fleet  was  now  ready  for  action. 

Colonel  Ellet  at  once  conferred  with  Flag-Officer  Charles  H.  Davis  on  the 
propriety  of  passing  Fort  Pillow,  and  engaging  the  enemy's  fleet  wherever 
found.  Flag-Officer  Davis  did  not  approve  the  plan  suggested,  but  offered 
no  objection  to  Colonel  Ellet's  trying  the  experiment.  Accordingly,  imme- 

j)The  Cincinnati  arid  the  Moimd  City.     See  page  447. — EDITORS. 


ELLET  AND  HIS  STEAM-RAMS  AT  MEMPHIS. 


455 


diate  preparations  were  begun  for  running  the  batteries  with  the  entire  rani- 
fleet.  During  this  period  of  preparation,  constant  watch  was  kept  upon 
the  fort  and  the  enemy's  fleet.  On  the  night  of  the  4th  of  June  I  crossed  the 
timber  point  in  front  of  the  fort,  and  reported  to  the  colonel  commanding 
my  conviction  that  the  fort  was  being  evacuated.  About  2  o'clock  in  the 
morning  I  obtained  permission,  with  many  words  of  caution  from  Colonel 
Ellet,  to  run  down  opposite  the  fort  in  a  yawl  and,  after  lying  off  in  order  to 
become  assured  that  the  place  was  abandoned,  to  land,  with  the  assurance 
that  the  rams  would  follow  in  case  my  yawl  did  not  return  before  daylight. 


(CAPTURED).  "  LOUISVILLE."  "  ST.  LOUIS."  UNFINISHED  CONFEDERATE  RAM. 

"  CARONOELET." 

CLOSE    OF  THE    BATTLE    OF   MEMPHIS,   JUNE  6,   1862  (LOOKING  NORTH). 
AFTER  A  DRAWING   BY  REAR-ADMIRAL  WALKE. 

I  landed  with  my  little  band,  only  to  find  the  fort  entirely  deserted ;  and  after 
planting  the  National  colors  upon  the  ruins  of  one  of  the  magazines,  we  sat 
down  to  wait  for  the  coming  of  daylight  and  the  rams.  They  came,  followed 
by  the  entire  fleet,  and  after  a  short  stop  all  proceeded  down  the  river,  the 
rams  taking  the  lead,  to  Fort  Randolph,  where  they  delayed  long  enough  to 
plant  the  National  flag  and  to  examine  the  abandoned  fortifications,  the  gun 
boats  at  this  point  taking  the  advance.  J 

After  leaving  Fort  Randolph  the  ram-fleet  proceeded  without  incident  to 
within  about  twenty-five  miles  of  Memphis,  where  they  all  rounded  to  and 


j  The  advance  of  Halleck  upon  Corinth  after 
Shiloh,  and  its  evacuation  on  May  30th,  gave  the 
Union  forces  possession  of  the  Memphis  and 
Charleston  railroad,  broke  the  second  line  of  Con 
federate  defense,  and  turned  all  the  positions  ou 


the  river  above  Memphis.  Fort  Pillow  and  Fort 
Randolph  were  thus  made  untenable  (just  as  Co 
lumbus  had  become  untenable  after  the  fall  of  Forts 
Henry  and  Donelson  on  the  Confederate  first  line 
of  defense)  and  hence  were  evacuated. — EDITORS. 


456  ELLET  AND  HIS  STEAM-RAMS  AT  MEMPHIS. 

tied  up  for  the  night,  with  orders  of  sailing  issued  to  each  commander ;  instruc 
tions  to  be  ready  to  round  out  at  the  signal  from  the  flag-ship,  and  that  "  each 
boat  should  go  into  the  anticipated  fight  in  the  same  order  they  maintained 
in  sailing."  At  the  first  dawn  of  day  (June  6th)  the  fleet  moved  down  the  river, 
and  at  sunrise  the  flag-ship  rounded  the  bend  at  "Paddy's  Hen  and  Chickens," 
and  immediately  after  came  in  sight  of  the  Federal  gun-boats  anchored  in 
line  across  the  river,  about  a  mile  above  Memphis.  Colonel  Ellet  promptly 
signaled  his  vessels  to  tie  up  on  the  Arkansas  shore,  in  the  order  of  their  sail 
ing,  as  he  desired  to  confer  with  Flag-Officer  Davis  before  passing  further. 

The  Queen  of  the  West  came  to,  first,  followed  by  the  Monarch  and  other 
rams  in  regular  succession.  The  Queen  of  the  West  had  made  the  land,  and 
passed  out  line  to  make  fast ;  the  Monarch  was  closing  in  just  above,  but  had 
not  yet  touched  the  shore.  At  this  moment,  and  as  the  full  orb  of  the  sun 
rose  above  the  horizon,  the  report  of  a  gun  was  heard  from  around  the  point 
and  down  the  river.  It  was  the  first  gun  from  the  Confederate  River  Defense 
Fleet  moving  to  attack  us.  Colonel  Ellet  was  standing  on  the  hurricane-deck 
of  the  Queen  of  the  West.  He  immediately  sprang  forward,  and,  waving  his 
hat  to  attract  my  attention,  called  out :  "  It  is  a  gun  from  the  enemy  !  Round 
out  and  follow  me  !  Now  is  our  chance  ! "  Without  a  moment's  delay,  the 
Queen  moved  out  gracefully,  and  the  Monarch  followed.  By  this  time  our 
gun-boats  had  opened  their  batteries,  and  the  reports  of  guns  on  both  sides 
were  heavy  and  rapid. 

The  morning  was  beautifully  clear  and  perfectly  still;  a  heavy  wall  of 
smoke  was  formed  across  the  river,  so  that  the  position  of  our  gun-boats 
could  only  be  seen  by  the  flashes  of  their  guns.  The  Queen  plunged  forward, 
under  a  full  head  of  steam,  right  into  this  wall  of  smoke  and  was  lost  sight 
of,  her  position  being  known  only  by  her  tall  pipes  which  reached  above  the 
smoke.  The  Monarch,  following,  was  greeted,  while  passing  the  gun-boats,  with 
wild  huzzas  from  our  gallant  tars.  When  freed  from  the  smoke,  those  of  us 
who  were  on  the  Monarch  could  see  Colonel  Ellet's  tall  and  commanding  form 
still  standing  on  the  hurricane-deck,  waving  his  hat  to  show  me  which  one 
of  the  enemy's  vessels  he  desired  the  Monarch  to  attack, — namely,  the  General 
Price,  which  was  on  the  right  wing  of  their  advancing  line.  For  himself  he 
selected  the  General  Lovell  and  directed  the  Queen  straight  for  her,  she  being 
about  the  middle  of  the  enemy's  advancing  line.  The  two  vessels  canie 
toward  each  other  in  most  gallant  style,  head  to  head,  prow  to  prow ; 
and  had  they  met  in  that  way,  it  is  most  likely  that  both  vessels  would  have 
gone  down.  But  at  the  critical  moment  the  General  Lovell  began  to  turn ; 
and  that  moment  sealed  her  fate.  The  Queen  came  on  and  plunged  straight 
into  the  LoveWs  exposed  broadside ;  the  vessel  was  cut  almost  in  two  and 
disappeared  under  the  dark  waters  in  less  time  than  it  takes  to  tell  the  story. 
The  Monarch  next  struck  the  General  Price  a  glancing  blow  which  cut  her 
starboard  wheel  clean  off,  and  completely  disabled  her  from  further  participa 
tion  in  the  fight.\ 

\  It  is  impossible  to  reconcile  this  statement  conflicting,  but  it  has  always  been  the  general 
with  that  of  Admiral  Walke,  on  page  450,  q.  r.  impression  that  the  Price  received  her  disabling 
The  reports  of  the  engagement  are  meager  and  blow  in  an  accidental  collision  with  the  Bcaure- 


ELLET  AND  HIS  STEAM-RAMS  AT  MEMPHIS.  457 

As  soon  as  the  Queen  was  freed  from  the  wreck  of  the  sinking  Lovell,  and 
before  she  could  recover  headway,  she  was  attacked  on  both  sides  by  the 
enemy's  vessels,  the  Beau/regard  on  one  side  and  the  Stouter  on  the  other.  In 
the  melee  one  of  the  wheels  of  the  Queen  was  disabled  so  that  she  could  not 
use  it,  and  Colonel  Ellet,  while  still  standing  on  the  hurricane-deck  to  view 
the  effects  of  the  encounter  with  the  General  Lovell,  received  a  pistol-ball  in 
his  knee,  and,  lying  prone  on  the  deck,  gave  orders  for  the  Queen  to  be  run 
on  her  one  remaining  wheel  to  the  Arkansas  shore,  whither  she  was  soon  fol 
lowed  by  the  General  Price  in  a  sinking  condition.  Colonel  Ellet  sent  an 
officer  and  squad  of  men  to  meet  the  General  Price  upon  her  making  the  shore, 
and  received  her  entire  crew  as  prisoners  of  war.  By  this  time  consternation 
had  seized  upon  the  enemy's  fleet,  and  all  had  turned  to  escape.  The  fight 
had  drifted  down  the  river,  below  the  city.-fr 

The  Monarch,  as  soon  as  she  could  recover  headway  after  her  conflict  with 
the  General  Price,  drove  down  upon  the  Beauregard,  which  vessel,  after  her 
encounter  with  the  Queen  of  the  West,  was  endeavoring  to  escape.  She  was 
thwarted  by  the  Monarch  coming  down  upon  her  with  a  well-directed  blow 
which  crushed  in  her  side  and  completely  disabled  her  from  further  hope  of 
escape.  Men  on  the  deck  waved  a  white  flag  in  token  of  surrender,  and  the 
Monarch  passed  on  down  to  intercept  the  Little  Held,  the  enemy's  flag-ship. 
She  had  received  some  injury  from  our  gun-boats'  fire,  and  was  making  for 
the  Arkansas  shore,  which  she  reached  at  the  moment  when  the  Monarch, 
with  very  slight  headway,  pushed  her  hard  and  fast  aground ;  her  crew 
sprang  upon  shore  and  ran  into  the  thick  woods,  making  their  escape.  Leav 
ing  the  Little  Rebel  fast  aground,  the  Monarch  turned  her  attention  to  the 
sinking  Beauregard,  taking  the  vessel  in  tow,  and  making  prisoners  of  her 
crew.  The  Beauregard  was  towed  by  the  Monarch  to  the  bar,  where  she  sank 
to  her  boiler-deck  and  finally  became  a  total  loss. 

The  others  of  the  enemy's  fleet  were  run  ashore  and  fired  by  the  crews  be 
fore  they  escaped  into  the  adjoining  Arkansas  swamps.  The  Jeff.  Thompson 
burned  and  blew  up  with  a  tremendous  report ;  the  General  Bragg  was  secured 
by  our  gun-boats  before  the  fire  gained  headway,  and  was  saved.  The  Van 
Dorn  alone  made  her  escape,  and  was  afterward  burned  by  the  enemy  at  Liver 
pool  Landing,  upon  the  approach  of  two  of  our  rams  in  Yazoo  River,  in  order 
to  prevent  her  from  falling  into  our  hands.  Two  other  rebel  boats  were 
burned  at  the  same  time, —  the  Polk  and  the  Livingston. 

After  the  Monarch  had  towed  the  Beauregard  into  shoal  water,  from  which, 
it  was  hoped,  she  might  be  raised,  I  received  the  first  intelligence,  from  a  dis- 

gardj  as  has  been  stated  by  Captain  Hurt,  com-  proceeded  immediately  to  quarters.     The  Confecl- 

maiider  of  the  Beaureyard.     The  reports  of  Flag-  erate  fleet  opened  at  5,  and  at  5  :  20  the  gun-boats 

Officer  Davis  and  of  General  M.  Jeff.  Thompson,  were  returning  the  fire  and  steaming  down  the 

commander  of  the  Confederate  troops  at  Memphis,  river.     The  higher  speed  of  Colonel  Ellet's  rams 

agree   in  saying   that   the  Price  was  rammed  by  enabled  them  to  pass  through  the   intervals  in 

one  of  her  consorts, —  General  Thompson  adding  Davis's  flotilla,  and  the  latter,  coming  after  them, 

that  the  blow,  which  he  states  was  delivered  by  completed  with  its  batteries  the  work  which  the 

the  Beauref/ard,  knocked  off  the  Price's  wheel"  and  rams  had  so  successfully  begun.     The  guns  of  the 

entirely  disabled  her. —  EDITORS.  flotilla  were  well  served,  and  both  the  Beauregard 

ty  The    gun-boat    flotilla,    under     Flag-Officer  and  Little  Rebel  were  disabled  by  shots  in  their 

Davis,    had  weighed   anchor  at   4:30  A.  M.    and  boilers. — EDITORS. 


4S8  ELLET  AND  HIS  STEAM-RAMS  AT  MEMPHIS. 

patch-boat  bearing  orders,  that  Colonel  Ellet  was  wounded.  The  orders  I 
received  from  him  were :  "  Continue  the  pursuit  as  long  as  there  is  any  hope 
of  overtaking  the  flying  enemy." 

One  other  episode  of  this  day  should  not  be  omitted.  Toward  the  close  of 
the  engagement,  Colonel  Ellet  was  informed  that  a  white  flag  had  been  raised 
in  Memphis,  and  he  immediately  sent  his  young  son,  Medical  Cadet  Charles 
Rivers  Ellet,  ashore  with  a  party  of  three  men  and  a  flag  of  truce,  to  demand 
the  surrender  of  the  city.  They  landed  in  a  row-boat  and  delivered  Colonel 
Ellet's  dispatch  to  the  mayor,  and  received  his  reply ;  then,  surrounded  by 
an  excited  and  threatening  crowd,  they  proceeded  to  the  post-office,  ascended 
to  the  top  of  the  building,  and,  while  stoned  and  fired  upon  by  the  mob  below, 
young  Ellet  lowered  the  Confederate  colors  and  raised  the  National  flag  over 
the  city  of  Memphis.  This  incident  occurred  a  considerable  length  of  time 
before  the  formal  surrender  of  the  city  into  the  possession  of  the  United 
States  troops  under  command  of  Colonel  Gr.  N.  Fitch. 

At  first,  Colonel  Ellet's  wound  was  not  considered  necessarily  dangerous, 
but  a  few  days  showed  us  all  how  futile  w^as  the  hope  that  our  brave  com 
mander  would  ever  again  tread  the  decks  of  his  victorious  fleet.  He  continued 
to  send  dispatches  and  issue  necessary  orders  from  his  bed  as  long  as  he 
could  receive  the  reports  of  his  subordinates.  Finally,  his  rapidly  failing 
strength  gave  way;  the  Switzerland,  to  which  he  had  been  removed,  and 
on  board  which  he  had  been  joined  by  his  heart-broken  wife  and  his  young 
daughter,  left  Memphis  011  the  night  of  the  18th  of  June,  and  as  the  vessel 
neared  Cairo  on  the  21st,  his  gallant  spirit  passed  away.  He  was  accorded  a 
state  funeral  in  Independence  Hall.  J 

The  boats  constituting  the  ram-fleet  of  the  Mississippi  Kiver  were  not 
built  for  the  purpose  they  were  to  serve ;  they  were  simply  such  river  steam 
ers  as  could  be  purchased  under  the  urgency  then  pressing.  Some  were 
side -wheelers,  others  stern -wheel  tugs,  with  strong  machinery  and  great 
power,  and  were  hurriedly  strengthened  and  braced  to  sustain  a  severe 
headlong  blow.  In  a  letter  to  the  Secretary  of  War  respecting  the  rams, 
while  they  were  being  fitted  out,  Colonel  Ellet  wrote :  "  The  boats  I  have 
purchased  are  illy  adapted  for  the  work  I  shall  require  of  them ;  it  is  not 
their  strength  upon  which  I  rely,  but  upon  the  audacity  of  our  attack,  for 
success." 

His  idea  of  an  effective  "steam-ram"  was  not  a  hermaphrodite  thing,  half 
ram,  half  gun-boat,  nor  did  he  favor  those  sharp  knife-like  prows  which,  if 
they  cut  a  hole  in  an  enemy,  would  plug  it  at  the  same  time.  He  wanted  a 
vessel  of  medium  size,  easy  to  handle,  and  of  great  speed;  she  should  be 
built  very  strongly,  fitted  with  machinery  of  great  power,  and  have  weight 
sufficient  when  projected  against  an  enemy  to  crush  the  side  of  any  vessel 
that  could  float.  Colonel  Ellet  did  not  rely  on  heavy  ordnance,  and  did  not 
recommend  arming  his  rams.  At  the  battle  of  Memphis  there  were  no  fire 
arms  on  board  the  ram-fleet  except  a  few.  short  carbines  and  some  pocket- 

j  His  devoted  wife,  stricken  by  grief,  survived  him  but  a  few  days.  Both  are  buried  at  Laurel  Hill 
Cemetery,  Philadelphia. — A.  W.  E. 


ELLET  AND  HIS  STEAM-RAMS  AT  MEMPHIS.  4S9 

revolvers;  his  reliance  was  upon  the  prow  of  his  vessel.  ^  He  desired,  as  far 
as  possible,  to  protect  the  vulnerable  parts  of  his  ship,  the  boilers  and  engines, 
and  with  simply  enough  men  as  crew  to  handle  the  boat  with  certainty  and 
dispatch,  to  run  the  gauntlet  of  any  fire  that  could  be  precipitated  upon  him, 
and  drive  his  ram  deep  into  his  unwieldy  adversary.  At  the  battle  of  Mem 
phis  the  enemy  concentrated  their  fire  upon  the  Queen  of  the  West  and 
the  Monarch,  but  their  missiles  passed  harmlessly  by.  Xot  a  splinter  was 
raised  off  either  of  the  rams,  and  not  a  man  sustained  the  slightest  injury 
except  Colonel  Ellet,  whose  fatal  wound  was  received  from  a  pistol-ball. 

The  battle  of  Memphis  was,  in  many  respects,  one  of  the  most  remarkable 
naval  victories  on  record.  For  two  unarmed,  frail,  wooden  river  steamboats, 
with  barely  men  enough  on  board  to  handle  the  machinery  and  keep  the  fur 
nace-fires  burning,  to  rush  to  the  front,  between  two  hostile  fleets,  and  into 
the  enemy's  advancing  line  of  eight  iron-clad,  heavily  armed,  and  fully 
manned  steam-rams,  sinking  one,  disabling  and  capturing  three,  and  carrying 
consternation  to  the  others,  was  a  sight  never  before  witnessed. 

The  River  Defense  Fleet  was  composed  of  strong,  well-built  ocean  steamers, 
well  strengthened  and  protected  with  railroad  iron  so  as  to  be  almost  invul 
nerable  to  shot  when  advancing.  The  intention  was  apparent  to  repeat  at 
Memphis  the  tactics  which  had  proved  so  successful  at  Fort  Pillow, —  to 
ram  the  Union  gun-boats  at  anchor;  and  had  the  rams  Queen  of  the  West 
and  Monarch  not  run  through  the  line  of  gun-boats  and  attacked  the  Defense 
Fleet  as  it  approached,  sinking,  disabling,  and  scattering  its  vessels,  and  thus 
removing  the  fight  half  a  mile  below,  the  result  of  the  affair  might  have  been 
very  different.  The  Defense  Fleet  was  advancing  up-stream,  thus  exposing 
the  strongest  and  best-protected  portions  of  each  vessel ;  the  gun-boats,  rely 
ing  upon  their  guns,  were  at  anchor,  with  their  sterns,  their  most  vulnerable 
part,  pointing  down-steam  and  consequently  exposed  to  the  tremendous 
attack  of  the  enemy.  Had  the  Confederate  commanders  trusted  only  to  the 
strength  of  their  vessels,  ceased  firing,  and  with  every  pound  of  steam  on 
plunged  at  full  speed  into  our  anchored  gun-boat  fleet,  who  could  doubt  what 
the  result  would  have  been  ? 

&  The  Monarch  had  11  sharp-shooters  out  of  a  detail  of  50  from  the  59th  Illinois  regiment,  who 
constituted  the  sole  armed  force  of  the  ram-fleet. — EDITORS. 


PRACTICING    ON    »    RIVER    PICKET. 


ETHOD    OF    CUTTING    THE    CHANNEL. 


SAWING  OUT   THE   CHANNEL   ABOVE   ISLAND   NUMBER   TEN. 

BY   J.    W.    BISSELL,    COLONEL,    U.    S.    V.,    IN    CHARGE    OF    THE   WORK. 


THE  Engineer  Regiment  of  the  West  was  an 
organization  composed  of  twelve  full  com 
panies  of  carefully  selected  workmen,  chiefly  me 
chanics,  and  officered  by  men  capable  of  directing 
such  skilled  labor.  Most  of  the  officers  and  about 
six  hundred  of  the  men  were  engaged  in  the  opera 
tions  about  New  Madrid  and  Island  Number  Ten. 
In  all  the  operations  of  that  regiment  I  am  not 
aware  that  any  of  its  officers  ever  made  a  report 
beyond  a  verbal  notification  to  the  general  in  com 
mand  that  the  work  required  of  it  was  done.  This 
narrative  is  therefore  made  entirely  from  mem 
ory,  aided  by  reference  to  letters  written  to  my 
family. 

It  is  perhaps  proper  to  state  here  that  the  term 
"  canal,"  as  used  in  all  the  letters  and  reports  re 
lating  to  the  opening  of  this  waterway,  conveys 
an  entirely  wrong  idea.  No  digging  was  done 
.except  by  way  of  slightly  widening  a  large  break 
in  the  levee,  and  those  who  speak  of  "working 
waist-deep  in  the  water"  knew  nothing  of  it. 

The  enemy  held  Island  Number  Ten  and  the  left 
bank  opposite,  and  the  same  bank  from  New 
Madrid  down  to  Tiptonville,  a  ridge  of  high  land 
between  the  back  swamp  and  the  river.  In  rear 
of  their  position  was  Reelfoot  Lake  and  the  over 
flow,  extending  from  above  them  to  a  point  below 
Tiptonville.  Escape  by  land  was  impossible,  New 
Madrid  and  the  right  bank  below  being  occupied 
by  General  Pope.  The  gun-boats  under  Foote 
held  the  river  above,  and  our  heavy  batteries 
commanded  the  only  place  of  debarkation  below. 
Having  accomplished  this  much,  the  problem  for 
General  Pope  to  solve  was  to  cross  his  army  to 
make  an  attack,  for  which  purpose  he  judged 
that  two  gun-boats,  to  be  used  as  ferry-boats, 
would  be  sufficient.  The  general  was  so  confident 
that  his  letter  to  Foote  would  bring  the  boats  that 
he  directed  me  to  go  back  to  the  fleet  at  Island 
Number  Eight  by  dug-out  across  the  overflow,  and 
come  down  with  them  past  the  batteries. 

I  reached  the  flag-ship  in  the  afternoon  about 
dark,  and  that  evening  Foote  called  together  all 
his  commanders  in  council.  One  or  two  wanted  to 


run  the  blockade,  but  the  commodore  flatly  refused. 
He  explained  that  his  boats,  since  they  were 
armored  solely  about  the  bows,  were  invincible 
fighting  up-stream,  but  fighting  down-stream  were 
of  little  account ;  and  that  if  one  of  them  should 
be  boarded  and  captured,  she  could  be  turned 
against  us,  and  could  whip  the  whole  fleet  and 
place  Cairo,  Louisville,  and  St.  Louis  at  her 
mercy !  One  of  the  captains  said  that  if  he  were 
allowed  to  go,  he  would  blow  the  vessel  out  of  water 
if  the  enemy  got  on  board.  Another,  I  think,  was 
quite  as  emphatic,  but  Foote  was  firm. 

The  next  day,  with  two  of  the  tugs  of  the  fleet, 
I  explored  the  shore  carefully  011  each  side  :  first 
on  the  eastern  shore,  to  see  if  the  enemy  were  se 
curely  shut  in,  which  I  found  to  be  the  case  ;  and 
then  on  the  western,  to  see  if  St.  James's  Bayou, 
which  emptied  into  the  river  seven  miles  above 
Island  Niimber  Eight,  in  any  way  communicated 
with  St.  John's  Bayou,  which  debouched  at  New 
Madrid.  Here  I  found  no  possible  way  across. 

Early  the  next  morning  while  standing  on  the 
levee,  chagrined  at  my  failure  to  obtain  a  gun-boat r 
and  while  waiting  for  the  guide  to  get  the  dug-out 
ready  to  take  me  back  to  camp,  I  spied,  directly 
opposite  me  across  the  submerged  fields,  an  open 
ing  in  the  timber ;  and  the  thought  flashed  upon 
me  that  there  was  the  place  to  take  the  transports 
through.  This  proved  to  be  an  old  wagon-road  ex 
tending  half  a  mile  into  the  woods ;  beyond  and 
around  wasa  dense  forest  of  heavy  timber.  The  guide 
said  it  was  two  miles  to  the  nearest  bayou.  I  asked 
him  to  make  a  map  upon  my  memorandum-book, 
which  he  did,  showing  a  straight  cut  to  the  first 
bayou  and  the  general  route  of  the  bayous  to  New 
Madrid.  This  route  we  carefully  explored,  and  I 
reached  Pope's  headquarters  about  dark.  When 
in  my  report  of  the  interview  I  mentioned  Foote's 
refusal,  the  general  gave  vent  to  his  disappointment 
and  indignation.  Some  officer  present  making  some 
suggestion  about  a  "  canal,  "  I  immediately  pulled 
out  my  memorandum-book,  and,  showing  the  sketch, 
said  the  whole  thing  was  provided  for,  and  that  I 
would  have  the  boats  througli  in  fourteen  days. 


460 


SAWING  OUT  THE  CHANNEL  ABO^E  ISLAND  NUMBER    TEN.      461 


General  Pope  then  gave  me  an  order  on  the  author 
ities  at  Cairo  for  steamboats  and  material.  That 
evening  Captain  William  Tweeddale,  Lieutenant 
Mahloii  Randolph,  and  I  sat  up  till  a  late  hour 
arranging  all  the  details,  including  barges  to  be 
fitted  with  heavy  artillery  to  be  used  as  gun-boats, 
and  the  next  morning  they  started  with  one  hun 
dred  men  for  Cairo,  to  meet  me  at  Island  Num 
ber  Eight  with  all  the  materials  they  could  get 


CORRECTED  LINE    OF   THE    CHANNEL  ABOVE    ISLAND    NO. 
TEN   CUT  BY  THE   ENGINEER  REGIMENT.     (Seep.  437.) 

the  first  day.  Other  officers  and  men  started  by 
the  same  route  daily,  until  the  six  hundred  men  of 
my  force  had  returned,  and  my  stock  of  supplies 
was  complete.  I  returned  in  the  dug-out  through 
the  selected  channel,  and  in  due  time  found  at  the 
proposed  starting-point  four  stern-wheel  steam 
boats,  drawing  thirty  to  thirty-six  inches  of  water, 
and  six  large  coal-barges,  besides  one  Columbiad, 
three  large  siege-guns  with  carriages  and  ammuni 
tion,  saws,  lines,  and  all  kinds  of  tools  and  tackle, 
and  fully  two  million  feet  of  timber  and  lumber. 

The  way  through  the  submerged  corn-field  and 
the  half-mile  of  road  was  easy  enough,  but  when 
we  reached  the  timber  the  labor  of  sawing  out  a 
channel  commenced.  The  one  steamer  which  had  a 
powerful  steam-capstan  was  put  in  the  lead,  and 
the  others  having  hand-capstans  were  fastened 
single  file  in  the  rear,  and  then  the  six  barges  in  like 
order,  so  that  the  progress  of  the  first  controlled 
all  the  others.  Captain  Tweeddale  took  charge  of 
the  cutting  in  front,  wliile  Lieutenant  Randolph 
was  fitting  up  the  improvised  gun-boats  astern. 
About  three  hundred  men  were  assigned  to  each, 
and  they  worked  in  relays  from  dawn  until  dark. 

First  of  all,  men  standing  on  platforms  on  small 
rafts  cut  off  the  trees  about  eight  feet  above  the 
water.  As  soon  as  a  tree  was  down,  another  set 
of  men,  provided  with  boats  and  lines,  adjusted 
about  it  a  line  which  ran  through  a  snatch-block 
and  back  to  the  steam-capstan,  and  hauled  it  out 
of  the  way ;  thus  a  partial  cut  was  made  forward, 


the  lines  always  working  more  than  two  hundred 
feet  ahead  of  the  capstan,  so  as  to  leave  plenty  of 
room  for  the  saws.  It  took  about  four  sets  of  lines 
to  keep  pace  with  twelve  saws. 

When  the  space  about  the  stumps  allowed  suf 
ficient  room,  a  raft  about  forty  feet  long  was 
lashed  to  a  stump,  and  the  saw  set  at  work  in  a 
frame  attached  by  a  pivot  and  working  in  an  arc  as 
shown  in  the  sketch  [page  460]  —  two  men  working 
the  saw  at  opposite  ends  by  a  rope,  and  a  fifth  on 
the  farther  side  of  the  tree  guiding  its  teeth  into  the 
tree.  Where  the  stumps  were  too  close,  or  irregu 
lar,  three  yawl-boats  were  used  instead  of  the  raft. 
No  trouble  was  experienced  with  stumps  a  foot 
or  less  in  diameter.  With  the  larger  ones  it  was 
different ;  the  elms  spread  out  so  much  at  the  bot 
tom  that  the  saw  almost  always  would  run  crooked 
and  pinch.  If  it  ran  up,  we  notched  the  top  and  set 
the  frame  farther  in  ;  if  down,  we  put  in  powerful 
tackle,  and  pulled  the  top  of  the  stump  over. 

Here  was  where  the  ingenuity  of  the  officers  and 
men  was  exercised  ;  as  the  saws  were  working 
four  and  a  half  feet  beneath  the  surface,  and  the 
water  was  quite  turbid,  the  question  was  how  to 
ascertain  what  was  interfering  with  the  saw,  and 
then  to  apply  the  remedy.  But  I  found  Captain 
Tweeddale  equal  to  the  most  obstinate  stump.  I 
think  two  and  a  half  hours  was  the  longest  time 
ever  expended  upon  any  one,  while  about  two 
minutes  would  dispose  of  some  small  ones  when 
the  saw  was  ready.  It  took  eight  days  to  cut  the 
two  miles. 

When  we  reached  the  bayous  the  hard  and  wet 
work  began.  The  river  had  begun  to  fall,  and  the 
water  was  running  very  rapidly.  We  had  to  get 
rid  of  great  drift-heaps  from  the  lower  side  with 
our  machinery  all  on  the  upper  side.  Small  pieces 
of  drift  would  be  disposed  of  by  the  yawl-boats,  or 
a  single  line  and  snatch-block  would  take  them 
right  out  ;  but  sometimes  a  great  swamp-oak, 
three  feet  through,  and  as  heavy  as  lignum-vitaj, 
lying  right  across  our  channel  a  foot  or  so  under 
water,  would  try  our  tackle.  We  had  then  to  raise 
them  up  to  the  siirface,  and  hold  them  there  till 
they  could  be  chopped  in  pieces.  In  one  of  the 
bayous  for  about  two  miles  the  current  was  so 
swift  that  all  the  men  who  were  out  on  logs,  or  in 
exposerl  places,  had  safety-lines  tied  around  them; 
and  as  the  timber  was  slippery,  some  were  indebted 
to  these  lines  for  their  lives.  During  the  whole 
work  not  a  man  was  killed,  injured,  or  taken  sick. 
While  all  this  was  being  done  in  front  of  the 
boats,  Lieutenant  Randolph  was  at  work  with  his 
detachment  in  the  rear  in  improvising  gun-boats 
to  supply  the  lack  of  Foote's.  The  barges  used 
were  coal-barges,  about  eighty  feet  long  and  twenty 
wide,  scow-shaped,  with  both  ends  alike.  The  sides 
were  six  inches  thick,  and  of  solid  timber.  The 
original  plan  was  to  use  three  of  the  steamboats 
with  a  barge  on  each  side — the  other  steamer  to 
be  kept  as  a  reserve.  One  Columbiad  and  three 
32-pounders  were  mounted  on  platforms,  and 
arrangements  were  made  to  use  a  considerable 
number  of  field-guns  to  be  taken  on  board  at  New 
Madrid.  Six  hundred  men  of  the  Engineer  Regi 
ment,  using  one  of  the  steamers  with  her  two 


462      SAWING  OUT  THE  CHANNEL  ABOJ/E  ISLAND  NUMBER   TEN. 


barges,  were  to  land  at  break  of  day  at  the  mouth 
of  the  slough  about  a  mile  below  and  opposite 
Fort  Thompson,  and  with  their  intrenching  tools 
dig  a  line  of  rifle-pits  as  soon  as  possible.  About 
the  same  number  of  picked  men  were  to  be  with 
them  to  help  fight  or  dig,  as  occasion  might  require. 
The  other  two  sections  of  the  flotilla  were  to  be 
filled  with  men,  and  landed  just  below,  as  best 
could  be  done  when  the  resistance  was  developed. 
The  reserve  steamer  with  her  men,  not  being 
incumbered  with  barges,  could  move  rapidly  and 
take  advantage  of  any  opening  to  land  the  force. 

When  about  half-way  through  the  channel,  I  left 
the  flotilla  and  reported  progress  to  General  Pope. 
Upon  a  reexamination  of  the  ground  from  Fort 
Thompson,  he  concluded  that  it  would  be  best  to 
make  the  leading  boat  a  fighting  boat  that  could 
not  be  disabled ;  so  he  telegraphed  to  Cairo  and 
St.  Louis  for  a  great  number  of  coal-oil  barrels, 
which  were  laid  in  two  tiers  all  over  the  bottoms 
of  two  barges  ;  the  interstices  were  filled  with  dry 
rails,  the  whole  well  secured  in  place  by  a  heavy 
floor.  In  the  mean  time  the  steamer  was  so  bulk- 
headed  with  lumber  that  her  engines  and  boilers 
were  secure  from  damage  from  field-artillery,  and 
the  forward  part  of  the  hull,  which  projected  be 
yond  the  barges,  was  bulkheaded  off  and  filled  witli 
dry  rails,  to  keep  her  from  being  disabled.  On  the 
steamer  and  barges  protection  was  prepared  for  a 
large  number  of  sharp-shooters. 

The  boats  and  barge  gun-boats  were  kept  con 
cealed  in  the  bayou,  just  back  from  New  Madrid,  f  or 
a  day  or  two,  till  the  soldiers  could  be  prepared  for 
the  passage  and  attack.  Meanwhile  Foote  con 
cluded  to  risk  the  passage  of  the  island  with  the 


•fa  The  effort  to  cut  the  canal  was  known  to  the  Con 
federates  as  early  as  March  31st,  the  day  General  Mack- 
all  relieved  General  McCown  of  the  command  at  Madrid 
Bend ;  for  General  Mackall  says  in  his  report,  that 
General  McCown  then  informed  him  "  that  they  [the 


Caronddct  and  afterward  with  the  Pittsburgh,  and 
the  whole  plan  was  changed  ;  the  gun-boats  could 
move  so  much  more  rapidly  that  they  were  to 
silence  the  Confederate  field-guns,  while  the  trans 
ports  could  land  the  troops  wherever  an  opening 
could  be  found.  The  barges  were  not  used  at  all ; 
nor  did  any  of  the  Engineer  Regiment  cross;  they 
were  kept  on  the  right  bank,  ready  in  case  of  disaster. 
Several  of  the  captured  officers  told  me  that 
after  the  gun-boats  had  run  their  batteries,  nearly 
their  whole  force  was  withdrawn  from  about  Island 
Number  Ten  and  kept  concealed  in  the  woods  back 
of  the  practicable  landing-places,  and  they  were 
prepared  to  pick  off  all  the  men  that  could  be 
landed ;  but  when  they  saw  the  four  transports, 
loaded  with  troops,  steam  out  from  the  bayou,  the 
word  was  given  for  each  man  to  take  care  of  him 
self.  A  few  hundred  did  manage  to  make  their  way 
through  the  swamps  in  the  rear,  but  the  most  of 
them  quietly  yielded  to  the  inevitable.  So  well 
had  the  movement  been  concealed  that  they  had 
not  the  least  idea  of  what  was  being  done. -fa 

POSTSCRIPT:  The  Official  Records,  which,  since 
writing  the  above,  I  have  just  seen  for  the  first 
time,  contain  a  letter  from  General  Pope  to  me, 
which  I  never  before  heard  of  (dated  the  day  I  was 
on  my  way  back  from  the  gun-boat  with  the  plan 
fully  matured),  asking  if  I  could  not  dig  a  canal,  a 
"  mere  ditch  of  a  foot  wide  which  the  water  of  the 
river  would  soon  wash  out,"  from  a  point  one  mile 
above  Island  Number  Ten  to  a  point  one  mile  be 
low.  That  land  was  at  this  time  ten  feet  under 
water. —  J.  W.  BISSELL. 

DECEMBER,  1  884. 

Union  forces]  wore  endeavoring  to  cut  a  canal  across 
the  opposite  peninsula  for  the  passage  of  transports,  in 
order  to  land  below  the  bend ;  that  they  would  fail,  and 
that  tho  position  was  safe  until  the  river  fell,  and  no 
longer."— EDITORS. 


COMMENT  BY  GENERAL  SCHUYLER  HAMILTON,  MAJOR-GENERAL,  U.  S.  V. 


I  have  read  Colonel  J.  W.  Bissell's  article  on  the 
"  Sawing  out  a  Channel  above  Island  Number  Ten."  I 
desire  to  call  attention  to  what  he  says  : 

"Some  officer  making  some  suggestion  about  a  'canal,'  I 
immediately  pulled  out  my  memorandum-book,  and,  showing 
the  sketch,  said  the  whole  thing  was  provided  for." 

This  on  the  evening  of  March  19th,  1862,  which  is  tho 
date  of  General  Pope's  letter  to  which  Colonel  Bissell 
refers  in  a  foot-note,  saying  he  did  not  receive  the  letter 
because  he  (Colonel  Bissell)  was  on  his  return  from  the 
reconnoissanco  he  had  been  ordered  to  make.  To  tho 
public  this  reads  as  though  the  plan  originated  with 
Colonel  Bissell,  while  I  am  ready  to  show  that  while  the 
colonel  directed  the  work,  "  some  officer,"  as  he  says, — 
or  to  be  exact  I  myself, — was  the  sole  inventor  of  the 
project.  My  own  official  report,  dated  Headquarters 
Second  Divisou  Army  of  the  Mississippi,  Pittsburg  Land 
ing,  April  22d,  1862,  reads  as  follows : 

"Transports  having  reached  us  through  a  channel  cut 
with  enormous  labor  under  the  direction  of  Colonel  Bissell, 
on  a  suggestion  advanced  by  the  subscriber,  March  17th,  1862, 
the  Second  Division  embarked  on  them,  April  7th,  to  cross  the 
Mississippi,  which  was  accomplished  in  gallant  style,  but 
without  opposition,  the  gun-boats  Carondelet  and  Pittsburgh, 
under  Captain  Walke,  having  in  dashing  style  silenced  the 
enemy's  shore  batteries." 

General  Pope  wrote  to  General  Hallcck,  under  date 
New  Madrid,  Mo.,  April  9th,  1862 : 


"The  canal  across  the  peninsula  opposite  Island  Number 
Ten,  and  for  tho  idea  of  which  I  am  indebted  to  General 
Hchuyler  Hamilton,  was  completed  by  Colonel  Bissell's 
Kngiueer  Regiment,  and  four  steamers  brought  through  on 
the  night.of  the  6th." 

General  Pope  again,  in  his  official  report  to  General 
Hallcck  of  May  2d,  1862,  writes  : 

"  On  the  16th  of  March  I  received  your  dispatch,  directing 
me,  if  possible,  to  construct  a  road  through  the  swamps  to  a 
point  on  the  Missouri  shore  opposite  Island  Number  Ten, 
and  transfer  a  portion  of  my  force  sufficient  to  erect  batteries 
at  that  poiut  to  assist  in  the  artillery  practice  on  the  enemy's 
batteries.  I  accordingly  dispatched  Colonel  J.  W.  Bissell, 
Kngineer  Regiment,  to  examine  the  country  with  this  view, 
directing  him  at  the  same  time,  if  he  found  it  impracticable 
to  build  a  road  through  the  swamps  and  overflow  of  the  river, 
to  ascertain  whether  it  were  possible  to  dig  a  canal  across  the 
peninsula  from  some  point  above  Island  Number  Ten  to  Now 
Madrid,  in  order  that  steam  transports  might  be  brought  to 
me,  which  would  enable  my  command  to  cross  the  river.  The 
idea  of  the  canal  was  suggested  to  me  by  General  Schuyler 
Hamilton  in  a  conversation  upon  the  necessity  of  crossing 
the  river  and  assailing  tho  enemy's  batteries  near  Island 
Number  Ten  in  the  rear." 

The  New  York  "  Herald,"  in  its  issue  of  April  13th,  1802, 
published  an  article  in  reference  to  this  channel,  en 
titled  "The  Schuyler  Hamilton  Canal." 

NEW  YORK,  June  16th,  1885. 


THE  OPPOSING  FORCES  AT  NEW  MADRID  (ISLAND  NUMBER 
TEN),  FORT  PILLOW,  AND  MEMPHIS. 

The  composition  and  losses  of  each  army  as  hero  stated  give  the  gist  of  all  the  data  obtainable  in  the  Official  Records. 
K  stands  for  killed ;  w  for  wounded ;  m  w  mortally  wounded ;  m  for  captured  or  missing ;  c  for  captured. —  EDITORS. 


UNION  ARMY  AT  NEW  MADRID.  Major-Gen.  John  Pope. 

FIRST  DIVISION,  Brig.-Gen.  David  S.  Stanley.  First 
Brigade,  Col.  John  Groesbeck:  27th  Ohio,  Col.  John  W. 
Fuller;  39th  Ohio,  Major  Edward  F.  Noyes.  Brigade 
loss:  k,  2;  w,  5  =  7.  Second  Brigade,  Col.  J.  L.  Kirby 
Smith:  43d  Ohio,  Lieut.-Col.  Wager  Swayue;  63d  Ohio, 
Col.  John  W.  Sprague.  Brigade  loss :  w,  5. 

SECOND  DIVISION,  Brig.-Geu.  Schuyler  Hamilton.  First 
Brigade,  Col.  W.  H.  Worthiugton:  59th  Ind.,  Col.  J.  I. 
Alexander ;  5th  Iowa,  Lieut.-Col.  Charles  L.  Matthies. 
Brigade  loss  :  k,  2 ;  w,  4=6.  Second  Brigade,  Col.  Nicholas 
Pcrczel :  10th  Iowa,  Lieut.-Col.  William  E.  Small ;  26th 
Mo.,  Col.  George  B.  Boomer.  Artillery:  llth  Ohio  Bat 
tery,  Capt.  Frank  C.  Sands.  Loss:  k,  1. 

THIRD  DIVISION,  Brig.-Gen.  John  M.  Palmer.  First 
Brigade,  Col.  James  R.  Slack:  34th  Iiid.,  Col.  Towuseud 
Ryan;  47th  Ind.,  Lieut.-Col.  Miltou  S.  Robinson.  Second 
Brigade,  Col.  Graham  N.  Fitch :  43d  Ind.,  Col.  William 

E.  McLean ;  46th  Ind.,  Lieut.-Col.  Newton  G.  Scott.    Cav 
alry  :  7th  111.,  Col.  Wm.  P.  Kellogg.  Loss :  w,  1 ;  m,  2  =3. 
Artillery  :  G,  1st  Mo.,  Capt.  Henry  Hescock. 

FOURTH  DIVISION,  Brig.-Gen.  E.  A.  Paine.  First  Bri 
gade,  Col.  James  D.  Morgan  :  10th  111.,  Lieut.-Col.  John 
Tillsou;  16th  111.,  Col.  Robert  F.  Smith.  Brigade  loss: 
k,  1 ;  w,  1=2.  Second  Brigade,  Col.  Gilbert  W.  dimming: 
22d  III.,  Lieut.-Col.  Harrison  E.  Hart;  51st  111.,  Lieut.- 
Col.  Luther  P.  Bradley.  Cavalry:  H  and  I,  1st  111., 
Major  D.  P.  Jenkins.  Sharpshooters ;  64th  111.,  Major 

F.  W.  Mattesoii. 

FIFTH  DIVISION,  Brig.-Gen.  Joseph  B.  Plummer.  First 
Brigade,  Col.  John  Bryuer :  47th  111.,  Lieut.-Col.  Daniel  L. 
Miles  ;  8th  Wis.,  Lieut.-Col.  George  W.  Robbins.  Second 
Brigade,  Col.  John  M.  Looinis:  26th  111.,  Lieut.-Col. 
Charles  J.  Tiukham;  llth  Mo.,  Lieut.-Col.  William  E. 
Panabaker.  Artillery:  M,  1st  Mo.,  Capt.  Albert.  M. 
Powell. 

CAVALUY  DIVISION,  Brig.-Geu.  Gordon  Granger :  2<l 
Mich.,  Lieut.-Col.  Seldeu  H.  Gorhani ;  3d  Mich.,  Lieut.- 
Col.  R.  H.  G.  Miuty,  Col.  John  K.  Mizuer. 

ARTILLERY  DIVISION,  Major  Warren  L.  Lothrop :  2d 
Iowa,  Capt.  N.  T.  Spoor ;  5th  Wis.,  Capt.  Oscar  F.  Pinney ; 
6th  Wis.,  Capt.  Henry  Dillon  ;  7th  Wis.,  Capt.  Richard  R. 
Griffiths ;  C,  1st  Mich.,  Capt.  A.  W.  Dees ;  H,  1st  Mich., 
Capt.  Samuel  De  Golyer ;  C,  1st  TIL,  Capt.  Charles  Hough- 
taliiig;  F,  2d  U.  S.,  Lieut.  John  A.  Darling,  Lieut.  D.  P. 
Walling. 

UNASSIGNED  TROOPS  :  Eugiueer  Regt.  of  the  West, 
Col.  Josiah  W.  Bissell;  22d  Mo.,  Lieut.-Col.  John  D. 
Foster;  2d  Iowa  Cav.,  Col.  W.  L.  Elliott;  2d  111.  Cav.  (4 
cos.),  Lieut.-Col.  Harvey  Hogg;  4th  U.  S.  Cav.  (3  cos.), 
Lieut.  M.  J.  Kelly;  1st  U.  S.  Infantry  (6  cos.),  Capt. 
George  A.  Williams.  Loss  of  latter  regiment:  k,  2 ;  w, 
5;  m,  1  =  8. 

FLOTILLA  BRIGADE,  Col.  Napoleon  B.  Buford:  27th 
111.,  Lieut.-Col.  F.  A.  Harrington;  42d  111.,  Col.  George 
W.  Roberts ;  15th  Wis.,  Col.  Hans  C.  Heg;  G,  1st  111. 
Artillery,  Capt.  Arthur  O'Leary;  G,  2d.  111.  Artillery, 
Capt.  Frederick  Sparrestrom. 

UNION  NAVAL  FORCES  AT  ISLAND  NUMBER  TEN.  Flag- 
Officer  A.  H.  Foote  :  Ben  ton  (flag-ship),  Lieut. -Couir.  S.  L. 
Phelps ;  St.  Louis,  Lieut. -Comr.  Leonard  Pauldiug 
Cincinnati,  Comr.  R.  N.  Stembel;  Pittsburgh,  Lieut. - 
Comr.  Egbert  Thompson;  Mound  City,  Comr.  A.  H. 
Kilty  ;  Carondclet,  Comr.  Henry  Walke ;  Eleven  Mortar- 
boats,  Capt.  Henry  E.  Maynadier. 

The  total  Union  loss  (including  2  killed  and  13  wounded 
on  the  St.  Louis,  by  the  bursting  of  a  gun  March  17)  was 
17  killed,  34  wounded,  and  3  captured  or  missing. 

CONFEDERATE  ARMY  AT  ISLAND  NUMBER  TEN.  a> 
Major-Gen.  John  P.  McCown ;  (2)  Brig.-Gen.  W.  W. 
Mackall.  Subordinate  General  Officers:  Brig.-Generals 
A.  P.  Stewart,  L.  M.  Walker,  E.  W.  Gantt,  and  James 


Trudeau.  Infantry:  1st  Ala.,  Tenn.,  and  Miss.,  Col. 
Alpheus  Baker;  1st  Ala.,  Col.  J.  G.  W.  Steedmau;  4th 
Ark.  Battalion,  Major  M.  M.  McKay ;  5th  Ark.  Battalion, 
Lieut.-Col.  F.  A.  Terry;  llth  Ark.,  Col.  J.  M.  Smith  ;  12th 
Ark.,  Lieut.-Col.  W.  D.  S.  Cook;  llth  La.,  Col.  S.  F. 
Marks;  32th  La.,  Col.  Thomas  M.  Scott;  5th  La.  Battal 
ion,  Col.  J.  B.  G.  Kennedy ;  4th  Tenu.,  Col.  R.  P.  Neely ; 
5th  Teuu.,  Col.  W.  E.  Travis;  31st  Tenn.,  Col.  W.  M. 
Bradford;  40th  Tenu.,  Col.  C.  C.  Henderson  ;  46th Tenu., 
Col.  John  M.  Clark;  55th  Tenn.,  Col.  A.  J.  Brown. 
Cavalry:  Hudson's  and  Wheclcj^s  companies,  Mis?.; 
Neely'saud  Hay-wood's  companies,  Teuu.  Light  Artil 
lery:  Point  Coupee,  La.  Battery,  Capt.  R.  A.  Stewart; 
Tenu.  Battery,  Capt.  Smith  P.  Baukhead.  Tenn.  Heavy 
Artillery:  Companies  of  Captains  Jackson,  Sterling, 
Humes,  Hoadley,  Caruthers,  Jones,  Dismuke,  Rucker, 
Fisher,  Johnston,  and  Upton.  Engineer  Corps  :  Captains 

A.  B.  Gray  and  D.  B.  Harris.      Sappers  and  Miners: 
Capt.  D.  Wintter. 

CONFEDERATE  NAVAL  FORCES  AT  ISLAND  NUMBER 
TEN.  Flag-Otticer  George  N.  Hollins.  McRae  (flag-ship), 
Lieut.  Thomas  B.  Huger,  6  32-pouuders,  1  9-iiich,  1  24- 
pouuder  rifle;  Livingston,  Comr.  R.  F.  Pinkney ;  Polk, 
Lieut. -Comr.  J.  H.  Carter,  5  gnus;  Pontchartrain,  Lieut.- 
Comr.  John  W.  Dunuington;  Maurepas,  Lieut.  Joseph 
Fry,  5  rifled  guns ;  Jackson,  Lieut.  F.  B.  Renshaw,  2 
guns ;  Floating  Battery,  Xew  Orleans,  Lieut.  S.  W.  Aver- 
ett.  No  loss  reported.  The  fleet,  with  the  exception  of 
the  Floating  Battery,  -was  not  actively  engaged. 

The  total  Confederate  loss  in  killed  and  wounded  is 
estimated  at  about  30.  Of  the  number  of  Confederates 
captured  the  Confederate  and  Union  reports  range  from 
2000  to  7000,  respectively. 

UNION  FLEET  AT  FORT  PILLOW,  MAY  IOTH,  1862.  Capt. 
Charles  Henry  Davis,  commanding  pro  tern.  Benton 
(flagship),  Lieut.  S.  L.  Phelps  ;  Carondelet,  Comr.  Henry 
Walke;  Mound  City,  Comr.  A.  H.  Kilty;  Cincinnati, 
Comr.  R.  N.  Stembel  (w) ;  St.  Louis,  Lieut.  Henry  Erben ; 
Cairo,  Lieut.  N.  C.  Bryant ;  Pittsburgh,  Lieut.  Egbert 
Thompson. 

The  Union  loss  as  officially  reported  was :  Cincinnati, 
wounded,  3  (1  mortally).  Mound  City,  wouuded,  1. 
Total,  4. 

UNION  FLEET  AT  MEMPHIS,  JUNE  6TH,  1862.  Flag-Of- 
licer  Charles  Henry  Davis,  commanding.  Gun-boats  — 
Benton  (flagship),  Lieut.  S.  L.  Phelps;  Louisville,  Comr. 

B.  M.  Dove ;    Carondelet,  Comr.  Henry  Walke ;  Cairo, 
Lieut.  N.  C.  Bryant ;  St.  Louis,  Lieut.  Wilson  McGunne- 
gle.     Ram  fleet— Queen   of  the   West  (flag-ship),   Col. 
Charles  Ellet,  Jr. ;  Monarch,  Lieut.-Col.  Alfred  W.  Ellet ; 
Switzerland,  First  Master  David  Millard. 

The  Union  loss  as  officially  reported  was  :  Gun-boats  — 
wounded,  3.  Ram  fleet—  wounded,  1  (Col.  Ellet,  who 
subsequently  died).  Total,  4. 

CONFEDERATE  RIVER  DEFENSE  FLKET,  AT  FORT  PIL 
LOW  AND  MEMPHIS.  Capt.  J.  E.  Montgomery,  com 
manding.  Little  Rebel  (flag-ship),  Capt.  Montgomery; 
General  Bragg,  Capt.  William  H.  H.  Leonard,  General 
Sterling  Price,  First  Officer,  J.  E.  Henthorue ;  Sumter, 
Capt.  W.  W.  Lamb  ;  General  Earl  Van  Dorn,  Capt.  Isaac 
D.  Fulkersou ;  General  M.  Jeff.  Thompson,  Capt.  John 
II.  Burke ;  General  Lovell,  Capt.  James  C.  Delaucy ; 
General  Beat/regard,  Capt.  James  Henry  Hurt.  Each 
vessel  carried  one  or  more  guns,  probably  32-pounders. 

The  Confederate  loss  in  the  action  off  Fort  Pillow, 
May  10th,  as  officially  reported,  was :  killed,  2  ;  wounded, 
1  =  3.  No  report  was  made  of  the  Confederate  loss  in 
the  action  at  Memphis  of  June  6th,  nor  is  it  possible,  in 
view  of  the  irregular  organization  of  the  fleet,  the  na 
ture  of  the  conflict,  and  the  dispersal  of  the  survivors, 
to  form  even  an  approximate  estimate  of  it. 


FROM    A     PHOT 


THE  BATTLE  OF  SHILOH. 


BY    ULYSSES    S.    GRANT,    GENERAL,  U.    8.   A. 


battle  of  Shiloh,  or  Pittsburg  Landing, 
-L  fought  on  Sunday  and  Monday,  the  6th  and 
7th  of  April,  1862,  has  been   perhaps  less 
understood,  or,  to  state  the  case  more  accu 
rately,    more    persistently   misunderstood, 
than   any  other   engagement  between  Na 
tional  and  Confederate  troops  during  the 
entire   rebellion.     Correct    reports    of   the 
battle    have    been   published,    notably  by 
Sherman,   Badeau,    and,   in   a   speech   be 
fore   a    meeting  of  veterans,   by   General 
Prentiss ;  but  all  of  these  appeared  long  subsequent  to 
the  close  of  the  rebellion,  and  after  public  opinion  had 
been  most  erroneously  formed. 

Events  had  occurred  before  the  battle,  and  others  sub 
sequent  to  it,  which  determined  me  to  make  no  report 
to  my  then  chief,  General  Halleck,  further  than  was  contained  in  a  letter, 
written  immediately  after  the  battle,  informing  him  that  an  engagement 
had  been  fought,  and  announcing  the  result.  The  occurrences  alluded  to 
are  these :  After  the  capture  of  Fort  Donelson,  with  over  fifteen  thousand 
effective  men  and  all  their  munitions  of  war,  I  believed  much  more  could 
be  accomplished  without  further  sacrifice  of  life. 

Clarksville,  a  town  between  Donelson  and  Nashville,  in  the  State  of  Tennes 
see,  and  on  the  east  bank  of  the  Cumberland,  was  garrisoned  by  the  enemy. 
Nashville  was  also  garrisoned,  and  was  probably  the  best-provisioned  depot 
at  the  time  in  the  Confederacy.  Albert  Sidney  Johnston  occupied  Bowling 
Green,  Ky.,  with  a  large  force.  I  believed,  and  my  information  justified  the 
belief,  that  these  places  would  fall  into  our  hands  without  a  battle,  if  threat 
ened  promptly.  I  determined  not  to  miss  this  chance.  But  being  only  a 
district  commander,  and  under  the  immediate  orders  of  the  department 
commander,  General  Halleck,  whose  headquarters  were  at  St.  Louis,  it  was 
my  duty  to  communicate  to  him  all  I  proposed  to  do,  and  to  get  his  approval, 
if  possible.  I  did  so  communicate,  and,  receiving  no  reply,  acted  upon  my 
own  judgment.  The  result  proved  that  my  information  was  correct,  and 
sustained  my  judgment.  What,  then,  was  my  surprise,  after  so  much  had 
been  accomplished  by  the  troops  under  my  immediate  command  between  the 
time  of  leaving  Cairo,  early  in  February,  and  the  4th  of  March,  to  receive 
from  my  chief  a  dispatch  of  the  latter  date,  saying:  "You  will  place  Major- 
General  C.  F.  Smith  in  command  of  expedition,  and  remain  yourself  at  Fort 
Henry.  Why  do  you  not  obey  my  orders  to  report  strength  and  positions  of 


466 


THE  BATTLE  OF  SHILOH. 


SCALE   OF   '~T~i  "i  -T1   MILES 


5lBETHEL<  ADAMSVILLE:         Cx 

PURDY 


S*&    S^    I    S     J 

•CORINTH 


OUTLINE    MAP    OF   THE    SHILOH    CAMPAIGN. 


your  command?"  I  was  left  virtually 
in  arrest  on  board  a  steamer,  without 
even  a  guard,  for  about  a  week,  when 
I  was  released  and  ordered  to  resume 
my  command. 

Again :  Shortly  after  the  battle  of 
Shiloh  had  been  fought,  G-eneral  Hal- 
leek  moved  his  headquarters  to  Pitts- 
burg  Landing,  and  assumed  command 
of  the  troops  in  the  field.  Although 
next  to  him  in  rank,  and  nominally 
in  command  of  my  old  district  and 
army,  I  was  ignored  as  much  as  if 
I  had.  been  at  the  most  distant  point 
of  territory  within  my  jurisdiction;  and  although  I  was  in  command  of 
all  the  troops  engaged  at  Shiloh,  I  was  not  permitted  to  see  one  of  the 
reports  of  General  Buell  or  his  subordinates  in  that  battle,  until  they  were 
published  by  the  War  Department,  long  after  the  event.  In  consequence,  I 
never  myself  made  a  full  report  of  this  engagement. 

When  I  was  restored  to  my  command,  on  the  13th  of  March,  I  found  it  on 
the  Tennessee  River,  part  at  Savannah  and  part  at  Pittsburg  Landing,  nine 
miles  above,  and  on  the  opposite  or  western  bank.  I  generally  spent  the  day 
at  Pittsburg,  and  returned  by  boat  to  Savannah  in  the  evening.  I  was  intend 
ing  to  remove  my  headquarters  to  Pittsburg,  where  I  had  sent  all  the  troops 
immediately  upon  my  reassuming  command,  but  Buell,  with  the  Army  of  the 
Ohio,  had  been  ordered  to  reenforce  me  from  Columbia,  Tenn.  He  was 
expected  daily,  and  would  come  in  at  Savannah.  I  remained,  therefore,  a  few 
days  longer  than  I  otherwise  should  have  done,  for  the  purpose  of  meeting 
him  on  his  arrival. 

G-eneral  Lew  Wallace,  with  a  division,  had  been  placed  by  General  Smith 
at  Crump's  Landing,  about  five  miles  farther  down  the  river  than  Pittsburg, 
and  also  on  the  west  bank.  His  position  I  regarded  as  so  well  chosen  that  he 
was  not  moved  from  it  until  the  Confederate  attack  in  force  at  Shiloh. 

The  skirmishing  in  our  front  had  been  so  continuous  from  about  the  3d  of 
April  up  to  the  determined  attack,  that  I  remained  on  the  field  each  night 
until  an  hour  when  I  felt  there  would  be  no  further  danger  before  morning.  In 
fact,  on  Friday,  the  4th,  I  was  very  much  injured  by  my  horse  falling  with 
me  and  on  me  while  I  was  trying  to  get  to  the  front,  where  firing  had  been 
heard.  The  night  was  one  of  impenetrable  darkness,  with  rain  pouring  down 
in  torrents;  nothing  was  visible  to  the  eye  except  as  revealed  by  the  frequent 
flashes  of  lightning.  Under  these  circumstances  I  had  to  trust  to  the  horse, 
without  guidance,  to  keep  the  road.  I  had  not  gone  far,  however,  when  I 
met  General  W.  H.  L.  Wallace  and  General  (then  Colonel)  McPhersori  coming 
from  the  direction  of  the  front.  They  said  all  was  quiet  so  far  as  the  enemy 
was  concerned.  On  the  way  back  to  the  boat  my  horse's  feet  slipped  from 
under  him,  and  he  fell  with  my  leg  under  his  body.  The  extreme  softness  of 


THE  BATTLE  OF  SHILOH. 


467 


the  ground,  from  the  excessive  rains  of  the  few  preceding  days,  no  doubt 
saved  me  from  a  severe  injury  and  protracted  lameness.  As  it  was,  my 
ankle  was  very  much  injured ;  so  much  so,  that  my  boot  had  to  be  cut  off. 
During  the  battle,  and  for  two  or  three  days  after,  I  was  unable  to  walk 
except  with  crutches. 

On  the  5th  General  Nelson,  with  a  division  of  Buell's  army,  arrived  at 
Savannah,  and  I  ordered  him  to  move  up  the  east  bank  of  the  river,  to  be 

in  a  position  where 
he  could  be  ferried 
over  to  Crump's 
Landing  or  Pitts- 
burg  Landing,  as 
occasion  required. 
I  had  learned  that 


General  Buell  him 
self  would  be  at 
Savannah  the  next 


MRS.    CRUMP'S    HOUSE. 


THE   LANDING    BELOW    THE    HOUSE.      FROM  PHOTOGRAPHS    TAKEN    IN    1884. 

Crump's  Landing  is,  by  river,  about  five  miles  below  (north  of)  Pittsburg  Laud 
ing.  Here  one  of  General  Lew  Wallace's  three  brigades  was  encamped  on  the 
moruing  of  the  battle,  another  brigade  being  two  miles  back,  on  the  road  to  Purdy, 
and  a  third  brigade  half  a  mile  farther  advanced.  The  Widow  Crump's  house 
is  about  a  caiarter  of  a  mile  above  the  landing. 


day,  and  desired  to 
meet  me  on  his  ar 
rival.  Affairs  at 
Pittsburg  Landing 
had  been  such  for 
several  days  that  I 
did  not  want  to  be 
away  during  the 
day.  I  determined, 
therefore,  to  take  a 
very  early  breakfast  and  ride  out  to  meet  Buell,  and  thus  save  time.  He  had 
arrived  on  the  evening  of  the  5th,  but  had  not  advised  me  of  the  fact,  and  I  was 
not  aware  of  it  until  some  time  after.  While  I  was  at  breakfast,  however, 
heavy  firing  was  heard  in  the  direction  of  Pittsburg  Landing,  and  I  hastened 
there,  sending  a  hurried  note  to  Buell,  informing  him  of  the  reason  why  I 
could  not  meet  him  at  Savannah.  On  the  way  up  the  river  I  directed  the 
dispatch-boat  to  run  in  close  to  Crump's  Landing,  so  that  I  could  communi 
cate  with  General  Lew  Wallace.  I  found  him  waiting  on  a  boat,  apparently 
expecting  to  see  me,  and  I  directed  him  to  get  his  troops  in  line  ready  to 


468  THE  BATTLE  OF  SHILOH. 

execute  any  orders  he  might  receive.   He  replied  that  his  troops  were  already 
under  arms  and  prepared  to  move. 

Up  to  that  time  I  had  felt  by  no  means  certain  that  Crump's  Landing 
might  not  be  the  point  of  attack.  On  reaching  the  front,  however,  about  8 
A.  M.,  I  found  that  the  attack  on  Shiloh  was  unmistakable,  and  that  nothing 
more  than  a  small  guard,  to  protect  our  transports  and  stores,  was  needed  at 
Crump's.  Captain  A.  S.  Baxter,  a  quartermaster  on  my  staff,  was  accordingly 
directed  to  go  back  and  order  General  Wallace  to  march  immediately  to  Pitts- 
burg,  by  the  road  nearest  the  river.  Captain  Baxter  made  a  memorandum 
of  his  order.  About  1  p.  M.,  not  hearing  from  Wallace,  and  being  much  in 
need  of  reinforcements,  I  sent  two  more  of  my  staff,  Colonel  James  B. 
McPherson  and  Captain  W.  R.  Rowley,  to  bring  him  up  with  his  division. 
They  reported  finding  him  marching  toward  Purdy,  Bethel,  or  some  point 
west  from  the  river,  and  farther  from  Pittsburg  by  several  miles  than  when 
he  started.  The  road  from  his  first  position  was  direct,  and  near  the  river. 
Between  the  two  points  a  bridge  had  been  built  across  Snake  Creek  by  our 
troops,  at  which  Wallace's  command  had  assisted,  expressly  to  enable  the 
troops  at  the  two  places  to  support  each  other  in  case  of  need.  Wallace  did 
not  arrive  in  time  to  take  part  in  the  first  day's  fight.  General  Wallace  has 
since  claimed  that  the  order  delivered  to  him  by  Captain  Baxter  was  simply 
to  join  the  right  of  the  army,  and  that  the  road  over  which  lie  marched 
would  have  taken  him  to  the  road  from  Pittsburg  to  Purdy,  where  it  crosses 
Owl  Creek,  on  the  right  of  Sherman ;  but  this  is  not  where  I  had  ordered 
him  nor  where  I  wanted  him  to  go.  I  never  could  see,  and  do  not  now  see, 
why  any  order  was  necessary  further  than  to  direct  him  to  come  to  Pitts 
burg  Landing,  without  specifying  by  what  route.  His  was  one  of  three  vet 
eran  divisions  that  had  been  in  battle,  and  its  absence  was  severely  felt. 
Later  in  the  war,  General  Wallace  would  never  have  made  the  mistake  that 
he  committed  on  the  6th  of  April,  1862.  I  presume  his  idea  was  that  by 
taking  the  route  he  did,  he  would  be  able  to  come  around  on  the  flank  or 
rear  of  the  enemy,  and  thus  perform  an  act  of  heroism  that  would  redound  to 
the  credit  of  his  command,  as  well  as  to  the  benefit  of  his  country.  ^> 

&  Since  the  publication  in  "  The  Century"  of  my  where  our  right  rested.    In  this  letter  General  Lew 

article  on  "The  Battle  of  Shiloh  "  I  have  received  Wallace  advises  General  W.  H.  L.  Wallace  that  he 

from  Mrs.  W.  H.  L.  Wallace,  widow  of  the  gallant  will  send  "to-morrow"  (and  his  letter  also  says 

general  who  was  killed  in  the  first  day's  fight  at  "April  nth,"  which  is  the  same  day  the  letter  was 

that  battle,  a  letter  from  General  Lew  Wallace  to  dated  and  which,  therefore,  must  have  been  writ- 

him,  dated  the  morning  of  the  nth.     At  the  date  ten  on  the  4th)  some  cavalry  to  report  to  him  at 

of  this  letter  it  was  well  known  that  the  Confeder-  his  headquarters,  and  suggesting  the  propriety  of 

ates  had  troops  out  along  the  Mobile  and  Ohio  rail-  General  W.  H.  L.  Wallace's  sending  a  company 

road  west    of    Crump's    Landing  and    Pittsburg  back  with  them  for  the  purpose  of  having  the  cav- 

Lauding,   and  were   also   collecting  near   Shiloh.  airy  at  the  two  landings   familiarize   themselves 

This  letter  shows  that  at  that  time  General  Lew  with  the  road,  so  that  they  could  "act  promptly 

Wallace  was  making  preparations  for  the  emer-  in  case  of  emergency  as  guides  to  and  from  the 

gency  that  might  happen  for  the  passing  of  reen-  different  camps." 

forcements  between  Shiloh  and  his  position,  ex-  This  modifies  very  materially  what  I  have  said, 

tending   from  Crump's    Landing   westward;    and  and  what  has  been  said  by  others,  of  the  conduct 

he  sends  the  letter  over  the   road  running  from  of  General  Lew  Wallace  at  the  battle  of  Shiloh. 

Adamsville  to  the  Pittsburg  Landing  and  Purdy  It  shows  that  he  naturally,  with  no  more  experi- 

road.     These  two  roads  intersect  nearly  a  mile  ence  than  he  had  at  the  time  in  the  profession  of 

west  of  the  crossing  of  the  latter  over  Owl  Creek,  arms,  would  take  the  particular  road  that  he  did 


THE  BATTLE  OF  SHILOH. 


469 


Shiloh  was  a  log  meeting 
house,  some  two  or  three 
miles  from  Pittsburg  Land 
ing,  and  on  the  ridge  which 
divides  the  waters  of  Snake 
and  Lick  creeks,  the  former 
entering  into  the  Tennes 
see  just  north  of  Pittsburg 
Landing,  and  the  latter 
south.  Shiloh  was  the  key 
to  our  position,  and  was 
held  by  Sherman.  His  di 
vision  was  at  that  time 


NEW    SHILOH    CHURCH,    ON"    THE    SITE    OF 
THE    LOG    CHAPEL    WHICH    WAS    DE 
STROYED  AFTER  THE   BATTLE 


wholly  raw,  no  part  of  it 
<>ver  having  been  in  an  en 
gagement,  but  I  thought  this 
deficiency  was  more  than 
made  up  by  the  superiority 
of  the  commander.  McCler- 
nand  was  on  Sherman's 
left,  with  troops  that  had 
been  engaged  at  Fort  Don- 
elson,  and  were  therefore 
veterans  so  far  as  Western 
troops  had  become  such 
at  that  stage  of  the  war. 
Xext  to  McClernand  came 
Prentiss,  with  a  raw  division, 
and  on  the  extreme  left, 
Stuart,  with  one  brigade  of  Sherman's  division.  Hurlbut  was  in  rear  of 
Prentiss,  massed,  and  in  reserve  at  the  time  of  the  onset.  The  division  of 
General  C.  F.  Smith  was  on  the  right,  also  in  reserve.  General  Smith  was 


SHILOH    BPBINO,    IN    THE    RAVINE    SOUTH    OF    THE    CHAPEL. 
FROM    1'HOTOGRAPHS    TAKEN"    IN    1884. 

The  spring  is  011  the  Confederate  side  of  the  ravine.    Hard  lighting 

took  place  here,  in  the  early  morning  of  Sunday, 

between  Sherman's  and  Hardee's  troops. 


start  upon  in  the  absence  of  orders  to  move  by  a 
different  road. 

The  mistake  he  made,  and  which  probably 
caused  his  apparent  dilatoriness,  was  that  of  ad 
vancing  some  distance  after  he  found  that  the 
tiring,  which  would  be  at  first  directly  to  his  front 
and  then  off  to  the  left,  had  fallen  back  until  it  had 
got  very  much  in  rear  of  the  position  of  his  advance. 
This  falling  back  had  taken  place  before  I  sent 
General  Wallace  orders  to  move  up  to  Pittsburg 
Laiiding,  and,  naturally,  my  order  was  to  follow  the 
road  nearest  the  river.  But  my  order  was  verbal, 
and  to  a  staff-officer  who  was  to  deliver  it  to  Gen 


eral  Wallace,  so  that  I  am  not  competent  to  say 
just  what  order  the  general  actually  received. 

General  Wallace's  division  was  stationed,  the 
First  Brigade  at  Crump's  Landing,  the  Second  out 
two  miles,  and  the  Third  two  and  a  half  miles  out. 
Hearing  the  sounds  of  battle,  General  Wallace  early 
ordered  his  First  and  Third  brigades  to  concen 
trate  on  the  Second.  If  the  position  of  our  front 
had  not  changed,  the  road  which  Wallace  took 
would  have  been  somewhat  shorter  to  our  right 
than  the  Eiver  road. 

U.  S.  GRAXT. 

MOUNT  MCGREGOR,  X.  Y.,  Juno  21,  I88o. 


The  map  used  with  General  Grant's  article  on  sequently  General  Grant,  through  his  son,  Colonel 
Shiloh,  as  first  printed  in  "The  Century"  Magazine  Frederick  D.  Grant,  furnished  the  editors  with 
for  February,  188r>,  was  a  copy  of  the  official  map  a  revision  of  the  official  map,  agreeing  in  every 
(see  page  508)  which  was  submitted  by  the  editors  respect  with  the  map  printed  in  the  "  Memoirs," 
to  General  Grant  and  was  approved  by  him.  Sub-  here  reproduced.  In  response  to  an  inquiry  by  the 

47C 


THE  BATTLE  OF  SHILOH. 


..v;;;;^  :>-  ^:^ 


FIRST    POSITION    OF    WATERHOUSE'S    BATTERY.      FROM    A    SKETCH    MADE    SHORTLY    AFTER    THE    BATTLE. 


Major  Ezra  Taylor,  General  Sherman's  chief  of  artil 
lery,  says  in  his  report :  "  Captain  A.  C.  Waterhouse's 
battery  [was  placed]  near  the  left  of  the  division  [Sher 
man's]  —  four  guns  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Owl  Creek 
[to  the  left  and  front  of  General  Sherman's  headquar 
ters]  and  two  guns  on  the  left  bank  of  Owl  Creek  [about 
150  yards  to  the  front].  The  enemy  appearing  in  large 
masses,  and  opening  a  battery  to  the  front  and  right  of 
the  two  guns,  advanced  across  Owl  Creek.  I  instructed 
Captain  Waterhouse  to  retire  the  two  guns  to  the  posi 
tion  occupied  by  the  rest  of  his  batterj",  about  which 
time  the  enemy  appeared  in  large  force  in  the  open  Held 


directly  in  front  of  the  position  of  this  battery,  bearing 
aloft,  as  I  supposed,  the  American  flag,  and  their  men 
and  officers  wearing  uniforms  so  similar  to  ours  that 
I  hesitated  to  open  fire  on  them  until  they  passed  into 
the  woods  and  were  followed  by  other  troops  who  wore 
a  uniform  not  to  be  mistaken.  I  afterward  learned  that 
the  uniform  jackets  worn  by  these  troops  were  black. 
As  soon  as  I  was  certain  as  to  the  character  of  the 
troops,  I  ordered  the  firing  to  commence,  which  was 
done  in  fine  style  and  with  excellent  irecision.''  Both 
Captain  Waterhouse  and  Lieutenant  A.  R.  Abbott  were 
severely  wounded.—  EDITORS. 


sick  in  bed  at  Savannah,  some  nine  miles  below,  but  in  hearing  of  our  guns. 
His  services  on  those  two  eventful  days  would  no  doubt  have  been  of 
inestimable  value  had  his  health  permitted  his  presence.  The  command 
of  his  division  devolved  upon  Brigadier-General  W.  H.  L.  Wallace,  a  most 
estimable  and  able  officer, —  a  veteran,  too,  for  he  had  served  a  year  in 
the  Mexican  war,  and  had  been  with  his  command  at  Henry  and  Donelson. 
Wallace  was  mortally  wounded  in  the  first  day's  engagement,  and  with  the 


editors  for  the  reasons  which  influenced  General 
Grant  in  making  the  substitution,  Colonel  Grant 
wrote  as  follows,  under  date  of  Chicago,  111.,  March 
20th,  1887:  "  Father  was  very  ill  when  the  map 
used  with  his  article,  on  Shiloh,  by  '  The  Century' 
Co.,  was  submitted  to  him.  He  looked  at  the 
topography  and  found  it  about  as  he  remembered 
the  ground;  but  after  you  published  it,  he  read 
some  of  the  criticisms  upon  both  the  article 
and  the  map.  Thus  having  his  attention  called 
to  the  subject,  he  revised  the  article,  making 
it  more  forcible,  and  directed  me  to  get  for  his 
book  the  map  which  was  in  the  possession  of 


Colonel  Dayton,  Secretary  of  the  Society  of  the 
Army  of  the  Tennessee,  and  which  he  had  heard 
of  or  seen. 

"This  map  proved  to  be  more  satisfactory  to  him 
than  the  one  he  had  first  used,  as  it  agreed  more 
perfectly  with  his  statements  and  recollection  of 
the  positions  occupied  by  the  troops  at  the  end 
of  the  first  day's  battle.  Therefore,  the  only 
reason  that  can  be  assigned  for  General  Grant's 
change  of  maps  is  that  the  one  used  in  his  book 
['Memoirs']  was  more  satisfactory  to  him,  his  deli 
cate  health  having  prevented  his  thorough  inves 
tigation  of  the  map  in  the  first  place." 


47^ 


THE  BATTLE  OF  SHILOH. 


CONFEDERATE    CHARGE    UPON'    PRKNTISS'S    CAMP    ON    8ITNDAY    MORNING. 


Of  the  capture  of  General  Prentiss's  camp,  Colonel 
Francis  Quinn  (Twelfth  Michigan  Infantry)  says  in  his 
official  report  dated  April  9th:  "About  daylight  the 
dead  and  wounded  began  to  be  brought  in.  The  firing 
grew  closer  and  closer,  till  it  became  manifest  a  heavy 
force  of  the  enemy  was  upon  us.  The  division  was 
ordered  into  line  of  battle  by  General  Prentiss,  and  im 
mediately  advanced  in  line  about  one-quarter  of  a  mile 
from  the  tents,  where  the  enemy  were  met  in  short- 
tiring  distance.  Volley  after  volley  was  given  and  re 
turned,  and  many  fell  on  both  sides,  but  their  numbers 
were  too  heavy  for  our  forces.  I  could  see  to  the  right 
and  left.  They  were  visible  in  line,  and  every  hill-top 


in  the  rear  was  covered  with  them.  It  was  manifest 
they  were  advancing,  in  not  only  one,  but  several  lines 
of  battle.  The  whole  division  fell  back  to  their  tents 
and  again  rallied,  and,  although  no  regular  line  was 
formed,  yet  from  behind  every  tree  a  deadly  fire  was 
poured  out  upon  the  enemy,  which  held  them  in  check 
for  about  one  half-hour,  when,  reinforcements  coming 
to  their  assistance,  they  advanced  furiously  upon  our 
camp,  and  we  were  forced  again  to  give  way.  At  this 
time  we  lost  four  pieces  of  artillery.  The  division  fell 
back  about  one  half-mile,  very  much  scattered  and 
broken.  Here  we  were  posted,  being  drawn  up  in  lino 
behind  a  dense  clump  of  bushes." — EDITORS. 


change  of  commanders  thus  necessarily  effected  in  the  heat  of  battle,  the 
efficiency  of  his  division  was  much  weakened. 

The  position  of  our  troops  made  a  continuous  line  from  Lick  Creek,  on  the 
left,  to  Owl  Creek,  a  branch  of  Snake  Creek,  on  the  right,  facing  nearly  south, 
and  possibly  a  little  west.  [See  map,  page  470.]  The  water  in  all  these  streams 
was  very  high  at  the  time,  and  contributed  to  protect  our  flanks.  The  enemy 
was  compelled,  therefore,  to  attack  directly  in  front.  This  he  did  with  great 
vigor,  inflicting  heavy  losses  on  the  National  side,  but  suffering  much  heavier 
on  his  own. 

The  Confederate  assaults  were  made  with  such  disregard  of  losses  on  their 
own  side,  that  our  line  of  tents  soon  fell  into  their  hands.  The  ground  on 
which  the  battle  was  fought  was  undulating,  heavily  timbered,  with  scattered 
clearings,  the  woods  giving  some  protection  to  the  troops  on  both  sides. 
There  was  also  considerable  underbrush.  A  number  of  attempts  were  made 
by  the  enemy  to  turn  our  right  flank,  where  Sherman  was  posted,  but  every 


THE  BATTLE  OF  SHILOH.  473 

effort  was  repulsed  with  heavy  loss.  But  the  front  attack  was  kept  up  so 
vigorously  that,  to  prevent  the  success  of  these  attempts  to  get  on  our  flanks, 
the  National  troops  were  compelled  several  times  to  take  positions  to  the  rear, 
nearer  Pittsburg  Landing.  When  the  firing  ceased  at  night,  the  National  line 
was  all  of  a  mile  in  rear  of  the  position  it  had  occupied  in  the  morning. 

In  one  of  the  backward  moves,  on  the  6th,  the  division  commanded  by 
General  Prentiss  did  not  fall  back  with  the  others.  This  left  his  flanks  exposed, 
and  enabled  the  enemy  to  capture  him,  with  about  2200  of  his  officers  and 
men.  General  Badeau  gives  4  o'clock  of  the  6th  as  about  the  time  this  cap 
ture  took  place.  He  may  be  right  as  to  the  time,  but  my  recollection  is  that 
the  hour  was  later.  General  Prentiss  himself  gave  the  hour  as  half-past  five. 
I  was  with  him,  as  I  was  with  each  of  the  division  commanders  that  day, 
several  times,  and  my  recollection  is  that  the  last  time  I  was  with  him  was 
about  half -past  four,  when  his  division  was  standing  up  firmly,  and  the  gen 
eral  was  as  cool  as  if  expecting  victory.  But  no  matter  whether  it  was  four  or 
later,  the  story  that  he  and  his  command  were  surprised  and  captured  in  their 
camps  is  without  any  foundation  whatever.  If  it  had  been  true,  as  currently 
reported  at  the  time,  and  yet  believed  by  thousands  of  people,  that  Prentiss 
and  his  division  had  been  captured  in  their  beds,  there  would  not  have  been 
an  all-day  struggle  with  the  loss  of  thousands  killed  and  wounded  on  the 
Confederate  side. 

With  the  single  exception  of  a  few  minutes  after  the  capture  of  Prentiss, 
a  continuous  and  unbroken  line  was  maintained  all  day  from.  Snake  Creek  or 
its  tributaries  on  the  right  to  Lick  Creek  or  the  Tennessee  on  the  left,  above 
Pittsburg.  There  was  no  hour  during  the  day  when  there  was  not  heavy 
firing  and  generally  hard  fighting  at  some  point  on  the  line,  but  seldom  at  all 
points  at  the  same  time.  It  was  a  case  of  Southern  dash  against  Northern 
pluck  and  endurance. 

Three  of  the  five  divisions  engaged  011  Sunday  were  entirely  raw,  and 
many  of  the  men  had  only  received  their  arms  on  the  way  from  their  States 
to  the  field.  Many  of  them  had  arrived  but  a  day  or  two  before,  and  were 
hardly  able  to  load  their  muskets  according  to  the  manual.  Their  officers 
were  equally  ignorant  of  their  duties.  Under  these  circumstances,  it  is  not 
astonishing  that  many  of  the  regiments  broke  at  the  first  fire.  In  two  cases, 
as  I  now  remember,  colonels  led  their  regiments  from  the  field  on  first 
hearing  the  whistle  of  the  enemy's  bullets.  In  these  cases  the  colonels  were 
constitutional  cowards,  unfit  for  any  military  position.  But  not  so  the  officers 
and  men  led  out  of  danger  by  them.  Better  troops  never  went  upon  a  battle 
field  than  many  of  these  officers  and  men  afterw.ard  proved  themselves  to  be 
who  fled  panic-stricken  at  the  first  whistle  of  bullets  and  shell  at  Shiloh. 

During  the  whole  of  Sunday  I  was  continuously  engaged  in  passing  from 
one  part  of  the  field  to  another,  giving  directions  to  division  commanders. 
In  thus  moving  along  the  line,  however,  I  never  deemed  it  important  to  stay 
long  with  Sherman.  Although  his  troops  were  then  under  fire  for  the  first 
time,  their  commander,  by  his  constant  presence  with  them,  inspired  a  confi 
dence  in  officers  and  men  that  enabled  them  to  render  services  on  that  bloody 


474  THE  BATTLE  OF  SHILOH. 

battle-field  worthy  of  the  best  of  veterans.  McClernand  was  next  to  Sherman, 
and  the  hardest  fighting  was  in  front  of  these  two  divisions.  McClernand 
told  me  on  that  day,  the  6th,  that  he  profited  much  by  having  so  able  a  com 
mander  supporting  him.  A  casualty  to  Sherman  that  would  have  taken 
him  from  the  field  that  day  would  have  been  a  sad  one  for  the  troops  engaged 
at  Shiloh.  And  how  near  we  came  to  this!  On  the  6th  Sherman  was  shot 
twice,  once  in  the  hand,  once  in  the  shoulder,  the  ball  cutting  his  coat  and 
making  a  slight  wound,  and  a  third  ball  passed  through  his  hat.  In  addition 
to  this  he  had  several  horses  shot  during  the  day. 

The  nature  of  this  battle  was  such  that  cavalry  could  not  be  used  in  front; 
I  therefore  formed  ours  into  line,  in  rear,  to  stop  stragglers,  of  whom  there 
were  many.  When  there  would  be  enough  of  them  to  make  a  show,  and  after 
they  had  recovered  from  their  fright,  they  would  be  sent  to  reenforce  some 
part  of  the  line  which  needed  support,  without  regard  to  their  companies, 
regiments,  or  brigades. 

On  one  occasion  during  the  day,  I  rode  back  as  far  as  the  river  and  met 
General  Buell,  who  had  just  arrived;  I  do  not  remember  the  hour,  but  at 
that  time  there  probably  were  as  many  as  four  or  five  thousand  stragglers 
lying  under  cover  of  the  river-bluff,  panic-stricken,  most  of  whom  would 
have  been  shot  where  they  lay,  without  resistance,  before  they  would  have 
taken  muskets  and  marched  to  the  front  to  protect  themselves.  This 
meeting  between  General  Buell  and  myself  was  on  the  dispatch-boat  used  to 
run  between  the  landing  and  Savannah.  It  was  brief,  and  related  specially 
to  his  getting  his  troops  over  the  river.  As  we  left  the  boat  together,  Buell's 
attention  was  attracted  by  the  men  lying  under  cover  of  the  bank.  I  saw 
him  berating  them  and  trying  to  shame  them  into  joining  their  regiments. 
He  even  threatened  them  with  shells  from  the  gun-boats  near  by.  But  it  was 
all  to  no  effect.  Most  of  these  men  afterward  proved  themselves  as  gallant 
as  any  of  those  who  saved  the  battle  from  which  they  had  deserted.  I  have 
no  doubt  that  this  sight  impressed  General  Buell  with  the  idea  that  a  line  of 
retreat  would  be  a  good  thing  just  then.  If  he  had  come  in  by  the  front 
instead  of  through  the  stragglers  in  the  rear,  he  would  have  thought  and  felt 
differently.  Could  he  have  come  through  the  Confederate  rear,  he  would 
have  witnessed  there  a  scene  similar  to  that  at  our  own.  The  distant  rear  of 
an  army  engaged  in  battle  is  not  the  best  place  from  which  to  judge  cor 
rectly  what  is  going  on  in  front.  Later  in  the  war,  while  occupying  the 
country  between  the  Tennessee  and  the  Mississippi,  I  learned  that  the  panic 
in  the  Confederate  lines  had  not  differed  much  from  that  within  our  own. 
Some  of  the  country  people  estimated  the  stragglers  from  Johnston's  army 
as  high  as  twenty  thousand.  Of  course,  this  was  an  exaggeration. 

The  situation  at  the  close  of  Sunday  was  as  follows:  Along  the  top 
of  the  bluff  just  south  of  the  log-house  which  stood  at  Pittsburg  Landing, 
Colonel  J.  D.  Webster,  of  my  staff,  had  arranged  twenty  or  more  pieces 
of  artillery  facing  south,  or  up  the  river.  This  line  of  artillery  was  on  the 
crest  of  a  hill  overlooking  a  deep  ravine  opening  into  the  Tennessee.  Hurlbut, 
with  his  division  intact,  was  on  the  right  of  this  artillery,  extending  west  and 


THE  BATTLE  OF  SH1LOH. 


475 


iw^T^iii- 

VS.-f'-si;.!*)'      -   i  <      *;ii»?*Vj tllJw  r>*T; 


'4W]^l^m 

•'',••    {£'.Lm&  ^,a;^ 


%£:? 

• 


CHECKING    THE    CONFEDERATE    ADVANCE    ON    THE    EVENING    OF  THE    FIRST    DAY. 

Above  this  ravine,  near  the  landing,  the  Federal  reserve  artillery  was  posted,  and  it  \vas  on  this  line  the 

Confederate  advance  was  checked,  about  sunset,  Sunday  evening.    The  Confederates 

then  fell  back  and  bivouacked  in  the  Federal  camps. 

possibly  a  little  north.  McClernand  came  next  in  the  general  line,  looking 
more  to  the  west.  His  division  "was  complete  in  its  organization  and  ready 
for  any  duty.  Sherman  came  next,  his  right  extending  to  Snake  Creek.  His 
command,  like  the  other  two,  was  complete  in  its  organization  and  ready,  like 
its  chief,  for  any  service  it  might  be  called  upon  to  render.  All  three  divisions 
were,  as  a  matter  of  course,  more  or  less  shattered  and  depleted  in  numbers 
from  the  terrible  battle  of  the  day.  The  division  of  W.  H.  L.  Wallace,  as  much 
from,  the  disorder  arising  from  changes  of  division  and  brigade  commanders, 
under  heavy  fire,  as  from  any  other  cause,  had  lost  its  organization,  and  did 
not  occupy  a  place  in  the  line  as  a  division ;  Prentiss's  command  was  gone  as 
a  division,  many  of  its  members  having  been  killed,  wounded,  or  captured. 
But  it  had  rendered  valiant  service  before  its  final  dispersal,  and  had  contrib 
uted  a  good  share  to  the  defense  of  Shiloh. 

There  was,  I  have  said,  a  deep  ravine  in  front  of  our  left.  The  Tennessee 
Eiver  was  very  high,  and  there  was  water  to  a  considerable  depth  in  the 
ravine.  Here  the  enemy  made  a  last  desperate  effort  to  turn  our  flank, 
but  was  repelled.  The  gun-boats  Tyler  and  Lexington,  Gwin  and  Shirk 
commanding,  with  the  artillery  under  Webster,  aided  the  army  and  effectu 
ally  checked  their  further  progress.  Before  any  of  Buell's  troops  had  reached 
the  west  bank  of  the  Tennessee,  firing  had  almost  entirely  ceased ;  anything 
like  an  attempt  on  the  part  of  the  enemy  to  advance  had  absolutely  ceased. 
There  was  some  artillery  firing  from  an  unseen  enemy,  some  of  his  shells 
passing  beyond  us;  but  I  do  not  remember  that  there  was  the  whistle  of  a 


476 


THE  BATTLE  OF  SHILOH. 


single  musket -ball  heard.  As  his  troops  arrived  in  the  dusk,  General 
Buell  marched  several  of  his  regiments  part  way  down  the  face  of  the 
hill,  where  they  fired  briskly  for  some  minutes,  but  I  do  not  think  a  single 
man  engaged  in  this  firing  received  an  injury;  the  attack  had  spent  its  force. 

General  Lew 
Wallace,  with  5000 
effective  men,  ar 
rived  after  firing 
had  ceased  for 
the  day,  and  was 
placed  on  the 
right.  Thus  night 
came,  Wallace 
came,  and  the  ad 
vance  of  Nelson's 
division  came, 
but  none — unless 
night — in  time  to 
be  of  material  ser 
vice  to  the  gallant 
men  who  saved 
Shiloh  on  that 
first  day,  against 
large  odds.  Buell's 
loss  011  the  6th  of 
April  was  two  men 
killed  and  one 
wounded,  all  mem 
bers  of  the  36th 
Indiana  Infantry. 
The  Army  of  the 

Tennessee  lost  on  that  day  at  least  7000  men.  The  presence  of  two  or  three 
regiments  of  his  army  on  the  west  bank  before  firing  ceased  had  not  the 
slightest  effect  in  preventing  the  capture  of  Pittsburg  Landing. 

So  confident  was  I  before  firing  had  ceased  on  the  6th  that  the  next  day 
would  bring  victory  to  our  arms  if  we  could  only  take  the  initiative,  that  I 
visited  each  division  commander  in  person  before  any  reenforcements  had 
reached  the  field.  I  directed  them  to  throw  out  heavy  lines  of  skirmishers  in 
the  morning  as  soon  as  they  could  see,  and  push  them  forward  until  they 
found  the  enemy,  following  with  their  entire  divisions  in  supporting  distance, 
and  to  engage  the  enemy  as  soon  as  found.  To  Sherman  I  told  the  story  of 
the  assault  at  Fort  Donelsoii,  and  said  that  the  same  tactics  would  win  at  Shi 
loh.  Victory  was  assured  when  Wallace  arrived  even  if  there  had  been  no  other 
support.  The  enemy  received  no  reenforcements.  He  had  suffered  heavy  losses 
in  killed,  wounded,  and  straggling,  and  his  commander,  General  Albert  Sidney 
Johnston,  was  dead.  I  was  glad,  however,  to  see  the  reenforcements  of  Buell 


PRESENT    ASPECT    OF    THE    OLD    HAMBURG    ROAD    (TO    THE    LKFT    OF    THE    NEW 

ROAD)    WHICH    LED    UP    TO  "THE    HORNETS'    NEST." 

FROM    A    PHOTOGRAPH    TAKEN    IN    1884. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  SHILOH. 


477 


and  credit  them  with  doing  all  there  was  for  them  to  do.  During  the  night  of  the 
6th  the  remainder  of  Nelson's  division,  Buell's  army,  crossed  the  river,  and  were 
ready  to  advance  in  the  morning,  forming  the  left  wing.  Two  other  divisions, 
Crittenden's  and  McCook's,  came  up  the  river  from  Savannah  in  the  trans 
ports,  and  were  on  the  west  bank  early  on  the  7th.  Buell  commanded  them 
in  person.  My  command  was  thus  nearly  doubled  in  numbers  and  efficiency. 

During  the  night  rain  fell  in  torrents,  and  our  troops  were  exposed  to  the 
storm  without  shelter.  I  made  my  headquarters  under  a  tree  a  few  hundred 
yards  back  from  the  river-bank.  My  ankle  was  so  much  swollen  from  the 
fall  of  my  horse  the  Friday  night  preceding,  and  the  bruise  was  so  painful, 
that  I  could  get  no  rest.  The  drenching  rain  would  have  precluded  the  pos 
sibility  of  sleep,  without  this  additional  cause.  Some  time  after  midnight, 
growing  restive  under  the  storm  and  the  continuous  pain,  I  moved  back  to 
the  log-house  on  the  bank.  This  had  been  taken  as  a  hospital,  and  all  night 
wounded  men  were  being  brought  in,  their  wounds  dressed,  a  leg  or  an  arm 
amputated,  as  the  case  might  require,  and  everything  being  done  to  save  life 
or  alleviate  suffering.  The  sight  was  more  unendurable  than  encountering 
the  enemy's  fire,  and  I  returned  to  my  tree  in  the  rain. 

The  advance  on  the  morning  of  the  7th  developed  the  enemy  in  the  camps 
occupied  by  our  troops  before  the  battle  began,  more  than  a  mile  back  from 
the  most  advanced  position  of  the  Confederates  011  the  day  before.  It  is 
known  now  that  they  had  not  yet  learned  of  the  arrival  of  Buell's  com 
mand.  Possibly  they  fell  back  so  far  to  get  the  shelter  of  our  tents  during 
the  rain,  and  also  to  get  away  from  the 
shells  that  were  dropped  upon  them  by 
the  gun -boats  every  fifteen  minutes 
during  the  night. 

The  position  of  the  Union  troops  on 
the  morning  of  the  7th  was  as  follows : 
General  Lew  Wallace  on  the  right,  Sher 
man  on  his  left ;  then  McClernaiid,  and 
then  Hurlbut.  Nelson,  of  Buell's  army, 
was  on  our  extreme  left,  next  to  the 
river;  Crittenden  was  next  in  line  after 
Xelson,  and  011  his  right ;  McCook  fol 
lowed,  and  formed  the  extreme  right  of 
Buell's  command.  My  old  command  thus 
formed  the  right  wing,  while  the  troops 
directly  under  Buell  constituted  the  left 
wing  of  the  army.  These  relative  positions 
were  retained  during  the  entire  day,  or  un 
til  the  enemy  was  driven  from  the  field. 

In  a  very  short  time  the  battle  became  general  all  along  the  line.  This  day 
everything  was  favorable  to  the  Federal  side.  We  had  now  become  the 
attacking  party.  The  enemy  was  driven  back  all  day,  as  we  had  been  the  day 
before,  until  finally  he  beat  a  precipitate  retreat.  The  last  point  held  by  him 


MAJOR-GENERAL  B.    M.    PRENTISS. 
FROM   A    PHOTOGRAPH. 


478 


THE  BATTLE  OF  SH1LOH. 


was  near  the  road  leading  from  the  landing  to  Corinth,  on  the  left  of  Sherman 
and  right  of  McClernand.  About  3  o'clock,  being  near  that  point  and  seeing 
that  the  enemy  was  giving  way  everywhere  else,  I  gathered  up  a  couple  of 
regiments,  or  parts  of  regiments,  from  troops  near  by,  formed  them  in  line  of 
battle  and  marched  them  forward,  going  in  front  myself  to  prevent  prema 
ture  or  long-range  firing.  At  this  point  there  was  a  clearing  between  us  and 

the  enemy  favorable  for  charging,  although 
exposed.  I  knew  the  enemy  were  ready  to 
break,  and  only  wanted  a  little  encourage 
ment  from  us  to  go  quickly  and  join  their 
friends  who  had  started  earlier.  After  march 
ing  to  within  musket-range,  I  stopped  and  let 
the  troops  pass.  The  command,  Charge,  was 
given,  and  was  executed  with  loud  cheers,  and 
with  a  run,  when  the  last  of  the  enemy  broke, 
During  this  second  day  of  the  battle  I  had 
been  moving  from  right  to  left  and  back,  to 
see  for  myself  the  progress  made.  In  the 
early  part  of  the  afternoon,  while  riding 
with  Colonel  James  B.  McPherson  and  Major 
J.  P.  Hawkins,  then  my  chief  commissary, 
we  got  beyond  the  left  of  our  troops.  We 
were  moving  along  the  northern  edge  of  a 
clearing,  very  leisurely,  toward  the  river  above 
the  landing.  There  did  not  appear  to  be  an 
enemy  to  our  right,  until  suddenly  a  battery 
with  musketry  opened  upon  us  from  the  edge  of  the  woods  on  the  other  side 
of  the  clearing.  The  shells  and  balls  whistled  about  our  ears  very  fast  for 
about  a  minute.  I  do  not  think  it  took  us  longer  than  that  to  get  out  of  range 
and  out  of  sight.  In  the  sudden  start  we  made,  Major  Hawkins  lost  his  hat. 
He  did  not  stop  to  pick  it  up.  'When  we  arrived  at  a  perfectly  safe  position 
we  halted  to  take  an  account  of  damages.  McPherson's  horse  was  panting  as 
if  ready  to  drop.  On  examination  it  was  found  that  a  ball  had  struck  him 
forward  of  the  flank  just  back  of  the  saddle,  and  had  gone  entirely  through. 
In  a  few  minutes  the  poor  beast  dropped  dead ;  he  had  given  no  sign  of 
injury  until  we  came  to  a  stop.  A  ball  had  struck  the  metal  scabbard  of  my 
sword,  just  below  the  hilt,  and  broken  it  nearly  off ;  before  the  battle  was 
over,  it  had  broken  off  entirely.  There  were  three  of  us :  one  had  lost  a 
horse,  killed,  one  a  hat,  and  one  a  sword-scabbard.  All  were  thankful  that 
it  was  no  worse. 

After  the  rain  of  the  night  before  and  the  frequent  and  heavy  rains  for 
some  days  previous,  the  roads  were  almost  impassable.  The  enemy,  carrying 
his  artillery  and  supply  trains  over  them  in  his  retreat,  made  them  still  worse 
for  troops  following.  I  wanted  to  pursue,  but  had  not  the  heart  to  order  the 
men  who  had  fought  desperately  for  two  days,  lying  in  the  rnud  and  rain 
whenever  not  fighting,  and  I  did  not  feel  disposed  positively  to  order  Buell, 


BlilGADIEIt-GEXEKAL  W.    H.   L.  WALLACE. 
FUO.M  A   PHOTOGRAPH, 


THE  BATTLE  OF  SHILOH.  479 

or  any  part  of  his  command,  to  pursue.  Although  the  senior  in  rank  at  the 
time,  I  had  been  so  only  a  few  weeks.  Buell  was,  and  had  been  for  some 
time  past,  a  department  commander,  while  I  commanded  only  a  district.  I 
did  not  meet  Buell  in  person  until  too  late  to  get  troops  ready  and  pursue 
with  effect ;  but,  had  I  seen  him  at  the  moment  of  the  last  charge,  I  should 
have  at  least  requested  him  to  follow. 

The  enemy  had  hardly  started  in  retreat  from  his  last  position,  when,  look 
ing  back  toward  the  river,  I  saw  a  division  of  troops  coming  up  in  beautiful 
order,  as  if  going  on  parade  or  review.  The  commander  was  at  the  head 
of  the  column,  and  the  staff  seemed  to  be  disposed  about  as  they  would 
have  been  had  they  been  going  on  parade.  When  the  head  of  the  column 
came  near  where  I  was  standing,  it  was  halted,  and  the  commanding  officer, 
General  A.  McD.  McCook,  rode  up  to  where  I  was  and  appealed  to  me  not  to 
send  his  division  any  farther,  saying  that  they  were  worn  out  with  marching 
and  fighting.  This  division  had  marched  on  the  6th  from  a  point  ten  or 
twelve  miles  east  of  Savannah,  over  bad  roads.  The  men  had  also  lost  rest 
during  the  night  while  crossing  the  Tennessee,  and  had  been  engaged  in  the 
battle  of  the  7th.  It  was  not,  however,  the  rank  and  file  or  the  junior  officers 
who  asked  to  be  excused,  but  the  division  commander.  ^  I  rode  forward  sev 
eral  miles  the  day  after  the  battle,  and  found  that  the  enemy  had  dropped 
much,  if  not  all,  of  their  provisions,  some  ammunition,  and  the  extra  wheels 
of  their  caissons,  lightening  their  loads  to  enable  them  to  get  off  their  guns. 
About  five  miles  out  we  found  their  field-hospital  abandoned.  An  immediate 
pursuit  must  have  resulted  in  the  capture  of  a  considerable  number  of  prison 
ers  and  probably  some  guns. 

Shiloh  was  the  severest  battle  fought  at  the  West  during  the  war,  and  but 
few  in  the  East  equaled  it  for  hard,  determined  fighting.  I  saw  an  open 
field,  in  our  possession  on  the  second  day,  over  which  the  Confederates  had 
made  repeated  charges  the  day  before,  so  covered  with  dead  that  it  would 
have  been  possible  to  walk  across  the  clearing,  in  any  direction,  stepping  on 
dead  bodies,  without  a  foot  touching  the  ground.  On  our  side  National  and 
Confederate  were  mingled  together  in  about  equal  proportions ;  but  on  the 
remainder  of  the  field  nearly  all  were  Confederates.  On  one  part,  which  had 
evidently  not  been  plowed  for  several  years,  probably  because  the  land  was 

&  In  an  article  on  the  battle  of  Shiloh,  which  I  battle  of  the  second  day,  and  did  as  good  service 
wrote  for  "  The  Century"  magazine,  I  stated  that  as  its  position  allowed.  In  fact,  an  opportunity  oc- 
General  A.  McD.  McCook,  who  commanded  a  di-  curred  for  it  to  perform  a  conspicuous  act  of  gal- 
vision  of  Buell's  army,  expressed  some  unwilling-  lantry  which  elicited  the  highest  commendation 
ness  to  pursue  the  enemy  on  Monday,  April  7th,  from  division  commanders  in  the  Army  of  the  Ten- 
because  of  the  condition  of  his  troops.  General  nessee.  General  Sherman,  both  in  his  memoirs 
Badeau,  in  his  history,  also  makes  the  same  and  report,  makes  mention  of  this  fact.  General 
statement,  on  my  authority.  Out  of  justice  to  McCook  himself  belongs  to  a  family  which  fur- 
General  McCook  and  his  command,  I  must  say  uished  many  volunteers  to  the  army.  I  refer  to 
that  they  left  a  point  twenty-two  miles  east  of  these  circumstances  with  minuteness  because  I  did 
Savannah  on  the  morning  of  the  Gth.  From  the  General  McCook  injustice  in  my  article  in  '•  The 
heavy  rains  of  a  few  days  previous  and  the  pas-  Century,"  though  not  to  the  extent  one  would  sup- 
sage  of  trains  and  artillery,  the  roads  were  neces-  pose  from  the  public  press.  I  am  not  willing  to  do 
sarily  deep  in  mud,  which  made  marching  slow,  any  one  an  injustice,  and  if  convinced  that  I  have 
The  division  had  not  only  marched  through  this  done  one,  I  am  always  willing  to  make  the  fullest 
mud  the  day  before,  but  it  had  been  in  the  rain  admission.  ^  ^  (jRAx-T 
all  night  without  rest.  It  was  engaged  in  the  MOUNT  MCGKKGOB,  N.Y.,  June  21, 1885. 


480 


THE  BATTLE  OF  SHILOH. 


FORD  WIIEHI 


THE    HAMBURG   ROAD    CROSSES    LICK    CREEK,    LOOKING    FROM    COLONEL    STUART'S 
POSITION    ON    THE    FEDERAL    LEFT. 


Lick  Creek  at  this  point  was  fordable  on  the  first  day  of  the  battle,  but  the  rains  on  Sunday  night  rendered 

it  impassable  on  the  second  day. 

poor,  bushes  had  grown  up,  some  to  the  height  of  eight  or  ten  feet.  There 
was  not  one  of  these  left  standing  unpierced  by  bullets.  The  smaller  ones 
were  all  cut  down. 

Contrary  to  all  my  experience  up  to  that  time,  and  to  the  experience  of  the 
army  I  was  then  commanding,  we  were  on  the  defensive.  We  were  without 
intrenchments  or  defensive  advantages  of  any  sort,  and  more  than  half  the 
army  engaged  the  first  day  was  without  experience  or  even  drill  as  soldiers. 
The  officers  with  them,  except  the  division  commanders,  and  possibly  two  or 
three  of  the  brigade  commanders,  were  equally  inexperienced  in  war.  The 
result  was  a  Union  victory  that  gave  the  men  who  achieved  it  great  con 
fidence  in  themselves  ever  after. 

The  enemy  fought  bravely,  but  they  had  started  out  to  defeat  and  destroy 
an  army  and  capture  a  position.  They  failed  in  both,  with  very  heavy  loss  in 
killed  and  wounded,  and  must  have  gone  back  discouraged  and  convinced 
that  the  "  Yankee  "  was  not  an  enemy  to  be  despised. 

After  the  battle  I  gave  verbal  instructions  to  division  commanders  to  let 
the  regiments  send  out  parties  to  bury  their  own  dead,  and  to  detail  parties, 
under  commissioned  officers  from  each  division,  to  bury  the  Confederate 
dead  in  their  respective  fronts,  and  to  report  the  numbers  so  buried.  The 
latter  part  of  these  instructions  was  not  carried  out  by  all ;  but  they  were 


THE  BATTLE  OF  SHILOH. 


481 


by  those  sent  from  Sherman's  division,  and  by  some  of  the  parties  sent  out 
by  McClernand.  The  heaviest  loss  sustained  by  the  enemy  was  in  front  of 
these  two  divisions. 

The  criticism  has  often  been  made  that  the  Union  troops  should  have  been 
intrenched  at  Shiloh ;  but  up  to  that  time  the  pick  and  spade  had  been  but 
little  resorted  to  at  the  West.  I  had,  however,  taken  this  subject  under  con 
sideration  soon  after  reassuming  command  in  the  field.  McPherson,  my  only 
military  engineer,  had  been  directed  to  lay  out  a  line  to  intrench.  He  did  so, 
but  reported  that  it  would  have  to  be  made  in  rear  of  the  line  of  encampment 
as  it  then  ran.  The  new  line,  while  it  would  be  nearer  the  river,  was  yet  too 
far  away  from  the  Tennessee,  or  even  from  the  creeks,  to  be  easily  supplied 
with  water  from  them ;  and  in  case  of  attack,  these  creeks  would  be  in  the 
hands  of  the  enemy.  Besides  this,  the  troops  with  me,  officers  and  men, 
needed  discipline  and  drill  more  than  they  did  experience  with  the  pick, 
shovel,  and  axe.  Reinforcements  were  arriving  almost  daily,  composed  of 
troops  that  had  been  hastily  thrown  "together  into  companies  and  regiments  — 
fragments  of  incomplete  organizations,  'the  men  and  officers  strangers  to  each 
other.  Under  all  these  circumstances  I  concluded  that  drill  and  discipline 
were  worth  more  to  our  men  than  fortifications. 

General  Buell  was  a  brave,  intelligent  officer,  with  as  much  professional 
pride  and  ambition  of  a  commendable  sort  as  I  ever  knew.  I  had  been  two 
years  at  West  Point  with  him,  and  had  served  with  him  afterward,  in  garrison 


BRIDGE    OVER    SNAKE    CREEK    BY    WHICH    GENERAL    LEW    WALLACE'S    TROOPS    REACHED    THE    FIELD, 
SUNDAY    EVENING.       FROM   A   PHOTOGRAPH   TAKEN    IN    1884. 

Pittsburg  Landing  is  nearly  two  miles  to  the  left.     Owl  Creek  empties  from  the  left  into  Snake  Creek, 

a  short  distance  above  the  bridge. 

VOL.  I.    31 


482 


THE  BATTLE  OF  SH1LOH. 


BIVOUAC    OF  THE    FEDERAL  TROOPS,     SUNDAY    NIGHT. 


and  in  the  Mexican  war,  several  years  more.  He  was  not  given  in  early 
life  or  in  mature  years  to  forming  intimate  acquaintances.  He  was  studious 
by  habit,  and  commanded  the  confidence  and  respect  of  all  who  knew  him. 
He  was  a  strict  disciplinarian,  and  perhaps  did  not  distinguish  sufficiently 
between  the  volunteer  who  "  enlisted  for  the  war "  and  the  soldier  who 
serves  in  time  of  peace.  One  system  embraced  men  who  risked  life  for  a 
principle,  and  often  men  of  social  standing,  competence,  or  wealth,  and 
independence  of  character.  The  other  includes,  as  a  rule,  only  men  who 
could  not  do  as  well  in  any  other  occupation.  General  Buell  became  an 
object  of  harsh  criticism  later,  some  going  so  far  as  to  challenge  his  loyalty. 
No  one  who  knew  him  ever  believed  him  capable  of  a  dishonorable  act,  and 
nothing  could  be  more  dishonorable  than  to  accept  high  rank  arid  command 
in  war  and  then  betray  the  trust.  When  I  came  into  command  of  the  army, 
in  1864,  I  requested  the  Secretary  of  War  to  restore  General  Buell  to  duty. 

After  the  war,  during  the  summer  of  1865, 1  traveled  considerably  through 
the  North,  and  was  everywhere  met  by  large  numbers  of  people.  Every  one 
had  his  opinion  about  the  manner  in  which  the  war  had  been  conducted ; 
who  among  the  generals  had  failed,  how,  and  why.  Correspondents  of  the 
press  were  ever  on  hand  to  hear  every  word  dropped,  and  were  not  always 
disposed  to  report  correctly  what  did  not  confirm  their  preconceived  notions, 
either  about  the  conduct  of  the  war  or  the  individuals  concerned  in  it.  The 
opportunity  frequently  occurred  for  me  to  defend  General  Buell  against  what 


THE  BATTLE  OF  SHILOH.  483 

I  believed  to  be  most  unjust  charges.  On  one  occasion  a  correspondent  put 
in  my  mouth  the  very  charge  I  had  .so  often  refuted — of  disloyalty.  This 
brought  from  General  Buell  a  very  severe  retort,  which  I  saw  in  the  New 
York  "  World  "  some  time  before  I  received  the  letter  itself.  I  could  very 
well  understand  his  grievance  at  seeing  untrue  and  disgraceful  charges 
apparently  sustained  by  an  officer  who,  at  the  time,  was  at  the  head  of  the 
army.  I  replied  to  him,  but  not  through  the  press.  I  kept  no  copy  of  my 
letter,  nor  did  I  ever  see  it  in  print,  neither  did  I  receive  an  answer. 

General  Albert  Sidney  Johnston,  who  commanded  the  Confederate  forces 
at  the  beginning  of  the  battle,  was  disabled  by  a  wound  in  the  afternoon  of 
the  first  day.  His  wound,  as  I  understood  afterward,  was  not  necessarily 
fatal,  or  even  dangerous.  But  he  was  a  man  who  would  not  abandon  what 
he  deemed  an  important  trust  in  the  face  of  danger,  and  consequently  con 
tinued  in  the  saddle,  commanding,  until  so  exhausted  by  the  loss  of  blood 
that  he  had  to  be  taken  from  his  horse,  and  soon  after  died.  The  news  was 
not  long  in  reaching  our  side,  and,  I  suppose,  was  quite  an  encouragement 
to  the  National  soldiers.  I  had  known  Johnston  slightly  in  the  Mexican  war, 
and  later  as  an  officer  in  the  regular  army.  He  was  a  man  of  high  char 
acter  and  ability.  His  contemporaries  at  West  Point,  and  officers  generally 
who  came  to  know  him  personally  later,  and  who  remained  on  our  side, 
expected  him  to  prove  the  most  formidable  man  to  meet  that  the  Confederacy 
would  produce.  Nothing  occurred  in  his  brief  command  of  an  army  to  prove 
or  disprove  the  high  estimate  that  had  been  placed  upon  his  military  ability.  | 

General  Beauregard  was  next  in  rank  to  Johnston,  and  succeeded  to  the 
command,  which  he  retained  to  the  close  of  the  battle  and  during  the  subse 
quent  retreat  on  Corinth,  as  well  as  in  the  siege  of  that  place.  His  tactics 
have  been  severely  criticised  by  Confederate  writers,  but  I  do  not  believe  his 
fallen  chief  could  have  done  any  better  under  the  circumstances.  Some  of 
these  critics  claim  that  Shiloh  was  won  when  Johnston  fell,  and  that  if  he  had 
not  fallen  the  army  under  me  would  have  been  annihilated  or  captured.  Ifs 
defeated  the  Confederates  at  Shiloh.  There  is  little  doubt  that  we  would  have 
been  disgracefully  beaten  if  all  the  shells  and  bullets  fired  by  us  had  passed 
harmlessly  over  the  enemy,  and  if  all  of  theirs  had  taken  effect.  Command 
ing  generals  are  liable  to  be  killed  during  engagements ;  and  the  fact  that 
when  he  was  shot  Johnston  was  leading  a  brigade  to  induce  it  to  make  a 
charge  which  had  been  repeatedly  ordered,  is  evidence  that  there  was  neither 
the  universal  demoralization  on  our  side  nor  the  unbounded  confidence  on 
theirs  which  has  been  claimed.  There  was,  in  fact,  no  hour  during  the  day 
when  I  doubted  the  eventual  defeat  of  the  enemy,  although  I  was  disappointed 
that  reinforcements  so  near  at  hand  did  not  arrive  at  an  earlier  hour. 

The  Confederates  fought  with  courage  at  Shiloh,  but  the  particular  skill 
claimed  I  could  not,  and  still  cannot,  see ;  though  there  is  nothing  to  criticise 

4  In   his   "  Personal   Memoirs  ''   General   Grant  orders  and  dispatches  of  Johnston  I  am  compelled 

says:  "I  once   wrote  that   'nothing   occurred   in  to   materially  modify  my  views  of  that   officer's 

his  brief  command  of  an  army  to  prove  or  dis-  qualifications   as    a   soldier.      My   judgment   now 

prove   the   high   estimate   that  had  been  placed  is  that   he  was  vacillating   and  undecided  in  his 

upon  his  military  ability' ;  but  after  studying  the  actions." 


484 


THE  BATTLE  OF  SHILOH. 


WOUNDED    AND    STRAGGLERS    ON    THK    WAY   TO    THE    LANDING,    AND    AMMUNITION- WAGONS    GOING    TO    THK    FRONT. 

except  the  claims  put  forward  for  it  since.  But  the  Confederate  claimants  for 
superiority  in  strategy,  superiority  in  generalship,  and  superiority  in  dash  and 
prowess  are  not  so  unjust  to  the  Union  troops  engaged  at  Shiloh  as  are  many 
Northern  writers.  The  troops  on  both  sides  were  American,  and  united  they 
need  not  fear  any  foreign  foe.  It  is  possible  that  the  Southern  man  started 
in  with  a  little  more  dash  than  his  Northern  brother ;  but  he  was  correspond 
ingly  less  enduring. 

The  endeavor  of  the  enemy  on  the  first  day  was  simply  to  hurl  their  men 
against  ours — first  at  one  point,  then  at  another,  sometimes  at  several  points 
at  once.  This  they  did  with  daring  and  energy,  until  at  night  the  rebel  troops 
were  worn  out.  Our  effort  during  the  same  time  was  to  be  prepared  to  resist 
assaults  wherever  made.  The  object  of  the  Confederates  on  the  second  day 
was  to  get  away  with  as  much  of  their  army  and  material  as  possible.  Ours 
then  was  to  drive  them  from  our  front,  and  to  capture  or  destroy  as  great  a 
part  as  possible  of  their  men  and  material.  We  were  successful  in  driving 
them  back,  but  not  so  successful  in  captures  as  if  further  pursuit  could  have 
been  made.  As  it  was,  we  captured  or  recaptured  on  the  second  day  about 
as  much  artillery  as  we  lost  on  the  first ;  and,  leaving  out  the  one  great  cap 
ture  of  Prentiss,  we  took  more  prisoners  on  Monday  than  the  enemy  gained 
from  us  011  Sunday.  On  the  6th  Sherman  lost  7  pieces  of  artillery,  McCler- 


THE  BATTLE  OF  SHILOH.  485 

nand  6,  Prentiss  8,  and  Hurlbut  2  batteries.  On  the  7th  Sherman  captured 
7  guns,  McClernand  3,  and  the  Army  of  the  Ohio  20. 

At  Shiloh  the  effective  strength  of  the  Union  force  on  the  morning  of  the 
6th  was  33,000.  Lew  Wallace  brought  five  thousand  more  after  nightfall. 
Beauregard  reported  the  enemy's  strength  at  40,955.  According  to  the  custom 
of  enumeration  in  the  South,  this  number  probably  excluded  every  man 
enlisted  as  musician,  or  detailed  as  guard  or  nurse,  and  all  commissioned 
officers, —  everybody  who  did  not  carry  a  musket  or  serve  a  cannon.  With 
us  everybody  in  the  field  receiving  pay  from  the  Government  is  counted. 
Excluding  the  troops  who  fled,  panic-stricken,  before  they  had  fired  a  shot, 
there  was  not  a  time  during  the  6th  when  we  had  more  than  25,000  men  in 
line.  On  the  7th  Buell  brought  twenty  thousand  more.  Of  his  remaining 
two  divisions,  Thomas's  did  not  reach  the  field  during  the  engagement ; 
Wood's  arrived  before  firing  had  ceased,  but  not  in  time  to  be  of  much  service. 

Our  loss  in  the  two-days  fight  was  1754  killed,  8408  wounded,  and  2885 
missing.  Of  these  2103  were  in  the  Army  of  the  Ohio.  Beauregard  reported 
a  total  loss  of  10,699,  of  whom  1728  were  killed,  8012  wounded,  and  959 
missing.  This  estimate  must  be  incorrect.  We  buried,  by  actual  count, 
more  of  the  enemy's  dead  in  front  of  the  divisions  of  McClernand  and  Sher 
man  alone  than  here  reported,  and  four  thousand  was  the  estimate  of  the 
burial  parties  for  the  whole  field.  Beauregard  reports  the  Confederate  force 
on  the  6th  at  over  40,000,  and  their  total  loss  during  the  two  days  at  10,699; 
and  at  the  same  time  declares  that  he  could  put  only  20,000  men  in  battle 
on  the  morning  of  the  7th. 

The  navy  gave  a  hearty  support  to  the  army  at  Shiloh,  as  indeed  it  always 
did,  both  before  and  subsequently,  when  I  was  in  command.  The  nature 
of  the  ground  was  such,  however,  that  on  this  occasion  it  could  do  nothing 
in  aid  of  the  troops  until  sundown  on  the  first  day.  The  country  was  broken 
and  heavily  timbered,  cutting  off  all  view  of  the  battle  from  the  river,  so  that 
friends  would  be  as  much  in  danger  from  fire  from  the  gun-boats  as  the  foe. 
But  about  sundown,  when  the  National  troops  were  back  in  their  last  position, 
the  right  of  the  enemy  was  near  the  river  and  exposed  to  the  fire  of  the  two 
gun-boats,  which  was  delivered  with  vigor  and  effect.  After  nightfall,  when 
firing  had  entirely  ceased  on  land,  the  commander  of  the  fleet  inf ormed  himself, 
proximately,  of  the  position  of  our  troops,  and  suggested  the  idea  of  drop 
ping  a  shell  within  the  lines  of  the  enemy  every  fifteen  minutes  during  the 
night.  This  was  done  with  effect,  as  is  proved  by  the  Confederate  reports. 

Up  to  the  battle  of  Shiloh,  I,  as  well  as  thousands  of  other  citizens,  believed 
that  the  rebellion  against  the  Government  would  collapse  suddenly  and  soon 
if  a  decisive  victory  could  be  gained  over  any  of  its  armies.  Henry  and 
Donelson  were  such  victories.  An  army  of  more  than  21,000  men  was  cap 
tured  or  destroyed.  Bowling  Green,  Columbus,  and  Hickman,  Ky.,  fell  in 
consequence,  and  Clarksville  and  Nashville,  Tenn.,  the  last  two  with  an 
immense  amount  of  stores,  also  fell  into  our  hands.  The  Tennessee  and 
Cumberland  rivers,  from  their  mouths  to  the  head  of  navigation,  were  secured. 
But  when  Confederate  armies  were  collected  which  not  only  attempted  to  hold 


486 


THE  BATTLE  OF  SHILOH. 


a  line  farther  south,  from  Memphis  to  Chattanooga,  Knoxville  and  on  to  the 
Atlantic,  but  assumed  the  offensive,  and  made  such  a  gallant  effort  to  regain 
what  had  been  lost,  then,  indeed,  I  gave  up  all  idea  of  saving  the  Union  except 
by  complete  conquest.  Up  to  that  time  it  had  been  the  policy  of  our  army, 
certainly  of  that  portion  commanded  by  me,  to  protect  the  property  of  the  citi 
zens  whose  territory  was  invaded,  without  regard  to  their  sentiments,  whether 
Union  or  Secession.  After  this,  however,  I  regarded  it  as  humane  to  both 
sides  to  protect  the  persons  of  those  found  at  their  homes  but  to  consume 
everything  that  could  be  used  to  support  or  supply  armies.  Protection  was 
still  continued  over  such  supplies  as  were  within  lines  held  by  us,  and  which 
we  expected  to  continue  to  hold.  But  such  supplies  within  the  reach  of  Con 
federate  armies  I  regarded  as  contraband  as  much  as  arms  or  ordnance  stores. 
Their  destruction  was  accomplished  without  bloodshed,  and  tended  to  the 
same  result  as  the  destruction  of  armies.  I  continued  this  policy  to  the  close 
of  the  war.  Promiscuous  pillaging,  however,  was  discouraged  and  punished. 
Instructions  were  always  given  to  take  provisions  and  forage  under  the  direc 
tion  of  commissioned  officers,  who  should  give  receipts  to  owners,  if  at  home, 
and  turn  the  property  over  to  officers  of  the  quartermaster  or  commissary 
departments,  to  be  issued  as  if  furnished  from  our  Northern  depots.  But 
much  was  destroyed  without  receipts  to  owners  when  it  could  not  be  brought 
within  our  lines,  and  would  otherwise  have  gone  to  the  support  of  secession 
and  rebellion.  This  policy,  I  believe,  exercised  a  material  influence  in 
hastening  the  end. 


ABOVE    THE    LANDING  —  THE    STORE,    AND    A    PAKT   OF  THE    NATIONAL    CEMETERY. 
FROM    A   PHOTOGHAPH    TAKEN    IN    1884. 


SHILOH  REVIEWED. 

BY  DON   CARLOS  BUELL,  MAJOR-GENERAL,  U.  S.  V. 


TWENTY-THREE  years  ago  the  banks  of  the  Ten 
nessee  witnessed  a  remarkable  occurrence.     There 
was  a  wage  of  battle.     Heavy  blows  were  given  and 
received,  and  the  challenger  failed  to  make  his  cause 
/      .        good.     But  there  were  peculiar  circumstances   which 
distinguished  the  combat  from  other  trials  of  strength 

BATTERr,     FORWARD  I 

in  the  rebellion :  An  army  comprising  70  regiments  of 

infantry,  20  batteries  of  artillery,  and  a  sufficiency  of  cavalry,  lay  for  two 
weeks  and  more  in  isolated  camps,  with  a  river  in  its  rear  and  a  hostile  army 
claimed  to  be  superior  in  numbers  20  miles  distant  in  its  front,  while  the 
commander  made  his  headquarters  and  passed  his  nights  9  miles  away  on 
the  opposite  side  of  the  river.  It  had  no  line  or  order  of  battle,  no  defensive 
works  of  any  sort,  no  outposts,  properly  speaking,  to  give  warning,  or  check 
the  advance  of  an  enemy,  and  no  recognized  head  during  the  absence  of  the 
regular  commander.  On  a  Saturday  the  hostile  force  arrived  and  formed  in 
order  of  battle,  without  detection  or  hindrance,  within  a  mile  and  a  half  of  the 
unguarded  army,  advanced  upon  it  the  next  morning,  penetrated  its  discon 
nected  lines,  assaulted  its  camps  in  front  and  flank,  drove  its  disjointed  mem 
bers  successively  from  position  to  position,  capturing  some  and  routing  others, 
in  spite  of  much  heroic  individual  resistance,  and  steadily  drew  near  the  land 
ing  and  depot  of  its  supplies  in  the  pocket  between  the  river  and  an  impass 
able  creek.  At  the  moment  near  the  close  of  the  day  when  the  remnant  of 
the  retrograding  army  was  driven  to  refuge  in  the  midst  of  its  magazines, 
with  the  triumphant  enemy  at  half -gunshot  distance,  the  advance  division  of 
a  reenforcing  army  arrived  oil  the  opposite  bank  of  the  river,  crossed,  and 
took  position  under  fire  at  the  point  of  attack ;  the  attacking  force  was 
checked,  and  the  battle  ceased  for  the  day.  The  next  morning  at  dawn  the 
reenforcing  army  and  a  fresh  division  belonging  to  the  defeated  force 
advanced  against  the  assailants,  followed  or  accompanied  by  such  of  the 
broken  columns  of  the  previous  day  as  had  not  lost  all  cohesion,  and  after 
ten  hours  of  conflict  drove  the  enemy  from  the  captured  camps  and  the  field. 


488 


SHILOH  REVIEWED. 


Such  are  the  salient  points  in  the  popular  conception  and  historical  record 
of  the  battle  of  Shiloh.  Scarcely  less  remarkable  than  the  facts  themselves 
are  the  means  by  which  the  responsible  actors  in  the  critical  drama  have 
endeavored  to  counteract  them.  At  society  reunions  and  festive  entertain 
ments,  in  newspaper  interviews  and  dispatches,  in  letters  and  contributions 
to  periodicals,  afterthought  official  reports,  biographies,  memoirs,  and  other 
popular  sketches,  the  subject  of  Shiloh,  from  the  first  hour  of  the  battle  to  the 
present  time,  has  been  invaded  by  pretensions  and  exculpatory  statements 
which  revive  the  discussion  only  to  confirm  the  memory  of  the  grave  faults 
that  brought  an  army  into  imminent  peril.  These  defenses  and  assumptions, 
starting  first,  apparently  half  suggested,  in  the  zeal  of  official  attendants  and 
other  partisans,  were  soon  taken  up  more  or  less  directly  by  the  persons  in 
whose  behalf  they  were  put  forward ;  and  now  it  is  virtually  declared  by  the 
principals  themselves,  that  the  Army  of  the  Ohio  was  an  unnecessary  intruder 
in  the  battle,  and  that  the  blood  of  more  than  two  thousand  of  its  members 
shed  on  that  field  was  a  gratuitous  sacrifice. 

With  the  origin  of  the  animadversions  that  were  current  at  the  time  upon 
the  conduct  of  the  battle,  the  Army  of  the  Ohio  had  little  to  do,  and  it  has 
not  generally  taken  a  willing  part  in  the  subsequent  discussion.  They  com 
menced  in  the  ranks  of  the  victims,  and  during  all  the  years  that  have  given 
unwonted  influence  to  the  names  which  they  affected,  the  witnesses  of  the 
first  reports  have  without  show  of  prejudice  or  much  reiteration  firmly 
adhered  to  their  earlier  testimony.  It  does  not  impair  the  value  of  that  testi 
mony  if  extreme  examples  were  cited  to  illustrate  the  general  fact ;  nor  con 
stitute  a  defense  that  such  examples  were  not  the  general  rule.  I  have 
myself,  though  many  years  ago,  made  answer  to  the  more  formal  pleas  that 


PITTSBURG    LANDING,   VIEWED    FROM    THE    FERRY    LANDING    ON    THE    OPPOSITE    SHORE. 
FROM    A    PHOTOGRAPH    TAKEN    IN    1885. 


SHILOH  REVIEWED. 


489 


PITTSBCRG    LANDING.       FROM    A    PHOTOGRAPH   TAKEN   A  FEW    DATS    AFTER  THE    BATTLE. 

Of  the  six  transports,  the  one  farthest  up  stream,  on  the  right,  is  the  Tycoon,  which  was  dispatched  by  the 

Cincinnati  Branch  of  the  Sanitary  Commission  with  stores  for  the  wounded.    The  next  steamer 

is  the  Tigress,  which  was  General  Grant's  headquarters  boat  during  the  Shiloh  cam 

paign.    On  the  opposite  side  of  the  river  is  seen  the  gun-boat  Tyler. 

concerned  the  army  which  I  commanded,  and  I  am  now  called  upon  in  the 
same  cause  to  review  the  circumstances  of  my  connection  with  the  battle,  and 
investigate  its  condition  when  it  was  taken  up  by  the  Army  of  the  Ohio. 


X  by  the  separate  or  concurrent  operations  of  the  forces  of  the  Depart 
ment  of  the  Missouri,  commanded  by  General  Halleck,  and  of  the  Department 
of  the  Ohio,  commanded  by  myself,  the  Confederate  line  had  been  broken,  first 
at  Mill  Springs  by  General  Thomas,  and  afterward  at  Fort  Henry  and  at  Fort 
Donelson  by  General  Grant  and  the  navy,  and  Nashville  and  Middle  Tennessee 
were  occupied  by  the  Army  of  the  Ohio,  the  shattered  forces  of  the  enemy 
fell  back  for  the  formation  of  a  new  line,  and  the  Union  armies  prepared  to 
follow  for  a  fresh  attack.  It  was  apparent  in  advance  that  the  Memphis  and 
Charleston  railroad  between  Memphis  and  Chattanooga  would  constitute  the 
new  line,  and  Corinth,  the  point  of  intersection  of  the  Memphis  and  Charles 
ton  road  running  east  and  west,  and  the  Mobile  and  Ohio  road  running  north 
and  south,  soon  developed  as  the  main  point  of  concentration. 

AVhile  this  new  defense  of  the  enemy  and  the  means  of  assailing  it  by  the 
Union  forces  were  maturing,  General  Halleck's  troops,  for  the  moment  under 


490 


SHILOH  REVIEWED. 


the  immediate  command  of  General  C.  F.  Smith,  were  transported  up  the 
Tennessee  by  water  to  operate  on  the  enemy's  railroad  communications.  It 
was  purely  an  expeditionary  service,  not  intended  for  the  selection  of  a 
rendezvous  or  depot  for  future  operations.  After  some  attempts  to  debark  at 
other  points  farther  up  the  river,  Pittsburg  Landing  was  finally  chosen  as  the 
most  eligible  for  the  temporary  object;  but  when  the  concentration  of  the 
enemy  at  Corinth  made  that  the  objective  point  of  a  deliberate  campaign,  and 
the  cooperation  of  General  Halleck's  troops  and  mine  was  arranged,  Savan 
nah,  on  the  east  bank  of  the  river,  was  designated  by  Halleck  as  the  point 
of  rendezvous.  This,  though  not  as  advisable  a  point  as  Florence,  or  some 
point  between  Florence  and  Eastport,  was  in  a  general  sense  proper.  It  placed 
the  concentration  under  the  shelter  of  the  river  and  the  gun-boats,  and  left 
the  combined  force  at  liberty  to  choose  its  point  of  crossing  and  line  of  attack. 
On  the  restoration  of  General  Grant  to  the  immediate  command  of  the 
troops,  and  his  arrival  at  Savannah  on  the  17th  of  March,  he  converted  the 
expeditionary  encampment  at  Pittsburg  Landing  into  the  point  of  rendez 
vous  of  the  two  armies,  by  placing  his  whole  force  on  the  west  side  of  the 
river,  apparently  on  the  advice  of  General  Sherman,  who,  with  his  division, 
was  already  there.  Nothing  can  be  said  upon  any  rule  of  military  art  or 
common  expediency  to  justify  that  arrangement.  An  invading  army  may, 
indeed,  as  a  preliminary  step,  throw  an  inferior  force  in  advance  upon  the 
enemy's  coast  or  across  an  intervening  river  to  secure  a  harbor  or  other 
necessary  foothold  ;  but  in  such  a  case  the  first  duty  of  the  advanced  force 
is  to  make  itself  secure  by  suitable  works.  Pittsburg  Landing  was  in  no 

sense  a  point  of  such 
necessity  or  desirabil 
ity  as  to  require  any 
risk,  or  any  great  ex 
penditure  of  means  for 
its  occupation.  If  the 
force  established  there 
was  not  safe  alone,  it 
had  no  business  there  ; 
but  having  been  placed 
there,  still  less  can  any 
justification  be  found 
for  the  neglect  of  all 
proper  means  to  make 
it  secure  against  a  su 
perior  adversary.  Gen 
eral  Grant  continued  his 
headquarters  at  Savan- 


THK    LANDING    AT    SAVANNAH,    NINE    MILES    BELOW    (NORTH    OF) 
PITTSBURG    LANDING. 

General  Grant's  headquarters  were  iii  the  Cherry  mansion,  on  the  right; 


vioV. 
liaJ1> 


C*  m         ..ol 

< 

Wit 

the  portico  has  since  been  added.    The  building  on  the  left  is  a  new  hotel.      of  control    at  Pittsburg 


The  town  lies  about  a  quarter  of  a  mile  back  from  the  bluff,  and  is  much 
changed  since  the  war.—  EDITORS. 


Landing. 


SHILOH  REVIEWED. 


491 


rank  did  not  allow  him  the  command,  but  he  was  authorized  to  assign  the 
arriving  regiments  to  brigades  and  -divisions  as  he  might  think  best,  and 
designate  the  camping-grounds.  In  these  and  other  ways  he  exercised  an 
important  influence  upon  the  fate  of  the  army. 

The  movement  of  the  Army  of  the  Ohio  from  Nashville  (which  I  had  occu 
pied  011  February  25th)  for  the  appointed  junction  was  commenced  on  the 
night  of  the  15th  of  March  by  a  rapid 
march  of  cavalry  to  secure  the  bridges 
in  advance,  which  were  then  still 
guarded  by  the  enemy.  It  was  fol 
lowed  on  the  16th  and  successive  days 
by  the  infantry  divisions,  McCook  be 
ing  in  advance  with  instructions  to 
move  steadily  forward;  to  ford  the 
streams  where  they  were  fordable,  and 
when  it  was  necessary  to  make  repairs 
on  the  roads,  such  as  building  bridges 
over  streams  which  were  liable  to  fre 
quent  interruption  by  high  water,  to 
leave  only  a  sufficient  working  party 
and  guard  for  that  purpose ;  to  use  all 
possible  industry  and  energy,  so  as 
to  move  forward  steadily  and  as  rap 
idly  as  possible  without  forcing  the 
march  or  straggling ;  and  to  send  for 
ward  at  once  to  communicate  with  General  Smith  at  Savannah,  and  learn 
his  situation. 

When  the  cavalry  reached  Columbia  the  bridge  over  Duck  River  was 
found  in  flames,  and  the  river  at  flood  stage.  General  McCook  immediately 
commenced  the  construction  of  a  frame  bridge,  but  finding,  after  several 
days,  that  the  work  was  progressing  less  rapidly  than  had  been  expected,  I 
ordered  the  building  of  a  boat  bridge  also,  and  both  were  completed  on  the 
30th.  On  the  same  day  the  river  became  fordable.  I  arrived  at  Columbia 
on  the  26th.  General  Xelsoii  succeeded  in  getting  a  portion  of  his  division 
across  by  fording  on  the  29th,  and  was  given  the  advance.  Most  of  his 
troops  crossed  by  fording  on  the  30th.  The  other  divisions  followed  him  on 
the  march  with  intervals  of  six  miles,  so  as  not  to  incommode  one  another — 
in  all  5  divisions ;  about  37,000  effective  men.  On  the  first  day  of  April, 
General  Halleck  and  General  Grant  were  notified  that  I  would  concentrate  at 
Savannah  on  Sunday  and  Monday,  the  6th  and  7th,  the  distance  being  ninety 
miles.  On  the  4th  General  Nelson  received  notification  from  General  Grant 
that  he  need  not  hasten  his  march,  as  he  could  not  be  put  across  the  river 
before  the  following  Tuesday ;  but  the  rate  of  march  was  not  changed. 

After  seeing  my  divisions  on  the  road,  I  left  Columbia  on  the  evening  of 
the  3d,  and  arrived  at  Savannah  on  the  evening  of  the  5th  with  my  chief  of 
staff,  an  aide-de-camp  (Lieutenant  C.  L.  Fitzhugh),  and  an  orderly,  leaving 


MAJOR-GENERAL  ALEXANDER    MCD.    MCCOOK. 
FROM    A    PHOTOGRAPH. 


492  SHILOH  REVIEWED. 

the  rest  of  my  staff  to  follow  rapidly  with  the  headquarters  train.  Nelson 
had  already  arrived  and  gone  into  camp,  and  Critteiiden  was  close  in  his 
rear.  We  were  there  to  form  a  junction  for  the  contemplated  forward  move 
ment  under  the  command  of  General  Halleck  in  person,  who  was  to  leave 
St.  Louis  the  first  of  the  following  week  to  join  us.  General  Grant  had  been 
at  Nelson's  camp  before  my  arrival,  and  said  he  would  send  boats  for  the 
division  "Monday  or  Tuesday,  or  some  time  early  in  the  week."  "There 
will,"  he  said,  "  be  no  fight  at  Pittsburg  Landing ;  we  will  have  to  go  to 
Corinth,  where  the  rebels  are  fortified.  If  they  come  to  attack  us  we  can 
whip  them,  as  I  have  more  than  twice  as  many  troops  as  I  had  at  Fort  Don- 
elson."  I  did  not  see  General  Grant  that  evening — probably  because  he  was 
at  Pittsburg  Landing  when  I  arrived,  but  he  had  made  an  appointment  to 
meet  me  next  day. 

We  were  finishing  breakfast  at  Nelson's  camp  Sunday  morning,  when  the 
sound  of  artillery  was  heard  up  the  river.  We  knew  of  no  ground  to  appre 
hend  a  serious  engagement,  but  the  troops  were  promptly  prepared  to  march, 
and  I  walked  with  my  chief  of  staff,  Colonel  James  B.  Fry,  to  Grant's  quar 
ters  at  Savannah,  but  he  had  started  up  the  river.  I  there  saw  General  C. 
F.  Smith,  who  was  in  his  bed  sick,  but  apparently  not  dangerously  ill.  He 
had  no  apprehension  about  a  battle,  thought  it  an  affair  of  outposts,  and  said 
that  Grant  had  sixty  thousand  men.  This  would  agree  approximately  with 
the  estimate  which  Grant  himself  made  of  his  force,  at  Nelson's  camp. 

As  the  firing  continued,  and  increased  in  volume,  I  determined  to  go  to 
the  scene  of  action.  Nelson  only  waited  for  the  services  of  a  guide  to  march 
by  land.  The  river  bottom  between  Savannah  and  Pittsburg  Landing  was  a 
labyrinth  of  roads  from  which  the  overflows  had  obliterated  all  recent  signs 
of  travel,  and  left  them  impassable  except  in  certain  places,  and  it  was  with 
great  difficulty  that  a  guide  could  be  obtained.  The  artillery  had  to  be  left 
behind  to  be  transported  by  water.  After  disposing  of  these  matters  and 
sending  orders  for  the  rear  divisions  to  push  forward  without  their  trains,  I 
took  a  small  steamer  at  the  landing  and  proceeded  up  the  river,  accompa 
nied  only  by  my  chief  of  staff.  On  the  way  we  were  met  by  a  descending 
steamer  which  came  alongside  and  delivered  a  letter  from  General  Grant 
addressed  to  the  "  Commanding  Officer,  advanced  forces,  near  Pittsburg, 

Term.,"  and  couched  in  the  following  words  : 

"  PITTSBURG,  April  6,  1862. 

"  GENERAL  :  The  attack  on  ray  forces  has  been  very  spirited  since  early  this  morning-.  The 
appearance  of  fresh  troops  on  the  field  now  would  have  a  powerful  effect,  both  by  inspiring 
our  men  and  disheartening  the  enemy.  If  you  will  get  upon  the  field,  leaving  all  your  baggage 
on  the  east  bank  of  the  river,  it  will  be  a  move  to  our  advantage,  and  possibly  save  the  day  to 
us.  The  rebel  forces  are  estimated  at  over  one  hundred  thousand  men.  My  headquarters  will 
be  in  the  log-building  on  the  top  of  the  hill,  where  you  will  be  furnished  a  staff-officer  to  guide 
you  to  your  place  on  the  field.  Respectfully,  &c.,  U.  S.  GRANT,  Maj.-Gen." 

About  half-way  up  we  met  a  stream  of  fugitives  that  poured  in  a  con 
stantly  swelling  current  along  the  west  bank  of  the  river.  The  mouth  of 
Snake  Creek  was  full  of  them  swimming  across.  We  arrived  at  the  landing 
about  1  o'clock.  I  inquired  for  General  Grant  and  was  informed  that  he  was 
on  his  headquarters  boat,  nearly  against  which  we  had  landed.  I  went  on 


SH1LOH  REVIEWED. 


493 


board,  and  was  met  by  him  at  the  door  of  the  ladies'  cabin,  in  which  there 
were  besides  himself  two  or  three  members  of  his  staff.  Other  officers  may 
have  entered  afterward.  He  appeared  to  realize  that  he  was  beset  by  a 
pressing  danger,  and  manifested  by  manner  more  than  in  words  that  he  was 
relieved  by  my  arrival  as  indicating  the  near  approach  of  succor ;  but  there 
was  nothing  in  his  deportment  that  the  circumstances  would  not  have  justi 
fied  without  disparagement  to  the  character  of  a  courageous  soldier.  Cer 
tainly  there  was  none  of  that  masterly  confidence  which  has  since  been 
assumed  with  reference  to  the  occasion.  After  the  first  salutation,  and  as  I 
walked  to  a  seat,  he  remarked  that  he  had  just  come  in  from  the  front,  and 
held  up  his  sword  to  call  my  attention  to  an  indentation  which  he  said  the 
scabbard  had  received  from  a  shot.  I  did  not  particularly  notice  it,  and 
after  inquiring  about  the  progress  of  the  battle  and  requesting  him  to  send 
steamers  to  bring  up  Crittenden's  division,  which  was  coming  into  Savannah 
as  I  left,  I  proposed  that  we  should  go  ashore.  As  we  reached  the  gangway 
I  noticed  that  the  horses  of  himself  and  his  staff  were  being  taken  ashore. 
He  mounted  and  rode  away,  while  I  walked  up  the  hill ;  so  that  I  saw  him 
no  more  until  the  attack  occurred  at  the  landing  late  in  the  evening.  I 
state  these  particulars  of  our  meeting  with  so  much  detail  because  a  totally 
incorrect  version  of  the  place,  manner,  and  substance  of  the  interview  has 
been  used  to  give  a  false  impression  of  the  state  of  the  battle,  and  a  false 
coloring  to  personal  traits  which  are  assumed  to  have  had  the  issue  in  controL  \ 


J)  About  two  weeks  after  the  battle  of  Shiloh 
there    appeared    in    some    newspaper    that    was 


ject.     The   third,  Colonel  Rawlins,  on   the   other 
hand,  made  it  the  occasion  of  a  specific  defense,  or 


shown  to  me  a  report  of  a  conversation  assumed     explanation,  or  commendation,  or  whatever  it  may 
to  have  taken  place  between  General  Grant  and     be  called,  of  General  Grant's  relation  to  the  battle. 

Among  other  things  that  have  since  been  more  or 

less  disputed,  he  said : 


myself  soon  after  the  battle,  in  which  I  was  repre 
sented  as  rallying  him  upon  the  narrowness  of  his 
escape,  and  saying  that  he  had  not  transports 


:  General  Nelson's  division  of  the  Army  of  the  Ohio 


enough  to  carry  off  ten  thousand  men;  to  which     Beached  Savannah  on  the  afternoonof  the  5th  of  April, 
he   was   reported  as  replying,  in   substance,  that 
when  it  came  to  retreating  transportation  would 
not  have  been  required  for  more  than  ten  thousand. 

The  story  had  been  colored  for  popular  effect,  but 
was  traceable  to  a  conversation  in  a  vein  of  pleas 
antry  that  occurred  at  my  camp,  after  the  battle, 
among  a  party  of  officers  in  which  I  had  taken  but 
little  part. 

Some  time  afterward  it  took  on  a  modification 
which  suited  the  alleged  conversation,  to  my  meet 
ing  with  General  Grant  on  my  arrival  at  Pittsburg 
Landing  during  the  battle.  This  changed  rnateri- 


but  General  Buell  himself  did  not  arrive.  .  .  .  You  [Gen 
eral  Grant]  then  rode  back  to  the  house  near  the  river 
that  had  been  designated  for  headquarters,  to  learn 
what  word  if  any  had  been  received  from  General  Nel 
son,  whose  division  you  expected  soon  to  arrive  at  the 
landing  on  the  opposite  side  of  the  river ;  and  you  there 
met  Maj.-Gen.  D.  C.  Buell,  who  had  arrived  at  Savannah 
and  taken  a  steamer  and  come  up  to  see  you,  and  learn 
how  the  battle  was  progressing  in  advance  of  his  force. 
Among  his  first  inquiries  was :  '  What  preparations 
have  you  made  for  retreating  ? '  To  which  you  replied, 
'  I  have  not  yet  despaired  of  whipping  them,  general ' ; 
and  went  on  to  state  to  him  your  momentary  expecta 
tion  of  the  arrival  of  General  Wallace,  to  whom  orders 
had  been  timely  and  repeatedly  sent,  and  that  General 


ally  the  character  of  the  report,  but  I  continued  to  Nelson's  division  might  soon  be  expected  by  the  wagon- 
treat   it  with  the  indifference  which  I  thought  it  road  from  Savannah,"  etc. 

deserved,  though  the  story  has  been  freely  circu-  This   statement,   ridiculous   and   absurd  in  its 

lated.     I  never  knew  until  within  a  few  months  principal  feature,  is  incorrect  in  every  particular. 


past,  through  the  publication  of  the  "  War  Rec 
ords,"  that  in  its  modified  form  it  had  the  indorse 
ment  of  an  official  authorship. 

From  that  publication  it  appears  that   a   year 
after  the  battle  General  Grant  called  upon  three 


It  is  well  known  that  I  arrived  at  Savannah 
on  the  5th  of  April;  General  Grant  did  not,  as 
might  be  inferred,  find  me  at  the  landing  at 
Pittsburg  —  I  found  Jiim  there  ;  we  did  not  meet  at 
"  the  house  near  the  river,"  but  on  his  headquarters 


of  his  staff-officers  to  make  reports  concerning  the  steamer. 

movements  of  General  Lew  Wallace's  division  on  I  mention   these   points  only  to  show  the  ten- 

the  day  of  the  battle,  in  answer  to  a  complaint  of  dency  of  the  statement  to  error,  and  I  aver  that  no 

the  latter  officer  that  injustice  had  been  done  him  such  conversation  as  is  described  ever  occurred. 

in   General  Grant's  reports.     Two  of  the  officers,  and  that  the  contingency   of  a   retreat   was  not 

namely,  General  McPherson  and  Captain  Rowley,  brought  forward  by  General  Grant  or  by  me. 

in  their  replies  confined  themselves  to  that  sub-  My  attention  has  within  a  few  days  been  called 


494 


SHILOH  REVIEWED. 


PITT8BURG    LANDING    IN    THE    SUMMER    OF    1884.       FROM    A    PHOTOGRAPH. 

The  central  or  main  lauding  is  here  shown.    On  the  hill  to  the  right  is  seen  the  flag-staff  of  the  National 

Cemetery  ;  in  the  rear  and  to  the  left  of  the  cemetery  is  the  stesiinboat-store  and 

post-office,  where  the  roads  from  the  landings  meet. 

On  the  shore  I  encountered  a  scene  which  has  often  been  described.  The 
face  of  the  bluff  was  crowded  with  stragglers  from  the  battle.  The  number 
there  at  different  hours  has  been  estimated  at  from  five  thousand  in  the 
morning  to  fifteen  thousand  in  the  evening.  The  number  at  nightfall  would 
not  have  fallen  short  of  fifteen  thousand,  including  those  who  had  passed 
down  the  river,  and  the  less  callous  but  still  broken  and  demoralized  frag 
ments  about  the  camps  on  the  plateau  near  the  landing.  At  the  top  of  the 
bluff  all  was  confusion.  Men  mounted  and  on  foot,  and  wagons  with  their 
teams  and  excited  drivers,  all  struggling  to  force  their  way  closer  to  the 
river,  were  mixed  up  in  apparently  inextricable  confusion  with  a  battery  of 
artillery  which  was  standing  in  park  without  men  or  horses  to  man  or  move 
it.  The  increasing  throng  already  presented  a  barrier  which  it  was  evidently 
necessary  to  remove,  in  order  to  make  way  for  the  passage  of  my  troops  when 
they  should  arrive.  In  looking  about  for  assistance  I  fell  upon  one  officer, 
the  quartermaster  of  an  Ohio  regiment,  who  preserved  his  senses,  and  was 
anxious  to  do  something  to  abate  the  disorder.  I  instructed  him  to  take  con 
trol  of  the  teams,  and  move  them  down  the  hill  by  a  side  road  which  led  to 
the  narrow  bottom  below  the  landing,  and  there  park  them.  He  went  to 
work  with  alacrity  and  the  efficiency  of  a  strong  will,  and  succeeded  in  clear- 


to  the  fact  that  an  article,  in  a  recent  number  of 
"  The  Century  "  magazine  [General  Adam  Badeau's 
paper  on  "General  Grant,"  in  the  number  for 
May,  1885],  has  given  fresh  circulation  to  the 
story,  and  has  combined  the  official  and  the  origi 
nal  phraseology  of  it.  I  have  regarded  it  as  a 


trivial  question,  of  little  moment  to  either  General 
Grant  or  myself ;  but  perhaps  the  value  attached 
to  it  by  others  makes  it  proper  for  me  to  give  it  an 
attention  which  I  have  not  heretofore  chosen  to 
bestow  upon  it. — D.  C.  BUELL. 
AIRDRIE,  Kentucky,  July  10th,  1885. 


SHILOH  REVIEWED. 


495 


ing  the  ground  of  the  wagons.  It  proved  before  night  to  have  been  a  more 
important  service  than  I  had  expected,  for  it  not  only  opened  the  way  for 
Nelson's  division,  but  extricated  the  artillery  and  made  it  possible  to  get  it 
into  action  when  the  attack  occurred  at  the  landing  about  sunset. 

It  is  now  time  to  glance  at  the  circumstances  which  had  brought  about  and 
were  urging  on  the  state  of  affairs  here  imperfectly  portrayed. 

UPON  learning  on  the  2d  of  April  of  the  advance  of  the  Army  of  the  Ohio 
toward  Savannah,  General  Sidney  Johnston  determined  to  anticipate  the 
junction  of  that  army  with  General  Grant's  force,  by  attacking  the  latter, 
and  at  once  gave  orders  for  the  movement  of  his  troops  on  the  following  day. 
It  was  his  expectation  to  reach  the  front  of  the  army  at  Pittsburg  Landing 
on  Friday,  the  4th,  and  make  the  attack  at  daylight  on  Saturday;  but  the 
condition  of  the  roads,  and  some  confusion  in  the  execution  of  orders,  pre 
vented  him  from  getting  into  position  for  the  attack  until  3  o'clock  p.  M.  on 
Saturday.  This  delay  and  an  indiscreet  reconnoissance  which  brought  on  a 
sharp  engagement  with  the  Federal  pickets,  rendered  it  so  improbable  that 
the  Union  commander  would  not  be  prepared  for  the  attack,  that  General 
Beauregard  advised  the  abandonment  of  the  enterprise,  to  the  success  of 
which  a  surprise  was  deemed  to  be  essential.  General  Johnston  overruled 
the  proposition,  however,  and  the  attack  was  ordered  for  the  following  morn 
ing.  The  army  was  drawn  up  in  three  parallel  lines,  covering  the  front  of 
the  Federal  position.  Hardee  commanded  the  first  line,  Bragg  the  second, 
and  Polk  and  Breckinridge  the  third,  the  latter  being  intended  as  a  reserve. 

The  locality  on  which  the  storm  of  battle  was  about  to  burst  has  often 
been  described  with  more  or  less  of  inaccuracy  or  incompleteness.  It  is  an 
undulating  table-land,  quite  broken  in  places,  elevated  a  hundred  feet  or 
thereabout  above  the  river ;  an  irregular  triangle  in  outline,  nearly  equilateral, 
with  the  sides  four  miles  long,  bordered  on  the  east  by  the  river,  which  here 
runs  nearly  due  north,  on  the  north-west  by  Snake  Creek  and  its  tributary, 
Owl  Creek,  and  on  the  south,  or  south-west,  by  a  range  of  hills  which  immedi 
ately  border  Lick  Creek  on  the  north  bank,  two  hundred  feet  or  more  in 
height,  and  sloping  gradually  toward  the  battle-field.  In  these  hills  rise  the 
eastern  tributaries  of  Owl  Creek,  one  of  them  called  Oak  Creek,  extending 
half-way  across  the  front  or  south  side  of  the  battle-field,  and  interlocking 
with  a  ravine  called  Locust  Grove  Creek,  which  runs  in  the  opposite  direction 
into  Lick  Creek  a  mile  from  its  mouth.  Other  short,  deep  ravines  start  from 
the  table-land  and  empty  into  the  river,  the  principal  among  them  being  Dill's 
.Branch,  six  hundred  yards  above  the  landing.  Midway  in  the  front,  at  the 
foot  of  the  Lick  Creek  hills,  start  a  number  of  surface  drains  which  soon 
unite  in  somewhat  difficult  ravines  and  form  Tillman's  Creek,  or  Brier  Creek. 
It  runs  almost  due  north,  a  mile  and  a  quarter  from  the  river,  in  a  deep 
hollow,  which  divides  the  table-land  into  two  main  ridges.  Tillman's  Creek 
empties  into  Owl  Creek  half  a  mile  above  the  Snake  Creek  bridge  by  which 
the  division  of  Lew  Wallace  arrived.  Short,  abrupt  ravines  break  from  the 
main  ridges  into  Tillman's  Hollow,  and  the  broad  surface  of  the  west  ridge 


496 


SHILOH  REVIEWED. 


rver 
high 


is  further  broken  by  larger  K- 
branches  which  empty  into  3 
Owl  Creek.  Tillman's  Hollow,  * 
only  about  a  mile  long,  is  a  ^ 
marked  feature  in  the  topog-  £ 
raphy,  and  is  identified  with  <• 
some  important  incidents  of  ^ 
the  battle. 

Pittsburg  Landing  is  three- 
quarters  of  a  mile   above  the    s 
mouth  of    Snake   Creek,   and 
two  and  a  quarter  miles  be 
low  the  mouth  of  Lick  Creek. 
Shiloh     Church    is    on     Oak 
Creek   two    miles   and  a  half 
south-west  of  Pittsburg  Land 
ing.     The  table-land  comes  up 
boldly  to  the  river  at  the  land 
ing  and  for  a  mile  south.    Be 
yond    those    limits    the 
bends    away  from    the 
land,  and  the  bottom  gradu 
ally  widens. 

The  principal  roads  are  the 
River  road,  as  it  will  here  be 
called,  which  crosses  Snake 
Creek  at  the  bridge  before 
mentioned,  and  running  a  mile 
west  of  Pittsburg  Landing, 
obliquely  along  the  ridge  east 
of  Tillman's  Creek,  crosses 
Lick  Creek  three-quarters  of 
a  mile  from  the  river  at  the 
ea,st  end  of  the  Lick  Creek 
hills;  the  Hamburg  and  Purdy 
road,  which  branches  from  the 
River  road  a  mile  and  two- 
thirds  in  a  straight  line  south 
of  Pittsburg  Landing,  and  ex 
tends  north-west  400  yards 
north  of  Shiloh  Church;  and 
two  roads  that  start  at  the 
landing,  cross  the  River  road 
two-thirds  of  a  mile  apart,  and 
also  cross  or  run  into  the  Ham 
burg  and  Purdy  road  nearly 


SHILOH  REVIEWED. 


497 


opposite  the  church. 
In  the  official  reports 
these  various  roads 
are  called  with  some 
confusion,  but  not 
altogether  inaccurate 
ly,  Crump's  Landing 
road,  Hamburg  road, 
Corinth  road  or  Pur- 
dy  road,  even  over 
the  same  space,  ac 
cording  to  the  idea  of 
the  writer.  The  Cor 
inth  road  from  the 
landing  has  two  prin 
cipal  branches.  The 
western  branch  passes 
by  the  church,  and 
the  eastern  passes  a 
mile  east  of  the  church 
into  the  Bark  road, 
which  extends  along 
the  crest  of  the  Lick 
Creek  hills.  The  mili 
tary  maps  show  many 
other  roads,  some  of 
them  farm-roads,  and 
some  only  well-worn 
tracks  made  in  haul 
ing  for  the  troops.  In 
some  places  the  old 
roads  were  quite  ob 
literated,  and  are  im 
properly  represented 
on  the  maps,  as  in 
the  case  of  the  River 
road,  which  is  not 
shown  on  the  official 
map  between  McAr- 
thur's  and  Hurlbut's 
headquarters,  imme 
diately  west  of  the 
landing.  It  is  shown 
on  Sherman's  camp 
map,  and  its  existence 
is  not  doubtful.  At 


VOL.  I.     32 


498  SHILOH  REVIEWED. 

the  time  of  the  battle,  much  the  largest  part  of  the  ground  was  in  forest, 
sometimes  open,  sometimes  almost  impenetrable  for  horsemen,  with  occa 
sional  cleared  fields  of  from  20  to  80  acres ;  and  these  variations  operated  in 
a  signal  manner  upon  the  fortune  of  the  combatants.  There  was  not  a 
cleared  field  within  the  limits  of  the  battle  that  has  not  its  history. 

We  may  now  locate  the  troops  in  their  encampments,  for  there  is  where  the 
battle  found  them,  and  its  currents  and  eddies  will  frequently  be  discovered 
by  the  reference  to  certain  camps  in  the  official  reports.  The  camp  map 
wThich  I  received  from  General  Sherman  will  serve  as  a  useful  guide,  subject 
to  some  necessary  modifications,  to  make  a  field  sketch  agree  with  an  actual 
survey.  But  the  regimental  camps  did  not  always  conform  to  the  lines  laid 
down  for  the  brigades  and  divisions.  Sometimes  they  were  in  front,  some 
times  in  rear  of  the  general  line.  I  have  not  pretended  generally  to  intro 
duce  these  variations  into  the  map  which  I  have  prepared  to  accompany 
this  article. 

Starting  at  the  landing,  we  find  the  Second  Division,  commanded  by  W. 
H.  L.  Wallace,  in  the  space  bounded  by  the  river,  Snake  Creek,  the  River 
road,  and  the  right-hand  road  leading  west  from  the  landing.  Along  that 
road  are,  in  this  order,  the  camps  of  the  12th,  7th,  14th,  and  2d  Iowa,  and 
the  52d  and  9th  Illinois.  At  the  point  where  that  road  crosses  the  River 
road,  in  the  south-west  angle  of  the  intersection,  are  the  headquarters  of  Gen 
eral  McArthur.  On  the  east  side  of  the  River  road,  north  of  McArthur  are, 
first,  the  14th  Missouri,  called  "Birge's  sharp-shooters"  (not  on  the  Sherman 
camp  map),  and  next  the  81st  Ohio.  The  16th  Wisconsin  has  been  assigned 
to  Prentiss's  division  since  the  Sherman  map  was  made,  and  the  13th  Missouri 
has  probably  taken  that  ground.  All  these  points  are  particularly  mentioned 
in  the  reports  of  the  battle  and  have  been  verified. 

On  the  left-hand  road  where  it  crosses  the  River  road,  three-quarters  of  a 
mile  from  the  landing,  is  the  Fourth  Division  (Hurlbut's),  its  Third  Brigade 
between  the  road  and  the  river,  and  the  line  of  the  two  other  brigades  bearing 
off  to  the  north-west.  I  have  located  the  3d  Iowa,  of  that  division,  on  the 
ground  just  in  front  of  which  Crittenden's  division  wras  first  formed  in  line 
Monday  morning,  because  it  was  stated  to  me  at  the  time  that  General  Pren- 
tiss  was  killed  at  that  camp ;  the  fact  being  that  near  that  point  Prentiss  was 
captured  and  W.  H.  L.  Wallace  mortally  wounded. 

At  the  fork  of  the  River  road  and  the  Hamburg  and  Purdy  road,  is  the 
camp  of  Sherman's  Second  Brigade,  commanded  by  Colonel  Stuart,  two 
miles  from  the  division  to  which  it  belongs,  and  one  mile  from  Hurlbut's 
division.  On  both  sides  of  the  eastern  Corinth  road,  half  a  mile  south  of  the 
Hamburg  and  Purdy  road,  is  Prentiss's  division  (the  Sixth)  of  2  brigades. 
It  is  not  shown  on  the  Sherman  map.  Stretching  across  the  western  Corinth 
road  at  the  church,  along  Oak  Creek,  are  the  other  three  brigades  of  the 
Fifth  Division  (Sherman's) — Hildebrand's  brigade  being  on  the  east  side  of 
the  road,  Buckland's  next  on  the  west  side,  and  John  A.  McDowell's  next 
on  Buckland's  right.  Only  one  regiment  (the  6th  Iowa)  of  McDowell's  brigade 
is  shown  on  the  Sherman  map. 


SHILOH  REVIEWED.  499 

The  official  reports  and  other  authority  locate  the  First  Division  (McCler- 
nand's)  as  follows :  The  right  of  the  Third  Brigade  is  at  the  point  where 
the  western  Corinth  road  crosses  the  Hamburg  and  Purely  road,  500  yards 
from  the  church,  and  the  left  is  200  yards  from  Hildebrand's  brigade,  which 
is  thus  obliquely  in  its  front.  The  other  2  brigades,  on  a  general  line  start 
ing  from  the  right  of  the  Third,  form  an  obtuse  angle  with  the  Third,  and 
are  along  the  ridge  nearly  parallel  with  Tillman's  Creek,  the  extreme  right 
being  not  far  from  the  bluff  overlooking  Owl  Creek  bottom.  The  First 
Brigade  is  on  the  east  side  of  the  adjacent  field  instead  of  the  west  side,  as 
the  Sherman  map,  according  to  the  road,  would  seem  to  place  it,  though 
that  map  does  not  show  the  field.  It  remains  to  be  added  that  3  of  the  5 
divisions  were  for  that  period  of  the  war  old  and  experienced  troops. 
Hurlbut's  Third  Brigade  belonged  to  the  Army  of  the  Ohio,  and  had  been 
sent  to  reenforce  Grant  before  Donelsou.  Eight  other  regiments  were  fur 
nished  by  me  for  the  first  movement  up  the  Tennessee,  and  remained  with 
Grant's  army.  Sherman's  division,  one  of  the  newest,  had  been  under  his 
command  more  than  a  month,  and  ought  to  have  been  in  a  tolerably  efficient 
state  of  discipline.  Prentiss's  division,  composed  largely  of  raw  regiments, 
had  only  been  organized  a  few  days ;  yet  it  was  posted  in  the  most  exposed 
and  assailable  point  on  the  front.  The  effective  force  at  the  date  of  the 
battle,  exclusive  of  Lew  Wallace's  division,  which  was  at  or  near  Crump's 
Landing,  6  miles  below,  is  stated  by  General  Sherman  at  32,000  men ;  by 
General  Grant  at  33,000.  General  Wallace  left  2  regiments  of  his  division 
and  a  piece  of  artillery  at  Crump's  Landing,  and  joined  the  army  Sunday 
evening,  with,  as  he  states,  not  more  than  5000  men. 

I  proceed  now,  in  the  light  of  the  official  reports  and  other  evidence,  to 
explain  briefly  what  happened :  the  object  being  not  so  much  to  criticise  the 
manner  of  the  battle,  or  give  a  detailed  description  of  it,  as  to  trace  it  to  its 
actual  condition  at  the  close  of  the  first  day,  and  outline  its  progress  during 
the  second.  With  this  object  the  question  of  a  surprise  has  little  to  do.  I 
stop,  therefore,  only  to  remark  that  each  revival  of  that  question  has  placed 
the  fact  in  a  more  glaring  light.  The  enemy  was  known  to  be  at  hand,  but 
no  adequate  steps  were  taken  to  ascertain  in  what  force  or  with  what  design. 
The  call  to  arms  blended  with  the  crash  of  the  assault,  and  when  the  whole 
forest  on  the  rising  ground  in  front  flashed  with  the  gleam  of  bayonets,  then 
General  Sherman,  as  he  reports,  "  became  satisfied  for  the  first  time  that  the 
enemy  designed  a  determined  attack."  Yet  among  the  more  watchful  offi 
cers  in  the  front  divisions,  there  was  a  nervous  feeling  that  their  superiors 
were  not  giving  due  heed  to  the  presence  of  hostile  reconnoitering  parties, 
though  they  little  imagined  the  magnitude  of  the  danger  that  impended.  On 
Saturday  General  Sherman  was  notified  of  these  parties.  He  answered  that 
the  pickets  must  be  strengthened,  and  instructed  to  be  vigilant ;  that  he  was 
embarrassed  for  the  want  of  cavalry;  his  cavalry  had  been  ordered  away,  and 
the  cavalry  he  was  to  have  instead  had  not  arrived ;  as  soon  as  they  reported 
he  would  send  them  to  the  front  and  find  out  what  was  there.  In  one  of  his 
brigades  the  regimental  commanders  held  a  consultation,  at  which  it  was 


500  SHILOH  REVIEWED. 

determined  to  strengthen  the  pickets.  These  are  curious  revelations  to  a 
soldier's  ear. 

Prentiss's  vigilance  gave  the  first  warning  of  the  actual  danger,  and  in  fact 
commenced  the  contest.  On  Saturday,  disquieted  by  the  frequent  appearance 
of  the  enemy's  cavalry,  he  increased  his  pickets,  though  he  had  no  evidence 
of  the  presence  of  a  large  force.  Early  Sunday  morning  one  of  these  picket- 
guards,  startled  no  doubt  by  the  hum  of  forty  thousand  men  half  a  mile  dis 
tant,  waking  up  for  battle,  went  forward  to  ascertain  the  cause,  and  soon 
came  upon  the  enemy's  pickets,  which  it  promptly  attacked.  It  was  then  a 
quarter  past  5  o'clock,  and  all  things  being  ready,  the  Confederate  general, 
accepting  the  signal  of  the  pickets,  at  once  gave  the  order  to  advance.  Pre 
viously,  however,  General  Prentiss,  still  apprehensive,  had  sent  forward  Col 
onel  Moore  of  the  21st  Missouri,  with  five  companies  to  strengthen  the 
picket-guard.  On  the  way  out  Colonel  Moore  met  the  guard  returning  to 
camp  with  a  number  of  its  men  killed  and  wounded.  Sending  the  latter  on 
to  camp  and  calling  for  the  remaining  companies  of  his  regiment,  he  pro 
ceeded  to  the  front  in  time  to  take  a  good  position  on  the  border  of  a  cleared 
field  and  opened  fire  upon  the  enemy's  skirmishers,  checking  them  for  a 
while ;  but  the  main  body  forced  him  back  upon  the  division  with  a  con 
siderable  list  of  wounded,  himself  among  the  number.  All  this  occurred  in 
front  of  Sherman's  camp,  not  in  front  of  Prentiss's.  This  spirited  beginning, 
unexpected  on  both  sides,  gave  the  first  alarm  to  the  divisions  of  Sherman 
and  Prentiss.  The  latter  promptly  formed  his  division  at  the  first  news 
from  the  front,  and  moved  a  quarter  of  a  mile  in  advance  of  his  camp,  where 
he  was  attacked  before  Sherman  was  under  arms.  He  held  his  position  until 
the  enemy  on  his  right  passed  him  in  attacking  Sherman,  whose  left  regi 
ment  immediately  broke  into  rout.  He  then  retired  in  some  disorder,  renew 
ing  the  resistance  in  his  camp  but  forced  back  in  still  greater  disorder,  until 
at  9  o'clock  he  came  upon  the  line  which  Hurlbut  and  W.  H.  L.  Wallace  were 
forming  half  a  mile  in  rear. 

Upon  the  first  alarm  in  his  camp,  which  was  simultaneous  with  the  attack 
upon  Sherman,  McClernand  rapidly  got  under  arms,  and  endeavored  to 
support  Sherman's  left  with  his  Third  Brigade,  only  two  hundred  yards  in 
rear,  while  he  placed  his  First  and  Second  Brigades  in  inverted  order  still 
farther  to  the  rear  and  left,  to  oppose  the  enemy's  columns  pouring  in  upon 
his  left  flank  through  the  opening  on  Sherman's  left ;  but  his  Third  Brigade 
was  forced  back  with  the  fugitives  from  Sherman's  broken  line  by  the 
advancing  enemy,  and  endeavored  with  only  partial  success  to  form  on  the 
right  of  McClernand's  line,  which  at  first  was  formed  with  the  left  a  little 
south,  and  the  center  north  of  the  Corinth  road.  Before  the  formation  was 
completed  the  line  was  compelled  to  retire  by  the  pressure  on  its  front  and  left 
flank,  with  the  loss  of  6  pieces  of  artillery,  but  it  re-formed  300  yards  in  rear. 

Hildebrand's  brigade  had  now  disappeared  in  complete  disorder  from  the 
front,  leaving  three  pieces  of  artillery  in  the  hands  of  the  enemy.  Buckland 
formed  promptly  at  the  first  alarm,  arid  in  order  to  keep  the  enemy  back 
endeavored  by  Sherman's  direction  to  throw  a  regiment  beyond  Oak  Creek, 


SHILOH  REVIEWED.  501 

which  covered  his  front  at  a  distance  of  two  hundred  yards,  but  on  reaching 
the  brow  of  the  low  hill  bordering  the  stream  the  enemy  was  encountered  on 
the  hither  side.  Nevertheless  the  brigade  resisted  effectively  for  about  two 
hours  the  efforts  of  the  assailants  to  cross  the  boggy  stream  in  force.  The 
enemy  suffered  great  loss  in  these  efforts,  but  succeeded  at  last.  Before 
being  quite  forced  back,  Buckland  received  orders  from  Sherman  to  form 
line  on  the  Purely  road  four  hundred  yards  in  rear,  to  connect  with  McCler- 
nand's  right.  Orders  were  also  given  to  McDowell,  who  had  not  yet  been 
engaged,  to  close  to  the  left  on  the  same  line.  These  orders  were  in  effect 
defeated  in  both  cases,  and  five  pieces  of  artillery  lost  by  faults  in  the  execu 
tion  and  the  rapid  advance  of  the  enemy.  Sherman's  division  as  an  organ 
ized  body  disappeared  from  the  field  from  this  time  until  the  close  of  the  day. 
McDowell's  brigade  preserved  a  sort  of  identity  for  a  while.  Sherman  reports 
that  at  "about  10:30  A.  M.  the  enemy  had  made  a  furious  attack  on  General 
Me  demand's  whole  front.  Finding  him  pressed,  I  moved  McDowell's  bri 
gade  against  the  left  flank  of  the  enemy,  forced  him  back  some  distance,  and 
then  directed  the  men  to  avail  themselves  of  every  cover — trees,  fallen 
timber,  and  a  wooded  valley  to  our  right."  It  sounds  like  the  signal  to  dis 
perse,  and  a  little  after  1  o'clock  the  brigade  and  regiments  are  seen  no  more. 
Some  fragments  of  the  division  and  the  commander  himself  attached  them 
selves  to  McClernand's  command,  which  now,  owing  to  its  composite  and 
irregular  organization,  could  hardly  be  denominated  a  division. 

The  contest  which  raged  in  McClernand's  camp  was  of  a  fluctuating  char 
acter.  The  ground  was  lost  and  won  more  than  once,  but  each  ebb  and  flow 
of  the  struggle  left  the  Union  side  in  a  worse  condition.  In  his  fifth  posi 
tion  McClernand  was  driven  to  the  camp  of  his  First  Brigade,  half  of  his 
command  facing  to  the  south  and  half  to  the  west,  to  meet  the  converging 
attack  of  the  enemy.  His  nominal  connection  with  the  left  wing  of  the  army 
across  the  head  of  Tillman's  Hollow  had  been  severed,  by  the  dispersion  or 
defeat  of  the  detached  commands  that  formed  it.  Another  reverse  to  his 
thinned  ranks  would  drive  him  over  the  bluff  into  Owl  Creek  bottom,  and 
perhaps  cut  him  off  from  the  river.  He  determined,  therefore,  between  2 
and  3  o'clock  to  retire  across  Tillman's  Hollow  in  the  direction  of  the  land 
ing.  That  movement  was  effected  with  a  good  deal  of  irregularity,  but 
with  the  repulse  of  a  small  body  of  pursuing  cavalry,  and  a  new  line  was 
formed  on  the  opposite  ridge  along  the  River  road,  north  of  Hurlbut's  head 
quarters.  I  shall  have  occasion  farther  along  to  remark  upon  the  display  of 
force  on  the  right  of  this  line  in  the  vicinity  of  McArthur's  headquarters. 
The  movement  must  have  been  completed  about  3  o'clock.  Leaving  the  right 
wing,  as  it  may  be  called,  in  this  position  prior  to  the  attack  of  -4  o'clock, 
which  drove  it  still  farther  back,  we  will  return  to  the  current  of  events  in 
the  left  wing. 

With  Stuart  on  the  extreme  left,  as  with  the  other  commanders,  the  pres 
ence  of  the  enemy  was  the  first  warning  of  danger.  He  was  soon  compelled 
to  fall  back  from  his  camp  to  a  new  position,  and  presently  again  to  a  third, 
which  located  him  on  the  prolongation  and  extreme  left  of  the  line  formed 


SCALE 


-~~/  ?3?n          *£*~%-*^'l?*2ti 

<**}        ^v  :;.«,•.•.  M  •.-•.-••:  \    ••-'..,;  -V 

HOSlPiTAL'r  v  ..-  .•!',.**£«••'    '*•!;; 


EXPLANATIONS: 
vjff/ifuA  Army  of  the  Ohio, 
nil    nil   IIP  Army  of  the  Tenn 
_  _  _  _  Confederate  Lines 

Regimental  Camps  ai 
the  date  o£  die  battle 

Headquarters- 


REFERENCES: 
McCook,  2d  Division. 
Nelson,  4th  Division, 
Crittenden,  5th  Division, 
Wood,  6th  Division, 
Terrill's  Battery, 
Mendenhall's  Battery, 
Bartlett's  Battery, 
McClernand,  1st  Division, 
\V.  H.  L.  Wallace,  zd  Div. 
LewAVallace,  3d  Division, 
Hurlbut,  4th  Division, 
Sherman,  jth  Division, 
Prentiss,  6th  Division, 
McArthur. 
Oglesby, 

Birge's  Sharpshooters  (14  th  Mo.) 
13th  Missouri. 
43d  Illinois* 
McDowell. 
Stuart 

Thompson's  &  Thurber's  Batteries. 
McAllister's  Battery. 


^g!!^^^|1S?fe  ^£2^ 

^vh3& 


+*r* 

etf^/l.i  ?     *    -    .»i 


At  the  period  indicated  \>y  "  8,  the 
Confederates  had  withdrawn  from 
the  field,  and  Gen.  Grant's  troops 
had  retired  to  their  respective- 
camps. 
9.  Night  of  the  7th. 


When  a  corps  is  missing  in  the  consec 
utive  series,  it  mean.'  that  in  the  interval 
its  action  was  movable  and  its  position  not 
defined- 


Brigades  :  a,  1st  ;  b,  zd  ;  r,  3d  ;  d,  4th. 

Numbtrs  indicate  liox-.rs  of  the  day,  or 
periods  of  the  battle,  as  follows  : 

1.  Attack  at  the  Landing,  evening  of  the 

6th. 

2.  Night  of  the  6th,  and  morning  of  the 

7th,  before  the  advance.  At  that 
period  the  Confederates,  for  the 
•most  part,  occupied  the  various. 
captured  camps. 

3.  Between,   6  and.   8  A.  M.  on  the  7th. 

4.  "         9    "    10      "         '        " 

5.  «       II    "    12      " 

6.  Between  12  .and   I    P.M.      '        " 


502 


MAP  OF  THE  FIELD  OF  SHILOH, 


REVISED    AND    AMENDED    BY    GEN.   D.   C.   BUELL. 


Th 


Andreas,   an  officer  in   the  battle,  and  now  President  of  the  Western  Art  As: 
from  the  official  map  of  the  Army  of  the  Ohio,  made  by  Captain  Michler,  Topographical  En 
gineers. 

The  camps  are  located  partly  in  accordance  with  a  camp  map  made  prior  to  the  battle  by 
Gen.  W.  T.  Sherman  (see  fac-simile,  p.  496) ;  partly  from  information,  original  or  confirmatory, 
obligingly  furnished  by  Capt.  Andreas,  and  from  other  authority.    AH  camps  referred  to  in 
the  official  reports  have  been  carefuly  identified. 

The  positions  A,  B,  and  C,  numbers  3  and  9,  agree  with  the  positions  of  McCook, 
Nelson,  and  Crittenden  for  "  the  morning"  and  "  evening  of  the  yth  "  on  the  Thorn 
map,  and  also  on  the  Michler  map. 

The  positions  of  Ten-ill's,  Mendenhall's,  and  Bartlett's  batteries  also  corre 
spond  with  those  maps. 

The  other  positions  of  the  Army  of  the  Ohio  are  not  on  the  Thorn  map, 
but  are  copied  from  the  Michler  map,   excepting  numbers  2  and  7,  which, 
with  the  positions  of  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee,  prior  to  number  4,  and 
between  numbers  4  and  9,  have  been  determined  from  the  official  reports. 
The  position  number  4  ( 10  o'clock  A.  M. )  of  McClernand,  Wallace, 
md  Sherman,   after  four  hours  of  fighting,  corresponds  with   their 
position  on  the  Thorn  map  for  the  "  morning  of  the  ith." 

The  first  position  of  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  on  the  morn 
ing  of  the  6th  conformed  substantially   to  the  camps  of  Stuart 
on  the  left,  Prentiss  in  the  center,  and  Sherman  on  the  right. 
At  4  P.  M.  of  the  6th,  McClernand,  Sherman,  and  one 
brigade  of  Hurlbut  were  on  the  River  road  north  of  Hurl- 
but's  headquarters.     The  remainder  of  the  army  that 
was  in  ranks  at  that  hour  —  Hurlbut,  W.  H.  L.  Wal 
lace,  and  Prentiss  —  was  almost  exactly  in  the  posi 
tion,  number  4,  occupied  on  the  7th  by  Crittenden, 
and  the  right  and  center  brigades  of  Nelson, 
extending   from    the    western    Corinth    road 
across   to  and  a    little  beyond    the    River 
road.     The    "Hornets'     Nest"    was    in 
front  of  Crittenden's  left   brigade  and 
Nelson's  right  brigade.—  D.  C.  B. 
AIRDRIE,  KENTUCKY,  June,  1885. 


504 


SHJLOH  REVIEWED. 


THE   "HORNETS'  NEST  "  —  PRENTISS'S  TROOPS  AND  HICKENLOOPER'S   BATTERY   REPULSING  HARDEE'S  TROOPS. 

This  cut  and  the  one  on  the  next  page  form  one  picture  relating  to  the  battle  of  the  first  day. 

by  Hurlbut  and  "W.  H.  L.  Wallace,  but  without  having  any  connection  with 
it.  As  soon  as  the  first  advance  of  the  enemy  was  known,  these  two  com 
manders  were  called  upon  by  those  in  front  for  support.  In  the  absence  of 
a  common  superior  it  was  sent  forward  by  regiments  or  brigades  in  such 
manner  as  seemed  proper  to  the  officer  appealed  to,  and  after  that  was  left  to 
its  own  devices.  It  seldom  formed  the  connection  desired,  or  came  under  the 
direction  of  a  common  superior.  Indeed,  the  want  of  cohesion  and  concert 
in  the  Union  ranks  is  conspicuously  indicated  in  the  official  reports.  A 
regiment  is  rarely  overcome  in  front,  but  falls  back  because  the  regiment  on 
its  right  or  left  has  done  so,  and  exposed  its  flank.  It  continues  its  back 
ward  movement  at  least  until  it  is  well  under  shelter,  thus  exposing  the  flank 
of  its  neighbor,  who  then  must  also  needs  fall  back.  Once  in  operation,  the 
process  repeats  itself  indefinitely.  In  a  broken  and  covered  country  which 
affords  occasional  rallying-points  and  obstructs  the  pursuit,  it  proceeds  step 
by  step.  On  an  open  field,  in  the  presence  of  light  artillery  and  cavalry,  it 
would  run  rapidly  into  general  rout. 

This  outflanking,  so  common  in  the  Union  reports  at  Shiloh,  is  not  a  mere 
excuse  of  the  inferior  commanders.  It  is  the  practical  consequence  of  the 
absence  of  a  common  head,  and  the  judicious  use  of  reserves  to  counteract 
partial  reverses  and  preserve  the  front  of  battle.  The  want  of  a  general 
direction  is  seen  also  in  the  distribution  of  Hurlbut's  and  Wallace's  divisions. 
Hurlbut  sent  a  brigade  under  Colonel  Veatch  to  support  Sherman's  left; 
Wallace  sent  one  under  General  McArthur  to  the  opposite  extreme  to  sup- 


SHILOH  REVIEWED. 


505 


"  ^4  s 

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v|t.//-'..,\;.:^-  ••.,.ti*st '•**?-  :  M  ^^aHnf '      --       IP  ^KlSS§i 


:  "' 


GIBSON'S    BRIGADE    CHARGING    HURLBUT'S    TROOPS    IX    THE  "  HORNETS'   XEST." 

From  the  Cyclorama  of  Shiloh  at  Chicago.    By  permission. 

port  Stuart;  and  the  two  remaining  brigades  of  each  were  between  the 
extremes — Wallace  on  Yeatch's  left  but  not  in  connection  with  it,  and  Hurl- 
but  on  McArthur's  right,  also  without  connection.  Stuart  himself  with  his 
brigade  was  two  miles  to  the  left  of  Sherman's  division  to  which  he  belonged. 
"When  the  three  Confederate  lines  were  brought  together  successively  at  the 
front,  there  was,  of  course,  a  great  apparent  mingling  of  organizations ;  but  it 
was  not  in  their  case  attended  with  the  confusion  that  might  be  supposed, 
because  each  division  area  was  thereby  supplied  with  a  triple  complement  of 
brigade  and  division  officers,  and  the  whole  front  was  under  the  close  super 
vision  of  four  remarkably  efficient  corps  commanders.  The  evils  of  dis 
jointed  command  are  plainly  to  be  seen  in  the  arrangement  of  the  Federal 
line,  but  the  position  of  the  left  wing  after  the  forced  correction  of  the  first 
faulty  disposition  of  Hurlbut's  brigades  was  exceedingly  strong,  and  in  the 
center  was  held  without  a  break  against  oft-repeated  assaults  from  9  o'clock 
until  5  o'clock.  From  12  until  2  it  was  identical  with  the  second  position 
taken  by  Nelson  and  Crittenden  on  Monday,  and  it  was  equally  formidable 
against  attack  from  both  directions.  Its  peculiar  feature  consisted  in  a  wood 
in  the  center,  with  a  thick  undergrowth,  flanked  on  either  side  by  open  fields, 
and  with  open  but  sheltering  woods  in  front  and  rear.  The  Confederates  gave 
the  name  of  "Hornets'  Xesfto  the  thicket  part  of  it  on  Sunday,  and  it  was  in 
the  open  ground  on  the  east  flank  that  General  Sidney  Johnston  was  killed. 

On  this  line,  between  and  under  the  shelter  of  Hurlbut  and  "\Y.  H.  L.  Wal 
lace,  Prentiss  rallied  a  considerable  force,  perhaps  a  thousand  men,  of  his 


506  SHILOH  REVIEWED. 

routed  division  at  9  o'clock,  and  fought  stubbornly  until  near  the  close  of  the 
day.  By  3  o'clock  the  withdrawal  of  the  right  wing,  accompanied  by  Veatch's 
brigade,  exposed  W.  H.  L.  Wallace's  right  flank,  which  also  partially  crumbled 
away;  and  the  retirement  of  Stuart  about  the  same  hour  before  the  strong 
attack  brought  against  him,  and  of  Huiibut  at  4  o'clock  under  the  same  pow 
erful  pressure  upon  his  left  flank,  left  Prentiss  and  Wallace  with  his  remain 
ing  regiments  isolated  and  unsupported.  Still  they  held  their  ground  while 
the  enemy  closed  upon  each  flank.  As  they  were  about  being  completely 
enveloped,  Wallace  endeavored  to  extricate  his  command,  and  was  mortally 
wounded  in  the  attempt  at  5  o'clock.  Some  of  his  regiments  under  Colonel 
Tuttle  fought  their  way  through  the  cross-fire  of  the  contracting  lines  of  the 
enemy,  but  6  regiments  of  the  2  divisions  held  fast  until  the  encompass- 
ment  was  complete,  and  one  by  one  with  Prentiss,  between  half-past  5  and 
6  o'clock,  they  were  forced  to  surrender.  This  gallant  resistance,  and  the 
delay  caused  by  the  necessary  disposition  of  the  captives,  weakened  the  force 
of  the  attack  which  McClernand  sustained  in  his  seventh  position  on  the 
River  road  at  4  o'clock,  and  retarded  the  onward  movement  of  the  enemy  for 
nearly  3  hours  after  the  retirement  of  the  right  wing  from  the  west  side 
of  Tillman's  Creek. 

Before  the  incumbrance  of  their  success  was  entirely  put  out  of  the  way  the 
Confederates  pressed  forward  to  complete  a  seemingly  assured  victory,  but  it 
was  too  late.  John  K.  Jackson's  brigade  and  the  9th  and  10th  Mississippi 
of  Chalmers's  brigade  crossed  Dill's  ravine,  and  their  artillery  on  the  south 
side  swept  the  bluff  at  the  landing,  the  missiles  falling  into  the  river  far 
beyond.  Hurlbut  had  hurriedly  got  into  line  in  rear  of  the  siege-guns,  as 
they  are  called  in  the  official  reports  posted  half  a  mile  from  the  river,  but 
for  five  hundred  yards  from  the  landing  there  was  not  a  soldier  in  ranks  or 
any  organized  means  of  defense.  \  Just  as  the  danger  was  perceived,  Colonel 
Webster,  Grant's  chief  of  artillery,  rapidly  approached  Colonel  Fry  and 
myself.  The  idea  of  getting  the  battery  which  was  standing  in  park  into 
action  was  expressed  simultaneously  by  the  three,  and  was  promptly  exe 
cuted  by  Colonel  Webster's  immediate  exertion.  General  Grant  came  up  a 
few  minutes  later,  and  a  member  of  his  escort  was  killed  in  that  position. 
Chalmers's  skirmishers  approached  to  within  one  hundred  yards  of  the  bat 
tery.  The  number  in  view  was  not  large,  but  the  gunners  were  already 
abandoning  their  pieces,  when  Ammen's  brigade,  accompanied  by  Nelson,  came 
into  action.  The  attack  was  repelled,  and  the  engagement  ended  for  the  day. 

In  his  report  of  April  9th,  to  Halleck,  General  Grant  says  of  this  incident : 

"  At  a  late  hour  in  the  afternoon  a  desperate  effort  was  made  by  the  enemy  to  turn  our  left 
and  get  possession  of  the  landing,  transports,  etc.  This  point  was  guarded  by  the  gun-boats 
Tyler  and  Lexington,  Captains  Gr\vin  and  Shirk,  U.  S.  Navy,  commanding,  four  20-pounder  Parrott 
guns,  and  a  battery  of  rifled  guns.  As  there  is  a  deep  and  impassable  ravine  for  artillery  or 
cavalry,  and  very  difficult  for  infantry,  at  this  point,  no  troops  were  stationed  here,  except  the 
necessary  artillerists  and  a  small  infantry  force  for  their  support.  Just  at  this  moment  the 

\  In  studying  the  Official  Eeports  these  "  siege-guns  "  must  not  be  confounded  with  the  battery  of 
rifle  field-guns  nearer  the  river ;  to  all  of  these  the  term  "  Reserve  Artillery"  has  been  given  on  the  map 
(page  503).— D.  C.  B. 


SHILOH  REVIEWED.  507 

advance  of  Major- General  Buell's  column  (a  part  of  the  division  under  General  Nelson)  arrived, 
the  two  generals  named  both  being  present.  An  advance  was  immediately  made  upon  the 
point  of  attack  and  the  enemy  soon  driven  back.  In  this  repulse,  much  is  due  to  the  presence 
of  the  gun-boats  Tyler  and  Lexington,  and  their  able  commanders,  Captains  Gwin  and  Shirk." 

My  own  official  report  is  to  the  same  effect.  In  a  calm  review  of  the 
battle,  not  unfriendly  to  General  Grant,  and  written  some  years  after  the 
occurrence,  General  Hurlbut  said : 

"  About  6  P.  M.  this  movement  (for  a  final  attack  at  the  landing)  was  reported  to  General 
Hurlbut.  He  at  once  took  measures  to  change  the  front  of  2  regiments,  or  parts  of  regiments, 
of  which  the  55th  Illinois  was  one,  and  to  turn  6  pieces  of  artillery  to  bear  upon  the  point 
of  danger.  At  that  instant,  he  being  near  the  head  of  the  Landing  road,  General  Grant  came 
up  from  the  river,  closely  followed  by  Ammen's  brigade  of  Nelson's  division.  Information  of 
the  expected  attack  was  promptly  given,  and  two  of  Ammen's  regiments  deployed  into  line,  moved 
rapidly  forward,  and  after  a  few  sharp  exchanges  of  volleys  from  them,  the  enemy  fell  back,  and 
the  bloody  series  of  engagements  of  Sunday  at  Pittsburg  Landing  closed  with  that  last  repulse." 

The  reports  of  all  the  officers  who  took  part  in  the  action  at  the  landing,  Nel 
son,  Ammen,  and  the  regimental  commanders,  fully  sustain  the  main  point  in 
these  accounts,  and  are  totally  at  variance  with  General  Grant's  statement  in 
his  "Century"  article  [see  page  465].  I  have  myself  never  described  the  attack 
at  the  landing  as  "  a  desperate  effort "  of  the  enemy ;  but  I  have  said  that  the 
condition  of  affairs  at  that  point  made  the  occasion  critical.  We  know  from 
the  Confederate  reports  that  the  attack  was  undertaken  by  Jackson's  and 
Chalmers's  brigades  as  above  stated ;  that  the  reserve  artillery  could  effect 
nothing  against  the  attacking  force  under  the  shelter  of  Dill's  ravine ;  that 
the  fire  of  the  gun-boats  was  equally  harmless  on  account  of  the  elevation 
which  it  was  necessary  to  give  the  guns  in  order  to  clear  the  top  of  the  bluff ; 
and  that  the  final  assault,  owing  to  the  show  of  resistance,  was  delayed. 
Jackson's  brigade  made  its  advance  without  cartridges.  When  they  came  to 
the  crest  of  the  hill  and  found  the  artillery  supported  by  infantry,  they 
shrank  from  the  assault  with  bayonets  alone,  and  Jackson  went  in  search  of 
cooperation  and  support.  In  the  meantime  the  attack  was  superseded  by 
the  order  of  the  Confederate  commander  calling  off  his  troops  for  the  night. 
The  attack  was  poorly  organized,  but  it  was  not  repelled  until  Animen  arrived, 
and  it  cannot  be  affirmed  under  the  circumstances  that  the  action  of  his 
brigade  in  delaying  and  repelling  the  enemy  was  not  of  the  most  vital  im 
portance.  Had  the  attack  been  made  before  Nelson  could  arrive,  with  the 
means  which  the  enemy  had  abundantly  at  hand,  it  would  have  succeeded 
beyond  all  question. 

As  fast  as  Nelson's  division  arrived  it  was  formed  in  line  of  battle  in  front 
of  Grant's  troops,  pickets  were  thrown  across  Dill's  ravine,  and  the  dawn  of 
another  day  was  awaited  to  begin  the  second  stage  in  the  battle ;  or,  speaking 
more  correctly,  to  fight  the  second  battle  of  Shiloh.  Let  us  in  the  meantime 
examine  more  in  detail  the  condition  in  which  the  first  day  had  left  General 
Grant's  command,  and  its  prospects  unaided  for  the  morrow. 

THE  evidence  relied  upon  to  refute  the  accepted  belief  in  the  critical  con 
dition  of  General  Grant's  command  on  Sunday  evening  is  of  two  sorts :  first, 


SCALE 


fOS/T/ON     OF  FEDERAL  FORCES     APRIL  6     MORNING 

F.  „  >•  »  ii  .1       EVENING 

n  „  „  „  APRIL  7 

a  „  ,t  n  ..  «       EVEN/NG       — ^ 

Positions   of  Confederate  forces   were  generally  parallel  to  those  indicated,  above. 


THE    OFFICIAL,    OK    TIIOM,    MAP    OF    THE    BATTLE    OF    SHILOII. 


On  Nov.  28th,  1884,  two  weeks  before  the  Official  Map 
was  scut  to  press  with  General  Grant's  Shiloh  article  (in 
"The  Century"  magazine  for  February,  1885),  inquiry 
was  made  of  General  George  Thorn  concerning  its  his 
tory.  He  replied,  Dec.  5th,  that  it  was  prepared  under 
his  direction  as  Chief  of  Topographical  Engineers  on 
Halleck's  staff  soon  after  the  battle,  while  the  Union 
troops  were  still  encamped  on  and  near  the  battle 
ground,  and  that  Generals  Grant,  Buell,  and  Sherman 
furnished  him  with  information  as  to  the  positions  occu 
pied  by  the  troops  in  the  battle.  On  Dec.  15th,  General 
Thorn  "called  the  attention  of  General  Grant  to  certain 
criticisms  which  General  Sherman  published  on  the 
Official  Map  ...  of  that  battle-field,  at  a  meeting  of 
the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  held  in  Cincinnati  on  the  6th 
and  7th  of  April,  1881."  In  reply,  General  Grant  wrote  : 

"  3  E.  66th  St.,  N.  Y.  City,  Dec.  30th,  1884. 
"  MY  DBAK  GENEKAI.THOM  :  Your  letter  of  the  loth  instant 
was  duly  received,  and  I  iiow  have  yours  of  the  28th.    In 


regard  to  the  matter  of  the  map  which  'The  Centuiy'  mag 
azine  is  to  use  in  illustration  of  the  article  which  I  have  fur 
nished  on  the  battle  of  Shiloh,  I  have  examined  it,  and  see 
nothing  to  criticise.  I  was  not  aware  before  the  receipt  of 
your  first  letter  that  General  Sherman  had  ever  criticised 
your  map  of  the  battle-tield  of  Shiloh.  I  have  not  spoken  to 
Sherman  on  that  particular  subject  recently,  nor  ever  that  I 
remember  of.  '  The  Centuiy,'  as  I  understand,  has  taken 
the  Official  Map  to  illustrate  my  article.  Very  truly  yours, 
U.  S.  GKAXT." 

General  Grant's  approval  of  the  use  of  the  Official 
Map  with  his  article  was  given  in  an  interview  with  one 
of  the  editors  over  the  map,  at  his  house  early  in  Nov., 
1884.  On  June  24th,  1885,  live  months  after  the  appear 
ance  of  the  article,  Colonel  P.  D.  Grant  wrote  to  the 
editor  from  Mount  McGregor,  inclosing  notes  for  the 
reviiion  of  the  map,  and  saying :  "  He  [General  Grant] 
would  like  you  to  make  the  changes  in  the  map,  indi 
cated."  For  General  Grant's  map  and  Colonel  Grant's 
explanation,  see  page  470.— EDITORS. 


SH/LOH  REVIEWED.  509 

the  official  mcq),  as  it  is  called,  and  second,  the  personal  statements  and 
assumptions  of  General  Grant  and  General  Sherman.  I  shall  examine  these 
data  upon  the  evidence  of  the  official  reports  and  my  own  observation. 

The  official  map  was  prepared,  after  the  arrival  of  General  Halleck  at  Pitts- 
burg  Landing,  by  his  topographical  engineer,  General  George  Thorn.  The  topo 
graphical  part  of  it  was  made  from  an  approximate  survey,  and,  though  not 
strictly  accurate,  is  sufficiently  so  for  an  intelligent  study  of  the  battle.  For 
the  errors  in  the  location  of  the  troops  General  Thorn  cannot  be  supposed  to 
be  responsible,  since  he  could  have  no  knowledge  of  the  facts  except  what  he 
derived  from,  the  statements  of  others ;  but  in  what  is  given  and  what  is 
withheld  they  are  of  a  very  misleading  nature.  They  consist,  first,  in  the 
extension  of  Grant's  line  on  the  evening  of  the  6th  a  full  half-mile  to  the  west 
of  its  true  limit — placing  Hurlbut's  division  on  the  front  actually  occupied 
by  McClernand,  McClernand  on  and  four  hundred  yards  beyond  Sherman's 
ground,  and  Sherman  entirely  on  the  west  side  of  Tilmian's  Hollow  on  the 
right  of  the  camping-ground  of  McClernand's  division,  and  within  the  lines 
occupied  by  the  Confederates.  On  the  morning  of  the  7th  they  place  from 
left  to  right,  McClernand,  then  Sherman,  then  Lew  Wallace,  along  the  bluff 
bordering  Owl  Creek  bottom,  all  west  of  Tillman's  Creek,  and  on  ground 
which  we  did  not  possess  until  after  four  hours  of  fighting ;  followed  on  the 
left  by  Hurlbut's  division ;  thus  occupying  a  solid  front  of  a  mile  and  a  third, 
in  comparison  with  which  the  undeveloped  front  of  my  army  presents  a  very 
subordinate  appearance.  They  give  no  account  of  the  positions  during  the 
battle,  in  which  the  right  of  that  army  was  substantially  in  contact  with 
Wallace's  division  on  the  extreme  right.  They  give  two  of  its  positions, —  one 
in  the  first  formation  before  its  front  was  developed,  and  the  other  at  the 
close  of  the  day,  when  Grant's  troops  had  taken  possession  of  their  camps 
again,  and  mine  had  been  withdrawn  from  the  ground  on  which  they  fought. 
These  two  positions  are  taken  from  nay  official  map,  but  not  the  intermediate 
positions  shown  on  that  map.  Below  the  copy  of  the  Thorn  map,  as  published 
with  General  Grant's  article  in  the  February  number  of  "The  Century"  (1885), 
it  was  stated  that  "the  positions  of  the  troops  were  indicated  in  accordance  with 
information  furnished  at  the  time  by  Generals  Grant,  Buell,  and  Sherman." 
It  would  be  presumed  that  Grant  and  Sherman,  the  latter  especially,  in  con 
sequence  of  his  intimate  relations  with  Halleck's  headquarters,  were  consulted 
about  the  location  of  the  troops ;  and  it  is  not  to  be  doubted  that  their  infor 
mation  was  the  guide.  If  any  information  of  mine  was  adopted,  it  was  only 
through  the  map  that  accompanied  my  report,  and  with  reference  to  the 
position  of  my  own  troops. 

Nineteen  years  after  the  battle  General  Sherman  revised  the  official  map, 
and  deposited  his  version  with  the  archives  of  the  Society  of  the  Army  of 
the  Tennessee  for  historical  use.  Ostensibly  it  accepts  the  topography  of 
the  Thorn  map,  but  modifies  the  positions  of  the  troops  in  the  most  radical 
manner.  On  the  Thorn  map  the  line  of  battle  Sunday  evening  is  represented 
as  being  along  the  right-hand  road  leading  west  from  the  landing,  with  the 
reserve  artillerv  and  Nelson's  and  Crittenden's  divisions  on  the  left,  and 


SHILOH  REVIEWED. 


CONFEDERATES. 


IN  THE   "HORNETS'  NEST"— W.    H.    L.   WALLACE'S  LINE. 

This  cut  and  the  one  on  the  next  page  form  one  picture  relating  to  the  first  day's  battle. 

Huiibut,  McClernand,  and  Sherman  in  the  order  mentioned,  toward  the  right. 
The  modification  of  this  position  of  the  troops  by  the  Sherman  edition,  may 
be  described  as  follows  [see  map,  page  470] :  Looking  west  over  the  map,  we 
see  a  line  on  the  east  bank  of  the  river  marked  "Buell."  No  part  of  my  army 
is  represented  on  the  west  bank.  On  the  west  side  of  the  river,  400  yards  back 
from  the  landing  and  parallel  with  the  river,  is  a  line  100  yards  long  marked 
"  Grant."  Extending  back  from  the  river  along  Dill's  Branch,  is  a  line  half 
a  mile  long  marked  "Detachments."  This  might  mean  the  reserve  artillery. 
From  the  outer  extremity  of  the  "Detachments"  is  a  line  two-thirds  of  a  mile 
long  running  west,  but  swelling  in  the  center  well  to  the  south,  with  its  right 
resting  on  Tillman's  Creek,  and  marked  "Hurlbut."  On  the  right  of  Huiibut 
extending  in  the  same  west  course,  and  entirely  011  the  west  side  of  Tillman's 
Creek,  is  a  double  line  one-eighth  of  a  mile  long  marked  "  McClernand." 
Then  commencing  one  hundred  yards  north-west  of  McClernand's  right  and 
extending  due  north,  along  the  edge  of  the  field  in  front  of  the  camp  of 
McClernand's  First  Brigade,  is  a  line  two-thirds  of  a  mile  long  marked 
"  Sherman."  On  the  right  of  this  line  are  three  houses  covered  in  front  by  a 
sort  of  demi-lune  and  wing,  between  which  and  the  main  Sherman  line  is  a 
bastion-like  arrangement.  The  demi-lune  figure  Sherman  designates  as  a 
"strong  flank,"  and  says  it  was  occupied  by  Birge's  sharp-shooters.  Off  to  the 
right  is  seen  Lew  Wallace's  division  crossing  Snake  Creek  bridge,  and  march 
ing  toward  the  demi-lune  by  a  road  which  had  no  existence  in  fact  or  on  the 
original  Thorn  map.  At  the  angle  between  Sherman  and  McClernand  is  a 


SHILOH  REVIEWED. 


i  i 


GEN.    W.    H 


IX    THE    "HORNETS'   NEST"  — W.   H.   L.    WALLACE'S  LINE. 

From  the  Cyclorama  of  Shiloh  at  Chicago.    By  permission. 

ravine  which  extends  into  the  camp  of  McClernand's  division,  and  along  the 
sides  of  this  ravine  from  the  right  and  left  respectively  of  McClernand  and 
Sherman  are  two  dotted  lines  terminating  in  a  point  at  the  head  of  the  ravine. 
In  his  speech  submitting  his  map  to  the  society,  Sherman  explains  how  that 
horn-like  projection  was  formed,  with  other  particulars,  as  follows : 

"  In  the  very  crisis  of  the  battle  of  April  6,  about  4  o'clock  P.  M.,  when  my  division  occupied 
the  line  from  Snake  Creek  bridge  to  the  forks  of  the  Corinth  and  Purdy  road,  there  occurred 
an  incident  I  have  never  seen  recorded.  Birge's  sharp-shooters,  or  '  Squirrel  Tails,'  occupied 
the  stables,  granaries,  and  house  near  the  bridge  as  a  strong  flank.  My  division  occupied  a 
double  line  from  it  along  what  had  once  been  a  lane  with  its  fences  thrown  down,  and  the 
blackberry  and  sassafras  bushes  still  marking  the  border  of  an  open  cotton-field  in  front,  and 
the  left  was  in  a  ravine  near  which  Major  Ezra  Taylor  had  assembled  some  ten  or  twelve  guns. 
This  ravine  was  densely  wooded  and  extended  to  the  front  near  two  hundred  yards,  and  I  feared 
it  might  be  occupied  by  the  enemy,  who  from  behind  the  trees  could  drive  the  gunners  from 
their  posts.  I  ordered  the  colonel  of  one  of  my  regiments  to  occupy  that  ravine  to  anticipate 
the  enemy,  but  he  did  not  quickly  catch  my  meaning  or  comprehend  the  tactics  by  which  he 
could  fulfill  my  purpose.  I  remember  well  that  Colonel  Thomas  W.  Sweeny,  a  one-armed  offi 
cer  who  had  lost  an  arm  in  the  Mexican  War  and  did  not  belong  to  my  command,  stood  near  by 
and  quickly  spoke  up  :  i  I  understand  perfectly  what  you  want ;  let  me  do  it.'  '  Certainly,' 
said  I,  '  Sweeny,  go  at  once  and  occupy  that  ravine,  converting  it  into  a  regular  bastion.'  He 
did  it,  and  I  attach  more  importance  to  that  event  than  to  any  of  the  hundred  achievements 
which  I  have  since  heard  '  saved  the  day,'  for  we  held  that  line  and  ravine  all  night,  and  the 
next  morning  advanced  from  them  to  certain  victory." 

And  yet  it  will  be  seen  that  this  new  line,  prepared  with  such  elaboration 
of  detail  and  introduced  with  such  richness  of  anecdotal  embellishment,  was 


5i2  SHILOH  REVIEWED. 

a  thorough  delusion ;  that  Birge's  sharp-shooters  were  not  there,  and  that 
General  Sherman  was  in  a  different  place !  Setting  aside  historical  accu 
racy,  however,  the  advantage  of  the  revised  arrangement  is  obvious.  It 
extended  General  Grant's  territory  a  half-mile  to  the  south,  fully  as  much  to 
the  west,  taking  in  Tillman's  Hollow,  one-third  of  McClernand's  captured 
camp,  and  a  large  part  of  the  Confederate  army,  giving  a  battle  front  of  two 
miles  and  a  half  instead  of  one  mile,  and  requiring  no  greater  power  of  imagi 
nation  to  man  it  than  to  devise  it.  In  presenting  his  map  to  the  Society, 
Sherman  said :  "  The  map  as  thus  modified  tells  the  story  of  the  battle ! " 

There  can  be  no  doubt  that  General  Sherman's  position  will  carry  unhesi 
tating  credence  to  his  naked  assertion  in  the  minds  of  a  considerable  number 
of  persons;  while  the  more  cautious  but  still  unsearching  readers  will  say 
that  until  the  accuracy  of  the  official  map  is  disproved,  it  must  be  accepted 
as  the  standard  representation  of  the  battle.  It  is  proper,  therefore,  to  cite 
the  proof  which  rejects  both,  and  establishes  a  materially  different  version. 
The  investigation  may  be  confined,  for  the  present,  to  the  location  of  the 
Federal  line  of  battle  on  Sunday  evening.  The  other  errors  in  the  maps  will 
be  developed  incidentally  as  the  general  subject  progresses.  Moreover,  the 
inquiry  will  be  directed  specifically  to  the  Sherman  map,  as  that  includes 
the  faults  of  the  Thorn  map  as  well  as  its  own  peculiar  errors. 

It  is  unnecessary  to  remark  upon  the  exclusion  of  Nelson's  leading  brigade 
from  the  west  bank  of  the  river  on  the  Sherman  map.  Its  presence  there  at 
the  time  in  question  is  as  notorious  as  the  battle  itself.  The  distance  from 
the  landing  to  Dill's  Branch  is  six  hundred  yards.  Sherman  places  his 
"  Detachments,"  /.  e.,  the  "  reserve  artillery,"  exactly  on  the  line  of  that 
branch,  whereas  they  were  five  hundred  yards  north  of  it.  During  the 
engagement  the  Confederates  passed  the  ravine  and  reached  the  crest  of  the 
hill  on  the  north  side.  After  the  engagement  Nelson's  division  occupied  the 
ravine,  and  his  pickets  held  ground  beyond  it  during  the  night.  None  of 
Grant's  troops  were  ever  in  that  position. 

In  adducing  evidence  from  the  official  reports  to  determine  the  further 
position  of  the  Union  line,  the  extracts  will  be  somewhat  extended  when  the 
context  is  pertinent,  in  order  to  show  at  the  same  time  the  number  and  con 
dition  of  the  troops  occupying  it.  The  reader  will  be  spared  the  impression 
of  some  irrelevancy  if  he  will  keep  these  additional  objects  in  mind. 

Of  the  position  of  General  Hurlbut's  division,  the  next  on  the  right  of  the 
"  Detachments,"  that  officer  says  in  his  official  report : 

"  On  reaching  the  24-pounder  siege-guns  in  battery  near  the  river,  I  again  succeeded  in 
forming  line  of  battle  in  rear  of  the  guns." 

That  brought  his  division  on  the  line  of  the  right-hand  road  leading  back 
from  the  river,  but  not  entirely  to  the  right  of  the  artillery  where  the  Thorn 
map  places  it.  He  adds : 

"  I  passed  to  the  right  and  found  myself  in  communication  with  General  Sherman,  and  received 
his  instructions.  In  a  short  time  the  enemy  appeared  on  the  crest  of  the  ridge,  led  by  the  18th 
Louisiana,"  etc.  ..."  General  Sherman's  artillery  also  teas  rapidly  engaged,  and  after  an 
artillery  contest  of  some  duration,  the  enemy  fell  back."  ..."  About  dark  the  firing 


SHILOH  REVIEWED.  513 

ceased.  I  advanced  my  division  one  hundred  yards  to  the  front,  threw  out  pickets,  and  officers 
and  men  bivouacked  in  a  heavy  storm  of  rain.'  About  12  p.  M.  General  Nelson's  leading  columns 
passed  through  my  line  and  icent  to  the  front.,  and  I  called  in  my  advance-guard." 

The  next  division  in  the  regular  order  is  McClernand's,  though  the  reader 
will  not  have  failed  to  observe  the  presence  of  General  Sherman,  with  at  least  a 
portion  of  his  command,  in  communication  with  Hurlbut's  right.  General  Sher 
man,  it  will  be  remembered,  locates  this  division  (McClernand's)  on  the  west 
side  of  Tillman's  Creek.  ~VTe  trace  its  retrogression  step  by  step,  from  its 
permanent  camp,  across  Tillman's  Hollow,  at  the  close  of  the  day,  by  the  fol 
lowing  extracts  from  General  McClernand's  report : 

u  Continuing  this  sanguinary  conflict  until  several  regiments  of  my  division  had  exhausted 
their  ammunition,  and  its  right  flank  had  been  borne  back,  and  it  was  in  danger  of  being  turned, 
the  remainder  of  my  command  .  .  .  also  fell  back  to  the  camp  of  the  First  Brigade.  Here 
the  portion  that  had  first  fallen  back  re-formed  parallel  with  the  camp,  and  fronting  the 
approach  of  the  enemy  from  the  west,  \vhile  the  other  portion  formed  at  right  angles  with  it, 
still  fronting  the  approach  of  the  enemy  from  the  south.  ...  It  was  2  o'clock  when  my 
fifth  line  had  been  thus  formed.  .  .  .  Deterred  from  direct  advance,  he  (the  enemy)  moved 
a  considerable  force  by  the  right  flank,  with  the  evident  intention  of  turning  my  left.  To  defeat 
this  purpose,  /  ordered  my  command  to  fall  back  in  the  direction  of  the  landing,  across  a  deep  hollow, 
and  to  re- form  on  the  east  side  of  another  field,  in  the  skirts  of  a  icood.  This  teas  my  sixth  line.  Here 
we  rested  a  half -hour,  continuing  to  supply  our  men  with  ammunition,  until  the  enemy's  cav 
alry  were  seen  rapidly  crossing  the  field  to  the  charge.  Waiting  until  they  approached  within 
some  thirty  paces  of  our  line,  I  ordered  a  fire,  which  was  delivered  with  great  coolness  and 
destructive  effect.  First  halting,  then  wavering,  they  turned  and  fled  in  confusion,  leaving 
behind  a  number  of  riders  and  horses  dead  on  the  field.  The  29th  Illinois  Infantry,  inspired  by 
the  courageous  example  of  their  commanding  officer,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Ferrell,  bore  the  chief 
part  in  this  engagement.  ...  In  the  meantime,  under  cover  of  this  demonstration  strength 
ened  by  large  additions  from  other  portions  of  the  field  yielded  by  our  forces,  the  enemy  con 
tinued  his  endeavors  to  turn  the  flanks  of  my  line,  and  to  cut  me  off  from  the  landing.  To 
prevent  this  I  ordered  my  left  wing  to  fall  back  a  short  distance  and  form  an  obtuse  angle  with 
the  center,  opposing  a  double  front  to  the  enemy's  approach.  Thus  disposed,  my  left  held  the 
enemy  in  cheek,  while  my  whole  line  sloicly  fell  back  to  my  seventh  position.  Here  I  re-formed  the 
icorn  and  famished  remnant  of  my  division,  on  favorable  ground  along  a  north  and  south  road,  sup 
ported  on  my  right  by  fragments  of  General  Sherman's  division,  and  on  my  left  by  the  [14th  Illinois  and 
25th  Indiana]  under  command  of  Colonel  Veatch,  acting  brigadier-general.'1'1 

The  identity  of  this  seventh  position  of  McClernand  is  determined  by 
the  following  extracts.  Colonel  Marsh,  commanding  McClernand's  Second 
Brigade,  says : 

"  At  this  time,  my  command  having  been  reduced  to  a  merely  nominal  one,  I  received  orders  to  fall 
a  short  distance  to  the  rear  and  form  a  new  line,  detaining  all  stragglers,  portions  of  commands, 
and  commands  which  should  attempt  to  pass.  In  obedience  to  this,  though  with  some  difficulty 
as  regarded  portions  of  some  commands,  whose  officers  seemed  little  inclined  to  halt  short  of  the 
river,  ...  I  had  gathered  quite  a  force,  and  formed  a  line  near  the  camp  of  the  Second  Divis 
ion,  concealing  my  men  in  the  timber  facing  an  open  field.  I  here  requested  Colonel  Davis,  of  the  4Qth 
Illinois,  to  take  position  on  my  right.  He  promptly  and  cheerfully  responded.  .  .  .  In  a  short 
time  General  McClernand,  with  portions  of  the  First  and  Third  Brigades  of  his  own  division,  and  two 
regiments  of  Ohio  troops,  came  up  and  formed  on  the  left  of  the  line  I  had  already  established." 

Colonel  Davis,  of  the  46th  Illinois,  says : 

"  It  being  now  1  o'clock,  my  ammunition  exhausted,  the  men  tired  and  hungry,  and  myself 
exhausted,  having  lost  my  horse  in  the  first  engagement,  and  compelled  to  go  on  foot  the 

VOL.  I.    33 


SHILOH  REVIEWED. 


THE    SIEGE-BATTERY,    ABOVE    THE    LANDING,   THAT  WAS   A    PART  OF  THE   "  LAST    LINE "  IN    THE    FIRST 
DAY'S    BATTLE.      FROM    A    PHOTOGRAPH   TAKEN    A    FEW    DAYS   AFTER    THE    BATTLE. 

balance  of  the  time,  and  finding  myself  within  one-half  mile  of  my  regimental  encampment,  I  marched 
my  men  to  it  and  got  dinner  for  them.  Calling  my  men  into  line  immediately  after  dinner,  I  formed  them 
upon  the  right  of  the  brigade  commanded  by  Colonel  C.  C.  Marsh,  at  his  request,  in  front  and  to  the  left 
of  my  camp,  where  we  again  met  the  enemy  on  Sunday  evening." 

Colonel  Engelmarm,  of  the  43d  Illinois,  whose  report  in  many  respects  is  a 
remarkably  clear  and  interesting  one,  says : 

"We  now  fell  back  by  degrees  [from  McClernand's  sixth  position],  and  a  new  line  being 
formed,  ice  found  ourselves  posted  between  the  46th  Illinois  and  the  13th  Missouri,  our  position  being 
midway  between  the  encampments  of  the  46M  and  9th  Illinois.'1'' 

Colonel  Wright,  13th  Missouri,  of  McArthur's  brigade,  Second  Division,  but 
attached  during  the  battle  to  Sherman's  division,  says : 

"  After  advancing  and  falling  back  several  times,  the  regiment  was  forced  to  retire,  with  all 
the  others  there,  to  the  road  which  crosses  the  Purdy  road  at  right  angles  near  General  McArthnr's 
headquarters.  We  here  took  up  quarters  for  the  night,  bivouacking  without  fires  icithin  four  hundred 
yards  of  our  regimental  camp.'1'' 

The  "  Purdy  road "  here  mentioned  is  the  continuation  of  the  right-hand 
road  leading  from  the  landing.  The  camp  of  the  9th  Illinois  was  in  the 
north-east  angle  of  the  intersection  of  that  road  with  the  River  road,  and 
General  McArthur's  headquarters  were  in  the  south-west  angle  of  the  same 
intersection.  The  camp  of  the  46th  Illinois  was  located  in  the  south-east 
angle  of  the  intersection  of  the  Eiver  road  and  a  middle  road  leading  west 
from  the  landing,  about  five  hundred  yards  from  McArthur's  headquarters. 
These  reports  plainly  identify  General  McClernand's  seventh  position,  of 
which  General  Sherman  formed  part,  with  the  River  road  between  McAr 
thur's  and  Hurlbut's  headquarters.  It  is  a  full  half-mile  in  rear  of  the  posi 
tion  given  to  Sherman's  division  on  the  Thorn  map,  and  of  the  position  which 


SHILOH  REVIEWED.  515 

General  Sherman  assigns  to  himself  on  his  edition,  with  the  deep  hollow  of 
Tillman's  Creek  intervening. 

The  struggle  which  drove  General  McClernand  from  his  seventh  position 
is  described  by  that  officer  as  follows  : 

u  The  enemy  renewed  the  contest  by  trying  to  shell  us  from  our  position.  .  .  .  Advancing 
in  heavy  columns  led  by  the  Louisiana  Zouaves  to  break  our  center,  we  awaited  his  approach 
within  sure  range,  and  opened  a  terrific  fire  upon  him.  The  head  of  the  column  was  instantly 
mowed  down  ;  the  remainder  of  it  swayed  to  and  fro  for  a  few  seconds,  and  turned  and  fled. 
This  second  success  of  the  last  two  engagements  terminated  a  conflict  of  ten  and  a  hah2  hours' 
duration,  from  6  o'clock  A.  M.  to  4:30  o'clock  P.  M.,  and  probably  saved  our  army,  ti-ansports 
and  all,  from  capture.  Strange,  however,  at  the  very  moment  of  the  flight  of  the  enemy,  the 
right  of  our  line  gave  way,  and  immediately  after,  notwithstanding  the  indignant  and  heroic 
resistance  of  Colonel  Veatch,  the  left,  comprising  the  [14th  Illinois  and  25th  Indiana]  was  irre- 
sistibly  swept  back  by  the  tide  of  fugitive  soldiers  and  trains  seeking  vain  security  at  the  land 
ing.  .  .  .  Left  unsupported  and  alone,  the  20th  and  17th  Illinois,  together  icith  other  portions  of 
my  division  not  borne  back  by  the  retreating  multitude,  retired  in  good  order  under  the  immediate  com 
mand  of  Colonel  JIarsh  and  Lieutenant- Colonel  Wood,  and  re-formed  tinder  my  direction,  the  right 
resting  near  the  former  line,  and  the  left  at  an  acute  angle  icith  it.  A  more  extended  line,  comprising 
portions  of  regiments,  brigades,  and  divisions,  was  soon  formed  on  this  nucleus  by  the  efforts  of  General 
Sherman,  myself,  and  other  officers.  Here,  in  the  eighth  position  occupied  by  my  division  during  the 
day,  ice  rested  in  line  of  battle  upon  our  arms,  uncovered  and  Deposed  to  a  drenching  rain  during  the  night."11 

This  last  position  would  locate  McClernand,  excepting  his  First  Brigade, 
perhaps  three  hundred  yards  south  of,  and  obliquely  with  reference  to  the 
right-hand  road  leading  from  the  landing,  facing  a  little  to  the  west.  His 
First  Brigade  is  traced  to  within  half  a  mile  of  the  river,  where  it  was  rallied 
by  its  commander  "  in  front  of  the  camp-ground  of  the  14th  Iowa,"  on  the 
road  to  the  landing.  It  did  not  join  tlie  division  again  until  after  the  battle, 
but  acted  in  connection  with  my  troops.  Colonel  Veatch,  who  was  on 
McClernand's  left  with  the  14th  Illinois  and  25th  Indiana  in  the  seventh 
position,  fell  back  and  took  "  position  011  the  road  leading  to  the  landing  near 
the  heavy  siege-guns,"  and  became  reunited  there  with  Huiibut's  division,  to 
which  he  belonged.  The  space  along  the  road  in  rear  of  McClernand  was 
filled  in  with  various  fragments  which  constituted  Sherman's  command, 
including  at  last  Buckland's  two  regiments.  General  Sherman  says  that 
Colonel  Sweeny  was  with  him.  Xo  doubt  some  of  Sweeny's  men  also  were 
there.  It  was  the  camp-ground  of  his  brigade — the  camp  of  his  own  regi 
ment,  the  52d  Illinois,  being  immediately  on  the  road.  Two  of  his  regiments 
were  captured  with  Prentiss,  and  the  remainder  had  been  driven  back  from 
AY.  H.  L.  Wallace's  right  and  virtually  broken  up.  One  of  his  regiments, 
the  50th  Illinois,  was  sent  in  the  morning  to  support  Colonel  Stuart  on  the 
extreme  left,  and  shared  the  fate  of  the  sufferers  in  that  quarter.  The  space 
along  the  road  between  Sherman  and  Hurlbut  was  occupied  by  the  remnant 
of  Colonel  Tuttle's  brigade  and  a  portion  of  McClernand's  First  Brigade  which 
united  itself  to  Tuttle.  It  was  Tuttle's  camp-ground.  Two  of  his  regiments 
had  been  captured  with  Prentiss. 

From  the  reports  of  the  13th  Missouri  and  43d  Illinois  it  is  inferred  that 
those  two  regiments  did  not  move  from  their  position  on  the  Eiver  road  in 
the  last  falling  back.  But  that,  if  certain,  is  not  important.  They  were  at 


516  SHILOH  REl/IEWED. 

any  rate  substantially  on  the  general  line  above  indicated.  The  same,  in  a 
careless  reading,  might  be  presumed  of  the  46th  Illinois,  which  was  imme 
diately  011  the  left  of  the  43d.  The  report  of  that  regiment  says :  "  The  regi 
ments  both  on  mi/  r'tf/ht  and  left  fell  lack,  but  my  line  did  not  waver  wider  the 
fire  of  the  enemy?  But  it  evidently  fell  back  at  last,  for  the  report  continues: 
"After  breakfast  on  Monday  morning,  still  retaining  my  position  on  the 
right  of  Colonel  Marsh's  brigade,  I  moved  with  him  until  I  readied  and  u'ent 
'beyond  the  ground  of  our  last  engagement  of  Sunday,  where  our  pickets  were 
driven  in,"  etc.  It  remains  now  to  determine  the  question  of  the  extreme 
right  of  the  general  line. 

General  Sherman  says,  and  his  statement  on  that  point  is  sustained  by  the 
reports,  that  Birge's  sharp-shooters  were  immediately  011  his  right  and  con 
stituted  the  extreme  right  of  the  line.  The  official  report  of  that  regiment 
shows  that  during  the  afternoon  it  occupied  a  "position  near  Colonel 
Me  Arthur's  headquarters"  in  an  open  field.  Its  camp  was  in  its  rear  along  the 
opposite  or  east  side  of  the  River  road.  This  would  fix  General  Sherman's 
right  at  the  cross-roads  near  McArthur's  headquarters.  It  is  more  than  a 
mile  from  the  Snake  Creek  bridge.  Other  evidence  confirms  these  positions. 
The  official  reports  of  Lew  Wallace's  division  show  that  he  marched  along 
the  Elver  road  from  the  bridge,  and  formed  in  line  of  battle,  facing  Tillman's 
Creek  in  front  of  the  camp  of  Birge's  sharp-shooters  and  the  81st  Ohio,  the 
right  of  the  division  being  in  front  of  the  latter,  and  the  left  in  front  of  the 
former ;  and  that  it  came  in  actual  contact  with  the  "  sharp-shooters,"  who 
occupied  their  camp  that  night  and  received  the  new-comers  with  cheers. 
This  is  clearly  and  more  circumstantially  explained  by  Greneral  Force  in  his 
book  entitled  "  From  Fort  Henry  to  Corinth,"  page  163.  He  was  present 
and  commanded  the  right  regiment  of  Lew  Wallace's  division  on  that  occa 
sion.  The  position  thus  assigned  to  Wallace  must  have  taken  his  left  well 
up  to  the  cross-road  at  McArthur's  headquarters,  and  covered  the  entire  field 
toward  the  north ;  for  the  distance  from  the  cross-road  to  the  right  of  the 
camp  of  the  81st  Ohio  was  only  half  a  mile. 

It  is  particularly  to  1)6  observed  that  in  no  report,  either  from  Sherman's 
division  or  from  Lew  Wallace's,  is  there  any  mention  of  actual  contact  or  of 
any  definite  proximity  of  these  two  divisions  on  the  evening  of  the  6th,  or 
earlier  than  10  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  the  7th.  The  inference  is,  that 
at  the  time  of  Wallace's  arrival  and  subsequently,  no  part  of  Sherman's 
division  was  on  the  River  road,  or  anywhere  along  the  heights  of  Tillman's 
Creek  north  of  McArthur's  headquarters.  General  Sherman,  in  his  report, 
says :  "  General  Wallace  arrived  from  Crump's  Landing  shortly  after  dark 
and  formed  his  line  to  my  right  and  rear."  That  relative  position  could  only 
exist  by  assuming  that  Sherman's  command  was  on  the  road  leading  to  the 
landing  east  of  McArthur's  headquarters,  and  nearly  at  right  angles  with 
Wallace, —  a  supposition  which  is  strengthened  by  the  condition  indicated 
in  Sherman's  revised  map,  that  Birge's  sharp-shooters  were  on  his  right- 
not  entirely  in  his  front,  as  they  would  have  been  if  his  front  had  been  on 
the  River  road.  It  is  also  sustained  by  General  Bucklaiid's  statement  in  the 


SH/LOH  REVIEWED. 

"  Journal  of  the  Society  of  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee "  for  1881,  p.  82. 
"About  dark,"  he  says,  "General  Wallace's  division  commenced  arriving, 
and  formed  to  the  right  of  my  brigade."  Buckland  states  in  his  report  and 
in  the  "Journal"  that  he  lay  "on  the  road."  If  he  had  been  on  the  Eiver 
road,  Wallace  would  have  come  in  contact  with  him,  and  when  he  formed  in 
line  would  have  been  entirely  in  his  front — not  in  rear  or  on  his  right.  Buck- 
land  seems  to  know  nothing  about  Birge's  sharp-shooters.  The  probable 
explanation  is  that  when  he  came  along  the  road  from  the  bridge  they  were 
on  the  west  side  of  the  road,  in  the  field  near  McArthur's  headquarters. 
After  Lew  Wallace  arrived  and  formed  in  front  of  them,  they  probably 
retired  to  their  camp  on  the  east  side  of  the  road.  The  explanation  of  Buck- 
land's  position  is  that,  after  the  retreat  across  Tillman's  Creek  from  the  west 
side,  he  found  himself,  as  he  says,  near  Snake  Creek  bridge  "  late  in  the 
afternoon,  after  the  repulse  of  the  right  of  the  line,"  entirely  apart  from  the 
rest  of  the  army,  and  that  to  reestablish  his  connection  with  it  he  started  on 
the  road  to  the  landing,  where  one  of  his  regiments  actually  went  and 
remained  overnight ;  and  that  he  came  upon  the  outer  flank  of  the  new  line 
where  General  Sherman  soon  after  found  him,  east  of  McArthur's  headquar 
ters,  and  thus  placed  himself  where  he  is  described  by  Sherman  as  being, 
between  Birge's  sharp-shooters  and  the  rest  of  the  line. 

The  Confederate  reports  mention  a  considerable  appearance  of  force  in  a 
camp  opposite  their  extreme  left  in  the  afternoon,  evidently  referring  to 
McArthur's  camp.  The  student  of  the  reports  will  not  be  misled  by  this 
appearance ;  it  was  the  force  that  clustered  with  Sherman  on  McCler- 
nand's  right  near  McArthur's  headquarters;  by  the  9th  Illinois,  81st  Ohio, 
and  Birge's  sharp-shooters,  all  belonging  to  McArthur's  brigade;  and  by 
the  movement  of  Buckland's  regiments  from  the  bridge  as  already  explained. 
The  sharp-shooters  and  the  81st  Ohio  had  been  posted  at  the  bridge,  and 
returned  to  their  camps  probably  at  the  time  of  the  retreat  from  the  west 
side  of  Tillman's  Creek.  The  9th  Illinois  had  during  the  morning  been 
engaged  on  the  extreme  left  under  its  brigade  commander.  It  had  lost 
250  men  out  of  550,  and  was  ordered  to  its  camp  "  to  replenish  cartridge- 
boxes,  clean  guns,  and  be  ready  for  action."  While  there  at  3  o'clock  it  was 
ordered  "  to  support  the  right  wing  of  General  Sherman's  division,"  as  the 
report  expresses  it,  and  in  the  subsequent  engagements  retired  to  within  half 
a  mile  of  the  landing.  Birge's  sharp-shooters  retained  their  position  at  or 
in  front  of  their  camp.  The  movements  of  the  81st  Ohio  are  not  very  clearly 
defined,  but  in  the  advance  next  morning  it  is  found  on  McClernand's  left. 
The  "10  or  12  guns  "  mentioned  by  General  Sherman  in  his  map-presentation 
speech  as  being  near  a  ravine  on  his  left,  Sunday  afternoon,  were  Taylor's 
battery,  as  it  was  called,  though  commanded  by  Captain  Barrett,  and  Bou- 
ton's  battery.  The  former  had  retired  for  ammunition  from  McClernand's 
camp,  probably  to  near  McArthur's  headquarters,  but  afterward  evidently 
went  near  the  river,  where  it  received  "  1  lieutenant  and  2-4  men  with  3 
horses  "  from  Fitch's  battery.  Bouton's  battery  was  taken  into  action  in  the 
field  in  front  of  McClernand's  right  about  4  o'clock,  and  was  forced  to  retire, 


SHILOH  REVIEWED. 


its  support  helping  to  draw  off  its  guns.  Both  the  battery  and  the  support 
went  back  toward  the  river,  for  in  the  advance  next  morning  the  support  is 
found  on  McClernand's  left,  and  the  battery  was  brought  into  service  with 
McCook  in  the  afternoon.  Sherman  had  no  artillery  with  him  on  Monday 
until  about  10  o'clock.  Major  Taylor  then  brought  up  three  pieces  of  an  Illi 
nois  battery  under  Lieutenant  Wood,  not  belonging  to  Sherman's  command. 
The  final  retreat  from  McClernand's  seventh  position,  Sunday  evening, 
undoubtedly  carried  with  it  all  of  the  fragments  connected  with  Sherman 
near  McArthur's  headquarters,  along  the  road  toward  the  river,  where  I 
found  him  about  dark,  excepting  Birge's  sharp-shooters,  the  13th  Missouri, 
and  the  43d  Illinois.  The  latter  belonged  to  McClernand's  Third  Brigade, 
but  remained  with  the  13th  Missouri  Sunday  night.  After  crossing  Till- 
maii's  Creek  next  morning,  both  were  brought  into  line  on  McClernand's 
left,  and  did  not  form  with  Sherman,  though  the  13th  Missouri  subsequently 
joined  him. 

My  own  observation  as  to  the  position  and  extent  of  General  Grant's  line 
accords  substantially  with  the  evidence  of  the  reports.  In  the  dusk  of  the 
evening  after  the  close  of  the  engagement  on  Sunday,  I  walked  out  with  my 

chief  -of  -staff,  following  the  road  and  the  line  of 
the  troops.  My  object  was  to  gain  information 
by  which  to  determine  the  formation  of  my 
divisions,  and  I  not  only  observed  all  that  I 
could  see  at  such  an  hour,  but  I  made  inquiry  as 
I  passed  along.  I  came  to  Hurlbut's  left  five 
hundred  yards  from  the  river  ;  I  passed  along 
its  front  and  came  to  troops  that  answered  as 
McClernand's,  and  which  I  supposed  at  the  time 
to  constitute  his  division,  but  which  were  proba 

bly  his  First  Brigade 
only;  I  passed  to 
the  front  of  these 
troops,  and  when  I 
turned  in  toward  the 
road  again,  I  came 
upon  Sherman's  line, 
as  it  happened,  not 
far  from  where  he 
was,  and  I  was  con 
ducted  to  him.  It  was 
then  growing  dark. 
I  judge  the  distance 
to  have  been  about 
three-quarters  of  a 
mile  from  the  river 
—  less  than  half  a 


BUELL'S    TROOPS    DEBARKING    AT   PITT8BURG    LANDING,    SUNDAY    NIGHT. 


mile    fl'Od 


SHILOH  REVIEWED. 


left,  and  I  think  now  that  it  was  near /the  camp  of  Colonel  Sweeny's  regiment, 
the  52d  Illinois,  that  I  found  General  Sherman. 

The  impression  made  upon  my  mind  by  that  interview  has  remained  as 
vivid  as  the  circumstances  were  peculiar.  I  had  no  thought  of  seeing  Gen 
eral  Sherman  when  I  set  out,  but  on  every  score  I  was  glad  to  meet  him,  and 
I  was  there  to  gain  information.  By  what  precise  words  I  sought  and  he 
gave  it,  I  would  not  pretend  at  this  day  to  repeat.  It  is  sufficient  for  the 
present  to  say  that  I  learned  the  nature  of  the  ground  in  front ;  that  his 
right  flank  was  some  three  hundred  yards 
from  us ;  and  that  the  bridge  by  which 
Lew  Wallace  was  to  cross  Snake  Creek 
was  to  his  right  and  rear  at  an  angle,  as 
he  pointed,  of  about  forty  degrees.  I  do 
not  know  whether  I  asked  the  question, 
but  I  know  now  that  it  was  a  mile  and 
a  quarter  from  his  flank,  and  that  he 
did  not  cover  it  in  any  practical  sense, 
though  in  advancing  Wallace  would  ap 
proach  by  his  right  and  rear.  I  also  see 
now  that  I  was  mistaken  in  supposing 
that  these  several  commands  retained  a 
regular  organization  and  had  distinct  lim 
its;  whereas  they  were  in  fact  much  in 
termixed. 

Of  course  we  talked  of  other  incidental 
matters.  In  all  his  career  he  has,  I  ven 
ture  to  say,  never  appeared  to  better  ad 
vantage.  There  was  the  frank,  brave 

soldier,  rather  subdued,  realizing  the  critical  situation  in  which  causes  of 
some  sort,  perchance  his  own  fault  chiefly,  had  placed  him,  but  ready, 
without  affectation  or  bravado,  to  do  anything  that  duty  required  of  him. 
He  asked  me  what  the  plans  were  for  the  morrow.  I  answered  that  I  was 
going  to  attack  the  enemy  at  daylight,  and  he  expressed  gratification  at  my 
reply,  though  apparently  not  because  of  any  unmixed  confidence  in  the 
result.  I  had  had  no  consultation  with  General  Grant,  and  knew  nothing  of 
his  purpose.  I  presumed  that  we  would  be  in  accord,  but  I  had  been  only  a 
few  hours  within  the  limits  of  his  authority,  and  I  did  not  look  upon  him  as 
my  commander,  though  I  would  zealously  have  obeyed  his  orders.  General 
Sherman  allowed  me  to  take  with  me  the  map  of  which  a  fac-simile  accompa 
nies  this  article  [page  496].  I  never  imagined  that  in  the  future  it  would 
have  the  interest  which  now  attaches  to  it,  and  after  the  battle  it  was  laid 
aside  and  forgotten. 

Within  two  years  after  that  meeting,  quite  contrary  opinions  developed 
themselves  between  General  Sherman  and  myself  concerning  the  battle  of 
Shiloh,  and  his  Memoirs  give  a  different  account  of  the  interview  above 
described.  He  says  that  he  handed  the  map  to  my  engineer-officer,  Captain 


MAJOR-GENERAL  THOMAS   J.   WOOD. 
COPIED   FROM    AX   ENGRAVING. 


520  SHILOH  REVIEWED. 

Michler,  who,  in  fact,  was  not  present,  and  complains  that  it  was  never 
returned  to  him.  He  says  that  I  grumbled  about  the  stragglers,  and  that  he 
feared  I  would  not  bring  my  army  across  the  river.  One  would  suppose  that 
his  fears  would  have  been  allayed  by  the  fact  that,  at  that  very  moment,  my 
troops  were  arriving  and  covering  his  front  as  fast  as  legs  and  steamboats 
could  carry  them. 

In  the  execution  of  the  retreat  described  in  the  reports  of  McClernarid  and 
Sherman,  from  the  west  to  the  east  side  of  Tillman's  Creek,  there  was  a  quite 
thorough  disintegration  of  divisions  and  brigades,  lacking  nothing  but  the 
pressure  of  a  vigorous  pursuit  to  convert  it  into  a  complete  rout.  In  its 
seventh  position,  McClernand's  division  recovered  some  force  and  preserved 
a  recognized  organization ;  but  not  so  with  Sherman's.  Indeed,  in  that  divi 
sion  the  disorganization  occurred,  as  has  already  been  stated,  at  an  earlier 
period.  In  Hildebrand's  brigade  it  was  almost  coincident  with  the  enemy's 
first  assault.  With  McDowell's  it  commenced  with  the  unsuccessful  attempt 
to  form  line  of  battle  along  the  Purdy  road,  and  was  complete  very  soon 
after  1  o'clock;  and  these  two  brigades  never  recovered  their  aggregation 
again  until  after  the  battle.  With  Buckland's  brigade  also  it  occurred  at 
the  miscarriage  at  the  Purdy  road  about  10  o'clock,  but  it  was  not  so  thor 
ough  as  in  the  other  brigades — at  least  it  was  afterward  partially  repaired 
during  the  first  day,  as  his  report  explains.  He  says,  after  the  retreat  from 
his  camp  about  10  o'clock : 

"  We  formed  line  on  the  Purdy  road,  but  the  fleeing  mass  from  the  left  broke  through  our 
lines,  and  many  of  our  men  caught  the  infection  and  fled  with  the  crowd.  Colonel  Cockerill 
became  separated  from  Colonel  Sullivan  and  myself,  and  was  afterward  engaged  with  part  of 
his  command  at  McClernand's  camp.  Colonel  Sullivan  and  myself  kept  together,  and  made 
every  effort  to  rally  our  men,  but  with  very  poor  success.  They  had  become  scattered  in  all 
directions.  We  were  borne  considerably  to  the  left,  but  finally  succeeded  in  forming  a  line,, 
and  had  a  short  engagement  with  the  enemy,  who  made  his  appearance  soon  after  our  line  was 
formed.  The  enemy  fell  back,  and  we  proceeded  to  the  road  where  you  [General  Sherman] 
found  us.  At  this  point  I  was  joined  by  Colonel  Cockerill,  and  we  there  formed  line  of  battle 
and  slept  on  our  arms  Sunday  night.  Colonel  Sullivan,  being  out  of  ammunition,  marched  to 
the  landing  for  a  supply,  and  while  there  was  ordered  to  support  a  battery  at  that  point. " 

It  is  only  after  a  close  examination  of  the  records  that  we  can  understand 
the  full  significance  of  the  following  passage  in  General  Sherman's  report : 

"  In  this  position  we  rested  for  the  night.  My  command  had  become  decidedly  of  a  mixed 
character.  Buckland's  brigade  was  the  only  one  with  me  that  retained  its  organization. 
Colonel  Hildebrand  was  personally  there,  but  his  brigade  was  not.  Colonel  McDowell  had 
been  severely  injured  by  a  fall  from  his  horse,  and  had  gone  to  the  river,  and  the  three  regi 
ments  of  his  brigade  were  not  in  line.  The  13th  Missouri,  Colonel  Crafts  J.  Wright,  had 
reported  to  me  on  the  field,  and  fought  well,  retaining  its  regimental  organization,  and  it  formed 
part  of  my  line  during  Sunday  night  and  all  of  Monday ;  other  fragments  of  regiments  and 
companies  had  also  fallen  into  my  division,  and  acted  with  it  during  the  remainder  of  the  battle." 

It  thus  appears  that  from  about  1  o'clock  until  the  time  when  General  Sher 
man  found  Colonel  Buckland  with  two  regiments  on  the  road  from  the  bridge 
to  the  landing,  not  a  single  regiment  of  his  division  excepting  Cockerill's,  and 
not  one  prominent  individual  representative  of  it  excepting  that  officer  and 


SHILOH  REVIEWED.  321 

Colonel  Hildebrand,  was  present  with  him.  The  only  body  of  troops  besides 
Cockerill's  regiment  having  any  recognized  organization  was  the  13th  Mis 
souri,  which  belonged  to  another  division.  All  the  rest  were  squads  or 
individual  stragglers.  In  all  the  official  reports,  not  a  regiment  or  part  of  a 
regiment  is  described  as  being  with  him  at  this  juncture  or  for  several  hours 
before.  Of  the  9  regiments  that  composed  the  3  brigades  under  his  imme 
diate  command  at  the  church,  only  5  rendered  reports,  and  3  of  these  were 
from  Buckland's  brigade.  The  division  did  not  exist  except  in  the  person  of 
its  commander.  Such  is  the  story  of  the  official  reports.  The  number  of 
men  present  could  not  have  been  large.  Less  than  1000,  including  Buck- 
land's  '2  regiments  after  they  were  found,  would  have  told  the  number  that 
lay  011  their  arms  in  Sherman's  ranks  on  Sunday  night. 

This  explains  the  close  relation  of  McClernand  and  Sherman  during  the 
last  five  hours  of  Sunday,  and  the  identity  of  their  experiences.  General 
Sherman  has  nothing  to  report  of  his  own  command  distinctively.  Every 
thing  is  conjunctive  and  general  as  between  McClernand  and  himself.  "We 
held  this  position,  General  McClernand  and  myself  acting  in  perfect  concert." 
"  General  McClernand  and  7,  on  consultation,  selected  a  new  line."  "  We  fell 
back  as  well  as  we  could."  "  The  enemy's  cavalry  charged  us,  and  was  hand 
somely  repulsed."  General  McClernand's  account  of  this  incident  has  been 
quoted  on  a  preceding  page.  When  Colonel  Hildebrand  lost  his  brigade,  it  is 
not  with  General  Sherman  that  he  is  identified,  but  with  McClernand,  on 
whose  staff  he  served  part  of  the  day.  Hildebrand  seems  to  have  been  active, 
but  not  under  the  direction  of  his  division  commander.  "About  3  o'clock," 
he  says,  "I  assumed  command  of  a  regiment  already  formed  of  fragmentary 
regiments.  I  inarched  in  a  north-western  direction,  where  I  aided  a  regiment 
of  sharp-shooters  in  defeating  the  enemy  in  an  attempt  to  flank  our  rear." 
This  movement  was  evidently  made  from  McClernand's  and  Sherman's  seventh 
position,  and  the  troops  assisted  were  Birge's  sharp-shooters.  General  Sher 
man  makes  no  mention  of  this  significant  if  not  important  occurrence.  His 
right  flank  was  threatened,  and  the  regiment  of  sharp-shooters  posted  in  the 
field  near  Me  Arthur's  headquarters  met,  and,  in  conjunction  with  Hildebrand's 
temporary  regiment,  repelled  the  danger. 

"VVe  have  in  the  official  reports  a  good  clew  to  the  condition  of  McClernand's 
division  also.  It  was  in  a  far  better  state.  It  was  shattered  and  worn,  but 
it  was  represented  by  at  least  some  recognized  following  of  regiments  and 
brigades.  One  of  the  brigades  had  five  hundred  men,  and  another,  the  com 
mander  reports,  was  "merely  nominal,"  not  long  before  McClernand  took  up 
his  seventh  position.  In  the  last  collision,  one  of  the  brigades  became 
entirely  separated  from,  the  division,  and  did  not  return  to  it  until  after  the 
battle.  Fifteen  hundred,  exclusive  of  that  brigade,  would  cover  the  number 
of  men  that  rested  that  night  under  McClernand's  colors. 

Hurlbut's  division  was  in  a  somewhat  better  condition  than  either  of  the 
others.  Its  loss  in  killed  and  wounded  was  greater  than  McClernand's,  but 
it  had  not,  like  the  latter,  been  affected  in  its  organization  by  oft-repeated 
shocks  sustained  in  a  cramped  and  embarrassing  position,  and  his  command 


522  SHILOH  REl/IEWED. 

had  received  some  accessions  from  the  driftings  of  other  divisions.  The  esti 
mate  which  he  makes  of  his  force  is  wholly  fallacious.  It  could  not  have 
stood  on  the  space  which  he  occupied.  There  may  have  been  two  thousand 
men  in  his  line  on  the  night  of  the  6th.  These  three  divisions,  if  they 
may  be  so  called,  and  Tuttle's  command,  with  Birge's  sharp-shooters  on  the 
extreme  right,  and  the  reserve  artillery  on  the  left,  which,  according  to  Gen 
eral  Grant's  report,  consisted  of  "four  20-pounder  Parrott  guns  and  a  battery 
of  rifled  guns,"  constituted  the  line  of  battle,  which  extended  a  mile  from  the 
river.  Five  thousand  men  occupied  it.  Other  partially  organized  fragments 
were  crowded  together  about  the  river  and  the  camps  on  the  plateau,  and 
with  proper  effort  could  have  been  fitted  for  good  service;  but  no  steps  to 
that  end  were  taken.  The  defect  in  the  command  that  opened  the  way  for 
the  disaster,  facilitated  its  progress  at  every  step — the  want  of  a  strong  execu 
tive  hand  guided  by  a  clear  organizing  head.  Some  of  these  fragmentary  com 
mands  sought  places  for  themselves  in  the  advance  next  day.  The  remnant 
of  the  Second  Division  under  Colonel  Tuttle  was  one  of  these.  Indeed,  it 
deserves  a  higher  name.  It  presented  itself  to  me  on  the  field  without  orders, 
and  rendered  efficient  service  with  my  divisions.  There  may  have  been 
1500  or  2000  men  of  these  unrecognized  commands  that  went  to  the  front 
on  Monday  without  instructions.  Seven  thousand  men  at  the  utmost,  besides 
Lew  Wallace's  5000,  were  ready  Sunday  night  to  take  part  in  the  struggle 
which  was  to  be  renewed  in  the  morning.  Of  the  original  force,  7000  were 
killed  or  wounded,  3000  were  prisoners,  at  least  15,000  were  absent  from  the 
ranks  and  hopelessly  disorganized,  and  about  30  pieces  of  artillery  were  in  the 
hands  of  the  enemy. 

The  physical  condition  of  the  army  was  an  exact  type  of  its  moral  con 
dition.  The  ties  of  discipline,  not  yet  of  long  enough  duration  or  rigidly 
enough  enforced  to  be  very  strong,  were  in  much  the  largest  part  of  the  army 
thoroughly  severed.  An  unbroken  tide  of  disaster  had  obliterated  the  dis 
tance  between  grades,  and  brought  all  men  to  the  standard  of  personal 
qualities.  The  feeble  groups  that  still  clung  together  were  held  by  force  of 
individual  character  more  than  by  discipline,  and  a  disbelief  in  the  ability  of 
the  army  unaided  to  extricate  itself  from,  the  peril  that  environed  it,  was,  I 
do  not  hesitate  to  affirm,  universal.  In  my  opinion,  that  feeling  was  shared 
by  the  commander  himself.  A  week  after  the  battle  the  army  had  not  recov 
ered  from  its  shattered  and  prostrated  condition.  On  the  14th,  three  days 
after  Halleck's  arrival,  he  instructed  Grant :  "  Divisions  and  brigades  should, 
where  necessary,  be  reorganized  and  put  in  position,  and  all  stragglers  re 
turned  to  their  companies  and  regiments.  Your  army  is  not  now  in  condition 
to  resist  an  attack."  We  are  told  that  the  enemy  had  stragglers  too.  Yes, 
every  cause  which  demands  effort  and  sacrifice  will  have  them ;  but  there  is 
a  difference  between  the  straggling  which  is  not  restrained  by  the  smile  of 
fortune,  and  that  which  tries  to  elude  the  pursuit  of  fate  —  it  is  the  difference 
between  victory  and  defeat.  The  Confederates  in  their  official  reports  make  no 
concealment  of  their  skeletons,  but  when  the  time  for  action  arrived  they  were 
vital  bodies,  and,  on  Sunday,  always  in  sufficient  force  to  do  the  work  at  last. 


SHILOH  REl/lEWED.  523 

General  McClernand,  it  will  have  been  observed,  ascribes  the  breaking  up 
of  his  seventh  position  to  a  panic  among  the  troops,  but  the  other  reports 
show  a  different  reason.  Colonel  Veatch  on  McClernand's  left  says : 

"  Our  men  were  much  encouraged  by  the  strength  of  our  position,  and  our  fire  was  telling  with 
terrible  effect.  Our  forces  were  eager  to  advance  and  charge  him  [the  enemy] ,  when  we  were 
surprised  by  his  driving  back  the  whole  left  wing  of  our  army,  and  advancing  close  to  our  rear 
near  General  Hurlbufs  headquarters.  A  dense  mass  of  baggage  wagons  and  artillery  crowded 
upon  our  ranks,  while  we  were  exposed  to  a  heavy  fire  of  the  enemy  both  in  front  and  rear." 

General  Hurlbut  thus  describes  the  crisis  at  that  stage  of  the  battle : 

"  I  had  hoped  to  make  a  stand  on  the  line  of  my  camp,  but  masses  of  the  enemy  were  press 
ing  rapidly  on  each  flank,  while  their  light  artillery  was  closing  rapidly  in  the  rear.  On  reach 
ing  the  24-pounder  siege-guns  in  battery  near  the  river,  I  again  succeeded  in  forming  line  of 
battle  in  rear  of  the  guns." 

We  see  here  that  there  was  a  stern  cause  for  the  falling  back.  It  was  the 
tide  of  defeat  and  pursuit  from  the  left  wing  of  the  army,  and  was  compul 
sory  in  the  strictest  sense.  How  fortunate  that  it  did  not  set  in  an  hour 
earlier,  and  strike  in  flank  the  disorganized  material  of  the  right  wing  as  it 
struggled  across  the  ravines  of  Tillinan's  Creek !  How  more  than  fortunate 
that  the  onward  current  of  the  victor  was  obstructed  still  an  hour  longer  by 
the  unyielding  tenacity  of  the  remaining  regiments  of  Wallace  and  Prentiss ! 
From  the  self-assuring  interview  in  which,  according  to  one  of  General 
Sherman's  reminiscences,  it  was  "  agreed  that  the  enemy  had  expended  the 
furor  of  his  attack "  at  4  o'clock,  and  General  Grant  told  the  "  anecdote  of 
his  Donelson  battle,"  that  officer  was  aroused  by  the  renewal  of  the  din  of 
the  strife,  and  made  his  way  to  the  river  through  the  disorganized  throng 
of  his  retreating  army.  While  those  mutual  felicitations  were  in  progress, 
the  enemy,  a  mile  to  the  left,  was  disarming  and  marching  six  captured 
regiments  to  the  rear.  Thus  disembarrassed,  his  furor  revived,  and  mani 
fested  itself  at  last  at  the  very  landing.  What  worse  state  of  affairs  than 
this  could  have  existed  when  at  noon  General  Grant  wrote :  "  If  you  will  get 
upon  the  field,  leaving  all  your  baggage  on  the  east  bank  of  the  river,  it  will 
be  a  move  to  our  advantage,  and  possibly  save  the  day  to  us"! 

Under  the  circumstances  here  described,  General  Grant  and  General  Sher 
man  have  said  that  reinforcements  other  than  Lew  Wallace's  division  were 
in  nowise  necessary  at  the  close  of  the  first  day,  and  that,  without  reference 
to  them,  General  Grant  would  have  assumed  the  offensive  and  defeated  the 
Confederate  army  next  morning.  Those  who  study  the  subject  attentively 
will  find  no  ground  to  accept  that  declaration  as  regards  either  the  purpose 
or  the  result.  The  former  indeed  presents  an  intangible  question  which  it- 
would  seem  to  be  useless  to  discuss.  At  the  time  it  is  alleged  to  have  been 
entertained,  the  reinforcements  were  actually  at  hand,  and  their  presence 
gives  to  the  announcement  the  semblance  of  a  vain  boast,  which  could  never 
have  been  put  to  the  test  of  reality.  That  with  the  reinforcements  from  rny 
army,  General  Grant  confidently  expected  that  the  enemy  would  be  defeated 
the  following  day,  it  is  impossible  to  doubt ;  but  it  was  not  known,  Sunday 
night,  that  the  enemy  had  withdrawn  from  our  immediate  front,  and  the  evi- 


524  SHILOH  REVIEWED. 

dence  establishes  that  General  Grant  had  not  determined  upon  or  had  not 
promulgated  a  plan  of  action  in  the  morning.  Not  an  order  was  given  or  a 
note  of  preparation  sounded  for  the  struggle  which,  with  or  without  his 
assistance,  was  to  begin  at  daybreak.  To  my  certain  knowledge,  if  words 
and  actions  were  not  wholly  misleading,  General  Sherman,  when  I  saw  him 
on  the  night  of  the  6th,  did  not  consider  that  any  instructions  had  been  given 
for  battle,  and  if  he  had  such  instructions  he  did  not  obey  them.  His  report 
sustains  the  impression  which  I  derived  from  our  interview.  "At  daylight 
on  Monday,"  he  says,  "  I  received  General  Grant's  orders  to  advance  and 
recapture  our  original  camps."  Then  only  it  was  that  he  dispatched  several 
members  of  his  staff  to  bring  up  all  the  men  they  could  find.  Is  that  the 
way  in  which  General  Sherman  would  have  acquitted  himself  of  the  obliga 
tion  of  orders  received  the  day  before  to  engage  in  battle  ?  I  answer  unhesi 
tatingly,  No !  The  reports  of  the  other  division  commanders  are  to  the  same 
effect.  General  McClernaiid  says :  "Your  [General  Grant's]  order  of  the 
morning  of  the  7th  for  a  forward  movement,"  etc.  The  hour  of  the  delivery 
of  this  order  is  indicated  approximately  by  the  following  passage  in  the 
report  of  Colonel  Marsh : 

"At  daylight  on  Monday  morning  the  men  in  line  were  supplied  with  some  provisions. 
While  this  was  being  done  firing  opened  on  our  right,  afterwards  ascertained  to  come  from  a 
portion  of  General  Lew  Wallace's  command.  Directly  afterwards,  firing  commenced  to  our 
left  and  front,  both  artillery  and  musketry,  supposed  by  me  to  be  a  portion  of  General  Buell's 
command,  who,  I  had  been  informed  during  the  night,  had  taken  position  on  our  left  and  con 
siderably  in  advance.  I  now  received  orders  from  General  McClernand  to  throw  out  skirmish 
ers  and  follow  with  my  whole  command." 

We  must  presume  that  General  McClernand  proceeded  to  the  execution  of 
General  Grant's  order  as  soon  as  it  was  received,  which  must  then  have  been 
after  the  commencement  of  the  battle  in  front  of  Nelson. 

General  Hurlbut  says :  "  On  Monday,  about  8  A.  M.,  my  division  was 
formed  in  line  close  to  the  river-bank,  and  I  obtained  a  few  crackers  for  my 
men.  About  9  A.  M.  I  was  ordered  by  General  Grant  to  move  up  to  the  sup 
port  of  General  McClernand."  Colonel  Tuttle,  commanding  the  Second  Divi 
sion,  acted  without  any  orders.  He  says :  "  On  Monday  morning  I  collected 
all  of  the  division  that  could  be  found,  and  such  other  detached  regiments  as 
volunteered  to  join  me,  and  formed  them  in  column  by  battalion  closed  in 
mass  as  a  reserve  for  General  Buell."  The  action  of  General  Lew  Wallace 
was  not  the  result  of  orders,  but  proceeded  from  his  own  motion  on  discover 
ing  the  enemy  in  his  front  at  daylight  across  Tillmaii's  Hollow.  While  that 
action  was  in  progress,  General  Grant  came  up  and  gave  Wallace  "the  direc 
tion  of  his  attack."  Nelson  had  been  in  motion  an  hour,  and  was  sharply 
engaged  before  these  orders  were  given. 

General  Grant's  official  reports  of  the  battle  are  in  accord  with  the  subor 
dinate  reports  upon  this  question.  In  his  first  telegraphic  announcement  of 
the  battle  to  General  Halleck,  he  says : 

u  Yesterday  the  rebels  attacked  us  here  with  an  overwhelming  force,  driving  our  troops  in 
from  their  advanced  position  to  near  the  landing.  General  Wallace  was  immediately  ordered  up 


SHILOH  REVIEWED.  525 

from  Crump's  Landing,  and  in  the  evening,  one  division  of  General  Buell's  army  and  General 
Buell  in  person  arrived.  During  the  night  one  other  division  arrived,  and  still  another  to-day. 
This  morning,  at  the  break  of  day,  I  ordered  an  attack,  which  resulted  in  a  fight,  which  continued 
until  late  this  afternoon,  with  severe  loss  on  both  sides,  but  a  complete  repulse  of  the  enemy. 
I  shall  follow  to-morrow  far  enough  to  see  that  no  immediate  renewal  of  an  attack  is  contemplated." 

In  his  more  detailed  report  of  April  9th  he  says: 

'•  During  the  night  [Sunday]  all  was  quiet,  and  feeling  that  a  great  moral  advantage  would  be 
gained  by  becoming  the  attacking  party,  an  advance  was  ordered  as  soon  as  day  dawned.  The  result 
was  a  gradual  repulse  of  the  enemy  at  all  parts  of  the  line  from  morning  until  probably  5 
o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  when  it  became  evident  that  the  enemy  was  retreating.  Before  the 
close  of  the  action  the  advance  of  General  T.  J.  Wood's  division  arrived  in  time  to  take  part  in 
the  action.  My  force  icas  too  much  fatigued,  from  two  days'1  hard  fighting  and  exposure  in  the  open 
air  to  a  drenching  rain  during  the  intervening  night,  to  pursue  immediately.  Night  closed  in  cloudy 
and  with  heavy  rain,  making  the  roads  impracticable  for  artillery  by  the  next  morning.  Gen 
eral  Sherman,  however,  followed  the  enemy,  finding  that  the  main  part  of  the  army  had  retreated 
in  good  order.'1'1 

Several  points  worthy  of  note  present  themselves  in  these  dispatches  of 
General  Grant.  There  is  still,  at  the  close  of  the  second  day,  the  impression 
of  the  enemy's  overwhelming  force,  which  the  day  before  he  "estimated  at 
over  one  hundred  thousand  men."  He  felt  on  Monday,  after  the  arrival  of 
reinforcements  to  the  number  of  25,000  fresh  troops,  that  "  a  great  moral 
advantage  would  be  gained  by  becoming  the  attacking  party."  There  was, 
then,  a  question  in  his  mind,  namely,  to  attack,  or  to  await  attack ;  it  was 
necessary  to  consider  all  the  advantages,  moral  and  physical ;  he  concluded 
to  secure  the  former  at  least,  and  accordingly  gave  the  order,  not  on  Sunday, 
but  on  Monday  "  at  break  of  day,"  to  attack.  The  severity  of  the  contest  on 
Monday  is  affirmed  in  both  dispatches ;  it  was  of  such  a  nature  as  to  prevent 
an  immediate  pursuit,  which  at  any  rate  he  would  only  make  the  next  morn 
ing  after  the  battle,  far  enough  to  see  that  no  immediate  renewal  of  the  attack 
was  contemplated.  The  pursuit  was  made  on  that  plan,  and  found  "  that  the 
main  part  of  the  army  had  retreated  in  good  order."  If  the  fact  were  not 
duly  authenticated,  one  would  wonder  whether  these  dispatches  were  actually 
written  by  an  officer  who,  twenty-three  years  afterward,  said  with  boastful 
assurance  over  his  own  signature,  "  Victory  was  assured  when  Wallace  arrived 
with  his  division  of  5000  effective  veterans,  even  if  there  had  been  no  other 
support ! " 

With  this  tedious  but  necessary  review  of  the  results  of  the  first  day,  I  take 
up  the  story  of  the  second. 

THE  engagement  was  brought  on,  Monday  morning,  not  by  General  Grant's 
order,  but  by  the  advance  of  Nelson's  division,  along  the  River  road  in  line 
of  battle,  at  the  first  dawn  of  day,  followed  by  Crittenden's  division  in  column. 
The  enemy  was  encountered  at  5 : 20  o'clock,  and  a  little  in  advance  of  Hurlbut's 
camp  Xelson  was  halted  while  Crittenden  came  into  line  on  his  right.  By  this 
time  the  head  of  McCook's  division  came  up  and  was  formed  on  the  right  of 
Crittenden.  Before  McCook's  rear  brigade  was  up  the  line  moved  forward, 
pushing  back  the  enemy's  light  troops,  until  Nelson  and  Crittenden  reached 
the  very  position  occupied  by  Hurlbut,  Prentiss,  and  W.  H.  L.  Wallace  at  4 


526 


SHILOH  REVIEWED. 


MAJOR-GENERAL   THOMAS   L.    CRITTEXDEN. 
FROM    A    PHOTOGRAPH. 


o'clock  the  previous  day,  where  the 
enemy  was  found  in  force.  McCook 
was  on  the  north  side  of  the  western 
Corinth  road,  and  eventually  swept 
across  half  of  McClernaiid's  camp 
and  released  his  headquarters  from 
the  grasp  of  the  enemy.  The  "  Hor 
nets'  Nest"  was  in  front  of  Critten- 
deii's  left  brigade,  and  "  the  peach 
orchard"  and  the  ground  where  Al 
bert  Sidney  Johnston  fell  were  in 
front  of  Nelson. 

Without  following  the  vicissitudes 
of  the  struggle  in  this  part  of  the 
field,  I  enter  with  a  little  more  de 
tail,  but  still  cursorily,  upon  the 
operations  of  Grant's  troops,  which 
have  not  been  connectedly  explained 
in  any  official  report.  The  action 
here  was  commenced  by  Lew  Wal 
lace,  one  of  whose  batteries  at  half- 
past  5  o'clock  opened  fire  on  the 
enemy,  who  was  discovered  on  the 
high  ground  across  Tillman's  Hollow.  There  is  some  diversity  of  state 
ment  among  the  official  reports  as  to  the  priority  of  artillery  firing  in  front 
of  Nelson  and  Wallace.  Colonel  Hovey,  who  was  in  immediate  support  of 
Wallace's  battery,  gives  the  priority  to  Nelson,  while  Colonel  Marsh,  who  was 
half  a  mile  farther  to  the  left,  gives  it  to  Wallace.  But  this  is  unimportant. 
Nelson  was  in  motion  three-quarters  of  an  hour  before  that  time1,  and  had 
been  engaged  with  the  enemy's  light  troops.  The  first  artillery  fire  was  from 
the  enemy,  Nelson  at  first  having  no  artillery.  Wallace's  action  was  not  yet 
aggressive,  no  orders  having  been  given  for  his  advance ;  but  while  the  firing 
was  in  progress  General  Grant  came  up,  and  gave  him  his  "direction  of 
attack,  which  was  formed  at  a  right  angle  with  the  river,  with  which  at  the 
time  his  line  ran  almost  parallel."  The  enemy's  battery  and  its  supports 
having  been  driven  from  the  opposite  height  by  the  artillery  of  Wallace,  the 
latter  moved  his  line  forward  about  7  o'clock,  crossed  the  hollow,  and  gained 
the  crest  of  the  hill  almost  without  opposition.  "  Here,"  he  says,  "  as  General 
Sherman's  division,  next  on  my  left,  had  not  made  its  appearance  to  support 
my  advance,  a  halt  was  ordered  for  it  to  come  up."  Wallace  was  now  on  the 
edge  of  the  large  oblong  field  which  was  in  front  of  the  encampment  of 
McClernaiid's  right  brigade. 

The  next  of  Grant's  commands  to  advance  was  McClernand's.  The  orders 
to  that  effect  have  already  been  cited,  and  their  execution  is  explained  by 
Colonel  Marsh,  into  whose  brigade  what  was  present  of  McClernaiid's  division 
seems  to  have  merged.  He  says  : 


SHILOH  REVIEWED. 


"  Moving  steadily  forward  for  half  a  mile,  I  discovered  a  movement  of  troops  on  the  hill 
nearly  a  quarter  of  a  mile  in  front.  Dispatching  scouts  to  ascertain  who  they  were,  they  were 
met  by  a  message  from  Colonel  Smith,  commanding  a  [the  left]  brigade  of  the  Third  Division 
[Wallace's],  informing  me  that  he  would  take  position  on  the  right  and  wait  my  coming  up." 

Sherman,  it  thus  appears,  was  not  yet  in  motion.     Hurlbut  moved  out  about 

9  o'clock,  and  formed  one  brigade  on  McClernand's  left. 

When  Lew  Wallace  advanced  across  Tillman's  Hollow,  followed  next  011 
the  left  by  McClernand,  the  force  opposed  to  him  fell  gradually  back  upon 
reinforcements  beyond  the  field  on  the  edge  of  which  was  the  encampment 
of  McClernand's  First  Brigade ;  the  enemy's  left  then  clinging  a  little  to  the 
bluffs  of  Owl  Creek  in  that  quarter,  but  yielding  without  a  very  stubborn 
resistance,  chiefly  because  of  McCook's  vigorous  pressure  along  the  western 
Corinth  road,  until  it  fell  into  a  general  line  running  through  the  center  of 
McClernand's  camp,  and 
nearly  parallel  with  the 
Hamburg  and  Purely 
road.  This  swinging 
back  of  the  enemy's  left, 
and  the  direction  of  the 
Owl  Creek  bluffs,  natu 
rally  caused  a  change  in 
the  direction  of  Wal 
lace's  front,  until  about 

10  o'clock  it  faced  south, 
at    right    ans'les    to    its 


direction  in  the  begin 
ning.  A  sharp  artillery 
contest  and  some  infan 
try  fighting  had  been 
going  on  all  the  time. 
It  was  at  10  o'clock,  ac 
cording  to  Sherman's 
report,  that  McClernand 
formed  line  obliquely  in 
rear  of  the  camp  of  his 
First  Brigade,  to  ad 
vance  against  the  ene 
my's  position.  Here  for 
the  first  time  Sherman's 
division  appears  in  the 
movement,  from  which 
its  absence  at  an  earlier 
period  is  mentioned  by  both  McClernand  and  Wallace.  The  statement  in 
General  Sherman's  report,  in  regard  to  its  movements,  is  as  follows  : 

"At  daylight  I  received  General  Grant's   orders   to  advance  and  recapture  our  original 
camps.     I  dispatched  several  members  of  my  staff  to  bring  up  all  the  men  they  could  find, 


CAPTURE  OF  A  CONFEDERATE  BATTERY. 

Colonel  Robert  H.  Sturgess  (8th  Illinois  Infantry)  says  in  his  official  re 
port  that  while  awaiting  orders  on  the  Purely  road,  during  the  morning  of 
the  second  day's  fight,  "General  Crittenden  ordered  the  Eighth  and 
Eighteenth  (Illinois)  to  take  a  rebel  battery  which  some  regiment  had  en 
deavored  to  capture,  but  had  been  driven  back  with  heavy  loss.  The  men 
received  the  order  with  a  cheer,  and  charged  on  a  double-quick.  The 
enemy,  after  firing  a  few  shots,  abandoned  his  guns  and  retreated  to  the 
woods.  My  color-bearer  rushed  up  and  planted  his  colors  on  one  of  the 
guns,  and  the  color-bearer  of  the  Eighteenth  took  possession  of  another." 


528  SHILOH  REVIEWED. 

and  especially  the  brigade  of  Colonel  Stuart,  which  had  been  separated  from  the  division  all 
the  day  before ;  and  at  the  appointed  time  the  division,  or,  rather,  what  remained  of  it,  with 
the  13th  Missouri  and  other  fragments,  marched  forward  and  reoccupied  the  ground  on  the 
extreme  light  of  General  McClernand's  camp,  where  we  attracted  the  fire  of  a  battery  located 
near  Colonel  McDowell's  former  headquarters.  Here  I  remained  patiently  waiting  for  the 
sound  of  General  Buell's  advance  upon  the  main  Corinth  road.  About  10  A.  M.  the  heavy 
firing  in  that  direction  and  its  steady  approach  satisfied  me,  and  General  Wallace  being  011 
our  right  flank  with  his  well-conducted  division,  I  led  the  head  of  my  column  to  General 
McClernand's  right,  formed  line  of  battle,  facing  south,  with  Buckland's  brigade  directly 
across  the  ridge,  and  Stuart's  brigade  on  its  right  in  the  woods,  and  thus  advanced  slowly 
and  steadily  under  a  heavy  fire  of  musketry  and  artillery.'' 

The  contest  thus  inaugurated  in  and  around  McClernand's  camp  involved 
the  whole  of  Grant's  available  force  and  McCook's  division  of  the  Army  of 
the  Ohio,  and  continued  with  great  violence  from  10  until  4  o'clock.  The 
significant  facts  connected  with  it  are,  the  narrowness  of  the  space  covered 
by  the  interior  divisions, — McClernand's,  Hurlbut's,  and  Sherman's, —  the 
lapping  over  them  by  McCook,  so  as  to  form,  in  fact,  a  connection  with  the 
division  of  Wallace  on  the  extreme  right,  and  the  decisive  part  ascribed  to 
McCook's  division  in  that  part  of  the  field  in  the  reports  of  McClernand, 
Wallace,  and  Sherman.  General  McClernand  says : 

"  Here  one  of  the  severest  conflicts  ensued  that  occurred  during  the  two  days.  We  drove  the 
enemy  back  ...  to  the  edge  of  a  field  .  .  .  where  reserves  came  to  his  support.  Our 
position  at  this  moment  was  most  critical,  and  a  repulse  seemed  inevitable ;  but  fortunately  the 
Louisville  Legion,  forming  part  of  General  Rousseau's  brigade,  came  up  at  my  request  and 
succored  me.  Extending  and  strengthening  my  line,  this  gallant  body  poured  into  the  enemy's 
ranks  one  of  the  most  terrible  fires  I  ever  witnessed.  Thus  breaking  its  [his]  center,  it  [he] 
fell  back  in  disorder,  and  thenceforth  he  was  beaten  at  all  points." 

Wallace  mentions  particularly  an  important  service  rendered  to  the  left 
of  his  division  at  a  crisis  in  its  operations,  by  one  of  McCook's  regiments. 

Colonel  McGimiis,  of  the  llth  Indiana,  whose  regiment  was  on  Wallace's 
extreme  left,  describes  this  incident  as  follows : 

"At  2:30  o'clock  I  discovered  that  the  Federal  forces  on  our  left  were  falling  back  and  the 
rebels  advancing,  and  that  they  were  nearly  in  rear  of  our  left  flank.  I  immediately  notified 
you  [the  brigade  commander]  of  their  position,  changed  front  with  our  left  wing,  opened  our 
fire  upon  them,  and  sent  to  you  for  assistance.  During  this  the  most  trying  moment  to  us  of 
the  day,  I  received  your  order  to  fall  back  if  it  got  too  hot  for  us.  .  .  .  Fortunately  and 
much  to  our  relief,  at  this  critical  moment  the  32d  Indiana,  Colonel  Willich,  came  up  on  our 
left,  and  with  their  assistance  the  advancing  enemy  was  compelled  to  retire." 

General  Sherman  says: 

<l  We  advanced  until  we  reached  the  point  where  the  Corinth  road  crosses  the  line  of  McCler 
nand's  camp,  and  here  I  saw  for  the  first  time  the  well-ordered  and  compact  columns  of  General 
Buell's  Kentucky  forces,  whose  soldierly  movements  at  once  gave  confidence  to  our  newer  and 
less-disciplined  forces.  Here  I  saw  Willich's  regiment  advance  upon  a  point  of  water-oaks  and 
thicket,  behind  which  I  knew  the  enemy  was  in  great  strength,  and  enter  it  in  beautiful  style. 
Then  arose  the  severest  musketry  fire  I  ever  heard,  which  lasted  some  twenty  minutes,  when 
this  splendid  regiment  had  to  fall  back.  This  green  point  of  timber  is  about  five  hundred  yards 
east  of  Shiloh  Meeting  House,  and  it  was  evident  that  here  was  to  be  the  struggle.  The  enemy 
could  be  seen  forming  his  lines  to  the  south.  .  .  .  This  was  about  2  o'clock  p.  M.  Willich's 
regiment  had  been  repulsed,  but  a  whole  brigade  of  McCook's  division  advanced  beautifully, 
deployed,  and  entered  this  dreaded  woods.  .  .  .  Rousseau's  brigade  moved  in  splendid  order 
steadily  to  the  front,  sweeping  everything  before  it." 


SHILOH  REVIEWED.  529 

This  occurred  in  front  of  Sherman,  who  was  between  McClernand  and 
Wallace,  for  he  says :  "  I  ordered  rny  Second  Brigade  ...  to  form  on 
its  right,  and  my  Fourth  Brigade,  Colonel  Buckland,  on  its  right,  all  to 
advance  abreast  with  this  Kentucky  brigade."  Of  the  action  of  McCook's 
division,  General  Sherman  further  says :  "  I  concede  that  General  McCook's 
splendid  division  from  Kentucky  drove  back  the  enemy  along  the  Corinth 
road,  which  was  the  great  central  line  of  this  battle." 

The  conclusion  to  be  drawn  from  these  several  reports  is  that  at  this  stage 
of  the  battle  McCook's  division  reached  across  and  practically  connected  the 
Army  of  the  Ohio  with  Wallace's  division,  which  formed  the  extreme  right  of 
Grant's  force,  and  that  its  steady  valor  and  effective  service,  not  without  the 
cooperation  of  McClernand's,  Hmibut's,  and  Sherman's  commands,  decided 
the  issue  of  the  conflict  on  that  portion  of  the  field.  The  result,  however,  was 
not  brought  about  without  the  concurrence  of  decisive  action  at  other  points. 

While  the  battle  was  going  on  in  McClernand's  camp,  it  raged  with  great 
fury  from  an  earlier  hour  in  front  of  Xelson  and  Crittenden  on  the  left,  and 
"vigorously  but  with  less  destructive  effects  in  front  of  Wallace  on  the  right. 
As  soon  as  the  enemy's  right  began  to  yield,  the  splendid  batteries  of  Men- 
denhall  and  Terrill  directed  an  enfilading  fire  upon  the  Confederate  batteries 
playing  fiercely  upon  McCook,  and  they  were  soon  silenced.  General  Sher 
man  ascribes  that  result  to  the  action  of  two  pieces  of  artillery  to  which  he 
says  he  gave  personal  direction,  but  it  is  probable  that  he  mistook  the  prin 
cipal  cause.  A  Confederate  view  of  the  contest  in  front  of  Nelson  and  Crit 
tenden  is  seen  in  the  report  of  Colonel  Trabue,  whose  brigade  at  a  certain 
stage  of  the  battle  (about  1  o'clock)  was  moved  with  Anderson's  brigade  to  their 
right,  in  front  of  Crittenden.  The  report  describes  the  conflict  at  this  point  as 
terrific,  the  ground  being  crossed  and  recrossed  four  times  in  the  course  of  it. 
I  refer  to  it,  chiefly  because  in  some  accounts  of  the  battle  it  has  erroneously 
been  identified  with  McCook's  front,  where  Trabue's  brigade  was  first  engaged. 

Without  going  further  into  details  in  which  the  official  reports  abound,  it 
may  be  sufficient  to  add  briefly,  that  at  4  o'clock  the  flag  of  the  Union  floated 
again  upon  the  line  from  which  it  had  been  driven  the  previous  day,  and 
General  Grant's  troops  at  once  resumed  their  camps. 

What  more  need  be  said '?  Must  I  sketch  the  scenes  with  twenty  thousand 
of  the  soldiers  of  the  Army  of  the  Ohio  left  out  of  their  place  in  the  combat, 
as  it  is  described  by  General  Grant  and  his  own  officers  \  Shall  I  not,  indeed, 
already  have  wearied  the  reader  with  the  citation  of  evidence  to  substantiate  a 
view  of  the  case  which  unbiased  intelligence  is  forbidden  to  deny  f 

But  if  the  Army  of  the  Ohio  had  not  arrived,  and  General  Grant  had 
remained  on  the  defensive,  what  then  ?  Some  of  those  who  frankly  acknowl 
edge  the  reality  of  their  discomfiture  on  Sunday,  like  now  to  believe  with 
natural  pride,  the  difficulties  that  beset  them  then  being  far  in  the  past,  that 
they  would  have  been  more  successful  the  second  day ;  and  it  has  been 
argued  that  the  withdrawal  of  the  Confederates  from  their  advanced  posi 
tions  on  the  night  of  the  6th  threw  doubt  upon  the  final  result.  A  news 
paper  interviewer  has  even  said  for  General  Grant  that  they  were  then 

VOL.  I.    34 


=,30  SHILOH  REVIEWED. 

preparing  to  retreat.  The  inconsistency  of  that  observation  is  evident.  A 
general  who  stops  to  fight  a  fresh  army  is  not  likely  to  have  had  it  in  con- 
templatation  to  flee  before  one  that  he  had  already  defeated  on  the  same 
ground.  The  published  reports  show  that  the  withdrawal  on  Sunday  night 
did  not  proceed  from  any  faltering  of  the  Confederate  commander.  On  the 
contrary,  he  believed  the  victory  to  have  been  substantially  won,  and  that 
the  fruit  would  certainly  be  gathered  the  following  day.  His  confidence  in 
that  respect  was  shared  in  the  fullest  manner  by  his  entire  army,  backed 
by  a  particularly  able  body  of  high  officers.  All  demanded  to  be  led  against 
the  last  position:  not  one  doubted  the  result.  We  can  imagine  the  effort 
such  an  army  would  have  put  forth  when  animated  by  such  a  spirit. 

With  the  usual  apologies  for  defeat  on  Monday,  they  rated  their  strength 
at  20,000  men,  but,  with  the  fruits  of  victory  in  view,  it  will  be  safe  to  say 
they  would  have  brought  at  least  25,000  into  action ;  and  it  has  been  claimed 
that  25,000,  according  to  the  Confederate  method  of  computation,  would  have 
been  equal  to  about  28,000  according  to  the  Federal  method.  Their  relative 
strength  would  have  been  materially  increased  by  the  large  accession  of  cap 
tured  cannon.  They  had  also  improved  their  condition  by  having  exchanged 
their  inferior  arms  for  better  ones  which  they  had  captured.  Comparatively, 
the  enemy  was  in  a  more  efficient  state  than  before  the  battle. 

The  Union  ranks  might  have  been  swelled  to  15,000 — not  more.  That 
force  on  such  ground  could  not  have  ventured  to  cover  a  line  of  more  than  a 
mile  —  its  left  at  the  river,  and  its  right  near  the  ravines  of  Tillman's  Creek. 
The  high  ground  beyond  the  creek  would  have  enfiladed  it,  and  the  ravines 
would  have  afforded  a  lodgment  and  shelter  for  the  enemy.  Dill's  ravine  on 
the  left  might  also  have  proved  an  element  of  weakness,  and  though  that 
flank  could  not  be  turned,  the  peculiar  advantage  of  position  that  aided  the 
Union  troops  on  the  left  so  much  on  Sunday,  would  not  have  existed  on  Mon 
day —  the  field  of  action  in  front  was  a  uniform  wooded  surface. 

Nowhere  in  history  is  the  profane  idea  that,  in  a  fair  field  fight,  Providence 
is  on  the  side  of  the  strongest  battalions,  more  uniformly  sustained  than  in 
our  Civil  War.  It  presents  no  example  of  the  triumph  of  15,000  or  even 
20,000  men  against  25,000.  It  affords  some  such  instances  where  the  stronger 
force  was  surprised  by  rapid  and  unexpected  movements,  and  still  others 
where  it  was  directed  with  a  want  of  skill  against  chosen  positions  strength 
ened  by  the  art  of  defense;  but  nowhere  else.  The  weaker  force  is  uniformly 
defeated  or  compelled  to  retire.  In  this  case  the  missiles  of  the  assailant 
would  have  found  a  target  in  the  battle-line  of  the  defense,  and  in  the  trans 
portation  and  masses  of  stragglers  crowded  together  about  the  landing. 
The  height  of  the  bluff  would  have  rendered  the  gun-boats  powerless ;  the 
example  of  Belmont  could  only  have  been  partially  repeated,  if  at  all ;  the 
bulk  of  the  defeated  force  must  have  laid  down  its  arms.  There  are  those 
who  argue  that  General  Grant's  personal  qualities  were  a  guarantee  for  his 
triumph.  That  is  a  poor  sort  of  logic,  and  thousands  of  patriotic  citizens,  not 
unfriendly  to  General  Grant,  would  draw  back  in  alarm  from  the  contempla 
tion  of  any  contingency  that  would  have  deprived  the  Union  cause  of  its 
superior  numbers  at  more  than  one  period  of  his  career. 


SHILOH  REVIEWED.  531 

Ix  the  usual  extravagant  newspaper  dispatches  from  the  field  of  battle, 
there  was  a  statement  of  charges  led  by  General  Grant  and  his  staff,  which 
were  assumed  to  have  decided  the  fate  of  the  day  on  Monday,  or  at  least  to 
have  given  a  crowning  touch  to  the  victory.  It  would  be  a  satire  to  repro 
duce  that  statement  in  its  original  form  at  this  time.  Its  adoption,  however, 
by  various  books  and  sketches,  and  especially  the  reference  to  such  an  inci 
dent  by  General  Grant  in  his  recent  "  Century  "  article  [see  page  465],  makes 
it  properly  an  object  of  inquiry.  Such  an  act  as  leading  a  charge  is  a  con 
spicuous  incident  rarely  resorted  to  by  the  commander  of  an  army.  General 
Grant  in  some  former  newspaper  interview  is  made  to  assume  that  General 
Sidney  Johnston  lost  his  life  under  such  circumstances,  from  which  he 
argues  the  failing  fortune  of  the  Confederate  attack  on  Sunday.  General 
Johnston's  conduct  in  that  affair  is  described  in  the  Confederate  reports. 
It  was  an  outburst  of  impatient  valor  not  caused  by  any  crisis  in  the  battle, 
though  an  attack  by  his  troops  at  a  certain  point  had  been  repulsed.  He  did 
not  lose  his  life  in  the  attack,  and  the  most  substantial  successes  of  the  Con 
federates  were  achieved  at  a  later  hour.  We  likewise  naturally  look  in  the 
official  reports  for  a  circumstantial  account  of  the  charge  said  to  have  been 
led  by  General  Grant,  for  no  colonel  of  a  regment  is  likely  to  overlook  the 
honor  of  having  been  led  in  a  charge  by  the  commander  of  the  army. 

In  the  report  of  Colonel  Veatch  of  Hurlbut's  division,  there  occurs  the  fol 
lowing  passage :  "  Maj.-Gen.  Grant  now  ordered  me  forward  to  charge  the 
enemy.  I  formed  my  brigade  in  column  of  battalions,  and  moved  forward 
in  double-quick  through  our  deserted  camps  and  to  the  thick  woods  beyond 
our  lines  in  pursuit  of  the  retreating  enemy,  following  until  we  were  in 
advance  of  our  other  forces,  and  were  ordered  to  fall  back  by  General  Buell." 
It  is  proper  to  remark  that  I  witnessed  this  movement.  I  was  in  advance  on 
the  line  toward  which  it  was  made,  and  understand  its  bearing.  It  does  not 
answer  the  description  of  a  charge  led  by  General  Grant,  since  he  is  not  said 
to  have  been  present  in  it. 

In  the  report  of  General  Rousseau  occurs  the  following : 

"  When  thus  repulsed,  the  enemy  fell  back  and  his  retreat  began :  soon  after  which  I  saw 
two  regiments  of  Government  troops  advancing  in  double-quick  time  across  the  open  fields  in 
our  front,  and  saw  that  one  of  them  was  the  1st  Ohio,  which  had  been  moved  to  our  left  to  wait 
for  ammunition.  I  galloped  to  the  regiment  and  ordered  it  to  halt,  as  I  had  not  ordered  the 
movement,  but  was  informed  that  it  was  advancing  by  order  of  General  Grant,  whom  I  then 
saw  in  rear  of  the  line  with  his  staff.  I  ordered  the  regiment  to  advance  with  the  other,  which 
it  did  some  two  or  three  hundred  yards  farther,  when  it  was  halted,  and  a  fire  was  opened  upon 
it  from  one  of  our  camps,  then  occupied  by  the  enemy.  The  fire  was  instantly  returned,  and 
the  enemy  soon  fled,  after  wounding  eight  men  of  the  1st  Ohio." 

There  is  in  the  official  reports  no  other  mention  of  such  an  occurrence. 
This  must  have  been  the  charge  referred  to,  though  it  does  not  satisfy  the 
description,  since  it  appears  that  General  Grant  was  not  taken  into  the 
enemy's  fire ;  and  there  is  nothing  in  it  which  fills  the  definition  of  a  charge. 
The  professional  soldier  at  least  understands  that  the  term  implies  something 
more  serious  than  a  movement  of  troops  upon  the  field  of  battle,  even  at  a 
rapid  pace,  in  the  presence  of  an  enemy.  But  putting  out  of  the  question  all 


532  SHILOH  REVIEWED. 

appropriate  distinctions  in  the  use  of  terms,  there  was  nothing  in  the  occa 
sion  or  in  these  simple  movements  which  promised  any  advantage,  or  entitled 
them  to  the  slightest  prominence.  The  enemy  had  retired  from  the  last  line, 
and  was  believed  to  be  in  retreat ;  but  he  had  withdrawn  in  good  order,  and 
it  is  known  that  he  halted  a  half-mile  beyond,  fully  prepared  to  repel  a  care 
less  pursuit.  The  topographical  feature  of  larger  fields  and  intervening 
woods,  made  the  left  and  left-center  of  the  battle-field  more  difficult  for  attack 
than  the  ground  about  McClernand's  camp,  as  was  illustrated  by  the  battle 
of  the  previous  day.  The  antagonists,  except  when  in  immediate  contact, 
were  kept  at  a  greater  distance  apart,  and  were  more  screened  from  the 
observation  of  each  other.  The  resistance,  quelled  for  the  moment,  would 
be  renewed  unexpectedly  by  reinforcements  or  on  a  new  line  with  increased 
vigor,  and  did  not  always  allow  the  assailant  to  retain  the  advantage  he 
had  gained. 

Nelson  and  Crittenden  were  working  their  way  step  by  step  over  this  dim- 
cult  ground,  when  the  cheers  of  victory  commenced  on  the  right  where  the 
enemy  could  be  better  observed.  It  was  my  misfortune  to  know  nothing 
about  the  topography  in  front,  and  when  at  that  moment  the  enemy  on  the 
left  was  found  to  be  yielding  readily  to  our  advance,  it  was  my  mistake  to 
suppose  that  the  retirement  was  more  precipitate  and  disordered  than  proved 
to  be  the  case.  On  that  supposition  Nelson  was  ordered  rapidly  to  the  lower 
ford  of  Lick  Creek,  by  which  I  supposed  a  part  of  the  enemy  had  advanced 
and  would  retreat,  and  was  thus  out  of  position  for  the  state  of  the  case  as  it 
turned  out.  The  last  attack  of  Crittenden  was  made  through  thick  woods, 
and  his  division  had  become  a  good  deal  scattered ;  but  a  brigade  of  Wood's 
division  came  up  just  then  and  was  pushed  forward  on  the  eastern  Corinth 
road.  It  soon  came  upon  and  engaged  the  enemy's  skirmishers,  and  was 
attracting  a  flank  fire  from  a  battery  a  considerable  distance  off  on  the  right. 
The  orderly  withdrawal  of  the  enemy  was  now  discovered,  and  indicated 
that  a  single  brigade  unsupported  would  be  insufficient  for  a  pursuit.  Wood's 
brigade  was  therefore  halted  while  its  skirmishers  occupied  the  enemy's 
cavalry,  and  orders  were  sent  to  McCook  and  Crittenden  to  form  on  the  new 
line.  Just  at  that  moment  a  feeble  column  was  seen  to  the  right  and  rear  of 
Wood's  brigade,  moving  in  a  direction  which  would  bring  it  into  the  flank 
fire  of  the  enemy's  artillery  on  the  right.  I  therefore  ordered  it  to  be  halted 
until  other  dispositions  were  made ;  but,  misapprehending  the  object  of  the 
order,  or  deeming  perhaps  that  enough  had  been  done  for  one  day,  it  with 
drew  altogether,  and,  like  the  rest  of  Grant's  troops,  retired  to  its  camp. 
Following  the  same  example,  and  most  probably  with  General  Grant's 
authority,  McCook's  division  had  started  to  the  river.  Before  these  mis 
conceptions  could  be  corrected,  and  my  divisions  got  into  position,  night 
came  on,  and  the  time  for  a  further  forward  movement  passed  for  the  day. 
Indeed,  while  my  troops  were  being  called  up,  I  received  from  General  Grant, 
who  had  retired  to  the  landing,  the  following  letter : 

u  HEADQUARTERS  DIST.  OF  W.  TENX.,  PITTSBURG,  April  7, 1862.  MAJOR-GENERAL  D.  C.  BUELL. 
GEN.  :  When  I  left  the  field  this  evening,  my  intention  was  to  occupy  the  most  advanced 


SHILOH  REVIEWED.  533 

position  possible  for  the  night,  with  the  infantry  engaged  through  the  day,  and  follow  up  our 
success  with  cavalry  and  fresh  troops  expected  to  arrive  during  my  last  absence  on  the  field. 
The  great  fatigue  of  our  men  —  they  having  been  engaged  in  two  days'  fight,  and  subject  to  a 
march  yesterday  and  a  fight  to-day  —  would  preclude  the  idea  of  making  any  advance  to-night 
without  the  arrival  of  the  expected  reinforcements.  My  plan,  therefore,  will  be  to  feel  out  in 
the  morning,  with  all  the  troops  on  the  outer  lines,  until  our  cavalry  force  can  be  organized 
(one  regiment  of  your  army  will  finish  crossing  soon),  and  a  sufficient  artillery  and  infantry 
support  to  follow  them  are  ready  for  a  move.  Under  the  instructions  which  I  have  previously 
received,  and  a  dispatch  also  of  to-day  from  Major-General  Halleck,  it  will  not  then  do  to 
advance  beyond  Pea  Ridge,  or  some  point  which  we  can  reach  and  return  in  a  day.  General 
Halleck  will  probably  be  here  himself  to-morrow.  Instructions  have  been  sent  to  the  division  com 
manders  not  included  in  your  command,  to  be  ready  in  the  morning  either  to  find  if  an  enemy 
was  in  front,  or  to  advance.  Very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

U.  S.  GRANT,  Major-General  Commanding." 

This  letter  implies  the  hypothesis  expressed  also  in  General  Grant's  dis 
patch  of  the  same  evening  to  General  Halleck,  that  the  enemy  might  still  be 
in  our  front  with  the  intention  of  renewing  the  attack.  I  make  no  comment 
on  that  point  further  than  to  contrast  it  with  the  later  pretensions  with 
which  the  battle  has  been  reviewed  by  General  Grant  and  his  friends.  The 
idea  is  again  indicated  in  his  orders  to  his  division  commanders  on  the  8th : 

•'  I  have  instructed  Taylor's  cavalry  to  push  out  the  road  toward  Corinth  to  ascertain  if  the 
enemy  have  retreated.  .  .  .  Should  they  be  retreating,  I  want  all  the  cavalry  to  follow  them." 

Something  in  the  same  vein,  which  I  would  by  no  means  be  understood  as 
dwelling  upon  censoriously,  is  seen  in  a  dispatch  of  the  next  day  to  Halleck. 

"'  I  do  not "  [he  says]  ''  like  to  suggest,  but  it  appears  to  me  that  it  would  be  demoralizing 
upon  our  troops  here  to  be  forced  to  retire  upon  the  opposite  bank  of  the  river,  and  unsafe  to 
remain  on  this  many  weeks  without  large  reinforcements." 

The  passage  is  chiefly  noteworthy  as  showing  that  the  fault  of  Shiloh  was 
not  in  an  excess  of  rashness  or  contempt  for  the  adversary,  and  that  the  les 
son  of  the  occasion  had  not  yet  pointed  out  a  means  of  security  other  than 
in  reenforcenients  or  retreat.  The  introduction  of  the  evidence  is  not  to  be 
ascribed  to  any  motive  of  disparagement.  It  is  entirely  pertinent  to  the  sub 
ject  under  consideration. 

General  Grant  has  recently  admitted  that  a  pursuit  ought  to  have  been 
made,  and  vaguely  intimates  that  somebody  else  than  himself  was  responsible 
that  it  was  not  done.  The  reason  given  in  his  letter  to  me  is,  of  course,  insuf 
ficient.  General  McCook  may  have  told  him  that  his  men  were  hungry  and 
tired ;  but  if  the  order  had  been  issued,  both  McCook  and  his  troops  would 
cheerfully  have  shown  how  much  tired  and  hungry  soldiers  can  do  when  an 
emergency  demands  it.  If  General  Grant  meant  to  imply  that  I  was  respon 
sible  that  the  pursuit  was  not  made,  I  might  perhaps  answer  that  it  is 
always  to  be  expected  that  the  chief  officer  in  command  will  determine  the 
course  to  be  pursued  at  such  a  juncture,  when  he  is  immediately  upon  the 
ground ;  but  I  inwardly  imposed  upon  myself  the  obligation  of  employing 
the  army  under  my  command  as  though  the  whole  duty  of  the  occasion 
rested  upon  it.  There  was  no  doubt  in  my  mind  or  hesitation  in  my  conduct 
as  to  the  propriety  of  continuing  the  action,  at  least  as  long  as  the  enemy 


534 


SHILOH  REVIEWED. 


SCENE    IN    A    UNION    FIELD-HOSPITAL. 


was  in  our  presence,  as  I  considered  him  still  to  be ;  and  I  make  no  attempt 
to  excuse  myself  or  blame  others  when  I  say  that  General  Grant's  troops,  the 
lowest  individual  among  them  not  more  than  the  commander  himself,  appear 
to  have  thought  that  the  object  of  the  battle  was  sufficiently  accomplished 
when  they  were  reinstated  in  their  camps ;  and  that  in  some  way  that  idea 
obstructed  the  reorganization  of  my  line  until  a  further  advance  that  day 
became  impracticable. 

MUCH  harsh  criticism  has  been  passed  upon  General  Lew  Wallace  for  hav 
ing  failed  to  reach  the  field  in  time  to  participate  in  the  battle  on  Sunday. 
The  naked  fact  is  apt  to  be  judged  severely,  and  the  reports  made  a  year 
afterward  by  General  Grant's  staff-officers  —  the  report  of  Colonel  Rawlins 
especially — are  calculated  to  increase  the  unfavorable  impression.  But  some 
qualification  of  that  evidence  must  be  made,  on  account  of  the  anxiety  pro 
duced  in  the  minds  of  those  officers  by  their  peculiar  connection  with  the 
exciting  circumstances  of  the  battle.  The  statement  of  Eawlins  is  particu 
larly  to  be  received  with  reservation.  They  found  Wallace  on  a  different 
road  from  the  one  by  which  they  expected  him,  and  assumed  that  he  was 
wrongfully  there.  Rawlins  pretends  to  give  the  words  of  a  verbal  order  that 
would  have  taken  him  to  a  different  place.  Wallace  denies  that  version  of 
the  order,  and  the  circumstances  do  not  sustain  it.  [See  page  607.]  He  was 


SHILOH  REVIEWED.  535 

on  the  road  to  and  not  far  from  the  upper  ford  of  Owl  Creek,  which  would 
have  brought  him  on  the  right  flank  of  the  Federal  line,  as  it  was  in  the 
morning,  and  as  he  presumed  it  still  to  be.  It  would  have  been  at  least  an 
honest  if  not  a  reasonable  interpretation  of  the  order,  that  took  him  to  a 
point  where  the  responsibility  and  danger  were  liable  to  be  greatly  increased. 
The  impression  of  Major  Kowley,  repeated  more  strongly  by  General  Grant 
in  his  "  Century  "  article,  that  when  found  he  was  farther  from  the  battle-field 
than  when  he  started,  the  map  shows  to  have  been  incorrect.  The  statement 
of  Rawlins,  that  he  did  not  make  a  mile  and  a  half  an  hour,  is  also  not  correct 
of  the  whole  day's  march.  He  actually  marched  nearly  15  miles  in  six  hours 
and  a  hah0.  That  is  not  particularly  rapid  marching,  but  it  does  not  indicate 
any  loitering.  At  the  same  time  it  must  be  said  that,  under  the  circum 
stances,  the  manner  in  which  the  order  was  given  to  Wallace  is  liable  to 
unqualified  disapproval,  both  as  it  concerned  the  public  interest  and  the 
good  name  of  the  officer. 

To  these  qualifying  facts  it  must  be  added  that  a  presumption  of  honest 
endeavor  is  due  to  Wallace's  character.  He  did  good  service  at  Donelson, 
and  at  Shiloh  on  the  7th,  and  on  no  other  occasion  have  his  zeal  and  courage 
been  impugned.  The  verdict  must  perhaps  remain  that  his  action  did  not 
respond  to  the  emergency  as  it  turned  out,  but  that  might  fall  far  short  of  a 
technical  criminality,  unless  under  a  more  austere  standard  of  discipline  than 
prevailed  at  that,  or  indeed  at  any  other  period  of  the  war.  If  he  had  moved 
energetically  after  McPherson  and  Rawlins  arrived  and  informed  him  of  the 
urgency  of  the  occasion,  no  just  censure  could  be  cast  upon  his  conduct. 
The  reports  of  those  officers  imply  that  he  did  not  do  so ;  but  McPherson, 
who  was  more  likely  to  be  correct,  is  least  positive  on  that  point.  It  would 
probably  be  easy  in  any  of  the  armies  to  point  to  similar  examples  of  a  lack 
of  ardent  effort  which  led  to  grave  disappointment  without  being  challenged, 
and  to  many  more  that  would  have  been  attended  with  serious  consequences 
if  any  emergency  had  arisen.  It  was  a  defect  in  the  discipline  which  it  was 
not  possible  at  that  time  to  remedy  completely. 

WHEN  this  article  was  urged  upon  me  by  the  recent  revival  of  the  discus 
sion,  I  was  advised  by  friends  in  whose  judgment  I  have  great  confidence,  to 
write  an  impersonal  account  of  the  battle.  The  idea  was  perfectly  in  har 
mony  with  my  disposition,  but  a  moment's  reflection  showed  me  that  it  was 
impracticable.  It  would  ignore  the  characteristics  which  have  made  the  bat 
tle  of  Shiloh  the  most  famous,  and  to  both  sides  the  most  interesting  of  the 
war.  The  whole  theme  is  full  of  personality.  The  battle  might  be  called, 
almost  properly,  a  personal  one.  It  was  ushered  in  by  faults  that  were  per 
sonal,  and  the  resistance  that  prolonged  it  until  succor  came  was  personal. 
This  does  not  pretend  to  be  a  history  of  it,  but  only  a  review  of  some  of  the 
prominent  facts  which  determined  its  character  and  foreshadowed  its  result. 
Even  this  fragmentary  treatment  of  the  subject  would  be  incomplete  without 
a  revision  of  the  roll  of  honor.  The  task  is  not  difficult,  for  the  evidence  is 
not  meager  or  doubtful.  It  says  of  McClernand,  that,  crippled  at  the  start  by 


536  SH1LOH  REVIEWED. 

the  rudeness  of  the  unexpected  attack  and  the  wreck  of  the  division  in  his  front, 
before  he  had  time  well  to  establish  his  line,  he  struggled  gallantly  and  long 
with  varying  fortune  to  keep  back  the  columns  of  the  enemy;  and  though  he 
failed  in  that,  he  was  still  able  to  present  an  organized  nucleus  which 
attracted  the  disrupted  elements  of  other  divisions:  of  Huiibut,  that  he  posted 
the  two  brigades  under  his  immediate  command,  not  in  the  strongest  manner 
at  first,  but  with  judgment  to  afford  prompt  shelter  to  the  defeated  division 
of  Prentiss,  and  maintained  his  front  with  some  serious  reverses  to  his  left 
flank,  for  7  hours  and  until  his  left  was  turned,  with  a  greater  list  of  mor 
tality  than  any  other  division  sustained :  of  W.  H.  L.  Wallace,  that,  never 
dislodged,  he  sacrificed  his  life  in  a  heroic  effort  with  Prentiss  to  maintain  his 
front  between  the  enemy  and  the  landing :  of  Prentiss,  that  with  the  rawest 
troops  in  the  army  his  vigilance  gave  the  earliest  warning  of  the  magnitude 
of  the  danger,  and  offered  a  resolute  resistance  to  its  approach ;  that,  though 
overwhelmed  and  broken  in  advance,  he  rallied  in  effective  force  on  the  line 
of  Hurlbut  and  Wallace,  and  firmly  held  his  ground  until  completely  sur 
rounded  and  overpowered :  and  of  Sherman,  that  he,  too,  strove  bravely,  but 
from  an  early  hour  with  a  feeble  and  ineffective  force,  to  stay  the  tide  of  dis 
aster  for  which  his  shortcoming  in  the  position  of  an  advanced  guard  was 
largely  responsible ;  but  it  discloses  no  fact  to  justify  the  announcement  of 
General  Halleck  that  he  "saved  the  fortune  of  the  day  on  the  6th."  On  the 
contrary  it  shows,  that,  of  all  the  division  commanders,  not  one  was  less  enti 
tled  to  that  distinction.  This  will  be  a  strange  and  may  seem  like  a  harsh  utter 
ance  to  many  readers,  but  it  is  the  verdict  of  the  record.  The  similar  indorsement 
of  General  Grant  a  year  later,  that  "he  held  the  key-point  to  the  landing,"  is 
equally  alien  to  the  evidence,  and  still  further  without  intelligent  meaning. 
If  the  key-point  was  any  other  than  the  landing  itself,  it  was  on  the  left 
where  the  attack  was  strongest  and  the  resistance  longest  maintained. 

Into  the  list  of  brave  men  in  the  inferior  grades  —  captains  and  even  lieu 
tenants  who  for  the  moment  led  the  wrecks  of  regiments  and  brigades,  and 
field-officers  who  represented  brigades  and  divisions,  and  who  poured  out 
their  lives  on  the  field  or  survived  its  carnage  —  I  cannot  here  pretend  to 
enter,  though  it  is  a  most  interesting  chapter  in  the  battle. 

And  of  Grant  himself  —  is  nothing  to  be  said  ?  The  record  is  silent  and 
tradition  adverse  to  any  marked  influence  that  he  exerted  upon  the  fortune 
of  the  day.  The  contemporaneous  and  subsequent  newspaper  accounts  of 
personal  adventure  are  alike  destitute  of  authenticity  and  dignity.  If  he 
could  have  done  anything  in  the  beginning,  he  was  not  on  the  ground  in 
time.  The  determining  act  in  the  drama  was  completed  by  10  o'clock.  From 
Sherman's  report  and  later  reminiscences  we  learn  that  he  was  with  that 
officer  about  that  hour,  and  again,  it  would  seem,  at  3  and  5  o'clock,  and  he 
was  with  Prentiss  between  10  and  11 ;  but  he  is  not  seen  anywhere  else  in 
front.  We  read  of  some  indefinite  or  unimportant  directions  given  without 
effect  to  straggling  bodies  of  troops  in  rear.  That  is  all.  But  he  was  one  of 
the  many  there  who  would  have  resisted  while  resistance  could  avail.  That 
is  all  that  can  be  said,  but  it  is  an  honorable  record. 

AIRDRIE,  Kentucky,  June,  1885. 


THE  OPPOSING  FORCES  AT  SHILOH. 


537 


THE    SKIRMISHING    IX  SHERMAN'S    FRONT. 


Robert  W.  Medkirk,  of  Co.  E,  72d  Ohio  Vols., 
wrote,  March  22d,  18 86,  from  Indianapolis,  Ind. : 

"On  Friday  afternoon,  April  4th,  two  days  before  the 
battle  of  Shiloh,  while  our  regiment  of  Buckland's  bri 
gade  was  drilling  on  the  west  side  of  Rea  Creek  [see  map, 
page  502],  about  a  mile  from  our  camp,  rapid  firing  was 
heard  from  the  direction  of  our  brigade  pickets,  from 
the  70th  Ohio,  Colonel  C'ockerill.  Our  commander,  Ma 
jor  Crockett,  was  conversing  with  Colonel  Bucklaud, 
who  soon  rode  rapidly  in  the  direction  of  the  firing. 
Major  Crockett  ordered  the  regiment  to  double-quick 
toward  the  outposts.  When  we  arrived  at  the  picket 
post,  we  found  that  it  had  been  captured.  Major  Crock 
ett,  with  part  of  our  regiment,  started  in  pursuit  of  the 
enemy.  In  a  little  while  a  soldier  came  back,  out  of 
breath,  and  asked  that  the  rest  of  the  regiment  be  sent 
to  the  major's  aid.  Then  we  heard  the  roar  of  artillery, 
and  felt  that  the  enemy  was  there  in  force.  Colonel 
C'ockerill  sent  an  orderly  back  to  camp,  with  orders 
for  the  70th  Ohio  to  hurry  out  to  the  front.  The 
remainder  of  our  regiment  pushed  on  to  the  assistance 
of  Major  Crockett.  After  wandering  in  the  woods  for 
a  time,  night  came  on,  and  we  returned  to  the  outpost. 
There  we  found  the  70th  Ohio,  and  General  Sherman 
with  them.  The  general  was  enraged  at  what  he  desig 
nated  indiscreet  conduct,  and  ordered  us  all  back  to 
camp.  That  portion  of  the  72d  Ohio  which  had  been 


with  Major  Crockett  came  straggling  in.  Then  it  was 
that  we  learned  of  the  capture  of  the  major  and  eight 
men. 

"  The  next  day,  Saturday,  my  company,  '  E,'  and  Com 
pany  '  C '  constituted  the  brigade  picket.  We  were 
stationed  on  the  east  side  of  the  Howell  farm  [see  page 
502].  All  day  the  enemy  kept  in  our  front.  We  tired 
on  them  frequently,  but  they  did  not  return  the  fire 
until  toward  evening,  when  they  had  a  brush  with  a 
squadron  of  the  5th  Ohio  Cavalry.  Late  Saturday  after 
noon,  a  Confederate  officer  with  his  staff  rode  up  on  a 
knoll  on  the  west  side  of  the  Howell  farm,  and  with  hia 
glass  began  to  take  observations;  in  a  few  minutes  we 
opened  fire  on  them  and  they  rode  rapidly  away.  To 
show  that  no  serious  attack  was  expected,  a  detail  from 
Colonel  Buckland's  brigade  worked  all  -day  Saturday, 
April  5th,  building  tico  bridges  in  front  of  Buckland's 
bngade,  one  over  the  east  branch  of  Oak  Creek  and 
one  over  the  west  branch  of  Rea  Creek,  which  bridges 
were  used  by  the  enemy  to  cross  their  artillery  on  Sun 
day,  after  our  brigade  fell  back  from  its  first  line." 

General  Sherman's  report  of  the  affair  of  April 
4th  to  Grant's  headquarters,  written  on  the  5th, 
says:  "  I  infer  that  the  enemy  is  in  some  consid 
erable  force  at  Pea  Ridge,"  or  Monterey,  about 
eight  miles  from  Shiloh  Church. —  EDITORS. 


THE   OPPOSING    FORCES    AT   SHILOH. 

The  composition,  losses,  ami  strength  of  each  Army  as  here  stated  give  the  gist  of  all  the  data  obtainable  in  the  Official 
Records.     K  stands  for  killed  ;  w  for  wounded ;  m  w  for  mortally  wounded ;  m  for  captured  or  missing  ;  c  for  captured. 

THE   UNION  ARMY. 

ARMY  OF  THE  TENNESSEE.—  Brigadier-General  Ulysses  S.  Grant 

Mo.  (Birge's  Sharp-shooters),  Col.  B.  S.  Compton.  Bri 
gade  toss  :  k,  99;  w,  470;  m,  11  =  580.  Third  Brigade,  Col. 
Thomas  W.  Sweeny  (w),  Col.  Silas  D.  Baldwin :  8th  Iowa. 
Col.  James  L.  Geddes  (w  andc);  7th  111.,  Maj.  Richard 
Rowett ;  50th  111.,  Col.  Moses  M.  Bane  (w);  52d  111.,  Maj. 
Henry  Stark,  Capt.  Edwin  A.  Bowen;  57th  111.,  Col.  Silas 
D.  Baldwin,  Lieut.-Col.  F.  J.  Hurlbut ;  58th  111.,  Col. 
William  F.  Lynch  (c).  Brigade  loss  :  k,  127  ;  w,  501;  m, 
619  =  1247.  (A  number  of  the  captured  or  missing  were 
also  wounded.)  Cavalry  :  C,  2d,  and  I,  4th  U.  S.,  Lieut. 
James  Powell;  A  andB,  2d  111.,  Capt's  John  R.  Hotaling 
and  Thomas  J.  Larrison.  Cavalry  loss:  k,  1;  w,  5  =  6. 
Artillery:  A,  1st  111.,  Lieut.  Peter  P.  Wood;  D,  1st  Mo., 
Capt.  Henry  Richardson ;  H,  1st  Mo.,  Capt.  Frederick 
Welker ;  K,  1st  Mo.,  Capt.  George  H.  Stone.  Artillery 
loss  :  k,  4 ;  w,  53  =  57. 
THIRD  DIVISION,  Major-General  ^ew  Wallace. 

Firsl  Briyade,  Col.  Morgan  L.  Smith :  llth  Ind.,  Col. 
G.  F.  McGiunis;  24th  Ind.,  Col.  Alvin  P.  Hovey  ;  8th  Mo., 
Lieut.-Col.  James  Peckham.  Brigade  loss :  k.  18;  w,  114  = 
132.  Second  Brigade,  Col.  John  M.  Thayer :  23d  Ind.,  Col. 
W.  L.  Sanderson ;  1st  Neb.,  Lieut.-Col.  William  D.  McCord ; 
56th  Ohio  (at  Crump's  Landing),  Col.  Peter  Kinuey;  58th 
Ohio,  Col.  Valentine  Bausenwein.  Brigade  loss:  k,  20; 
w,  99;  m,  3=  122.  Third  Brigade,  Col.  Charles  Whittle- 
sey :  20th  Ohio,  Lieut.-Col.  Manning  F.  Force ;  68th  Ohio 
(at  Crump's  Landing).  Col.  S.  H.  Steedman:  76th  Ohio, 
Col.  Charles  R.  Woods  :  78th  Ohio,  Col.  M.  D.  Leggett. 
Brigade  loss  :  k.  2  ;  w,  32  ;  m.  1  =  35.  A  rtillery:  9th  Ind. 
Battery,  Capt.  N.  S.Thompson;  List  Mo.,  Lieut.  Charles 
H.  Thurber.  Artillery  loss  :  k,  1 :  w.  6=  7.  Caralri/  :  3d 
Battalion,  llth  111.,  Maj.  James  F.  Johnson  ;  3d  Battalion, 
5th  Ohio.  Maj.  C.  S.  Hayes. 
FOfRTH  DIVISION,  Brig-Gen.  Stephen  A.  Hurlbut. 

First  Brigade,  Col.  N.  G.  Williams  (w),  Col.  Isaac  C. 
Pugh:  28th  111 ,  Col.  A.  K.  Johnson;  32d  111.,  Col.  John 
Logan  (wi  ;  41st  111.,  Col.  Isaac  C.  Pugh,  Lieut.-Col. 
Ansel  Tupper  (k),  Maj.  John  Warner,  Capt.  John  H. 
Xale ;  3d  Iowa,  Maj.  William  M.  Stone  (c),  Lieut.  G.  W. 


FIRST  DIVISION,  Major-Gen.  John  A.  McClernand.    Staff 
loss:  w,  2. 

First  Brigade,  Col.  A.  M.  Hare  (w),  Col.  M.  M.  Crocker: 
8th  111.,  ('apt.  James  M.  Ashmore  iwi,  Capt.  William  H. 
Harvey  (k),Capt.  R.  H.  Sturgess;  18th  111.,  Major  Samuel 
Eaton  (W),  Capt.  Daniel  H.  Brush  iwi,  Capt.  William  J. 
Dillon  (k),  Capt.  J.  J.  Anderson;  llth  Iowa,  Lieut.-Col. 
William  Hall;  13th  Iowa,  Col.  Marcellus  M.  Crocker; 
Battery  D,  2d  111.  Artillery,  Capt.  James  P.  Timouy. 
Brigade  loss :  k,  104  ;  w,  467  ;  m,  9  =  580.  Second  Brigade, 
Col.  C.  Carroll  Marsh  :  llth  111.,  Lieut.-Col.  T.  E.  G.  Ran 
som  (w/,  Major  Garrett  Nevins  (w>,  Capt.  Lloyd  D. 
Waddell,  Major  Garrett  Nevius;  20th  111..  Lieut.-Col. 
Evan  Richards  iwt,  Capt.  Orton  Frisbie ;  45th  111.,  Col. 
JohnE.  Smith;  48th  111.,  Col.  Isham  X.  Haynie  iwi,  Maj. 
Manning  Mayfield.  Brigade  loss  :  k,  80  ;  w,  475;  m,  30  = 
585.  Third  Brigade,  Col.  Julius  Raith  (m  w),  Lieut.- 
Col.  EHOS  P.  Wood,  Col.'  C.  Carroll  Marsh:  17th  111.. 
Lieut.-Col.  Enos  P.  Wood,  Maj.  Francis  M.  Smith;  29th 
111..  Lieut.-Col.  Charles  M.  Ferrell;  43d  111.,  Lieut.-Col. 
Adolph  Eugelmann  ;  49th  111.,  Lieut.-Col.  Phineas  Pease ; 
Company  111.  Cavalry,  Capt.  E.  Carmichael.  Brigade 
loss  :  k,  96;  w,  393  ;  m,  46  =535.  Tnattached :  Stewart's  Co. 
111.  Cav.,  Lieut.  Ezra  King;  D,  1st  111.  Artillery,  Capt. 
Edward  McAllister  (wi ;  E,  2(1111.  Artillery,  Lieut.  George 
L.  Nispel;  14th  Ohio  Battery.  Capt.  J.  B.  Burrows  (wi. 
Unattached  loss :  k,  5 ;  w.  35  =  40 

SECOND  DIVISION,  Brig.-Gen.  W.  H.  L.  Wallace  (m  w), 
Col.  James  M.  Tuttle.     StaffTossTwTT: 

First  Brigade,  Col.  James  M.  Tuttle :  2d  Iowa.  Lieut.- 
Col.  James  Baker ;  7th  Iowa,  Lieut.-Col.  James  C.  Parrott ; 
12th  Iowa,  Col.  Joseph  J.  Woods  (W),  Capt.  Samuel  R. 
Edgington  ;  14th  Iowa,  Col.  William  T.  Shaw.  Brigade 
loss :  k.  39  ;  w,  143 ;  m,  676  =  858.  (A  number  of  the  captured 
or  missing  were  also  wounded,  i  Second  Brigade.  Brig.- 
Gen.  John  McArthur  (w),  Col.  Thomas  Morton  :  9th  111., 
Col.  August  Mersy;  12th  111..  Lieut.-Col.  Augustus  L. 
Chetlain,  Capt.  James  R.  Hugunin ;  81st  Ohio,  Col. 
Thomas  Morton;  13th  Mo.,  Col.  Crafts  J.  Wright :  14th 


538 


THE  OPPOSING  FORCES  AT  SHILOH. 


Crosley.  Brigade  loss:  k,  112;  w,  532;  in,  43=687. 
Second  Brigade,  Col.  James  C.  Veatch:  14th  111.,  Col. 
Cyrus  Hall;  15th  Ill.,Lieut.-Col.  E.  F.  W.  Ellis  (k),  Capt. 
Louis  D.  Kelley,  Licut.-Col.  William  Cam  ;  46th  111.,  Col. 
John  A.  Davis  (w),  Lieut. -Col.  John  J.  Jones ;  25th  Ind., 
Lieut.-Col.  William  H.  Morgan  (\v),  Maj.  John  W.  Foster. 
Brigade  loss :  k,  130 ;  w,  492 ;  in,  8  =  630.  Third  Brigade, 
Brig.-Gen.  Jacob  G.  Laumau :  31st  lud.,  Col.  Charles 
Cruft  (w),  Lieut.-Col.  John  Osboru  ;  44th  lud..  Col.  Hugh 
B.  Reed;  17th  Ky.,  Col.  John  H.  McHeury,  Jr.;  25th  Ky., 
Lieut.-Col.  B.  H.  Bristow,  Maj.  Win.  B.  Wall  (W),  Col. 
John  II.  McHeury,  Jr.  Brigade  loss  :  k,  70 ;  w,  384 ;  in, 
4  =  458.  Cavalry:  1st  and  2d  Battalions,  5th  Ohio,  Col. 
W.  H.  H.  Taylor.  Loss:  k,  1;  w,  6=7.  Artillery:  2d 
Mich.  Battery,  Lieut.  C.  W.  Laing ;  Mann's  Mo.  Battery, 
Lieut.  Edward  Brotzmanu ;  13th  Ohio  Battery,  Capt. 
John  B.  Myers.  Artillery  loss :  k,  4 ;  w,  27  ;  m,  56  =  87. 
FIFTH  DIVISION,  Brig.-Gen.  William  T.  Sherman  (w). 

Staff  loss:  w,  1. 

First  Brigade,  Col.  Jolm  A.  McDowell :  40th  111.,  Col. 
Stephen  G.  Hicks  (w),  Lieut.-Col.  James  W.  Boothe;  6th 
Iowa,  Capt.  John  Williams  (w),  Capt.  Madison  M. 
Waldeu ;  46th  Ohio,  Col.  Thomas  Worthington  ;  6th  lud. 
Battery,  Capt.  Frederick  Bchr  (k).  Brigade  loss:  k, 
137;  w,  444;  m,  70  =  651.  Second' Brigade,  Col.  David 
Stuart  (w),  Lieut.-Col.  Oscar  Malmborg  (temporarily), 
Col.  T.  Kilby  Smith :  55th  HI.,  Lieut.-Col.  Oscar  Malm 
borg;  54th  Ohio,  Col.  T.  Kilby  Smith,  Lieut.-Col.  James 
A.  Farden  ;  71st  Ohio,  Col.  Rodney  Mason.  Brigade  loss: 
k,  80;  w,  380;  m,  90  =  550.  Third  Brigade,  Col.  Jesse 
Ilildebrand:  53d  Ohio,  Col.  J.  J.  Appier,  Lieut.-Col. 
Robert  A.  Fulton ;  57th  Ohio,  Lieut.-Col.  Americus  V. 
Rice ;  77th  Ohio,  Lieut.-Col.  Wills  De  Hass,  Maj.  Benja 
min  D.  Fearing.  Brigade  loss:  k,  70;  w,  222  ;  in,  65= 
356.  Fourth  Brigade,  Col.  Ralph  Buckland  :  48th  Ohio, 
Col.  Peter  J.  Sullivan  (w),  Lieut.-Col.  Job  R.  Parker;  70th 
Ohio,  Col.  Joseph  R.  Cockerill;  72d  Obio,  Lieut.-Col. 
Herman  Cantield  (k),  Col.  Ralph  P.  Buckland.  Brigade 
loss:  k,  36;  w,  203;  m,  74=313.  Cavalry:  1st  and  2d 


Battalions,  4th  111.,  Col.  T.  Lyle  Dickey.  Cavalry  loss  : 
w,  6.  Artillery,  Maj.  E/ra  Taylor  :  B,  1st  111.,  Capt.  Sam 
uel  E.  Barrett;  E,  1st  111.,  Capt.  A.  C.  Waterhouse  (w), 
Lieut.  A.  R.  Abbott  (w),  Lieut.  J.  A.  Fitch.  Artillery 
loss  :  k,  2 ;  w,  22  =  24. 

SIXTH  DIVISION,  Brig.-Gen.  BeujaminlVLPrentiss  (c>. 
Staff  loss:  k,  1  ;  m,  2=3. 

First  Brigade,  Col.  Everett  Peabody  (k) :  12th  Mich., 
Col.  Francis  Qninu  ;  21st  Mo.,  Col.  David  Moore  (w), 
Lieut.-Col.  II.  M.  Woodyard ;  25th  Mo.,  Col.  Robert  T. 
Van  Horn ;  16th,  Wis.,  Col.  Benjamin  Allen  (w).  Brigade 
loss:  k,  113;  w,  372;  m,  236=  721.  Second  Brigade,  Col. 
Madison  Miller  (c) :  61st  111.,  Col.  Jacob  Fry;  16th  Iowa, 
Col.  Alexander  Chambers  (w),  Lieut.-Col  A.  H.  Sanders; 
18th  Mo.,  Lieut.-Col.  Isaac  V.  Pratt  (c).  Brigade  loss  :  k, 
44;  w,  228;  in,  178=450.  Cavalry:  llth  111.  (8  co's),  Col. 
Robert  G.  Ingersoll.  Cavalry  loss :  k,  3  ;  w,  3  =  6.  Artil 
lery:  1st  Minn.  Battery,  Capt.  Emil  Munch  (w),  Lieut. 
William  Pt'aender ;  5th  Ohio  Battery,  Capt.  A.  Hicken- 
looper.  Artillery  lows  :  k,  4;  w,  27  =  31.  Unattached  In 
fantry  :  15th  Iowa,  Col.  Hugh  T.  Reid ;  23d  Mo.,  Col. 
Jacob  T.  Tindall  (k),  Lieut.-Col.  Quiu  Mortou  (c); 
18th  Wis.,  Col.  James  S.  Albau  (k).  Loss  Unattached 
Infantry  :  k,  71 ;  w,  298 ;  in,  502  =  961.  (Some  of  the 
captured  or  missing  |1008]  of  this  division  were  also 
wounded.) 

UNASSIGNED  TROOPS  :  15th  Mich.,  Col.  John  M.  Oliver ; 
14th  Wis.,  Col.  David.  E.  Wood;  H,  1st  111.  Artillery, 
Capt.  Axel  Silf  versparre ;  T,  1st  111.  Artillery,  Capt.  Ed 
ward  Boutoii ;  B,  2d  111.  Artillery,  Capt.  Relly  Madison  ; 
F,  2d  111.  Artillery,  Capt.  John  W.  Powell  (w) ;  8th  Ohio 
Battery,  Capt.  Louis  Markgraf .  Loss  unassigned  troops : 
k,  39 ;  w,  159  ;  m,  17  =  215.  The  total  loss  of  the  Army  of 
the  Tennessee  was  1513  killed,  6601  wounded,  and  2830 
captured  or  missing  =  10,944. 

UNION  GUN-BOATS.  Tyler,  Lieut. -Com.  William 
Gwin  ;  Lexington,  Lieut-Coin.  James  W.  Shirk. 


ARMY  OF  THE  OHIO  —  Major-General  Don  Carlos  BuelL. 


SECOND  DIVISION.  Brig.-Gen.  Alexander  McD.  McCook. 

Fourth  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  Lovell  H.  Rousseau:  6th 
Ind.,  Col.  Thomas  T.  Crittejiden  ;  5th  Ky.,  Col.  II.  M. 
Buckley;  Ist'Ohio.Tol.  B.  FTSiTiith;  1st  Battalion,  15th U. 
S.  (Capt.  Peter  T.  Swaine),  and  1st  Battalion,  16th  U.  8. 
(Capt.  Edwin  F.  Townseud),  Major  John  II.  King;  1st 
Battalion,  19th  U.  S.,  Maj.  S.  D.  Carpenter.  Brigade  loss: 
k,  28;  w,  280;  m,  3=  311.  Fifth  Brigade,  Col.  Edward  N. 
Kirk  (w) :  34th  111.,  Maj.  Charles  N.  Levanway  (k),  Capt. 
Hiram  W.  Bristol ;  2!>th  Ind.,  Lieut.-Col.  David  M.  Dunn; 
30th  lud.,  Col.  Sion  S.  Bass  (m  w),  Lieut.-Col.  Joseph  B. 
Dodge;  77th  Pa.,  Col.  Fred.  S.  Stumbaugh.  Brigade  loss: 
k,  24  ;  w,  310 ;  m,  2  =  346.  Sixth  Brigade,  Col.  William  H. 
Gibson  :  32d  Ind.,  Col.  August  Willich  ;  39th  Ind.,  Col. 
Thomas  J.  Harrison;  15th  Ohio,  Maj.  William  Wallace; 
49th  Ohio,  Lieut.-Col.  Albert  M.  Blackman.  Brigade  loss  : 
k,  25  ;  w,  220  ;  m,  2  =247,  Artillery  :  H,  5th  U.  S.,  Capt. 
William  R.  Terrill.  Artillery  loss :  k,  1 :  w,  13  =  14. 
FOURTH  DIVISION,  Brig.-Gen.  William  Nelson. 

Tenth  Brigade,  Col.  Jacob  Ainmen  :  36th  Ind.,  Col. 
William  Grose  ;  6th  Ohio,  Lieut.-Col.  Nicholas  L.  Ander 
son  ;  24th  Ohio,  Lieut.-Col.  Frederick  C.  Jones.  Brigade 
loss  :  k,  16  ;  w,  106 ;  m,  8  =  130.  Nineteenth  Brigade,  Col. 
William  B.  Hazeu  :  9th  Ind.,  Col.  Gideon  C.  Moody  ;  6th 
Ky.,  Col.  Walter  C.  Whitaker;  41st  Ohio,  Lieut.-Col. 


406.  Twenty-second  Brigade,  Col.  Sanders  D.  Bruce  :  1st 
Ky.,  Col.  David  A.  Enyart  ;  2d  Ky.,  Col.  Thomas  D. 
Sedgewick;  20th  Ky.,  Lieut.-Col.  Charles  S.  Hanson. 
Brigade  loss :  k,  29 ;  w,  138 ;  m,  11=  178.  Cavalry  :  2d  Ind. 
(not  actively  engaged),  Lieut.-Col.  Edward  M.  McCook. 
FIFTH  DIVISION,  Brig.-Gen.  Thomas  L.  Crittenden. 

Eleventh  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  Jeremiah  T.  Boyle:  9th 
Ky.,  Col.  Benjamin  C.  Grider;  13th  Ky.,  Col.  Edward 
H.  Hobson  ;  19th  Ohio,  Col.  Samuel  Beatty ;  59th  Ohio, 
Col.  James  P.  Fyffe.  Brigade  loss  :  k,  33 ;  w,  212;  m,  18= 
263.  Fourteenth  Brigade,  Col.  William  Sooy  Smith  :  llth 
Ky.,  Col.  Pierce  B.  Hawkins;  26th  Ky.,  Lieut.-Col. 
Cicero  Maxwell;  13th  Ohio,  Lieut. -Col.  Joseph  G.  Haw 
kins.  Brigade  loss:  k,  25;  w,  157;  m,  10=192.  Artil 
lery  :  G,  1st  Ohio,  Capt.  Joseph  Bartlett ;  H  and  M,  4th 
U.  S.,  Capt.  Jdhii  Mendenhall.  Artillery  loss:  k,  2;  w, 
8  =  10.  Cavalry:  3d  Ky.  (not  actively  engaged),  Col. 
James  S.  Jackson. 
SIXTH  DIVISION,  Brig.-Gen.  Thomas  J.  WTood. 

Twentieth  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  James  A.  Garfleld :  13th 
Mich.,  Col.  Michael  Shoemaker;  64th  Ohio,  Col.  John 
Ferguson  ;  65th  Ohio,  Col.  Charles  G.  Harker.  Twenty- 
first  Brigade,  Col.  George  D.  Wagner:  15th  Ind.,  Lieut.- 
Col.  Gustavus  A.  Wood  ;  40th  Ind.,  Col.  John  W.  Blake; 
57th  Ind.,  Col.  Cyrus  C.  nines;  24th  Ky.,  Col.  Lewis  B. 
Grigsby.  Brigade  loss :  w,  4. 


George  S.  Mygatt.    Brigade  loss :  k,  48;  w,  357;  m,  1  = 

The  total  loss  of  the  Army  of  the  Ohio  was  241  killed,  1807  wounded,  and  55  captured  or  missing  =  2103. 

The  grand  total  of  Union  loss  was  1754  killed,  8408  wounded,  and  2885  captured  or  missing  =  13,047. 

The  only  official  statement  of  Gr.ant'8  strength  at  Shiloh  is  on  page  112,  Vol.  X.,  "  Official  Records,"  which  is  com 
piled  from  division  returns  of  April  4th  and  5th,  and  shows  (exclusive  of  two  regiments  and  one  battery  not  reported), 
an  aggregate,-"  present  for  duty,"  of  44,895.  Included,  however,  in  these  figures  are  such  non-combatants  as  medi 
cal  officers,  quartermasters,  chaplains,  musicians,  hospital  stewards,  buglers,  etc.,  etc.  Deducting  from  the  total 
above  given  the  "  present  for  duty"  of  Lew  Wallace's  division  (7564),  leaves  37,331  as  the  "  present  for  duty  " 
(combatant  and  non-combatant)  in  Grant's  army  on  the  morning  of  April  6th.  The  actual  number  of  effectives 
is  nowhere  officially  reported,  nor  do  the  "  Official  Records  "  afford  any  information  as  to  the  number  of  men 
brought  by  Buell  to  Grant's  assistance.  General  Buell  speaks  in  a  general  way  of  "25,000  reenforcements,"  in 
cluding  "Lew  Wallace's  5000."  General  Grant  says :  "  At  Shiloh,  the  effective  strength  of  the  Union  forces  on  the 
morning  of  the  6th  was  33,000  men.  Lew  Wallace  brought  5000  more  after  nightfall.  .  .  .  Excluding  the  troops  who 
fled,  panic-stricken,  before  they  had  fired  a  shot,  there  was  not  a  time  during  the  6th  when  we  had  more  than 


THE  OPPOSING  FORCES  AT  SHILOH. 


539 


25  000  men  in  line.  On  the  7th  Buell  brought  20,000  more  (Nelson's,  Crittenden's,  and  McCook's  divisions).  Of  his 
remaining  two  divisions  Thomas's  did  not  reach  the  Held  during  the  engagement ;  Wood's  arrived  before  firing 
had  ceased,  but  not  in  time  to  be  of  much  service."  General  M.  F.  Force,  in  "  From  Fort  Henry  to  Corinth" 
(Charles  Scribner's  Sons),  says:  "The  reinforcements  of  Monday  numbered,  of  Buell's  army  about  25,000;  Lew 
Wallace's  6500;  other  regiments  about  1400."  General  Lew  Wallace  says  in  his  report  that  his  command  "did  not 
exceed  5000  men  of  all  anus." 

THE   CONFEDERATE   ARMY. 

ARMY  OF  THE   MISSISSIPPI.— General  Albert  8idney_JohuBton  (k).    General  G.  T.  Beauregard. 

tart  (w),  Lieut.-Col.  William  D.  Chadick;  1st  La,,  Col. 
Daniel  AV.  Adams,  Maj.  F.  H.  Farrar,  Jr. ;  Ala.  Battery, 
Capt.  F.  H.  Robertson.  Brigade  loss  :  k,  129  ;  w,  597  ;  in, 
103  =  829.  Second  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  James  R.  Chal 
mers:  5th  Miss.,  Col.  A.  E.  Fant ;  7th  Miss.,  Lieut.-Col. 
H.  Mayson;  9th  Miss.,  Lieut.-Col.  William  A.  Rankiu 
(m  w) ;  10th  Miss.,  Col.  R.  A.  Smith;  52d  Tenn.,  Col.B.  J. 
Lea ;  Ala.  Battery,  Capt.  Charles  P.  Gage.  Brigade  loss  : 
k,  83;  w,  343;  m,  19=445.  Third  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen. 
John  K.  Jackson :  17th  Ala,,  Lieut.-Col.  Robert  C.  Farris ; 
18th  Ala.,  Col.  Eli  S.  Shorter;  19th  Ala.,  Col.  Joseph 
Wheeler ;  2d  Tex.,  Col.  John  C.  Moore,  Lieut.-Col.  W.  P. 
Rogers,  Maj.  H.  G.  Runnels;  Ga.  Battery,  Capt.  I.  P. 
Girardey.  Brigade  loss  :  k,  86 ;  w,  364;  m,  194  =  644. 

THIRD  ARMY  CORPS,  Maj. -Gen.  Wnu  J.Hardee  (w). 
First  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  T.  C.  Hindman  (commanded 
his  own  and  the  Third  Brigade),  Col.  K;  G.  Shaver :  2d 
Ark.,  Col.  D.  C.  Govan,  Maj.  R.  F.  Harvey;  6th  Ark., 
Col.  A.  T.  Hawthorn ;  7th  Ark.,  Lieut.-Col  John  M. 
Dean  (k),  Maj.  James  T.  Martin;  3d  Confederate,  Col. 
John  S.  Marmaduke ;  Miss.  Battery,  Capt.  Charles 
Swett.  Brigade  loss:  k,  109;  w,  546;  m,  38=693.  Second 
Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  P.  R.  Cleburne:  15th  Ark.,  Lieut.- 
Col.  A.  K.  Patton  (k)r<5tin5IisH.,  Col.  J.  J.  Thornton  (w), 
Capt.  W.  A.  Harper;  2d  Tenn.,  Col.  W.  B.  Bate  (w),  Lieut.- 
Col.  D.  L.  Goodall ;  5th  Tenn.,  Col.  Ben.  J.  Hill ;  23d  Tenu., 
Lieut.-Col.  James  F.  Neill  (w) ;  24th  Tenn.,  Lieut.-Col. 
Thomas  H.  Peebles ;  Ark.  Batteries,  Capts.  J.T.Trigg  and 
J.  H.  Calvert.  Brigade  loss :  k,  188  ;  w,  790 ;  in,  65  =  1043. 
Third  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  S.  A.  M.  Wood,  Col.  W.  K.  Pat 
terson  (temporarily) :  16th  Ala.,  Lieut.-Col.  J.  W.  Harris  ; 
8th  Ark.,  Col.  W.  K.  Patterson;  9th  Ark.  (battalion),  Maj. 
J.  H.  Kelly;  3d  Miss.  Battalion,  Maj.  A.  B.  Hardcastle ; 
27th  Tenn.,  Col.  Chris.  H.  Williams  (k),  Maj.  Samuel  T. 
Love  (in  w) ;  44th  Tenu.,  Col.  C.  A.  McDaniel ;  55th  Tenn., 
Col.  James  L.  MoKoiii ;  Miss.  Battery,  Capt.  W.  L.  Harper 
(w),  Lieut.  Put.  Darden ;  Ga.  Dragoons,  Capt.  I.W.  Avery. 
Brigade  loss  :  k,  107  ;  w,  600 ;  in,  38  =  745. 

RESERVE  CORPS,  Brig.-Gen.  JohnJlBreckinridge. 
First  Brigade,  Col.  Robert  P.  TraUue:  4th  Ala.  uatt., 

Maj.  J.  M!  Clifton  ;  31st  Ala.,  Lieut.-Col. Galbraith  ; 

3d  Ky.,  Lieut.-Col.  Ben.  Anderson  (w) ;  4th  Ky., 
Lieut.-Col.  A.  R.  Hynes  (w) ;  5th  Ky.,  Col.  Thomas 
H.  Hunt;  6th  Ky.,  Col.  Joseph  H.  Lewis;  Teuu.  Battal. 
ion,  Lieut.-Col.  J.  M.  Crews ;  Ky.  Battery,  Capt.  Ed 
ward  P.  Byrne;  Ky.  Battery,  Capt.  Robert  Cobb. 
Brigade  loss":  k,  151 ;  w,  557;  in,  92=  800.  Second  Brigade, 
Brig.-Gen.  John  S.  Bowen  (w),  Col.  John  D.  Martin  :  9th 
Ark.,  Col.  Isaac  L.  Dunlop ;  10th  Ark.,  Col.  T.  D.  Merrick ; 
2d  Confederate,  Col.  John  D.  Martin,  Maj.  Thomas  H. 
Mangum;  1st  Mo.,  Col.  Lucius  L.  Rich;  Miss.  Battery, 
Capt.  Alfred  Hudson.  Brigade  loss:  k,98;  w,498;  in,  28  = 
624.  Third  Brigade,  Col.  W.  S.  Statham  :  15th  Miss.  ;  22d 
Miss. ;  19th  Tenn.,  Col.  D  H.  Cummings :  20th  Tenn.,  Col. 
J.  A.  Battle  (c) ;  28th  Tenu. ;  45th  Tenn.,  Lieut.-Col.  E. 
F.  Lytle ;  Tenn.  Battery,  Capt.  A.  M.  Rutledge.  Brigade 
loss  :  k,  137  ;  w,  627  ;  m,  45  =  809. 


FIRST  ARMY  CORPS.— Major-Gen.  Leouida^Polk. 
FIRST    DIVISION,  Brig.-Gen.   Charles    Clark  (w),  Brig.- 
Gen.  Alexander  P.  Stewart.    Staff  loss:  w,  1. 

First  Brigade,  Col.  R.  M.  Russell:  llth  La.,  Col.  S.  F. 
Marks  (w),  Lieut.-Col.  Robert  II.  Barrow ;  12th  Tenn., 
Lieut.-Col.  T.  H.  Bell,  Major  R.  P.  Caldwell ;  13th  Tenn., 
Col.  A.  J.  Vaughan,  Jr.;  22d  Teuu.,  Col.  T.  J.  Freeman 
(w);  Tenu.  Battery,  Capt.  Smith  P.  Bankhead.  Brigade 
loss :  k,  97  ;  w,  512  =  609.  Second  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  Alex 
ander  P.  Stewart :  13th  Ark.,  Lieut.-Col.  A.  D.  Grayson 
(k),  Major  James  A.  McNeely  (w),  Col.  J.  C.  Tappan;  4th 
Tenn.,  Col.  R.  P.  Neely,  Lieut.-Col.  O.  F.  Strahl;  5th 
Tenu.,  Lieut.-Col.  C.  D.  Veuable;  33d  Tenn.,  Col.  Alex 
ander  W.  Campbell  (w) ;  Miss.  Battery,  Capt.  T.  J.  Stan 
ford.  Brigade  loss :  k,  93 ;  w,  421 ;  m,  3  =517. 
SECOND  DIVISION,  Major-Gen.  B.  F.  Cheatham  (w). 
Staff  loss  :  w,  1. 

First  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  Bushrod  R.  Johnson  (w), 
Col.  Preston  Smith  (w) :  Blythe's  Miss.,  Col.  A.  K.  Blythe 
(k),  Lieut.-Col.  D.  L.  Herron  (k),  Major  James  Moore;  2d 
Tenn.,  Col.  J.  Knox  Walker;  15th  Tenn.,  Lieut.-Col.  R. 
C.  Tyler  (w),  Major  John  F.  Hearn;  154th  Tenn.  (senior), 
Col.  Preston  Smith,  Lieut.-Col.  Marcus  J.  Wright;  Teuu. 
Battery,  Capt.  Marshall  T.  Polk  (w).  Brigade  loss :  k, 
120;  w,  607;  m,  13  =  740.  Second  Brigade,  Col.  William 
H.  Stephens,  Col.  George  Maney:  7th  Ky.,  Col.  Charles 
Wickliffe  (in.  w),  Lieut.-Col.  W.  D.  Launom ;  1st  Teuii. 
(battalion),  Col.  George  Mauey,  Major  II.  R.  Field  ;  6th 
Tenu.,  Lieut.-Col.  T.  P.  Jones,  Col.  W.  H.  Stephens;  9th 
Tenn.,  Col.  H.  L.  Douglass ;  Miss.  Battery,  Capt.  Melanc- 
thon  Smith.  Brigade  loss  :  k,  75  ;  w,  413 ;  in,  3  =491.  Cav 
alry  :  1st  Miss.,  Col.  A.  J.  Lindsay  ;  Miss,  and  Ala.  Bat 
talion,  Lieut.-Col.  R,  H.  Brewer.  Cavalry  loss  :  k,  5 ;  w,  12 ; 
m,  2  =  19.  Unattached  :  47th  Tenu.,  Col.  M.  R.  Hill. 

SECOND  ARMY  CORPS,  Major-Gen.  BraxtouJBragj£. 
Escort :  Alabama  Cavalry,  Capt.  R.  W.  Smith. 

FIRST  DIVISION,  Brig.-Gen.  Daniel  Ruggles.  First 
Brigade,  Col.  Randall  L.  Gibson  :  1st  Ark.,  Col.  James 
F.  Fagan ;  4th  La.,  Col.  H.  W.  Allen  (w),  Lieut.-Col.  S. 

E.  Hunter;  13th  La.,  Major  A.  P.  Avegno  (m  w),  Capt. 
S.  O'Leary  (w;,  Capt,  E.  M.  Dubroca;  19th  La.,  Col.  Ben 
jamin  L.  Hodge,  Lieut.-Col.  J.  M.  Holliugsworth.     Bri 
gade  loss:  k,  97;  w,  488;  m,  97=682.     Second  Brigade, 
Brig.-Gen.  Pattou  Anderson :  1st  Fla.  Battalion,  Major  T. 
A.  McDonell  (w),  Capt.  W.  G.  Poole,  Capt.  W.  C.  Bird; 
17th  La.,  Lieut.-Col.  Charles  Jones  (w);  20th  La.,  Col. 
August  Reichard  ;  9th  Texas,  Col.  W.  A.  Stanley  ;   Con 
federate  Guards  Response  Battalion,  Major   Franklin 
H.  Clack;    5th    Company  Washington  (La.)    Artillery, 
Capt.  W.  I.  Hodgson.     Brigade  loss :  k,  69 ;  w,  313 ;  m, 
52  =  434.     Third  Brigade,  Col.  Preston  Pond,  Jr.:   16th 
La.,  Maj.  Daniel  Gober;  18th  La.,  Col.  Alfred  Mouton 
(w),  Lieut.-Col.  A.  Roman;    Crescent  (La.)  Regt,,  Col. 
Marshall   J.  Smith;    Orleans    Guard  Battalion,  Major 
Leon  Querouze  (w) ;  38th  Tenn.,  Col.  R.  F.  Looncy ;  Ala. 
Battery,  Capt.  Wm.  H.  Ketchum.    Brigade  loss:  k,  89; 
w,  336 ;  m,  169=  594.     Cavalry  :  Ala.  Battalion,  Capt.  T. 

F.  Jenkins.     Cavalry  loss,  k,  2  ;  w,  6  ;  m,  1  =  9. 
SECOND  DIVISION,  Brig.-Gen.  Jones  M.  Withers.    First 

Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  A.  H.  Gladden  (m  w),  Col.  Daniel 
W.  Adams  (w),  Col.  Z.  C.  Deas  (w) :  21st  Ala,,  Lieut.-Col. 
S.  W.  Cayce,  Maj.  F.  Stewart  ;  22d  Ala.,  Col.  Z.  C.  Deas, 
Lieut.-Col.  John  C.  Marrast ;  25th  Ala.,  Col.  J.  Q.  Loomis 
(w),  Maj.  George  D.  Johnston ;  26th  Ala.,  Col.  J.  G.  Col- 


TROOPS  NOT  MENTIONED  IN  THE  FOREGOING  LIST.     CaV- 

aln/  :  Teun.  Regt.,  Col,  NL  B.  Fprrest_(w)  ;  Ala.  Regt., 
Col.  James  H.  Clanton;  Texas  Regt.,  Col.  John  A.  Whar- 
ton  (w)  ;  Ky.  Squadron,  Capt,  John  H.  Morgan.  Artil 
lery  :  Ark.  Battery,  Capt,  George  T.  Hubbard ;  Teun. 
Battery,  Capt.  H.  L.  W.  McClung. 

The  total  Confederate  loss,  as  officially  reported,  was  1728  killed,  8012  wounded,  and  959  missing  =  10,699. 
According  to  a  field  return  for  April  3d,  1862  ("  Official  Records,"  Vol.  X,  398),  the  effective  strength  of  the  Con 
federate  forces  that  marched  from  Corinth  was  as  follows  :  Infantry,  34,727 ;  artillery,  1973  ;  cavalry,  2073,-or  an 
aggregate  of  38,773.    The  47th  Tennessee  Regiment  reached  the  field  on  the  7th  with  probably  550  men  making  in 
all  39,323.    Another  return  (»  Official  Records,"  Vol.  X.,  396)  gives  the  following  "  effective  total  before  the  battl 
Infantry  and  artillery,  35,953 ;  cavalry,  4382,—  grand  total,  40,335. 


ALBERT  SIDNEY  JOHNSTON  AT  SHILOhU 


BY   HIS  SON,   WILLIAM  PRESTON  JOHNSTON,   COLONEL,   C.  S.  A. 


NEY    JOHNSTON     AT    THE    AGE    OF 
JRE      BY    THOMAS    CAMPBELL,     PAIN 


the  angry  political  strife  which  pro- 
ceded  the  contest  of  arms,  General  Albert 
Sidney  Johnston  ^  remained  silent,  stern,  and  sor 
rowful.  He  determined  to  stand  at  his  post  in 
San  Francisco,  performing  his  full  duty  as  an 
officer  of  the  United  States,  until  events  should 
require  a  decision  as  to  his  course.  When 
Texas  —  his  adopted  State  —  passed  the  ordi 
nance  of  secession  from  the  Union,  the  alterna 
tive  was  presented,  and,  on  the  day  he  heard  the 
news,  he  resigned  his  commission  in  the  army. 
He  kept  the  fact  concealed,  however,  lest  it 
might  stir  up  disaffection  among  the  turbulent 

population  of  the  Pacific  Coast.  He  said,  "  I  shall  do  my  duty  to  the  last, 
and,  when  absolved,  shall  take  my  course."  All  honest  and  competent  wit 
nesses  now  accord  that  he  carried  out  this  purpose  in  letter  and  spirit. 
General  Sumner,  who  relieved  him,  reported  that  he  found  him  "  carrying 
out  the  orders  of  the  Government." 

Mr.  Lincoln's  Administration  treated  General  Johnston  with  a  distrust 
which  wounded  his  pride  to  the  quick,  but  afterward  made  such  amends  as  it 
could,  by  sending  him  a  major-general's  commission.  He  was  also  assured 
through  confidential  sources  that  he  would  receive  the  highest  command  in 
the  Federal  Army.  But  he  declined  to  take  part  against  his  own  people,  and 
retired  to  Los  Angeles  with  the  intention  of  farming.  There  he  was  sub 
jected  to  an  irritating  surveillance;  while  at  the  same  time  there  came 


,1  For  extended  treatment  of  this  subject,  see 
"  The  Life  of  General  Albert  Sidney  Johnston," 
by  William  Preston  Johnston  (D.  Appleton  &  Co.), 
upon  which  Colonel  Johnston  has  drawn  freely  in 
the  preparation  of  this  paper. —  EDITORS. 

&  General  Johnston  was  of  New  England  de 
scent,  though  both  he  and  his  mother  were  of 
pioneer  stock  and  natives  of  Kentucky.  His 
father  was  the  village  physician.  He  was  born 
February  3d,  1803,  in  Mason  County,  Kentucky. 
He  was  "  a  handsome,  proiid,  manly,  earnest,  and 
self-reliant  boy,"  "  grave  and  thoughtful."  His 
early  education  was  desultory,  but  was  continued 
at  Transylvania  and  at  West  Point,  where  he 
evinced  superior  talents  for  mathematics,  and  was 
graduated  in  13126.  He  was  a  lieutenant  of  the 
6th  Infantry,  from  1827  to  1834,  when  he  re 
signed.  His  only  active  service  during  this  period 
was  the  Black  Hawk  war,  in  which  he  won  consid 
erable  distinction.  In  1829  he  married  Miss  Hen 
rietta  Preston,  who  died  in  1835.  In  1836  he 
joined  the  army  of  the  young  republic  of  Texas, 


and  rapidly  rose  to  the  chief  command.  In  1  S3!) 
he  was  Secretary  of  War,  and  expelled  the  intrud 
ing  United  States  Indians,  after  two  battles  on  the 
Kiver  Neches.  He  served  one  campaign  in  Mexico 
under  General  Taylor,  and  was  recommended  by 
that  commander  as  a  brigadier-general  for  his  con 
duct  at  Monterey,  but  was  allowed  no  command 
by  the  Administration.  In  1843  he  married  Miss 
Eliza  Griffin,  and  retired  to  a  plantation  in  Brazoria 
County,  Texas,  where  he  spent  three  years  in  se 
clusion  and  straitened  circumstances.  In  1849  he 
was  appointed  a  paymaster  by  President  Taylor, 
and  served  in  Texas  until  1855,  when  he  was 
made  colonel  of  the  2d  Cavalry  by  President 
Pierce.  In  1857  he  conducted  the  remarkable 
expedition  to  Utah,  in  which  he  saved  the  United 
States  army  there  from  a  frightful  disaster  by  his 
prudence  and  executive  ability.  He  remained  in 
command  in  Utah  until  the  summer  of  1860,  which 
he  passed  with  his  family  in  Kentucky.  In  Decem 
ber  of  that  year  he  was  assigned  to  the  command 
of  the  Pacific  Coast.— W.  P.  J. 


ALBERT  SIDNEY  JOHNSTON  AT  SHILOH. 


across  mountain  and  desert  the  voice  of  the  Southern  people  calling  to  him 
for  help  in  their  extremity.  |  His  heart  and  intellect  both  recognized  their 
claim  upon  his  services,  and  he  obeyed.  At  this  time  he  wrote,  "  No  one 
could  feel  more  sensibly  the  calamitous  condition  of  our  country  than  my- 
s i «lf,  and  whatever  part  I  may  take  hereafter,  it  will  always  be  a  subject  of 
gratulation  with  me  that  no  act  of  mine  ever  contributed  to  bring  it  about. 
I  suppose  the  difficulties  now  will  only  be  adjusted  by  the  sword.  In  my 
humble  judgment,  that  was  not  the  remedy." 

When  he  arrived  in  the  new  Confederacy,  his  coming  was  welcomed  with 
a  spontaneous  outburst  of  popular  enthusiasm,  and  deputations  from  the 
West  preceded  him  to  Richmond,  entreating  his  assignment  to  that  depart 
ment.  President  Davis  said  that  he  regarded  his  coming  as  of  more  worth 
than  the  accession  of  an  army  of  ten  thousand  men  ;  and  on  the  10th  of  Sep 
tember,  1861,  he  was  intrusted  with  the  defense  of  that  part  of  the  Confed 
erate  States  which  lay  west  of  the  Alleghany  Mountains,  except  the  Gulf  Coast 
(Bragg  having  control  of  the  coast  of  West  Florida  and  Alabama,  and  Mans 
field  Lovell  of  the  coast  of  Mississippi  and  Louisiana).  His  command  was 


4  The  following  statement  was  written  in  re 
sponse  to  an  inquiry  by  the  editors  as  to  the  details 
of  the  offer  of  high  command  referred  to  by  Colo 
nel  Johnston  : 

"  The  circumstances  which  gave  rise  to  the  ex 
pressed  desire  of  the  Administration  in  1861  to 
retain  General  Albert  Sidney  Johnston  in  the 
Federal  army  were  as  follows  : 

"  Early  in  April,  1861,  while  on  duty  in  the  ad 
jutant-general's  office  in  Washington,  I  learned 
that  Colonel  Sumner  had  been  dispatched  incog. 
to  California,  with  secret  orders  to  assume  com 
mand  of  the  Department  of  the  Pacific,  and  that 
this  unusual  course  had  been  prompted  by  the 
fear  that  the  forts  and  arsenals  and  garrisons 
on  that  coast  would  be  placed  in  the  hands  of 
the  secessionists  by  General  Johnston,  the  then 
commander,  who  was  reported  to  be  arranging 
to  do  so. 

"  I  had  just  received  a  letter  from  General  John 
ston  expressing  his  pleasure  at  the  large  and 
handsome  parade  of  State  troops  in  San  Fran 
cisco,  on  February  22d,  and  at  the  undoubted 
loyalty  to  the  Union  cause  of  the  whole  Pacific 
coast,  and  also  his  earnest  hope  that  the  patriotic 
spirit  manifested  in  California  existed  as  strongly 
in  all  other  States,  and  would  as  surely  be  main 
tained  by  them  as  it  would  be  in  the  Pacific  States 
in  case  of  attempted  secession. 

"Fearing  the  effect  of  the  superseding  orders 
upon  a  high-toned  and  sensitive  officer,  one  whom 
I  esteemed  as  a  brother,  and  earnestly  desired  to 
be  secured  to  our  cause,  I  induced  Major  McDow 
ell  to  show  the  letter  to  Secretary  Cameron,  and 
to  urge  every  effort  to  keep  General  Johnston 
from  leaving  the  service.  His  superior  qualifica 
tions,  his  influence  among  prominent  citizens  at 
the  South,  and  especially  among  his  relatives  in 
his  native  State,  Kentucky, —  which  it  was  exceed 
ingly  desirable  to  keep  in  the  Union, —  were  strong 


inducements  to  these  efforts.  My  desire  was  met 
as  cordially  and  earnestly  as  it  existed,  and  I 
was  authorized  to  send,  as  I  did  through  my 
friend  '  Ben '  Holliday,  in  New  York,  for  trans 
mission  by  telegraph  to  St.  Louis,  and  thence  by 
his  '  pony  express '  to  San  Francisco,  the  follow 
ing  message :  '  I  take  the  greatest  pleasure  in 
assuring  you,  for  the  Secretary  of  War,  that  he 
has  the  utmost  confidence  in  you,  and  will  give 
you  the  most  important  command  and  trust  on 
your  arrival  here.  Sidney  is  appointed  to  the 
Military  Academy.'  This  message  reached  Gen 
eral  Johnston  after  the  arrival  of  Colonel  Sumner. 

"  In  response  to  the  above,  and  by  the  same 
channel  of  communication,  I  received  this  mes 
sage  :  '  I  thank  you  and  my  friends  for  efforts  in 
my  behalf.  I  have  resigned,  and  resolved  to  follow 
the  fortunes  of  my  State.'  His  letter  of  resigna 
tion  was  soon  received,  and  put  an  end  to  all 
hope,  especially  as  Texas  —  which  had  then  se 
ceded —  was  his  adopted  State. 

"  I  felt  in  1SG1,  as  I  now  know,  that  the  asser 
tion  that  General  Johnston  intended  to  turn  over 
to  the  secessionists  the  defenses  of  California,  or 
any  part  of  the  regular  army,  was  false  and  ab 
surd.  Under  no  circumstances,  even  if  intended, 
could  such  a  plan  have  succeeded,  especially  with 
the  regular  army.  But  no  such  breach  of  trust 
was  intended,  nor  would  any  graduate  of  West 
Point  in  the  army  have  committed  or  permitted  it. 
It  had  no  better  foundation  than  the  statement  of 
Senator  Conness  of  California,  who  three  years 
later  urged  and  secured  the  assignment  of  Gen 
eral  McDowell  to  command  on  the  Pacific  coast, 
on  the  ground  that  after  the  war  for  the  Union 
should  have  ended  there  would  be  in  California  a 
more  powerful  rebellion  than  that  then  existing 
among  the  Southern  States. 

"  FITZ  JOHX  PORTER. 

"XEW  YOKK,  December  8,  1884." 


ALBERT  SIDNEY  JOHNSTON  AT  SHILOH. 


GKNERAL    ALBERT    SIDNEY    JOHNSTON    AT    THE    AGE    OF    FIFTY-SEVEN. 
FROM   A    PHOTOGRAPH    TAKEN    IN    SALT    LAKE    CITY    IN    1860. 


The  appearance  of  General  Albert  Sidney  Johnston 
before  the  war  is  described  as  both  commanding  and 
attractive.  In  some  respects  the  bust  of  Alexander 
Hamilton  is  the  best  extant  likeness  of  him,  a  resem 
blance  very  frequently  remarked.  His  cheek-bones  were 
rather  high,  and  with  his  nose  and  complexion  gave  him 
a  Scotch  look.  His  chin  was  delicate  and  handsome ; 
his  teeth  were  white  and  regular,  and  his  mouth  was 
square  and  firm.  In  the  portrait  by  Bush  taken  about 
this  time,  his  lips  seem  rather  full,  but  as  they  are 
best  remembered,  they  were  somewhat  thin  and  very 


firmly  set.  Light-brown  hair  clustered  over  a  noble 
forehead,  and  from  under  heavy  brows  his  deep-set 
but  clear,  steady  eyes  looked  straight  at  you  with  a 
regard  kind  and  sincere,  yet  penetrating.  In  repose  his 
eyes  were  as  blue  as  the  sky,  but  in  excitement  they 
flashed  to  a  steel-gray,  and  exerted  a  remarkable  power 
over  men.  He  was  six  feet  and  au  inch  in  height,  of 
about  one  hundred  and  eighty  pounds  weight,  straight 
as  an  arrow,  with  broad,  square  shoulders  and  a  mass 
ive  chest.  He  was  strong  and  active,  and  of  a  military 
bearing.— W.  P.  J. 


imperial  in  extent,  and  his  powers  and  discretion  as  large  as  the  theory  of 
the  Confederate  Government  permitted.  He  lacked  nothing  except  men, 
munitions  of  war,  and  the  means  of  obtaining  them.  He  had  the  right  to  ask 
for  anything,  and  the  State  Executives  had  the  power  to  withhold  everything. 
The  Mississippi  River  divided  his  department  into  two  distinct  theaters  of 
war.  West  of  the  river,  Fremont  held  Missouri  with  a  force  of  from  60,000 
to  80,000  Federals,  confronted  by  Price  and  McCulloch  in  the  extreme  south- 


ALBERT  SIDNEY  JOHNSTON  AT  SHILOH. 


543 


AUTOGRAPH  FOUND  INSIDE  THE  COVER  OF  GENERAL  JOHN- 

STON'S   POCKET-MAP   OF  TENNESSEE,    AND   WRITTEN 

THREE  DATS  BEFORE  THE  BATTLE  OF  SHILOH— 

PROBABLY  HIS  LAST  AUTOGRAPH. 


west  corner  of  the  State  with  6000.  men,  and  by  Hardee,  in  north-eastern 
Arkansas,  with  about  as  many  raw  recruits  down  with  camp  diseases  and 
unable  to  move.  East  of  the  Mississippi,  the  northern  boundary  of  Ten 
nessee  was  barely  in  his  possession,  and  was  held  under  sufferance  from 
an  enemy  who,  for  various  reasons,  hesitated  to  advance.  The  Mississippi 
opened  the  way  to  a  ruinous  naval  / 

invasion  unless  it  could  be  de-  _^xy  ^~i/  *^~~-?*s-7  ^^^ 
fended  and  held.  Grant  was  at 
Cairo  and  Paducah  with  20,000 
men ;  and  Polk,  to  oppose  his  in 
vasion,  had  seized  Columbus,  Ky., 
with  about  11,000  Confederates, 
and  had  fortified  it.  Tennessee 
was  twice  divided  :  first  by  the 
Tennessee  River,  and  then  by  the 
Cumberland,  both  of  which  invited  the  advance  of  a  hostile  force.  Some 
small  pretense  of  fortifications  had  been  made  on  both  rivers  at  Forts  Henry 
and  Donelson,  near  the  boundary  line,  but  practically  there  was  nothing  to 
prevent  the  Federal  army  from  capturing  Nashville,  then  the  most  important 
depot  of  supplies  west  of  the  Alleghanies.  Hence  the  immediate  and  press 
ing  question  for  General  Johnston  was  the  defense  of  the  Tennessee  border. 
The  mock  neutrality  of  Kentucky,  which  had  served  as  a  paper  barrier,  was 
terminated,  on  the  13th  of  September,  by  a  formal  defiance  from  the  Union 
Legislature  of  Kentucky.  The  United  States  Government  had  about  34,000 
volunteers  and  about  6000  Kentucky  Home  Guards  assembled  in  the  State 

under  General  Robert  Anderson,  of  Fort 
Sumter  fame,  who  had  with  him  such  en 
terprising  corps  commanders  as  Sherman, 
Thomas,  and  Nelson. 

The  Confederacy  had  some  four  thousand 
ill-armed  and  ill-equipped  troops  at  Cum 
berland  Gap  under  General  Zollicoffer, 
guarding  the  only  line  of  railroad  com 
munication  between  Virginia  and  Tennes 
see,  and  overawing  the  Union  population 
of  East  Tennessee.  This  hostile  section 
penetrated  the  heart  of  the  Confederacy 
like  a  wedge  and  flanked  and  weakened 
General  Johnston's  line  of  defense,  requir 
ing,  as  it  did,  constant  vigilance  and 
repression. 

Besides  Zollicoffer's  force,  General  John 
ston  found  only  4000  men  available  to  pro 
tect  his  >hole  line  against  40,000  Federal 
troops.  There  were,  it  is  true,  some  four 

BIRTHPLACE    OF   ALBERT    SIDNEY   JOHNSTON,  -.  f 

WASHINGTON,  KY.  FROM  A  PHOTOGRAPH.  thousand  more  raw  recruits  in  camps  ol 


544 


ALBERT  SIDNEY  JOHNSTON  AT  SHILOH. 


instruction,  but  they  were  sick 
and  not  half  armed.  Of  course 
he  might  have  abandoned  the 
Mississippi  River  to  Grant  and 
brought  Polk  to  his  aid,  but 
he  had  no  thought  of  that; 
that  would  have  been  all  which 
the  Federals  could  have  asked. 
The  boldest  policy  seemed  to 
him  the  best,  and  he  resolved 
011  a  daring  step.  On  Septem 
ber  17th  he  threw  forward  his 
whole  force  of  four  thousand 
men  under  Buckner  by  rail 
into  Kentucky  and  seized  Bowling  Green.  It  was  a  mere  skirmish  line  to  mask 
his  own  weakness.  But  if  he  could  maintain  it,  even  temporarily,  it  gave  him 
immense  strategic  and  political  advantages,  and,  most  of  all,  time  to  collect  or 
create  an  army.  And  then  (I  hold  in  spite  of  some  dilettante  criticism)  it  gave 
him  a  formidable  line,  with  Cumberland  Gap  and  Columbus  as  the  extremities 
and  Bowling  Green  as  the  salient. 

The  result  more  than  answered  his  expectations.  Buckner's  advance  pro 
duced  the  wildest  consternation  in  the  Federal  lines.  Even  Sherman,  writing 
thirteen  years  later,  speaks  of  a  picket  which  burned  a  bridge  thirty  miles  from 
Louisville  as  a  "  division."  As  late  as  November  10th,  1861,  he  said :  "  If  John 
ston  chooses,  he  could  march  into  Louisville  any  day."  The  effect  of  the  move 
ment  was  for  a  time  to  paralyze  the  Federal  army  and  put  it  011  the  defensive. 


FORT  ANDERSON,  PADUCAH,   IN  APRIL,  1862.      FROM  A   LITHOGRAPH. 


•^-  ,.:;r^':^  S^B^S^    **. 

^  A,--S  B"™^,^^ 

-'••wy     '  '•  ••'VWii J^V' '  ***         •fSr^r/^'  ^^^l  '\  't%t:y*'Ta*'*%    ^"'f-rj  i        '  itftttfP^       ••"'(''  ' 

.  -4$-  v..Mv'jfev-'vw  ^MLj^^&^i^^^^^^K^^^^^^^ 


CAMP    BURGESS,    BOWLING    GREEN  — THE    70TH   INDIANA  ON    DRESS    PARADE.       FROM    A    LITHOGRAPH. 

On  the  hill  are  seen  the  Confederate  fortifications  erected  by  General  Buekucr. 


ALBERT  SIDNEY  JOHNSTON  AT  SHILOH. 


545 


Alton  MAP 

KENTUCKY  AMI 

""' :  SCALE  OF 


General  Johnston  had  made  the  opportunity  required  by  the  South,  if  it 
meant  seriously  to  maintain  its  independence.  He  had  secured  time  for  prep 
aration  ;  but  it  neglected  the  chance,  and  never  recovered  it.  He  at  once 
strongly  fortified  Bowling  Green,  and  used  every  measure  to  stir  up  and  rally 
the  Kentuckians  to  his  standard.  He  brought  Hardee  with  four  thousand 
men  from  Arkansas,  and  kept  his  little  force  in  such  constant  motion  as  to 
produce  the  impression  of  a  large  army  menacing  an  attack.  Even  before 
Buckner  advanced,  General  Johnston  had  sent  to  the  Southern  governors  an 
appeal  for  arms  and  a  call  for  fifty  thousand  men.  Harris  of  Tennessee 
alone  responded  heartily,  and  the  Government  at  Richmond  seemed  unable 
to  reenforce  him  or  to  arm  the  troops  he  had.  Many  difficulties  embarrassed 
it,  and  not  half  his  men  were  armed  that  winter ;  while  up  to  the  middle  of 
November  he  received  only  three  new  regiments.  General  Johnston  realized 
the  magnitude  of  the  struggle,  but  the  people  of  the  South  only  awoke  to  it 
when  it  was  too  late.  Calamity  then  stirred  them  to  an  ineffectual  resist 
ance,  the  heroism  of  which  removed  the  reproach  of  their  early  vainglory 
and  apathy.  General  Johnston  never  was  able  to  assemble  more  than  22,000 
men  at  Bowling  Green,  to  confront  the  100,000  troops  opposed  to  him  on 
that  line. 

The  only  battle  of  note  that  occurred  that  fall  was  at  Belrnont,  opposite 
Columbus,  in  which  Polk  scored  a  victory  over  Grant.  General  Johnston 
wrote  as  follows  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  on  Christmas  Day,  from  Bowling 
Green :  "  The  position  of  General  Zollicoffer  on  the  Cumberland  holds  in 
check  the  meditated  invasion  and  hoped-for  revolt  in  East  Tennessee ;  but  I 
can  neither  order  Zollicoffer  to  join  me  here  nor  withdraw  any  more  force 
from  Columbus  without  imperiling  our  communications  toward  Richmond 


VOL.  I.     35 


546 


ALBERT  SIDNEY  JOHNSTON  AT  SHILOH. 


COL.     SPEED     8.     FR 


BATTLE    OF    LOGAN'S    CROSS    ROADS,    OR    MILL    SPRINGS    (SEE    MAP,    PAGE    388).      FROM    A     LITHOGRAPH. 

or  endangering  Tennessee  and  the  Mississippi  Valley.  This  I  have  resolved 
not  to  do,  but  have  chosen,  on  the  contrary,  to  post  my  inadequate  force 
in  such  a  manner  as  to  hold  the  enemy  in  check,  guard  the  frontier,  and 
hold  the  Barren  [River]  till  the  winter  terminates  the  campaign ;  or,  if  any 
fault  in  his  movements  is  committed,  or  his  lines  become  exposed  when 
his  force  is  developed,  to  attack  him  as  opportunity  offers."  This  sums  the 
situation. 

In  January,  1862,  General  Johnston  found  himself  confronted  by  Halleck 
in  the  West,  and  by  Buell,  who  had  succeeded  Sherman,  in  Kentucky.  With 
the  exception  of  the  army  under  Curtis  in  Missouri,  about  twelve  thousand 
strong,  the  whole  resources  of  the  North-west,  from  Pennsylvania  to  the 
plains,  were  turned  against  General  Johnston's  lines  in  Kentucky.  Halleck, 
with  armies  at  Cairo  and  Paducah,  under  Grant  and  C.  F.  Smith,  threatened 
equally  Columbus,  the  key  of  the  Mississippi  River,  and  the  water-lines 
of  the  Cumberland  and  Tennessee,  with  their  defenses,  at  Forts  Donelsoii  and 
Henry.  Buell's  right  wing  also  menaced  Donelson  and  Henry,  while  his  cen 
ter  was  directed  against  Bowling  Green,  and  his  left  was  advancing  against 
Zollicoffer  at  Mill  Springs,  on  the  Upper  Cumberland.  If  this  last-named 
position  could  be  forced,  the  way  seemed  open  to  East  Tennessee  on  the  one 
hand,  and  to  Nashville  on  the  other. 

The  campaign  opened  with  the  defeat  of  the  Confederates  under  Crittenden 
and  Zollicoffer,  January  19th,  1862,  by  General  Thomas,  at  Mill  Springs,  or 
Fishing  Creek.  The  fighting  was  forced  by  the  Confederates,  but  the  whole 
affair  was  in  disregard  of  General  Johnston's  orders.  The  loss  was  not  severe, 
but  it  ended  in  a  rout  which  left  General  Johnston's  right  flank  exposed. 


ALBERT  SIDNEY  JOHNSTON  AT  SHILOH. 


547 


There  has  been  much  discussion  as  to  who  originated  the  movement  up 
the  Tennessee  Eiver.  Grant  made  it,  and  it  made  Grant.  It  was  obvious 
enough  to  all  the  leaders  on  both  sides.  General  Johnston  wrote,  January  22d : 

"  To  suppose,  with  the  facilities  of  movement  by  water  which  the  well-filled  rivers  of  the 
Ohio,  Cumberland,  and  Tennessee  give  for  active  operations,  that  they  will  suspend  them  in 
Tennessee  and  Kentucky  during  the  winter  months  is  a  delusion.  All  the  resources  of  the 
Confederacy  are  now  needed  for  the  defense  of  Tennessee." 

Great  efforts  were  made  to  guard  against  it,  but  the  popular  fatuity  and 
apathy  prevented  adequate  preparations.  General  Polk  says  in  a  report, 
"  The  principal  difficulty  in  the  way  of  a  successful  defense  of  the  rivers 
in  question  was  the  want  of  an  adequate  force."  It  was  only  one  of  a  number 
of  possible  and  equally  fatal  movements,  which  could  not  have  been  properly 
met  and  resisted  except  by  a  larger  force  than  was  to  be  had.  General  John 
ston  could  not  reduce  the  force  at  Columbus  without  imperiling  the  Missis 
sippi  River,  and  this  was  not  even  debatable.  Nor  could  he  hazard  the  loss  of 
Nashville,  if  it  could  be  saved.  He  was  compelled,  therefore,  to  take  the  risk 
at  Forts  Henry  and  Donelson.  The  thrust  was  made  at  Henry,  and  it  fell. 

As  soon  as  General  Johnston  learned  of  the  movement  against  Fort  Henry 
he  resolved  to  fall  back  to  the  line  of  the  Cumberland,  and  make  the  defense 
of  Nashville  at  Donelson.  Buell  was  in  his  front  with  90,000  men,  and  to 
save  Nashville — Buell's  objective  point — he  had  to  fall  back  upon  it  with  part 
of  his  army.  He  kept  for  this  purpose  14,000  men,  including  his  sick, — only 
8500  effectives  in  all, — to  confront  Buell's  90,000  men,  and  concentrated  at 
Fort  Donelson  17,000  men  under  Floyd,  Pillow,  and  Buckner,  his  three  most 
experienced  generals,  to  meet  Grant,  who  had  28,000  troops,  but  was  reported 


COLONEL   SCIIOEPF'S    TROOPS    CROSSING   FISHING    CREEK    ON   THE    WAY    TO    JOIN    GENERAL    THOMAS 
AT   LOGAN'S    CROSS   ROADS,    OR   MILL    SPRINGS.      FROM     '    LITHOGRAPH. 


548 


ALBERT  SIDNEY  JOHNSTON  AT  SHILOH. 


as  having  only  12,000.  He  certainly  reserved  for  himself  the  more  difficult 
task,  the  place  of  greater  hazard,  leaving  the  chance  of  glory  to  others.  The 
proposition  that  he  should  have  left  Nashville  open  to  capture  by  Buell,  and 
should  have  taken  all  his  troops  to  Donelson,  could  not  have  been  seriously 
considered  by  any  general  of  even  moderate  military  capacity.  General 
Beauregard  alleges  that  he  urged  General  Johnston  to  concentrate  all 

his  available  forces  and 
attack  Grant  at  Fort 
Henry.  Conclusive  con 
temporary  evidence  de 
monstrates  that  General 
Beauregard's  memory  is 
at  fault.  But,  this  aside, 
no  more  fatal  plan  of 
campaign  could  have 
been  proposed.  Such 
a  concentration  was  im 
practicable  within  the 
limits  of  the  time  re 
quired  for  success.  The 
Confederates  would  have 
been  met  by  a  superior 
force  under  General 
Grant,  whose  position, 
flanked  by  the  batteries 
of  Fort  Henry,  covered 
by  gun-boats,  and  to  be 
approached  only  over 
causeways  not  then  con 
structed,  was  absolutely  impregnable.  It  requires  an  utter  disregard  of 
facts  seriously  to  consider  such  a  project.  Moreover,  this  movement  would 
have  been  an  abandonment  to  Buell  of  Nashville,  the  objective  point  of  the 
Federal  campaign.  And,  finally,  this  desperate  project,  commended  by  Gen 
eral  Beauregard,  was  exactly  what  the  Union  generals  were  striving,  hoping, 
planning,  to  compel  General  Johnston  to  do.  The  answer  to  any  criticism  as 
to  the  loss  of  the  army  at  Donelson  is  that  it  ought  not  to  have  been  lost.  That 
is  all  there  is  of  it. 

At  midnight  of  February  15th-16th  General  Johnston  received  a  telegram 
announcing  a  great  victory  at  Donelson,  and  before  daylight  information 
that  it  would  be  surrendered.  His  last  troops  were  then  arriving  at  Nashville 
from  Bowling  Green.  His  first  words  were :  "I  must  save  this  army."  He 
at  once  determined  to  abandon  the  line  of  the  Cumberland,  and  concentrate 
all  available  forces  at  Corinth,  Mississippi,  for  a  renewed  struggle.  He  had 
indicated  this  movement  as  a  probable  event  to  several  distinguished  officers 
some  time  previous ;  it  was  now  to  be  carried  into  effect.  He  had  remain 
ing  only  his  little  army  from  Bowling  Green,  together  with  the  fragments  of 


CONFEDERATE    TYPES    OF    1862. 


ALBERT  SIDNEY  JOHNSTON  AT  SHILOH.  549 

Crittenden's  army,  and  the  fugitives  from  Donelson.  These  he  reorganized 
at  Murfreesboro'  within  a  week.  He  saved  the  most  of  his  valuable  stores 
and  munitions,  which  fully  absorbed  his  railroad  transportation  to  Stevenson, 
Alabama,  and  moved  his  men  over  the  mud  roads  to  Corinth,  Mississippi, 
by  way  of  Decatur,  in  a  wet  and  stormy  season.  Nevertheless,  he  assembled 
his  army  of  23,000 — about  16,000  effectives  —  at  Corinth,  on  the  25th  day  of 
March,  full  of  enthusiasm  and  the  spirit  of  combat.  In  the  meantime  the 
Confederate  Government  lent  him  all  the  aid  in  its  power,  reenforcing  him 
with  an  army  ten  thousand  strong,  from  the  Southern  coast,  under  General 
Braxton  Bragg,  who  had  been  in  command  at  Pensacola  [see  note,  page  32], 
and  with  such  arms  as  could  be  procured. 

General  Beauregard  has  claimed  that  he  raised,  concentrated,  and  organ 
ized  the  army  which  fought  at  Shiloh ;  that  he  persuaded  General  Johnston 
to  turn  aside  from  a  retreat  toward  Stevenson  and  join  him  at  Corinth,  and 
substituted  an  offensive  campaign  for  a  defensive  one  projected  by  General 
Johnston ;  and  that  he  likewise  planned  the  battle  of  Shiloh,  induced  Gen 
eral  Johnston  to  fight  it,  and  executed  all  the  general  movements  on  the  field, 
and  that  General  Johnston  was  merely  the  ostensible  commander.  I  have 
elsewhere  fully  confuted  each  of  these  absurd  pretenses;  and  as  this  rapid 
survey  is  historical,  not  controversial,  the  space  at  my  disposal  does  not  per 
mit  me  to  argue  here  the  points  involved ;  I  shall,  therefore,  merely  state  the 
facts,  which  rest  upon  unimpeachable  contemporary  evidence.  The  final 
verdict  I  am  satisfied  to  leave  to  the  soldiers  of  both  armies  who  fought  there, 
to  the  careful  analysis  of  impartial  military  criticism,  or  to  the  ultimate  arbit 
rament  of  history. 

When  the  capture  of  Fort  Henry  separated  Tennessee  into  two  distinct 
theaters  of  war,  General  Johnston  assigned  the  district  west  of  the  Ten 
nessee  Eiver  to  General  Beauregard,  who  had  been  sent  to  him  for  duty. 
This  officer  had  suddenly  acquired  a  high  reputation  at  the  battle  of  Bull 
Euri,  and  General  Johnston  naturally  intrusted  him  with  a  large  discre 
tion.  He  sent  him  with  instructions  to  concentrate  all  available  forces 
near  Corinth,  a  movement  previously  begun.  His  own  plan  was  to  defend 
Columbus  to  the  last  extremity  with  a  reduced  garrison,  and  withdraw 
Polk  and  his  army  for  active  movements.  Beauregard  made  the  mistake, 
however,  of  evacuating  Columbus,  and  making  his  defense  of  the  Missis 
sippi  River  at  Island  Number  Ten,  which  proved  untenable  and  soon  sur 
rendered  with  a  garrison  of  6000  or  7000  men.  He  was  ill  most  of  the  time 
and  intrusted  the  actual  command  to  Bragg,  but  did  what  he  could  from 
his  sick-bed. 

Besides  the  reinforcements  brought  by  Bragg,  General  Beauregard  found 
in  the  western  district  17,500  effectives  under  Polk,  and  at  or  near  Corinth 
3000  men  under  Pope  Walker  and  Chalmers,  and  5000  under  Ruggles  sent 
from  Louisiana  by  Lovell.  He  made  eloquent  appeals,  which  brought  him 
'several  regiments  more.  Thus  he  had  nearly  40,000  men  collected  for  him, 
10,000  of  whom  he  disposed  in  river  defenses,  and  the  remainder  to  pro 
tect  the  railroads  from  Grant's  force  which  was  concentrating  at  Pittsburg 


550  ALBERT  SIDNEY  JOHNSTON  AT  SHILOH. 

Landing.  General  Johnston's  arrival  increased  the  force  at  Corinth  to  about 
50,000  men,  about  40,000  of  whom  were  effectives. 

After  the  surrender  at  Donelson,  the  South,  but  especially  the  important 
State  of  Tennessee,  was  in  a  delirium  of  rage  and  terror.  As  the  retreat  from 
Nashville  to  the  Tennessee  River  went  on,  the  popular  fury  rose  to  a  storm 
everywhere.  The  people  who  had  refused  to  listen  to  his  warnings,  or  answer 
his  appeals  for  aid,  now  denounced  General  Johnston  as  an  idiot,  coward,  and 
traitor.  Demagogues  joined  in  the  wild  hunt  for  a  victim,  and  depiitations 
waited  on  President  Davis  to  demand  his  removal.  To  such  a  committee  of 
congressmen  he  replied:  "If  Sidney  Johnston  is  not  a  general,  I  have  none." 
General  Johnston  was  too  calm,  too  just,  and  too  magnanimous  to  misappre 
hend  so  natural  a  manifestation.  His  whole  life  had  been  a  training  for  this 
occasion.  To  encounter  suddenly  and  endure  calmly  the  obloquy  of  a  whole 
nation  is,  to  any  man,  a  great  burden.  To  do  this  with  a  serenity  that  shall 
not  only  not  falter  in  duty,  but  restore  confidence  and  organize  victory,  is 
conclusive  proof  of  greatness  of  soul. 

But  while  the  storm  of  execration  raged  around  him,  the  men  who  came 
into  immediate  contact  with  General  Johnston  never  for  a  moment  doubted 
his  ability  to  perform  all  that  was  possible  to  man  in  the  circumstances. 
To  a  friend  who  urged  him  to  publish  an  explanation  of  his  course  he  replied: 
"I  cannot  correspond  with  the  people.  What  the  people  want  is  a  battle 
and  a  victory.  That  is  the  best  explanation  I  can  make.  I  require  no  vin 
dication.  I  trust  that  to  the  future."  J) 

General  Johnston's  plan  of  campaign  may  be  summed  up  in  a  phrase.  It 
was  to  concentrate  at  Corinth  and  interpose  his  whole  force  in  front  of  the 
great  bend  of  the  Tennessee,  the  natural  base  of  the  Federal  army :  this  effected, 
to  crush  Grant  in  battle  before  the  arrival  of  Buell.  This  meant  immediate 
and  decisive  action.  The  army  he  had  brought  from  Nashville  was  ready  for 
the  contest,  but  Generals  Beauregard  and  Bragg  represented  to  him  that  the 
troops  collected  by  them  were  unable  to  move  without  thorough  reorganiza 
tion.  Ten  days  were  consumed  in  this  work  of  reorganization.  Moments 
were  precious,  but  there  was  the  hope  of  reenforcement  by  Van  Dorn's  army, 
which  might  arrive  before  Buell  joined  Grant,  and  which  did  arrive  only  a 
day  or  two  later.  [See  page  277.]  But  Buell's  movements  were  closely 
watched,  and,  hearing  of  his  approach  on  the  2d  of  April,  General  Johnston 
resolved  to  delay  no  longer,  but  to  strike  at  once  a  decisive  blow. 

In  the  reorganization  of  the  army,  he  assigned  General  Bragg  as  chief  of 
staff,  with  command  of  a  corps.  To  Beauregard  he  tendered  the  immediate 
command  of  the  army  in  the  impending  battle.  Though  General  Beauregard 
declined  the  offer,  he  evidently  misinterpreted  its  spirit  and  intention.  He 
imagined  it  was  a  confession  of  inadequacy  for  the  duty,  in  which  case  he 
ought  to  have  accepted  it.  The  truth  was  that,  coming  into  this  district 
which  he  had  assigned  to  Beauregard,  Johnston  felt  disinclined  to  deprive 
him  of  any  reputation  he  might  acquire  from  a  victory.  He  had  not  the 

j)  For  part  of  his  much-quoted  letter  of  March  18th  to  President  Davis,  written  at  Decatur,  in 
regard  to  the  loss  of  Donelson,  see  foot-note,  page  399.—  EDITORS. 


ALBERT  SIDNEY  JOHNSTON  AT  SHILOH. 


slightest  idea, 
however,  of  ab 
dicating  the 
supreme  com 
mand,  and  said 
to  friends  who 
remonstrated 
with  him :  "I 
will  be  there  to 


MAP 

used  by  the 

CONFEDERATE  GENERALS 
AT  SIIILOH 

Scale  of  JIHes 


.    JOHNSTON.          (D.    APPLETON    *    CO.) 


right."  He  was 
willing  to  yield 
to  another  the 
glory,  if  thereby 
anything  was 
added  to  the 
chance  of  vic 
tory.  The  offer 
was  rather  quix 
otic,  but  char 
acteristic  ;  he 

had  done  the  same  thing  in  his  victories  on  the  Neches  in  1840.  He  then  gave 
General  Beauregard  the  position  of  second  in  command,  without  special  assign 
ment.  Indeed,  as  is  shown  by  his  own  frequent  statements,  General  Beauregard 
was,  from  severe  and  protracted  ill-health,  inadequate  to  anymore  serious  duty. 

General  Grant's  army  had  been  moved  up  the  Tennessee  River  by  boat,  and 
had  taken  position  on  its  left  bank  at  Pittsburg  Landing.  It  had  been  landed 
by  divisions,  and  Bragg  had  proposed  to  Beauregard  to  attack  Grant  before 
he  assembled  his  whole  force.  Beauregard  forbade  this,  intending  to  await 
events,  and  attack  him  away  from  his  base  if  possible,  though  he  now  insists 
that  his  plan  of  campaign  was  offensive.  Grant's  first  object  was  to  destroy 
the  railroads  which  centered  at  Corinth,  and,  indeed,  to  capture  that  place  if 
he  could.  But  his  advance  was  only  a  part  of  a  grand  plan  for  a  combined 
movement  of  his  own  and  Buell's  army.  With  Pittsburg  Landing  as  a  base, 
this  army  was  to  occupy  North  Mississippi  and  Alabama,  command  the  entire 
railroad  system  of  that  section,  and  take  Memphis  in  the  rear,  while  Halleck 
forced  his  way  down  the  Mississippi  Eiver.  General  Johnston  divined 
the  movement  before  it  was  begun,  and  was  there  to  frustrate  it.  Indeed, 
Grant's  army  was  assembled  at  Pittsburg  Landing  only  one  week  before 
Johnston  completed  the  concentration. 

Grant  has  been  severely  criticised  for  placing  his  army  with  the  river  at  its 
back.  But  he  was  there  to  take  the  initiative.  He  had  the  larger  army, 
under  cover,  too,  of  his  gun-boats ;  he  was  expecting  Buell  daily ;  and  the 
ground  was  admirable  for  defense.  Indeed,  his  position  was  a  natural  strong 
hold.  Flanked  by  Owl  and  Lick  creeks,  with  their  marshy  margins,  and  with 
his  front  protected  by  a  swampy  valley,  he  occupied  a  quadrilateral  of  great 


552  ALBERT  SIDNEY  JOHNSTON  AT  SHILOH. 

strength.  His  troops  were  stationed  on  wooded  heights,  generally  screened 
by  heavy  undergrowth  and  approached  across  boggy  ravines  or  open  fields. 
Each  camp  was  a  fortress  in  itself,  and  the  line  of  retreat  afforded  at  each 
step  some  like  point  to  rally  on.  He  did  not  fortify  his  camps,  it  is  true ;  but 
he  was  not  there  for  defense,  but  for  attack.  It  must  be  admitted  that  he 
undervalued  his  enemy's  daring  and  celerity ;  but  he  was  a  young  general, 
exultant  in  his  overwhelming  victory  at  Donelson ;  and  his  generals  and  army 
shared  his  sense  of  security.  He  had  an  army  of  58,000  men  in  camp,  nearly 
50,000  of  whom  were  effectives.  Buell  was  near  at  hand  with  37,000  more, 
and  Mitchel  was  moving  against  the  railroad  at  Florence,  Alabama,  not  far 
distant,  with  an  additional  force  of  18,000.  In  all  Grant  had  105,000  effectives. 
Opposed  to  him  were  50,000  Confederate  troops,  less  than  40,000  of  whom  were 
available  for  combat.  General  Johnston's  aggregate  was  60,000  men,  opposed 
to  about  200,000  Federals  in  all,  but  the  effective  forces  were  as  above.  As 
these  figures  are  disputed  I  invite  a  rigid  examination  of  the  Official  Kecords.\ 

Such  was  the  position  on  April  2d,  when  General  Johnston,  learning  that 
Buell  was  rapidly  approaching,  resolved  to  advance  next  day  and  attack 
Grant  before  his  arrival.  His  general  plan  was  very  simple  in  outline.  It 
seems  to  have  been  to  march  out  and  attack  the  Federals  by  columns  of 
corps,  to  make  the  battle  a  decisive  test,  and  to  crush  Grant  utterly  or  lose 
all  in  the  attempt ;  this  effected,  to  contend  with  Buell  for  the  possession  of 
Tennessee,  Kentucky,  and  possibly  the  North-west. 

General  Beauregard  also,  it  seems,  had  a  plan,  which,  however,  must  have 
differed  widely  from  that  of  General  Johnston,  as  it  was  evidently  tentative  in 
its  nature, — "  a  reconnoissance  in  force,"  with  a  retreat  on  Corinth  as  one  of  its 
features, —  and  which  admitted  the  possibility  of  finishing  on  Monday  a  battle 
which  had  to  be  won  on  Sunday  or  never.  This  was  not  in  any  sense  General 
Johnston's  plan,  and  much  useless  discussion  has  arisen  from  a  confusion  of 
the  two.  But,  as  General  Johnston  intended  to  fight,  and  did  fight,  on  his 
own  plan  as  long  as  he  lived,  the  battle  may  be  considered  his  until  Beau- 
regard's  order  of  retreat,  about  5  o'clock  Sunday  evening,  substituted  "  the 
reconnoissance  in  force"  in  place  of  the  decisive  test  of  victory  or  defeat. 

General  Beauregard  had  been  on  the  ground  some  six  weeks,  and  his  pres 
tige  as  an  engineer  and  a  victor  of  Bull  Run  warranted  General  Johnston 
in  committing  to  him  the  elaboration  of  the  details  of  the  march  and  order  of 
battle.  Unfortunately  he  changed  what  seems  evidently  General  Johnston's 
original  purpose  of  an  assault  by  columns  of  corps  into  an  array  in  three  paral 
lel  lines  of  battle,  which  produced  extreme  confusion  when  the  second  arid  third 
lines  advanced  to  support  the  first  and  intermingled  with  it.  Johnston's 
original  plan  is  summed  up  in  the  following  dispatch  to  President  Davis: 

"  CORINTH,  April  3d,  1862.  General  Buell  in  motion  thirty  thousand  strong,  rapidly  from 
Columbia  by  Clifton  to  Savannah.  Mitchel  behind  him  with  ten  thousand.  Confederate  forces — 
forty  thousand  —  ordered  forward  to  offer  battle  near  Pittsburg.  Division  from  Bethel,  main 

\  By  careful  and  thorough  examination  of  the  greatly  overestimates  the  Union  strength.    Before 

Official  Records  we  have  not  been  able  to  verify  January,  1863  (when  a  new  form  was  adopted), 

Colonel  Johnston's  estimates  of  forces.      In   im-  the   Union  returns  did  not  show  the  number  of 

portant  particulars  the  Records  are  not  explicit,  effectives  separate  from  the  "  present  for  duty,"  a 

and  in  places  they  indicate  that  Colonel  Johnston  term  that  included  the  non-combatants. — EDITORS. 


ALBERT  SIDNEY  JOHNSTON  AT  SHILOH. 


body  from  Corinth,  reserve  from  Burnsville,  converging  to-morrow  near  Monterey  on  Pittsburg. 
Beauregard  second  in  command,  Polk  the  left',  Bragg  the  center,  Hardee  the  right  wing,  Breck- 
inridge  the  reserve.  Hope  engagement  before  Buell  can  form  junction.'' 

In  the  original  dispatch,  the  words  italicised  are  in  General  Johnston's  own 
handwriting.  The  words,  u  the  left,"  "  the  center,"  "  the  right  wing,"  u  the 
reserve,"  clearly  point  to  a  formation  by  columns  of  corps.  Moreover,  owing 
to  ignorance  of  the  country,  the  march  was  so  ordered  that  the  corps  inter 
fered  with  each  other  in  their  advance, 
and  by  a  detention  the  battle  was  delayed 
an  entire  day,  an  almost  fatal  loss  of  tune. 

If  it  be  asked  why  General  Johnston  ac 
cepted  and  issued  an  order  of  march  and 
battle  which  he  had  not  contemplated,  the 
reply  is  that  it  had  been  prepared  by  his 
second  in  command,  who  was  presuma 
bly  more  familiar  with  the  country  and 
the  roads  than  himself,  and  hence  with 
the  necessities  of  the  case.  But  the  over 
ruling  reason  was  the  question  of  time. 
Buell  was  at  hand,  and  Johnston's  plan 
was  not  to  manoeuvre,  but  to  attack ;  and 
any  plan  which  put  him.  front  to  front 
with  Grant  was  better  than  the  best  two 
days  later.  Besides,  the  written  orders 
were  not  shown  him  until  the  morning  of 
the  4th,  after  he  had  mounted  to  start  to  the  front,  and  when  his  advance  was 
near  its  position  on  the  field.  It  was  then  obviously  too  late  to  apply  a  remedy. 

General  Johnston  did  not  undervalue  the  importance  of  details.  Xo  man 
regarded  more  closely  all  the  details  subsidiary  to  a  great  result  than  he. 
But,  important  as  were  the  preliminaries, —  the  maps,  the  roads,  the  methods 
of  putting  his  army  face  to  face  with  the  enemy,  which  General  Johnston 
had  to  take  on  trust, —  he  knew  that  the  chief  strategy  of  the  battle  was  in 
the  decision  to  fight.  Once  in  the  presence  of  the  enemy,  he  knew  that  the 
result  would  depend  on  the  way  inichlcli  Ids  troops  were  handled.  This  was 
his  part  of  the  work,  and  he  felt  full  confidence  in  his  own  ability  to  carry  it 
out  successfully.  The  order  was  issued,  as  elaborated  by  Beauregard,  and 
the  army  was  moved  against  the  enemy,  April  3d,  1862.  Said  General  Bragg : 

"  The  details  of  that  plan,  arranged  after  General  Sidney  Johnston  decided  on  delivering 
battle,  and  had  given  his  instructions,  were  made  up  and  published  to  the  army  in  full  from  the 
adjutant-general's  office.  My  first  knowledge  of  them  was  derived  from  this  general  order,  the 
authorship  of  which  has  been  claimed  by  General  Beauregard.  .  .  .  In  this  case,  as  I  under 
stood  then,  and  still  believe,  Johnston  gave  verbal  instructions  for  the  general  movement.  .  .  . 
Over  his  [Colonel  Jordan,  the  adjutant -general's]  signature,  they  reached  the  army.  The  general 
plan  (Genei'al  Johnston's)  was  admirable —  the  elaboration  simply  ej:ecrable. 

"  When  the  time  arrived  for  execution,  you  know  well  what  occurred.  In  spite  of  opposition 
and  prediction  of  failure.  Johnston  firmly  and  decidedly  ordered  and  led  the  attack  in  the  execu 
tion  of  his  general  plan,  and,  notwithstanding  the  faulty  arrangement  of  troops,  was  eminently 
successful  up  to  the  moment  of  his  fall.  TJie  victory  was  icon.  How  it  was  lost,  the  official 
reports  will  show,  and  history  has  recorded.''  [Bragg  to  W.  P.  Johnston,  December  16th.  1874.] 


LIECTENAXT-GEXERAL    W.   J.    HAHDEE,   C.   8.    A. 
FROM    A    PHOTOGRAPH. 


554  ALBERT  SIDNEY  JOHNSTON  AT  SHILOH. 

The  President  of  the  Confederate  States  has  repeatedly  and  positively 
asserted  that  he  received  from  General  Johnston  a  dispatch  which  gave  the 
plan  of  battle,  exactly  as  it  was  fought,  and  that  this  dispatch  was  not  that 
of  April  3d  already  quoted,  but  was  lost.  General  Beauregard  and  his  staff- 
officer,  Colonel  Jordan,  have  taken  issue  with  Mr.  Davis  on  this  point, 
vehemently  insisting  that  no  such  dispatch  was,  or  could  have  been,  sent. 
Their  denial  rests  merely  upon  a  priori  objections  to  the  probability  of  Mr. 
Davis's  assertion.  On  the  other  hand,  Mr.  Davis's  clear  and  positive  statement 
made  many  years  ago,  and  often  repeated  since,  is  confirmed  by  contem 
porary  documentary  evidence.  On  April  5th  he  sent  a  telegram  to  General 
Johnston,  in  which  he  acknowledges  his  telegram  of  "  yesterday,"  April 
4th.  This  telegram  of  "yesterday"  was  plainly  the  "lost  dispatch,"  for 
"  yesterday  "  was  April  4th,  not  April  3d.  If,  as  I  have  sought  to  show,  impor 
tant  changes  had  occurred  in  the  plan  of  battle,  nothing  could  be  more 
natural  and  proper  for  the  commanding  general  than  instantly  to  inform  his 
friend  and  commander-in-chief ;  and  even  if  no  change  had  occurred,  still  it 
would  have  been  right  for  him  to  keep  his  chief  fully  advised  of  the  progress 
of  the  movement.  I  have  always  said  that  General  Johnston's  original  plan 
was  probably  to  attack  by  columns  of  corps,  as  indicated  in  his  telegram  of 
April  3d.  Special  Orders,  No.  8  directed  an  attack  in  three  lines  parallel  to 
the  enemy's  front.  Jordan  tells  us  General  Johnston  did  not  see  these  orders 
as  published  until  the  morning  of  the  4th.  What  more  natural  than  that  he 
should  then  communicate  the  changes  made,  and  add  his  purpose  to  turn  the 
enemy's  left,  not  mentioned  in  the  telegram  of  April  3d.  A  curious  corrobora- 
tion,  hitherto  unobserved,  occurs  in  Mr.  Davis's  telegram  of  April  5th,  that  it 
was  in  reply  to  a  lost  dispatch.  On  April  2d  General  Beauregard  "wrote  to 
General  Johnston,  saying  that  he  had  telegraphed  to  the  War  Depart 
ment  for  generals,  and  adding,  "  Would  it  not  be  well  for  you  to  telegraph 
also  for  the  generals  you  may  require  f "  We  have  no  record  of  any  such 
request  made  upon  this  suggestion,  but  Mr.  Davis,  in  his  telegram  of  April 
5th,  says :  "  Brigadiers  have  been  recently  appointed  ;  among  them,  Bowen. 
Do  you  require  others  ?  "  This  seems  to  be  a  response  to  a  request ;  Boweii 
was  commanding  a  brigade  in  General  Johnston's  army.  But  as  there  was 
no  request  in  General  Johnston's  telegram  of  April  3d,  it  is  reasonable  to 
suppose  that  it  was  contained  in  one  of  the  4th,  which  has  been  lost.  But  I 
am  giving  an  importance  to  this  question  which  it  would  not  merit  except 
for  the  prominence  given  it  in  the  pages  of  "  The  Century  Magazine."  Whether 
sent  or  not,  it  is  entirely  irrelevant  to  the  main  issue.  Its  whole  importance 
consists  in  showing,  not  who  made  the  plan  of  battle,  but  that  the  plan 
having  been  given  to  his  subordinates,  General  Johnston,  so  long  as  he  lived, 
held  them  to  the  steady  and  successful  execution  of  it.  When  General 
Beauregard  succeeded  to  the  command  he  abandoned  the  vital  principle  of 
that  plan,  which  was  to  push  the  contest  to  a  final  decision  that  day,  and 
took  a  course  of  his  own,  not  embraced  or  contemplated  in  General  John 
ston's  designs  —  a  policy  of  withdrawal  and  delay  which  led  to  defeat  instead 
of  victory. 


ALBERT  SIDNEY  JOHNSTON  AT  SHILOH. 

General  Johnston  gave  orders  abqut  1  o'clock  on  the  night  of  Wednesday, 
the  2d  of  April,  for  the  advance.  But  much  time  was  spent  in  their  elabora 
tion,  and  the  troops  did  not  receive  them  from  the  adjutant-general's  office 
until  the  next  afternoon.  When  the  soldiers  learned  that  they  were  going 
out  to  fight,  their  long-restrained  ardor  burst  into  a  blaze  of  enthusiasm,  and 
they  did  all  that  was  possible  for  inexperienced  troops  in  both  marching  and 
fighting.  Some  of  the  arms  were  not  distributed  till  that  afternoon.  With 
hasty  preparations  the  movement  began,  and  Hardee's  corps  was  at  Mick 
ey's,  within  four  or  five  miles  of  Pittsburg,  next  morning.  But  some  of 
the  troops  did  not  move  until  the  morning  of  Saturday,  the  5th,  owing  to  a 
still  further  delay  in  the  delivery  of  orders  by  the  adjutant-general's  office, 
and  all  were  impeded  by  the  heavy  condition  of  the  roads,  through  a  dense 
forest,  and  across  sloughs  and  marshes. 

The  order  was  to  attack  at  3  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  Saturday,  the  5th ;  but 
the  troops  were  not  in  position  until  late  that  afternoon.  All  day  Friday  the 
advancing  columns  had  pushed  on  over  the  tangled,  miry  roads,  hindered  and 
embarrassed  by  a  pelting  rain.  After  midnight  a  violent  storm  broke  upon  them 
as  they  stood  under  arms  in  the  pitch  darkness,  with  no  shelter  but  the  trees. 
From  detention  by  the  rain,  ignorance  of  the  roads,  and  a  confusion  produced  by 
the  order  of  march,  some  divisions  failed  to  get  into  line,  and  the  day  was 
wasted. 

As  they  were  waiting  the  disposition  of  troops  late  Saturday  afternoon,  a 
council  of  war  occurred,  in  which  Johnston,  Beauregard,  Bragg,  Polk,  Breck- 
inridge  and  Gilrner  took  part,  which  added  greatly  to  General  Johnston's 
responsibilities,  and  the  heavy  burden  he  had  already  incurred  by  his  experi 
ment  of  concentration,  and  his  resolve  to  fight  a  pitched  battle.  The  Confed 
erate  army  was  in  full  battle  array,  within  two  miles  of  Shiloh  Church  and 
Grant's  line,  when  General  Beauregard  suddenly  proposed  that  the  army 
should  be  withdrawn  and  retreat  to  Corinth.  He  maintained  that  the  delay 
and  noise  must  have  given  the  enemy  notice,  and  that  they  would  be  found 
intrenched  "  to  their  eyes  "  and  ready  for  attack.  General  Johnston  seemed 
to  be  much  surprised  at  the  suggestion.  Polk  and  Bragg  differed  with  Beau- 
regard,  and  a  warm  discussion  ensued  between  him  and  Polk,  in  which 
General  Johnston  took  little  part,  but  closed  it  with  the  simple  remark, 
"  Gentlemen,  we  shall  attack  at  daylight  to-morrow,"  which  he  uttered  with 
great  decision.  Turning  to  one  of  his  staff-officers,  he  said,  "  I  would  fight 
them  if  they  were  a  million.  They  can  present  no  greater  front  between 
these  two  creeks  than  we  can,  and  the  more  men  they  crowd  in  there,  the 
worse  we  can  make  it  for  them.  Polk  is  a  true  soldier  and  a  friend." 

General  Bragg,  in  a  monograph  prepared  for  the  use  of  the  writer,  says : 
"The  meeting  then  dispersed  upon  an  invitation  of  the  commanding 
general  to  meet  at  his  tent  that  evening.  At  that  meeting  a  further  dis 
cussion  elicited  the  same  views,  and  the  same  firm,  decided  determina 
tion.  The  next  morning,  about  dawn  of  day,  the  6th,  as  the  troops 
were  being  put  in  motion,  several  generals  again  met  at  the  camp-fire 
of  the  general-in-chief.  The  discussion  was  renewed,  General  Beauregard 


556 


ALBERT  SIDNEY  JOHNSTON  AT  SHILOH. 


again  expressing  his  dissent,  when,  rapid  firing  in  front  indicating  that  the 
attack  had  commenced,  General  Johnston  closed  the  discussion  by  remark 
ing,  '  The  battle  has  opened,  gentlemen ;  it  is  too  late  to  change  our  disposi 
tions.'  He  proposed  to  move  to  the  front,  and  his  subordinates  promptly 
joined  their  respective  commands,  inspired  by  his  coolness,  confidence, 

and  determina 
tion.  Few  men 
have  equaled 
him  in  the  pos 
session  and  dis 
play  at  the 
proper  time  of 
these  great  qual 
ities  of  the  sol 
dier." 

It  will  read 
ily  be  seen  how 
much  General 
Beauregard's  ur 
gent  opposition 
to  fighting  must 
have  added  to 
the  weight  of 
General  John 
ston's  responsi 
bility.  Beaure- 


gard  was  in  the 
full  tide  of  pop 
ular  favor,  while 
Johnston  was 
laboring  under 
the  load  of  pub 
lic  obloquy  and 
odium.  Nothing 
short  of  com 
plete  and  overwhelming  victory  would  vindicate  him  in  differing  with  so 
famous  a  general.  A  reverse,  even  a  merely  partial  success,  would  leave 
him  under  condemnation.  Nevertheless,  without  a  moment's  hesitation,  he 
resolved  to  fight. 

The  sun  set  on  Saturday  evening  in  a  cloudless  sky,  and  night  fell  calm, 
clear,  and  beautiful.  Long  before  dawn  the  forest  was  alive  with  silent  prep 
arations  for  the  ensuing  contest,  and  day  broke  upon  a  scene  so  fair  that  it 
left  its  memory  on  thousands  of  hearts.  The  sky  was  clear  overhead,  the  air 
fresh,  and  when  the  sun  rose  in  full  splendor,  the  advancing  host  passed  the 
word  from  lip  to  lip  that  it  was  the  "  sun  of  Austeiiitz." 

General  Johnston,   usually   so  self-contained,  felt  the  inspiration  of  the 


BATTLE  OF 

SHILOH 

Part  I. 


ALBERT  SIDNEY  JOHNSTON  AT  SHILOH.  557 

scene,  and  welcomed  with  exultant  joy  the  long-desired  day.  His  presence 
inspired  all  who  came  near  him.  His  sentences,  sharp,  terse,  and  clear,  had 
the  ring  of  victory  in  them.  Turning  to  his  staff,  as  he  mounted,  he 
exclaimed :  "  To-night  we  will  water  our  horses  in  the  Tennessee  River."  It 
was  thus  that  he  formulated  his  plan  of  battle ;  it  must  not  stop  short  of  entire 
victory.  To  Randall  L.  Gibson,  who  was  commanding  a  Louisiana  brigade, 
he  said :  "  I  hope  you  may  get  through  safely  to-day,  but  ice  must  win  a 
victory?  To  Colonel  John  S.  Marmaduke,  who  had  served  under  him  in 
Utah,  he  said,  placing  his  hand  on  his  shoulder :  "  My  son,  we  must  this  day 
conquer  or  perish."  To  the  ambitious  Hindman,  who  had  been  in  the  van 
guard  from  the  beginning,  he  said :  "  You  have  earned  your  spurs  as  a 
major-general.  Let  this  day's  work  win  them."  With  such  words,  as  he 
rode  from  point  to  point,  he  raised  a  spirit  in  that  host  which  swept  away 
the  serried  lines  of  the  conquerors  of  Donelson.  Friend  and  foe  alike  testify 
to  the  enthusiastic  courage  and  ardor  of  the  Southern  soldiers  that  day. 

General  Johnston's  strategy  was  completed.  He  was  face  to  face  with  his 
foe,  and  that  foe  all  unaware  of  his  coming.  His  front  line,  composed  of  the 
Third  Corps  and  Gladden's  brigade,  was  under  Hardee,  and  extended  from 
Owl  Creek  to  Lick  Creek,  more  than  three  miles.  (See  maps.)  Hindman's 
division  of  two  brigades  occupied  the  center,  Cleburne's  brigade  had  the  left, 
and  Gladden's  the  right  wing — an  effective  total  in  the  front  line  of  9024.  The 
second  line  was  commanded  by  Bragg.  He  had  two  divisions  :  Withers's,  of 
two  brigades,  on  the  right,  and  Ruggles's,  of  three  brigades,  on  the  left.  The 
brigades  were,  in  order  from  right  to  left,  as  follows :  Chalmers,  Jackson, 
Gibson,  Anderson,  Pond.  This  second  line  was  10,731  strong.  The  third  line, 
or  reserve,  was  composed  of  the  First  Corps,  under  Polk,  and  three  brigades 
under  Breckinridge.  Polk's  command  was  massed  in  columns  of  brigades 
on  the  Bark  road  near  Mickey's,  and  Breckinridge's  on  the  road  from  Mon 
terey  toward  the  same  point.  Polk  was  to  advance  on  the  left  of  the  Bark 
road,  at  an  interval  of  about  eight  hundred  paces  from  Bragg' s  line ;  and 
Breckinridge,  to  the  right  of  that  road,  was  to  give  support  wherever  it 
should  become  necessary.  Polk's  corps,  9136  strong  in  infantry  and  artillery, 
was  composed  of  two  divisions  :  Cheatham's  on  the  left,  made  up  of  Bushrod 
R.  Johnson's  and  Stephens's  brigades,  and  Clark's  on  his  right,  formed  of 
A.  P.  Stewart's  and  Russell's  brigades.  It  followed  Bragg's  line  at  a  distance 
of  about  eight  hundred  yards.  Breckinridge's  reserve  was  composed  of  Tra- 
bue's,  Bowen's,  and  Statham's  brigades,  with  a  total,  infantry  and  artillery,  of 
6439.  The  cavalry,  about  4300  strong,  guarded  the  flanks  or  was  detached  on 
outpost  duty ;  but,  both  from  the  newness  and  imperfection  of  their  organiza 
tion,  equipment,  and  drill,  and  from  the  rough  and  wooded  character  of  the 
ground,  they  could  do  little  service  that  day.  The  effectives  of  all  arms  that 
marched  out  to  battle  were  about  39,630,  or,  exclusive  of  cavalry,  35,330. 

The  Federal  army  numbered  present  49,232,  and  present  for  duty  41,543. 
But  at  Crump's  Landing,  five  or  six  miles  distant,  was  General  Lew  Wallace's 
division  with  8820  present,  and  7771  men  present  for  duty.  [See  page  538.] 
General  Nelson's  division  of  BuelTs  arniv  had  arrived  at  Savannah  on  Satur- 


558  ALBERT  SIDNEY  JOHNSTON  AT  SHILOH. 

day  morning,  and  was  now  about  five  miles  distant ;  Crittenden's  division  also 
had  arrived  on  the  morning  of  the  6th.  So  that  Grant,  with  these  three 
divisions,  may  be  considered  as  having  about  22,000  men  in  immediate  reserve, 
without  counting  the  remainder  of  Buell's  army,  which  was  near  by.  ,1 

As  General  Johnston  and  his  staff  were  taking  their  coffee,  the  first  gun  of 
the  battle  sounded.  "  Note  the  hour,  if  you  please,  gentlemen,"  said  General 
Johnston.  It  was  fourteen  minutes  past  5.  They  immediately  mounted  and 
galloped  to  the  front. 

Some  skirmishing  on  Friday  between  the  Confederate  cavalry  and  the 
Federal  outposts,  in  which  a  few  men  were  killed,  wounded,  and  captured  on 
both  sides,  had  aroused  the  vigilance  of  the  Northern  commanders  to  some 
extent.  Sherman  reported  on  the  5th  to  Grant  that  two  regiments  of  infantry 
and  one  of  cavalry  were  in  his  front,  and  added :  "I  have  no  doubt  that 
nothing  will  occur  to-day  more  than  some  picket-firing.  ...  I  do  not 
apprehend  anything  like  an  attack  on  our  position."  In  his  "  Memoirs  "  he 
says :  "  I  did  not  believe  they  designed  anything  but  a  strong  demonstration." 
He  said  to  Major  Bicker  that  an  advance  of  Beauregard's  army  "could  not  be 
possible.  Beauregard  was  not  such  a  fool  as  to  leave  his  base  of  operations  and 
attack  us  in  ours, —  mere  reconnaissance  in  force."  This  shows  a  curious 
coincidence  with  the  actual  state  of  General  Beauregard's  mind  on  that  day. 
And  Grant  telegraphed  Halleck  on  Saturday  night :  "  The  main  force  of  the 
enemy  is  at  Corinth.  .  .  .  One  division  of  Buell's  column  arrived  yester 
day.  .  -.  .  I  have  scarcely  the  faintest  idea  of  an  attack  (general  one) 
being  made  upon  us." 

Nevertheless,  some  apprehension  was  felt  among  the  officers  and  men  of  the 
Federal  army,  and  General  Prentiss  had  thrown  forward  Colonel  Moore,  with 
the  21st  Missouri  regiment,  on  the  Corinth  road.  Moore,  feeling  his  way 
cautiously,  encountered  Hardee's  skirmish-line  under  Major  Hardcastle,  and, 
thinking  it  an  outpost,  assailed  it  vigorously.  Thus  really  the  Federals 
began  the  fight.  The  struggle  was  brief,  but  spirited.  The  8th  and  9th 
Arkansas  came  up.  Moore  fell  wounded.  The  Missourians  gave  way,  and 
Shaver's  brigade  pursued  them.  Hindman's  whole  division  moved  on,  follow 
ing  the  ridge  and  drifting  to  the  right,  and  drove  in  the  grand  guards  and 
outposts  until  they  struck  Prentiss's  camps.  Into  these  they  burst,  over 
throwing  all  before  them. 

To  appreciate  the  suddenness  and  violence  of  the  blow,  one  must  read  the 
testimony  of  eye-witnesses.  General  Bragg  says,  in  a  sketch  of  Shiloh  made 
for  the  writer :  "  Contrary  to  the  views  of  such  as  urged  an  abandonment  of 
the  attack,  the  enemy  was  found  utterly  unprepared,  many  being  surprised 
and  captured  in  their  tents,  and  others,  though  on  the  outside,  in  costumes 
better  fitted  to  the  bedchamber  than  to  the  battle-field."  General  Preston  says  : 
"  General  Johnston  then  went  to  the  camp  assailed,  which  was  carried  between 
7  and  8  o'clock.  The  enemy  were  evidently  surprised.  The  breakfasts  were 

J  General  Grant  takes  no  account  of  these  in  his  narratives  of  the  battle,  and  talks  as  though  he 
were  outnumbered  instead  of  outgeneraled.  It  was  his  business  to  get  these  troops  there  in  time, 
especially  if  he  was  not  surprised. — W.  P.  J. 


ALBERT  SIDNEY  JOHNSTON  AT  SHILOH.  559 

on  the  mess  tables,  the  baggage  unpacked,  the  knapsacks,  stores,  colors,  and 
ammunition  abandoned." 

The  essential  feature  of  General  Johnston's  strategy  had  been  to  get  at  his 
enemy  as  quickly  as  possible,  and  in  as  good  order.  In  this  he  had  succeeded. 
His  plan  of  battle  was  as  simple  as  his  strategy.  It  had  been  made  known  in 
his  order  of  battle,  and  was  thoroughly  understood  by  every  brigade  com 
mander.  The  orders  of  the  3d  of  April  were,  that  "  every  effort  should  be 
made  to  turn  the  left  flank  of  the  enemy,  so  as  to  cut  off  his  line  of  retreat  to 
the  Tennessee  River  and  throw  him  back  on  Owl  Creek,  -where  he  ivill  be  obliged 
to  surrender."  It  is  seen  that,  from  the  first,  these  orders  were  carried  out  in 
letter  and  spirit ;  and,  so  long  as  General  Johnston  lived,  the  success  of  this 
movement  was  complete.  The  battle  was  fought  precisely  as  It  was  planned. 
The  first,  and  almost  only,  censure  of  this  plan  was  made  by  Colonel  Jordan, 
confidential  adviser  and  historian  of  General  Beauregard,  who  now  claims 
to  have  made  this  plan.  The  instructions  delivered  to  General  Johnston's 
subordinates  on  the  previous  day  were  found  sufficient  for  their  conduct 
on  the  battle-field.  But,  to  accomplish  this,  his  own  personal  presence  and 
inspiration  and  direction  were  often  necessary  with  these  enthusiastic  but 
raw  troops.  He  had  personal  conference  on  the  field  with  most  of  his  gen 
erals,  and  led  several  brigades  into  battle.  The  criticism  upon  this  conduct, 
that  he  exposed  himself  unnecessarily,  is  absurd  to  those  who  know  how 
important  rapid  decision  and  instantaneous  action  are  in  the  crisis  of  conflict. 

His  lines  of  battle  were  pushed  rapidly  to  the  front,  and  as  gaps  widened 
in  the  first  lines,  they  were  filled  by  brigades  of  the  second  and  third.  One 
of  Breckinridge's  brigades  (Trabue's)  was  sent  to  the  left  to  support  Cle- 
burne  and  fought  under  Polk  the  rest  of  the  day ;  and  the  other  two  were  led 
to  the  extreme  right,  only  Chalmers  being  beyond  them.  Gladden,  who  was 
on  Hindman's  right,  and  had  a  longer  distance  to  traverse  to  strike  some  of 
Prentiss's  brigades  further  to  the  left,  found  them  better  prepared,  but, 
after  a  sanguinary  resistance,  drove  them  from  their  camps.  In  this  bitter 
struggle  Gladden  fell  mortally  wounded.  Chalmers's  brigade,  of  Bragg's  line, 
came  in  on  Gladden's  right,  and  his  Mississippians  drove  the  enemy,  under 
Stuart,  with  the  bayonet  half  a  mile.  He  was  about  to  charge  again,  when 
General  Johnston  came  up,  and  moved  him  to  the  right,  and  brought  John 
K.  Jackson's  brigade  into  the  interval.  Prentiss's  left  and  Stuart's  brigade 
retreated  sullenly,  not  routed,  but  badly  hammered. 

With  Hindman  as  a  pivot,  the  turning  movement  began  from  the  moment 
of  the  overthrow  of  Prentiss's  camps.  While  the  front  attacks  were  made  all 
along  the  line  with  a  desperate  courage  which  would  have  swept  any  ordinary 
resistance  from  the  field,  and  with  a  loss  which  told  fearfully  on  the  assail 
ants,  they  were  seconded  by  assaults  in  flank  which  invariably  resulted  in 
crushing  the  Federal  line  with  destructive  force  and  strewing  the  field  with 
the  wounded  and  the  dead.  The  Federal  reports  complain  that  they  were 
flanked  and  outnumbered,  which  is  true ;  for,  though  fewer,  the  Confederates 
were  probably  stronger  at  every  given  point  throughout  the  day  except  at 
the  center  called  the  Hornets'  Nest,  where  the  Federals  eventually  massed 


560 


ALBERT  SIDNEY  JOHNSTON  AT  SHILOH. 


nearly  two  divisions.  The  iron  flail  of  war  beat  upon  the  Federal  front  and 
right  flank  with  the  regular  and  ponderous  pulsations  of  some  great  engine, 
and  these  assaults  resulted  in  a  crumbling  process  which  was  continually  but 
slowly  going  on,  as  regiment  arid  brigade  and  division  yielded  to  the  continu 
ous  and  successive  blows.  There  has  been  criticism  that  there  were  no  grand 
assaults  by  divisions  and  corps.  In  a  broken,  densely  wooded  and  unknown 
country,  and  with  the  mode  of  attack  in  parallel  lines,  this  was  impossible, 

but  the  attack 
was  unremitting 
and  the  fact  is 
that  there  were 
but  few  lulls 
in  the  contest. 
The  fighting  was 
a  grapple  and 
a  death-struggle 
all  day  long,  and, 
as  one  brigade 
after  another 
wilted  before 
the  deadly  fire 
of  the  stubborn 
Federals,  still 
another  was 
pushed  into  the 
combat  and  kept 
up  the  fierce  as 
sault.  A  breath 
ing  -  spell,  and 

the  shattered  command  would  gather  itself  up  and  resume  its  work  of 
destruction.  These  were  the  general  aspects  of  the  battle. 

"When  the  battle  began  Hindman,  following  the  ridge,  had  easy  ground  to 
traverse;  but  Cleburne's  large  brigade,  on  his  left,  with  its  supports,  moving 
over  a  more  difficult  country,  was  slower  in  getting  upon  Sherman's  front. 
That  general  and  his  command  were  aroused  by  the  long  roll,  the  advancing 
musketry,  and  the  rush  of  troops  to  his  left,  and  he  got  his  division  in  line  of 
battle  and  was  ready  for  the  assault  of  Cleburne,  which  was  made  about  8 
o'clock.  General  Johnston,  who  had  followed  close  after  Hindman,  urging  on 
his  attack,  saw  Cleburne's  brigade  begin  its  advance,  and  then  returned  to 
where  Hindman  was  gathering  his  force  for  another  assault.  Hardee  said  of 
Cleburne  that  he  "moved  quickly  through  the  fields,  and,  though  far  outflanked 
by  the  enemy  on  our  left,  rushed  forward  under  a  terrific  fire  from  the  serried 
ranks  drawn  up  in  front  of  the  camp.  A  morass  covered  his  front,  and,  being 
difficult  to  pass,  caused  a  break  in  this  brigade.  Deadly  volleys  were  poured 
upon  the  men  from  behind  bales  of  hay  and  other  defenses,  as  they  advanced; 
arid  after  a  series  of  desperate  charges  they  were  compelled  to  fall  back. 


ALBERT  SIDNEY  JOHNSTON  AT  SHILOH. 


561 


,;> 

p=£\ii,ijfil  .          .-.v  .    «    ! 


VICINITY  OF  THE   "  HORNETS'   NEST." 
FROM  PHOTOGRAPHS  TAKEN  IN  1885. 

The  stump  in  the  field  on  the  right  is 
said  to  mark  the  spot  where  General 
Albert  Sidney  Johnston  was  killed. 
The  point  of  woods  beyond  the  field  is 
supposed  to  be  the  place  which  the 
Confederates  called  the  "  Hor7iets' 
Nest."  The  "peach  orchard"  was  a 
little  to  the  left  of  the  field  in  the  mid 
dle  ground,  and  behind  the  house  (in 
the  lower  picture)  which  is  across  the 
road  from  the  field  in  which  General 
Johnston  was  killed.— EDITORS. 

'•  Supported  by  the  arrival  of  the  second  line,  Cleburne,  with  the  remainder  of 
his  troops,  .  .  .  entered  the  enemy's  encampment,  which  had  been  forced  on 
the  center  and  right  by  ...  Gladden's,  Wood's,  and  Hindman's  brigades." 

While  Sherman  was  repelling  Cleburne's  attack,  McClernand  sent  up  three 
Illinois  regiments  to  reenforce  his  left.  But  General  Polk  led  forward  Bushrod 
E.  Johnson's  brigade,  and  General  Charles  Clark  led  Russell's  brigade,  against 
Sherman's  left,  while  General  Johnston  himself  put  A.  P.  Stewart's  brigade  in 
position  on  their  right.  Supported  by  part  of  Cleburne's  line,  they  attacked 
Sherman  and  McClernand  fiercely.  Polk  said :  "  The  resistance  at  this  point 
was  as  stubborn  as  at  any  other  point  on  the  field."  Clark  and  Bushrod 
R.  Johnson  fell  badly  wounded.  Hildebrand's  Federal  brigade  was  swept  from 
the  field,  losing  in  the  onslaught  300  killed -and  wounded,  and  94  missing. 

Wood's  brigade,  of  Hindman's  division,  joined  in  this  charge  on  the  right. 
As  they  hesitated  at  the  crest  of  a  hill,  General  Johnston  came  to  the  front 
and  urged  them  to  the  attack.  They  rushed  forward  with  the  inspiring 
"rebel  yell,"  and  with  Stewart's  brigade  enveloped  the  Illinois  troops.  In 
ten  minutes  the  latter  melted  away  under  the  fire,  and  were  forced  from  the 
field.  In  this  engagement  John  A.  McDowell's  and  Veatch's  Federal  bri 
gades,  as  well  as  Hildebrand's,  were  demolished  and  heard  of  no  more.  Buck- 
land  retreated  and  took  position  with  McClernand.  In  these  attacks 
Anderson's  and  Pond's  Confederate  brigades  joined  with  great  vigor  and 
severe  loss,  but  with  unequal  fortune.  The  former  had  one  success  after 


VOI,.  I.     36 


562  ALBERT  SIDNEY  JOHNSTON  AT  SH1LOH. 

another ;  the  latter  suffered  a  series  of  disasters ;  and  yet  an  equal  courage 
animated  them.  (lladden's  brigade  made  a  final  desperate  and  successful  charge 
on  Prentiss's  line.  The  whole  Federal  front,  which  had  been  broken  here  and 
there,  and  was  getting  ragged,  gave  way  under  this  hammering  process  on  front 
and  flank,  and  fell  back  across  a  ravine  to  another  strong  position  behind  the 
Hamburg  and  Purdy  road  in  rear  of  Shiloh.  Sherman's  route  of  retreat  was 
marked  by  the  thick-strewn  corpses  of  his  soldiers.  At  last,  pressed  back 
toward  both  Owl  Creek  and  the  river,  Sherman  and  McClernarid  found  safety 
by  the  interposition  on  their  left  flank  of  W.  H.  L.  Wallace's  fresh  division. 
Hurlbut  and  Wallace  had  advanced  about  8  o'clock,  so  that  Prentiss's  com 
mand  found  a  refuge  in  the  intervals  of  the  new  and  formidable  Federal  line, 
with  Stuart  on  the  left  and  Sherman's  shattered  division  on  the  right. 

General  Johnston  had  pushed  Chalmers  to  the  right  and  front,  sweeping 
down  the  left  bank  of  Lick  Creek,  driving  in  pickets,  until  he  encountered 
Stuart's  Federal  brigade  on  the  Pittsburg  and  Hamburg  road.  Stuart  was 
strongly  posted  on  a  steep  hill  near  the  river,  covered  with  thick  undergrowth, 
and  with  an  open  field  in  front.  McArthur  was  to  his  right  and  rear  in  the 
woods.  Jackson  attacked  McArthur,  who  fell  back ;  and  Chalmers  went  at 
Stuart's  brigade.  This  command  reserved  its  fire  until  Chalmers's  men  were 
within  forty  yards,  and  then  delivered  a  heavy  and  destructive  volley ;  but, 
after  a  hard  fight,  the  Federals  were  driven  back.  Chalmers's  right  rested  on 
the  Tennessee  River  bottom-lands,  and  he  fought  down  the  bank  toward 
Pittsburg  Landing.  The  enemy's  left  was  completely  turned,  and  the  Fed 
eral  army  was  now  crowded  on  a  shorter  line,  a  mile  or  more  to  the  rear  of 
its  first  position,  with  many  of  their  brigades  hors  de  combat.  The  new  line 
of  battle  was  established  before  10  o'clock.  All  the  Confederate  troops  were 
then  in  the  front  line,  except  two  of  Breckinridge's  brigades,  Bo  wen's  and 
Statham's,  which  were  moving  to  the  Confederate  right,  and  soon  occupied 
the  interval  to  the  left  of  Chalmers  and  Jackson.  Hardee,  with  Cleburne 
and  Pond,  was  pressing  Sherman  slowly  but  steadily  back.  Bragg  and  Polk 
met  about  half -past  10  o'clock,  and  by  agreement  Polk  led  his  troops  against 
McClernand,  while  Bragg  directed  the  operations  against  the  Federal  center. 
A  gigantic  contest  now  began  which  lasted  more  than  five  hours.  In  the 
impetuous  rush  forward  of  regiments  to  fill  the  gaps  in  the  front  line,  even 
the  brigade  organization  was  broken ;  but,  though  there  was  dislocation  of 
commands,  there  was  little  loss  of  effective  force.  The  Confederate  assaults 
were  made  by  rapid  and  often  unconnected  charges  along  the  line.  They 
were  repeatedly  checked,  and  often  repulsed.  Sometimes  counter-charges 
drove  them  back  for  short  distances ;  but,  whether  in  assault  or  recoil,  both 
sides  saw  their  bravest  soldiers  fall  in  frightful  numbers.  The  Confederates 
came  on  in  motley  garb,  varying  from  the  favorite  gray  and  domestic  "  but 
ternut"  to  the  blue  of  certain  Louisiana  regiments,  which  paid  dearly  the 
penalty  of  doubtful  colors.  Over  them  waved  flags  and  pennons  as  various 
as  their  uniforms.  At  each  charge  there  went  up  a  wild  yell,  heard  above  the 
roar  of  artillery ;  only  the  Kentuckians,  advancing  with  measured  step,  sang 
in  chorus  their  war-song :  "  Cheer,  boys,  cheer ;  we'll  march  away  to  battle." 


ALBERT  SIDNEY  JOHNSTON  AT  SHILOH. 


563 


SCENE    OF    GENERAL 

ALBERT  SIDNEY 
JOHNSTON'S    DEATH. 


FROM  A  PHOTOGRAPH  TAKEN 

IN    THE    SUMMER    OF 

1884. 


On  the  Federal  ^T^PlPlfP^  left  center  W'  H'  L' 

Wallace's  and  Hurl-  C,^'"P^^^>^^^  but's  divisions  were 

massed,  with  Pren-  'rr  tiss's  fragments,  in  a 

position  so  impregnable,  and  thronged  with  such  fierce  defenders,  that  it 
won  from  the  Confederates  the  memorable  title  of  the  "Hornets'  Nest." 
[See  pages  504-5,  510,  and  588.]  Here,  behind  a  dense  thicket  on  the  crest  of 
a  hill,  was  posted  a  strong  force  of  as  hardy  troops  as  ever  fought,  almost 
perfectly  protected  by  the  conformation  of  the  ground,  and  by  logs  and  other 
rude  and  hastily  prepared  defenses.  To  assail  it  an  open  field  had  to  be 
passed,  enfiladed  by  the  fire  of  its  batteries.  Xo  figure  of  speech  would 
be  too  strong  to  express  the  deadly  peril  of  assault  upon  this  natural  fortress. 
For  five  hours  brigade  after  brigade  was  led  against  it.  Hindman's  brigades, 
which  earlier  had  swept  everything  before  them,  were  reduced  to  fragments, 
and  paralyzed  for  the  remainder  of  the  day.  A.  P.  Stewart's  regiments  made 
fruitless  assaults.  Then  Bragg  ordered  up  Gibson's  brigade.  Gibson  him 
self,  a  knightly  soldier,  was  aided  by  colonels  three  of  whom  afterward 
became  generals.  The  brigade  made  a  gallant  charge ;  but,  like  the  others, 
recoiled  from  the  fire  it  encountered.  Under  a  cross-fire  of  artillery  and 
musketry  it  at  last  fell  back  with  very  heavy  loss.  Gibson  asked  that  artillery 
should  be  sent  him ;  but  it  was  not  at  hand,  and  Bragg  sent  orders  to  charge 
again.  The  colonels  thought  it  hopeless ;  but  Gibson  led  them  again  to  the 
attack,  and  again  they  suffered  a  bloody  repulse. 

The  brigade  was  four  times  repulsed,  but  maintained  its  ground  steadily, 
until  W.  H.  L.  Wallace's  position  was  turned,  when,  renewing  its  forward 
movement  in  conjunction  with  Cheathain's  command,  it  helped  to  drive  back 
its  stout  opponents.  Cheatham,  charging  with  Stephens's  brigade  on  Gibson's 
right,  across  an  open  field,  had  been  caught  under  a  murderous  cross-fire,  but 
fell  back  in  good  order,  and,  later  in  the  day,  came  in  on  Breckinridge's  left 
in  the  last  assault  when  Prentiss  was  captured.  This  bloody  fray  lasted  till 
nearly  4  o'clock,  without  making  any  visible  impression  on  the  Federal  center. 
But  when  its  flanks  were  turned,  these  assaulting  columns,  crowding  in  on  its 
front,  aided  in  its  capture. 


564  ALBERT  SIDNEY  JOHNSTON  AT  SHILOH. 

General  Johnston  was  with  the  right  of  Statham's  brigade,  confronting  the 
left  of  Hurlbut's  division,  which  was  behind  the  crest  of  a  hill,  with  a  depres 
sion  filled  with  chaparral  in  its  front.  Bowen's  brigade  was  further  to  the 
right  in  line  with  Statham's,  touching  it  near  this  point.  The  Confederates 
held  the  parallel  ridge  in  easy  musket-range ;  and  "  as  heavy  fire  as  I  ever 
saw  during  the  war,"  says  Governor  Harris,  was  kept  up  on  both  sides  for 
an  hour  or  more.  It  was  necessary  to  cross  the  valley  raked  by  this  deadly 
ambuscade  and  assail  the  opposite  ridge  in  order  to  drive  the  enemy  from 
his  stronghold.  When  General  Johnston  came  up  and  saw  the  situation,  he 
said  to  his  staff :  "  They  are  offering  stubborn  resistance  here.  I  shall  have 
to  put  the  bayonet  to  them."  It  was  the  crisis  of  the  conflict.  The  Federal 
key  was  in  his  front.  If  his  assault  were  successful,  their  left  would  be  com 
pletely  turned,  and  the  victory  won.  He  determined  to  charge.  He  sent 
Governor  Harris,  of  his  staff,  to  lead  a  Tennessee  regiment;  and,  after  a 
brief  conference  with  Breckinridge,  whom  he  loved  and  admired,  that  officer, 
followed  by  his  staff,  appealed  to  the  soldiers.  As  he  encouraged  them  with 
his  fine  voice  and  manly  bearing,  General  Johnston  rode  out  in  front  and 
slowly  down  the  line.  His  hat  was  off.  His  sword  rested  in  its  scabbard.  In 
his  right  hand  he  held  a  little  tin  cup,  the  memorial  of  an  incident  that  had 
occurred  earlier  in  the  day.  Passing  through  a  captured  camp,  he  had  taken 
this  toy,  saying,  "  Let  this  be  my  share  of  the  spoils  to-day."  It  was  this 
plaything  which,  holding  it  between  two  fingers,  he  employed  more  effect 
ively  in  his  natural  and  simple  gesticulation  than  most  men  could  have 
used  a  sword.  His  presence  was  full  of  inspiration.  He  sat  his  thorough 
bred  bay,  "Fire-eater,"  with  easy  command.  His  voice  was  persuasive, 
encouraging,  and  compelling.  His  words  were  few;  he  said:  "Men!  they 
are  stubborn ;  we  must  use  the  bayonet."  When  he  reached  the  center  of 
the  line,  he  turned.  "  I  will  lead  you ! "  he  cried,  and  moved  toward  the 
enemy.  The  line  was  already  thrilling  and  trembling  with  that  irresistible 
ardor  which  in  battle  decides  the  day.  With  a  mighty  shout  Bowen's  and 
Statham's  brigades  moved  forward  at  a  charge.  A  sheet  of  flame  and  a 
mighty  roar  burst  from  the  Federal  stronghold.  The  Confederate  line  with 
ered;  but  there  was  not  an  instant's  pause.  The  crest  was  gained.  The 
enemy  were  in  flight. 

General  Johnston  had  passed  through  the  ordeal  seemingly  unhurt.  His 
horse  was  shot  in  four  places ;  his  clothes  were  pierced  by  missiles  ;  his  boot- 
sole  was  cut  and  torn  by  a  minie ;  but  if  he  himself  had  received  any  severe 
wound,  he  did  not  know  it.  At  this  moment  Governor  Harris  rode  up  from 
the  right.  After  a  few  words,  General  Johnston  sent  him  with  an  order  to 
Colonel  Statham,  which  having  delivered,  he  speedily  returned.  In  the  mean 
time,  knots  and  groups  of  Federal  soldiers  kept  up  a  desultory  fire  as  they 
retreated  upon  their  supports,  and  their  last  line,  now  yielding,  delivered 
volley  after  volley  as  they  sullenly  retired.  By  the  chance  of  war,  a  minie- 
ball  from  one  of  these  did  its  fatal  work.  As  he  sat  there,  after  his  wound, 
Captain  Wickham  says  that  Colonel  O'Hara,  of  his  staff,  rode  up,  and  General 
Johnston  said  to  him,  "We  must  go  to  the  left,  where  the  firing  is  heaviest," 


ALBERT  SIDNEY  JOHNSTON  AT  SHILOH.  565 

and  then  gave  him  an  order,  which  O'Hara  rode  off  to  obey.  Governor 
Harris  returned,  and,  finding  him  very  pale,  asked  him,  "  General,  are  you 
wounded  ? "  He  answered,  in  a  very  deliberate  and  emphatic  tone :  "  Yes, 
and,  I  fear,  seriously."  These  were  his  last  words.  Harris  and  Wickham  led 
his  horse  back  under  cover  of  the  hill,  and  lifted  him  from  it.  They  searched 
at  random  for  the  wound,  which  had  cut  an  artery  in  his  leg,  the  blood  flow 
ing  into  his  boot.  When  his  brother-in-law,  Preston,  lifted  his  head,  and 
addressed  him  with  passionate  grief,  he  smiled  faintly,  but  uttered  no  word. 
His  life  rapidly  ebbed  away,  and  in  a  few  moments  he  was  dead. 

His  wound  was  not  necessarily  fatal.  General  Johnston's  own  knowledge 
of  military  surgery  was  adequate  for  its  control  by  an  extemporized  tourni 
quet  had  he  been  aware  or  regardful  of  its  nature.  Dr.  D.  W.  Yandell,  his 
surgeon,  had  attended  his  person  during  most  of  the  morning ;  but,  finding  a 
large  number  of  wounded  men,  including  many  Federals,  at  one  point,  Gen 
eral  Johnston  had  ordered  Yandell  to  stop  there,  establish  a  hospital,  and  give 
them  his  services.  He  said  to  Yandell :  "  These  men  were  our  enemies  a 
moment  ago ;  they  are  our  prisoners  now.  Take  care  of  them."  Yandell 
remonstrated  against  leaving  him,  but  he  was  peremptory.  Had  Yandell 
remained  with  him,  he  would  have  had  little  difficulty  with  the  wound. 

Governor  Harris,  and  others  of  General  Johnston's  staff,  promptly  informed 
General  Beauregard  of  his  death,  and  General  Beauregard  assumed  command, 
remaining  at  Shiloh  Church,  awaiting  the  issue  of  events. 

Up  to  the  moment  of  the  death  of  the  commander-in-chief,  in  spite  of  the 
dislocation  of  the  commands,  there  was  the  most  perfect  regularity  in  the 
development  of  the  plan  of  battle.  In  all  the  seeming  confusion  there  was 
the  predominance  of  intelligent  design  ;  a  master  mind,  keeping  in  clear  view 
its  purpose,  sought  the  weak  point  in  the  defense,  and,  by  massing  his  troops 
upon  the  enemy's  left,  kept  turning  that  flank.  "With  the  disadvantage  of 
inferior  numbers,  General  Johnston  brought  to  bear  a  superior  force  on  each 
particular  point,  and,  by  a  series  of  rapid  and  powerful  blows,  broke  the 
Federal  army  to  pieces. 

Now  was  the  time  for  the  Confederates  to  push  their  advantage,  and,  clos 
ing  in  on  the  rear  of  Prentiss  and  Wallace,  to  finish  the  battle.  But,  on  the 
contrary,  there  came  a  lull  in  the  conflict  on  the  right,  lasting  more  than  an 
hour  from  half-past  2,  the  time  at  which  General  Johnston  fell.  It  is  true 
that  the  Federals  fell  back  and  left  the  field,  making  some  desultory  resist 
ance,  and  the  Confederates  went  forward  deliberately,  occupying  their  posi 
tions,  and  thus  helping  to  envelop  the  Federal  center ;  but  Breckinridge's  two 
brigades  did  not  make  another  charge  that  day,  and  there  was  no  further 
general  direction  or  concerted  movement.  The  determinate  purpose  to  cap 
ture  Grant  that  day  was  lost  sight  of.  The  strong  arm  was  withdrawn,  and 
the  bow  remained  unbent.  Elsewhere  there  were  bloody,  desultory  combats, 
but  they  tended  to  nothing. 

About  half-past  3  the  contest,  which  had  throbbed  with  fitful  violence 
for  five  hours,  was  renewed  with  the  utmost  fury.  While  an  ineffectual 
struggle  was  going  on  at  the  center,  a  number  of  batteries  opened  upon 


566 


ALBERT  SIDNEY  JOHNSTON  AT  SHILOH. 


Prentiss's  right  flank,  the  center  of  what  remained  of  the  Federals.  The  open 
ing  of  so  heavy  a  fire,  and  the  simultaneous  though  unconcerted  advance  of 
the  whole  Confederate  line,  resulted  at  first  in  the  confusion  of  the  enemy, 
and  then  in  the  death  of  W.  H.  L.  Wallace  and  the  surrender  of  Prentiss. 

These  generals  have  received  scant  justice  for  their  stubborn  defense.  They 
agreed  to  hold  their  position  at  all  odds,  and  did  so  until  Wallace  received 


FROM    THE  "  LIFE    OF    GENERAL    A.    8.    JOHNSTON,"    BY    W.    P.    JOHNSTON.      (D.    APPLETON    £    CO.) 

his  fatal  wound  and  Prentiss  was  surrounded  and  captured  with  nearly  three 
thousand  men.    This  delay  was  the  salvation  of  Grant's  army. 

General  Breckinridge's  command  closed  in  on  the  Federal  left  and  rear ; 
General  Polk  crushed  their  right  center  by  the  violence  of  his  assault, 
and  in  person,  with  Marshall  J.  Smith's  Crescent  regiment,  received  the  sur 
render  of  many  troops.  General  Prentiss  gave  up  his  sword  to  Colonel 
Russell.  Bragg's  troops,  wrestling  at  the  front,  poured  in  over  the  Hornets' 
Nest,  and  shared  in  the  triumph.  Polk  ordered  his  cavalry  to  charge  the 
fleeing  enemy,  and  Colonel  Miller  rode  down  and  captured  a  6-gun  battery. 


ALBERT  SIDNEY  JOHNSTON  AT  SHILOH.  567 

His  men  "  watered  their  horses  in  the  Tennessee  River."  All  now  felt  that 
the  victory  was  won.  Bragg,  Polk,  Hardee,  Breckinridge,  all  the  corps  com 
manders,  were  at  the  front,  and  in  communication.  Their  generals  were 
around  them.  The  hand  that  had  launched  the  thunder-bolt  of  war  was 
cold,  but  its  influence  still  nerved  this  host  and  its  commanders.  A  line 
of  battle  was  formed,  and  all  was  ready  for  the  last  fell  swoop,  to  compel 
an  "unconditional  surrender"  by  General  Grant. 

The  only  position  on  the  high  grounds  left  to  the  Federals  was  held  by  Col 
onel  Webster,  of  Grant's  staff,  who  had  collected  some  twenty  guns  or  more 
and  manned  them  with  volunteers.  Soon  after  4  o'clock  Chalmers  and  Jack 
son,  proceeding  down  the  river-bank  while  Prentiss's  surrender  was  going  on, 
came  upon  this  position.  The  approaches  were  bad  from  that  direction;  never 
theless,  they  attacked  resolutely,  and,  though  repeatedly  repulsed,  kept  up  their 
assaults  till  nightfall.  At  one  time  they  drove  some  gunners  from  their  guns, 
and  their  attack  has  been  generally  mistaken  by  Federal  writers  for  the  final 
assault  of  the  Confederate  army — which  was  never  made.  The  Federal  gen 
erals  and  writers  attribute  their  salvation  to  the  repulse  of  Chalmers,  and  the 
honor  is  claimed  respectively  for  Webster's  artillery  and  for  Ammen's  brigade 
of  Buell's  army,  which  came  up  at  the  last  moment.  But  neither  they  nor  all 
that  was  left  of  the  Federal  army  could  have  withstood  five  minutes  the  united 
advance  of  the  Confederate  line,  which  was  at  hand  and  ready  to  deal  the 
death-stroke.  Their  salvation  came  from  a  different  quarter.  Bragg,  in  his 
monograph  written  for  the  use  of  the  writer  in  preparing  the  "  Life  of  A.  S. 
Johnston,"  gives  the  following  account  of  the  close  of  the  battle : 

"  Concurring  testimony,  especially  that  of  the  prisoners  on  both  sides, —  our  captured  being 
present  and  witnesses  to  the  demoralization  of  the  enemy,  and  their  eagerness  to  escape  or  avoid 
further  slaughter  by  surrender,  —  left  no  doubt  but  that  a  persistent,  energetic  assault  would 
soon  have  been  crowned  by  a  general  yielding  of  his  whole  force.  About  one  hour  of  daylight 
was  left  to  us.  The  enemy's  gun-boats,  his  last  hope,  took  position  opposite  us  in  the  river,  and 
commenced  a  furious  cannonade  at  our  supposed  position.  From  the  elevation  necessary  to 
reach  the  high  bluff  on.  which  we  were  operating,  this  proved  '  all  sound  and  fury  signifying 
nothing,'  and  did  not  in  the  slightest  degree  mar  our  prospects  or  our  progress.  Not  so,  how 
ever,  in  our  rear,  where  these  heavy  shells  fell  among  the  reserves  and  stragglers ;  and  to  the 
utter  dismay  of  the  commanders  on  the  field,  the  troops  were  seen  to  abandon  their  inspiring 
work,  and  to  retire  sullenly  from  the  contest  when  danger  was  almost  past,  and  victory,  so 
dearly  purchased,  was  almost  certain." 

Polk,  Hardee,  Breckinridge,  Withers,  Gibson,  Gilmer,  and  all  who  were 
there  confirm  this  statement.  General  Buell  says  of  Grant's  army  that  there 
were  "  not  more  than  five  thousand  men  in  ranks  and  available  on  the  battle 
field  at  nightfall.  .  .  .  The  rest  were  either  killed,  wounded,  captured,  or 
scattered  in  inextricable  and  hopeless  confusion  for  miles  along  the  banks  of 
the  river."  General  Nelson  describes  them  as  "  cowering  under  the  river- 
bank,  .  .  .  frantic  with  fright  and  utterly  demoralized." 

At  this  crisis  came  from  General  Beauregard  an  order  for  the  withdrawal 
of  the  troops,  of  which  his  chief  of  staff  says  :  "  General  Beauregard,  in  the 
meantime,  observing  the  exhausted,  widely  scattered  condition  of  his  army, 
directed  it  to  be  brought  out  of  battle,  collected  and  restored  to  order  as  far 


568  ALBERT  SIDNEY  JOHNSTON  AT  SHILOH. 

as  practicable,  and  to  occupy  for  the  night  the  captured  encampments  of  the 
enemy.  This,  however,  had  been  done  in  chief  part  by  the  officers  in  immediate 
command  of  the  troops  before  the  order  was  generally  distributed."  For  this  last 
allegation,  or  that  the  army  was  exhausted,  there  is  not  the  slightest  warrant. 
When  Beauregard's  staff  -officer  gave  Bragg  this  order  he  said :  "  Have  you 
promulgated  this  order  to  the  command? "  The  officer  replied :  "  I  have."  Gen 
eral  Bragg  then  said :  "  If  you  had  not  I  would  not  obey  it.  The  battle  is  lost." 

The  concurrent  testimony  of  the  generals  and  soldiers  at  the  front  is  at  one 
on  all  essential  points.  General  Beauregard  at  Shiloh,  two  miles  in  the  rear, 
with  the  debris  of  the  army  surging  back  upon  him,  the  shells  bursting 
around  him,  sick  with  his  two  months'  previous  malady,  pictured  in  his 
imagination  a  wreck  at  the  front,  totally  different  from  the  actual  condition 
there.  Had  this  officer  been  with  Bragg,  and  not  greatly  prostrated  and 
suffering  from  severe  sickness,  I  firmly  believe  his  order  would  have  been  to 
advance,  not  to  retire.  And  this  in  spite  of  his  theory  of  his  plan  of  battle, 
which  he  sums  up  as  follows,  and  which  is  so  different  from  General  John 
ston's  :  "  By  a  rapid  and  vigorous  attack  on  General  Grant,  it  was  expected 
he  would  be  beaten  back  into  his  transports  and  the  river,  or  captured  in 
time  to  enable  us  to  profit  by  the  victory,  and  remove  to  the  rear  all  the 
stores  and  munitions  that  would  fall  into  our  hands  in  such  an  event  before 
the  arrival  of  General  Buell's  army  on  the  scene.  It  was  never  contemplated, 
however,  to  retain  the  position  thus  gained  and  abandon  Corinth,  the  strategic 
point  of  the  campaign."  Why,  then,  did  General  Beauregard  stop  short  in  his 
career  ?  Sunday  evening  it  was  not  a  question  of  retaining,  but  of  gaining, 
Pittsburg  Landing.  Complete  victory  was  in  his  grasp,  and  he  threw  it  away. 
General  Gibson  says :  "  General  Johnston's  death  was  a  tremendous  catas 
trophe.  There  are  no  words  adequate  to  express  my  own  conception  of  the 
immensity  of  the  loss  to  our  country.  Sometimes  the  hopes  of  millions  of 
people  depend  upon  one  head  and  one  arm.  The  West  perished  with  Albert 
Sidney  Johnston,  and  the  Southern  country  followed." 

Monday  was  General  Beauregard's  battle,  and  it  was  well  fought.  But  in 
recalling  his  troops  from  the  heights  which  commanded  the  enemy's  landing, 
he  gave  away  a  position  which  during  the  night  was  occupied  by  Buell's 
twenty  thousand  fresh  troops,  who  thus  regained  the  high  grounds  that  had 
been  won  at  such  a  cost.  Lew  Wallace,  too,  had  come  up  6500  strong.^  More 
over,  the  orders  had  been  conveyed  by  Beauregard's  staff  to  brigades  and 
even  regiments  to  withdraw,  and  the  troops  wandered  back  over  the  field, 
without  coherence,  direction,  or  purpose,  and  encamped  where  chance  pro 
vided  for  them.  All  array  was  lost,  and,  in  the  morning,  they  met  the  attack 
of  nearly  thirty  thousand  fresh  and  organized  troops,  with  no  hope  of  suc 
cess  except  from  their  native  valor  and  the  resolute  purpose  roused  by  the 
triumph  of  Sunday.  Their  fortitude,  their  courage,  and  the  free  offering  of 
their  lives  were  equal  to  the  day  before.  But  it  was  a  retreat,  not  an  assault. 
They  retired  slowly  and  sullenly,  shattered,  but  not  overthrown,  to  Corinth, 
the  strategic  point  of  General  BeauregarcVs  campaign. 

•&  General  Wallace,  in  his  report  to  General  Halleck,  says  that  his  whole  command  "did  not  exceed 
5000  men  of  all  arms." — EDITORS. 


PREACHING    AT    THE    UNION    CAMP    DICK     ROBINSON,     KENTUCKY    (SEE    PAGE    377).        SKETCHED    FROM    A    LITHOGRAPH. 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  SHILOHJ 

BY  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD,  GENERAL,  (.'.  S.  A. 

ON  the  22d  of  January,  1862,  Colonel  Roger  A.  Pryor,  a  member  of  the  Mili 
tary  Committee  of  the  lower  branch  of  the  Confederate  Congress,  visited 
my  headquarters  at  Centreville,  Virginia,  and  in  his  own  name,  as  also  for  the 
representatives  in  Congress  of  the  Mississippi  Valley  States,  urged  me  to 
consent  to  be  transferred  from  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  to  the  command 
of  the  Confederate  forces  at  Columbus,  Kentucky,  within  the  Department  of 
Kentucky  and  Tennessee,  under  the  superior  command  of  General  Albert 
Sidney  Johnston, —  a  transfer  which  he  said  Mr.  Davis  would  not  direct 
unless  it  was  agreeable  to  me,  but  which  was  generally  desired  at  Richmond 
because  of  the  recent  crushing  disaster  at  Mill  Springs,  in  eastern  Kentucky: 
the  defeat  and  death  of  Zollicoffer.  Against  the  monitions  of  some  of  my 
friends  at  Richmond,  and  after  much  hesitation  and  disinclination  to  sever 
my  relations  with  such  an  army  as  that  of  the  Potomac,  but  upon  the 
assurance  that  General  Johnston's  command  embraced  an  aggregate  of  at 
least  seventy  thousand  men  of  all  arms,  which,  though  widely  scattered, 
might,  by  virtue  of  the  possession  of  the  "  interior  lines,"  be  concentrated  and 
operated  offensively,  I  gave  Colonel  Pryor  authority  to  inform  Mr.  Davis  of 
my  readiness  to  be  thus  transferred.  Upon  the  return  of  Colonel  Pryor  to 
Richmond,  I  was,  on  the  26th  of  January,  ordered  to  proceed  at  once  "to 
report  to  General  A.  S.  Johnston  at  Bowling  Green,  Kentucky,"  and  thence 

}  Recast  and  revised  from  the  "North  American  Review"  for  January  and  February,  1886. — EDITORS. 

569 


570  THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  SHILOH. 

as  promptly  as  possible  to  assume  my  new  command  at  Columbus,  "  which," 
said  my  orders,  "  is  threatened  by  a  powerful  force,  and  the  defense  of  which 
is  of  vital  importance." 

Dispatching  Colonel  Thomas  Jordan,  my  chief  of  staff,  to  Richmond,  with 
a  view  to  secure  from  the  War  Department  certain  aids  to  the  proper  organ 
ization  of  the  troops  I  was  to  command,  I  left  Centreville  on  the  2d  of  Feb 
ruary  and  reached  Bowling  Green  about  the  5th.  General  Johnston,  whom 
I  had  never  seen  before,  welcomed  me  to  his  department  with  a  cordiality  and 
earnestness  that  made  a  deep  impression  on  me  at  the  time.  As  he  informed 
me,  General  Buell's  army,  fully  75,000  strong,  was  on  the  line  of  Bacon  Creek, 
on  the  Louisville  and  Nashville  railroad,  about  40  miles  from  Bowling  Green. 
General  Grant  had  about  20,000  men  in  hand  at  or  about  Cairo,  ready  to 
move  either  upon  Fort  Henry  or  Fort  Donelson.  General  Pope,  having  a 
force  of  not  less  than  30,000  men  in  Missouri,  was  menacing  General  Folk's 
positions,  including  New  Madrid,  while  General  Halleck,  exercising  command 
over  the  whole  of  this  force  of  125,000  men  of  all  arms,  had  his  headquarters 
at  St.  Louis. 

On  the  other  hand,  General  Johnston  (as  he  stated,  to  my  surprise)  had 
an  "  aggregate  effective  "  of  not  over  45,000  men  of  all  arms,  thus  distributed : 
at  Bowling  Green,  his  headquarters,  not  over  14,000 ;  at  Forts  Henry  and 
Donelson,  5500 ;  in  the  quarter  of  Clarksville,  Tennessee,  8000 ;  besides  17,000 
under  General  Polk,  chiefly  at  Columbus,  and  for  the  most  part  imperfectly 
organized,  badly  armed  and  equipped.  As  may  be  seen  from  any  map  of  the 
region,  the  chief  part  of  this  force  occupied  a  defensive  line  facing  north 
wardly,  the  two  salient  extremities  of  which  were  Bowling  Green,  some  70  miles 
by  railway  in  advance  of  Nashville,  and  Columbus,  about  110  miles  west  of 
Bowling  Green.  This  line  was  penetrated,  almost  centrally,  by  the  Cumber 
land  and  Tennessee  rivers,  respectively,  at  points  in  Tennessee  just  south  of 
the  Kentucky  line,  twelve  miles  apart,  at  which  Fort  Henry  had  been  estab 
lished  on  the  east  bank  of  the  Tennessee,  and  Fort  Donelson  on  the  west 
bank  of  the  Cumberland,  thus  constituting  the  reentering  angle  of  the  line. 
These  vital  works  General  Johnston  described  as  defective  in  more  than  one 
respect  and  unready,  but  said  that  he  had  sent  his  chief  engineer  to  improve 
their  effectiveness  as  far  as  possible.  So  unpromising  was  the  situation  and 
so  different  from  what  had  been  represented  before  I  left  Virginia,  that  my 
first  impulse  was  to  return  at  once ;  but  this  idea  was  abandoned  at  the  ear 
nest  request  of  General  Johnston.  However,  after  an  inspection  of  the  works 
at  and  around  Bowling  Green,  I  found  that  while  strong  against  any  direct 
attack,  they  could  be  readily  turned  on  their  right,  and  I  so  stated  to  General 
Johnston.  His  reply  was,  that  in  the  event  of  a  serious  flank  movement  he 
must  evacuate  the  position,  having  no  relieving  army  to  support  it.  In  the 
face  of  this  self-evident  military  proposition,  I  recommended  the  immediate 
evacuation  of  a  position  so  salient  as  Bowling  Green,  that  must  fall  from  its 
own  weight  if  turned, — leaving  there  only  a  cavalry  force  in  observation,  and 
concentrating  at  once  all  our  available  strength  at  Henry  and  Donelson, 
information  having  just  reached  us  of  the  aggressive  presence  of  General 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  SHILOH.  571 

Grant  on  the  Tennessee  River.  That  recommendation  was  not  adopted,  for 
the  alleged  reason  that,  in  the  event  of  a  failure  to  defeat  G-eneral  Grant  as 
proposed,  our  forces  thus  assembled  might  be  caught  and  crushed  between 
the  armies  of  Grant  and  Buell,  and  that  it  would  also  expose  to  capture  the 
large  stock  of  military  supplies  collected  so  far  in  advance  as  Bowling  Green 
and  Clarksville,  as  well  as  at  Nashville.  In  this  decision  sight  was  certainly 
lost  of  the  facts  that,  having  no  pontoon-train,  General  Buell  could  not  possi 
bly  throw  his  army  across  the  Cumberland,  between  Donelson  and  Nashville, 
so  as  to  prevent  the  Confederates  from  falling  safely  back  behind  Duck 
River,  or  retreating  upon  Nashville  behind  the  Cumberland,  as  we  would  hold 
the  interior  or  shorter  lines. 

Fort  Henry  having  fallen  after  an  ineffective  but  gallant  defense  of  twenty- 
four  hours,  immediately  thereafter  the  railroad  bridge  across  the  Tennessee, 
about  twelve  miles  southward  of  the  surrendered  fortress,  was  destroyed.  The 
direct  line  of  communication  between  our  forces  eastward  of  that  stream  and 
those  at  Columbus  having  thus  been  broken,  on  the  7th  of  February  I  again 
urged  as  imperative  the  swift  concentration  of  all  our  then  available  forces 
upon  Donelson.  General  Johnston,  however,  asserting  that  Fort  Donelson 
was  not  "  tenable,"  would  only  support  the  position  by  directing  the  force  at 
Clarksville  to  cross  to  the  south  side  of  the  Tennessee  River,  and  ordered 
immediate  "preparations  "  to  be  made  for  the  "  removal "  of  the  army  at  Bowl 
ing  Green,  "to  Nashville,  in  rear  of  the  Cumberland  River." ^  He  also  pre 
scribed  that,  "from  Nashville,  should  any  further  retrograde  movement 
become  necessary,"  it  should  be  "  made  to  Stevenson  and  thence  according  to 
circumstances."^  He  further  declared  that  as  "the  possession  of  the  Ten 
nessee  River  by  the  enemy,  resulting  from  the  fall  of  Fort  Henry,  separated 
the  army  at  Bowling  Green  from  the  one  at  Columbus,"  henceforth  the  forces 
thus  sundered  must  "act  independently  of  each  other  until  they  can  again 
be  brought  together."  & 

Fort  Henry  fell  on  the  6th  of  February,  but  General  Grant,  failing  to  press 
the  signal  advantage  thus  gained,  did  not  advance  against  Fort  Donelson 
until  the  12th,  and  then  with  but  15,000  men,  having  dispatched,  at  the  same 
time,  6  regiments  under  General  Lew  Wallace  by  water.  The  investment  of 
the  position  was  not  completed,  however,  until  early  on  the  13th  of  February, 
the  Confederate  commander  having  had  a  whole  week  for  preparation.  On 
the  6th  of  February  the  Confederate  garrison  at  Fort  Donelson  embraced 
about  600  artillerists  and  3  regiments  of  infantiy,  or  at  most  2350  officers 
and  men;  to  this  force  Heiman's  brigade  and  other  troops,  some  2500  men, 
were  added  that  night,  having  been  detached  that  morning  from  Fort 
Henry.  Between  the  morning  of  the  7th  of  February  and  the  investment  of 
the  position  by  the  Federal  army  of  15,000  men,  on  the  morning  of  the  13th, 
it  was  further  increased  from  the  troops  on  the  east  and  north  side  of  the 
Cumberland,  under  Brigadier-General  Floyd,  to  whom  the  command  of  the 
defense  was  now  intrusted,  so  as  to  be,  in  numbers,  about  equal  to  that  of  the 
enemy  on  the  land  side,  until  the  latter  was  reenforced  by  General  Wallace's 

&  See  p.  487,  "Life  of  General  A.  S.  Johnston,"  by  W.  P.  Johnston.     New  York:  D.  Appleton  &  Co. 


S72  THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  SHILOH. 

division,  nearly  10,000  strong,  later  in  the  afternoon  of  the  14th.  By  that 
time  the  evacuation  of  Bowling  Green,  determined  upon,  as  I  have  said,  on  the 
7th, — and  commenced  on  the  llth  of  February, — had  been  completed,  the  Con 
federate  rear-guard  having  marched  out  of  the  town  at  3 : 30  p.  M.  on  the  14th. 

Satisfied,  as  affairs  stood,  that  Nashville  and  the  Valley  of  the  Cumberland 
could  only  be  defended  successfully  at  Donelson  and  by  the  crushing  defeat 
of  General  Grant  in  that  quarter,  an  end  to  which  all  other  considerations 
were  evidently  of  minor  military  importance,  I  had  insisted,  as  I  may  repeat, 
upon  that  as  the  one  evident  exigent  operation.  That  the  resolution  to  give 
up  Bowling  Green  and  to  begin  such  a  movement  as  early  as  the  llth  of  Feb 
ruary  ought  to  have  removed  every  possible  objection  on  the  part  of  General 
Johnston  to  going  at  once  in  person  with  fully  ten  thousand  of  his  Bowling 
Green  army,  I  am  very  sure  must  be  the  ultimate  professional  lesson  taught 
by  the  history  of  that  most  disastrous  Confederate  campaign  !  Nothing  were 
easier  in  the  exigency  than  the  transfer  from  Bowling  Green  to  Donelson  by 
the  night  of  the  13th  of  February  of  ten  thousand  men,  after  General  Johnston 
had  decided  that  the  immediate  abandonment  of  Kentucky  was  an  imperative 
necessity.  |  Thus,  on  the  morning  of  the  14th,  General  Grant's  army  of  15,000 
men  could  and  should  have  been  confronted  with  nearly  if  not  quite  25,000 
men,  who,  promptly  handled,  must  have  so  effectually  beaten  their  adversary, 
taken  at  such  disadvantage,  before  the  advent  of  Lew  Wallace  that  afternoon, 
as  to  have  enhanced  the  victory  for  the  Confederates  by  the  immediate  defeat 
of  Wallace  also. 

What  happened  from  the  policy  adopted  by  the  Confederate  general  in 
chief  may  be  briefly  stated :  Fort  Donelson  was  surrendered  at  2  A.  M.  on  the 
16th  of  February,  and  with  it  11,600  men.  In  the  expressive  words  of  Gen 
eral  Johnston's  telegram,  which  reached  me  at  Corinth,  "  We  lost  all."  And 
as  in  the  business  of  war,  as  in  all  other  material  human  affairs,  "  the  omis 
sion  to  do  that  which  is  necessary  seals  a  commission  to  a  blank  of  dangers," 
so  was  it  now.  The  failure  to  employ  opportunely  all  possible  available 
resources  against  General  Grant,  and  the  consequent  loss  of  Donelson,  with 
its  invaluable  garrison,  carried  immediately  in  its  train  the  irrevocable  loss 
of  Nashville  also,  with  the  early  abandonment  of  Middle  Tennessee.  Another 
irrevocable  consequence  was  the  evacuation  of  Columbus,  with  incalculable 
moral  detriments.  And  had  the  stroke  consummated  at  Donelson  been  vigor 
ously  pressed  to  its  proper  military  corollary, —  Buell  being  left  to  look  after  the 
remains  of  Johnston's  army, —  General  Grant's  victorious  army  of  25,000  men, 
with  the  resources  of  transportation  at  its  disposal,  might  have  been  thrown 
within  ten  days,  at  latest,  after  the  fall  of  Donelson,  upon  the  rear  of  General 
Folk's  forces  at  Columbus  and  their  easy  capture  thus  have  been  assured. 

Going  no  farther  in  the  direction  of  Columbus  than  Jackson,  in  West  Ten 
nessee,  fifty-seven  miles  north  of  Corinth,  I  there  established  my  head 
quarters,  and  called  thither  Colonel  Jordan,  my  chief  of  staff,  who  had  gone 
to  Columbus  direct  from  Virginia  (with  Captain  D.  B.  Harris,  my  chief  engi- 

|  It  is  noteworthy  that  in  the  movement  to  Nashville  from  Bowling  Green,  Breekinridge's  division 
was  marched  twenty-seven  miles  one  day.  —  G.  T.  B. 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  SHILOH.  573 

neer)  to  inspect  the  command.  His  report  upon  rejoining  me  about  the  17th 
of  February,  and  that  of  Captain  Harris,  regarding  the  exaggerated  exten 
sion  of  the  lines,  coupled  with  a  faulty  location,  imperfect  command  of  the 
river,  and  defective  organization  of  the  troops,  confirmed  my  opinion  that 
the  place  could  not  be  evacuated  too  soon.  General  Polk,  whom  I  also  called 
to  Jackson,  I  found  possessed  with  a  belief  in  the  defensive  capacity  of  the 
position  and  averse  to  its  abandonment.  However,  upon  my  exposition  of 
its  salieney,  and  the  ease  with  which  its  communications,  both  by  railway 
and  water,  might  be  broken,  he  changed  his  views.  As,  meanwhile  G-eneral 
Johnston  had  telegraphed  that  I  must  do  with  respect  to  Columbus  as  my 
"  judgment  dictates " ;  and  also,  that  "  the  separation  of  our  armies  is  now 
complete  " ;  and  further,  as  upon  my  report  of  the  situation  at  Columbus  the 
Confederate  War  Department  had  consented,  on  the  19th  of  February  Gen 
eral  Polk  was  directed  to  prepare  to  evacuate  the  position  without  delay. 
It  was  only  to  be  held  long  enough  to  remove  its  invaluable  ordnance 
to  the  batteries  erected  or  under  construction  at  Island  Number  Ten 
and  Madrid  Bend,  to  New  Madrid  and  to  Fort  Pillow,  upon  which  the 
ultimate  defense  of  the  Mississippi  River  must  depend  thereafter.  The 
preparation  of  these  works  for  the  vital  service  hoped  from  them  was  now 
intrusted  to  Captain  D.  B.  Harris,  who  subsequently  left  so  brilliant  a  rec 
ord  as  a  consummate  engineer  at  Charleston  and  Savannah,  Drewry's  Bluff 
and  Petersburg. 

On  the  25th  of  February  commenced  the  evacuation  of  a  position  the 
attempt  to  hold  which  must  have  resulted  in  the  loss  by  capture  of  the  corps 
of  at  least  13,000  men  thus  isolated,  or,  on  the  other  hand,  if  left  intact  or 
unassailed  by  the  enemy,  must  have  been  rendered  wholly  unavailable  in  the 
formation  of  a  Confederate  army  for  the  recoveiy  of  what  had  been  lately 
lost, —  a  corps  without  which  no  such  army  could  have  been  possibly  assem 
bled  at  Corinth  as  early  as  the  1st  of  April,  1862. 

Because  of  a  severe  bronchial  affection  contracted  by  exposure  before  leav 
ing  Bowling  Green,  I  had  not  assumed  formal  command  of  the  military  dis 
trict  assigned  to  me,  though  virtually  directing  all  the  movements  within  it, 
and  arduously  endeavoring  to  become  acquainted  with  the  chief  points  within 
its  limits, —  a  course  specially  requested  of  me  by  General  Johnston  through 
his  adjutant-general,  in  the  event  that  I  should  not  feel  "well  enough  to 
assume  command." 

Meanwhile,  threatened  by  Buell's  presence  with  a  large  army  in  front  of 
Nashville,  General  Johnston,  following  the  line  of  retreat  (marked  out  as 
early  as  February  7th)  to  Stevenson,  in  north-eastern  Alabama,  had  moved 
as  far  in  that  direction  as  Murfreesboro',  where  he  assembled  about  17,000 
men  by  the  23d  of  February,  who  were  there  subdivided  into  3  divisions  each 
of  2  brigades,  with  a  "reserve"  under  Brigadier-General  Breckinridge,  and 
several  cavalry  regiments  unattached. 

As  the  system  of  the  "passive  defensive"  hitherto  pursued  had  only  led 
us  to  disaster, — the  natural  fruits,  in  fact,  of  the  system, — encouraged  by  the 
latitude  that  was  given  me  in  General  Johnston's  telegram  of  February  18th, 


574  THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  SHILOH. 

I  resolved  to  exert  myself  to  the  utmost,  despite  all  that  was  so  unpromising, 
to  secure  the  means  for  an  aggressive  campaign  against  the  enemy,  of  whose 
early  movement  up  the  Tennessee  there  were  already  such  indications  that 
there  should  be  no  doubt  as  to  its  objective. 

But  as  General  Johnston's  projected  line  of  retrograde  upon  Stevenson 
must  with  each  day's  march  widen  the  distance  between  that  army  and  the 
corps  of  General  Polk,  while  General  Grant,  naturally  flushed  with  his  recent 
signal  successes,  would  be  left  free  at  any  moment  to  move  up  the  Tennessee 
to  Hamburg  or,  indeed,  to  Eastport,  and  thus,  by  seizing  the  Memphis  and 
Charleston  railroad,  effectually  separate  and  virtually  neutralize  the  two  Con 
federate  armies, — my  sole  force  left  available  for  the  protection  of  that 
important  railway,  exclusive  of  General  Folk's  forces  at  Columbus  and  else 
where,  would  be  but  2500  men  under  Chalmers,  in  the  quarter  of  luka,  with 
3000  men  recently  arrived  at  Corinth  from  New  Orleans,  under  Ruggles. 

With  a  view  to  avoiding  such  a  catastrophe  as  the  enforced  permanent 
separation  of  our  two  armies,  I  urged  General  Johnston,  about  the  22d  of 
February,  to  abandon  his  line  of  march  toward  Stevenson,  and  to  hasten  to 
unite  his  army  with  such  troops  as  I  might  be  able  to  assemble,  meanwhile,  at 
the  best  point  to  cover  the  railroad  center  at  Corinth  together  with  Memphis, 
while  holding  Island  Number  Ten  and  Fort  Pillow.  This  plan,  of  course, 
required  more  troops  than  our  united  armies  would  supply.  Therefore,  on  the 
22d  of  February,  I  dispatched  staff-officers  with  a  circular  addressed  to  the 
governors  of  Alabama,  Louisiana,  Mississippi,  and  Tennessee  respecting  the 
supreme  urgency  and  import  of  the  situation,  in  all  its  phases,  and  invoking 
their  utmost  exertions  to  send  me,  each  of  them,  from  5000  to  10,000  men  as 
well  armed  and  equipped  as  possible,  enrolled  for  90  days,  within  which  period, 
by  timely,  vigorous  action,  I  trusted  we  might  recover  our  losses,  and  assure 
the  defense  of  the  Mississippi  River,  j]  At  the  same  time  I  appealed  to  Gen 
eral  Bragg  for  such  troops  as  he  could  possibly  spare  temporarily  in  such  an 
exigency,  from  Mobile  and  Pensacola;  and  to  General  Lovell  for  the  like  aid 
from  New  Orleans.  To  General  Van  Dorn,  represented  to  have  an  army 
twenty  thousand  strong  in  Arkansas,  I  likewise  sent,  on  the  21st  of  February, 
a  most  pressing  invitation  to  come  in  haste  to  our  aid  with  as  many  men  as 
possible,  by  way  of  New  Madrid.  To  him  I  wrote  ("O.  E.,"  VII.,  900) :  "  The 
fate  of  Missouri  necessarily  depends  on  the  successful  defense  of  Columbus 
and  of  Island  Number  Ten;  hence  we  must,  if  possible,  combine  our  opera 
tions  not  only  to  defend  those  positions,  but  also  to  take  the  offensive  as  soon 
as  practicable  to  recover  some  lost  ground." 

General  Johnston  acceded  to  my  views  and  request,  though  he  did  not 
put  his  troops  in  motion  until  the  28th  of  February,  and  although  he 
regarded  the  projected  attempt  to  unite  his  army  with  mine  a  "hazardous 
experiment."  \ 

j>  See  "Military  Operations  of  General  Beaure-  those  who  are  declaiming  against  me  will  be 

gard"  (N.  Y. :  Harper  &  Brothers),  I.,  240-241.  without  an  argument."  —  "Life  of  General  A.  S. 

\  "If  I  join  this  corps  to  the  forces  of  Beaure-  Johnston."  Letter  dated  Decatur,  Alabama,  March 

gard  (I  confess  a  hazardous  experiment),  then  18th,  1862,  p.  521.— G.  T.  B. 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  SHILOH.  575 

The  evacuation  of  Columbus  was  successfully  completed  on  the  2d  of  March, 
apparently  without  any  suspicion  on  the  part  of  our  adversary  in  that  quar 
ter  that  such  an  operation  had  been  going  on,  or  without  the  least  show  of 
that  vigilance  and  vigor  that  were  to  be  apprehended  from  him  after  the 
series  of  most  serious  disasters  for  the  Confederate  arms  which  had  character 
ized  the  month  of  February,  1862.  About  seven  thousand  men  were  now 
placed  at  New  Madrid,  and  in  the  quarter  of  Island  Number  Ten,  under  the 
command  of  General  McCown,  while  the  rest  of  General  Folk's  force  was  with 
drawn  along  the  line  of  the  Mobile  and  Ohio  railroad  as  far  south  as  Hum- 
boldt,  and  there  held  in  observation,  with  a  small  detachment  of  infantry 
left  at  Union  City,  and  some  five  hundred  cavalry  thrown  well  out  toward 
Hickman,  on  the  Mississippi  below  Columbus,  and  extending  across  to  the 
Tennessee  River  in  the  quarter  of  Paris,  to  watch  and  report  all  material 
movements  upon  either  river. 

Reliable  information  reached  me  that  while  General  Pope  was  on  his  march 
on  the  Missouri  side  of  the  Mississippi,  to  strike  at  New  Madrid,  such  was 
the  urgency  of  the  danger  impending  by  way  of  the  Tennessee  River  that  it 
threatened  the  fatal  hindrance  of  the  conjunction  of  our  forces,  as  already 
arranged  about  the  23d  of  February,  in  response  to  my  dispatch  through  my 
aide-de-camp,  Captain  Ferguson.  Growing  profoundly  apprehensive,  on  the 
2d  of  March  I  dispatched  Captain  Otey,  an  assistant  adjutant-general  on 
my  staff,  with  a  note  to  General  Johnston  which  contained  these  words : 
"I  send  herewith  inclosed  a  slip  showing  intended  movements  of  the 
enemy,  no  doubt  against  the  troops  in  Western  Tennessee.  I  think 
you  ought  to  hurry  up  your  troops  to  Corinth  by  railroad,  as  soon  as  prac 
ticable,  for  [tjhere  •&  or  thereabouts  will  be  fought  the  great  battle  of  this 
controversy." 

I  thus  fixed  upon  Corinth  as  the  Confederate  base,  because  the  recent 
movements  of  our  enemy  up  the  Tennessee  could  only  be  intelligently  con 
strued  as  having  the  Memphis  and  Charleston  railroad  primarily,  and  such 
a  railway  center  as  Corinth  later,  as  their  immediate  objectives.  ,1 

•fe  Evidently  the  word  "  here,"  as  it  appears  in  to  foretell  in  January,  1862,  that  a  battle  would  be 

the  original  letter  as  it  reached  General  John-  f  ought  at  "Shiloh  Church,"  General  Johnston  must 

ston,  did  not  refer  and  could  not  possibly  have  also  have  foreseen  at  that  moment  that  within  the 

referred  to  Jackson,  but  to  Corinth,  as  is  shown  next  thirty  days  General  Grant  would  strike  and 

by  the  context  of  that  letter  and  of  others  rel-  capture  the  Confederate  center  at  Forts  Henry  and 

ative  to  Corinth  as  the  evident  Federal  objec-  Donelson,  with  one-fourth  of  the  entire  force  under 

tive. —  G.  T.  B.  General  Johnston's  command  at  the  time,  as  also 

J  To  say,  as  has  been  done,  with  apparent  seri-  obtain  the  control  of  both  the  Tennessee  and  Cum- 
ousness,  by  Colonel  W.  P.  Johnston  [see  p.  549  of  berland  rivers  as  far  as  navigable;  thus  forcing 
the  present  work],  that  his  father  "  sent "  me  at  any  the  immediate  loss  by  abandonment  of  the  Confed- 
time,  "  with  instructions  to  concentrate  all  avail-  erates  in  turn  of  Bowliiig  Green,  Nashville,  and  Co- 
able  forces  near  Corinth, —  a  movement  previously  lumbus  ;  foreseen  a,lso  that  General  Grant  would 
begun," — is  a  sheer  invention  that  is  twin-born  straightway  establish  himself  at  so  unfavorable  a 
with  the  fable  concerning  General  Johnston  and  base  of  operations  as  Pittsburg  Landing  rather 
the  map  upon  which  in  January,  1862,  it  is  alleged,  than  at  Hamburg,  which  was  really  about  to  be 
he  pointed  out  a  position  which  had  been  marked  by  made  the  Federal  base  of  operations  when  the  bat- 
the  engineers  "  Shiloh  Church,"  and  said  in  effect:  tie  of  Shiloh  interrupted  the  movement.  Under  no 
"Here  the  great  battle  of  the  South-east  will  be  other  conditions  could  there  have  been  a  battle  at 
fought"  ("Life  of  General  A.  S.  Johnston,"  by  Shiloh  Church,  a  mere  log-cabin,  unmarked  on  any 
W.  P.  Johnston,  pp.  488-490).  Now,  to  be  able  map  existing  in  January,  1862. —  G.  T.  B. 


576 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  SHILOH. 


LIEUTENANT-GENERAL  JOHN  C.  BHECKJNEIDGE,  C.  S.  A 
KKOM.A  PHOTOGRAPH.       (SEE  ALSO  PAGE  377.) 


On  the  5th  of  March  I  formally  as 
sumed  command  of  the  district,  retain 
ing  my  headquarters  for  the  time  at 
Jackson  as  the  most  central  point 
of  observation  and  the  junction  of 
two  railroads.  General  Bragg's  forces 
began  to  arrive  at  Corinth  on  the  6th, 
when  they,  with  the  other  troops  reach 
ing  there  from  other  quarters,  were 
organized  as  fast  as  possible  into  bri 
gades  and  divisions. 

As  a  material  part  of  the  history  of 
the  campaign,  I  might  here  dwell  upon 
the  perplexing,  inexplicable  lack  of 
cordial  cooperation,  in  many  ways,  in 
the  essential  work  of  organizing  the 
Confederate  army  being  assembled  at 
Corinth,  as  efficiently  and  speedily  as 
possible  for  the  work  ahead,  that  was 
manifested  by  the  War  Department  at 
Richmond,  but  it  must  suffice  to  say 
that  a  drawback  was  encountered  from 
that  quarter  which  served  to  delay  us,  while  helping  to  make  the  operation 
which  we  finally  took  in  hand  fall  greatly  short  of  its  momentous  aim. 

Five  Federal  divisions  (reenforced  a  few  days  later)  had  reached  Savannah, 
twelve  miles  below  Pittsburg  Landing,  on  the  east  bank  of  the  Tennessee, 
by  the  13th  of  March.  This  force,  aggregating  some  43,000  men  of  all  arms, 
was  under  the  direct  command  of  General  C.  F.  Smith,  and  embraced  the 
greater  part  of  the  army  that  had  triumphed  at  Donelson.  One  division, 
without  landing  at  Savannah,  was  dispatched,  under  General  "W.  T.  Sherman, 
to  endeavor  to  land,  and  to  reach  and  cut  some  trestle-work  near  Burnsville, 
on  the  Memphis  and  Charleston  railroad.  Effecting  a  landing,  short,  however, 
of  Eastport,  the  intervening  country  was  found  so  inundated  as  to  be  seem 
ingly  impracticable.  So,  this  expedition,  hardly  characterized  by  a  really 
vigorous  effort  to  reach  the  railroad,  was  abortive  —  a  result  aided  somewhat 
by  the  opportune  presence  on  the  ground  of  Brigadier-General  Chalmers  with 
a  Confederate  force  of  2500  infantry.  On- his  way  upon  this  expedition,  Gen 
eral  Sherman  had  wisely  sent  back  from  Pittsburg  Landing  a  request  that 
a  Federal  division  should  be  dispatched  at  once  to  that  point,  to  prevent  the 
Confederate  forces  from  occupying  it  and  obstructing  his  return  ;  consequently 
Hurlbut's  division  was  sent  thither,  and  it  was  found  on  its  transports  at  that 
point  by  Sherman  on  his  return  that  far  down  the  river  on  the  16th  of  March. 
Sherman,  landing  there  his  own  division,  made  an  apparently  objectless  short 
march  into  the  interior  and  back  on  the  17th  of  March.  Making  his  report  the 
same  day  to  General  Grant,  who  had  just  reached  Savannah,  General  Sherman 
stated  that  he  was  "  strongly  impressed  with  the  position  "  of  Pittsburg  Land- 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  SHILOH. 


577 


SLAVES    LABORING    AT    NIGHT    ON   THE    CONFEDERATE    EARTHWORKS    AT    CORINTH. 

ing,  "for  its  land  advantages  and  its  strategic  character.  The  ground  itself 
admits  of  easy  defense  by  a  small  command,  and  yet  affords  admirable  camping- 
ground  for  one  hundred  thousand  men."  Unquestionably,  it  was  upon  this 
report  that  Pittsburg,  rather  than  Hamburg,  was  made  the  Federal  base ;  for 
Hurlbut's  and  Sherman's  divisions  were  immediately  ordered  ashore  to 
encamp  upon  a  prescribed  line,  while,  on  the  same  day  General  Grant  directed 
all  the  other  troops  at  Savannah  except  one  division  to  be  immediately  sent 
to  the  same  point ;  Wallace's  division  being  left,  however,  at  Crump's  Land 
ing.  About  the  position  thus  taken  by  the  Federal  army,  there  can  hardly 
be  two  professional  opinions.  It  gave  their  adversary  an  opportunity  for  an 
almost  fatal  counterstroke  such  as  has  rarely  been  afforded  to  the  weaker  of 
two  belligerents  in  all  the  sinews  and  resources  of  war.  A  narrow  cul  de  sac, 
formed  by  Snake  Creek  and  Lick  Creek,  with  the  broad  bank-full  river  form 
ing  its  bottom,  tactically  as  well  as  strategically  it  was  a  false  position  for  an 
invading  army,  and  I  may  add  that,  having  been  occupied,  the  exigent  pre 
caution,  under  the  circumstances,  of  making  a  place  cVarmes  of  it  was  wholly 
overlooked,  though  it  was  barely  twenty-three  miles  distant  from  Corinth, 
where,  according  to  the  Federal  general's  reports  of  the  period,  a  supposed 
Confederate  army  of  from  50,000  to  60,000  men  were  concentrated. 

Previously,  or  as  early  as  the  3d  of  March,  Pope,  with  about  19,000  "  present 
for  duty,"  had  appeared  before  New  Madrid,  in  Missouri,  the  essentially 
weak  or  most  vulnerable  point  of  our  upper  Mississippi  defenses.  $  Delaying 

3>  Five  divisions  each  of  2  brigades,  3  regiments  of  cavalry,  a  body  of  unattached  troops,  including 
some  "regulars,"  and  11  batteries  of  field-artillery.     "Official  Records,"  VIIL,  94.— G.  T.  B. 

VOL.  I.   37 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  SHILOH. 

his  attack,  however,  until  the  12th, — until  siege-guns  could  be  brought 
up, — the  works  there  were  easily  made  so  untenable  that  General  McCown 
abandoned  them  and  transferred  his  forces,  at  night,  across  the  river  to  sup 
port  the  heavy  batteries  at  Madrid  Bend  and  Island  Number  Ten. 

About  the  time  Pittsburg  Landing  was  made  General  Grant's  base,  I  had 
collected  within  easy  marches  of  Corinth  about  23,000  men  of  all  arms  of  the 
service,  independent  of  the  forces  of  General  Polk, — giving,  with  his  troops 
and  including  those  at  Forts  Pillow  and  Madrid  Bend,  an  aggregate  of  at 
most  44,000  men,  of  excellent  personality  but  badly  armed — particularly  the 
cavalry,  some  of  whom  had  no  arms  at  all.  The  new  forces,  with  the  excep 
tion  of  those  from  Mobile,  Pensacola,  and  New  Orleans,  were  raw  and  undis 
ciplined.  Made  aware  by  the  great  number  of  transports  |  that  were  now 
plying  up  and  down  the  Tennessee  of  the  magnitude  of  the  invasion  that 
clearly  threatened  the  seizure  of  the  Memphis  and  Charleston  railroad,  the  delay 
on  the  part  of  the  Bowling  Green  forces  filled  both  General  Bragg  and  myself 
with  great  solicitude.  Meanwhile,  on  the  15th  of  March,  General  Johnston 
addressed  me  by  telegraph :  "  Have  you  had  the  south  bank  of  the  Hatchee 
examined  near  Bolivar  1  I  recommend  it  to  your  attention.  It  has,  besides 
the  other  advantages,  that  of  being  further  from  the  enemy's  line," — that 
is,  Pittsburg  Landing.  As  the  essential  point  for  us,  however,  was  to 
strike  a  blow  at  General  Grant  so  soon  as  General  Johnston's  troops  were 
united  with  mine,  but  before  Buell's  junction  with  the  exposed  army  at 
Pittsburg,  I  could  see  no  possible  advantage  in  the  least  increase  of  dis 
tance  from  our  real  objective  so  soon  as  the  advent  of  General  Johnston's 
troops  should  give  us  the  power  to  undertake  the  offensive.  Exposing  these 
features  of  the  situation,  I  again  urged  General  Johnston  to  hurry  his  forces 
forward. 

On  the  22d  of  March  he  reached  Corinth  with  his  staff,  and  I  went  down 
from  Jackson  to  meet  him.  Proceeding  at  once  to  explain  to  him  what 
resources  had  been  collected  and  all  that  was  known  of  the  position  and 
numbers  of  our  adversary  at  Pittsburg,  as  also  my  views  of  the  imperative 
necessity  for  an  immediate  movement  against  that  adversary  lest  Buell's 
forces  should  become  a  fatal  factor  in  the  campaign,  to  my  surprise  General 
Johnston,  with  much  emotion,  informed  me  that  it  was  his  purpose  to  turn 
over  to  me  the  command  of  the  entire  force  being  assembled  at  Corinth,  and 
thereafter  confine  himself  to  the  duties  of  department  commander,  with  his 
headquarters  either  at  Memphis  or  Holly  Springs,  in  Mississippi.  This  course, 
as  he  explained,  he  felt  called  upon  to  take  in  order  to  restore  confidence  to 
the  people  and  even  the  army,  so  greatly  impaired  by  reason  of  recent  disas 
ters.  Thoroughly  understanding  and  appreciating  his  motives  (and  about 
these  and  his  words  there  could  be  no  possible  misinterpretation),  I  declined  as 
altogether  unnecessary  the  unselfish  tender  of  the  command,  but  agreed,  after 
some  further  exchange  of  views  touching  the  military  situation,  to  draw  up 
a  plan  for  the  organization  of  our  forces,  and,  as  second  in  command,  to 
supervise  the  task  of  organization. 

4.  Sixty-one  of  these  transports  were  reported  to  have  passed  by  a  point  known  as  Coffee.—  G.  T.  B. 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  SHILOH.  579 

By  the  27th  of  March  the  last  of  General  Hardee's  corps  reached  the  vicinity 
of  Corinth, — about  8000  men, — while  Crittenden's  division  of  5000  men  was 
halted  at  Burnsville  and  luka,  eastward  of  Corinth.  The  order  of  organiza 
tion,  signed  by  General  Johnston,  was  published  on  the  29th  of  March.  Based 
on  my  notes,  it  had  been  drawn  up  by  Colonel  Jordan,  and  subdivided  the 
armies  of  Kentucky  and  Mississippi,  now  united,  into  three  army  corps, 
with  reserves  of  cavalry,  artillery,  and  infantry,  the  corps  under  Major-Gen 
erals  Polk,  Bragg,  and  Hardee  respectively,  and  the  reserve  (two  brigades) 
under  Major-General  G.  B.  Crittenden.  On  the  30th  of  March,  Colonel 
Maekall  having  been  promoted  and  assigned  to  the  command  of  the  river 
defenses  at  Madrid  Bend,  Colonel  Jordan  was  formally  announced  as  the 
adjutant-general  of  the  "Army  of  the  Mississippi,"  and  on  the  following  day 
Brigadier-General  Breckinridge  was  substituted  for  General  Crittenden  in  the 
command  of  the  reserve. 

So  much  longer  time  than  I  had  anticipated  had  been  taken  in  effecting 
the  junction  of  the  "  Central  Army  "  with  mine,  agreed  upon  as  far  back  as 
the  23d  of  February,  that  we  were  scarcely  as  ready  for  assuming  the  offen 
sive  as  I  had  hoped  to  be,  at  latest  by  the  1st  of  April. 

However,  on  the  night  of  the  2d  of  April,  after  10  o'clock,  a  dispatch  from 
Brigadier-General  Cheatham,  in  command  at  Bethel  Station,  twenty  odd 
miles  north  of  Corinth,  reached  me  through  General  Polk,  to  the  effect  that 
he  was  being  menaced  by  General  Lew  Wallace's  division.  Assuming  that  the 
enemy  had  divided  his  forces  for  an  operation  against  the  Mobile  and  Ohio 
railroad  at  Bethel,  I  thus  indorsed  the  dispatch :  "  Now  is  the  moment  to 
advance  and  strike  the  enemy  at  Pittsburg  Landing."  Colonel  Jordan 
was  then  asked  to  carry  it  at  once  to  General  Johnston,  who,  after  reading 
both  dispatch  and  indorsement,  accompanied  by  Colonel  Jordan,  went 
to  General  Bragg's  quarters  near  by.  That  officer,  already  in  bed,  imme 
diately  agreed  with  my  recommendation.  General  Johnston  presented  objec 
tions  in  effect  that  our  forces  were  not  as  yet  ready  for  the  movement,  and 
that  we  could  not  move  up  our  reserve  in  time.  Colonel  Jordan,  however, 
was  able  to  reassure  him  on  these  points  by  expressing  my  conviction  that 
we  were  as  ready  now  as  we  could  hope  to  be  for  some  time  to  come,  whereas 
the  union  of  Buell's  forces  with  Grant,  which  might  be  anticipated  at  an 
early  day,  would  make  any  offensive  operation  on  our  side  out  of  the  ques 
tion.  Thereupon,  General  Johnston  instructed  Colonel  Jordan  to  issue  the 
orders  for  the  movement.  This  was  done  in  General  Bragg's  bed-chamber, 
in  a  "  circular"  to  the  three  corps  commanders  directing  them  "  to  hold  their 
commands  in  hand,  ready  to  advance  upon  the  enemy  in  the  morning  by 
6  A.  M.,  with  3  days'  cooked  rations  in  haversacks,  100  rounds  of  ammunition 
for  small  arms,  and  200  rounds  for  field-pieces.  Carry  2  days'  cooked  sub 
sistence  in  wagons  and  2  tents  to  the  company."  These  orders  reached  the 
hands  of  Generals  Polk  and  Hardee  by  1 : 30  A.  M.,  and  General  Breckinridge 
was  notified  to  the  same  effect  by  telegraph  that  night. 

As  it  had  been  agreed  between  General  Johnston  and  myself,  the  day 
after  his  arrival  at  Corinth,  that  all  orders  relating  to  our  operations  in  that 


580 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  SHILOH. 


?;-•  f :  acEE 
"  doSS 

'   .       ~-  "•'•.'  ^.""    "^s»^"v    ,.   '"*,•;*_?'. -*frw"  - ""  '   • 

'>[-";.-'-''-.'/  ^.  .     ,'   "'"  '~'-'-     ^    •  .  "*  '      *'."A-*;    '^"""-A  '    *'"  —      "'.""li'"V1''  •'•^:-*- 

^»v>-."  "A  ^4^»3^^L-  '^••^^^:r:^'^ 


quarter,  as,  also,  touching  re 
organization,  should  be  left  in 
my  hands,  during  the  night  of 
the  2d  of  April  I  had  made 
notes  regulating  the  order  of 
march  from  Corinth  to  Pitts- 
burg,  and  the  manner  of  bring 


ing  on  the  battle,  which  I  hand 
ed  to  Colonel  Jordan  soon  after 
daylight  the  next  morning. 
Those  notes  served  as  the  basis 
of  Special  Orders,  No.  8  of  that 
date,  issued  in  the  name  of 
General  Johnston.  However, 
before  these  orders  were  finally 


:^:-'^mt  o,  ,v- ,;  /& 


hich  Albert  Sidney  Johnston's  body  la 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  SHILOH. 


581 


•written,  all  the  details  were  explained  to  and  discussed  by  me  with  Gen 
eral  Johnston,  who  came  early  to  my  headquarters ;  next,  before  10  A.  M., 
I  explained  to  and  instructed  Generals  Polk,  Bragg,  and  Hardee,  also,  at 
my  headquarters,  in  the  presence  of  General  Johnston  and  of  one  another, 
precisely  what  each  of  them  had  to  do  with  their  respective  corps  that 
day,  and  they  were  severally  directed  to  put  their  corps  in  motion  by  the 
described  roads  in  the  direction  of  the  enemy,  by  12  meridian,  without 
further  order. 

Though  the  distance  to  be  traversed  was  barely  twenty-three  miles,  it  was 
no  easy  matter  to  move  an  army  of  thirty  odd  thousand  essentially  raw  troops, 
with  their  artillery,  through  so  densely  wooded  a  country  as  that  intervening 
between  Corinth  and  our  objective.  Of  the  two  narrow  country  roads  that 
existed,  the  shorter  was  assigned  to  Bragg's  corps,  because  it  was  the  one 
immediately  contiguous  to  it ;  while  to  Hardee's  corps  was  given  the  initiation 
of  the  movement,  with  the  longest  line  of  march  as  well  as  the  front  line 
in  the  approaching  onset,  because  it  was  made  up  of  troops  most  hardened 
by  long  marches,  and  the  best  trained  in  field  service.  Folk's  corps 
followed  Hardee's  necessarily,  because  there  was  no  other  way  for  it,]) 


j;  As  for  marching  upon  Pittsburg  in  three  sep 
arate  columns  of  corps,  as  would  seem  to  be  indi 
cated  in  the  cipher  dispatch  to  Mr.  Davis  of  the 
3d  of  April,  the  terrain  to  be  passed  over  made 
such  a  movement  an  absolute  impossibility.  And 
I  must  add,  that  another  pretension  set  up  by 
Colonel  Johnston,  supported  by  Mr.  Davis,  is  flatly 
contradicted  by  the  official  reports  of  the  corps 
commanders,  which  show  that  they  entered  battle 
exactly  as  prescribed  in  Special  Orders,  No.  8. 

Apropos  of  the  alleged  missing  dispatch  of  April 
4th,  Mr.  Davis  has  asseverated  as  recently  as  the 
spring  of  1887,  that  it  was  in  a  different  cipher 
from  that  of  April  3d,  which  erroneously  described 
the  manner  of  march,  not  only  in  date  and  matter, 
but  in  the  character  of  cipher  used,  being  in  a 
cipher  that  he  had  sent  General  Johnston  specially 
for  such  a  dispatch:  a  fatal  statement  in  view  of  the 
fact  that  there  is  to  be  found  (p.  365,  Vol.  X.,  Part 
II., "Official Records")  this  postscriptum  to  a  letter 
from  Mr.  Davis  to  General  Johnston,  dated  as  late 
as  March  26th,1862: 

"  I  send  you  [by  Mr.  Jack]  a  dictionary,  of  which  I  have 
the  duplicate,  so  that  you  may  communicate  with  me  by 
cipher,  telegraphic  or  written,  as  follows:  First  give  the 
page  by  its  number;  second,  the  column  by  the  letter  L, 
M,  or  K,  as  it  may  be,  in  the  left-hand,  middle,  or  right- 
hand  column ;  third,  the  number  of  the  word  in  the 
column,  counting  from  the  top.  Thus,  the  word  junc 
tion  would  be  designated  by  146,  L,  20." 

That  is,  Mr.  Davis  sent  him  the  very  diction 
ary  which  supplied  the  cipher  into  which  the 
original  of  General  Johnston's  dispatch  to  Mr. 
Davis  of  April  3d  was  translated,  by  one  of  my 
staff,  for  transmission,  having  been  handed  over 
to  me  for  that  purpose  by  General  Johnston  ;  and 
a  copy  of  the  translation  into  that  cipher  is  to  be 
seen,  in  its  due  order  of  date,  in  my  telegraph-book 
of  the  period.  That  Captain  Jack  reached  Corinth 
before  General  Johnston  advanced  against  Pitts- 
burg  is  stated,  page  522  of  Col.  Johnston's  Life  of 


his  father,  on  which  page,  I  may  notice,  is  the  very 
letter  from  Davis  of  the  26th  of  March,  but  with 
the  material  postscriptum  omitted.  After  General 
Johnston's  death,  the  original  of  the  telegram  of 
April  3d  was  found,  but  no  record  of  another  later 
one,  which  Mr.  Davis  claims  to  have  received, 
basing  that  claim,  manifestly,  only  on  the  fact  that 
in  his  own  reply,  dated  April  5th,  he  had  referred 
to  a  telegram  ''of  yesterday,"  which  plainly  could 
only  be  that  of  April  3d,  received,  however,  on 
the  4th,  which  he  erroneously  supposed  to  be  of  that 
date.  That  Mr.  Davis's  telegram  was  an  answer 
to  no  other  dispatch  than  that  of  the  3d  of  April 
is  plain  from  the  text  of  that  answer,  for  it  clearly 
echoes  its  language.  For  the  clear  understanding 
of  this  much-mooted  matter,  I  give  the  exact  cipher 
text  of  the  dispatch  of  April  3d,  as  it  reached  Mr. 
Davis,  as  I  insist,  not  until  April  5th,  and  as  it  is 
of  record  in  my  official  telegram-book  in  its  regu 
lar  order  of  date  as  follows  : 

"CORINTH,  April  3d,  1862,  3  P.  M. 
"  To  THE  PRESIDENT,  RICHMOND,  VA. 

"General  Buell  132.  R.  5  —  166  L  26—250. 
M20  — 250  Rg— 239  M  32— HIM  28— Colum 
bia  43  M  6— Clifton  252  M  6.— 218  M.  26.  Mit 
chell  32.  R.  22— 124.  R.  32.— 276  R  27—248 
M,  1—250  R.  9—59  R.  17  — 108  — M.  20  — 
109.  R. 16  —  175R6ed  — 109  R.  18—  252.  M  6  — 
174  L.  28  —  31  M.  10—69.  L.  12— Pittsburg  — 
84  M.  4  —  111.  M.  28  — Bethel  — 156  M.  4  —  37 
M.  20  —  111.  M.  28  Corinth  — 210  M.  16  111  M. 
28—  Burnsville  —  63  R.  25—252  R.  11  —  169. 
L  12  — Monterey  —  174.  R.  14  — Pittsburg.  Beau- 
regard,  221  R.  10  —  132  R.  5  —  56,  M.  14  — 
Polk  150.  M.  7  — Hardee,  48.  M.  3— Bragg  213 
M.  6  —  276.  M.  22.  Breckinridge  210  M.  16  — 
126  M.  4  — 92.  R.  18  — 32.  M.  28  — Buell  44.  M 
13  —  109  M.  6  —  146.  L.  20— (Signed)  A.  S. 
JOHNSTON,  General  C.  S.  A.'' 

The  translated  text,  as  given  both  by  Mr.  Davis 


582  THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  SHILOH. 

and  next  to  Hardee's  troops   those  under  Polk  had  been   most  seasoned 
by  marching. 

Although  our  troops  were  under  arms  at  an  early  hour  on  the  3d  of  April, 
as  prescribed  in  the  "circular"  order,  it  is  a  part  of  the  history  of  the  cam 
paign  that  the  commanders  of  the  two  leading  corps  not  only  failed  to  put 
their  troops  in  motion  at  least  as  early  as  meridian  on  the  3d  of  April,  but 
did  not  move  until  so  late  in  the  afternoon  as  in  effect  to  cause  our  army  to 
reach  the  presence  of  its  objective  twenty-four  hours  later  than  there  was 
every  reason  to  expect,  considering  the  shortness  of  the  distance  to  be  over 
come.  What  led  to  this  delay  of  the  outset  of  the  Second  and  Third  corps 
has  certainly  never  been  explained  in  any  official  document  which  has  yet 
seen  the  light.  Their  preparations  necessary  for  such  a  movement  were  of 
the  slightest,  or  only  to  cook  five  days'  rations,  and  to  load  a  few  wagons,  for 
the  amount  of  ammunition  to  be  carried  was  no  more  than  they  had  been 
directed  some  days  previously  to  have  and  keep  in  possession  of  the  troops. 
Moreover,  Hardee's  corps  (Folk's  also),  "with  all  detached  brigades,"  had  been 
under  orders  of  "readiness  for  a  field  movement"  ever  since  the  1st  of  April 
("Official  Records,"  Vol.  X.,  Part  II.,  p.  381).  Be  this  as  it  may,  Bragg's  corps 
did  not  quit  the  vicinage  of  Corinth  until  so  late  that  afternoon  that  none  of  it 
reached  Monterey,  twelve  miles  away,  until  the  next  morning  at  8:30,  and 
one  division  (Withers's)  was  not  there  until  late  on  the  4th  of  April.  Har 
dee's  corps,  though  dilatory  in  quitting  Corinth,  would  have  easily  reached  its 
destination  early  enough  on  the  second  day's  march  to  have  been  deployed  on 
the  same  ground  that  it  occupied  on  the  night  of  the  5th,  twenty-four  hours 
later,  had  not  General  Bragg  interposed  his  authority  to  check  its  advance. 
The  march  on  the  4th  was  unaccountably  slow  and  confused,  especially  that  of 
the  Second  Corps,  in  view  of  the  numerous  staff  attached  to  the  headquarters 
of  each  corps.  The  roads  were  extremely  narrow  and  rendered  excessively 
bad  for  artillery  in  some  places  by  the  rains,  while  the  Second  Corps  was 
unused  to  marching;  but  all  this  hardly  made  it  out  of  the  power  of  that  army 
to  reach  its  objective  by  the  night  of  April  4th,  had  there  been  a  closer 
personal  attention  given  to  the  movement  during  that  day  by  those  whose 
duty  it  was  to  execute  Special  Orders,  No.  8.  And  the  cost  was  an  irreme 
diable  loss  of  twenty-four  hours.  Another  misadventure,  that  might  have 
brought  us  sore  disaster,  was  a  cavalry  reconnoissance  with  two  pieces  of  artil 
lery  pushed  forward  without  authority  on  the  4th,  from  Bragg's  corps  into 

and  Colonel  Johnston,  is  in  these  words :  "  COR-  In  publishing    it   as   found  among   his  father's 

INTH,  April  3d,   1862.     General  Buell  in  motion  papers,  the  son  presents  this  telegram  as  "contain- 

30,000  strong,  rapidly  from  Columbia  by  Clifton  ing  the  plan  of  battle  as  General  Johnston  had 

to  Savannah.     Mitchel  behind  him  with  10,000.  originally  devised,  but  not  as  he  had  fought  it; 

Confederate    forces  —  40,000 — ordered    forward  doubtless  in   deference  to   General    Beauregard's 

to   offer  battle    near    Pittsburg.     Division    from  opinion  in   the    matter,   and    for    reasons   which 

Bethel,   main  body  from   Corinth,   reserve    from  seemed  sufficient  at  the  time."  On  the  other  hand, 

Burnsville,  converging  to-morrow  near  Monterey  Mr.  Da  vis  gives  it  not  as  a  plan  of  battle,  but  merely 

on  Pittsburg.     Beauregard   second  in   command,  of  the  march  from  Corinth  to  the  field, —  while  the 

Polk  the  left,  Bragg  the  center,  Hardee  the  right  alleged  missing  dispatch  of  the  4th  of  April  gave 

wing,   Breckinridge   the   reserve.     Hope   engage-  not  only  the  plan  of  battle  as  devised,  but  as  it 

ment  before  Buell  can  form  junction.  was  fought  up  to  the  moment  of  General  John- 

"To  THE  PRESIDENT,  RICHMOND."  ston's  death. —  G.  T.  B. 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  SHILOH.  583 

collision  with  the  enemy  with  such  aggressiveness  that  it  ought  to  have  given 
the  Federal  general  full  notice  that  an  offensive  army  was  close  behind  it,  and 
led  to  immediate  preparation  for  our  onset,  including  intrenchments. 

After  the  Third  Corps  had  reached  its  assigned  position,  on  the  after 
noon  of  the  5th  of  April,  and  the  other  corps  were  in  supporting  distance, 
including  the  reserve  that  had  encountered  a  much  more  difficult  road 
between  Burnsville  and  Monterey  than  had  been  traversed  by  the  other 
troops,  naturally  their  commanders  were  called  together  at  a  point  not  two 
miles  distant  from  Shiloh  Church, — as  it  turned  out,  not  far  in  the  rear  of 
Hardee's  line. 

Of  course,  it  was  recognized  to  be  too  late  for  an  attack  that  day.  More 
over,  it  was  reported  that  the  First  Corps  was  already  nearly  out  of  provisions, 
and  that  the  ammunition  train  was  still  so  far  to  the  rear  as  to  be  unprom 
ising.  The  loss  of  twenty-four  hours,  when  every  hour  was  precious  because 
of  the  imminent  danger  of  Buell's  conjunction,  the  maladroit  manner  in 
which  our  troops  had  been  handled  on  the  march,  and  the  blunder  of  the 
noisy,  offensive  reconnoissance,  coupled  with  these  reports  of  corps  com 
manders,  served  to  satisfy  me  that  the  purpose  for  which  we  had  left  Corinth 
had  been  essentially  frustrated  and  should  be  abandoned  as  no  longer  fea 
sible.  The  military  essence  of  our  projected  operation  was  that  it  should  be 
a  surprise,  whereas,  now,  I  could  not  believe  the  enemy  was  still  ignorant 
of  our  near  presence  with  an  aggressive  intention,  and  if  now  attacked  would 
be  found  intrenched  beyond  the  possibility  of  being  beaten  in  assault  by  so 
raw  and  undisciplined  an  army  as  ours  was,  however  intrepid.  Hence,  an 
imperative  prudence  that  included  the  necessity  for  preserving  that  army 
essentially  intact  for  further  operations  forced  me  to  advise  against  any 
attempt  now  to  attack  the  enemy  in  position  and  to  retrace  our  steps  toward 
our  base  with  the  possible  result  of  leading  him  to  follow  us  away  from  his 
own  and  thus  giving  us  a  probable  opening  to  the  retrieval  of  the  present 
lost  opportunity. 

General  Johnston  listened  needfully  to  what  I  said,  but  answered  that  he 
hoped  not  only  we  should  find  our  enemy  still  unready  for  a  sudden  onslaught, 
but  that  there  was  yet  time  for  it  before  Buell  could  come  up ;  therefore,  he 
should  decide  to  adventure  the  enterprise  as  early  after  dawn  the  next  day 
as  possible,  adding  his  opinion  that  now  our  troops  were  partly  in  line  of 
battle  it  were  "  better  to  make  the  venture."  The  opinions  of  the  corps  com 
manders,  I  may  add,  were  neither  asked  nor  given.  That  my  views  were 
based  on  sound  military  principles  it  seems  to  me  could  be  readily  deduced 
from  what  followed  at  the  battle  of  Shiloh  itself,  were  this  the  place  for  such 
a  discussion. 

So  soon  as  General  Johnston's  decision  was  announced,  the  conference 
ended  with  the  understanding  on  all  sides  that  the  battle  should  be  ventured 
at  dawn  on  the  6th  of  April,  according  to  the  manner  already  prescribed  in 
Special  Orders,  No.  8,  to  which  end  every  exertion  should  be  made  to  place 
our  troops  in  the  best  shape  possible  for  the  attack.  Xo  further  conference 
was  held  that  night  by  General  Johnston  with  myself,  or  with  the  reserve 


584  THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  SHILOH. 

or  corps  commanders;  nor  did  he  issue  any  order  at  all  concerning  the 
impending  battle. 

At  the  first  flush  of  dawn  on  the  6th,  the  Confederate  army  was  promptly 
formed  in  the  three  lines  directed  in  Special  Orders,  No.  8,  except  that  unto- 
wardly  the  left  of  Hardee's  corps,  which,  reenforced  by  Gladden's  division  of 
Bragg' s  corps,  constituted  the  advance,  did  not  rest  on  Owl  Creek,  as  pre 
scribed.  Nine  thousand  and  twenty-four  men  were  in  this  line,  deployed  for 
battle,  and  formed,  as  it  were,  a  heavy  skirmish  line  thrown  forward  to 
embrace  the  whole  Federal  front.  Five  hundred  yards  rearward  was  Bragg's 
corps  (less  Gladden's  division),  10,731  men,  exclusive  of  cavalry,  in  a  line,  as 
far  as  the  nature  of  the  ground  admitted,  of  regiments  massed  in  double  col 
umns  at  half  distance — not  deployed  in  line  of  battle,  as  softie  writers  have 
stated,  coupled  with  criticisms  based  thereon.  General  Folk's  corps  of  9036 
men,  exclusive  of  cavalry,  came  next,  some  800  yards  behind  Bragg  in  a  col 
umn  of  brigades  deployed  in  line  of  battle  on  the  left  of  the  Pittsburg  road, 
each  brigade  having  its  own  battery,  and  there  was  cavalry  protecting  the 
left  of  his  line.  The  reserve,  under  Breckinridge,  of  706*2  men,  exclusive  of 
cavalry,  inarched  in  the  rear  of  Bragg's  right  or  between  the  Pittsburg  road 
and  Lick  Creek.  The  troops  of  the  third  line  were  to  be  thrown  forward 
according  to  the  exigencies  of  the  battle.  The  total  force  thus  sent  for 
ward  against  the  Federal  position  numbered  40,335  rank  and  file,  of  all 
arms,  including  4382  cavalry,  more  than  half  of  whom  were  of  no  other 
military  value  except  for  observation  or  outpost  service  that  did  not  involve 
skirmishing.  [See  estimates,  page  557.] 

On  the  other  hand,  the  force  to  be  assailed  occupied  "a  continuous  line 
from  Lick  Creek,  on  the  [Federal]  left,  to  Owl  Creek,  a  branch  of  Snake 
Creek,  on  the  [Federal]  right,  facing  nearly  south,  and  possibly  a  little  west," 
says  General  Grant.  Their  first  line,  reaching  from  the  bridge  on  Owl  Creek 
to  the  Lick  Creek  ford,  was  held  by  the  divisions  of  Generals  Sherman 
and  Preiitiss ;  three  of  Sherman's  brigades  holding  the  Federal  right,  while 
the  other  (Stuart's)  was  on  the  extreme  left,  with  its  left  resting  on  Lick  Creek. 
This  division  had  from  16  to  18  guns,  and  also  a  cavalry  support.  Prentiss 
occupied  the  intervening  space.  These  two  divisions  numbered  at  least  seven 
teen  thousand  men,  exclusive  of  cavalry.\ 

About  hah0  a  mile  behind  Sherman  and  Prentiss  came  McClernand's  divis 
ion  of  7028  effectives ;  nearer  the  river  were  the  divisions  of  C.  F.  Smith, 
(under  W.  H.  L.  Wallace)  and  of  Huiibut,  aggregating  16,000  men  with  34 
guns.  There  was  also  a  cavalry  force  including  detachments  from  two  "  regu 
lar  "  regiments.  Thus  the  force  encountered  must  have  numbered  forty  thou 
sand  men,  infantry  and  artillery,  supported  by  sixty  odd  guns.  The  ground 
occupied  was  an  undulating  table-land  embraced  between  Owl  Creek  and 
Lick  Creek,  that  run  nearly  in  the  same  general  direction  and  are  about  four 
miles  apart  at  their  mouths.  This  area,  rising  in  some  places  about  one  hun 
dred  feet  above  the  low-water  level  of  the  river,  was  from  three  to  five  miles 

\Prentiss's  division  is  reported  ("Official  Becords,"  Vol.  X.,  Part  L,  112)  as  numbering  but  5463 
men  "  present  for  duty  "  April  5th,  but  2  regiments  and  a  battery  joined  during  the  battle.—  G.  T.  B. 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  SHILOH. 


broad.  Interlaced  by  a  network  of  ravines,  which,  near  the  river,  are  deep, 
with  abrupt  sides,  the  ground  rises  somewhat  ridge-like  in  the  quarter  of 
Lick  Creek,  and  recent  rains  had  made  all  these  depressions  boggy  and  diffi 
cult  for  the  movement  of  artillery  across  them.  A  primitive  forest,  dense 
with  undergrowth,  spread  over  the  whole  space  except  a  few  scattered  farm 
fields  of  from  fifty 
to  seventy-five  acres. 
Pittsburg  Landing, 
near  the  mouth  of 
Snake  Creek,  was 
about  three  miles 
from,  that  of  Lick 
Creek.  The  two  roads 
from  Corinth,  while 
crossing  Lick  Creek 
about  a  mile  asunder, 
come  together  two 
miles  from  Pittsburg. 
A  road  from  Purdy, 
crossing  Owl  Creek  by 
a  bridge  near  Sher 
man's  right,  gave  one 
way  to  reach  the  field 
from  Crump's  Land 
ing,  but  the  shortest 
road  between  the  two 
landings  was  one  near 
the  river  leading  over 
a  bridge  across  Snake 
Creek. 

As  it  has  been  de 
nied  in  the  highest 
quarters  that  the  Con 
federate  attack  on  the  6th  of  April  was  of  the  nature  of  a  surprise,  it  belongs 
to  the  history  of  the  day's  operations  to  give  here  these  words  of  a  note  from 
General  Sherman  to  his  chief,  in  the  afternoon  of  the  5th.  The  "  enemy  is 
saucy,  but  got  the  worst  of  it  yesterday.  ...  I  do  not  apprehend  any 
thing  like  an  attack  upon  our  position."  General  Grant  thereupon  wrote 
to  his  superior,  General  Halleck:  "Our  outposts  have  been  attacked  in  con 
siderable  force.  I  immediately  went  up,  but  found  all  quiet.  ...  I  have 
scarcely  the  faintest  idea  of  an  attack  upon  us."  Moreover,  at  3  o'clock 
P.  M.,  having  visited  the  encampment  of  Colonel  Ammen  near  Savannah, 
General  Grant  informed  that  officer  that  water  transportation  would  be 
furnished  for  his  brigade  of  Xelson's  division,  Army  of  the  Ohio,  on  the 
7th  or  8th  of  April,  or  some  time  early  in  the  week,  and  also  that  there 
would  be  "no  fight "  at  Pittsburg,  but  at  "  Corinth,  where  the  rebels  were 


MAJOR-GKNERAL  BUSHKOD   R.  JOHNSON,   C.   S.   A. 
FROM  A    AVAR-TIME    PHOTOGRAPH. 


586  THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  SHILOH. 

fortified."^  Further,  even  when  leaving  Savannah  the  next  morning,  General 
Grant  scarcely  at  first  can  have  believed  that  his  army  was  being  seriously 
attacked,  for  instead  of  dispatching  to  the  field  the  whole  of  Nelson's  division 
by  steamers,  he  ordered  it  to  march  thither  by  a  wretched  road,  a  march 
that  occupied  nearly  the  whole  day.  Aside,  however,  from  such  documen 
tary  evidence,  or  did  none  exist,  the  absence  of  all  those  ordinary  precautions 
that  habitually  shield  an  army  in  the  field  must  forbid  the  historian  from 
regarding  it  as  other  than  one  of  the  most  surprising  surprises  ever  achieved. 

About  5  A.  M.  the  Confederate  lines  were  set  in  motion.  The  first  collision 
was  in  the  quarter  of  Gladden's  brigade,  on  our  right,  and  with  a  battalion 
of  five  companies  of  the  21st  Missouri  of  Prentiss's  division  dispatched  well 
to  the  front  by  General  Prentiss,  of  his  own  motion,  as  early  as  3  A.  M.  But 
for  this  incident,  due  solely  to  the  intelligent,  soldierly  forethought  of  an 
officer  not  trained  to  the  business  of  war,  the  whole  Federal  front  would 
have  been  struck  wholly  unawares,  for  nowhere  else  had  such  prudence 
been  shown. 

Exactly  at  6  A.  M.  Prentiss's  whole  division  was  under  fire,  and  the  battle 
of  Shiloh  began  in  earnest. 

As  soon  as  the  outburst  of  musketry  and  artillery  gave  notice  that  Hardee's 
line  was  engaged,  General  Johnston  said  that  he  should  go  to  the  front, 
leaving  me  in  the  general  direction,  as  the  exigencies  of  the  battle  might 
arise. ,1  Then  he  rode  forward  with  his  personal  staff  and  the  chief  engineer 
of  the  army,  Colonel  Gilmer,  the  only  officer  of  the  general  staff  in  his  suite, 
Colonel  Jordan,  remaining  with  me.  At  7 : 30  A.  M.,  by  which  time  the  battle 
was  in  full  tide,  as  was  evident  from  the  play  of  artillery  and  the  heavy,  con 
tinuous  rattle  of  small  arms,  I  ordered  Generals  Polk  and  Breckinridge  to 
hasten  forward,  the  first  to  the  support  of  our  now  engaged  left,  and  the  latter 
in  a  like  service  affecting  our  right.  Adjutant-General  Jordan,  whom  I  had 
early  in  the  morning  directed  to  impress  personally  on  the  corps  commanders 
the  value  of  fighting  their  artillery  massed  twelve  guns  at  a  point,  was  also 
now  dispatched  forward  to  overlook  the  field  and  urge  on  the  attack  con 
tinuously  at  as  many  points  as  possible. 

When  our  attack  reached  Sherman's  division,  owing  to  the  failure  of 
Hardee  to  keep  his  left  near  Owl  Creek  as  was  intended,  only  the  left  bri 
gade  of  that  division  on  the  Federal  right  was  struck,  leaving  intact  the  other 
two  to  the  left  of  our  left  flank,  which  were  swiftly  formed  by  General 
Sherman  on  strong  ground  with  a  small  watercourse  in  his  front.  But  the 
other  stricken  brigade  was  swept  out  of  its  encampment,  scattered,  and  took 
no  further  part  as  an  organization  in  the  battle  of  either  day. 

While  Hardee's  left  failed  to  touch  the  enemy's  right,  on  his  own  right 
there  was  left  a  vacant  space  between  it  and  Lick  Creek,  to  fill  which  Chal 
mers's  brigade  of  Withers's  division,  Bragg's  corps,  was  ordered  up  from  the 
second  line,  with  a  battery ;  and  a  hot,  urgent  conflict  ensued  in  that  quarter, 
in  which  General  Johnston  was  present,  after  Chalmers  had  carried  at  least 

&•  Diary  of  Col.  Jacob  Ammen,  "Official  Becords,"  Vol.  X.,  Part  L,  p.  331. 

^  See  report  of  Col.  Thompson,  A.  D.  C.,  p.  570,  "Life  of  General  A.  S.  Johnston,"  by  W.  P.  Johnston. 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  SHILOH.  587 

one  encampment.  In  the  same  quarter  of  the  field  all  of  Withers's  division, 
including  Gladden's  brigade,  reenforced  by  Breckinridge's  whole  reserve,  soon 
became  engaged,  and  Prentiss's  entire  line,  though  fighting  stoutly,  was 
pressed  back  in  confusion.  We  early  lost  the  services  of  the  gallant 
Gladden,  a  man  of  soldierly  aptitudes  and  experience,  who,  after  a  marked 
influence  upon  the  is'sue  in.  his  quarter  of  the  field,  fell  mortally  wounded. 
His  immediate  successor,  Colonel  D.  W.  Adams,  was  also  soon  seriously 
disabled.  Meantime,  on  our  left  (Federal  right)  Ruggles's  division  of  Bragg's 
corps  was  so  strenuously  pressing  the  two  brigades  of  Sherman's  division, 
that  at  the  moment  McClernand's  division  came  up,  Sherman  was  giving 
way  with  the  loss  of  five  or  six  guns.  McClernand  could  not  stay  the  retro 
grade,  and  the  Federal  right  was  forced  back  to  the  line  of  the  road  from 
Purely  to  Hamburg.  There  a  foothold  was  gained  on  a  thickly  wooded 
ridge,  with  a  ravine  in  front,  from  which  two  favorably  posted  batteries 
were  used  with  deadly  effect  for  a  time  upon  our  assailing  force,  now  com 
posed  of  Ruggles's  three  brigades  reenforced  by  several  of  Polk's.  Here, 
again,  the  Federal  line  had  to  give  way,  with  the  loss  of  some  guns. 

By  7:30  Huiibut,  sending  Yeatch's  brigade  of  his  division  to  the  help  of 
Sherman  and  McClernand,  had  gone,  in  person  with  his  two  other  brigades,  to 
the  support  of  Prentiss,  and  with  him  went  8  companies  of  cavalry  and  3 
batteries.  Prentiss's  division  was  met,  however,  in  a  somewhat  fragmentary 
condition,  but  was  rallied  in  the  immediate  rear  of  a  line  which  Huiibut 
formed  along  the  edge  of  a  field  on  favorable  ground  on  the  Hamburg  road, 
southward  of  the  position  last  taken  up  by  McClernand.  Meanwhile  (9  :  30 
A.  M.)  I  had  advanced  my  headquarters  to  a  point  about  a  quarter  of  a  mile  in 
advance  of  the  Shiloh  Meeting  House,  whence  I  dispatched  my  staff  in  all 
directions  to  gather  reports  of  the  progress  of  the  battle  with  its  exigencies 
and  needs  on  our  side,  as,  also,  in  quest  of  stragglers,  whose  numbers  had 
become  dangerously  large  under  the  temptations  of  the  abundant  stores  of 
food  and  other  articles  left  in  the  abandoned  Federal  camps.  $  In  the  work 
of  cleaning  these  encampments  of  stragglers  and  dispatching  them  to  the 
front,  my  cavalry  escort  was  also  effectively  employed. 

As  designated  by  Special  Orders,  No.  8,  Hardee's  corps  having  developed  the 
enemy's  position,  Bragg's  troops  first  and  then  Polk's  on  our  left  and  left 
center,  Withers's  division  of  Bragg's  corps  and  Breckinridge's  reserves  on  the 
right,  had  been  thrown  forward  to  fill  intervening  gaps  and  to  aid  the 
onset.  At  all  points  from  the  right  to  the  left,  the  opposing  forces  had  been 
stoutly  engaged  on  ground  in  rear  of  the  line  of  McClernand's  encampment 
since  9  A.  M.,  when  W.  H.  L.  Wallace  had  carried  forward  his  division  into 
action;  a  division  that,  trained  by  so  thorough  a  soldier  as  General  C.  F. 
Smith,  had  done  most  soldierly  work  at  Donelson,  and  which  Wallace  now 
handled  with  marked  vior.  Its  influence  seemed  to  stiffen  the  Federal 


the  conference  in  the  afternoon  of  April  The    best-disciplined    troops    do    not    fight    well 

5th,  I   had   said  in  support  of  my  recommenda-  on   empty   stomachs.     And   this  is   all  the  more 

tions    to    retire   without    attacking   the    enemy  :  true  of  raw  troops  unaccustomed  to  the  hardships 

"  Nature  has  claims  that  cannot  be  disregarded,  of  war.''  —  G.  T.  B. 


$88 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  SHILOH. 


WOOD    AND    UNDERBRUSH    CALLED    THE   "HORNETS'   NEST."     FROM  A  PHOTOGRAPH    TAKEN    IN    1885. 

center  and  left  center.  Stuart,  commanding  one  of  Sherman's  brigades  strongly 
posted  on  the  extreme  Federal  left,  also,  had  made  so  obstinate  a  stand  that 
he  was  not  forced  from  the  position  until  three  times  his  numbers,  of  "Withers's 
division,  diverted  from  the  main  current  of  the  attack,  were  brought  to  bear 
against  him.  For  some  time  General  Johnston  was  with  that  division,  but  he 
shifted  to  Breckinridge's  division  about  11  A.  M.,  and  remained  closely  in  rear 
alternately  of  either  Bowen's  or  Statham's  brigade  until  mortally  wounded 
near  the  latter,  a  little  after  2  p.  M.  He  took  post  and  remained  on  our 
extreme  right,  and  at  no  time  does  it  appear  from  the  reports  of  subordi 
nates  in  any  other  part  of  the  field  that,  either  personally  or  by  his  staff, 
General  Johnston  gave  any  orders  or  concerned  himself  with  the  general 
movements  of  our  forces.  In  fact,  engrossed  as  he  soon  became  with  the 
operations  of  two  or  three  brigades  on  the  extreme  right,  it  would  have  been 
out  of  his  power  to  direct  our  general  operations,  especially  as  he  set  no 
machinery  in  motion  with  which  to  gather  information  of  what  was  being 
done  elsewhere,  or  generally,  by  the  Confederate  army,  in  order  to  enable 
him  to  handle  it  intelligently  from  his  position  on  the  field. 

Learning  about  1  p.  M.  that  the  Federal  right  (Sherman  and  McClernand) 
seemed  about  to  give  way,  I  ordered  General  Hardee  to  employ  his  cavalry 
(Wharton's  Texas  Bangers)  to  turn  their  flank  and  cut  off  their  retreat  to  the 
river,  an  operation  not  effected  because  a  proper  or  sufficient  detour  to  the 
left  was  not  made;  and  the  gallant  Texans  under  a  heavy  fire  became  involved 
in  ground  impracticable  for  cavalry,  and  had  to  fall  back.  But  Colonel  Whar- 
ton  soon  afterward  dismounted  half  of  his  regiment  and,  throwing  it  forward 
on  foot,  drove  his  adversary  from  the  position. 

The  falling  back  of  Sherman's  and  McClernand's  troops  under  stress  from 
several  brigades  of  Hardee's  corps  with  a  part  of  Ruggles's  division  of  Bragg's, 
aided  by  some  of  Folk's  troops,  left  Wallace  (W.  H.  L.)  on  the  advanced  Fed 
eral  right,  where,  with  Huiibut  and  Prentiss  on  his  left,  in  a  strong,  sheltered 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  SHILOH.  589 

position,  well  backed  by  artillery,  and  held  with  great  resolution,  they 
repulsed  a  series  of  uncombined  assaults  made  against  them.  Here  General 
Bragg  was  directing  operations  in  person;  and  it  was  here  that,  after  Hindman 
had  suffered  severely  in  several  ineffectual  efforts,  Gibson's  brigade  of  Bragg's 
own  corps  was  employed  in  four  unavailing  assaults,  when  finding  himself 
unable  to  carry  the  position,  General  Bragg,  as  he  reports,  desisted  from  any 
further  attempt,  leaving  that  part  of  the  field  in  charge  of  a  staff-officer  with 
authority  to  act  in  his  name,  and  going  farther  to  the  right  to  find  that 
General  Johnston  was  dead.  However,  having  previously  learned,  from  his 
aide-de-camp,  Colonel  Urquhart,  that  Adjutant-General  Jordan  was  near  by,  he 
requested  that  officer,  through  Colonel  Urquhart,  to  collect  and  employ  some 
of  our  troops  to  turn  the  left  of  the  position  that  obstructed  his  advance 
toward  the  river,  as  just  described.  Upon  that  service  Colonel  Jordan,  in  a. 
few  moments,  employed  Statham's  brigade,  which  was  fortunately  found  near 
by,  resting  at  ordered  arms,  General  Breckiiiridge,  to  whom  the  order  was 
given,  being  with  it  at  the  time.  This  happened,  be  it  noted,  at  2:30  p.  M., 
or  about  the  moment  that  General  Johnston  was  bleeding  to  death  in  the 
covert  of  a  deep  ravine  a  very  short  distance  from  Statham's  brigade,  in  the 
immediate  rear  of  which  it  was  that  his  wound  had  been  inflicted.  | 

General  Breckiiiridge  quickly  became  engaged  with  the  enemy  in  his  front, 
covered  by  a  thick  underbrush  that  edged  an  open  field  over  which  the  Con 
federate  advance  was  made.  The  conflict  was  sharp  for  a  few  moments,  but 
the  Federals  had  to  give  way.  Jl  About  this  time,  under  my  orders,  Cheatham 
came  up  with  his  Second  Brigade  on  the  left  of  Breckinridge.  Moreover,  a 
few  moments  later,  or  as  early  as  3  p.  M.,  Withers,  of  Bragg's  corps,  having 
found  that  his  adversary  (Stuart's  brigade)  which  had  so  long  occupied  him  on 
the  extreme  right  had  disappeared  toward  Pittsburg  Landing,  and  having 
moved  across  the  intervening  ravines  and  ridges  with  his  division  to  where  the 
sound  of  artillery  and  musketry  showed  the  main  battle  was  now  raging, — was 
brought  opportunely  into  cooperation  with  Cheatham's  and  Breckinridge's 
operations  directly  upon  Hurlbut's  left  flank  —  a  movement  which  Hurlbut 
resisted  stoutly  until,  justly  apprehensive  of  being  cut  off,  he  fell  back,  after 
4  p.  M.,  upon  Pittsburg  Landing. \  This  left  Prentiss's  left  flank  exposed; 
Wallace,  whose  unflinching  handling  of  his  division  had  done  so  much  to  keep 
the  Federal  army  from  being  driven  to  the  river-side  by  midday,  now  also,  to 

4.  General  Johnston  was  not  wounded  while  that  event,  there  was  in  effect  a  lull  in  the 
leading  a  charge,  as  has  been  so  frequently  operations  on  the  Confederate  right  of  which  Gen- 
asserted,  but  while  several  hundred  yards  in  the  eral  Johnston  had  hitherto  been  the  soul— a  lull 
rear  of  Statham's  brigade  after  it  had  made  a  of  an  hour ;  whereas  it  is  manifest  there  cannot 
successful  advance,  and  during  the  absence  of  have  been  a  cessation  of  the  operations  of 
Governor  Harris  of  his  staff,  whom  he  had  dis-  General  Breckinridge's  troops  for  more  than 
patched  to  Colonel  Statham,  some  two  hundred  fifteen  minutes  at  most,— the  only  troops  whom 
yards  distant,  with  orders  to  charge  and  take  a  General  Johnston  had  been  directing  in  any  way 
Federal  battery  on  his  left.  (See  letter  of  Isham  since  11  A.  M. —  G.  T.  B. 

G.  Harris,  April  13th,  1S7G,  p.  537,  Vol.  I.    "The         \  This  saved  him  from  sharing  the  fate  of  Pren- 

Military  Operations   of  General  Beauregard.")—  tiss,  for  the  strength  of  the  Confederate  force  that 

G.  T.  B.  had  now  been  brought  to  bear  upon  the  remains  of 

j)  Colonel  W.  P.  Johnston  has  sought  to  make  it  Wallace's,  Hurlbut's,  and  Prentiss's  divisions  was 
appear  that  immediately  tipon  the  death  of  his  sufficient  to  assure  their  environment  and  cap- 
father  [see  page  565],  and  in  consequence  of  ture.— G.  T.  B. 


590  THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  SHILOH. 

avoid  being  surrounded,  gave  orders  for  it  to  retire,  and  soon  fell  mortally 
wounded ;  but  a  part  of  his  division  remained  with  Prentiss. 

Sometime  previously  I  had  ordered  General  Hardee  to  gather  all  the  forces 
he  could  and  press  the  enemy  on  our  own  left.  Stragglers  that  had  been 
collected  by  Colonels  Brent  and  Chisolm  and  others  of  my  staff,  were  also  sent 
forward  extemporized  into  battalions,  and  Colonel  Marshall  J.  Smith  with  the 
New  Orleans  Crescent  Regiment  was  added,  with  orders  to  "  Drive  the  enemy 
into  the  Tennessee." 

Meantime,  or  shortly  after  3  p.  M.,  Governor  Harris  and  Captain  Wickliffe, 
both  of  General  Johnston's  staff,  had  reached  me  with  information  of  his 
death.  Staff-officers  were  immediately  dispatched  to  acquaint  the  corps  com 
manders  of  this  deplorable  casualty,  with  a  caution,  however,  against  other- 
•  wise  promulgating  the  fact.  They  were  also  urged  to  push  the  battle  with 
renewed  vigor  and,  if  possible,  to  force  a  speedy  close,  to  which  end  my  staff 
were  energetically  employed  in  pushing  up  the  stragglers  or  regiments  or 
parts  of  regiments  that  had  become  casually  separated  from  their  organiza 
tions  because  of  the  nature  of  the  battle-field. 

As  I  have  said,  by  five  o'clock  the  whole  Federal  army  except  Prentiss's 
division,  with  a  part  of  Wallace's,  had  receded  to  the  river-bank,  and  the  indom 
itable  force  which  under  Prentiss  still  contested  the  field  was  being  environed 
on  its  left  by  brigades  from  the  divisions  of  Breckiuridge,  Cheatham,  and 
Withers  in  that  quarter.  It  remains  to  be  said  that  Prentiss  was  equally 
encompassed  on  the  other  flank  by  a  part  of  Ruggles's  division,  together 
with  some  of  General  Polk's  corps.  Thus  surrounded  on  all  sides,  that 
officer,  whose  division  had  been  the  first  to  come  into  collision  with  us  that 
morning,  stoutly  keeping  the  field  to  the  last,  was  now  forced  to  surrender  in 
person,  just  after  5 : 30  p.  M.,  with  some  2200  officers  and  men. 

We  had  now  had  more  than  eleven  hours  of  continuous  fighting,  fighting 
without  food  except  that  hastily  snatched  up  in  the  abandoned  Federal 
encampments.  In  the  meantime  Colonel  J.  D.  Webster,  the  Federal  chief  of 
staff,  had  massed  his  reserve  artillery,  some  sixty  guns,  011  a  ridge  about 
three  hundred  yards  in  advance  of  the  landing  which  commanded  all  the 
approaches  thereto  from  the  landward,  with  a  deep  ravine  on  the  side  facing 
the  Confederates.  Moreover,  much  of  the  ground  in  front  of  this  position 
was  swept  by  the  guns  of  the  steamers  Lexington  and  Tyler,  properly  posted 
for  that  purpose.  Near  by  had  gathered  the  remnants  of  Wallace's,  Huiibut's, 
and  McClernand's  divisions,  from  which  gunners  had  been  taken  to  man  the 
artillery.  At  this  critical  instant,  Colonel  Ammen's  brigade  of  Nelson's  divi 
sion  of  Buell's  army  was  brought  across  the  Tennessee  and  placed  as  a  support, 
on  the  ridge,  in  a  position  selected  by  General  Buell  himself,  just  at  the 
instant  that  the  Confederates  attempted  to  storm  this  last  foothold  to  which 
they  had  finally  driven  their  adversary  after  eleven  hours  of  unceasing  battle. 

This  was  the  situation  at  6  P.  M.,  and  that  the  Confederate  troops  were 
not  in  a  condition  to  carry  such  a  position  as  that  which  confronted  them 
at  that  late  hour  becomes  clearly  apparent  from  the  official  reports.  After 
the  capture  of  General  Prentiss  no  serious  effort  was  made  to  press  the 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  SHILOH.  591 

victory  by  the  corps  commanders.  In  fact  the  troops  had  got  out  of  the 
hands  either  of  corps,  divisional,  or  brigade  commanders,  and  for  the  most 
part,  moreover,  at  the  front,  were  out  of  ammunition.  Several  most  gallant 
uncombined  efforts  (notably  by  Chalmers)  were  made  to  reach  and  carry  the 
Federal  battery,  litt  in  every  instance  the  effort  failed. 

Comprehending  the  situation  as  it  was,  at  six  p.  M.  I  dispatched  staff-offi 
cers  with  orders  to  cease  hostilities,  withdraw  the  troops  from  under  fire  of 
the  Federal  gun-boats,  and  to  sleep  on  their  arms.  However,  before  the 
order  was  received  many  of  the  regiments  had  already  been  withdrawn  out 
of  action,  and  really  the  attack  had  practically  ceased  at  every  point.  •& 

My  headquarters  for  the  night  were  established  at  the  Shiloh  Meeting 
House,  in  the  tent  that  General  Sherman  had  occupied.  There  several  of 
the  corps  and  division  commanders  called  for  orders,  and  all  evinced  and 
expressed  much  satisfaction  with  the  results,  while  no  one  was  heard  to 
express  or  suggest  that  more  might  have  been  achieved  had  the  battle 
been  prolonged.  All  seemed  to  believe  that  our  troops  had  accomplished 
as  much  as  could  have  been  hoped  for. 

OF  the  second  day's  battle  my  sketch  shall  be  very  brief.  It  began  with 
daylight,  and  this  time  Buell's  army  was  the  attacking  force. 

Our  widely  scattered  forces,  which  it  had  been  impossible  to  organize  in  the 
night  after  the  late  hour  at  which  they  were  drawn  out  of  action,  were  gath 
ered  in  hand  for  the  exigency  as  quickly  as  possible.  G-enerals  Bragg,  Hardee, 
and  Breckinridge  hurried  to  their  assigned  positions, —  Hardee  now  to  the 
extreme  right,  where  were  Chalmers's  and  Jackson's  brigades  of  Bragg's  corps ; 
General  Bragg  to  the  left,  where  were  assembled  brigades  and  fragments  of 
his  own  troops,  as  also  of  Clark's  division,  Folk's  corps,  with  Trabue's  brigade 
of  Kentuckians  ;  Breckinridge  was  on  the  left  of  Hardee.  This  left  a  vacant 
space  to  be  occupied  by  General  Polk,  who  during  the  night  had  gone  with 
Cheatham's  division  back  nearly  to  Hardee's  position  on  the  night  of  the 
5th  of  April.  But  just  at  the  critical  time,  to  my  great  pleasure,  General 
Polk  came  upon  the  field  with  that  essential  division. 

By  7  P.  M.  the  night  before,  all  of  Xelson's  division  had  been  thrown  across 
the  Tennessee,  and  during  the  night  had  been  put  in  position  between  General 
Grant's  disarrayed  forces  and  our  own ;  Crittenden's  division,  carried  from 
Savannah  by  water  and  disembarked  at  midnight,  was  forced  through  the 
mob  of  demoralized  soldiers  that  thronged  the  river-side  and  established  half 
a  mile  in  advance,  to  the  left  of  Nelson.  Lew  Wallace's  division  of  General 
Grant's  army  also  had  found  its  way  after  dark  on  the  6th  across  Snake 
Creek  from  Crump's  Landing  to  the  point  near  the  bridge  where  General  Sher 
man  had  rallied  the  remains  of  two  of  his  brigades.  Rousseau  reached  the 
field  by  water,  at  daylight,  while  two  other  brigades  of  the  same  division 

•&  Colonel    William    Preston    Johnston  has  in  position,    a   statement   that   flies  in  the   face   of 

effect  asserted  [see  page   567]  that  my  order  to  all  the  reports  of  the  division,  brigade,  and  regi- 

retire   out   of    action   prevented    a   concentrated  mental    commanders  but  one  (Withers),  as   may 

organized    operation   on   the   part    of    the   corps  be  readily  seen  from  the  official  documentary  his- 

commanders  about  to  be  launched  at  the  Federal  tory  of  the  battle.— G.  T.  B. 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  SHILOH. 


N'i.  * 


IPf  '  "•  ; 


• 


THE    UNION    GUN-BOATS    AT    SHILOH    ON    THE    EVENING    OF    THE   FIRST    DAY.      FROM   A  LITHOGRAPH. 

(McCook's)  were  close  at  hand.  Thus,  at  the  instant  when  the  battle  was 
opened  we  had  to  face  at  least  23,000  fresh  troops,  including  3  battalions 
of  regulars,  with  at  least  48  pieces  of  artillery.  ,1  On  the  Confederate 
side  there  was  not  a  man  who  had  not  taken  part  in  the  battle  of  the  day 
before.  The  casualties  of  that  day  had  not  been  under  C500  officers  and 
men,  independent  of  stragglers;  consequently  not  more  than  20,000  infan 
try  could  be  mustered  that  morning.  The  Army  of  the  Ohio  in  General 
Buell's  hands  had  been  made  exceptionally  well-trained  soldiers  for  that 
early  period  of  the  war. 

The  extreme  Federal  right  was  occupied  by  General  Lew  Wallace's  division, 
while  the  space  intervening  between  it  and  Rousseau's  brigade  was  filled 
with  from  5000  to  7000  men  gathered  during  the  night  and  in  the  early  morn 
ing  from  General  Grant's  broken  organizations. 

After  exchanging  some  shots  with  Forrest's  cavalry,  Nelson's  division  was 
confronted  with  a  composite  force  embracing  Chalmers's  brigade,  Moore's 
Texas  Regiment,  with  other  parts  of  Withers's  division,  also  the  Crescent 
Regiment  of  New  Orleans  and  the  26th  Alabama,  supported  by  well-posted 
batteries,  and  so  stoutly  was  Nelson  received  that  his  division  had  to  recede 
somewhat.  Advancing  again,  however,  about  8  o'clock,  now  reenforced  by 
Hazen's  brigade,  it  was  our  turn  to  retire  with  the  loss  of  a  battery.  But 
rallying  and  taking  the  offensive,  somewhat  reenforced,  the  Confederates  were 

J  General  Lew  Wallace's  division  numbered  "5000  men  of  all  arms,"  with  12  guns;  Nelson's  divi 


sion,      4541  strong,"  officers  and  men,  with  18  guns.     The  strength  of  Critteiiden's  division  maybe 
estimated  at  6750,  rank  and  file,  and  Rousseau's  brigade  of  McCook's  division  at  2250.— G.  T.  B." 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  SHILOH.  593 

able  to  recover  their  lost  ground  and'  guns,  inflicting  a  sharp  loss  on  Hazen's 
brigade,  that  narrowly  escaped  capture.  Ammen's  brigade  was  also  seriously 
pressed  and  must  have  been  turned  but  for  the  opportune  arrival  and  effec 
tive  use  of  Terrill's  regular  battery  of  McCook's  division. 

In  the  meantime  Crittenden's  division  became  involved  in  the  battle,  but 
was  successfully  kept  at  bay  for  several  hours  by  the  forces  under  Hardee 
and  Breckinridge,  until  it  was  reenforced  by  two  brigades  of  McCook's  division 
which  had  been  added  to  the  attacking  force  on  the  field,  after  the  battle  had 
been  joined,  the  force  of  fresh  troops  being  thus  increased  by  at  least  five 
thousand  men.  &  Our  troops  were  being  forced  to  recede,  but  slowly ;  it  was 
not,  however,  until  we  were  satisfied  that  we  had  now  to  deal  with  at  least 
three  of  Buell's  divisions  as  well  as  with  General  Lew  Wallace's,  that  I  deter 
mined  to  yield  the  field  in  the  face  of  so  manifestly  profitless  a  combat. 

By  1  o'clock  General  Bragg's  forces  011  our  left,  necessarily  weakened  by  the 
withdrawal  of  a  part  of  his  troops  to  reenforce  our  right  and  center,  had 
become  so  seriously  pressed  that  he  called  for  aid.  Some  remnants  of  Loui 
siana,  Alabama,  and  Tennessee  regiments  were  gathered  up  and  sent  forward 
to  support  him  as  best  they  might,  and  I  went  with  them  personally.  Gen 
eral  Bragg,  now  taking  the  offensive,  pressed  his  adversary  back.  This  was 
about  2  P.  M.  My  headquarters  were  still  at  Shiloh  Church. 

The  odds  of  fresh  troops  alone  were  now  too  great  to  justify  the  prolonga 
tion  of  the  conflict.  So,  directing  Adjutant-General  Jordan  to  select  at  once 
a  proper  position  in  our  near  rear,  and  there  establish  a  covering  force  includ 
ing  artillery,  I  dispatched  my  staff  with  directions  to  the  several  corps  com 
manders  to  prepare  to  retreat  from  the  field,  first  making  a  show,  however, 
at  different  points  of  resuming  the  offensive.  These  orders  were  executed,  I 
may  say,  with  no  small  skill,  and  the  Confederate  army  began  to  retire  at 
2:30  P.  M.  without  apparently  the  least  perception  on  the  part  of  the  enemy 
that  such  a  movement  was  going  on.  There  was  no  flurry,  no  haste  shown  by 
officers  or  men ;  the  spirit  of  all  was  admirable.  Stragglers  dropped  into  line; 
the  caissons  of  the  batteries  were  loaded  up  with  rifles ;  and  when  the  last  of 
our  troops  had  passed  to  the  rear  of  the  covering  force,  from  the  elevated 
ground  it  occupied  and  which  commanded  a  wide  view,  not  a  Federal  regiment 
or  even  a  detachment  of  cavalry  was  anywhere  to  be  seen  as  early  as  4  P.  M. 

General  Breckinridge,  with  the  rear-guard,  bivouacked  that  night  not  more 
than  two  miles  from  Shiloh.  He  withdrew  three  miles  farther  on  the  8th, 
and  there  remained  for  several  days  without  being  menaced. 

Our  loss  in  the  two  days  was  heavy,  reaching  10,699.     [See  page  539.] 

The  field  was  left  in  the  hands  of  our  adversary,  as  also  some  captured 
guns,  which  were  not  taken  away  for  want  of  horses,  but  in  exchange  we  car 
ried  off  at  least  30  pieces  of  his  artillery  with  26  stands  of  colors  and 
nearly  3000  prisoners  of  war,  also  a  material  acquisition  of  small  arms  and 
accouterrnents  which  our  men  had  obtained  on  Sunday  instead  of  their 
inferior  weapons. 

&The  fresh  Federal  troops  now  engaged  aggregated  at  least  25,000  rank  and  file,  further  increased, 
about  1  o'clock,  by  Wagner's  brigade  of  Wood's  division,  say  2500  strong. —  G-.  T.  B. 
VOL.  I.    33 


NOTES   OF  A   CONFEDERATE   STAFF-OFFICER  AT   SHILOH 

BY  THOMAS  JORDAN,   BRIGADIER-GENERAL  (AT  SHILOH,  ADJUTANT-GENERAL  OF  THE 

CONFEDERATE   ARMY). 


10  o'clock  at  night,  on  the  2d  of  April,  1862, 
while  in  my  office  as  adjutant-general  of  the  Con 
federate  army  assembled  at  Corinth,  a  telegram  was 
brought  to  me  from  General  Cheatham,  command 
ing  an  outpost  on  our  left  flank  at  Bethel,  on  the 
Mobile  and  Ohio  railway,  some  twenty  odd  miles 
northward  of  Corinth.  General  Cheatham  had  ad 
dressed  it  to  General  Polk,  his  corps  commander, 
informing  him  that  a  Federal  division,  under  Gen 
eral  Lew  Wallace,  had  been  manoeuvring  in  his 
proximity  during  the  day.  General  Polk  had  in 
due  course  sent  the  message  to  General  Beauregard, 
FROM  A  T.NTYPE.  f  i'om  whom  it  came  to  me  with  his  indorsement, 

addressed  to  General  A.  S.  Johnston,  in  substance  :  "Now  is  the  time  to 
advance  upon  Pittsburg  Landing."  And  below  were  these  words,  in  effect, 
if  not  literally:  "Colonel  Jordan  had  better  carry  this  in  person  to  General 
Johnston  and  explain  the  military  situation.  —  G.  T.  B." 

At  the  time  Colonel  Jacob  Thompson,  formerly  Secretary  of  the  Interior  of 
the  United  States,  was  in  my  office.  I  read  the  telegram  aloud  to  him  and 
immediately  thereafter  proceeded  to  General  Johnston's  quarters,  nearly  a 
quarter  of  a  mile  distant,  where  I  found  the  general  surrounded  by  his  per 
sonal  staff,  in  the  room  which  the  latter  habitually  occupied.  I  handed  him 
the  open  dispatch  and  the  indorsements,  which  he  read  without  comment.  He 
then  asked  me  several  questions  about  matters  irrelevant  to  the  dispatch  or 
what  might  naturally  grow  out  of  it,  and  rose,  saying  that  he  would  cross  the 
street  to  see  General  Bragg.  I  asked  if  I  should  accompany  him.  "  Certainly," 
was  his  answer.  We  found  that  General  Bragg  had  already  gone  to  bed,  but  he 
received  us  in  dishabille,  General  Johnston  handing  him  the  dispatch  at  once, 
without  remark.  Bragg,  having  read  it,  immediately  expressed  his  agreement 
with  Beauregard's  advisement.  General  Johnston  thereupon  very  clearly 
stated  strongly  some  objections,  chiefly  to  the  effect  that  as  yet  our  troops  were 
too  raw  and  incompletely  equipped  for  an  offensive  enterprise,  such  as  an 
attack  upon  the  Federal  army  in  a  position  of  their  own  choosing,  and  also  that 
he  did  not  see  from  what  quarter  a  proper  reserve  could  be  assembled  in  time. 
As  General  Beauregard  had  discussed  with  me  repeatedly  within  a  week 
the  details  of  such  an  offensive  operation  in  all  its  features,  and  the  neces 
sity  for  it  before  the  Federal  army  was  itself  ready  to  take  the  offensive,  I 
was  able  to  answer  satisfactorily  the  objections  raised  by  General  Johnston, 
including  the  supposed  difficulty  about  a  reserve  —  for  which  use  I  pointed 
out  that  the  Confederate  forces  posted  under  General  Breckinridge  at  several 
points  along  the  line  of  the  Memphis  and  Charleston  railroad,  to  the  east- 


NOTES  OF  A  CONFEDERATE  STAFF-OFFICER  AT  SHILOH.         595 

ward  of  Corinth,  could  be  quickly  concentrated  at  Burnsville,  and  be  moved 
thence  direct  to  Monterey,  and  there  effect  a  junction  with  our  main  force. 
General  Johnston  at  last  assented  to  the  undertaking.  Thereupon  I  turned 
to  a  table  in  General  Bragg's  chamber,  and  wrote  a  circular  order  to  the  three 
corps  commanders,  Major-Generals  Polk,  Bragg,  and  Hardee,  directing  that 
each  should  hold  his  corps  under  arms  by  6  A.  M.,  on  the  3d  of  April,  ready 
to  march,  with  one  hundred  rounds  of  ammunition ;  three  days'  cooked  pro 
visions  per  man  in  their  haversacks,  with  two  more  to  be  transported  in 
wagons.  This  circular  also  prescribed  the  ammunition  for  the  artillery,  and 
the  number  of  tents  each  company  should  be  provided  with;  all  of  which 
was  approved  by  General  Johnston  when  I  read  the  rough  draught  of  it. 
Afterward  the  copies  were  made  by  an  aide-de-camp  on  the  staff  of  General 
Bragg. 

These  orders  were  delivered  to  Generals  Polk  and  Hardee  by  1 : 40  A.  M.,  as 
shown  by  their  receipts,  which  I  required  to  be  taken.  The  orders  to  Gen 
eral  Breckmridge  were  given  by  telegraph,  he  having  been  called  by  me  to 
the  military  telegraph  office  nearest  his  headquarters  to  receive  them  and  to 
answer  queries  regarding  his  command.  J  Thus  did  it  happen  that  the  Con 
federate  army  was  brought  to  undertake  the  offensive  at  Pittsburg  Landing. 


n. 

UPON  quitting  General  Bragg's  quarters  I  proceeded  immediately  to  the 
tent  of  Colonel  A.  R.  Chisolm,  aide-de-camp  to  General  Beauregard,  sepa 
rated  from  my  office  by  some  thirty  or  forty  yards,  roused  him  from  sleep, 
and  asked  him  to  inform  the  general  at  daylight  that  the  order  to  advance 
at  midday  had  been  issued. 

Soon  after  sunrise  I  was  called  to  the  quarters  of  General  Beauregard, 
whom  I  found  with  the  notes  of  the  plan  of  operations  and  orders  of  engage 
ment.  These,  I  may  add,  had  just  been  copied  by  Colonel  Chisolm  from 
the  backs  of  telegrams  and  envelopes  upon  which  the  general  had  made  them 
during  the  night  while  in  bed.  Taking  these  notes  and  the  general's  sketch- 
map  of  the  roads  leading  from  all  surrounding  quarters  to  Monterey  and 
thence  to  Pittsburg  Landing,  I  returned  to  my  office  and  began  to  draw  up 
the  order  for  the  battle  (Special  Orders,  No.  8),  which  will  be  found  in  the 
"Official  Eecords,"  X.,  392 -395. & 

Called  to  my  breakfast  before  the  order  could  be  framed,  I  met  General 
Johnston  en  route  for  General  Beauregard's  quarters,  where  I  said  I  would 
meet  him  as  quickly  as  possible,  and  where  I  soon  joined  him.  General 
Beauregard  was  explaining  the  details  as  to  the  roads  by  which  the  several 
corps  would  have  to  move  through  the  somewhat  difficult,  heavily  wooded 
country,  both  before  and  after  leaving  Monterey ;  and  to  make  this  clear,  as 

^  As  I  find  from  a  paper  officially  signed  by  me  leon's  order  for  the  battle  of  Waterloo,  and,  in 

April  21st,  1862,  this  reserve  consisted  of  6436  attention  to  ante-battle  details,  took  those  of 

rank  and  file  effectives.  ("Official  Records,"  Series  such  soldiers  as  Napoleon  and  Soult  for  model  —  a 

I.,  Vol.  X.,  p.  396.) — T.  J.  fact  which  I  here  mention  because  the  ante-Shiloh 

$  As  I  framed  this  order,  I  had  before  me  Napo-  order  has  been  hypercriticised.— T.  J. 


596        NOTES  OF  A  CONFEDERATE  STAFF-OFFICER  AT  SHILOH. 

I  had  from  General  Beauregard  the  only  sketch  extant,  General  Beauregard 
drew  a  rough  sketch  on  his  camp-table  top.  Meanwhile,  General  Bragg 
and  afterward  Generals  Polk  and  Hardee  had  joined  the  conference.  As  I 
remarked  that  it  would  take  me  some  time  to  formulate  the  order  and  issue 
all  the  requisite  copies,  General  Beauregard  explained  orally  to  the  three 
generals  their  routes  of  march  for  the  first  day,  so  that  they  might  not  wait 
for  receipt  of  the  written  orders,  which  would  be  in  all  proper  hands  before 
night.  Accordingly,  these  explanations  were  carefully  made,  and  the  corps 
commanders  went  away  with  distinct  instructions  to  begin  the  movement  at 
midday,  as  prescribed  in  the  written  orders  subsequently  issued.  Pursuant 
to  the  terms  of  the  circular  order  which  I  had  written  and  issued  from 
General  Bragg's  headquarters  the  night  before,  the  troops  were  brought  under 
arms  before  noon,  by  which  time  the  streets  and  all  approaches  to  the  rail 
way  station,  as  well  as  the  roads  leading  from  Corinth,  were  densely  packed 
with  troops,  wagons,  and  field-batteries  ready  for  the  march.  But  no  move 
ment  was  made;  General  Polk's  corps  in  some  way  blocked  the  line  of 
march, —  as  was  reported  to  General  Beauregard  at  a  late  hour  in  the  after 
noon  by  General  Hardee  in  person.  Thereupon,  an  aide-de-camp  was  sent  to 
General  Polk,  who,  to  the  surprise  of  all,  explained  that  he  had  kept  his 
corps  at  a  stand  awaiting  the  written  order.  Thus  it  was  so  late  before  the 
movement  actually  began,  that,  coupled  with  the  really  inexplicable  tardiness 
with  which  Bragg's  corps  was  moved,  it  caused  the  arrival  of  the  Confederate 
army  in  the  near  presence  of  their  adversary  twenty-four  hours  later  than 
was  intended,  as,  by  reason  of  this  tardiness,  it  was  not  until  the  late  after 
noon  of  the  5th  of  April  that  the  head  of  the  Confederate  column  reached  a 
point  within  less  than  two  miles  of  the  Federal  lines,  instead  of  on  the  4th,  in 
which  case  the  battle  would  have  been  fought  with  General  Grant  alone,  or 
without  the  material  and  moral  help  derived  from  the  advent  of  Buell  on  the 
field,  as  happened  on  the  night  of  April  6th  and  morning  of  the  7th. 

in. 

GENERAL  BEAUREGARD  with  his  staff  left  Corinth  the  afternoon  of  the  4th  of 
April,  and  reaching  Monterey,  twelve  miles  distant,  found  the  Confederate  corps 
massed  in  that  quarter.  He  was  hardly  encouraged,  however,  by  the  man 
ner  in  which  they  had  been  handled  to  that  stage  in  the  operation.  General 
Johnston  and  his  staff  were  already  at  the  same  point,  in  occupation  of  a  house 
at  which  we  dismounted  just  as  some  cavalry  brought  from  the  front  a  sol 
dierly  young  Federal  volunteer  officer,  Major  Le  Eoy  Crockett,  of  the  72d  Ohio, 
who  had  been  captured  a  few  hours  before  in  a  sharp  skirmish  in  close  prox 
imity  to  the  Federal  lines,  brought  on  by  a  Confederate  reconnoitering  force 
pressed  most  indiscreetly  from  General  Bragg's  corps  almost  upon  the  Federal 
front  line.  As  this  officer  rode  beside  his  captors  through  the  mass  of  Con 
federate  infantry  and  batteries,  and  his  eyes  rested  intelligently  on  the  war 
like  spectacle,  he  exclaimed,  "  This  means  a  battle " ;  and  he  involuntarily 
added,  "  They  don't  expect  anything  of  this  kind  back  yonder."  He  was  taken 


NOTES  OF  A  CONFEDERATE  STAFF-OFFICER  AT  SHILOH.         597 

in  charge  by  myself,  and,  assisted  by  Major  Gilmer,  chief  engineer  on  the 
staff,  I  interrogated  him  with  the  least  possible  semblance  of  so  doing,  with 
the  result  of  satisfying  me,  as  I  reported  to  Generals  Johnston  and  Beaure- 
gard,  that  we  should  have  no  earth-works  to  encounter,  and  an  enemy  wholly 
unaware  of  what  was  so  near  at  hand. 


IT  has  more  than  once  been  represented  with  pencil,  as  well  as  with  pen, 
that  there  was  a  somewhat  dramatic  conference  of  the  Confederate  generals 
around  the  camp-fire  the  night  before  the  battle  of  the  6th  of  April.  The 
simple  fact  is  this :  Hardee,  whose  corps  was  to  be  in  the  advance  in  the 
attack,  having  reached  a  point  known  to  be  somewhat  less  than  two  miles 
from  our  adversary,  was  halted  and  deployed  in  line  of  battle  across  the 
Pittsburg  road  to  await  the  arrival  and  formation  in  his  rear  of  the  rest  of 
the  army  as  prescribed  in  the  battle  order.  As  this  was  not  effected  until 
after  3  o'clock,  it  was  too  late  to  make  the  attack  that  day.  As  a  matter  of 
course  in  such  a  contingency,  the  corps  commanders  were  called  to  meet  Gen 
erals  Johnston  and  Beauregard,  who,  having  gone  from.  Monterey  together 
with  the  general  staff  and  their  respective  personal  staffs,  had  taken  a  position, 
dismounted,  on  the  Pittsburg  road,  somewhat  to  the  rear  of  Hardee's  corps. 
The  meeting  took  place  about  4  o'clock.  General  Polk  now  reported  that 
his  men  were  almost  destitute  of  provisions,  having  either  already  consumed 
or  thrown  them  away.  General  Bragg  reported  that  his  own  men  had  been 
more  provident,  and  therefore  could  spare  enough  for  the  emergency.  Deeply 
dissatisfied  with  the  inexplicable  manner  in  which  both  Bragg's  and  Polk's 
corps  had  been  delayed,  both  before  reaching  and  after  leaving  Monterey,  as 
well  as  by  the  injudicious  manner  in  which  a  reconnoissance  had  been  made 
with  such  aggressiveness  and  use  of  artillery  as  ought  to  have  apprised  any 
sharp-sighted  enemy  that  an  offensive  army  was  not  far  distant,  General 
Beauregard  —  though  it  had  been  upon  his  urgent  instance  that  the  advance 
had  been  made  —  did  not  hesitate  to  say  that,  inasmuch  as  it  was  scarcely 
possible  for  the  enemy  to  be  unaware  of  our  presence  and  purpose,  should  we 
attack  next  morning  we  would  find  the  Federals  ready  for  us  intrenched 
to  the  eyes ;  whereas  the  whole  success  of  the  movement  had  depended  on 
our  ability  to  assail  our  enemy  unexpectedly.  Therefore  he  advised  the 
return  of  the  Confederate  army  to  Corinth,  as  it  assuredly  was  not  in  a 
condition  to  attack  an  army  superior  in  numbers  and  behind  the  intrench- 
rnents  that  would  now  be  thrown  up  in  expectation  of  our  approach. 

General  Johnston  listened  attentively  to  what  General  Beauregard  said, 
and  at  length  replied  in  substance  that  he  recognized  its  weight ;  neverthe 
less,  as  he  hoped  the  enemy  was  not  suspecting  our  proximity,  he  felt  bound, 
as  he  had  put  the  army  in  motion  for  a  battle,  to  venture  the  hazard.  Where 
upon  the  officers  rapidly  dispersed  to  their  respective  commands  for  that 
venture.  As  I  have  seen  it  intimated,  among  others  by  General  Bragg,  that 
this  conference  was  a  mere  casual  or  "  partly  accidental  meeting  of  general 


598         NOTES  OF  A  CONFEDERATE  STAFF-OFFICER  AT  SHILOH. 


A    UNION    BATTERY   TAKEN   BY     SURPRISE.       (SEE    PAGE   601.) 

officers,"  it  may  not  be  amiss  to  recall  that  such  a  conference  was  the  inevi 
table  consequence  of  the  arrival  of  the  Confederate  army  at  the  point  from 
which  it  was  to  spring  upon  the  enemy,  as  it  were  from  an  ambush.  Naturally, 
moreover,  by  a  conference  with  their  corps  commanders,  Johnston  and  Beau- 
regard  could  best  ascertain  the  condition  of  all  the  troops  and  determine  the 
best  course  to  be  pursued.  It  was  after  the  reports  thus  made  with  the 
mutual  blame  of  each  other  of  two  of  the  corps  commanders  for  the  delay, 
that  Beauregard,  confirmed  in  his  apprehension  that  the  campaign  had  mis 
carried,  urged  that  its  objective  should  be  given  up, —  much  as  Wellington 
once,  in  Spain,  after  taking  the  field  to  attack  Massena,  finding  the  latter 
more  strongly  posted  and  prepared  than  he  had  been  misled  to  believe, 
had  not  hesitated  to  retire  without  fighting.  The  course  of  events  demon 
strated  the  correctness  of  Beauregard's  judgment. 


v. 


THAT  night,  soon  after  supper,  an  aide-de-camp  from  General  Johnston 
informed  me  of  the  general's  desire  to  see  me,  and  guided  me  to  where  he  was 
bivouacking  in  the  open  air.  I  was  wanted  to  issue  the  order  for  the  imme 
diate  transfer  of  Maney's  regiment  of  Tennessee  infantry  from  a  brigade  in 


NOTES  OF  A  CONFEDERATE  STAFF-OFFICER  AT  SHILOH.         599 

Bragg's  corps  to  a  certain  brigade  in  Folk's  corps,  of  which  Colonel  Maney 
would  have  the  command  as  senior  officer,  which  order  I  wrote,  in  the 
absence  of  any  table  or  other  convenience,  outstretched  upon  General  John 
ston's  blankets,  which  were  spread  at  the  foot  of  a  tree.  After  this  was  done, 
and  the  order  dispatched  by  a  special  courier  so  that  the  transfer  might  be 
made  in  time  to  place  Colonel  Maney  at  the  head  of  the  brigade  in  the  com 
ing  battle,  something  led  us  to  talk  of  the  Pacific  Coast,  in  which  quarter  I 
had  served  eight  years.  Having  been  at  Washington  during  the  momentous 
winter  of  1860-61,  I  spoke  of  the  fact  that  when  Colonel  Sumner  had  been 
sent  via  the  Isthmus  of  Panama  to  supersede  him  (Johnston)  in  the  com 
mand  of  the  Department  of  the  Pacific  in  April,  1861,  Sumner's  berth  in  the 
steamer  had  been  taken  under  an  assumed  name,  so  that  the  newspapers 
might  not  get  and  divulge  the  fact  of  his  departure  on  that  errand  in  time  for 
intelligence  of  it  to  reach  the  Pacific  Coast  by  the  overland  route,  and  lead 
General  Johnston  to  act  with  a  supposed  powerful  disunion  party  in  Cali 
fornia  in  a  revolt  against  the  Federal  authority  before  Sumner's  arrival. 
"  Yes,"  answered  the  general,  with  much  quiet  feeling  in  his  manner,  "  while 
distrusting  me  sufficiently  to  act  thus  toward  me,  my  former  adjutant-general, 
Fitz  John  Porter,  was  induced  to  write  me  of  their  great  confidence  in  me,  and 
to  say  that  it  was  their  purpose  to  place  me  in  command  of  the  Federal  army, 
immediately  next  to  General  Scott."  He  had  evidently  been  deeply  hurt  that 
his  personal  character  had  not  shielded  him  from  the  suspicion  of  doing  aught 
while  holding  a  commission  that  could  lead  his  superiors  to  suppose  it  neces 
sary  to  undertake  his  supersedure  by  stealth.  [See  p.  541.] 


THE  next  morning,  as  the  Confederate  army,  deployed  in  the  three  lines 
prescribed  in  the  order  of  march  and  battle,  moved  before  sunrise  down  the 
gentle  wooded  slope  toward  Shiloh  Chapel,  Generals  Johnston  and  Beaure- 
gard,  with  the  general  staff  as  well  as  aides-de-camp,  stood  upon  a  slight 
eminence,  delighted  with  the  evident  alacrity,  animated  faces,  and  elastic  gait 
with  which  all  moved  forward  into  action.  Hardly  had  the  last  line  passed 
them  before  the  rattle  of  musketry  announced  that  Hardee's  corps  was  en 
gaged.  General  Johnston  now  informed  General  Beauregard  that  he  would 
go  to  the  front  with  the  troops  engaged,  leaving  General  Beauregard  to  take 
the  proper  central  position  from  which  to  direct  the  movement  as  the  exigen 
cies  of  the  battle  might  require.  Then  General  Johnston  rode  off  with  his 
personal  staff  exclusively,  except  possibly  Major  Gilmer,  the  chief  engineer. 
Soon  the  sound  of  battle  became  general ;  and,  as  during  the  battle  of  Manas- 
sas,  I  had  been  left  at  headquarters  to  send  reinforcements  into  action  as  they 
came  up  by  rail,  I  reminded  General  Beauregard  of  the  fact,  and  requested 
to  be  dispatched  to  join  General  Johnston.  He  assented,  and  I  set  off, 
accompanied  by  my  friend  Colonel  Jacob  Thompson.  In  a  little  time  I  found 
that  the  corps  commanders  were  ahead  of  or  separated  from  a  material  part 
of  their  troops,  whom  I  repeatedly  found  halted  for  want  of  orders.  In  all 


6oo        NOTES  OF  A  CONFEDERATE  STAFF-OFFICER  AT  SHILOH. 


-       iu         i 

m 

T        A   V  \        .     \      v     *\  V      " : '  / '  "TJT         '         i  TI        '  '         ftrV'"' 


THE    LAST    STAND    MADE   BY    THE    CONFEDERATE    LINE. 

General  Beauregard  at  Shiloh  Chapel  sending  Ms  aides  to  the  corps  commanders  with  orders  to  begin  the 

retreat.    This  was  at  two  o'clock  on  Monday  (see  page  603).    The  tents  are  part  of 

Sherman's  camp,  which  was  reoccupied  by  him  Monday  evening. 

such  cases,  assuming  the  authority  of  my  position,  I  gave  the  orders  in  the 
name  of  General  Johnston.  At  one  time  I  had  with  me  the  chiefs-of-staff  of 
Polk,  Bragg,  and  Hardee,  Colonel  David  Urquhart,  the  chief  aide-de-camp  of 
Bragg,  and  Colonel  William  Preston,  the  chief  aide-de-camp  of  General  John 
ston,  all  of  whom  I  employed  in  assisting  to  press  the  Confederate  troops 
toward  the  heaviest  firing,  and  to  keep  the  batteries  advancing.  Colonels 
Preston  and  Urquhart  remained  with  me  the  longer  time  and  assisted  greatly. 
Finally,  however,  Urquhart,  learning  from  some  of  the  troops  encountered 
that  he  was  in  proximity  to  his  chief,  General  Bragg,  left  me  to  join  him> 


NOTES  OF  A  CONFEDERATE  STAFF-OFFICER  AT  SHILOH.         60 1 

while  I,  accompanied  by  Colonel  Preston,  rode  to  the  right  wing  in  the 
direction  of  sharp  battle.  Soon  we  came  in  near  view  of  a  deserted  Federal 
encampment  in  an  open  field,  with  a  Federal  battery  of  four  or  six  guns 
unlimbered  and  horseless,  while  in  advance  of  it  were  to  be  seen  a  brigade  of 
Confederate  troops  at  a  halt.  Urquhart  now  galloped  up  and  informed  me 
that  General  Bragg  had  sent  him  to  me  with  the  request  that  I  should 
find  and  order  forward  some  troops  to  turn  and  capture  some  batteries 
just  in  his  front  which  obstructed  his  advance.  I  at  once  pushed  across  a 
deep  ravine  with  Urquhart  and  Preston  to  the  troops  in  view,  which  proved 
to  be  Statham's  brigade  of  the  reserve  under  General  Breckinridge ;  but 
because  it  belonged  to  the  reserve,  I  hesitated  to  take  the  responsibility  to 
employ  it,  and  said  so ;  however,  asking  Colonel  Preston  —  the  brother-in- 
law  as  well  as  aide-de-camp  of  General  Johnston  —  the  hour,  he  replied,  from 
his  watch,  twenty  minutes  after  2  o'clock.  I  then  said  that  the  battle  ought 
to  be  won  by  that  time,  and  "  I  think  the  reserve  should  be  used."  Colonel 
Preston  expressed  his  agreement  with  me,  and  I  rode  at  once  to  General 
Breckinridge,  who  was  not  far  to  the  rear  of  his  troops,  surrounded  by  a 
number  of  officers. 

Accosting  him,  I  said,  "General  Breckinridge,  it  is  General  Johnston's 
order  that  you  advance  and  turn  and  take  those  batteries,"  pointing  in  the 
direction  indicated  by  Urquhart,  and  where  was  to  be  heard  the  din  of  their 
discharges.  As  the  order  was  given,  General  Breckinridge,  clad  in  a  well- 
fitting  blouse  of  dark-colored  Kentucky  jeans,  straightened  himself  in  his 
stirrups.  His  dark  eyes  seemed  to  illuminate  his  swarthy,  regular  features, 
and  as  he  sat  in  his  saddle  he  seemed  to  me  altogether  the  most  impressive- 
looking  man  I  ever  had  seen. 

I  then  turned,  accompanied  both  by  Urquhart  and  Preston,  with  the 
purpose  of  going  to  the  camp  and  battery  previously  mentioned,  and  from, 
that  point  to  observe  the  movement.  On  reaching  the  ravine,  which  we 
had  crossed,  Colonel  Preston,  who  possibly  had  just  heard  from  some  of 
the  officers  of  the  command  just  set  in  motion  of  General  Johnston's 
recent  presence  with  them,  said  to  me,  "I  believe  I  will  make  another 
attempt  to  find  General  Johnston,"  and  rode  down  the  ravine  toward  the 
left,  and  as  it  so  happened,  did  find  General  Johnston,  but  already  uncon 
scious,  if  not  dead. 

General  Johnston  had  received  his  death-wound  near  the  very  troops  I  had 
found  standing  at  ordered  arms,  but  who  were  unaware  of  the  fact,  and  there 
fore  were  not,  as  has  been  written,  brought  to  a  stand-still  by  reason  of  that 
catastrophe,  and  who  undeniably  were  put  in  effective  forward  movement  by 
me  within  twenty  minutes  after  his  wounding. 

A  striking  incident  of  the  first  day's  battle  may  be  here  mentioned  for 
its  novelty  011  battle-fields.  A  completely  equipped  Federal  battery  was 
so  suddenly  turned  and  environed  by  the  Confederates,  that  it  was  cap 
tured  with  all  the  guns  limbered  up  en  regie  for  movement  as  upon  drill, 
before  its  officers  could  possibly  unlimber  and  use  its  guns  in  self-defense. 
The  drivers  were  in  their  saddles,  the  gunners  seated  side  by  side  in  their 


602         NOTES  OF  A  CONFEDERATE  STAFF-OFFICER  AT  SHILOH. 

places  upon  the  ammunition-boxes  of  the  caissons,  grinning  over  the  situa 
tion,  and  the  officers  with  their  swords  drawn  were  mounted  on  their  horses. 
Not  a  horse  had  been  disabled. 

VII. 

AT  the  time  of  the  reception  of  the  order  given  as  the  sun  was  setting  on  the 
6th  of  April  by  General  Beauregard  for  his  greatly  disarranged  arid  scattered 
troops  to  withdraw  from  action  and  reorganize  for  the  next  day's  operations, 
I  had  reached  a  point  very  close  to  the  Tennessee  River  where  it  was  densely 
wooded.  The  large  ordnance  of  the  gun-boats  was  raking  this  position,  cre 
ating  more  noise  in  some  quarters  than  harm  to  the  Confederates,  as  the 
heavy  projectiles  tore  and  crashed  in  all  directions  through  the  heavy  forest. 

Riding  slowly  backward  to  the  point  at  which  I  understood  I  should  find 
General  Beauregard,  it  was  after  sunset  when  I  dismounted  at  the  tent  of  a 
Federal  officer,  before  which  the  general  was  standing  with  some  of  his  staff 
and  with  an  officer  in  the  uniform  of  a  Federal  general,  to  whom  I  was  intro 
duced.  It  was  General  Prentiss.  Several  hours  previously  a  telegraphic 
dispatch  addressed  by  Colonel  Helm  to  General  Johnston  (as  well  as  I  now 
remember,  from  the  direction  of  Athens,  in  Tennessee)  was  brought  me 
from  Corinth  by  a  courier,  saying  that  scouts  employed  in  observing  Gen 
eral  Buell's  movements  reported  him  to  be  marching  not  toward  a  junc 
tion  with  Grant,  but  in  the  direction  of  Decatur,  North  Alabama.  This 
assuring  dispatch  I  handed  to  General  Beauregard,  and  then,  at  his  order,  I 
wrote  a  telegraphic  report  to  the  Confederate  adjutant-general,  Cooper, 
at  Richmond,  announcing  the  results  of  the  day,  including  the  death  of 
Johnston. 

Meanwhile,  it  had  become  so  dark  that  I  could  barely  see  to  write,  and  it 
was  quite  dark  by  the  time  Generals  Hardee  and  Breckinridge  came  to  see 
General  Beauregard  for  orders  for  the  next  day's  operations.  General  Bragg, 
who  had  also  come  from  the  front,  had  taken  up  his  quarters  for  the  night 
in  a  tent  which  General  Sherman  had  previously  occupied  at  the  Shiloh 
Chapel.  This  chapel,  a  rude  log-hut  of  one  story,  was  only  two  or  three  hun 
dred  yards  distant  from  the  spot  at  which  I  had  found  General  Beauregard. 
Leaving  General  Prentiss  in  my  charge,  General  Beauregard  soon  after  dark 
took  up  his  quarters  for  the  night  with  General  Bragg.  The  corps  command 
ers  had  meanwhile  been  personally  directed  to  assemble  their  respective  com 
mands  at  the  earliest  possible  moment  in  the  morning  to  be  ready  for  the 
final  stroke. 

Colonel  Thompson  and  myself,  with  General  Prentiss  sandwiched  between 
us,  shared  a  rough  makeshift  of  a  bed  made  up  of  tents  and  captured 
blankets.  Prentiss  and  Thompson  had  been  old  acquaintances,  and  the 
former  talked  freely  of  the  battle,  as  also  of  the  war,  with  a  good  deal  of 
intelligence  and  good  temper.  With  a  laugh,  he  said:  "You  gentlemen 
have  had  your  way  to-day,  but  it  will  be  very  different  to-morrow.  You'll 
see!  Buell  will  effect  a  junction  with  Grant  to-night,  and  we'll  turn  the 
tables  on  you  in  the  morning." 


NOTES  OF  A  CONFEDERATE  STAFF-OFFICER  AT  SHILOH.         603 

This  was  said  evidently  with  sincerity,  and  was  answered  in  the  same  pleas 
ant  spirit,  and  I  showed  him  the  dispatch  that  had  reached  me  on  the  field. 
He  insisted,  however,  that  it  was  a  mistake,  as  we  would  see.  Tired  as  we 
were  with  the  day's  work,  sleep  soon  overtook  and  held  us  all  until  early 
dawn,  when  the  firing  first  of  musketry  and  then  of  field-artillery  roused  us, 
and  General  Prentiss  exclaimed:  "Ah!  didn't  I  tell  you  so!  There  is  Buell ! " 
And  so  it  proved. 

VIII. 

UP  to  half -past  two  o'clock  on  the  7th  of  April,  or  second  day's  conflict, 
General  Beauregard  had  his  headquarters  at  the  Shiloh  Chapel,  or  immedi 
ately  at  Sherman's  former  headquarters.  The  Confederate  troops,  now  hardly 
20,000  men,  were  all  either  directly  in  advance  of  that  position,  or,  to  the  right 
and  left  of  it,  somewhat  in  advance,  hotly  engaged,  having  only  receded  from 
the  places  occupied  during  the  night  sufficiently  to  be  better  massed  and 
organized  for  fighting.  But  our  losses  were  swelling  perilously,  and  the  strag 
gling  was  growing  more  difficult  to  restrain.  A  little  after  two  o'clock,  Gov 
ernor  Harris  of  Tennessee,  who,  after  the  death  of  General  Johnston,  had 
joined  the  staff  of  Beauregard  in  action,  taking  me  aside,  asked  if  I  did  not 
regard  the  day  as  going  against  us  irremediably,  and  whether  there  was  not 
danger  in  tarrying  so  long  in  the  field  as  to  be  unable  to  withdraw  in  good 
order.  I  answered  that  I  thought  it  would  soon  be  our  proper  course  to 
retreat.  Having  an  opportunity  a  moment  later  to  speak  to  General  Beaure 
gard  in  private,  I  brought  the  subject  before  him  in  almost  these  words : 

"  General,  do  you  not  think  our  troops  are  very  much  in  the  condition  of 
a  lump  of  sugar  thoroughly  soaked  with  water,  but  yet  preserving  its  orig 
inal  shape,  though  ready  to  dissolve?  Would  it  not  be  judicious  to  get 
away  with  what  we  have  ?  " 

"  I  intend  to  withdraw  in  a  few  moments,"  was  his  reply. 

Calling  upon  his  aides-de-camp  present,  he  dispatched  them  with  orders  to 
the  several  corps  commanders  to  begin  the  rearward  movement.  He  also 
directed  me  to  collect  as  many  of  the  broken  organizations  as  I  could, — both 
of  infantry  and  artillery, — post  them  in  the  best  position  I  might  find,  and 
hold  it  until  the  whole  army  had  passed  to  the  rear  of  it.  Such  a  position  I 
quickly  found  on  an  elevated  ridge  in  full  view  of  the  chapel  and  the  ground 
to  the  right  and  left  of  it,  and  also  somewhat  more  elevated,  rising  abruptly 
toward  the  enemy  but  receding  gently  toward  Corinth.  There  I  collected 
and  posted  some  two  thousand  infantry,  making  them  lie  down  at  rest.  I 
also  placed  in  battery  some  twelve  or  fifteen  guns,  so  as  to  command  and 
sweep  the  approach  from  the  direction  of  the  enemy.  There  also  I  remained 
until  after  4  o'clock,  or  until  the  entire  Confederate  force  had  retired, 
General  Breckinridge's  troops  being  the  last,  and  without  seeing  a  single 
Federal  soldier  within  the  wide  range  of  my  eyes.  I  then  retired,  carrying 
from  the  field  the  caissons  loaded  down  with  muskets  and  rifles  picked  up  on 
the  field. 


SURPRISE   AND   WITHDRAWAL   AT  SHILOH. 

BY  S.  H.  LOCKETT,  COLONEL,  C.  S.  A.  (AT  SHILOH  GENERAL  BRAGG'S  CHIEF  ENGINEER). 


AT 


LT  the  time  of  the  battle 
of  Shiloh  I  was  on  Gen 
eral  Bragg's  staff  as  his 
chief  engineer,  with  the 
rank  of  captain.  On  the 
night  of  April  5th  I  ac 
companied  him  to  General 
Johnston's  headquarters, 
where  the  last  council  of 
war  was  held.  I  was  not 
present  at  the  meeting  of 
the  generals,  but  with  a 

number  of  other  staff-officers  remained  near  by. 
We  could  hear  the  low,  earnest  discussion  of  our 
superiors,  but  could  not  distinguish  the  words 
spoken. 

When  the  council  closed,  and  General  Bragg 
started  to  his  own  bivouac,  I  joined  him,  and 
received  the  following  instructions :  That  as  the 
attack  would  be  made  at  daylight,  the  next  morn 
ing  at  4  o'clock  I  should  proceed  to  the  front  along 
the  Bark  road,  with  Lieutenant  Steel,  of  the  engi 
neers,  and  a  squad  of  cavalry,  until  I  came  to  the 
enemy's  camp ;  that  I  should  very  carefully  and 
cautiously  reconnoiter  the  camp  from  where  I 
struck  it  toward  the  enemy's  left  flank ;  that  I 
should  by  no  means  allow  any  tiring  by  my  little 
force,  or  do  anything  to  attract  attention  ;  that  my 
duty  was  to  get  all  the  information  possible  about 
the  enemy's  position  and  condition,  and  send  it  back 
by  couriers  from  point  to  point,  as  my  judgment 
should  suggest.  Those  orders  I  carried  out  the 
next  morning.  Lieutenant  S.  M.  Steel,  now  Major 
Steel,  of  Nashville,  Tenu.,  had  been  a  civil  engi 
neer  and  surveyor  in  that  section  of  the  country, 
had  already  made  several  daring  and  valuable 
reconnoissances  of  the  Federal  camps,  and  knew 
the  country  thoroughly.  He  was  a  splendid  scout, 
and  as  brave  a  man  as  ever  lived.  Under  his  skill 
ful  guidance  I  reached  in  safety  a  point  which  he 
said  was  not  more  than  a  few  hundred  yards  from 
the  Federal  camps.  Here  our  cavalry  escort  and 
our  own  horses  were  left,  and  we  two,  leaving  the 
road,  passed  down  a  narrow  valley  or  gorge,  got 
beyond  the  Federal  pickets,  and  came  within  a  few 
rods  of  a  sleepy  camp  sentinel  leaning  against  a 
tree.  In  front  of  us  was  a  large  camp  as  still  and 
silent  as  the  grave ;  no  signs  of  life  except  a  few 
smoldering  fires  of  the  last  night's  supper.  Noting 
these  facts  and  without  disturbing  the  man  at  the 
tree,  we  returned  to  our  cavalry  squad,  and  I  dis 
patched  a  courier  to  General  Bragg  with  a  note 
telling  what  I  had  seen.  We  then  moved  by  our 
right  flank  through  the  woods,  from  a  quarter  to 
half  a  mile,  and  repeated  our  former  manoeuvre. 
This  time  we  found  the  cooks  of  the  camp  astir 
preparing  breakfast.  While  we  were  watching  the 
process  reveille  was  sounded,  and  I  saw  one  or  two 
regiments  form  by  companies,  answer  to  roll-call, 
and  then  disperse  to  their  tents.  Once  more  I 
returned  to  my  cavalry  and  dispatched  a  courier. 


A  third  time  I  made  a  descent  from  the  hills, 
down  a  narrow  hollow,  still  farther  to  our  right, 
and  saw  Federal  soldiers  cleaning  their  guns  and 
accouterments  and  getting  ready  for  Sunday  morn 
ing  inspection.  By  this  time  firing  had  begun  on 
our  left,  and  I  could  see  that  it  caused  some  com 
motion  in  the  camps,  but  it  was  evident  that  it  was 
not  understood.  Soon  the  firing  became  more 
rapid  and  clearer  and  closer,  and  I  saw  officers  be 
gin  to  stir  out  of  their  tents,  evidently  anxious  to 
find  out  what  it  all  meant.  Then  couriers  began 
to  arrive,  and  there  was  great  bustle  and  confu 
sion  ;  the  long  roll  was  beaten ;  there  was  rapid 
falling  in,  and  the  whole  party  in  front  of  me  was 
so  thoroughly  awake  and  alarmed  that  I  thought 
my  safest  course  was  to  retreat  while  I  could  and 
send  another  courier  to  the  rear. 

How  long  all  this  took  I  cannot  now  recall,  but 
perhaps  not  more  than  an  hour  and  a  half  or  two 
hours.  When  I  reached  my  cavalry  squad  I  knew 
that  the  battle  had  opened  in  earnest,  but  I  deter 
mined  to  have  one  more  look  at  the  Federal  posi 
tion,  and  moved  once  more  to  the  right.  Without 
getting  as  near  as  our  former  positions,  I  had  a 
good  view  of  another  camp  with  a  line  of  soldiers 
formed  in  front  of  it.  Meantime  the  Confederate 
troops  had  moved  on  down  the  hills,  and  I  could 
plainly  see  from  the  firing  that  there  was  hot  and 
heavy  work  on  my  left  and  in  advance  of  my  present 
position.  I  then  began  to  fear  that  the  division  in 
front  of  me  would  swing  around  and  take  our 
forces  in  flank,  as  it  was  manifest  that  the  Federal 
line  extended  farther  in  that  direction  than  ours. 
I  therefore  disposed  my  little  cavalry  force  as 
skirmishers,  and  sent  a  courier  with  a  sketch  of 
the  ground  to  General  Bragg,  and  urged  the  im 
portance  of  having  our  right  flank  protected.  How 
long  I  waited  and  watched  at  this  point  it  is  hard 
to  say.  Finally,  becoming  very  uneasy  at  the  state 
of  affairs,  I  left  Lieuteiiant  Steel  with  the  cavalry 
and  rode  to  the  left  myself  to  make  a  personal 
report.  In  this  ride  I  passed  right  down  the  line 
of  battle  of  the  Confederate  forces,  and  saw  some 
splendid  duels  both  of  artillery  and  infantry. 
Finally,  as  I  have  always  thought  about  11 
o'clock,  I  came  to  General  A.  S.  Johnston  and  his 
staff  standing  on  the  brow  of  a  hill  watching  the 
conflict  in  their  front.  I  rode  up  to  General  John 
ston,  saluted  him,  and  said  I  wished  to  make  a 
report  of  the  state  of  affairs  on  our  extreme  right. 
He  said  he  had  received  that  report  and  a  sketch 
from  Captain  Lockett,  of  the  engineers.  I  told 
him  I  was  Captain  Lockett.  He  replied,  "Well, 
sir,  tell  me  as  briefly  and  quickly  as  possible  what 
you  have  to  say."  When  my  report  was  finished 
he  said,  "  That  is  what  I  gathered  from  your  note 
and  sketch,  and  I  have  already  ordered  General 
Breckinridge  to  send  forces  to  fill  up  the  space  on 
our  right.  Ride  back,  sir,  toward  the  right,  and 
you  will  probably  meet  General  Breckinridge  ; 
lead  him  to  the  position  you  indicate,  and  tell  him 


SURPRISE  AND   WITHDRAWAL  AT  SHILOH. 


605 


to  drive  the  enemy  he  may  find  in  his  front  into 
the  river.  He  needs  no  further  orders."  The 
words  are,  as  near  as  I  can  remember  them,  ex 
actly  the  ones  General  Johnston  used.  I  obeyed 
the  order  given,  met  General  Breckinridge,  con 
ducted  him  to  the  place  where  I  had  left  my 
cavalry,  but  found  both  them  and  the  Federal 
division  gone.  I  rode  with  General  Breckinridge 
a  few  hundred  yards  forward,  and  we  soon  received 
a  volley  which  let  us  know  that  the  Federal  forces 
had  retired  but  a  very  short  distance  from  their 
original  position.  General  Breckinridge  deployed 
Bowen's  and  Statham's  brigades,  moved  them  for 
ward,  and  soon  engaged  the  Federal  forces.  I 
bade  the  General  good-day  and  good  luck,  and 
once  more  rode  down  the  line  of  battle  until  I 
found  General  Bragg.  With  him  I  remained,  ex 
cepting  when  carrying  orders  and  making  recon- 
noissances,  until  the  close  of  the  first  day's  fight. 

I  witnessed  the  various  bloody  and  unsuccessful 
attacks  on  the  "Hornets'  Nest."  During  one  of  the 
dreadful  repulses  of  our  forces,  General  Bragg  di 
rected  me  to  ride  forward  to  the  central  regiment 
of  a  brigade  of  troops  that  was  recoiling  across  an 
open  field,  to  take  its  colors  and  carry  them  for 
ward.  "The  flag  must  not  go  back  again,"  he 
said.  Obeying  the  order,  I  dashed  through  the 
line  of  battle,  seized  the  colors  from  the  color- 
bearer,  and  said  to  him,  "  General  Bragg  says 
these  colors  must  not  go  to  the  rear."  While  I  was 
talking  to  him  the  color-sergeant  was  shot  down. 
A  moment  or  two  afterward  I  was  almost  alone  on 
horseback  in  the  open  field  between  the  two  lines 
of  battle.  An  officer  came  up  to  me  with  a  bullet- 
hole  in  each  cheek,  the  blood  streaming  from  his 
mouth,  and  asked,  "  What  are  you  doing  with  my 
colors,  sir  ?"  "I  am  obeying  General  Bragg's  or 
ders,  sir,  to  hold  them  where  they  are,"  was  my 
reply.  "  Let  me  have  them,"  he  said.  "  If  any  man 
but  my  color-bearer  carries  these  colors,  I  am  the 
man.  Tell  General  Bragg  I  will  see  that  these  col 
ors  are  in  the  right  place.  But  he  must  attack  this 
position  in  flank  ;  we  can  never  carry  it  alone  from 
the  front."  It  was  Colonel  H.  W.  Allen,  afterward 
Governor  Allen  of  Louisiana.  I  returned,  miracu 
lously  preserved,  to  General  Bragg,  and  reported 
Colonel  Allen's  words.  I  then  carried  an  order  to 
the  same  troops,  giving  the  order,  I  think,  to  Gen 
eral  Gibson,  to  fall  back  to  the  fence  in  the  rear 
and  reorganize.  This  was  done,  and  then  General 
Bragg  dispatched  me  to  the  right,  and  Colonel  Frank 
Gardner  (afterward  Major-General)  to  the  left,  to 
inform  the  brigade  and  division  commanders  on 
either  side  that  a  combined  movement  would  be 
made  on  the  front  and  flanks  of  that  position.  The 
movements  were  made,  and  Prentiss  was  captured. 

As  Colonel  William  Preston  Johnston  says,  that 
capture  was  a  dear  triumph  to  us  —  dear  for  the 
many  soldiers  we  had  lost  in  the  first  fruitless  at 
tacks,  but  still  dearer  on  account  of  the  valuable 
time  it  cost  us.  The  time  consumed  in  gathering 
Prentiss's  command  together,  in  taking  their  arms, 
in  marching  them  to  the  rear,  was  inestimably 
valuable.  Not  only  that ;  the  news  of  the  capture 
spread,  and  grew  as  it  spread ;  many  soldiers  and 


officers  believed  we  had  captured  the  bulk  of  the 
Federal  army,  and  hundreds  left  their  positions 
and  came  to  see  the  "captured  Yanks."  But  after 
a  while  the  Confederates  were  gotten  into  ranks, 
and  a  perfect  line  of  battle  was  formed,  with  our 
left  wing  resting  on  Owl  Creek  and  our  right  on  the 
Tennessee  River.  General  Polk  was  on  the  left, 
then  Bragg,  then  Hardee,  then  Breckinridge.  In 
our  front  only  one  single  point  was  showing  fight, 
a  hill  crowned  with  artillery.  I  was  with  General 
Bragg,  and  rode  with  him  along  the  front  of  his 
corps.  I  heard  him  say  over  and  over  again,  "One 
more  charge,  my  men,  and  we  shall  capture  them 
•  all."  While  this  was  going  on  a  staff-officer  (or 
rather,  I  think,  it  was  one  of  the  detailed  clerks  of 
General  Beauregard's  headquarters,  for  he  wore 
no  uniform)  came  up  to  General  Bragg,  and  said, 
"The  General  directs  that  the  pursuit  be  stopped  ; 
the  victory  is  sufficiently  complete  ;  it  is  needless 
to  expose  our  men  to  the  fire  of  the  gun-boats." 
General  Bragg  said,  "My  God,  was  a  victory  ever 
sufficiently  complete  ?"  and  added,  "Have  you 
given  that  order  to  any  one  else?"  "Yes,  sir," 
was  the  reply,  "to  General  Polk,  on  your  left; 
and  if  you  will  look  to  the  left,  you  will  see  that 
the  order  is  being  obeyed."  General  Bragg  looked, 
and  said,  " My  God,  my  God,  it  is  too  late!"  and 
turning  to  me,  he  said,  "Captain,  carry  that  order 
to  the  troops  on  the  right";  and  to  Captain  Frank 
Parker,  "You  carry  it  to  the  left."  In  a  short 
time  the  troops  were  all  falling  back — and  the  ric- 
tory  was  lost.  Captain  Parker  and  myself  were  the 
only  members  of  General  Bragg's  staff  who  were 
with  him  at  that  time.  Captain  Parker,  I  think,  is 
still  living  in  South  Carolina,  and  will  surely  re 
member  all  that  I  have  narrated. 

In  this  hasty  sketch  I  have  intentionally  omitted 
everything  but  the  beginning  and  end  of  that  day's 
operations,  to  throw  what  light  I  can  upon  the 
two  great  points  of  dispute  :  Was  the  Federal  army 
surprised  by  our  attack?  and  whose  fault  was  it 
that  the  victory  was  not  sufficiently  complete  on 
the  first  day  ? 

In  regard  to  the  second  day's  fight,  I  will  touch 
upon  but  one  point.  I,  as  a  great  many  other 
staff-officers,  was  principally  occupied  in  the  early 
hours  of  the  second  day  in  gathering  together  our 
scattered  men  and  getting  them  into  some  sort  of 
manageable  organization.  In  this  duty  I  collected 
and  organized  a  body  of  men  about  a  thousand 
strong.  They  were  composed  of  men  of  at  least  a 
half-dozen  different  regiments.  The  7th  Kentucky, 
with  a  tattered  flag,  and  the  9th  Arkansas  were 
the  most  numerously  represented.  We  had  not 
one  single  field-officer  in  the  command.  "When  I 
reported  to  General  Beauregard  that  I  had  the 
troops  divided  into  companies,  had  assigned  a 
captain  to  duty  as  lieutenant-colonel  and  a  first 
lieutenant  as  major,  he  himself  put  me  in  com 
mand  of  them  as  colonel.  In  order  that  my  com 
mand  might  have  a  name,  I  dubbed  it  the 
"Beauregard  Regiment," — a  name  that  was  re 
ceived  with  three  rousing  cheers.  Not  long  after 
my  regiment  was  thus  officered  and  christened,  a 
message  came  from  General  Breckinridge  on  our 


6o6 


THE  SHILOH  BATTLE-ORDER  AND    THE  WITHDRAWAL. 


extreme  right  that  he  was  hard  pressed,  and  needed 
reenforcernents.  My  regiment,  which  was  at  the 
time  just  behind  General  Beauregard,  held  in  re 
serve  by  his  orders,  was  sent  by  him  to  General 
Breckiuridge's  assistance.  We  marched  down  the 
line  of  battle  to  the  extreme  right,  passed  beyond 
General  Breckinridge's  right,  wheeled  by  com 
panies  into  line  of  battle,  and  went  in  with  the 
"rebel  yell."  The  men  on  our  left  took  up  the  yell 
and  the  charge,  and  we  gained  several  hundred 
yards  of  ground.  From  this  point  we  fought  back 


slowly  and  steadily  for  several  hours,  until  word 
came  that  the  army  was  ordered  to  retreat,  that 
the  commands  would  fall  back  in  succession  from 
the  left,  and  that  the  right  wing  would  be  the  rear 
guard.  This  order  was  carried  out,  and  when  night 
came  the  right  wing  was  slowly  falling  back  with 
face  to  the  foe.  We  halted  on  the  same  ground  we 
had  occupied  on  the  morning  of  the  6th,  just 
before  the  battle  began.  If  there  was  any  "break 
ing"  and  "starting,"  as  General  Grant  expresses 
it,  I  did  not  witness  it. 


THE    SHILOH    BATTLE-ORDEE  AND   THE   WITHDRAWAL     SUNDAY    EVENING. 

BY  ALEXANDER  ROBERT  CHISOLM,  COLONEL,  C.  S.  A.  (AT  SHILOH  ON  GENERAL  BEAUREGARD'S  STAFF). 


IN  the  paper  published  in  "The  Century  "  for  Feb 
ruary,  1885,  Colonel  William  Preston  Johnston, 
assuming  to  give  the  Confederate  version  of  the 
campaign  and  battle  of  Shiloh,  at  which  he  was 
not  present,  has  adventured  material  statements 
regarding  operations  on  that  field,  which  must  have 
been  based  on  misinformation  or  misunderstand 
ing  in  essential  particulars,  as  I  take  occasion  to 
assert  from  personal  knowledge  acquired  as  an  eye 
witness  and  aide-de-camp  on  the  staff  of  General 
Beauregard.  My  personal  knowledge  runs  counter 
to  many  of  his  statements  and  deductions,  but  I 
shall  here  confine  myself  to  two  points. 

First,  I  must  dispute  that  the  battle-order  as 
promulgated  was  in  any  wise  different  from  the 
one  submitted  by  General  Beauregard  at  his  own 
quarters  at  Corinth,  early  in  the  morning  of  the  3d 
of  April,  to  General  A.  S.  Johnston,  and  which  was 
accepted  without  modification  or  suggestion.  This 
assertion  I  base  on  these  facts  :  About  1  o'clock 
in  the  morning  the  adjutant-general  of  the  Confed 
erate  forces,  Colonel  Jordan,  aroused  me  from 
sleep  in  my  tent,  close  by  General  Beauregard's 
chamber,  and  desired  me  to  inform  the  general  at 
dawn  that  General  Johnston  had  agreed  to  his 
recommendation  to  move  offensively  against  Pitts- 
burg  Landing  early  that  same  day,  and  that  the 
circular  orders  to  the  corps  commanders  had  been 
already  issued  by  Colonel  Jordan  to  that  effect. 
Acting  upon  this  request,  I  found  that  General 
Beauregard  had  already  during  the  night  made  full 
notes  on  loose  scraps  of  paper  of  the  order  of  march 
and  battle,  from  which  he  read  aloud  for  me  to 
copy  —  my  copy  being  given  to  Colonel  Jordan  as 
soon  as  completed,  as  the  basis  of  the  official  order 
which  he  was  to  frame,  and  did  frame  and  issue  in 
the  name  of  General  Johnston.  And  that  is  the 
order  which  Colonel  Johnston  erroneously  alleges 
upon  the  posthumous  authority  of  General  Bragg 
to  differ  essentially  from  the  plan  settled  upon  by 
General  Johnston  for  the  battle.  This  allegation  I 
know  to  be  unfounded,  as  the  order  as  issued  varies 
in  no  wise  from  the  notes  dictated  to  me  by  General 
Beauregard,  excepting  the  mere  wording  and  some 
details  relating  to  transportation  and  ordnance 
service  added  by  Colonel  Jordan ;  that  is  to  say,  the 
plan  explained  by  General  Beauregard  and  accepted 
by  General  Johnston  at  the  quarters  of  the  former. 

Being  limited  as  to  space,  I  shall  pass  over  a 
throng  of  facts  within  my  personal  knowledge, 


which  would  establish  that  General  Beauregard 
was  as  actively  and  directly  handling  the  Con 
federate  forces  engaged  in  their  general  conduct 
of  the  battle  before  the  death  of  General  Johnston 
as  he  was  after  that  incident.  I  shall  confine  my 
self  on  this  occasion  to  relating  that  after  General 
Beauregard  became  cognizant  of  the  death  of  Gen 
eral  Johnston,  he  dispatched  me  to  the  front  with 
orders  that  led  to  the  concentration  of  the  widely 
scattered  and  disarrayed  Confederate  forces,  which 
resulted  in  the  capture  of  General  Prentiss  and  so 
many  of  his  division  after  5  o'clock  on  the  Gth. 

I  also,  later  in  the  day,  carried  orders  to  Hardee, 
who  was  engaged  on  our  extreme  left,  or  Federal 
right,  where  I  remained  with  that  officer  until  almost 
dark,  up  to  which  time  no  orders  had  reached  him 
to  cease  fighting.  On  the  contrary,  he  was  doing 
his  best  to  force  back  the  enemy  in  his  front.  As 
he  was  without  any  of  his  staff  about  him,  for  the 
nonce  I  acted  as  his  aide-de-camp.  Meantime  the 
gun-boats  were  shelling  furiously,  and  their  huge 
missiles  crushed  through  the  branches  of  the  trees 
overhead  with  so  fearful  a  din,  frequency,  and  close 
ness  that,  despite  the  excitement  of  our  apparently 
complete  victory,  there  was  room  left  in  our  minds 
for  some  most  unpleasant  sensations,  especially 
when  the  top  of  some  lofty  tree,  cut  off  by  a  shell, 
would  come  toppling  down  among  the  men. 

Possibly,  had  Colonel  Johnston  been  present  on 
the  field  at  that  last  hour  of  the  battle  of  the  Gth, 
a  witness  of  the  actually  fruitless  efforts  made  to 
storm  the  last  position  held  by  the  enemy  upon 
the  ridge  covering  the  immediate  landing-place, 
known  as  Pittsburg,  he  might  be  better  informed 
why  it  was  that  that  position  was  not  carried,  and 
be  less  disposed  to  adduce  such  testimony  as  that 
of  General  Bragg,  to  the  effect  that  but  for  the 
order  given  by  Beauregard  to  withdraw  from  action 
he  would  have  carried  all  before  him. 

It  so  happened  that  I  rejoined  General  Beaure 
gard  at  a  point  near  Shiloh  Chapel  (having  escorted 
General  Prentiss  from  the  field  to  General  Beaure 
gard),  when  General  Bragg  rode  up  from  the  front, 
and  I  heard  him  say  in  an  excited  manner :  "Gen 
eral,  we  have  carried  everything  before  us  to  the 
Tennessee  River.  I  have  ridden  from  Owl  to  Lick 
Creek,  and  there  is  none  of  the  enemy  to  be  seen." 
Beauregard  quietly  replied:  "Then,  General,  do 
not  unnecessarily  expose  your  command  to  the  fire 
of  the  gun-boats." 


THE    MARCH    OF    LEW    WALLACE'S    DIVISION    TO    SHILOH. 


CIRCUMSTANCES  AND  CHARACTER  OF  THE  ORDER. 

As  GENERAL  GRANT  passed  up  from  Savannah 
on  the  Tigress  on  the  6th  of  April  to  the  battle-field 
of  Shiloh,  he  found  General  Lew  Wallace  await 
ing  him  at  Crump's  Landing,  the  troops  of  Ms 
division  having  been  ordered  under  arms  at  the 
sound  of  the  battle.  [For  General  Grant's  state 
ments,  see  pages  467-8.]  General  Wallace  in  his 
official  report  places  the  hour  at  which  General 
Grant  reached  Crump's  at  about  9,  while  General 
Grant  gives  the  hour  of  his  arrival  at  Pittsburg 
Landing  as  about  8.  Grant  left  Wallace  a  direction 
to  hold  himself  in  readiness  for  orders.  In  anticipa 
tion  of  the  receipt  of  them,  a  horse  was  saddled  at 
Crump's  for  the  use  of  the  expected  messenger, 
the  First  Brigade  having  been  already  sent  from 
Crump's  to  join  the  Second  at  Stony  Lonesome 
(marked  A  on  the  map),  General  Wallace  fol 
lowing  about  9:15.  To  this  point,  at  an  hour 
which  has  been  variously  stated  by  the  officers 
of  the  command  at  from  11  o'clock  to  noon 
(Wallace  says,  "  exactly  11:30"),  came  Captain 
A.  S.  Baxter,  quartermaster  on  Grant's  staff, 
with  the  order.  Concerning  the  time,  dispatch, 
and  character  of  this  order  there  is  much  dis 
agreement.  General  Grant  says  that  the  order 
was  verbal ;  that  it  was  given  after  riding  out  to 
the  front,  and  that  Baxter  made  a  memorandum 
of  it,  though  he  does  not  say  that  he  saw  Baxter. 
Furthermore  Rawlins  says  that  the  order  was  taken 
by  him  back  to  the  Landing,  half  a  mile  away,  and 
given  verbally  to  Baxter,  and  afterward  dictated 
to  him,  at  the  latter's  request,  and  that  Baxter 
started  on  the  steamer  not  later  than  9  o'clock. 
Kowley  states  that  Grant  gave  the  order  verbally 
and  in  person  to  Baxter  at  once  upon,  arriving  at 
the  Landing,  and  then  rode  immediately  to  the 
front.  Wallace  states  that  Baxter  delivered  an 
unsigned  order  and  said  that  "it  had  been  given 
to  him  verbally,  but  that  in  coming  down  the  river 
he  had  reduced  it  to  writing." 

Concerning  the  circumstances  and  character  of 
the  order  Captain  Baxter  made  the  following  state 
ment  in  the  New-York  "Mail  and  Express"  for 
November  4th,  1886: 

"  T  will  give  niy  own  recollection  of  the  event  at  Pitts 
burg  Landing.  On  Sunday,  between  the  hours  of  8  and 
9  o'clock  A.  M.,  April  6th,  1862,  Adjutant-General  Rawlins, 
of  General  Grant's  staff,  requested  me  to  go  to  Crump's 
Landing  (five  miles  below)  and  order  General  Lew  Wal 
lace  to  march  hi.s  command  at  once  by  the  River  Rottd  to 
Pittsburg  Landing,  and  join  the  army  on  the  right.  At 
the  same  time  General  Rawlins  dictated  the  order  to 
General  Wallace,  which  was  written  by  myself  and 
signed  by  General  Rawlins. 

"Onmeeting  General  Wallace  I  gave  the  orderverbally, 
also  handed  to  him  the  written  order.  General  Wallace 
said  '  he  was  waiting  for  orders,  had  heard  the  firing  all 
the  morning,  and  was  ready  to  move  with  his  command 
immediately  — knew  the  road  and  had  put  it  in  good 
order.' 

"  My  stay  with  Lew  Wallace  did  not  exceed  three  min 
utes.  I  had  no  further  conversation  with  him,  and  I  re 
turned  immediately  to  Pittsburg  Landing." 

As  to  the  character  of  the  order :  General  Grant's 


statement  (see  page  468)  is  that  the  order  as  given 
was  "to  march  immediately  to  Pittsburg  by  the 
road  nearest  the  river."  Captain  Rowley  says,  "  to 
march  with  his  division  up  the  river,  and  into  the 
field  on  the  right  of  our  line,  as  rapidly  as  possible." 
Rawlins  says  it  read  "substantially  as  follows: 
'  Major-General  Wallace  :  You  will  move  forward 
your  division  from  Crump's  Landing,  leaving  a  suffi 
cient  force  to  protect  the  public  property  at  that 
place,  to  Pittsburg  Landing,  on  the  road  nearest  to 
and  parallel  to  the  river,  and  form  in  line  at  right  an 
gles  with  the  river,  immediately  in  rear  of  the  camp 
of  Major-General  C.  F.  Smith's  division  on  our  right 
[W.  H.  L.  Wallace's],  and  there  wait  further  or 
ders.'"  General  Wallace  says,  that  as  received,  it 
directed  him  "to  come  up  and  take  position  on  the 
right  of  the  army,  and  form  my  line  of  battle  at  a 
right  angle  with  the  river,"  and  "to  leave  a  force 
to  prevent  surprise  at  Crump's  Landing."  Colonel 
James  R.  Ross  says,  "  I  very  distinctly  remember 
that  this  order  directed  you  to  move  forward  and 
join  General  Sherman's  right  on  the  Purdy  Road, 
and  form  your  line  of  battle  at  right  angles  with  the 
river,  and  then  act  as  circumstances  would  dic 
tate."^  General  Fred.  Knefler  says,  "It  was  a 
written  order  to  march  and  form  a  junction  with 
the  right  of  the  army."  \  Captain  Addison  Ware 
says  it  was  "to  move  your  division  up  and  join 
General  Sherman's  right  on  the  road  leading  from 
Pittsburg  Landing  to  Purdy."  &  General  Knefler 
adds,  "  The  order  was  placed  in  my  hands  as  As 
sistant  Adjutant-General ;  but  where  it  is  now,  or 
what  became  of  it,  I  am  unable  to  say.  Very 
likely,  having  been  written  on  a  scrap  of  paper,  it 
was  lost."\ 

ROUTE   AND   LIMIT   OP  THE   MARCH. 


•&ROSS  to  Wallace,  January  25th,  1868. 


All  reports  agree  that  the  march  of  the  two  bri 
gades  began  at  12  o'clock,  along  the  road  ABC. 
Wallace  not  arriving  at  Pittsburg  Landing,  General 
Grant  sent  Captain  Rowley  of  his  staff  to  hurry 
him  forward.  Rowley  went  by  the  River  Road  al 
most  to  Crump's  Landing,  and  then  "a  distance 
of  between  five  and  six  miles,"  when  he  reached 
the  rear  of  Wallace's  division  by  the  road  ABC, 
and  passing  the  resting  troops  continued  to  the 
head  of  the  column,  where  he  found  Wallace  and 
delivered  the  orders,  and  gave  him  the  first  in 
formation  that  the  right  of  the  army  had  been 
driven  back.  Wallace  then  ordered  a  counter 
march  of  the  troops.  The  point  at  which  this 
turning  took  place  is  fixed  by  General  Wallace  at 
D,  half-way  between  the  Purdy  crossing  and  the 
Owl  Creek  bridge.  (This  identification  is  fully  con 
firmed  by  letters  of  October  5th  and  6th,  1887, 
written  by  Generals  Fred.  Knefler  and  G.  F.  Mc- 
Ginnis,  Captains  Thomas  C.  Pursel  and  George  F. 
Brown,  and  Dr.  S.  L.  Ensminger,  all  of  whom  took 
part  in  the  march,  and  the  last  two  of  whom  exam 
ined  the  ground  in  1884  to  determine  the  point.) 
In  the  "Official  Records"  is  a  sketch  map,  without 
scale,  by  Colonel  James  B.  McPherson,  placing  the 

\  Knefler  to  Wallace,  February  19th,  1868.    &  Ware  to  Wallace  [1868]. 
607 


6o8 


THE  MARCH  OF  LEW  WALLACE'S  DIVISION  TO  SHILOH. 


MAP    OF  THE    ROUTES    BY    WHICH    GENERAL    GRANT    WAS    REINFORCED    AT    1'ITTSHURG    LANDING. 


Authorities  :  (1.)  The  Official  or  Thorn  map  (p.  508),  for 
roads  and  distances  on  the  south  side  of  Snake  Creek ; 
(2.)  the  Union  Camp  map  (pp.  49C-7),  for  the  location  of 
camps  morning  of  April  5th,  1862 ;  (3.)  the  Shiloh  map 
in  General  Badeau's  "  Military  History  of  U.  8.  Grant," 
for  the  main  roads  on  the  north  side  of  Snake  Creek, 
that  map  also  agreeing  with  General  McPherson's 
sketch  map  without  scale  in  "  Official  Records,"  Vol.  X., 
p.  183 ;  (4.)  General  Wallace's  statement  to  the  editors, 
1887,  based  on  investigations  and  measurements  in  1884, 

limit  of  march  at  C.  This  was  probably  intended 
for  the  point  where  Eowley  came  up  with  the  rear 
of  the  column,  which  must  have  covered  a  distance 
of  two  miles  or  more  ;  but  if  intended  for  the 
limit  of  the  advance,  it  could  not  have  been  fixed 
on  McPherson's  own  knowledge,  for  when  Eawlins 
and  McPherson,  who  were  also  sent  by  General 
Grant  (McPherson  says  at  2:30)  to  hasten  the 
movement,  following  Rowley's  course,  came  up 
with  the  division  (Eawlins  says  about  3 : 30),  the 
First  Brigade  had  passed  across  toward  E  and  the 
Second  was  passing.  Some  mystery  attaches  to  the 
inaction  of  the  Third  Brigade  during  the  morning. 
General  Wallace  states  in  his  report  that  it  was 
concentrated  on  the  Second,  meaning,  as  he 
explains  to  the  editors,  that  the  order  for  the 
concentration  had  been  sent,  and,  he  presumed, 
obeyed.  Colonel  Ross  delivered  the  order  to  Colonel 
Charles  R.  Woods,  then  in  command  at  Adamsville, 
and  Captain  Ware,  Wallace's  second  aid,  carried  a 
repetition  of  it— both  during  the  morning.  [Ross to 
Wallace,  January  25th,  1868,  and  Ware  to  Wallace, 
1868.]  Yet  Colonel  Whittlesey,  who  during  the 
day,  by  seniority  of  commission,  succeeded  to  the 


l>y  Captain  George  F.  Brown  and  Dr.  S.  L.  Ensmin- 
ger,  for  the  roads  from  (i  to  C  and  from  C  to  E,  and 
for  the  point  D  as  the  limit  of  the  march  toward  Owl 
Creek.  K.  B. — No  detailed  survey  appears  to  have  been 
made. 

Key  to  routes  of  Wallace's  division : 

Route  of  First  Brigade,  morning  of  April  6th  —  F  A. 

Route  of  First  and  Second  brigades  to  the  battlefield, 
afternoon— A  B  C  D  C II E  K. 

Route  of  Third  Brigade,  afternoon  —  G  C II E  K. 

command  of  the  brigade, says  in  his  report  that  three 
of  the  four  regiments  "received  orders  to  march 
with  their  trains  about  2  P.  M.,  and  to  advance  to 
ward  Pittsburg  Landing  in  advance  of  the  trains  at 
4  P.  M."  This  they  did  (General  Wallace  informs  us) 
by  the  route  shown  on  the  map.  The  fourth  regi 
ment  went  to  Crump's  to  guard  the  public  property- 
The  "Official  Eecords"  (Vol.  X.,  p.  177)  also 
contain  a  rough  sketch  map,  submitted  by  General 
Wallace  to  General  Halleck,  accompanying  a  mem 
orandum  dated  March  14th,  1863.  That  map  is 
manifestly  imperfect  in  representing  but  one 
bridge  between  A  and  the  right  of  the  army,  the 
junction  of  Owl  and  Snake  creeks  being  placed 
above  the  upper  Snake  creek  bridge,  instead  of 
below  it.  General  Wallace  himself  has  informed 
the  editors  that  that  map  is  incorrect,  and  that  its 
inaccuracy  arose  from  a  prevalent  confusion  of  the 
names  of  Snake  and  Owl  creeks.  That  map,  how 
ever,  faithfully  represents  General  Wallace's  claim 
that  the  head  of  his  column  advanced  to  within 
a  mile  of  what  had  been  the  right  of  the  army. 
This  confusion  of  the  two  creeks  has  given  am 
biguity  to  General  Wallace's  statement  in  his  re- 


THE  MARCH  OF  LEW  WALLACE'S  DIVISION  TO  SHILOH. 


609 


port,  made  five  days  after  the  battle,  which  he  in 
forms  us  should  read  as  bracketed  : 

"  Selecting  a  road  that  led  directly  to  the  right  of 
the  lines,  as  they  were  established  around  Pittsburg 
Landing  oil  Sunday  morning,  my  column  started  im 
mediately,  the  distance  being  about  six  miles.  The 
cannonading,  distinctly  audible,  quickened  the  steps  of 
the  men.  Snake  Creek  [Owl  Creek],  difficult  of  passage? 
at  all  times  on  account  of  its  steep  banks  and  swampy 
bottoms,  ran  between  me  and  the  point  of  junction. 
Short  way  from  it  [Owl  CreekJ  Captain  Rowley,  from 

General  Grant,  .   .   .  overtook  me It  seemed,  on 

his  representation,  most  prudent  to  carry  the  column 
across  to  what  is  called  the  '  River  Road.'  .  .  .  This 
movement  occasioned  a  counter-march,  which  delayed 
my  junction  with  the  main  army  until  a  little  after 
nightfall." 

CHARACTER    OF    THE    MARCH. 

Rowley,  MePherson,  and  Rawlins  report  that 
they  represented  the  need  of  haste,  and  that  the 
march  was  slow  : 

"  Of  the  character  of  the  march,  after  I  overtook  Gen 
eral  Wallace,  I  can  only  say  that  to  me  it  appeared  in 
tolerably  slow,  resembling  more  a  reconnoissance  iuthe 
face  of  an  enemy  than  a  forced  march  to  relieve  a  hard- 
pressed  army.  So  strongly  did  this  impression  takehold 
of  my  mind,  that  I  took  the  liberty  of  repeating  to  Gen 
eral  Wallace  that  part  of  General  Grant's  order  enjoin 
ing  haste."  [Rowley.] 

"  After  I  had  reached  the  head  of  the  column,  I  must 
say  it  seemed  to  me  that  the  march  was  not  as  rapid  as 
the  urgency  of  the  case  required.  Perhaps  this  arose  in 
a  great  measure  from  my  impatience  and  anxiety  to  get 
this  force  on  the  field  before  dark.  .  .  ."  [MePherson] 

'•  Colonel  MePherson  and  I  came  up  to  him  about  3:30 
o'clock  p.  M.  He  was  then  not  to  exceed  four  or  four 
and  a  half  miles  [two  and  a  half  miles  ?]  from  the  scene 
of  action ;  the  roads  were  in  flue  condition ;  he  was 
marching  light ;  his  men  were  in  buoyant  spirits,  within 
hearing  of  the  musketry,  and  eager  to  get  forward.  He 
did  not  make  a  mile  and  a  half  an  hour,  although  urged 
and  appealed  to,  to  push  forward.  Had  he  moved  with 
the  rapidity  his  command  were  able  and  anxious  to  have 
moved  after  we  overtook  him,  he  would  have  reached 
you  [Grant]  iu  time  to  have  engaged  the  enemy  before 
the  close  of  Sunday's  fight."  [Rawlins.] 

General  Wallace  denies  this  last  conclusion  and 
the  statement  about  the  condition  of  the  road. 
General  Knefler  says  [letter  to  Wallace]  :  "After 
some  hard  marching  over  execrable  roads,  we 
reached  our  position  about  dusk."  Col.  James 
E.  Ross  says  [letter  to  Wallace,  January  25th, 
1868]:  "We  had  to  march  over  the  worst  road 
I  ever  remember  to  have  seen.  In  many  places 
it  was  almost  impossible  to  get  artillery  through." 

The  head  of  the  column  did  not  arrive  at  K  until 
after  dark,  probably  at  7:15,  sunset  being  at  6  :  30. 
The  total  time  of  the  march  was  about  7  hours. 
The  total  distance  traveled  to  the  lower  bridge  (K) 
was,  according  to  our  map,  11  miles.  It  is  pos 
sible  that  a  detailed  survey  of  the  field  would  in 
dicate  the  distance  as  somewhat  greater.  General 
Wallace  estimates  it  as  '•  over  14  miles,  of  which 
quite  5  miles  were  through  mire  so  deep  that  the 
axles  of  my  guns  left  wakes  behind  them  as  if 
mud-scows  had  been  dragged  that  way."  Cap 
tain  Brown,  who  studied  the  route  in  18^4,  esti 
mates  it  at  between  13  and  14  miles.  Not  con 
sidering  the  comparative  difficulties  of  the  two 
marches,  the  map  indicates  little  difference  in  the 
VOL.  T.  39. 


speed  of  Wallace's  division  and  that  of  Nelson's 
leading  brigade  (Ammen)  from  Savannah  to  Pitts- 
burg  Landing  (1:30  to  5).  Ammen  in  his  diary 
dwells  on  the  extreme  difficulties  of  his  route,  which 
lay  largely  through  swamps  impassable  by  artillery. 

DOCUMENTS  SUBMITTED  BY  GENERAL  "WALLACE. 

I. —  Letter  found  on  the  person  of  General  W.  H. 
L.  Wallace,  after  he  had  received  a  mortal  wound 
at  Shiloh,  and  sent  by  his  widow  to  General  Grant 
[see  foot-note,  page  468 ;  printed  also  in  THE 
CENTURY  and  in  the  "  Personal  Memoirs  of  U.  S. 
Grant"]: 

"  HEADQUARTERS  THIRD  DIVISION,  ADAMSVILLE,  April 
5th,  1862.  GENERAL  W.  H.  L.  WALLACE,  commanding  Sec 
ond  Division.  SIR  :  Yours  received.  Glad  to  hear  from 
you.  My  cavalry  from  this  point  has  been  to  and  from 
your  post  frequently.  As  my  Third  Brigade  is  here,  five 
miles  from  Crump's  Landing,  my  Second  two  and  a  half 
miles  from  it,  I  thought  it  would  be  better  to  open  com 
munication  with  you  from  Adamsville.  I  will  to-morrow 
order  Major  Hayes,  of  the  5th  Ohio  Cavalry,  to  report  to 
you  at  your  quarters ;  and,  if  you  are  so  disposed,  prob 
ably  you  had  better  send  a  compan y  to  return  with  him, 
that  they  may  familiarize  themselves  with  the  road,  to 
act  in  case  of  emergency  as  guides  to  and  from  our 
camps. — I  am,  very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 
LEWIS  WALLACE,  General  Third  Division." 

General  Wallace  says :  "  As  I  was  ignorant  of  the 
position  of  W.  H.  L.Wallace's  camp,  this  letter  was 
sent  by  way  of  Owl  Creek.  I  knew  Wallace,  and  did 
not  know  Sherman,  whose  camp  was  nearer." 

II.  — Letter  from  General  Grant  to  General  Lew 
Wallace,  in  1868,  after  examining  statements  by 
the  latter  and  by  the  following  officers  of  his  com 
mand,  touching  the  character  of  the  order  and 
march:  Generals  Fred.  Knefler,  George  F.  Mc- 
Ginnis,  Daniel  Macauley,  Silas  A.  Strickland,  John 
M.  Thayer,  Colonel  James  R.  Ross,  and  Captain  Ad- 
dison  Ware : 

"  HEADQUARTERS  ARMY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES,  WASH 
INGTON,  D.  C.,  March  10th,  1868.  MY  DEAR  GENERAL: 
Inclosed  herewith  I  return  you  letters  from  officers  of 
the  army  who  served  with  you  at  the  battle  of  Shiloh, 
Tennessee,  giving  their  statement  of  your  action  on 
that  occasion.  I  can  only  state  that  my  orders  to  you 
were  given  verbally  to  a  staff-officer  to  communicate, 
and  that  they  were  substantially  as  given  by  General 
Badeau  in  his  book.  I  always  understood  that  the  staff- 
oflicer  referred  to,  Captain  Baxter,  made  a  memorandum 
of  the  orders  he  received,  and  left  it  with  you.  That 
memorandum  I  never  saw. 

"  The  statements  which  I  now  return  seem  to  exoner 
ate  you  from  the  great  point  of  blame,  your  taking  the 
wrong  road,  or  different  road  from  the  one  directed, 
from  Crump's  Landing  to  Pittsburg  Landing.  All  your 
subsequent  military  career  showed  you  active  and  ready 
in  the  execution  of  every  order  you  received.  Your 
promptness  in  moving  from  Baltimore  to  Monocacy, 
Maryland,  in  1864,  and  meeting  the  enemy  m  force  far 
superior  to  your  own  when  Washington  was  threat 
ened,  is  a  case  particularly  in  point.  Ihere  you  could 
scarcely  have  hoped  for  a  victory,  but  you  delayed  the 
enemy,  and  enabled  me  to  get  troops  from  City  Point, 
Virginia,  in  time  to  save  the  city.  That  act  I  regarded 
as  most  praiseworthy.  I  refer  you  to  my  report  of  1865, 
touching  your  course  there.  In  view  of  the  assault 
made  upon  you  now,  I  think  it  due  to  you  that  you 
should  publish  what  your  own  staff  and  other  subordi 
nate  officers  have  to  say  in  exoneration  of  your  course. 
— Yours  truly,  U.  S.  GRANT,  General. 
"To  MAJOR-GENERAL  L.  WALLACE." 


6io 


THE  MARCH  OF  LEW  WALLACE'S  DIVISION  TO  SHILOH. 


III. —  Letter  from  General  Wallace  to  General 
Grant,  in  1884,  referring  to  the  whole  controversy. 
The  omissions  are  made  by  the  editors,  for  lack  of 
space  : 

"  CRAWFORDSVILLE,  IND.,  September  16th,  1884.  DEAR 
GENERAL:  The  Century  C'o.  people  inform  me  that 
they  have  engaged  you  to  write  a  paper  for  them  on 
Pittsburg  Lauding.  Such  a  contribution  from  your  hand 
will  be  important  as  well  an  most  interesting.  Probably 
I  ought  not  to  trouble  you  touching  the  subject ;  still,  I 
trust  you  will  appreciate  the  anxieties  natural  to  one 
who  has  been  so  bitterly  and  continuously  criticised  hi 
the  connection,  and  pardon  me  a  few  liue.s  of  request. 

"  The  letter  of  exoneration  you  gave  me  some  years  ago 
is  not  permitted  to  bo  printed  in  the  volume  of  reports 
published  by  the  Government,  though  I  earnestly  sought 
the  favor  of  the  Secretary  of  War.  The  terrible  reflec 
tions  in  your  indorsement  on  my  official  report  of  the 
battle,  and  elsewhere,  go  to  the  world  wholly  unquali 
fied.  It  is  not  possible  to  exaggerate  the  misfortune  thus 
entailed  upon  me.  But  now  you  have  it  in  power  to  make 
correction,  in  a  paper  which  will  bo  read  far  more  gen 
erally  than  the  compilation  of  the  department.  May  I 
hope  you  will  do  it  ? 

"Since  my  return  from  Europe  I  have  for  the  first  time 
read  the  reports  of  Generals  Rawlins  and  McPherson,  and 
Major  Rowley,  touching  my  march  the  first  day  of  the 
battle.  I  shall  regret  all  my  remaining  days  not  pre 
viously  knowing  their  tenor;  for  I  think  I  could  have 
explained  to  the  satisfaction  of  those  gentlemen  every 
mystery  of  my  conduct  during  their  ride  with  mo  the 
afternoon  of  the  6th  April.  They  did  not  understand 
that  there  was  a  mistake  in  your  order  as  it  was  deliv 
ered  to  me,  and  while  with  them  I  supposed  they  knew 
why  I  was  where  they  found  me.  Consequently,  no  ex 
planation  took  place  between  us.  I  see  now,  they  really 
supposed  me  lost,  and  wandering  aimlessly  about.  Had 
the  correctness  of  the  order  been  mooted,  no  doubt  the 
order  itself  could  have  been  produced.  I  would  not  have 
rested  until  my  adjutant-general  had  produced  it.  Is 
it  to  be  supposed  for  an  instant  that,  knowing  their 
thoughts  of  me  during  the  hours  of  that  ride,  I  could 
have  been  indifferent  to  them  ?  As  it  is,  you  will  observe 
that  neither  of  them  pretends  to  explain  my  behavior. 
Neither  makes  allusion  to  a  theory  of  explanation.  The 
truth  is,  I  all  the  time  supposed  the  necessity  for  the 
change  of  direction  in  my  movement  was  simply  due  to 
the  bad  turn  of  the  battle  after  the  order  was  dispatched 
to  me.  The  whole  time  I  was  in  their  company  I  thought 
myself  entitled  to  credit  for  the  promptness  with  which 
I  was  obeying  your  orders.  It  never  occurred  to  mo  that 
there  was  anything  to  explain,  and  I  was  wholly  given 
up  to  the  movement  of  the  division,  which  was  urgent 
business  in  hand. 

"  With  reference  to  Major  Rowley's  statement,  that  I 
had  no  knowledge  of  any  other  road  than  that  by  the  old 
mill,  and  his  other  statement,  that  I  retained  him  as  a 
guide,  the  explanation  is  that  I  was  speaking  of  a  cross 
road  to  the  River  Road.  I  had  no  knowledge  of  such  a 
road.  In  hopes  of  finding  one,  I  countermarched  instead 
of  facing  column  to  the  rear.  One  of  my  captains  of  artil 
lery  has  since  gone  over  the  entire  route  we  took,  from 
Stony  Lonesome,  the  place  at  which  I  received  your 
order  to  march,  to  Pittsburg  Landing,  and  he  finds  me 
mistaken  in  saying  we  countermarched  back  nearly  to 
the  initial  point  of  movement.  Ho  not  only  found  the 
cross-road  taken,  but  measured  the  whole  march,  chain 
in  hand,  making  it  a  little  more  than  fifteen  miles.  .  .  . 
"As  to  my  requiring  a  written  order  from  you,  I  repeat 
my  absolute  denial  of  the  statement.  The  order  I  acted 
upon  was  unsigned,  and  it  is  susceptible  of  proof  that 
when  the  young  Illinois  cavalryman  overtook  me  I  was 
already  on  the  inarch. 

"  As  to  the  slowness  referred  to  by  McPhersou,  Raw 
lins  and  Rowley,  please  try  that  point  by  compari 
sons From  11  :  30  o'clock  till  just  dusk  my 

march  was  quite  fifteen  miles.    I  refer  the  argument  to 
your  calm  judgment.    I  do  not  wonder  my  movement 


seemed  slow  to  your  officers.  With  their  anxieties  quick 
ened  by  what  they  had  seen  on  the  field,  it  must  have 
seemed  intolerable  to  them.  They  describe  me  correctly 
as  at  the  head  of  the  column,  and  I  did  several  times  dis 
mount,  but  only  towTait  the  closing  up  of  the  division  and 
reports  of  my  own  staff-officers,  who  were  kept  urging 
the  column  through  the  mud  and  mire. 

"There  is  another  point  your  officers  seem  not  to  have 
understood,  and  that  was  my  determination  not  to  send 
the  division  piecemeal  into  the  battle.  The  whole-  di 
vision  was  what  I  supposed  you  wanted,  and  1  was  re 
solved  to  bring  you  the  whole  division.  I  paid  no 
attention  to  contrary  suggestions  from  anybody.  I 
think  you  will  justify  this  pertinacity  of  purpose  by 
the  fact  that  it  was  impossible  to  tell  the  moment  I 
might  be  attacked  en  route.  The  chances  of  such  an 
occurrence  grew  sharper  as  I  drew  nearer  Pittsburg 
Landing.  For  you  must  remember,  general,  that  from 
the  moment  Major  Rowley  overtook  mo  with  the  infor 
mation,  then  first  received,  that  our  army  had  been 
driven  from  the  lino  it  occupied  in  the  morning,  and  was 
back  far  towards  the  river,  I  supposed  it  utterly  unable 
to  help  me.  Then  whether  the  enemy  attacked  me  or  I 
them,  it  was  only  my  division,  and  not  a  part  of  it,  that 
could  have  achieved  your  desires.  .  .  . 

"At  your  table  at  City  Point  we  one  day  sat  listening 
to  the  comments  of  some  officers  upon  the  battle  of  Pitts 
burg  Landing.  After  a  while  you  remarked  to  me  in  a 
low  tone,  '  If  I  had  known  then  what  I  know  now,  I 
would  have  ordered  you  where  you  were  marching  "when 
stopped.'  The  remark  was  made  at  your  table,  and  in 
a  confidential  manner,  so  that  I  have  never  felt  at 
liberty  to  repeat,  much  less  publish,  it.  But  times 
innumerable  since  then  I  have  wished  that  Rowley  had 
not  overtaken  me  for  another  hourthat  afternoon.  The 
enemy  had  used  the  last  of  his  reserves.  I  would  have 
taken  the  bluff  on  which  Sherman  had  been  camped  in 
the  morning  and,  without  opposition,  effected  my  de 
ployment.  The  first  of  the  rebels  struck  would  have 
been  the  horde  plundering  the  sutlers  and  drinking  in 
the  streets  of  the  camp.  Their  fears  would  have  magni 
fied  my  command,  and  rushing  to  their  engaged  lines 
they  would  have  carried  the  word  that  Buell's  army 
was  up  and  on  their  lines  of  retreat.  For  your  sake,  and 
my  own,  general,  and  for  the  cause  generally,  it  was 
unfortunate  that  Rowley  had  not  lost  his  way,  as  it  was 
said  I  had  mine. 

"  Finally,  general,  did  you  ever  ask  yourself  what  mo 
tive  I  could  have  bad  to  play  you  falsely  that  day  1  It 
couldn't  have  been  personal  malice.  Only  a  few  weeks 
before  I  had  been  promoted  major-general  on  your 
recommendation.  It  couldn't  have  been  cowardice. 
You  had  seen  mo  under  fire  at  Donelson,  and  twice  the 
second  day  at  Pittsbiirg  Landing  you  found  me  with  my 
division  under  fire.  It  couldn't  have  been  lack  of  reso 
lution.  I  certainly  showed  no  failing  of  that  kind  at 
Monocacy  Junction,  where  my  situation  was  quite  as 
trying  as  at  any  hour  of  the  Gth  of  April  of  which  I  am 
writing.  The  fact  is,  I  was  the  victim  of  a  mistake. 
Captain  Baxter's  omission  from  the  order  you  gave,  him 
for  transmission  to  me— the  omission  of  the  road  you 
wanted  me  to  take  in  coming  up  —  viz.,  the  lower  or  River 
Road  to  Pittsburg  Landing,  was  the  cause  of  my  move 
ment  at  noon.  It  is  also  the  key  of  explanation  of  all 
that  followed.  That  I  took  the  directest  and  shortest 
road  to  effect  a  junction  with  the  right  of  the  army,  and 
marched  promptly  upon  receipt  of  the  order,  are  the 
best  evidence  I  could  have  furnished  of  an  actual  desire 
to  do  my  duty,  and  share  the  fortunes  of  the  day  with 
you,  whether  they  were  good  or  bad. 

"In  all  the  years  that  have  followed  I  have  been 
patient  and  uncomplaining,  because,  as  3-011  had  shown 
the  will  to  exonerate  me,  I  believed  you  would  follow  it 
up  on  all  proper  occasions.  And  I  submit  to  you  if  this 
is  not  one  of  them.  For  the  sake  of  the  hundreds  of  sur 
vivors  of  my  old  division,  as  well  as  that  justice  may 
be  finally  and  completely  done  to  me  individually,  I 
presume  to  present  the  matter  to  you  in  this  letter. 
"  Very  respectfully,  your  friend,  LEW  WALLACE." 


THE   UNION    AND   CONFEDERATE   NAVIES. 

BY  JAMES  RUSSELL  SOLEY,   PROFESSOR,   U.  S.  N. 

IN  order  to  understand  the  condition  of  the  United  States  navy  in  1861,  it 
is  necessary  to  glance  at  the  state  of  affairs  during  the  twenty  years 
before  the  war.  Until  the  year  1840,  naval  science  during  a  long  period 
had  made  but  little  progress.  The  various  improvements  in  construction, 
in  equipment,  and  in  ordnance  that  had  been  introduced  before  this  date 
had  come  about  very  slowly  and  gradually,  and  though  numerous  small 
mechanical  devices  had  been  adopted  from  time  to  time,  and  old  ones  had 
been  rendered  more  efficient,  no  marked  changes  had  taken  place  in  the  art 
of  naval  war.  Ships  were  essentially  what  they  had  been  for  two  hundred 
years,  and  they  were  rigged,  propelled,  armed,  and  fought  upon  essentially 
the  same  principles.  But  toward  the  year  1840,  the  introduction  of  steam 
as  a  motive  power  marked  the  beginning  of  a  new  era, —  an  era  of  develop 
ments  so  rapid  and  of  changes  so  radical  that  only  the  most  progressive 
and  elastic  minds  could  follow  them.  The  sailing  vessel  was  about  to  be  laid 
aside,  except  for  purposes  of  training.  In  the  next  few  years  it  was  replaced, 
first  by  the  paddle-wheel  steamer,  then  by  the  screw,  then  by  the  twin-screw. 
The  rig  of  the  ship  was  next  altered,  and  her  spars  and  sail-spread  reduced 
until  they  were  merely  auxiliary.  Gradually  it  was  realized  that  the  danger 
from  falling  spars  in  an  engagement  was  a  disadvantage  often  out  of  all  pro 
portion  to  the  benefits  of  auxiliary  sail-power,  and  vessels  were  built  with  no 


612  THE  UNION  AND  CONFEDERATE  NAI/IES 

spars  above  the  deck  but  a  signal-pole  forward  and  aft.  Steam  brought 
with  it  also  a  new  weapon.  The  ram,  which  had  been  the  principal  engine 
of  naval  warfare  in  the  Greek  and  Roman  galleys,  had  disappeared  in  the 
Middle  Ages  when  galleys  were  superseded  by  sailing  ships.  The  latter, 
being  dependent  upon  the  wind  for  their  motive  power  and  direction,  could 
not  attack  an  enemy  end-on,  and  hence  the  ram  became  useless.  Soon  after 
the  introduction  of  steam  a  few  men  of  inquiring  and  fertile  minds,  among 
them  Commodore  Matthew  Perry  and  Mr.  Charles  Ellet,  a  distinguished  civil 
engineer,  perceived  that  the  steam-engine  placed  a  ship-of-war  in  the  same 
situation  as  the  galleys  of  the  classical  period,  and  that  the  ram  might  be 
employed  on  the  modern  vessel  to  much  greater  advantage  than  in  ancient 
times.  Presently,  the  whole  system  of  naval  tactics  underwent  a  change,  due 
to  the  same  cause.  The  close-hauled  line  ahead,  the  order  of  battle  for  two 
hundred  years  and  more,  gave  place  to  the  direct  attack  in  line  abreast.  To 
utilize  the  guns  in  this  new  order  of  battle,  they  must  no  longer  be  mounted 
in  broadside,  but  upon  elevated  citadels,  giving  them  a  wider  sweep  around 
the  horizon.  Meantime  the  guns  had  undergone  a  change,  and  were  becom 
ing  vastly  more  powerful.  First  they  were  adapted  to  fire  shells,  which  had 
hitherto  been  confined  to  mortars;  next  the  calibers  were  increased,  then 
rifling  was  adopted,  giving  greater  range,  accuracy,  and  penetration,  and 
finally  breech-loaders  came  into  use.  Following  closely  upon  the  improve 
ments  in  guns,  came  the  idea  of  protecting  the  sides  of  vessels  with  a  light 
armor,  at  first  of  bar  iron  or  of  two-inch  plates,  developed  by  experiment 
after  experiment  into  masses  of  solid  steel,  twenty-two  inches  in  thickness. 
Last  of  all  came  the  torpedo,  of  which  a  slight  and  tentative  use  had  been 
made  as  early  as  1776,  but  which  only  made  its  way  into  successful  and 
general  employment  in  the  war  of  1861. 

There  were  signs  of  the  dawn  of  this  revolution  before  1840,  and  its  culmi 
nation  was  only  reached  during  the  war.  But  the  twenty  years  between  1840 
and  1860  were  those  in  which  the  movement  was  really  accomplished.  During 
this  period  the  naval  administration  had  endeavored  to  follow  the  changes 
that  were  taking  place,  but  it  had  not  fully  caught  up  with  them.  It  had 
begun  by  building  heavy  side-wheelers,  first  the  Mississippi  and  Missouri  and 
next  the  Powliatan  and  Susquehanna.  Efficient  as  these  latter  vessels  were 
considered  in  1847,  when  they  were  begun,  and  even  in  1850,  when  they  were 
launched,  their  model  was  promptly  dropped  when  the  submarine  screw  was 
introduced  in  place  of  the  vulnerable  paddle-wheel.  The  six  screw-frigates 
were  accordingly  built  in  1855,  and  they  were  regarded  with  admiration 

by  naval  men  abroad  as  well  as  at 
home.  The  Niagara,  the  largest  of 
these,  was  a  ship  of  4500  tons.  The 
other  five,  the  Roanoke,  Colorado,  Mcr- 
rimac,  Minnesota,  and  Wabasli,  had  a 

3000.     All  of 


them  were   heavily  armed,  and   they 

ROMAN    WAR-GALLEY.  J 

FROM    ANCIENT    TERRA-COTTA   MODEL.  formed,       OI'      WCl'C        SUppOSed       tO 


THE  UNION  AND  CONFEDERATE  NAl/IES. 


613 


LINE-OF-BATTLE    SHIP    OF  THE    SEVENTEENTH    CENTURY. 


the  chief  element  of  naval  strength  of  the  United  States.  This  reliance  of 
the  Government  upon  its  large  frigates  would  seem  to  have  been  well 
grounded,  and  if  a  war  had  arisen  with  a  maritime  enemy  supplied  with 
vessels  of  the  same  general  type,  they  would  have  given  a  good  account  of 
themselves.  In  the  civil  war,  however,  the  enemy  had  no  ordinary  vessels  of 
war  to  be  met  and  conquered  in  ocean  duels,  and  the  waters  upon  his  coast 
at  points  vulnerable  to  naval  attack  were  too  shallow  to  admit  the  frigates. 
Hence  none  of  them  performed  any  service  at  all  proportionate  to  their  size 
and  cost  of  maintenance,  except  in  two  or  three  isolated  cases  of  bombard 
ment,  as  at  Hatteras  Inlet,  Port  Royal,  and  Fort  Fisher. 

Of  a  much  more  useful  type  for  general  service  were  the  twelve  screw 
sloops-of-war  built  in  1858.  There  were  five  of  these  of  the  first  class,  among 
them  the  Hartford,  Brooklyn,  and  Richmond,  which  gave  and  took  so  many 
heavy  blows  while  fighting  in  Farragut's  West  Gulf  Squadron.  Hardly  less 
important  were  the  sloops  of  the  second  class,  of  which  the  Iroquois  and 
Dacotali  were  the  largest  and  most  typical  examples.  To  the  same  group 
belonged  the  Pawnee,  a  vessel  of  peculiar  construction,  whose  constant  service 
was  hardly  surpassed  in  efficiency  and  importance  by  any  other  ship  of  her 
size  on  the  Atlantic  coast.  Besides  the  sloops,  there  were  a  few  other 
steamers  of  miscellaneous  dimensions  and  character,  some  of  which  had 
been  purchased  and  altered  for  naval  use;  and  these  comprised  all  that 
the  Government  had  secured  toward  the  creation  of  a  modern  steam  fleet. 

The  normal  strength  of  the  United  States  navy,  if  it  is  to  be  a  navy  at  all, 
cannot  be  figured  at  much  less  than  from  80  to  100  vessels,  and  this  was  the 
number  in  1861.  But  of  the  actual  total  of  90,  as  shown  by  the  navy  list, 
50  were  sailing  ships, — line-of-battle  ships,  frigates,  sloops,  and  brigs, — which, 


614 


THE   UNION  AND  CONFEDERATE  NAVIES. 


splendid  vessels  as  they  had  been  in  their  day,  were  now  as  obsolete  as 
the  galleys  of  Themistocles.  It  was  in  placing  a  false  reliance  upon  these 
vessels  that  the  Government  was  at  fault :  it  should  have  recognized  in  the 
course  of  twenty  years  that  their  day  was  gone  forever,  that  they  were  of  no 
more  use  than  if  they  did  not  exist,  that  they  would  only  be  the  slaughter 
houses  of  their  gallant  crews  in  an  encounter  with  a  modern  antagonist ; 
and  it  should  by  that  time  have  replaced  every  one  of  them  by  war-ships  of 
the  period. 

At  the  beginning  of  President  Lincoln's  administration,  out  of  the  forty 
vessels  composing  the  steam-fleet,  one,  the  Michigan,  was  stationed  on  the 
lakes,  and  five  were  from  one  cause  or  another  unserviceable.  The  remain 
ing  thirty-four,  which  comprised  the  whole  of  the  effective  force,  were  in  the 
scattered  situation  that  is  usual  in  time  of  profound  peace.  Nine  were  laid 
up  in  ordinary,  and  with  the  traditional  methods  prevailing  at  the  Navy 
Department,  it  would  have  taken  some  months  to  fit  them  out  for  sea.  No 
orders  had  been  issued  for  the  general  recall  of  the  seventeen  ships  on  foreign 
service,  an  operation  requiring  considerable  time  in  those  days,  when  no 
submarine  cable  existed.  In  the  Home  Squadron  there  were  seven  steamers, 
two  of  which,  the  sloop-of-war  Brooklyn  and  the  small  steamer  Wyandotte,  were 
at  Pensacola ;  two  others,  the  gun-boats  Mohawk  and  Crusader,  were  at  New 
York ;  the  Pawnee,  a  second-class  sloop,  was  at  Washington  ;  and  the  Poiv- 
hatan,  a  side-wheeler  of  1850,  was  on  her  way  home  from  Vera  Cruz  in 
company  with  the  gun-boat  Pocahontas.  Five  sailing  ships  were  also 
attached  to  this  squadron, — the  frigate  Saline  and  the  sloop  St.  Louis,  at 
Pensacola ;  the  sloops  Cumberland  and  Macedonian,  at  Vera  Cruz  or  return 
ing  thence,  and  the  store-ship  Supply,  at  New  York.  These  twelve  vessels, 
together  with  the  Anacostia,  a  small  screw-tender,  at  the  Washington  Navy 

Yard,  were  all  that  could 
be  said  to  be  at  the  im 
mediate  disposal  of  the 
Administration. 

When  the  vessels  abroad 
were  gathered  in,  and 
those  in  ordinary  were 
fitted  out,  the  Govern 
ment  had  a  little  squad 
ron  of  about  30  steamers, 
of  which  the  most  im 
portant  were  5  screw- 
frigates  (the  sixth,  the 
Merrimac,  having  been 
abandoned  at  Norfolk), 
6  sloops  of 


THE   UNITED  STATES  FRIGATE    "  MERRIMAC  "  BEFORE 
AND  AFTER   CONVERSION  INTO  AN  IRON-CLAD. 


THE  UNION  AND  CONFEDERATE  NAl/IES.  615 

the  first  or  Hartford  class,  4  large  side-wheelers,  and  8  sloops  of  the  second  or 
Iroqiiois  class.  All  these  were  exceedingly  valuable  as  the  nucleus  of  a  fleet,  but 
for  the  war  which  the  Government  had  now  on  hand  they  could  be  considered 
as  nothing  more  than  this.  According  to  the  position  which  the  Adminis 
tration  was  very  soon  compelled  to  take,  the  struggle  was  one  a  entrance.  In  a 
foreign  war  the  conflict  usually  springs  from  a  collision  of  rights  or  of  inter 
ests,  involving  only  a  particular  branch  of  the  relations  of  the  two  contestants, 
and  the  question  is  ultimately  settled  by  some  form  of  compromise,  as  soon 
as  financial  or  military  exhaustion  leads  one  party  or  the  other  to  conclude  that 
a  protraction  of  the  contest  is  not  worth  its  while.  In  the  civil  war,  however, 
no  compromise  was  possible,  and  with  the  resolution  shown  by  the  Southern 
people,  nothing  short  of  complete  subjugation  would  insure  the  restoration 
of  the  Union.  In  such  a  war,  a  little  fleet  capable  of  raids  upon  the 
enemy's  commerce  or  sea-ports  might  be  advantageous  to  the  insurgents,  but 
the  Federal  Government  required  materials  and  methods  of  a  totally  different 
character.  Xo  mere  raids  would  profit  it  a  jot.  It  must  blockade  the  insur 
gent  territory  ;  and  to  do  this  it  was  not  enough  to  keep  a  few  ships  cruising 
in  neighboring  waters,  but  a  cordon  of  fast  and  efficient  steamers  must  be 
stretched  from  end  to  end,  without  so  much  as  a  gap  in  the  whole  four 
thousand  miles  of  coast.  The  reduction  or  even  the  passage  of  fortifications 
required  powerful  and  well-equipped  fleets  engaged  solely  in  these  enter 
prises.  The  vast  net-work  of  interior  waterways  in  which  the  army's  base 
and  communications  must  be  protected,  could  only  be  occupied  successfully 
by  another  and  equally  numerous  fleet.  Finally,  the  protection  of  commerce 
demanded,  from  the  very  nature  of  things,  far  more  vessels  than  its  destruction. 

Had  the  material  of  the  navy  of  1861  been  such  as  it  ought  to  have  been, — 
composed,  let  us  say,  of  ninety  modern  war-steamers  of  fair  quality ;  with 
such  an  organization  that  those  laid  up  in  ordinary  could  have  been  fitted 
out  in  two  weeks  at  farthest,  as  should  always  be  the  case ;  with  a  reserve  of 
a  hundred,  or  even  of  fifty  merchant-steamers,  constructed  with  a  view  to 
conversion  into  war- vessels  at  short  notice,  which  is  an  easy  matter  to  accom 
plish  ;  with  some  system  by  which  the  latest  problems  in  naval  science, 
especially  in  reference  to  iron-clads,  had  been  considered  and,  in  part  at  least, 
carried  to  solution ;  and  finally,  with  a  corps  of  officers  graded  more  or  less 
by  merit,  or  the  promise  of  growing  fitness  for  command,  instead  of  by  age, 
or  the  promise  of  growing  uufitness, —  had  all  these  plain,  practicable,  and 
sensible  measures  found  a  place  in  the  naval  administration,  it  is  perfectly 
safe  to  say  that  a  single  year  would  have  seen  the  opening  of  the  Mississippi,  the 
occupation  of  North  Carolina,  the  fall  of  Richmond,  Charleston,  Savannah, 
and  Mobile,  and  probably  the  end  of  the  Confederacy.  During  the  first  six 
months  of  the  war,  there  was  really  nothing  to  oppose  the  vigorous  attack  of 
such  a  force,  and  there  was  little  more  during  the  six  months  following. 

As  the  naval  material  was  not  011  a  respectable  peace-footing,  and  as  no 
provision  had  been  made  for  its  conversion  to  a  war-footing,  the  measures 
adopted  for  its  increase  were  chiefly  makeshifts  to  which  the  Government 
was  driven  bv  the  exigencies  of  the  moment.  The  vessels  purchased  by  the 


bib  THE  UNION  AND  CONFEDERATE  NAYIES. 

Department  during  the  war  amounted  to  418,  and  included  every  variety  of 
merchantman  and  river  steamboat  roughly  adapted  in  the  navy  yards  for  war 
service.  Three  types  of  wooden  vessels  were  built :  14  screw  sloops  of  the 
Kearsarye,  Shenandoah,  and  Osslpee  classes ;  23  screw  gun-boats,  called  from 
the  rapidity  of  their  construction  the  "  ninety-day  "  gun-boats ;  and  47  side- 
wheel  steamers,  known  as  "  double-enders,"  for  service  in  narrow  channels, 
where  they  could  move  ahead  or  astern  without  turning.  ,1  Later  in  the  war 
forty-eight  additional  sloops  or  corvettes  of  various  sizes  were  projected,  but 
few  of  these  were  ever  finished,  and  hardly  any  before  the  close  of  the  struggle. 
In  the  matter  of  iron-clads,  the  extreme  slowness  with  which  the  Navy 
Department  moved  shows  that  it  failed  to  comprehend  the  magnitude  of  the 
struggle,  and  that  it  was  unfamiliar  with  the  recent  progress  of  naval  warfare. 
The  advantages  of  a  light  armor-plating  for  vessels-of-war  had  been  demon 
strated  by  the  experience  of  the  French  floating  batteries  Devastation,  Lave, 
and  Tonnante,  in  the  attack  on  Kinburn  in  1855,  during  the  Crimean  war. 
These  vessels  were  protected  by  4^-inch  plates,  and  the  experiment  had  been 
deemed  so  conclusive  that  both  France  and  England  had  already  constructed 
new  war-ships  incased  in  armor.  It  was  to  be  expected  that  a  navy  with  a 
war  on  its  hands  would  have  directed  its  attention  from  the  first  moment 
when  it  was  convinced  of  the  probability  of  hostilities  to  securing  some  of 
these  formidable  vessels ;  and  if  a  hesitation  due  to  the  want  of  statutory 
authority  had- led  the  Department  to  defer  building  until  after  Congress 
met,  it  would  at  least  by  that  time  have  digested  its  plans  so  thoroughly  that 
the  work  could  begin  at  once.  Nevertheless,  for  four  months  after  Mr.  Welles 
entered  upon  his  office  no  steps  were  taken,  even  of  the  most  elementary 
character,  toward  procuring  iron-clads.  In  his  report  of  July  4th,  1861,  at  the 
opening  of  the  special  session  of  Congress,  the  Secretary,  by  way  of  calling  at 
tention  to  the  subject,  makes  the  following  somewhat  ponderous  observations  : 

"  Much  attention  has  been  given  within  the  last  few  years  to  the  subject  of  floating  batteries, 
or  iron-clad  steamers.  Other  governments,  and  particularly  France  and  England,  have  made 
it  a  special  object  in  connection  with  naval  improvements ;  and  the  ingenuity  and  inventive 
faculties  of  our  own  countrymen  have  also  been  stimulated  by  recent  occurrences  toward  the 
construction  of  this  class  of  vessel.  The  period  is,  perhaps,  not  one  best  adapted  to  heavy  ex 
penditures  by  way  of  experiment,  and  the  time  and  attention  of  some  of  those  who  are  most 
competent  to  investigate  and  form  correct  conclusions  on  the  subject  are  otherwise  employed. 
I  would,  however,  recommend  the  appointment  of  a  proper  and  competent  board  to  inquire 
into  and  report  in  regard  to  a  measure  so  important ;  and  it  is  for  Congress  to  decide  whether,  on 
a  favorable  report,  they  will  order  one  or  more  iron-clad  steamers,  or  floating  batteries,  to  be 
constructed,  with  a  view  to  perfect  protection  from  the  effects  of  present  ordnance  at  short 
range,  and  make  an  appropriation  for  that  purpose." 

In  consequence  of  this  recommendation,  which,  it  must  be  confessed,  was 
hardly  such  as  the  urgency  of  the  measure  demanded,  Congress,  a  whole 
month  later,  on  the  3d  of  August,  passed  an  act  authorizing  the  Secretary  to 
appoint  a  board  of  officers  to  investigate  the  subject,  a  thing  which  was  cer 
tainly  within  the  scope  of  ministerial  powers  without  any  special  legislation,. 

J  Eight  of  the  "  double-enders"  were  built  of  iron. 


THE   UNION  AND  CONFEDERATE   NAMES. 


617 


THE    NAVY    YARD,   WASHINGTON,   IN    18G1. 

and  appropriating  $1,500,000  for  the  work.  After  another  delay  of  five 
precions  days,  on  the  8th  of  August  the  board  was  appointed,  composed  of 
Commodores  Smith  and  Paulding  and  Commander  Davis.  The  board  took 
occasion  to  remark  that  it  approached  the  subject  "  with  diffidence,  having 
no  experience,  and  but  scanty  knowledge  in  this  branch  of  naval  architecture." 
Inconceivable  as  it  seems,  this  statement  was  literally  true ;  for  although 
five  months  had  elapsed  since  the  new  administration  had  come  in ;  although 
it  knew,  or  should  have  known,  what  the  Confederates  were  doing  at  Norfolk, 
and  that  time  was  of  vital  moment,  the  very  best  men  whom  it  could  select 
took  six  weeks  to  reach  a  conclusion  on  the  subject.  Even  at  the  close  of  its 
protracted  deliberations,  so  little  did  the  board  understand  the  tremendous 
importance  of  its  work  that  in  its  final  report  it  sagely  remarked  : 

"  Opinions  differ  amongst  naval  and  scientific  men  as  to  the  policy  of  adopting  the  iron  arma 
ture  for  ships-of-war.  For  coast  and  harbor  defense  they  are  undoubtedly  formidable 
adjuncts  to  fortifications  011  land.  As  cruising  vessels,  however,  we  ai'e  skeptical  as  to  their 
advantages  and  ultimate  adoption.  But  whilst  other  nations  are  endeavoring  to  perfect  them, 
we  must  not  remain  idle.  .  .  .  We,  however,  do  not  hesitate  to  express  the  opinion,  notwith 
standing  all  we  have  heard  or  seen  written  on  the  subject,  that  no  ship  or  floating  battery, 
however  heavily  she  may  be  plated,  can  cope  successfully  with  a  properly  constructed  fortifica 
tion  of  masonry." 

The  same  inability  to  understand  the  situation  is  shown  in  the  Secretary's 
report  transmitted  to  Congress  in  December,  in  which  he  contents  himself 
with  this  perfunctory  utterance  : 

"  The  subject  of  iron  armature  for  ships  is  one  of  great  general  interest,  not  only  to  the  navy 
and  country,  but  is  engaging  the  attention  of  the  civilized  world." 

The  board  selected  three  plans,  offered  respectively  by  Bushnell  &  Co.,  of 
New  Haven,  Merrick  &  Sons,  of  Philadelphia,  and  John  Ericsson,  of  New 
York,  from  which  were  subsequently  built  the  Galena,  the  New  Ironsides,  and 


6i8 


THE  UNION  AND  CONFEDERATE   NAMES. 


the  Monitor.  The  choice  of  plans  was  wise,  although  the  Galena  totally 
failed  to  accomplish  what  was  expected  of  her,  and  neither  she  nor  the  Iron 
sides  was  afterward  duplicated.  The  Ironsides,  however,  proved  a  very  efficient 
vessel  within  her  sphere  of  action ;  but  so  overwhelming  was  the  success  of 
the  Monitor  that  hardly  any  other  model  was  afterward  adopted. 

The  main  features  of  the  Monitor  were  the  revolving  turret,  the  low  free 
board,  and  the  projecting  overhang.  By  means  of  these  devices  the  ship  was 
made  to  present  a  very  small  target,  and  her  engines,  battery,  screw,  rudder, 
and  anchor,  as  well  as  her  crew,  were  thoroughly  protected,  and  neither  rams 
nor  guns  could  make  much  impression  on  her.  On  the  other  hand,  the  low 
freeboard  had  also  one  distinctive  disadvantage,  in  that  it  reduced  the  vessel's 
reserve  of  flotation,  thus  making  it  possible  for  a  small  influx  of  water  to 
sink  her.  The  idea  of  mounting  guns  in  a  revolving  circular  turret  had 
been  suggested  before  at  various  times,  but  had  never  been  carried  to  the 
point  of  useful  application.  In  1842  Timby  had  proposed  a  system  of  coast 
fortification  based  on  this  idea,  but  the  plan  had  been  found  defective,  and 
had  been  rejected.  In  1854  Captain  Ericsson  had  submitted  to  the  Emperor 
Napoleon  III.  a  design  of  an  iron-clad  battery  with  a  hemispherical  turret. 
In  the  next  year  Captain  Cowper  Coles,  R.  N.,  had  suggested  a  vessel  in  the 
form  of  a  raft  with  a  stationary  shield  for  protecting  the  guns ;  and  in  1859 
he  had  improved  upon  this  design  by  adding  a  revolving  cupola.  But  it  was 
left  to  the  genius  of  Ericsson  to  develop  by  itself  the  perfected  application 
of  the  principle,  and  to  construct  a  navigable  turret  iron-clad  which  should  be 
nearly  invulnerable  to  every  weapon  but  the  torpedo. 

When  the  Navy  Department  finally  understood  Ericsson's  plan,  it  immedi 
ately  adopted  it.  According  to  Captain  Ericsson,  "  The  Committee  of  Naval 
Commanders  .  .  .  occupied  me  less  than  two  hours  in  explaining  my  new 
system.  In  about  two  hours  more  the  committee  had  come  to  a  decision. 
After  their  favorable  report  had  been  [made]  to  the  Secretary  I  was  called  into 
his  office,  where  I  was  detained  less  than  five  minutes.  In  order  not  to  lose  any 


THE  UNION  AND  CONFEDERATE  NAJ/IES.  619 

time,  the  Secretary  ordered  me  to  '  go  ahead  at  once.'  Consequently,  while 
the  clerks  of  the  department  were  engaged  in  drawing  up  the  formal  contract, 
the  iron  which  now  forms  the  keel-plate  of  the  Monitor  was  drawn  through 
the  rolling-mill." 

The  contract  for  the  Monitor  was.  finally  signed  on  the  4th  of  October.  The 
extraordinary  energy  of  the  contractors  when  they  had  once  undertaken  the 
work  pushed  it  to  completion  with  unexampled  speed.  But  the  time  which 
had  been  of  the  greatest  value,  namely,  the  six  months  from  March  to  Sep 
tember,  had  been  lost,  and  thus  it  happened  that  the  new  iron-clad  was  not 
finished  in  season  to  prevent  the  raid  of  the  Merrimac  in  Hampton  Roads, 
and  the  obliteration  of  the  Congress  and  the  Cumberland.  In  the  battle  of  the 
9th  of  March  the  presence  of  the  Monitor,  which  had  arrived  late  the  night 
before,  saved  the  rest  of  the  fleet  from  a  like  fate,  to  say  nothing  of  other 
disasters  whose  magnitude  can  only  be  conjectured. 

It  must  be  remembered  that  the  Navy  Department  had  possessed  from  the 
beginning  five  frigates,  sister  ships  of  the  Merrimac,  any  one  of  which  could 
have  been  armored  more  efficiently  than  she  was,  in  half  the  time  and  with 
half  the  money,  and  without  waiting  for  congressional  action.  Evidently 
the  department  little  imagined,  while  it  was  dallying  for  six  months  with 
the  question  of  iron-clads,  that  the  first  twenty-four  hours  of  the  Monitor's 
career  would  be  so  big  with  fate. 

In  addition  to  the  three  vessels  selected  by  the  board  of  1861,  there  were 
built  or  projected  during  the  war  nearly  sixty  iron-clads,  all  of  which  were  of 
the  Monitor  type  except  three, — the  huge  ram  Dunderberg,  which  was  sold  to 
the  French  Government,  and  afterward  called  the  Rochambeaii ;  the  Keokuk, 
which  sank  off  Charleston,  immediately  after  the  battle  of  April  7th,  1863, 
and  the  converted  frigate  Moanoke.  Of  the  fourteen  double-turreted  monitors, 
including  the  Puritan,  the  Onondaga,  the  Kalamazoo  class,  the  Monadnock  class, 
and  the  Winnebago  class,  only  six  were  finished  in  time  to  take  part  in  the 
war.  The  single-turreted  monitors  which  saw  the  most  service  were  those  of 
the  Passaic  class,  most  of  which  were  stationed  in  the  South  Atlantic  Squad 
ron.  Besides  these  there  were  the  Dictator,  the  nine  vessels  of  the  Canonicus 
class,  and  the  twenty  light-draft  monitors.  The  last  were  never  of  any  use, 
the  calculations  for  their  displacement  having  been  so  faulty  that  they  could 
not  float  their  guns  and  coal. 

Hitherto  we  have  been  speaking  of  vessels  for  service  on  the  coast  or  in  the 
waters  adjacent  to  the  coast.  The  Mississippi  flotilla  deserves  a  place  by 
itself.  This  force,  which  included  all  the  vessels  operating  on  the  Ohio,  the 
Mississippi,  the  Red  River,  and  their  tributaries,  comprised  altogether  over  a 
hundred  vessels,  of  the  greatest  variety  in  construction  and  character, —  pro 
pellers,  side- wheelers,  stern-wheelers,  rams,  iron-clads,  "  tin-clads,"  unarmored 
boats,  mortar-vessels.  As  the  first  demand  for  a  flotilla  came  from  the  army,  its 
early  organization  was  directed  by  the  War  Department,  although  a  naval  officer 
was  placed  in  command.  The  complications  resulting  from  this  arrangement, 
under  which,  as  Foote  said,  "every  brigadier  could  interfere  with  him,"  were 
obviated,  October  1st,  1862,  by  the  transfer  of  the  force  to  the  Navy  Department. 


62O 


THE  UNION  AND  CONFEDERATE  NAVIES. 


LAUNCH    OF  THE   "DICTATOR"  FROM    THE    DELAMATER    IRON    WORKS,    NEW    YORK,    DECEMBER   27,    1863. 

The  first  step  in  the  creation  of  the  Mississippi  flotilla  was  taken  in  May, 
1861,  by  Commander  John  Rodgers,  who,  acting  under  the  authority  of  the 
War  Department,  purchased  at  Cincinnati  three  river-steamboats,  the  Cones- 
toga,  Lexington,  and  Tyler,  and  altered  them  into  gun-boats  by  strengthening 
their  frames,  lowering  their  machinery,  and  protecting  their  decks  by  heavy 
bulwarks.  In  August,  the  War  Department  made  a  contract  with  James  B. 
Eads  [see  page  338],  the  famous  engineer  of  the  Mississippi  jetties,  to  build  in 
two  months  seven  gun-boats,  propelled  by  a  central  paddle-wheel,  and  covered 
with  armor  two  and  a  half  inches  thick,  on  the  forward  end  of  the  casemates 
and  on  the  sides  abreast  of  the  engines.  These  may  be  said  to  have  been  our 
first  iron-dads,  light  as  their  plating  was,  and  imperfectly  as  it  covered  the 
vessels.  In  spite  of  all  their  defects,  they  performed  constant  service  of  incal 
culable  importance  throughout  the  war ;  and  there  is  not  one  among  them 
all — the  Cairo,  Carondelet,  Cincinnati,  Louisville,  Mound  City,  Pittsburgh,  and 
St.  Louts  or  T)e  Kallj  —  which  failed  to  make  her  name  famous  in  the  incessant 
conflicts  of  the  Mississippi.  Two  larger  vessels  purchased  by  the  Government, 
the  Benton  and  the  Essex,  of  one  thousand  tons  each,  and  somewhat  more 
heavily  armored,  together  with  thirty-eight  mortar-boats,  complete  the  list  of 


THE  UNION  AND  CONFEDERATE  NAMES.  621 

vessels  of  the  Mississippi  flotilla  during  the  period  of  Foote's  command,  which 
extended  to  the  summer  of  1862.  [See  pages  358  and  430.] 

During  the  following  year  important  additions  were  made  to  the  flotilla. 
These  were  of  two  classes,  light-draft  boats  and  iron-clads.  The  light-drafts 
were  small  stern-wheel  boats  armjed  with  howitzers,  which  were  peculiarly 
useful  for  vedette  and  other  light,  flying  service,  but  which  in  addition  took 
their  full  share  of  the  brunt  of  battle  in  the  numerous  contests  that  took  place 
in  the  shoal  waters  of  the  Yazoo  and  the  Eed  River.  Drawing  less  than  two 
feet  of  water,  they  could  go  almost  anywhere,  and  with  their  howitzer  bat 
teries,  and  their  light,  bullet-proof  plating,  they  were  efficient  vessels  for 
clearing  the  river-banks  of  field  batteries  and  sharp-shooters.  Their  armor, 
less  than  an  inch  in  thickness,  gave  them  the  colloquial  name  of  "  tin-clads." 
Many  of  them,  such  as  the  Forest  Rose,  Juliet,  Marmora,  Rattler,  Romeo,  and 
Signal,  became  famous  in  the  annals  of  the  squadron,  and  the  tiny  Cricket, 
under  Gorringe,  fought  in  the  Eed  River  one  of  the  hottest  and  most  gallant 
little  battles  of  the  Western  campaign. 

The  second  class  of  new  acquisitions,  which  may  be  called  by  comparison 
the  heavily  armored  vessels,  though  more  pretentious  than  their  older  con 
sorts,  were  hardly,  as  a  whole,  more  efficient.  Three  of  them,  the  TuscumUa, 
Indianolaj&nd  ChiUicothc,wQTQ  side-wheel  casemate  iron-clads,  carrying  a  some 
what  thicker  plating  than  the  earlier  boats  and  a  much  more  formidable  arma 
ment,  but  owing  to  poor  and  hasty  workmanship  they  were  occasionally  found 
unequal  to  the  demands  that  were  made  upon  them.  Of  a  more  satisfactory 
performance  were  two  large  steamers,  the  Lafayette  and  Choctaw,  of  one 
thousand  tons  each,  well-built  side-wheelers,  which  the  Government  pur 
chased  and  altered  into  casemate  iron-clads  fitted  with  rams.  Still  later,  three 
turreted  iron-clads  of  light  draft,  the  Osaye,  Ozark,  and  Neoslio  [see  page 
342],  were  added  to  the  squadron.  The  above,  together  with  a  number  of 
captured  gun-boats,  the  foremost  of  which  was  the  Eastport,  and  a  few 
wooden  steamers  of  various  size  and  miscellaneous  description,  made  up  the 
force  with  which  Admiral  Porter  conducted  his  wonderful  series  of  operations 
from  the  autumn  of  1862  until  his  transfer  to  the  North  Atlantic  Squadron 
in  1864. 

In  addition  to  these  vessels,  which  constituted  the  regular  naval  force, 
special  mention  must  be  made  of  the  Ram  Fleet,  as  it  was  called.  This  fleet 
was  the  really  brilliant  conception  of  Colonel  Charles  Ellet,  Jr.,  a  civil 
engineer  who,  as  has  been  already  said,  had  called  attention,  some  years 
before  the  war,  to  the  renewed  importance  of  the  ram  as  a  naval  weapon. 
Having  been  vested  with  rank  and  authority  by  the  War  Department, 
Colonel  Ellet,  who  was  no  less  ready  in  execution  than  brilliant  in  concep 
tion,  bought  nine  river-boats,  which  he  strengthened  and  altered  into  rams 
on  a  plan  of  his  own.  They  were  called  the  Queen  of  the  West,  Monarch, 
Samson,  Lioness,  Switzerland,  Lancaster,  Minyo,  T.  D.  Homer,  and  Dick  Fulton. 
Though  they  were  hastily  and  imperfectly  prepared,  yet  under  the  leadership 
of  Ellet  and  other  members  of  his  remarkable  family,  who  shared  with  him  a 
.native  military  instinct  that  was  little  short  of  genius,  and  a  superb  courage 


622 


THE  UNION  AND  CONFEDERATE  NAJ/1ES. 


MONITOR  "WEEHAWKEN"   IN    A    6TOKM. 


that  bordered  upon  recklessness,  they  performed  services  that  gave  them  a 
place  apart  in  the  history  of  the  river  operations.  [See  page  453.] 

In  its  personnel,  the  navy  was  by  no  means  so  well  prepared  for  war  as  it 
should  have  been.  Several  circumstances  combined  to  weaken  the  strength 
of  the  corps.  As  there  was  no  system  of  retirement,  and  as  promotion  for 
many  years  had  been  made  solely  on  the  basis  of  seniority,  the  upper  part  of 
the  list  was  filled  with  officers  who  had  grown  too  old  for  active  service,  but 
who  nevertheless  felt  that  their  position  entitled  them  to  important  com 
mands  at  sea,  or  to  high  places  in  council  or  in  administration.  For  these 
duties  most  of  them  were  peculiarly  unfitted.  At  a  time  when  conservatism 
meant  stagnation,  the  seventy-eight  commodores  and  captains  who  were  the 
senior  officers  of  the  navy,  through  long  adherence  to  routine,  had,  with  few 
exceptions,  become  doubly  conservative,  and  owing  to  the  rapid  development 
of  their  profession,  those  whose  early  training  belonged  to  the  sail  period 
seemed  almost  the  relics  of  a  bygone  age. 

The  consciousness  of  ignorance  in  some  men  begets  modesty,  but  it  seldom 
has  this  effect  upon  the  older  members  of  a  military  hierarchy.  Obedience 
to  the  orders  of  a  superior  is,  of  course,  the  essence  of  military  discipline, 
without  which  it  could  not  exist,  and  rank  is  the  primary  source  of  authority. 
But  a  system  which  combines  reliance  upon  rank  as  the  sole  source  of 
authority,  and  reliance  upon  age  as  the  sole  qualification  for  rank,  contains 
essential  elements  of  weakness.  Its  tendency  is  to  make  the  seniors  grow 
less  capable  and  more  despotic,  while  the  juniors  gradually  lose  all  sense 
of  responsibility  and  all  power  of  initiative,  and  when  they  at  last  reach 
a  position  of  command,  their  faculties  have  become  paralyzed  from  long  dis 
use.  Especially  is  this  the  case  in  a  long  period  of  peace,  such  as  followed 
the  war  of  1812,  and  lasted,  with  only  a  brief  intermission,  until  1861. 
During  this  time  the  navy  was  always  grasping  at  the  shadow  and  losing  the 


THE  UNION  AND  CONFEDERATE   NAVIES.  623 

substance.  The  commodore  of  the  period  was  an  august  personage,  who 
went  to  sea  in  a  great  flag-ship,  surrounded  by  a  conventional  grandeur  which 
was  calculated  to  inspire  a  becoming  respect  and  awe.  As  the  years  of  peace 
rolled  on,  this  figure  became  more  and  more  august,  more  and  more  conven 
tional.  The  fatal  defects  of  the  system  were  not  noticed  until  1861,  when  the 
crisis  came  and  the  service  was  unprepared  to  meet  it ;  and  to  this  cause  was 
largely  due  the  feebleness  of  naval  operations  during  the  first  year  of  the  war. 

In  addition  to  the  other  elements  of  weakness,  the  junior  grades  at  this  time 
were  short  of  officers,  owing  to  the  recent  establishment  of  the  Naval  Academy 
and  the  limitation  of  the  power  of  appointment ;  and  at  the  very  moment  when 
stress  was  put  upon  the  service,  it  lost  through  resignation  a  large  number  of 
its  members,  many  of  them  men  of  high  professional  reputation.  To  fill  these 
gaps,  the  course  at  the  Academy  was  for  the  moment  curtailed,  and  the  upper 
classes  were  ordered  into  active  service.  On  the  1st  of  August,  1861,  the 
total  number  of  officers  of  all  grades  and  corps  holding  regular  appointments 
in  the  navy  was  1457.  This  number  was  inadequate  to  supply  the  demands 
of  the  newly  expanded  fleet,  and  it  became  necessary  to  employ  volunteer 
officers,  7500  of  whom  were  enrolled  in  the  navy  during  the  war.  These 
came  chiefly  from  the  merchant  marine.  Many  of  them  were  brave  and  capable, 
but  their  want  of  naval  (as  distinguished  from  merely  nautical)  training  delayed 
their  development.  A  still  larger  increase  took  place  in  the  force  of  enlisted 
men.  The  normal  strength  of  the  corps  of  seamen  was  7600,  which  rose 
during  the  war  to  51,500,  although  the  utmost  difficulty  was  found  in  obtain 
ing  recruits,  and  it  became  necessary  toward  the  end  of  the  war  to  offer  enor 
mous  bounties.  The  same  want  of  training  wras  apparent  in  the  blue-jackets 
as  in  the  volunteer  officers,  and  while  the  army  was  able  to  rely  from  the 
beginning  upon  a  trained  militia,  the  navy  was  compelled  to  create  its  militia 
after  the  war  had  begun.  Although  the  organization  of  a  trained  naval 
reserve  presents  no  serious  difficulties,  and  although  it  is  evident  that  such  a 
reserve  is  of  prime  importance  in  any  considerable  war,  no  steps  had  ever 
been  taken  to  form  it. 

This  was,  however,  only  one  of  the  many  points  in  which  the  workings  of 
the  department  were  defective.  There  seems  to  have  been  a  total  want  of 
information  at  the  central  office  of  administration  in  reference  to  the  existing 
demands  of  naval  war,  and  the  measures  necessary  to  put  the  machine  into 
efficient  operation.  Everything  in  relation  to  the  plan  of  a  campaign,  to  the 
vulnerability  of  points  on  the  coast, —  and  it  must  be  remembered  that  this 
was  our  own  coast,  whose  capacity  for  resisting  attack  should  have  been  bet 
ter  known  to  the  Navy  Department  than  any  other, —  to  the  increase  of  the 
force  of  officers  and  men,  to  the  expansion  of  the  fleet,  to  the  acquisition  of 
the  most  modern  instruments  of  warfare, —  in  short,  all  problems  relating  to 
the  conduct  of  hostilities,  the  only  purpose  for  which  a  navy  really  exists,  had 
to  be  worked  out  and  solved  after  the  war  had  begun.  Indeed,  it  would  seem 
that  the  one  subject  with  which  the  direction  of  naval  affairs  had  never  con 
cerned  itself  was  the  subject  of  making  war. 

These  circumstances  placed  the  Secretary,  at  the  opening  of  his  adminis- 


624  THE  UNION  AND  CONFEDERATE   NAVIES. 

tration,  in  a  situation  of  peculiar  difficulty.  Although  Mr.  Welles  had  at  one 
time  been  connected  with  the  Navy  Department,  having  been  the  civil  chief 
of  the  Bureau  of  Provisions  and  Clothing  from  1846  to  1849,  he  was  in  no 
sense  a  naval  expert,  and  he  was  obliged  to  rely  upon  others  for  expert  advice 
and  assistance  in  his  office.  There  was  no  one,  however,  at  his  office  to  give 
such  advice  and  assistance,  except  the  five  chiefs  of  bureau,  who  were  con 
cerned  only  with  the  business  of  supplying  materials,  and  who  had  really 
nothing  to  do  with  the  general  direction  of  the  fleet, —  meaning  thereby  the 
working  force  of  ships,  officers,  and  men  actually  employed  in  naval  opera 
tions.  To  meet  this  difficulty,  the  Secretary  wisely  called  Captain  Gustavus 
V.  Fox  to  the  post  of  chief  professional  adviser.  Captain  Fox  had  formerly 
been  an  officer  of  the  navy,  and  had  borne  a  high  reputation  for  professional 
skill.  His  connection  with  manufacturing  enterprises  during  the  few  years 
preceding  the  war  had  emancipated  him  from  the  slavery  of  routine  and  had 
given  him  a  knowledge  of  affairs  which  naval  officers  in  general  could  not 
easily  acquire.  He  had  shown  great  intelligence  and  zeal  in  the  second  relief- 
expedition  to  Fort  Sumter,  where  he  acted  in  a  semi-private  capacity,  and 
Mr.  Welles  decided  to  take  him  into  the  department.  The  duties  for  which 
he  was  wanted,  and  which  he  ultimately  performed  with  such  success,  were 
those  which  are  commonly  assigned  to  an  officer  known  as  the  chief  of  staff, 
namely,  the  disposition  and  direction  of  the  fleet,  and  the  conduct  of  naval 
operations.  It  is  hardly  necessary  to  add  that  without  his  previous  expe 
rience  as  a  naval  officer  he  could  not  have  performed  these  duties  for  a  day. 
A  temporary  place  was  made  for  him  on  May  9th,  1861,  as  chief  clerk.  When 
Congress  met  in  July,  it  created  the  office  of  Assistant  Secretary,  to  which 
Fox  was  appointed  on  August  1st,  and  which  he  retained  until  after  the  close 
of  the  war.  He  was  succeeded  in  the  chief  clerkship  by  William  Faxon. 

THE  South  entered  upon  the  war  without  any  naval  preparation,  and  with 
very  limited  resources  by  which  its  deficiencies  could  be  promptly  supplied. 
Indeed,  it  would  hardly  be  possible  to  imagine  a  great  maritime  country 
more  destitute  of  the  means  for  carrying  on  a  naval  war  than  the  Confeder 
ate  States  in  1861.  No  naval  vessels,  properly  speaking,  came  into  their 
possession,  except  the  Fulton,  an  old  side-wheeler  built  in  1837,  and  at  this 
time  laid  up  at  Pensacola,  and  the  sunken  and  half-destroyed  hulks  at  Nor 
folk,  of  which  only  one,  the  Merrimac,  could  be  made  available  for  service. 
The  seizures  of  other  United  States  vessels  included  six  revenue-cutters,  the 
Duane  at  Norfolk,  the  William  Aiken  at  Charleston,  the  Lewis  Cuss  at  Mobile, 
the  Robert  McClelland  and  the  Washington  at  New  Orleans,  and  the  Henry 
Dod(/e  at  Galveston  ;  |  three  coast-survey  vessels,  the  schooners  Petrel  and 
Twilight,  and  the  steam-tender  Firefly ;  and  six  or  eight  light -house  tenders. 
As  all  of  these  were  small,  and  most  of  them  were  sailing  vessels,  they 
were  of  little  value. 

Several  coasting  or  river  steamers  belonging  to  private  owners,  which  were 
lying  in  Southern  waters  when  the  war  broke  out,  were  taken  or  pur- 

\  The  James  C.  Dobbin  was  also  seized  at  Savannah,  but  was  soon  afterward  released. —  J.  R.  S. 


THE  UNION  AND  CONFEDERATE  NAVIES. 


62=, 


chased  by  the  Confederate  Gov 
ernment.  The  most  important 
were  the  Jamestown  and  the 
Yorktown  (afterward  the  Patrick 
Henry)  at  Richmond ;  the  Sel- 
den  at  Norfolk;  the  Beaufort, 
Raleiyli,  Winslou;  and  Ellis, 
screw-tugs  plying  on  the  Chesa 
peake  and  ATbemarle  Canal ; 
the  side-wheel  passenger  boats 
Seabird  and  Curlew,  in  the 
North  Carolina  Sounds;  the 
Nashville  at  Charleston,  and  the 
Everglade  at  Savannah. 

The  Star  of  the  West,  whose 
name  had  been  on  everybody's 
lips  after  the  attack  made  upon 
her  in  January,  1861,  while  she 
was  attempting  to  relieve  Fort 
Sumter,  had  subsequently  sailed 
on  transport  service  to  Indian- 
ola,  Texas,  where  she  was  seized 
in  April  by  a  party  of  Texan 
volunteers.  In  the  Confederate 
navy  she  became  the  St.  Philip. 
She  was  stationed  at  New  Or 
leans  as  a  receiving-ship  when 
Farragut  passed  the  forts,  and 
fled  with  other  vessels  up  the 
Mississippi  River,  taking  refuge  finally  in  the  Yazoo.  In  March,  1863,  when 
the  ships  of  the  Yazoo  Pass  expedition  descended  the  windings  of  the  Talla- 
hatchie  to  attack  Fort  Pemberton,  they  found  the  river  barricaded  by  the  hull 
of  a  sunken  vessel,  which  was  no  other  than  the  once-famous  Star  of  the  West. 

The  purchases  and  seizures  made  at  New  Orleans  enabled  the  Confederate 
Government  to  equip  at  that  point  its  only  considerable  fleet.  The  vessels 
fitted  out  successively  by  Commodores  Rousseau  and  Hollins  included  the 
Habana,  afterward  the  Sumter,  in  which  Semmes  made  his  first  commerce- 
destroying  cruise ;  the  Enoch  Train,  which  was  altered  into  a  ram  and  called 
the  Manassas ;  the  Florida  and  Pamlico,  employed  on  Lake  Pontchartrain ; 
the  Marques  de  la  Havana  (McEae),  the  Webb,  Yankee  (Jackson),  Gros-tete 
(Maurepas),  Lizzie  Simmons  (Pontchartrain),  Ivy,  General  Polk,  and  a  few 
others  of  smaller  size.  The  State  of  Louisiana  and  the  citizens  of  New 
Orleans  also  made  purchases  of  vessels  on  their  own  account.  Thus  the 
Governor  Moore  and  the  General  Quitman,  which  took  part  in  the  action  at  the 
forts,  were  State  vessels ;  and  the  Enoch  Train  was  originally  purchased  by 
private  subscription.  There  were  also  a  large  number  of  flat-boats  or  coal- 


GIDEON  WELLES,   SECRETARY  OF  THE   UNITED  STATES  NAVY 
DURING  THE   WAR.      FROM  A  PHOTOGRAPH. 


VOL.  I.     40 


626 


THE  UNION  AND  CONFEDERATE   NAVIES. 


barges,  destined  for  use   as  fire-ships,  upon  which  Commodore  George   N. 
Hollins  placed  great  reliance. 

Another  measure  of  defense  adopted  by  the  Confederate  Government 
deserves  mention  here,  although  the  navy  was  in  no  way  connected  with  it. 
On  the  14th  of  January,  1862,  Secretary  Benjamin,  of  the  War  Department, 
telegraphed  orders  to  General  Lovell,  who  was  in  command  at  New  Orleans, 
to  impress  certain  river  steamboats,  fourteen  in  number,  for  the  public  service. 
On  the  15th  the  vessels  designated  were  seized.  They  were  intended  to  form 
a  flotilla  of  rams  for  the  defense  of  the  Mississippi,  in  accordance  with  a  plan 
suggested  by  two  steamboat  captains,  Montgomery  and  Townsend,  who  had 
secured  the  adoption  of  their  project  at  Richmond  through  the  influence  of 
political  friends  in  Congress.  In  the  words  of  Secretary  Benjamin,  they  were 
"  backed  by  the  whole  Missouri  delegation."  The  scheme  had  its  origin  partly 
in  jealousy  or  distrust  of  the  navy,  and  the  direction  of  the  "  River  Defense 
Fleet,"  as  it  was  called,  was  therefore  intrusted  to  the  army.  The  projectors 

of  the  enterprise  had  taken 
care,  however,  to  limit  the  au 
thority  of  the  army  officers 
over  the  fleet,  and  the  War 
Department  wrote  that  when 
it  sailed  it  would  be  "subject 
to  the  orders  of  General  Beau- 
regard,  as  regards  the  service 
required  of  it,  but  of  course 
without  any  interference  in 
its  organization."  The  original 
cost  of  the  vessels  was  $563,000, 
and  the  cost  of  equipping  and 
fitting  them  out  was  $800,000. 
The  River  Defense  Flotilla 
hardly  accomplished  results 
that  justified  this  heavy  out 
lay.  Its  organization,  as  might 
have  been  expected,  was  seri 
ously  defective.  In  January, 
Lovell  was  apprehensive  that 
"  fourteen  Mississippi  River 
captains  and  pilots  will  never  agree  about  anything  after  they  once  get 
under  way."  These  fears  were  afterward  realized.  April  15th,  Lovell  wrote : 

"  The  river  pilots  (Montgomery  and  Townsend),  who  are  the  head  of  the  fleet,  are  men  of 
limited  ideas,  no  system,  and  no  administrative  capacity  whatever.  I  very  much  fear,  too,  that 
their  powers  of  execution  will  prove  much  less  than  has  been  anticipated, —  in  short,  unless  some 
competent  person  of  education,  system,  and  brains  is  put  over  each  division  of  this  fleet,  it  will, 
in  my  judgment,  prove  an  utter  failure.  No  code  of  laws  or  penalties  has  been  established,  and 
it  is  difficult  to  decide  how  deserters  from  the  fleet  are  to  be  tried  and  punished.  There  is  little 
or  no  discipline  or  subordination  —  too  much  '  steamboat '  and  too  little  of  the  '  man-of-war '  to 
be  very  effective." 


GDSTAVUS  V.  FOX,   ASSISTANT  SECRETARY,   UNITED  STATES   NAVY 
FROM    A   PHOTOGRAPH. 


THE  UNION  AND   CONFEDERATE   NAl/IES. 


627 


When  the  Eiver  Defense  Fleet  was  ready,  eight  of  the  vessels,  commanded 
by  Captain  J.  E.  Montgomery,  were  sent  up  the  river  to  meet  the  Union  fleet, 
then  on  its  way  down,  under  Flag-Officer  Davis.  After  a  gallant  but  ineffectual 
brush  near  Fort  Pillow,  Montgomery's  flotilla  had  a  pitched  battle  at  Mem 
phis,  on  the  6th  of  June,  with  tfre 
Union  force,  now  strengthened  by  the 
addition  of  Colonel  Ellet's  ram-fleet, 
and  was  literally  wiped  out  of  exist 
ence, — four  of  the  vessels  being  cap 
tured  and  three  destroyed.  The  Van 
Dorn  alone  escaped,  and  fleeing  to  the 
Yazoo  River  was  soon  afterward  burnt. 
The  six  vessels  of  the  River  Defense 
Fleet,  which  had  been  retained  by 
General  Lovell  at  New  Orleans,  were 
sent  down  to  assist  in  the  defense  of 
the  forts,  but  the  only  part  they  took 
in  the  battle  was  to  get  out  of  the  way 
as  quickly  as  possible.  All  of  them 
were  captured  or  destroyed. 

In  addition  to  the  vessels  purchased 
and  altered,  the  Confederate  author 
ities  built  several  new  ones  at  New 
Orleans.  Of  these  there  were  three 
wooden  boats,  the  Livingston,  Bieni-ille,  and  Carondelet,  and  two  iron-clads, 
the  Louisiana  and  the  Mississippi.  The  Bienville  and  Carondelet  were  substan 
tially  built  side-wheelers  of  light  draft,  built  on  the  lakes,  and  were  only  fin 
ished  in  March  and  April,  1862.  They  were  unable  to  fill  up  their  crews,  and 
hence  took  no  part  in  the  action  at  the  forts.  \  The  Livingston,  which  had  been 
attached  some  time  before  to  the  flotilla  in  the  upper  Mississippi,  made  its 
way  to  the  Yazoo  River,  and  was  burnt  there  with  the  Polk  and  Van  Dorn. 
The  two  new  iron-clads,  however,  were  intended  to  be  by  far  the  most  impor 
tant  factors  in  the  defense  of  New  Orleans.  If  they  had  been  finished  in  time, 
this  intention  would  doubtless  have  been  realized.  The  Louisiana,  built  by 
contract  with  E.  C.  Murray,  was  not  begun  until  the  middle  of  October,  and 
her  machinery  was  transferred  from  the  steamer  Inaomar,  which  the  contrac 
tors  had  bought  for  the  purpose.  She  was  264  feet  long,  and  from  400  to  500 
tons  of  railroad  iron  were  used  in  plating  her  with  armor.  The  ship  was  in 
several  ways  badly  designed,  and  on  the  20th  of  April,  when  she  was  sent  from 
New  Orleans  down  the  river  to  the  forts,  her  engines  would  not  work.  During 
the  battle  she  could  only  serve  as  a  stationary  floating  battery,  and  she  was 
blown  up  by  Captain  J.  K.  Mitchell  on  the  day  of  the  surrender  of  the  forts. 
The  other  iron-clad,  the  Mississippi,  a  still  larger  and  more  heavily  armored 
vessel,  was  constructed  by  the  Messrs.  Tift  upon  a  very  novel  and  peculiar 
design.  To  obviate  the  want  of  ship-builders  and  designers,  she  was  built 

|  Report  of  Joint  Confederate  Committee  on  the  affairs  of  the  Navy  Department,  p.  28. 


WILLIAM  FAXON,  CHIEF  CLERK  OF  THE   UNITED  STATES 

NAVY  DEPARTMENT  DURING  THE   WAR. 

FROM  A  PHOTOGRAPH. 


628  THE  UNION  AND  CONFEDERATE   NAVIES. 

like  a  house,  in  straight  lines  and  with  pointed  ends.  Though  there  was 
apparently  no  lack  of  steamers  to  tow  the  unfinished  vessel  up  the  river,  she 
was  burnt  just  before  the  Federal  fleet  reached  the  city. 

The  total  failure  of  the  Confederate  fleet  on  the  Mississippi  was  largely  due 
to  bad  management  and  to  the  want  of  a  proper  organization.  Authority  was 
divided  between  the  State  Government  and  the  Confederate  Government, 
and  still  further  between  the  army,  the  navy,  and  the  steamboat  captains. 
The  War  and  Navy  Departments  at  Richmond  did  not  work  together.  There 
were  some  differences  of  opinion  between  General  Lovell,  in  command  at 
New  Orleans,  and  General  Duncan,  in  command  of  the  exterior  defenses. 
Four  naval  officers,  Rousseau,  Hollins,  Mitchell,  and  Whittle,  were  succes 
sively  in  command  of  the  "  Naval  Station,"  a  command  of  vague  and  inde 
terminate  limits,  and  there  were  plenty  of  sources  of  disagreement  between 
them  and  their  colleagues  of  the  army.  They  were  perplexed  and  worried 
by  confusing  orders,  and  by  the  presence  of  independent  agents  in  their  own 
field  of  operations.  They  had  no  authority  over  the  work  of  building  the 
iron-clads,  although  constantly  urged  to  hurry  their  completion.  The  organ 
ization  of  the  River  Defense  Fleet,  under  Montgomery,  was  a  direct  and 
intentional  blow  at  their  authority,  and  left  them  without  the  aid  of  reserves 
whose  disposition  they  could  direct.  The  naval  operations  suffered  from  the 
lack  of  funds,  so  much  so  that  on  the  26th  of  February  Governor  Moore 
telegraphed  to  Richmond,  "  The  Navy  Department  here  owes  nearly  a 
million.  Its  credit  is  stopped."  This  condition  of  affairs  was  all  the  more 
remarkable,  since  the  strategic  position  of  New  Orleans  and  the  river  was 
of  vital  importance  to  the  Confederacy,  and  the  post  required  above  all 
things  unity  of  command, — indeed,  one  might  well  say  a  dictatorship.  Had 
one  man  of  force  and  discretion  been  in  full  command  and  provided  with 
sufficient  funds,  the  defense  would  at  least  not  have  presented  a  spectacle  of 
complete  collapse. 

The  construction  and  equipment  of  vessels  for  the  Confederate  Govern 
ment  at  other  points  were  executed  with  great  difficulty,  owing  to  the  want 
of  iron  and  the  absence  of  properly  equipped  workshops.  In  1861  the  only 
foundry  or  rolling-mill  of  any  size  in  the  Confederacy  was  the  Tredegar  Iron 
Works,  at  Richmond,  and  here  the  principal  work  in  ordnance  and  armor  was 
done.  By  dint  of  great  efforts,  foundries  and  rolling-mills  were  established 
at  Selma,  Atlanta,  and  Macon ;  smelting-works  and  a  rope- walk  at  Peters 
burg;  a  powder-mill  at  Columbia,  and  an  ordnance-foundry  and  chemical 
works  at  Charlotte.  These  works  supplied  what  was  needed  in  the  way 
of  ordnance  and  equipment,  but  they  could  not  build  vessels.  The  spring 
of  1862  saw  the  loss  of  Norfolk,  Pensacola,  and  New  Orleans,  and  after 
this  date  the  Confederacy  had  no  well-appointed  ship-yard.  Neverthe 
less,  numerous  contracts  were  entered  into  with  business  firms  all  over 
the  country,  and  the  construction  of  small  vessels  went  on  actively 
during  the  war.  On  March  15th,  1861,  the  Provisional  Congress  had 
authorized  the  construction  or  purchase  of  10  steam  gun-boats,  of  from 
750  to  1000  tons.  By  the  latter  part  of  1862  the  Navy  Department  had 


THE  UNION  AND  CONFEDERATE  NAMES.  629 

purchased  and  altered  44  vessels,  and  had  built  and  completed  24,  while  32 
others  were  in  process  of  construction. 

Most  of  these  vessels  were  small  craft,  only  suitable  for  detached  local 
employment  in  rivers  and  harbors.  Of  the  more  formidable  ships,  the  Ten 
nessee  and  Arkansas  were  built  at  Memphis  in  the  winter  of  1861-62.  They 
were  covered  with  railroad  iron.  The  Arkansas  was  completed  and  taken  to 
the  Yazoo  Eiver  in  April,  1862.  After  a  short  and  brilliant  career  under 
Lieutenant  Isaac  N.  Brown,  she  finally  fell  a  victim  in  August  to  the  defects  of 
her  engines.  The  Tennessee,  being  still  on  the  stocks  at  Memphis  when 
Davis's  fleet  descended  the  river,  was  burnt  where  she  lay.  At  Mobile,  the 
second  Tennessee,  a  much  more  powerful  vessel,  but  with  engines  transferred, 
like  those  of  the  Louisiana,  from  a  river  steamboat,  was  captured  in  her  first 
and  only  engagement,  when  she  attacked  single-handed  the  whole  Federal 
squadron.  At  Savannah,  the  Atlanta,  a  converted  blockade-runner  with  a 
casemate  covered  with  four  inches  of  armor,  was  disabled  and  defeated  by 
four  shots  from  the  monitor  Weeliawken.  At  Charleston,  four  casemate  iron 
clads  were  built,  the  Palmetto  State  and  Gliicora  in  1862,  the  Charleston  in 
1863,  and  the  Columbia;  the  last,  however,  was  still  unfinished  at  the  close 
of  the  war,  and  was  captured  by  Admiral  Dahlgren  at  the  evacuation  of  the 
city.  The  other  three  were  blown  up  at  the  same  time.  In  the  sounds  of 
North  Carolina  two  iron-clads  were  projected,  one  to  be  built  on  the  Neuse 
River,  the  other  on  the  Roanoke.  The  first  was  destroyed  before  completion, 
but  the  second,  the  Albemarle,  which  the  Union  forces,  through  most  culpable 
negligence,  suffered  to  remain  undisturbed  until  she  was  fully  armed  and 
equipped,  captured  the  town  of  Plymouth,  and  fought  a  drawn  battle  with 
the  squadron  of  double-enders  in  the  sound.  After  a  career  of  six  months, 
she  was  destroyed  by  the  expedition  under  Lieutenant  Gushing. 

The  last,  and  in  some  ways  the  most  useful  naval  force  of  the  Confederates, 
was  the  James  River  Squadron.  After  the  destruction  of  the  Merrimac  in 
May,  1862,  and  the  abortive  attempt  of  the  Union  vessels  to  pass  up  the 
James  River,  a  fleet  was  gradually  constructed  and  fitted  out  for  the  defense 
of  Richmond.  There  were  still  in  the  river  the  Patrick  Henry,  which  was 
soon  after  assigned  to  the  use  of  the  Confederate  Naval  Academy,  and  the 
Beaufort  and  Ealeigli,  which  had  come  to  Hampton  Roads  from  the  North 
Carolina  Sounds  after  the  battles  of  Roanoke  Island  and  Elizabeth  City. 
All  three  had  taken  part  in  the  first  day's  engagement  off  Newport  News, 
when  the  Merrimac  (Virginia)  had  destroyed  the  Congress  and  the  Cumber 
land,  after  which  they  withdrew  to  the  James  River.  To  these  were  added 
the  gun-boats  Nanscmond,  Hampton,  and  Drimj.  But  by  far  the  most  impor 
tant  division  of  the  squadron  consisted  of  the  three  iron-clads  Richmond,  the 
second  Virginia,  and  Frederickslmrg.  Of  these  the  Fredericksburg  was  the 
weakest  and  the  Virginia  the  strongest.  In  fact,  the  Virginia  was  one  of  the 
strongest  vessels  that  the  Confederates  got  afloat  at  any  point,  having  six 
inches  of  armor  on  the  sides  of  her  casemate  and  eight  inches  on  the  ends. 
This  fleet  was  an  important  element  in  the  military  situation  in  Virginia  in 
1864-65,  though  never  brought  into  decisive  action.  At  the  evacuation  of 


630  THE  UNION  AND  CONFEDERATE  NAl/IES. 

Richmond  it  was  burned,  and  with  its  destruction  the  coast  navy  of  the 
Confederates  came  to  an  end. 

In  order  to  make  war  011  the  commerce  of  the  United  States,  the  Con 
federacy  early  resorted  to  privateering,  which  was  then,  as  it  is  now,  a  legiti 
mate  practice  with  all  States  not  parties  to  the  Declaration  of  Paris.  In 
accordance  with  the  President's  proclamation  of  April  17th,  and  the  Act  of 
Congress  of  May  6th,  letters  of  marque  were  issued  by  the  Confederate 
Government  to  owners  of  private  vessels,  authorizing  them  to  cruise  against  the 
United  States.  Under  this  authority,  more  than  twenty  privateers  were 
fitted  out  and  made  cruises  during  the  summer  and  autumn  of  1861,  taking 
sixty  or  more  prizes.  The  exact  number  either  of  privateers  or  of  prizes  will 
probably  never  be  known.  Charleston,  New  Orleans,  and  Hatteras  Inlet  were 
the  principal  centers  of  privateering  operations.  Three  of  the  privateers  were 
captured, — the  Savannah  by  the  brig  Pern/,  the  Petrel  by  the  frigate  St.  Laiv- 
rence,  and  the  Beauregard  by  the  bark  W.  G.  Anderson.  The  cessation  of  pri 
vateering  after  the  first  year  was  brought  about  by  the  blockade,  which  took 
away  the  profits  of  the  sale  of  prizes,  and  such  of  the  privateers  as  were  not 
taken  into  the  Government  service  were  converted  into  blockade-runners. 

After  privateering  came  to  an  end,  the  Confederate  Government  depended 
almost  wholly  upon  Europe  for  sea-going  cruisers.  These  were  not  privateers, 
however,  but  commissioned  ships-of-war  of  the  Confederacy.  Captain  James 
D.  Bulloch  resided  in  England  as  the  Confederate  naval  agent,  and  his  skill 
and  enterprise  resulted  in  the  acquisition  of  the  Florida,  Alabama,  Georgia 
and  tilienandoali,  all  of  which  made  successful  commerce-destroying  cruises. 
Attempts  to  secure  other  vessels,  including  the  Alexandra,  the  Pampero,  the 
iron-clad  contracted  for  by  Captain  North  on  the  Clyde,  and  the  two  armored 
rams  built  by  the  Messrs.  Laird,  failed  through  the  intervention  of  the  British 
Government.  Of  the  six  vessels  built  in  France,  including  four  corvettes  and 
two  iron-clads,  only  one  of  the  latter,  Stonewall,  passed  into  the  hands  of  the 
Confederates,  and  this  was  acquired  so  late  in  the  war  as  to  be  of  no  value. 

In  its  personnel,  the  Confederate  navy  was  more  fortunate  than  in  its  ves 
sels.  The  Secretary  was  Stephen  E.  Mallory  [see  p.  106],  who  had  been  for 
several  years  before  the  war  the  chairman  of  the  Naval  Committee  in  the 
Senate, —  a  position  much  better  calculated  to  give  its  holder  a  knowledge  of 
the  demands  of  a  modern  navy  than  that  which  Mr.  Welles  had  filled  from 
1846  to  1849.  He  entered  upon  his  task  with  vigor  and  intelligence,  and  he 
was  ably  seconded  by  the  officers  around  him,  many  of  whom  had  been  men 
of  conspicuous  ability  in  the  old  navy.  In  the  branches  of  ordnance  and 
torpedoes  he  relied  largely  upon  two  men,  Commander  John  M.  Brooke  and 
Lieutenant  Hunter  Davidson.  To  Brooke  were  due  the  banded  guns  which 
proved  of  such  signal  use  during  the  war,  while  Davidson  did  much  to 
develop  the  torpedo  service,  which  probably  contributed  more  to  the  defense 
of  the  Confederacy  than  all  the  vessels  of  its  navy.  In  1862,  some  impatience 
was  shown  by  the  press  and  the  public  of  the  South  at  the  continued  succes 
sion  of  naval  disasters,  and  a  Congressional  committee  made  an  exhaustive 
investigation  of  the  department.  Nothing  of  importance  was  disclosed  except 


THE  UNION  AND  CONFEDERATE  NAVIES.  631 

the  condition  of  affairs  at  New  Orleans  in  1861-62,  already  referred  to,  for 
which  the  Navy  Department  was  partly  responsible,  but  which  was  largely 
owing  to  the  poverty  of  Confederate  resources. 

It  was  especially  in  his  quick  perception  of  the  demands  of  modern  naval 
war,  and  his  prompt  and  bold  action  to  meet  these  demands,  that  Secretary 
Mallory  showed  his  ability  and  decision  of  character.  No  doubt  this  was  in 
great  part  due  to  good  advisers,  but  it  is  not  every  man  who  has  the  wisdom 
to  perceive  what  good  advice  is,  and  the  courage  to  act  upon  it,  where  his 
action  involves  heavy  responsibilities.  Mr.  Mallory's  emphatic  recommenda 
tions  in  reference  to  iron-clads  contrast  favorably  with  the  halting  sugges 
tions  of  Mr.  Welles  on  the  same  subject.  In  a  letter  of  May  8th,  1861,  to  Mr. 
Conrad,  the  chairman  of  the  Naval  Committee,  Mallory  presents  with  precision 
and  force  the  history  of  the  development  of  armored  vessels,  stating  accurately 
the  essential  facts,  which  certainly  were  either  not  known  or  not  appreciated 
at  Washington.  He  closes  his  letter  with  these  remarkable  words : 

"  I  regard  the  possession  of  an  iron-armored  ship  as  a  matter  of  the  first  necessity.  Such  a 
vessel  at  this  time  could  traverse  the  entire  coast  of  the  United  States,  prevent  all  blockade, 
and  encounter,  with  a  fair  prospect  of  success,  their  entire  navy. 

"  If,  to  cope  with  them  upon  the  sea,  we  follow  their  example,  and  build  wooden  ships,  we 
shall  have  to  construct  several  at  one  time,  for  one  or  two  ships  would  fall  an  easy  prey  to  her 
comparatively  numerous  steam-frigates.  But  inequality  of  numbers  may  be  compensated  by 
invulnerability,  and  thus  not  only  does  economy,  but  naval  success,  dictate  the  wisdom  and 
expediency  of  fighting  with  iron  against  wood  without  regard  to  first  cost. 

''  Naval  engagements  between  wooden  frigates  as  they  are  now  built  and  armed  will  prove 
to  be  the  forlorn  hopes  of  the  sea — simply  contests  in  which  the  question,  not  of  victory,  but 
who  shall  go  to  the  bottom  first  is  to  be  solved. 

"  Should  the  committee  deem  it  expedient  to  begin  at  once  the  construction  of  such  a  ship, 
not  a  moment  should  be  lost." 

The  result  was  that  early  in  July  the  Mcnimac  had  been  raised  and 
docked,  the  details  of  the  plan  of  reconstruction  had  been  completed,  and 
the  work  had  been  begun  without  waiting  for  an  appropriation.  This  early 
start  enabled  her  to  destroy  the  Congress  and  the  Cumberland  unopposed. 

The  number  of  officers  who  left  the  United  States  navy,  either  by  resigna 
tion  or  dismissal,  to  join  the  Southern  cause,  was  322,  of  whom  243  were  line- 
officers.  In  the  beginning  they  were  attached  to  the  separate-  State  organiza 
tions,  but  during  the  spring  of  1861  they  were  gradually  enrolled  in  the  navy 
of  the  Confederate  States.  In  1863  a  naval  academy  was  established  under 
the  command  of  Captain  W.  H.  Parker,  on  board  the  Patrick  Henry  in  the 
James  Eiver,  which  turned  out  excellent  junior  officers.  The  personnel  of 
the  Confederate  navy  was  distinguished  by  enterprise,  originality,  and 
resource,  and  to  it  were  due  some  of  the  most  gallant  episodes  of  the  war. 

In  seamen  the  South  was  deficient,  not  having  a  seafaring  population. 
The  number  of  enlisted  men  in  the  navy  at  any  given  time  was  probably 
less  than  four  thousand,,  but  as  it  took  the  offensive  only  in  detached  enter 
prises,  no  very  extensive  force  w^s  required.  The  four  principal  commerce- 
destroyers  were  chiefly  manned  by  foreign  sailors. 


EARLY  COAST  OPERATIONS  IN  NORTH  CAROLINA. J 


BY   RUSH  C.  HAWKINS,  BREVET  BRIGADIER-GENERAL,  U.  S.  V. 

NE  sultry  afternoon  in  the  last  third  of  the  month  of 
August,  1861,  while  stationed  at  Newport  News,  Virginia, 
with  my  regiment,  the  9th  New  York  (Zouaves),  a  mes 
sage  from  General  Benjamin  F.  Butler  came  through 
the  signal  corps  station  from  Fort  Monroe  asking  if  I 
would  like  to  go  upon  an  expedition.  An  affirmative 
answer  brought  General  Butler  to  my  headquarters  the 
same  afternoon,  and  he  explained  the  objects  of  the 
proposed  expedition,  which  was  to  be  composed  of  mili 
tary  and  naval  forces  for  joint  offensive  action  on  the 
coast  of  North  Carolina. 

CAPTUKE   AND    DEFENSE    OF    HATTERAS   ISLAND. 

AT  11  o'clock  in  the  forenoon  of  August  26th,  1861, 
all  arrangements  having  been  completed,  the  combined 
forces  set  sail  for  Hatteras  Inlet,  North  Carolina,  with 
Flag-Officer  Silas  H.  Stringham  in  command  of  the  fleet  and  Major-General 
B.  F.  Butler  of  the  land  forces.  The  same  afternoon  the  fleet  arrived  off 
Hatteras,  and  at  10  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  the  28th  began  the  bombard 
ment  of  Forts  Clark  and  Hatteras  (the  latter  mounting  twenty-five  guns), 
wrhich  was  continued  throughout  a  part  of  the  day,  until  several  of  the 
ships  were  compelled  to  put  out  to  sea  for  fear  of  being  blown  too  near 
the  shore.  During  the  bombardment,  efforts  were  being  made  about  three 
miles  north  of  the  inlet  to  land  the  troops  through  the  Hatteras  breakers; 
in  these  efforts  all  the  available  boats  were  smashed.  Two  hulks,  which  had 
been  towed  from  Fort  Monroe  for  the  purpose  of  assisting  the  landing,  were 
then  filled  with  troops  and  slowly  allowed  to  drift  into  the  breakers  by  means 
of  a  cable  attached  to  an  anchor  and  passed  around  a  windlass  fixed  in  the 
deck  of  each  hulk.  Late  in  the  afternoon,  when  the  wind  came  to  blow  fresh 
from  the  east,  the  position  of  the  troops  upon  the  hulks  became  most  perilous, 
and  for  a  time  there  were  serious  doubts  about  a  successful  rescue.  Finally 


(INS'S    ZOUAVES, 


I  "  The  State  of  North  Carolina,  immediately  after 
passing  the  ordinance  of  secession,  began  the  work  of 
defending  the  possession  of  the  sounds.  The  steamer 
Winslow,  a  small  side-wheel  steamboat,  was  fitted  out 
by  the  governor  of  the  State,  and  on  the  outside  of  Hat 
teras  began  to  annoy  and  destroy  the  commerce  of  the 
United  States,  under  Thomas  M.  Crossan,  formerly  of 
the  United  States  Navy.  The  Winslow  captured  and 
brought  into  the  sounds  for  condemnation  many  prizes. 
.  .  .  The  outcry  that  went  up  from  commercial  circles 
at  the  North  may  have  had  no  little  to  do  in  influencing 
the  naval  authorities  to  block  the  outlet  from  which  the 
little  Winslow  inflicted  such  damages.  After  the  State 
united  herself  to  the  Confederate  States  her  navy,  con 
sisting  of  the  Winslow,  the  Ellis,  the  Raleif/h,  and  the 
Beaufort,  all  ordinary  steamboats  armed  with  one  gun 


each,  was  turned  over  to  the  Confederate  States.  The 
defense  of  the  entrances  to  these  sounds  was  under 
taken  by  the  erection  of  batteries  at  Ilatteras  and  Ocra- 
coke  Inlet,  and  at  Beaufort ;  011  the  interior  waters 
New  Berne,  Roanoke  Island,  and  the  mouth  of  the 
Neuse  River  were  defended  under  the  State  by  small 
batteries,  which  were  not  completed  when  the  State 
adopted  the  constitution  of  the  Confederate  States. 

"  Major  R.  C.  Gatliu  was  commander  of  the  Southern 
Department  Coast  Defenses,  with  headquarters  at  Wil 
mington,  North  Carolina.  Promoted  to  Brigadier-Gen 
eral  in  August,  1861,  he  was  assigned  to  the  command 
of  the  Department  of  North  Carolina  and  the  coast 
defenses  of  the  State."  fScharf's  "  History  of  the  Con 
federate  States  Navy."  New-York :  Rogers  and  Sher 
wood.] 


C32 


EARLY  COAST  OPERATIONS  IN  NORTH  CAROLINA. 


633 


the  Fanny,  after  several  unsuccessful 
backings  into  the  breakers,  which 
every  moment  were  becoming  more 
dangerous,  succeeded  in  getting  lines 
on  board  the  hulks  and  towing  them 
to  calmer  water.  But  the  few  troops 
(318)  who  had  effected  a  landing  were 
left  on  shore  in  face  of  an  enemy 
twice  their  numbers.  The  next  day 
the  vessels  came  in  from  sea  and  re 
commenced  the  action  as  early  as  8 
o'clock  A.  M.,  and  by  11  o'clock  the 
last  gun  on  Fort  Hatteras  had  ceased 
firing,  and  before  noon  the  white  flag 
had  taken  the  place  of  the  Confeder 
ate  colors.  During  the  bombardment 
our  troops  on  shore  gained  possession 
of  Fort  Clark,  but  were  driven  out  by 
our  own  guns,  a  fragment  of  a  shell 
striking  private  Lembrecht,  of  Com 
pany  Gr,  9th  New  York,  making  a  pain 
ful  wound  in  the  hand.  This  was  the 
only  casualty  among  the  Union  forces. 

The  immediate  results  of  this  expe 
dition  were  the  capture  of  670  men, 
1000  stand  of  arms,  35  cannon,  and  2 
strong  forts ;  the  possession  of  the  best 
sea  entrance  to  the  inland  waters  of 
North  Carolina ;  and  the  stoppage  of  a  favorite  channel  through  which  many 
supplies  had  been,  carried  for  the  use  of  the  Confederate  forces.  $ 

The  whole  affair  was  conceived  and  carried  out  with  simplicity  and  pro- 

and,  taking  command,  was  included  in  the  capitu 
lation,  of  which  he  says  in  his  report  made  on 
board  the  Minnesota  : 


REAR-ADMIRAL    SILAS    H.    STRINGHAM. 
FROM   A  PHOTOGRAPH. 


3»  The  vessels  detailed  were  the  Minnesota  (flag 
ship),  Captain  Gr.  J.  Van  Brunt ;  Wabaxli,  Captain 
Samuel  Mercer ;  Susqueltanna,  Captain  I.  S.  Chaun- 
cey  :  Pawnee,  Commander  S.  C.  Rowan  ;  Monticello, 
Commander  J.  P.  Gillis ;  Harriet  Lane,  Captain 
John  Faunce ;  and  the  Cumberland  (sailing-ship), 
Captain  John  Marston, —  carrying  in  all  14.3  guns. 
For  the  transportation  of  troops  there  were  the 
chartered  steamers  Adelaide,  Commander  H.  S. 
Stelhvagen,  and  (leorge  Peabody,  Lieutenant  R.  B. 
Lowry,  and  the  tug  Fanny,  Lieutenant  Pierce 
Crosby.  Upon  these  were  embarked  detachments 
of  infantry  from  the  !)th  and  2<  >th  New  York  Volun 
teers,  the  Union  Coast  Guard,  and  a  company  of 
the  2d  U.  S.  Artillery,  —  in  all  numbering  about 
«80  men. 

Both  the  forts  were  under  command  of  Major 
W.  S.  G.  Andrews,  the  North  Carolina  troops  being 
under  Colonel  Win.  F.  Martin.  Flag-Officer  Sam 
uel  Ban-on,  C.  S.  X..  who  was  charged  with  the 
defense  of  this  coast,  arrived  during  the  attack, 


'•  During  the  first  hour  the  shells  of  the  ships  fell  short, 
we  only  firing:  occasionally  to  ascertain  whether  our 
shots  would  reach  them,  and  wishing1  to  reserve  our 
very  limited  supply  of  ammunition  until  the  vessels 
might  find  it  necessary  to  come  nearer  in ;  but  they, 
after  some  practice,  got  the  exact  range  of  the  9, 10,  and 
11  inch  guns,  and  did  not  find  it  necessary  to  alter  their 
positions,  while  not  a  shot  from  our  battery  reached 
them  with  the  greatest  elevation  we  could  get.  This 
state  of  things  — shells  bursting  over  and  in  the  fort 
every  few  seconds  —  Laving  continued  for  about  three 
hours,  the  men  were  directed  to  take  shelter  under  the 
parapet  and  traverses,  and  I  called  a  council  of  officers, 
at  which  it  was  unanimously  agreed  that  holding  out 
longer  could  only  result  in  a  greater  loss  of  life.  .  .  . 
The  personnel  of  the  command  are  now  prisoners  of  war 
on  board  this  ship,  where  everything  is  done  to  make 
them  as  comfortable  as  possible  under  the  circum 
stances,  Flag-Officer  Htringham,  Captain  Van  Brunt,  and 
Commander  Case  extending  to  us  characteristic  cour 
tesy  and  kindness."  EDITORS. 


634 


EARLY  COAST  OPERATIONS  IN  NORTH  CAROLINA. 


fessional  directness, 
and  the  valuable  re 
sults  attained  cost 
the  Government  only 
a  small  expenditure 
for  coal  and  ammu 
nition.  Flag-Officer 
Stringham  fought 
this  action  with  ad 
mirable  skill,  worthy 
of  a  great  command 
er.  Instead  of  an 
choring  his  ships,  he 
kept  them  moving 
during  the  whole 
engagement  and, 
as  he  came  within 
range  of  the  enemy's 
works,  delivered  his 
fire,  generally  with 
surprising  accuracy, 
while  the  gunners  in 
the  forts  were  com 
pelled  to  make  an 
on  -  the  -  wing  shot 
with  pieces  of  heavy 
ordnance,  and  in 
most  instances  their 
shot  fell  short.  | 

On  the  29th  of  Au 
gust  articles  of  full 
capitulation  were 
signed  interchange 
ably  by  officers  representing  both  forces,  and  General  Butler  and  Flag- 
Officer  Stringham  sailed  away  with  the  prisoners,  leaving  the  Pawnee, 
Captain  S.  C.  Rowan,  the  Monticello,  Lieutenant  D.  L.  Braine,  and  the  tug 
Fanny,  Lieutenant  Pierce  Crosby,  as  the  sea  forces ;  and  detachments  of  the 
9th  and  20th  New  York  Volunteers  and  Union  Coast  Guard  to  garrison  the 
captured  forts,  of  which  I  was  left  in  command.  Just  before  the  squadron 
sailed,  General  Butler  sent  word  on  shore  that  the  three  schooners  left  by 
the  enemy  inside  the  inlet  were  loaded  with  provisions  that  could  be  used 


MAI'  OF  EARLY  COAST  OPERATIONS  IN  NORTH  CAROLINA. 


\.  Boynton,  in  his  "  History  of  the  Navy,"  says  : 
"So  far  as  known  this  was  the  first  trial  in  our  navy 
of  this  movement,  and  the  honor  of  introducing  it  be 
longs  to  Commodore  Stringham.  The  little  that  was 
known  of  the  real  character  of  the  Hatteras  expedi 
tion  prevented  the  public  from  paying  any  attention 
to  the  commodore's  strategy,  but  when  it  was  repeated 


soon  after  by  Commodore  DuPont  in  a  more  brilliant 
affair,  its  merit  was  duly  recognized." 

While  DuPont  rose  to  the  highest  point  in  public 
estimation,  Stringham  was  relegated  to  an  obscure 
official  background  and  never  after  had  a  sea- 
service  command. — E.  C.  H. 


EARLY  COAST  OPERATIONS   IN   NORTH  CAROLINA. 


635 


by  the  troops.  An  examination  proved  that  the  only  food-materials  were 
fruits  from  the  West  Indies,  which  were  fast  decaying.  For  the  next  ten  days 
the  diet  of  the  stranded  soldiers  consisted  of  black  coffee,  fresh  fish,  and  a 
"  sheet-iron  pancake "  made  of  flour  and  salt-water.  This  diet  was  neither 
luxurious  nor  nutritious,  and  it  produced  unpleasant  scorbutic  results.  On  the 
10th  of  September  relief  arrived,  and  with  it,  under  Lieut.-Colonel  George 

F.  Betts,  six  more  companies 
of  the  9th  New  York. 

Until  September  16th,  noth 
ing  occurred  to  disturb  the 
uneventful  routine  work  in 
cident  to  military  occupation 
of  an  enemy's  territory.  On 
that  day  a  mixed  expedition  of 
land  and  sea  forces  under  com- 


FORT*    HATTERAS    AND    CLARK.      FROM  WAR-TIME    SKETCHES. 


maud  of  Lieutenant 
James  G.  Maxwell, 
of  the  United  States 
navy,  was  sent  to 
destroy  the  forts 
of  Beacon  Island 
and  Portsmouth, 
near  Ocracoke  Inlet. 
They  were  found  to 
have  been  deserted 
by  the  Confeder 
ates,  but  twenty- 
two  guns  of  heavy  caliber,  that  were  left  intact,  were  made  useless  by  the 
Union  forces. 

Soon  after  the  capture  of  the  forts  the  "intelligent  contraband"  began 
to  arrive,  often  bringing  news  of  important  military  activity  in  several 
directions. 

Before  the  first  week  of  our  occupation  had  expired  I  became  convinced 
that  the  enemy  was  fortifying  Roanoke  Island,  with  the  intention  of  making 
it  a  base  for  immediate  operations,  and  that  his  first  offensive  work  would 
be  against  the  forces  stationed  at  Hatteras  Inlet,  with  the  further  purpose  of 
destroying  the  Hatteras  light ;  and  that  they  would  land  a  considerable  force 
at  the  upper  end  of  the  island,  at  a  point  near  Chicamacomico,  and  march  down. 

Seeing  the  necessity  of  counter-action  on  the  part  of  the  Union  forces,  on 
the  6th  of  September  I  wrote  a  full  account  of  the  situation  to  General  John 


636 


EARLY  COAST  OPERATIONS  IN  NORTH  CAROLINA. 


E.  Wool,  commanding  the  Department  of  Virginia,  in  which  occurred  the 
following  suggestions : 

11  First.  Roanoke  Island,  which  commands  the  Croatan  Channel  between  Pamlico  and  Albe- 
marle  sounds,  should  be  occupied  at  once.  It  is  now  held  by  the  rebels.  They  have  a  battery 
completed  at  the  upper  end  of  the  island  and  another  in  course  of  erection  at  the  southern 
extremity.  Second.  A  small  force  should  be  stationed  at  Beacon  Island,  which  is  in  the  mouth 
of  Ocracoke  Inlet  and  commands  it.  Third.  Two  or  three  light-draught  vessels  should  be 
stationed  between  the  mouths  of  the  Neuse  and  Pamlico  rivers.  This  would  shut  out  all 
commerce  with  New  Berne  and  Washington.  Fourth.  There  should  be  at  least  eight  light- 
draught  gun-boats  in  Pamlico  Sound.  Fifth.  Beaufort  should  be  occupied  as  soon  as  possible. 
All  of  these  recommendations  should  be  attended  to  immediately.  Seven  thousand  men 
judiciously  placed  upon  the  soil  of  North  Carolina  would,  within  the  next  three  weeks,  draw 
20,000  Confederate  troops  from  the  State  of  Virginia. 

"  I  wish,  if  you  agree  with  me  and  deem  it  consistent  with  your  duty,  that  you  would  impress 
upon  the  Government  the  importance  and  necessity  of  immediate  action  in  this  department." 

General  Wool  gave  this  letter  the  strongest  possible  indorsement,  and  sent 
a  copy  to  the  Secretary  of  War. 

In  my  next  report  (September  llth)  I  sent  an  account  of  the  marked  enter 
prise  on  the  part  of  the  enemy,  setting  forth  that  since  the  capture  of  Fort 
Hatteras  they  had  strengthened  Fort  Macon,  obstructed  the  Neuse  and 
Pamlico  rivers,  mounted  seventeen  heavy  guns  at  Eoanoke  Island  and 
landed  a  considerable  number  of  troops  at  that  place.  I  urged  my  former 
suggestions  and  called  for  immediate  action  and  reinforcements.  A  copy 
of  this  letter,  with  a  very  strong  approval,  was  also  sent  to  the  Secre 
tary  of  War,  but  neither  brought  any  response  beyond  a  merely  formal 
acknowledgment. 

My  policy  from  the  moment  of  assuming  command  on  Hatteras  Island  had 
been  to  cultivate  friendly  relations  with  the  inhabitants.  As  they  were 
mostly  of  a  seafaring  race,  I  concluded  they  could  not  have  much  sympathy 

with  the  revolt  against  a  government 
which  had  been  their  constant  friend. 
Within  ten  days  after  the  landing, 
nearly  all  of  the  male  adults  had 
taken  the  oath  of  allegiance,  and 
several  professed  their  willingness  to 
carry  proclamations  to  the  mainland, 
and  to  bring  back  such  news  of  mili 
tary  movements  as  they  could  obtain. 
One  of  these  volunteer  spies  succeeded 
in  opening  communication  with  a  rel 
ative,  who  lived  at  Roanoke  Island, 
and  from  him  I  learned  that,  as  I  had 
suspected,  a  force  was  to  start  from 
that  point  to  make  the  attack  upon  Hatteras  Island.  In  the  meantime  we  had 
done  what  we  could  to  place  the  forts  at  the  inlet  in  a  better  condition  for 
defense,  and  General  Wool,  of  his  own  volition,  had  sent  reenf orcements, —  the 
seven  remaining  companies  of  the  9th  New  York,  the  20th  Indiana  Volunteers, 


THE     UNITED     STATES     SLOOP     "  CUMBERLAND "     SAILIM 
INTO   ACTION    AT    THE     BOMBARDMENT    OF    FORTS    HAT 
TERAS     AND     CLARK.       FROM     A     WAR-TIME     SKETCH. 


EARLY  COAST  OPERATIONS   IN   NORTH  CAROLINA. 


637 


FORT    HATTERAS.  FLAG-SHIP    "  MINNESOTA."  "  SUSQUEHANNA."        "   PAWNEE." 

THE    UNION    FLEET    BOMBARDING    FORTS    HATTERAS    AND   CLARK.      FROM   A  WAR-TIME    SKETCH. 

Colonel  "W.  L.  Brown,  and  one  company  of  the  1st  U.  S.  Artillery,  under 
Captain  Lewis  0.  Morris. 

In  the  latter  days  of  September,  information  of  the  intended  movement  from 
Eoanoke  Island  made  immediate  action  necessary.  I  had  already  apprised 
General  Wool  of  my  intention  to  establish  a  post  near  Chicamacomico  for  the 
purpose  of  protecting  the  natives  who  had  taken  the  oath,  and  also  to  pre 
vent  a  surprise  by  the  landing  of  a  large  force  of  the  enemy  to  march  down 
the  island.  Accordingly,  on  the  29th  of  September,  I  embarked  the  20th 
Indiana  regiment  upon  the  gun-boats  Putnam  and  Ceres,  and  accompanied  it 
to  a  point  opposite  Chicamacomico,  saw  the  troops  safely  disembarked,  and 
returned  with  the  gun-boats  to  the  inlet.  On  the  first  day  of  October,  the 
Fanny  was  dispatched  with  supplies,  and  arrived  at  the  point  of  disembarka 
tion  the  same  afternoon.  After  preparations  for  landing  had  commenced, 
a  force  of  the  enemy's  gun-boats  was  discovered.  The  Fanny  tried  to 
escape,  but  got  aground  and  was  captured,  not,  however,  until  after  a 
spirited  resistance  by  the  men  and  officers  with  the  two  small  guns  which 
were  mounted  on  her  deck. 

Flag-Officer  W.  F.  Lynch,  C.  S.  X.,  in  his  report  says : 

"  Colonel  Wright,  of  the  3d  Georgia  regiment,  who  commands  the  military  forces  of  the  island, 
had  agreed  with  me  to  make  an  attempt  to  destroy  Hatteras  Light-house,  and  we  only  waited 
the  return  of  an  emissary  I  had  sent  to  glean  intelligence  as  to  the  force  of  the  enemy  in  that 
vicinity.  But  early  in  the  forenoon  of  the  1st  instant  intelligence  came  that  one  of  the  Federal 
steamers  was  at  Chicamacomico,  about  forty  miles  distant  on  the  eastern  shore  of  Pamlico  Sound, 
and  I  determined  to  get  after  her.  As  Colonel  Wright  was  anxious,  however,  to  make  the  con 
templated  attempt,  I  would  not,  in  courtesy,  refuse  to  wait  for  the  embarkation  of  troops, 


638 


EARLY  COAST  OPERATIONS   IN  NORTH  CAROLINA. 


although  two  precious  hours  were  thereby  lost.  We  left  here  at  2  : 30  p.  M.  with  about  two  hun 
dred  of  the  3d  Georgia  regiment,  Colonel  W ,  who  is  a  man  after  my  own  heart  in  such 

matters,  accompanying  them.  A  little  before  5  P.  M.  we  came  in  sight  and  soon  after  opened  fire 
upon  the  enemy,  which  was  returned  at  first  with  spirit ;  but  in  about  twenty  minutes  he 
attempted  to  escape,  and  in  the  attempt  ran  aground,  and  shortly  after  surrendered." 

The  Fanny  had  on  board,  when  captured,  a  captain  and  30  men  of  the  20th 
Indiana  regiment,  and  the  sergeant-major  and  11  men  of  the  9th  New  York. 
The  Confederate  vessels  engaged  were  the  Curlew,  lialeiyli,  and  the  little  tug 
JunalnskL  As  soon  as  I  heard  of  the  disaster  I  sent  an  order  for  Colonel 
Brown  to  retreat.  On  the  4th  of  October  a  large  body  of  Confederates, 
under  Colonel  A.  R.  Wright,  assisted  by  gun-boats,  landed  at  Chicamacomico, 
and  Colonel  Brown  commenced  a  successful  retreat  down  the  island.  Having 
received  early  news,  by  a  native  messenger,  of  the  landing  and  Brown's 
march,  I  moved,  with  my  regiment,  toward  the  north,  and  met  Colonel 
Brown's  command  early  the  next  morning  at  the  light-house.  Colonel  Wright 
was  closely  following  the  retreating  troops,  but  as  soon  as  he  saw  the  reen- 
forcements  he  faced  about  and  commenced  a  retreat  which  only  ended  in  the 
landing  of  his  forces  at  Roanoke  Island.  During  the  march  back  the 
steamer  Monticello,  from  the  ocean  side,  with  her  heavy  guns,  maintained 
a  fire  at  the  Confederates  across  the  low  sand-fields,  which  may  have 
annoyed  them  without  doing  any  serious  damage.  This  was  the  end  of  an 
elaborately  conceived  plan  on  the  part  of  the  enemy  to  capture  our  troops, 
destroy  Hatteras  Light,  and  recapture  the  forts  of  the  inlet.  From  that  time 
until  the  arrival  of  the  "Burnside  expedition,"  the  Federal  forces  at  the 
inlet  pursued  the  even  quiet  of  routine  duty. 

The  news  of  the  loss  of  the  Fanny  created  some  excitement  both  at  Fort 
Monroe  and  at  Washington,  and  I  was  severely  censured  for  having  divided 
so  small  a  force,  and  was  superseded  by  Brigadier-General  J.  K.  F.  Mansfield. 
I  am  still  of  the  opinion  that  my  course  was  right,  as  no  other  disposition  of 
the  small  force  at  my  command  would  have  saved  the  light-house  and  pre 
vented  the  landing,  opposite  the  light-house,  where  there  was  a  wharf 
and  deep  water,  of  the  whole  Confederate  force  of  about  two  thousand  men. 
That  landing  w^ould  have  given  them  a  safe  base  for  a  decisive  movement 
against  the  Union  troops  at  the  inlet.  I  afterward  heard  that  Colonel 


RETREAT  OF  THE  CONFEDERATES  TO  THEIR  BOATS  AFTER  THEIR  ATTACK  UPON  HATTERAS. 


EARLY  COAST  OPERATIONS   IN   NORTH   CAROLINA. 


639 


LANDING    OF  THE    UNION    TROOPS    AT   HATTERAS    UNDER    COVER    OF   THE    FLEKT.       FROM    A   WAR-TIME    SKETCH. 

Wright  intended  to  land  part  of  his  force  above  and  the  balance  below  the 
camp  of  Colonel  Brown,  capture  his  regiment,  destroy  the  light-house,  and 
then,  in  his  discretion,  move  upon  Hatteras  Inlet.  The  prompt  retreat  frus 
trated  the  first  part  of  the  design,  and  Colonel  Wright,  seeing  what  he 
believed  to  be  a  large  reenforcement,  retreated  without  undertaking  the 
other  parts  of  his  plan. 

Until  October  13th  we  had  peace  at  the  inlet.  That  day  Brigadier-General 
Thomas  Williams  relieved  General  Mansfield,  and  assumed  command  of 
the  post.  The  new  commander  was  a  man  of  many  idiosyncrasies,  and 
outside  of  his  staff  was  cordially  disliked  for  his  severe  treatment  of  the 
men.  £ 

On  the  5th  of  November  I  was  sent  by  General  Wool  on  a  special  boat 
to  Washington  to  urge  upon  the  President  the  importance  of  either  aban 
doning  Hatteras  Inlet  or  erecting  suitable  accommodations  for  the  troops. 
The  next  morning  after  my  arrival  in  Washington  I  reported  to  the  Presi 
dent  and  presented  my  letter  from  General  Wool,  and  was  asked  by  the 
President  to  appear  before  the  Cabinet.  I  did  so  and  explained  fully  the 
situation  at  Hatteras  Inlet  and  urged  the  importance  of  undertaking 
further  operations  to  hold  that  position,  it  being  the  threshold  to  the 

1 1  was  arrested  by  General  Williams  for  refus-  ment  from  Governor  E.  D.  Morgan.  I  denied  the 
ing  to  assign  to  duty,  as  captain  in  my  regiment,  right  of  appointment,  and  I  was  sustained  by 
»  disreputable  officer  who  had  received  an  appoint-  General  Wool  and  President  Lincoln. —  R.  C.  H. 


lTlVBBSXTY] 


640  EARLY  COAST  OPERATIONS  IN  NORTH  CAROLINA. 

whole  inland  water  system  of  North  Carolina.  At  this  meeting  the  Secre 
tary  of  War  was  represented  by  General  McClellan,  who  had  one  end  of  the 
long  council-table  to  himself.  After  I  had  finished,  he  drew  me  into  con 
versation  about  operations  in  the  Department  of  Virginia,  and  as  I  had 
often  urged  upon  General  Wool  the  importance  of  making  Fort  Monroe 
a  base  for  operations  against  Richmond,  I  was  fully  prepared  to  answer 
his  questions  or  to  combat  opposition.  At  his  request  I  made  a  rough 
drawing  showing  the  old  road  up  the  peninsula,  with  a  waterway  on  each 
side  for  gun-boats  and  general  transportation.  He  listened  attentively  to 
all  I  had  to  say,  talked  but  little  himself,  and  put  my  drawing  in  his 
pocket.  I  have  always  suspected  that  my  animated  advocacy  of  that  route 
may  have  had  something  to  do  with  his  change  of  base  from  Washing 
ton,  and  the  undertaking  of  his  unfortunate  Peninsular  Campaign.  Before 
the  council  dissolved  it  was  decided  to  hold  Hatteras  Inlet  and  to  erect 
suitable  quarters  for  the  forces,  and  I  was  instructed  to  wait  until  neces 
sary  orders  could  be  prepared  before  returning  to  General  Wool  and  rny 
command.  •£ 

LAND   AND   WATEll    FIGHTING    AT    KOANOKE    ISLAND. 

THE  Burnside  expedition,  the  naval  part  being  under  command  of  Flag- 
Officer  L.  M.  Goldsborough,  J  had  concentrated  in  Pamlico  Sound  by  the  4th 
of  February,  and  on  the  5th  the  welcome  signal  was  hoisted  for  the  whole 
command  to  move  up  toward  the  Confederate  stronghold.  About  sundown, 
after  a  charming  day's  sail,  the  fleet  came  to  anchor  for  the  night,  arid  started 
again  early  the  next  morning,  but  in  consequence  of  the  inclemency  of  the 
weather  was  soon  compelled  to  seek  another  anchorage.  On  the  morning 
of  the  7th  the  expedition  got  under  way  very  early,  the  armed  army  boats 
and  naval  part  taking  the  lead  several  miles  in  advance.  By  11  o'clock  the 
first  division  of  army  gun-boats,  under  Commander  Hazard,  arrived  opposite 
the  forts  on  the  west  side  of  Roanoke  Island,  and  commenced  the  bombard 
ment  in  earnest,  and  at  the  same  time  engaged  the  enemy's  fleet.  As  the 
naval  vessels  arrived  they  went  into  action,  and  by  half-past  11  the  whole 
fleet  of  gun-boats  was  engaged.  The  engagement  between  the  heavy  guns 
lasted  all  day  without  much  damage  having  been  done  to  either  side.  At  the 
close  the  gunners  answered  each  other  with  about  the  same  spirit  displayed 
at  the  commencement.  The  Confederate  forts  had,  however,  fared  better 
than  their  fleet.  The  latter  was  protected  from  an  assault  011  the  part  of  our 
vessels  by  a  row  of  piles  driven  across  the  navigable  part  of  the  channel, 
and  by  sunken  vessels;  but,  notwithstanding  this  protection,  the  accurate 
fire  of  the  Union  fleet  soon  compelled  it  to  retire  out  of  range,  with  the  loss 

•&  Captain  W.  H.  Parker,  C.  S.  N.,  who  com-  gun-boats,  carrying  one  gun  each.  Two  of  the  small 
manded  the  Beaufort  in  these  waters,  says  in  his  steamers,  under  Flag-Officer  Stringham,  should  have 
"Recollections  of  a  Naval  Officer"  (N.  Y.  :  Charles  ^t  the  sounds,  and  a  force  should  have  occupied 

-  OKC  181(111(1. 


f-  j        .  ,  ,       .-,.  . 

bcribner's  Sons): 
,<Tll(J  J  For  details  of  the  origin   and  composition   of 

-I  he  enemy  made  a  great  mistake  in  not  taking  pos-  ,.  i  ^  i  T> 

session  of  the  sounds  immediately  after  capturing  Hat-  thls  expedition,  see  the  article  by  General  Burn- 

teras.    There  was  nothing  to  prevent  it  but  two  small  side,  p.  060.  —  EDITORS. 


EARLY   COAST   OPERATIONS  IN  NORTH  CAROLINA. 


641 


MAP    OF  THE    OPERATIONS    AT    ROANOKE    ISLAND — FROM    THE    OFFICIAL    RECORDS. 


Captain  W.  H.  Parker,  in  his  "  Eecolleetions  of  a 
Naval  Officer"  (Charles  Scribner's  Sons),  thus  de 
scribes  the  later  Confederate  defenses  of  Croatan 
Sound : 

"  Three  forts  had  been  constructed  on  the  [Roanokej 
island  to  protect  the  channel.  The  upper  one  was  on 
Weir's  Point,  and  was  named  Fort  Huger.  It  mounted 
12  guns,  principally  32-poundors  of  33  cwt.,  and  was  com 
manded  by  Major  John  Taylor,  formerly  of  the  navy. 
About  one  and  three-quarter  miles  below,  on  Pork  Point, 
was  Fort  Bartow ;  it  mounted  7  [9  ?]  guns,  5  of  which 
were  32-poundcrs  of  33  cwt.,  and  2  were  rifled  32-pouud- 
crs.  This  fort,  which  was  the  only  one  subsequently  en 
gaged  in  the  defense,  was  in  charge  of  Lieut.  B.  P.  Loyall, 
of  the  navy.  Between  these  two  points  was  a  small  bat 
tery.  On  the  mainland  opposite  the  island,  at  Redstone 
Point,  was  .a  battery  called  Fort  Forrest.  The  guns, 
which  were  32-pounders,  were  mounted  on  the  deck 
of  a  canal-boat  which  had  been  hauled  up  in  the  imid 
and  placed  so  that  the  gnus  would  command  the  chan 
nel.  The  channel  itself  was  obstructed  a  little  above 

Vol.  1.     41 


Fort  Huger  by  piling.  It  was  hoped  that  these  batter 
ies,  with  the  assistance  of  Commodore  Lynch's  squad 
ron,  would  be  able  to  prevent  the  enemy's  ships  from 
passing  the  island.  The  great  mistake  on  our  part  was 
in  not  choosing  the  proper  point  at  which  to  dispute  the 
entrance  to  the  sound.  The  fortifications  and  vessels 
should  have  been  at  the  '  marshes,'  a  few  miles  below, 
where  the  channel  is  very  narrow." 

The  attack  by  the  Union  fleet  is  thus  described 
by  Captain  Parker : 

"At  daylight  the  next  morning,  February  7th,  the 
Appomattox  was  dispatched  to  Edenton,  and  as  she  did 
not  return  till  sunset,  and  the  Warrior  did  not  take  any 
part  in  the  action,  this  reduced  our  [Confederate]  force 
to  seven  vessels  and  eight  guns.  [See  list,  p.  670.]  At 
9  A.  M.  we  observed  the  enemy  to  be  under  way  and 
coming  up,  and  we  formed  'line  abreast,'  in  the  rear  of 
the  obstructions.  At  II :  30  the  fight  commenced  at  long 
range.  The  enemy's  fire  was  aimed  at  Fort  Bartow  and 
our  vessels,  and  we  soon  became  warmly  engaged.  The 
commodore  at  first  directed  his  vessels  to  fall  back,  in 


642  EARLY  COAST  OPERATIONS  IN  NORTH  CAROLINA. 

of  one  of  its  vessels.  A  short  time  before  sunset  the  Confederate  boats  came 
near  enough  to  fire  a  few  more  shots,  but  were  again  driven  off,  this  time 
making  their  last  appearance  as  a  fleet. 

During  the  fight  between  the  forts  and  the  vessels  the  army  transport  fleet 
was  at  anchor  about  three  miles  to  the  south,  prepared  for  landing.  A  little 
after  4  o'clock  the  troops  began  to  land,  General  Foster's  brigade  taking 
the  lead,  followed  by  Reno's  and  Parke's.  By  10  o'clock  a  force  of  about 
7500  strong  had  been  landed.  One  of  the  two  sections  of  a  boat-gun 
battery  manned  by  men  of  the  Union  Coast  Guard,  in  charge  of  Midshipman 
Porter,  was  stationed  well  out  to  the  front,  supported  by  the  21st  Massa 
chusetts  ;  the  other  troops  bivouacked  in  an  open  field,  where  before  morning 
they  were  thoroughly  drenched  by  a  most  uncomfortable  cold  rain. 

The  morning  was  cold  and  cheerless  and  the  breakfast  was  poor,  but 
the  troops  were  in  fine  spirits.  Foster  was  the  first  to  move,  the  25th 
Massachusetts  in  the  advance,  followed  by  Midshipman  Porter's  guns.  The 
enemy's  pickets  gradually  retired  into  an  earth-work  mounting  three  guns, 
situated  in  the  center  of  a  morass,  flanked  on  each  side  by  an  almost 
impenetrable  swamp,  and  protected  in  front  by  an  open  field  of  deep  mud, 
in  part  covered  by  fallen  trees  with  their  limbs  cut  short  and  sharpened. 

General  Foster,  as  soon  as  he  reached  the  earth-work,  placed  his  troops  and 
the  boat-guns  in  position,  and  by  8  o'clock  the  attack  had  commenced  in 
earnest.  But  no  effective  work  was  done  until  General  Reno  came  up  and 
with  the  21st  Massachusetts,  the  51st  New  York,  and  the  9th  New  Jersey 
began  his  effective  attack  upon  the  Confederate  right.  With  great  diffi 
culty  he  penetrated  the  swamp,  covered  with  its  thick  interwoven  growth  of 
briers,  shrubs,  and  trees.  At  length  he  succeeded  in  delivering  his  fire  from 

the  hope  of  drawing  the  enemy  under  the  lire  of  Forts  that  the  enemy's  troops  were  landing  to  the  south- 

Huger  and  Forrest ;  but  as  they  did  not  attempt  to  ad-  ward  of  Pork  Point,  under  the  guns  of  a  division  of 

vance,  and  evidently  had  no  intention  of  passing  the  their  fleet,  and  could  not  perceive  that  any  successful 

obstructions,  we  took  up  our  first  position  and  kept  it  resistance  was  being  made  to  it.    A  little  after  sunset 

during  the  day.    At  2  P.  M.  the  tiring  was  hot  and  heavy,  the  tiring  ceased  on  both  sides,  and  as  we  felt  sure  the 

and  continued  so  until  sunset.    Our  gunners  had  had  no  euemy  would  not  attempt  to  pass  the  obstructions  by 

practice  with  their  rifled  guns,  and  our  firing  was  not  night,  as  he  had  declined  to  attempt  them  by  day,  we 

what  it  should  have  been.    It  was  entirely  too  rapid,  ran  in  and  anchored  under  Fort  Forrest.    .    .    .    Soon 

and  not  particularly   accurate.    Early  in  the  tight  the  after  we  anchored  signal  was  made  by  the  flag-ship  for 

Forrest  was  disabled  in  her  machinery,  and  her  gallant  the  captains  to  report  on  board.    Upon  my  entering  the 

young  captain,  Lieutenant  Hoole,  badly  wounded  in  the  cabin  I  was  informed  by  Commodore  Lynch  that  we 

head  by  a  piece  of  shell.    She  got  in  under  Fort  Forrest  must  retreat  from  Roanoke  Island.    Much  surprised  and 

and  anchored.    Some  time  in  the  afternoon,  in  the  hot-  mortified,  I  asked  why,  and  was  told  that  the  vessels 

test  of  the  fire,  reinforcements  arrived  from  Wise's  bri-  generally  were  out  of  ammunition.    A  council  was  held 

gade,  and  were  landed  on  the  island.    The  Richmond  as  to  whether   the  vessels  should  retreat  to  Norfolk, 

Blues,  Captain  O.  Jennings  Wise,  were,  I  think,  a  part  through  the  Chesapeake  and  Albemarle  Canal,  or  go  to 

of  this  force.    Pork  Point  Battery  kept  up  a  constant  Elizabeth  City,  on  the  Pasquotank  River.    We  would 

fire  on  the  fleet,  and  the  enemy  could  not  silence  it.  The  have  saved  the  vessels  by  going  to  the  former  place,  but 

garrison  stood  to  their  guns  like  men,  encouraged  by  the  the  commodore's  orders  were  to  do  his  utmost  to  defend 

spirited  example  of  their  instructor,  Lieutenant  B.  P.  the  waters  of  North  Carolina ;  so  we  decided  to  go  to  the 

Loyall.    Forts  Huger  and  Forrest  did  not  fire,  the  ene-  latter,  where  it  was  understood  a  fort  had  been  built  to 

my  being  out  of  range ;  but  the  small  battery  between  protect  the  town.    Elizabeth  City  was  the  terminus  of 

Pork  Point  and  Weir's   Point  fired  an  occasional  gun  the  Dismal  Swamp  Canal,  and  we  hoped  to  get  aninmni- 

during  the  day.    Toward  4  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  a  tion  that  way  from  Norfolk  in  time  to  act  in  conjunction 

shot  or  shell  struck  the  hurricane-deck  of  the  Curlew  with  the  fort.    I  was  sent  to  Roanoke  Island  to  commu- 

[Captain  Hunter]  in  its  descent,  and  went  through  her  nicate  all  this  to  Colonel  Shaw,  and  confess  did  not  relish 

decks  and   bottom  as  though  they  had  been  made  of  my  mission.    It  looked  too  much  like  leaving  the  army 

paper.     Hunter  put  his  vessel  ashore,  immediately  in  in  the  lurch,  and  yet  to  have  remained  without  ammu- 

froiit  of   Fort  Forrest,   completely  masking  its  guns,  nition would  have  been  mere  folly.    .    .    .    I  met  Colonel 

and  we  could  not  fire  her  for  fear  of  burning  up  the  Shaw  at  his  quarters,  and  stated  the  facts  in  relation  to 

battery,  which,  as  I  have  said,  was  built  on  an  old  the  vessels,  and  then  returned  to  the  Beaufort.  A 11  lights 

canal-boat.    .    .    .    We,  in  the  Beaufort,  did  our  best  in  were  now  extinguished,  and  the  squadron  got  under 

maintaining  our  position.     About   4  p.  M.  I  observed  way  for  Elizabeth  City." 


EARLY  COAST  OPERATIONS   IN   NORTH  CAROLINA. 


643 


an  unexpected  di 
rection  upon  the 
enemy  inside  the 
work.  They 
turned  their  guns 
upon  his  troops, 
but  failed  to  drive 
them  from  their 
position.  While 
General  Reno  was 
maintaining  the 
left  attack,  Gen 
eral  Foster,  with 
the  25th  Massa 
chusetts  and  10th 
Connecticut,  was 
making  a  serious 
demonstration  in 
front ;  and  the 
23d  and  27th  Mas 
sachusetts,  later 
with  the  51st 
Pennsylvania, 
were  trying  to 
penetrate  the 
almost  impassa 
ble  wood  and 
swamp  in  the 
far-off  front  of 
the  earth  -  work 
for  the  purpose 
of  getting  on 
the  enemy's  left. 
While  engaged 
in  this  move 
ment,  the  Massachusetts  troops  encountered  a  battalion  of  the  enemy  and 
drove  them  inside  their  work. 

About  11  o'clock  General  Parke  with  his  brigade  arrived  upon  the  field, 
and  the  4th  Rhode  Island  was  ordered  to  follow  the  regiments  making  the 
demonstration  on  the  enemy's  left.  "  The  9th  New  York  regiment,  arriving 
upon  the  ground,  was  ordered  to  follow."  ..."  The  regiment,  under  the 
lead  of  the  colonel,  Eush  C.  Hawkins,  entered  the  clearing  with  great  spirit." 
Nearly  two  companies  had  succeeded  in  getting  into  the  clearing  immediately 
in  front  of  the  earth-work,  where  the  mud  was  more  than  ankle-deep,  and 
where  they  were  receiving  the  undivided  attention  of  the  enemy's  three 
pieces  of  artillery,  and  getting  a  shot  now  and  then  from  the  infantry.  It 


MAP  OF  THE  BATTLE-FIELD 
OF  UOANOKE  ISLAND,  FEB 
RUARY  8TII,  18G2.  DRAWN 
BY  LIEUT.  W.  S.  ANDREWS, 
OF  THE  9TII  N.  Y.  PUB 
LISHED  BY  AUTHORITY  OF 
THE  SECRETARY  OF  WAR. 


644 


EARLY  COAST  OPERATIONS   IN  NORTH  CAROLINA. 


THE  THREE-GUN  BATTERY,   ROANOKE  ISLAND.      (SEE  MAP,   PAGE  642.) 
FROM  A  WAR-TIME  SKETCH. 


was  at  this  point  that  Colonel  De  Monteil  was  killed.  Seeing  that  it  would 
be  almost  impossible  to  get  through  the  deep  mud,  I  had  made  up  my  mind 
to  face  to  the  front  and  make  an  effort  to  charge  the  work,  and  after  a 
moment's  consultation  with  Lieutenant-Colonel  Betts  and  Captain  Jardine, 
who  commanded  the  right  company,  I  ordered  my  bugler  to  sound  the  charge. 
At  that  moment  I  heard  a  great  cheer  down  the  line,  and,  looking  jn  that 
direction,  discovered  that  Major  Kimball  had  broken  the  regiment  in  two 
parts  and  was  heading  the  left  companies  in  a  direct  charge  up  a  causeway 
running  through  the  center  of  the  field  of  fallen  timber  directly  to  the  sally 
port  covered  by  a  24-pounder  howitzer.  Soon  the  right  companies  joined, 
and  all  entered  the  work,  pell-mell,  together.  As  the  column  advanced, 
the  men  crowded  each  other  from  the  causeway,  and  soon  the  whole  front  of 
the  work  was  covered  with  an  animated  sea  of  red  fezzes.  The  men  of  Com 
pany  C  were  the  first  to  cross  the  ditch  and  enter  the  work.  About  the  same 
time,  the  21st  Massachusetts  and  the  51st  New  York  came  into  the  work  from 
the  left. 

The  officers  of  those  two  regiments  claimed  that  their   colors   were  the 
first  on  the  parapet ;  if  so,  it  was  because  the  colors  of  the  9th  New  York 


EARLY  COAST  OPERATIONS    IN   NORTH  CAROLINA.  645 

were  in  the  center  of  the  column  and  did  not  get  into  the  work  with  the  men 
on  the  right  who  led  the  charge.  The  regiments  sent  around  to  outflank 
the  enemy's  left  arrived  at  their  objective  point  about  the  time  the  decisive- 
charge  was  made,  and  were  entitled  to  a  fair  share  of  credit  for  the  success 
ful  day's  work. 

The  commands  of  Generals  Foster  and  Reno  pursued  the  enemy  to  a 
point  near  the  northern  end  of  the  island,  where  an  unconditional  surrender 
was  consummated.  Soon  after  leaving  the  earth-work  my  regiment  deflected 
to  the  right  and  succeeded  in  capturing  two  boat-loads  of  the  Richmond 
Blues,  among  them  O.  Jennings  Wise,  trying  to  escape  to  Nag's  Head,  on 
the  opposite  shore.  Company  B  in  the  meantime  had  taken  possession  of 
a  two-gun  battery  at  Shallowbag  Bay.  Wise,  severely  wounded,  was  earned 
to  a  farm-house,  where  he  received  the  best  attention  attainable,  but  died 
the  next  morning,  defiant  to  the  last,  and  wishing  he  had  more  lives  to  lose 
in  the  defense  of  the  Confederacy.  Among  the  results  of  these  two  days' 
fighting  were  the  capture  of  2675  officers  and  men  of  the  Confederate  army 
and  5  forts  mounting  32  heavy  guns,  the  complete  possession  of  Roanoke 
Island,  and  with  it  the  control  of  the  inland  waters  of  North  Carolina.  $ 
[For  losses,  see  p.  670.] 

THE   TWO    SQUADRONS   AT   ELIZABETH   CITY. 

THE  Confederate  fleet,  known  as  the  "  mosquito  fleet,"  was  under  command 
of  Commodore  William  F.  Lynch,  who,  after  firing  one  of  his  own  steamers,  the 
Curlew,  and  blowing  up  Fort  Forrest,  a  work  situated  opposite  Roanoke  Island 
on  the  mainland,  retreated  up  the  Pasquotank  River,  and  concentrated  his  ves 
sels  behind  a  four-gun  battery  at  a  point  a  short  distance  below  Elizabeth  City. 

At  8  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  February  10th  Commander  Rowan  came 
up  with  the  Union  fleet,  and  the  rebels  opened  fire  upon  him  at  a  long  range. 
The  L^nion  forces  continued  their  course  uninterrupted  by  the  enemy's  fire 
until  within  three-fourths  of  a  mile  of  their  position,  when  they  opened  fire 
and  dashed  on  at  full  speed.  In  a  few  minutes  five  of  the  enemy's  six 
vessels  were  either  captured  or  destroyed,  and  Elizabeth  City  was  in  posses 
sion  of  the  naval  forces.  |  Two  days  later  a  small  naval  division  under 
Lieutenant  Alexander  Murray  took  possession  of  Edenton. 

1^  The  Confederate  commander  at  Roanoke  Isl-  between  General  Wise  and  Flag-Officer  Lynch, 
and  was  General  Henry  A.  Wise,  who,  on  the  7th  General  Wise  being  ill  at  Nag's  Head  on  the  day 
of  January,  1862,  had  assumed  command  of  the  of  the  battle,  the  Confederate  troops  on  the  field 
Clio  wan  district,  General  Benjamin  Huger  being  were  under  command  of  Colonel  H.  M.  Shaw, 
in  command  of  the  department,  that  of  Norfolk,  who  says  in  his  report :  "An  unceasing  and  effect- 
The  official  relations  of  the  two  generals  were  ive  fire  was  kept  up  from  7  A.  M.  until  12:20, 
somewhat  strained,  and  the  responsibility  for  this  when,  our  artillery  ammunition  having  been  ex- 
disaster  was  afterward  the  subject  of  recrimina-  hausted  and  our  right  flanks  having  been  turned 
tion  between  them.  General  Wise  claimed  that  by  an  overwhelming  force  of  the  enemy,  I  was 
he  had  been  deprived  of  his  artillery  by  reason  compelled  to  yield  the  place." 
of  the  countermanding  of  his  orders  by  General 

Huger,  and  that,  in  general,  there  had  been  culpa-  I  Of  this  engagement  Captain  Parker,  C.  S.  N., 

ble  neglect  on  the  part  of  the  Confederate  authori-  in  his  "  Recollections  of  a  Naval  Officer,"  writes 

ties  to  aid  the  defense  of  Roanoke  Island.   "  Noth-  as  follows  : 

ing!  nothing!!  nothing!!!"  he  said.     "That  was  ,.The  enemy  were  coming  up  at  full  speed  and  our 

the  disease  which  brought  disaster  at  Roanoke  Isl-  vessels  were  under  weigh  ready  to  abide  the  shock,  when 

and."      There  was  also  lack  of  cordial  agreement  a  boat  came  off  from  the  shore  with  the  bearer  of  a  dis- 


646  EARLY  COAST  OPERATIONS   IN  NORTH  CAROLINA. 

The  morning  of  February  9th,  having  heard  that  a  portion  of  the  command 
of  General  Henry  A.  Wise  still  remained  at  Nag's  Head,  General  Parke 
ordered  that  I  should  take  a  battalion  of  my  regiment,  proceed  to  that  point, 
and,  if  possible,  effect  their  capture.  When  we  arrived  at  the  place  of  debar 
kation  we  were  surprised  to  meet  with  no  resistance  to  our  landing.  The  fact 
was  sufficiently  accounted  for  when  we  learned  that  Wise  with  his  whole  com 
mand  had  retreated  northward  at  sundown  the  day  before. 

From  the  time  of  the  capture  of  Roanoke  Island  stories  had  come  frequently 
to  the  Union  commanders  setting  forth  the  loyalty  of  the  citizens  of  the  town 
of  Winton  on  the  Chowan  River,  and  their  desire  to  serve  the  Union  cause. 
On  the  18th  of  February  an  expedition  of  eight  gun-boats  under  Com 
mander  Rowan,  and  a  land  force  of  which  I  had  charge,  started  for  the  Chowan 
River,  for  the  purpose  of  encouraging  our  friends  at  Winton  and  destroying 
two  important  bridges  of  the  Seaboard  and  Roanoke  Railroad.  The  morning 
of  the  19th  we  began  to  ascend  the  river,  and  as  I  had  never  believed  in  the 
tales  regarding  the  loyalty  of  the  Wintonians,  from  the  time  of  entering 
the  river,  I  assumed  the  position  of  volunteer  lookout  from  the  cross-trees 
of  the  mainmast  of  the  steamer  Delaware.  The  day  was  beautiful,  the 
sail  charming,  and  all  went  well  until  about  half-past  3  o'clock.  The 
steamer  had  "slowed  down"  and  taken  a  sheer  in  toward  the  Winton  wharf, 
where  a  negro  woman  stood  waving  a  rag,  when  from  my  lofty  perch  I  dis 
covered  the  glistening  of  many  musket-barrels  among  the  short  shrubs  that 
covered  the  high  bank,  and  farther  back  two  pieces  of  artillery  in.  position. 
I  shouted  to  the  astonished  native  pilot  at  the  helm,  "  Ring  on,  sheer  off, 
rebels  on  shore  ! "  fully  half  a  dozen  times  before  he  could  comprehend  my 
meaning.  At  last  he  rang  on  full  speed,  changed  his  course,  and  cleared 
the  wharf  by  about  ten  feet.  At  that  moment  the  enemy  opened  fire,  and 

patch  for  me.  It  road :  '  Captain  Parker,  with  the  crew  on  their  side  of  the  river.  The  Funiu/  was  run  on  shore 
of  the  Beaufort,  will  at  once  take  charge  of  the  fort. —  and  blown  up  by  her  commander,  who  with  his  crew 
Lynch.'  'Where  the  devil,'  I  asked,  '  are  the  men  who  escaped  to  the  shore.  .  .  .  Captain  Sims,  of  tho 
were  in  the  fort  ? '  '  All  rim  away,'  said  the  messenger.  Ap)tomattox,\M\*t  up  a  sharp  lire  from  his  bow  gun  until 
.  .  .  Upon  getting  into  the  fort  I  hastily  commenced  it  was  accidentally  spiked ;  and  he  then  had  to  run  for 
stationing  the  men  at  the  guns,  and  as  quickly  as  pos-  it.  He  had  a  howitzer  aft  which  he  kept  in  play;  but 
sible  opened  fire  upon  the  advancing  enemy.  Some  of  upon  arriving  at  the  mouth  of  the  canal  he  found  his 
the  officers  and  men  of  the  Forrest  made  their  way  to  us  vessel  was  about  two  inches  too  wide  to  enter ;  he  there 
upon  learning  that  the  militia  had  fled.  I  must  not  for-  fore  set  her  on  tire,  and  she  blew  up.  The  Beaufort  got 
get  to  say  that  the  engineer  officer  who  had  been  sent  through  to  Norfolk. 

from  Richmond  for  service  in  the  fort  remained  bravely  "We  in  the  fort  saw  this  work  of  destruction  going 

at  his  post.   .    .    .    I  found  Commodore  Lynch  on  shore;  on  without  being  able  to  prevent  it.    As  soon  as  the 

his  boat  had  been  cut  iu  two  by  a  shot  and  he  could  not  vessels  passed  the  fort  we  could   not  bring  a  gun  to 

get  off  to  his  ship,  as  he  informed  me;  and  he  further-  bear  on  them,  and  a  shot  from  them  would  have  taken 

more  said  I  was  to  command  the  fort  without  reference  us  in  reverse.    A  few  rounds  of  grape  would  have  killed 

to  his  being  there  — that  if  he  saw  an  opportunity  to  get  and  wounded  all  the  men  in  the  fort,  for  the  distance 

off  to  the  Seabird,  he  should  embrace  it.     The  enemy's  was  only  a  few  hundred  yards.    Seeing  this,  I  directed 

vessels  came  on  at  full  speed  under  a  heavy  fire  from  Johnson  to  spike  the   guns,  to  order    every   man   to 

our  vessels  and  the  fort.    The  fire  from  the  latter  was  shoulder  his  musket,  and  then  to  take  down  the  flag. 

ineffectual.     The  officers  and  men  were  cool  enough;  "  All  this  was  promptly  and  coolly  done,  and  upon  the 

but  they  had  not  had  time  to  look  about  them.    Every-  fact  being  reported   tome  by  Johnson,   I  pointed  to 

thing  was  in  bad  working  order,  and  it  was  difficult  to  pome  woods   in   our  rear  and   told  him  to  make  the 

train  the  guns.     .     .     .    Commodore  Rowan's  steamers  best  of    his  way  there  with    the  command.    All  this 

did  not  reply  to  our  fire  until  quite  close  ;  and  without  time  Commodore  Lynch  had  stood  quietly  looking  on, 

slackening  their  speed  they  passed  the  fort  and  fell  upon  but  without  uttering  a  word.    As  his  command  had 

our  vessels.    They  made  short  work  of  them.    The  Sea-  just  been  destroyed  under  his  eyes,  T  knew  pretty  well 

bird  was  rammed  and  sunk  by  the  Commodore  Perry,  what  his  feelings  were.    Turning  to  him  T  said  :  '  Com- 

The  Ellis  was  captured  after  a  desperate  defense,  in  modore,  I  have  ordered  the  fort  evacuated.'    '  Why  so, 

h  her  gallant  commander,  James  Cooke,  was  badly  sir?'    he  demanded.     T  pointed   out  the  condition  of 

nded.    The  schooner  Black  Warrior  was  set  on  fire  affairs  I  have  just  stated,  and  he  acquiesced.    Ann  in 

and  abandoned,  her  crew  escaping  through  the  marshes  arm,  we  followed  the  retreating  men." 


EARLY  COAST  OPERATIONS   IN   NORTH  CAROLINA. 


647 


before  we  passed  out  of  range  the  low  guards,  wheel-house,  and  masts  of 
the  Delaware  were  riddled.  My  descent  from  the  cross-trees,  with  only  the 
mast  to  protect  my  body,  was  rapid  and  not  graceful ;  ratlines  and  shrouds 
were  cut  by  bullets  as  I  went  down,  and  my  escape  without  injury  was  one 
of  the  every-day  miracles  of  war.  . 

The  Union  forces  withdrew  down  the  river  and  anchored.     Early  the  next 

morning  we  returned,  and  after  some  pre 
liminary  shelling,  my  regiment  with  two 
boat-howitzers  were  landed,  the  enemy 
was  driven  out,  and  the  town  was  occu 
pied.  We  soon  discovered  that  the  court 
house  and  several  other  buildings  were  in 
use  for  barracks  and  store-houses  for 
army  supplies.  They  were  all  fired. 
Then  the  expedition  returned  to  Roanoke 
Island. 

The  Winton  expedition  was,  for  the 
time  being,  the  last  of  active  operations 
having  Roanoke  Island  for  a  base.  The 
army  forces  on  shore  were  enjoying  a 
period  of  luxurious  rest,  while  the  naval 
vessels  were  making  pleasant  excursions 
to  the  towns  on  the  snores  of  the  sounds 
before  embarking  in  an  enterprise  second 
only  in  importance  to  the  capture  of  Roanoke  Island.  It  was  an  open  secret 
that  the  next  move  would  be  against  New  Berne,  a  small  city  on  the  Neuse 
River. 

The  morning  of  the  10th  of  March  ^  a  letter  was  handed  to  me  from  General 
Burnside  containing  the  information  that  a  new  brigade,  composed  of  the  9th 
and  89th  New  York  and  the  6th  New  Hampshire,  and  designated  as  the  Fourth, 
had  been  formed  for  duty  at  Roanoke  Island,  which  was  to  be  left  under  my 
command  for  the  protection  of  that  post.  The  formation  of  this  new  brigade 
was  the  culmination  of  preparations  for  the  departure  of  the  New  Berne 
expedition. 

THE  BATTLE  OF  XEW  BERNE. 

THE  morning  of  the  llth  the  force  detailed  for  the  attack  upon  that  city 
embarked  and  that  night,  with  the  naval  forces,  rendezvoused  at  Hatteras  Inlet. 
On  the  12th  an  early  start  was  made,  and  that  evening  the  whole  fleet  anchored 
off  the  mouth  of  Slocum's  Creek,  about  sixteen  miles  below  New  Berne. 

The  next  morning  was  as  unpleasant  as  a  cold  penetrating  rain  and  dark  sky 
could  make  it,  but,  notwithstanding,  at  6:30,  after  some  preliminary  shelling 
of  woods  near  the  landing,  the  troops  began  to  disembark,  the  majority 


VICE-ADMIKAL  S.   C.   ROWAX. 


|  The  Oth  of  March  had  been  clear  and  sunny, 
with  a  light  breeze  from  the  north.  Although  Iwas 
at  Roanoke  Island,  some  eighty  miles  away,  I  heard, 


quite  distinctly,  the  roar  of  the  guns  engaged  in 
the  action  between  the  Merrimac  and  the  Union 
fleet,  including  the  Monitor.—  R.  C.  H. 


648  EARLY  COAST  OPERATIONS  IN  NORTH  CAROLINA. 

going  in  small  boats,  while  others  in  their  eagerness  for  the  fray  jumped  from 
the  transports,  which  were  fast  oil  the  mud  bottoms,  and,  holding  their  car 
tridge-boxes  and  muskets  over  their  heads,  waded  to  the  land.  In  addition  to 
the  13  regiments  of  infantry,  8  pieces  of  artillery  were  landed,  6  in  charge 
of  Lieutenant  McCook,  of  the  navy,  and  2  commanded  by  Captains  Dayton 
and  Bennett,  of  the  Marine  Artillery. 

The  enemy  had  chosen  a  strong  position,  well  calculated  for  defensive  pur 
poses.  On  Otter  Creek,  about  seven  miles  up  the  river  from  the  mouth  of 
Slocum's  Creek,  they  had  a  line  of  intrenchments  reaching  from  the  Neuse 
River  to  the  Atlantic  and  North  Carolina  Railroad  ;  two  miles  beyond  they  had 
erected  a  strong  field-  work  for  preventing  a  landing  at  that  point  ;  three  miles 

farther  on  there  was  a  battery  mounting  4  heavy  guns, 
but  bearing  upon  the  river  ;  and  one  mile  farther  up  to 
ward  New  Berne  was  their  long  line  of  strong  works, 
the  chief  defense  against  an  attack  upon  that  city.  Fort 
Thompson,  a  large  and  carefully  planned  flanking  bas 
tion,  located  on  the  river,  and  mounting  13  heavy 
guns,  the  enemy's  extreme  left,  was  the  commencement 
of  their  main  line  of  breastworks,  which  extended  a 
mile  and  a  quarter  to  the  railroad;  and  commencing 
the  other  side  of  the  railroad  was  another  series  of  de 
fensive  works,  consisting  of  rifle-pits  and  detached 
intrenchments  in  the  form  of  redans  and  lunettes,  that 
terminated  in  a  2-guii  battery,  about  two  miles  from 
CONFEDERATE  FORCES  AT  NEW  Fort  Thompson.  All  were  located  upon  a  low,  swampy 

BERN!:.      KILLED    AT    ANTIKT.VM,  \  7 

SEPT.  17,  1862.  soil.     The  line  trom  the  river  to  the  railroad  was  pro- 

FROM  A  PHOTOGRAPH.  -,     n  Tj_     1  11  •  <?  1      j_1 

tected  by  a  ditch  and  clearing  in  tront,  and  the  one 

beyond  by  a  swamp  and  underbrush  along  its  whole  length.  These  works 
were  armed  with  41  heavy  guns  and  19  field-pieces,  and  had  between 
7000  and  8000  men  for  their  defense.  In  the  river,  opposite  Fort  Thompson, 
and  crossing  its  channel,  were  a  double  row  of  piles  and  many  sunken  vessels, 
formidable  obstructions,  to  assist  the  fort  in  preventing  an  attack  upon  New 
Berne  from  the  river.  The  naval  forces  moved  up  the  river  along  with  the 
troops  while  the  light  guns  on  shore  were  being  dragged  through  the  deep 
mud  of  the  road.  The  first  day's  march  took  the  whole  Union  force  beyond 
the  second  deserted  work,  where  the  advance  came  in  contact  with  the 
enemy's  pickets.  It  being  then  8  o'clock,  a  halt  was  ordered  for  the  night, 
and  the  weary,  hungry  troops  found  a  soldiers'  resting-place  in  the  mud,  with 
no  better  covering  than  a  continuous  downpour  of  cold  water.  The  eight 
pieces  of  artillery,  although  assisted  on  their  way  by  the  whole  of  the  51st 
Pennsylvania,  did  not  arrive  on  the  ground  until  3  o'clock  the  following 
morning.  [See  map,  p.  651.] 

During  the  night  it  was  ascertained  from  pickets,  negroes,  and  others  that 
the  enemy's  fortified  line  was.  not  far  off  ;  and  early  on  the  morning  of  the 
14th  the  positions  of  the  Union  forces  were  designated  preparatory  to  a  for 
ward  movement  for  attack.  General  Foster  was  to  move  up  the  country 


THE 


EARLY  COAST  OPERATIONS   IN  NORTH  CAROLINA. 


649 


BOMBARDMENT    OF    THE     CONFEDERATE    FORT    THOMPSON    DURING    THE    BATTLE    OF    NEW   BERNE. 

FROM   A  WAR-TIME    SKETCH. 

road  and  attack  the  enemy's  left ;  General  Reno  was  to  advance  by  the  rail 
road  and  attempt  to  turn  the  rebel  right ;  while  General  Parke  was  to  follow 
on  the  country  road  as  a  reserve,  or  to  operate  in  the  center.  The  heads  of 
the  two  advancing  columns  soon  came  within  range,  and  a  disposition  of  the 
troops  for  a  general  engagement  was  immediately  consummated.  The  25th 
Massachusetts  had  the  extreme  right ;  second  in  line  came  the  24th  Massa 
chusetts,  its  left  resting  on  the  country  road,  which  was  occupied  by  the 
artillery  commanded  by  Captain  Dayton  and  Lieutenant  McCook.  The  27th 
Massachusetts,  with  its  right  resting  on  the  country  road,  was  joined  on  its 
left  by  the  23d  Massachusetts,  the  whole  parallel  with  the  enemy's  works.  The 
artillery  and  right  regiments  opened  the  engagement  before  those  on  the  left 
of  the  road  got  into  position.  The  10th  Connecticut  Volunteers,  arriving  a 
little  after  the  others,  was  ordered  to  the  left  of  the  23d.  The  action  along 
the  whole  of  General  Foster's  front  had  now  commenced  in  earnest.  The 
27th  Massachusetts  soon  exhausted  its  short  supply  of  ammunition,  and  was 
replaced  by  the  llth  Connecticut,  which  had  been  ordered  by  General  Parke 
to  assist  in  bringing  up  the  guns. 

Early  in  the  morning  General  Eeno,  on  the  left,  moved  his  brigade  along  the 
railroad  in  the  following  order :  21st  Massachusetts,  51st  New  York,  9th  Xew 
Jersey,  and  51st  Pennsylvania.  The  first  encounter,  about  8  o'clock,  was  with 
a  large  detachment  of  the  enemy  who  were  bringing  a  gun  to  bear  on  the  rail 
road.  This  move  was  checked  by  a  well-maintained  fire  from  the  Union 
skirmishers,  and  soon  after  the  right  wing  of  the  21st  Massachusetts,  under 


650 


EARLY  COAST  OPERATIONS  IN  NORTH  CAROLINA. 


Lieutenant-Colonel  Clark,  charged  through  an  opening  and  captured  a  brick 
kiln  within  the  enemy's  line.  The  other  regiments  of  the  brigade  were  now 
brought  into  line  on  the  left  of  the  21st  Massachusetts,  with  the  51st  Pennsyl 
vania  in  reserve,  supporting  the  extreme  left  of  the  line.  On  this  part  of  the 
field  the  action  lasted  for  about  three  and  a  half  hours,  when  the  regiments 
engaged  had  expended  nearly  all  their  ammunition.  At  that  time  the  right 
wing  of  the  51st  Pennsylvania,  under  Lieutenant-Colonel  T.  S.  Bell,  was 
ordered  to  relieve  the  51st  New  York,  which  had  suffered  severely,  to  pass 

in  front  of  it,  deliver  one  volley,  and  then 
charge  the  enemy's  works.  This  order  was 
gallantly  executed.  At  the  same  time  the 
other  wing  of  the  51st  Pennsylvania  and 
the  9th  New  Jersey  charged  the  intrench- 
ments,  and  the  enemy  fled  from  their  entire 
left,  leaving  fifty  prisoners.  Just  then 
General  Reno  discovered  the  Stars  and 
Stripes  waving  from  the  works  far  off  to 
his  right. 

Lieutenant-Colonel  Clark,  after  captur 
ing  the  brick-kiln,  moved  along  the  inside 
of  the  works  toward  the  right,  came  upon 
a  light  battery  of  sixteen  pieces  which  he 
captured,  but  was  driven  back  by  an  over 
whelming  force  of  infantry. 

General  Parke's  brigade,  consisting  of 
the  4th  and  5th  Rhode  Island  and  the 
8th  and  llth  Connecticut  regiments,  was 

assigned  to  the  center  in  supporting  distance  of  either  end  of  the  line,  but 
this  command  was  destined  to  play  a  more  important  part  than  merely 
supporting  the  troops.  Soon  after  getting  under  fire  Colonel  Rodman,  with 
the  4th  Rhode  Island,  offered  to  charge  through  an  opening  left  in  the  in- 
trenchments  for  the  railroad  to  pass  through.  The  offer  was  accepted,  and 
the  8th  Connecticut  and  the  5th  Rhode  Island  were  ordered  to  his  support. 
Passing  the  rifle-pits,  he  entered  the  rear  of  the  intrenchments,  moving  toward 
the  right,  capturing  nine  brass  guns  and  driving  the  enemy  from  his  intrenched 
position  between  the  railroad  and  the  river.  Simultaneously  with  the  move 
ment  of  Colonel  Rodman,  General  Foster  made  a  charge  along  his  whole  front, 
when  the  enemy  retreated.  During  the  greater  part  of  the  action  the  gun-boats 
cooperated  by  shelling  the  woods  in  the  rear  of  the  works.  Rodman's 
soldierly  movement  was  the  culminating  point  of  the  day,  and  ended  a  battle 
most  creditable  for  all  the  Union  troops  and  the  officers  who  commanded 
them.  Immediately  after  the  close  of  the  action,  New  Berne  was  occupied. 

When  the  strength  of  the  position  is  taken  into  consideration,  the  fatigue 
of  the  Union  forces,  and  the  great  difficulties  they  had  to  encounter  in  mak 
ing  an  infantry  attack  against  a  strong  intrenched  position,  it  is  astonishing 
that  they  came  out  of  the  action  with  a  loss  of  only  90  killed  arid  880 


MAJOR-GENERAL  JOHN   G.    FOSTER. 
FROM  A  PHOTOGRAPH. 


EARLY  COAST  OPERATIONS  IN  NORTH  CAROLINA. 


651 


wounded.  The  loss  to  the  enemy  was  9  forts,  mounting  41  heavy  guns,  over 
2  miles  of  intrenchments,  with  19  field-pieces  in  position,  6  32-pounders 
not  mounted,  over  300  prisoners,  more  than  1000  stand  of  small  arms,  tents 
and  barracks  for  10,000  troops,  a  large  amount  of  army  supplies  and  naval 
stores,  and  the  control  of  the  second  commercial  city  in  the  State  of  North 
Carolina.  The  enemy's  loss  in  killed,  wounded,  prisoners,  and  missing  was 
about  578.  This  complete  success,  coming  so  soon  after  that  of  Roanoke 
Island,  created  an  esprit  de  corps  among  the  troops  of  the  "  Coast  Division  " 
which  they  maintained  to  the  end  of  their  army  career.  \ 


\  The  Confederate  forces  in  this  engagement 
were  all  North  Carolinians,  and  were  commanded 
by  General  L.  O'B.  Branch,  who  gives  in  his  official 
report  this  account  of  the  battle  : 

"The  defensive  works  were  located  and  constructed 
before  I  assumed  command.  The  troops  under  my  com 
mand  had  performed  a  large  amount  of  work,  but  it 
was  mainly  on  the  river  defenses,  which  were  not  as 
sailed  by  the  enemy.  They  had  been  originally  planned 
for  a  force  much  larger  than  any  ever  placed  at  my 
disposal,  and  I  was  for  six  weeks  engaged  in  making 
the  necessary  changes  to  contract  them,  but  the  failure 
of  all  my  efforts  to  obtain  implements  and  tools  with 
which  the  troops  could  carry  on  the  work  prevented  me 
from  making  .satisfactory  progress.  I  had  circulated 
handbills  over  the  State,  calling  on  the  citizens  gener 
ally  to  assist  me,  and  received  from  two  counties  a 
small  party  of  free  negroes  without  implements.  I 
then  inserted  in  the  newspaper  an  advertisement  call 
ing  on  the  slave-owners  to  hire  their  slaves,  with  im 
plements,  for  a  few  days,  and  I  got  but  a  single  negro. 
During  all  this  time  I  continued  the  troops  at  work,  and 
when  the  enemy  came  into  the  river,  five  hundred  per 
dav  were  being  detailed  to  construct  breastworks,  with 


BATTLE    OF  ^ 

h 


NEW  BERNE.N.C. 


A  Battery  of  two   24Pounders   not  finished  i 
L,  Latham's Battery.  B  Brem's  Battery.  H  Hardi 


less  than  half  that  number  of  worn  and  broken  shovels 
and  axes,  without  picks  or  grubbing-hoes.  If  the  fate 
of  New  Beme  shall  prevent  a  similar  supineness  on  the 
part  of  citizens,  and  especially  slave-owners,  elsewhere, 
it  will  be  fortunate  for  the  country.  .  .  .  At  about  7: 30 
o'clock,  Friday  morning,  the  fire  opened  along  the  line 
from  the  railroad  to  the  river.  I  soon  received  a  mes 
sage  from  Colonel  Lee  [commanding  the  Confederate 
left  wing]  that  the  enemy  were  attempting  to  turn  our 
left.  This  proved  to  be  a  feint,  as  I  replied  to  him  that 
I  thought  it  would.  The  next  incident  of  the  battle 
was  the  appearance  of  the  enemy's  skirmishers  in  front  of 
Vance  [26th  X.  C.],  and  consequently  on  the  prolongation 
of  the  line  held  by  the  militia.  It  was  to  drive  the  enemy 
from  that  position  that  I  had  directed  the  24-pound  bat 
tery  to  be  placed  there,  and  supposing  it  was  ready  for 
service,  I  sent  Captain  Rodman,  with  his  company,  to 
man  it,  but  they  found  the  guns  not  mounted,  and  were 
ordered  into  position  to  act  as  infantry.  The  skirmish 
ers  of  the  enemy,  finding  themselves  on  the  flank  of  the 
militia,  fired  at  them  a  few  shots  from  their  flank  files, 
which  caused  a  portion  of  them  to  flee  in  great  disorder. 
I  instantly  ordered  Colonel  Avery  [33d  Regiment]  to 
send  five  companies  to  dislodge  them.  He  sent  them  in 
stantly,  under  Lieutenant-Colonel  Hoke;  but  before 
Colonel  Hoke  had  fully  got  into  position, 
though  he  moved  with  the  greatest 
promptness  and  celerity,  I  received  a 
message  from  Colonel  Clark,  of  the  mi 
litia,  informing  me  that  the  enemy  were 
in  line  of  battle  in  great  force  on  his 
right.  I  instantly  ordered  up  the  re 
maining  five  companies  of  Colonel 
Avery's  regiment,  and  the  whole  ten 
opened  a  terrific  fire  from  their  En- 
field  rifles.  The  whole  militia,  how 
ever,  had  now  abandoned  their  posi 
tions,  and  the  utmost  exertions  of  myself 
and  my  staff  could  not  rally  them. 
Colonel  Sinclair's  regiment  [35th]  very 
quicklyt'ollowed  their  example,  retreat 
ing  in  the  utmost  disorder.  This  laid 
open  Haywood's  right  [7th],  and  a  large 
portion  of  the  breastwork  was  left  va 
cant.  I  had  not  a  man  with  whom  to 
reoccupy  it,  and  the  enemy  soon  poured 
in  a  column  along  the  railroad  and 
through  a  portion  of  the  cut -down 
ground  in  front,  which  marched  up  be 
hind  the  breastwork  to  attack  what  re 
mained  of  Campbell's  command  [7th]. 
The  brave  7th  met  them  with  the  bay 
onet,  and  drove  them  headlong  over 
the  parapet,  inflicting  heavy  loss  upon 
them  as  they  fled ;  but  soon  returning 
with  heavy  reinforcements,  not  less  than 


~~  five  or  six  regiments,  the  7th  was  obliged 

MAP  OF  THE  BATTLE  OF  NEW  BERNE,  XORTH  CAROLINA,  tQ  yieldj   fallin?   Dack  p]owlv   alld   in  Or- 

MARCH  14,  1862.  (jer<  geeing  the  enemy  behind  the  breast- 

This  map  i<  based    upon  the  sketch   map  accompanying   General  work,  without  a  single  man  to  place  in 

Branch's  official  report  of  the  Confederate  operations  in  this  engage,  the  gap  through  which  he  was  entenng, 

meTit  with  the  addition  of  the  Union  dispositions  as  indicated  by  the  and  finding  the  day  lost,  my  next  care 

official  reports.  wa8  to  secure  tne  retreat." 


EARLY  COAST  OPERATIONS  IN  NORTH  CAROLINA. 


ASSAULT    OF  THE    UNION    TROOPS    UPON    FORT    THOMPSON,    NKAK    NEW  BERNE.      FROM   A   WAR-TIME   SKETCH. 

The  enemy  in  their  retreat  destroyed  bridges,  and  as  they  passed  through 
the  town  set  fire  to  it,  and  left  parts  of  it  in  a  blaze ;  and  the  first  work  of  our 
troops  and  sailors  after  landing  was  to  assist  the  citizens  in  putting  out  the 
flames,  which  was  not  done  until  much  valuable  property  had  been  uselessly 
destroyed.  With  the  military  machinery  at  his  command  it  did  not  take 
General  Burnside  long  to  establish  order  and  give  the  captured  city  such  a 
government  as  the  occasion  required.  The  next  and  most  important  business 
in  hand  was  to  make  the  captured  position  secure  from  a  land  attack ;  and 
in  order  to  accomplish  this,  a  portion  of  the  railroad  leading  to  Goldsboro' 
had  to  be  destroyed,  and  a  line  of  fortifications  built  between  the  Neuse  and 
Trent  rivers,  which  would  completely  insulate  New  Berne  from  the  sur 
rounding  country. 

THE   SIEGE   OF   FORT   MACON. 

THE  next  and  last  objective  point  of  any  importance  in  the  new  depart 
ment  of  North  Carolina  was  the  capture  of  Fort  Macon,  an  old-style,  strong, 
stone,  casemated  work,  mounting  67  guns,  garrisoned  by  above  500  men,  com 
manded  by  Colonel  Moses  J.  White,  located  on  the  eastern  extremity  of  Bogue 
Island,  commanding  the  channel  from  the  open  sea  to  Beaufort  Harbor,  and 
about  forty  miles  from  New  Berne.  [See  map,  p.  634.]  To  General  Parke  was  as 
signed  the  duty  of  moving  upon  this  work  and  undertaking  its  capture.  March 
18th,  General  Burnside  and  Lieutenant  Williamson,  of  the  Engineers,  made 
a  reconnoissance  to  the  east  as  far  as  Slocum's  Creek,  and  occupied  Have- 
lock  Station  with  one  company  of  the  5th  Rhode  Island  Battalion.  The  21st, 


EARLY  COAST  OPERATIONS  IN  NORTH  CAROLINA. 


653 


f 

K^&£L'A*  "a"  'a'  -*£&--" 


FORT  MACON  AFTER    ITS    CAITURE    BY    THE    UNION 

FORCES,   SHOWING    EFFECTS  OF  THE  BOMBARD- 

3IENT.       FROM   WAR-TIME   SKETCHES. 

Carolina  City,  a  small  settlement 
opposite  Bogue  Island,  was  occu 
pied;  the  22d,  two  companies  of 
the  4th  Rhode  Island  took  pos 
session  of  Morehead  City;  the 
night  of  the  25th,  a  detachment  of 
the  same  regiment,  with  a  com 
pany  of  the  8th  Connecticut,  occupied  Beaufort ;  and  the  night  of  the  23d, 
Newport  was  garrisoned  by  the  5th  Rhode  Island.  Thus  all  the  important 
positions  around  or  in  the  vicinity  of  Fort  Macon  had  fallen  into  the  posses 
sion  of  the  Union  forces  without  contest  or  the  loss  of  a  man.  General  Parke, 
who  had  established  his  headquarters  at  Carolina  City,  demanded  a  surrender 
of  the  fort,  which  was  refused.  The  evidence  of  preparations  completed  and 
in  hand  left  no  doubt  upon  the  mind  of  General  Parke  that  Colonel  White 
intended  to  make  a  desperate  defense.  It  was  therefore  decided  to  besiege 
the  fort,  and  as  soon  as  possible  to  make  a  combined  land  and  sea  attack. 

In  this  important  work  General  Parke  was  most  ably  assisted  by  Captain 
Williamson  and  Lieutenant  Flagler,  of  the  Ordnance  Corps.  On  the  29th  a 
part  of  the  Third  Brigade  was  landed  upon  Bogue  Island,  and  operations  for 
besieging  the  fort  were  immediately  commenced.  The  configuration  of  the 
sand-hills  was  singularly  well  adapted  to  facilitate  the  operations  of  the  Union 
forces.  These  ridges  or  hills  intervened  between  the  working  parties  and  the 
fort  to  such  an  extent  in  height  as  to  permit  the  erection  of  besieging  works 
to  go  on  by  day  as  well  as  by  night,  without  any  serious  inconvenience  from 
the  enemy's  fire.  By  April  23d,  the  fort  was  entirely  cut  off  from  comniuni- 


654  EARLY  COAST  OPERATIONS  IN  NORTH  CAROLINA. 

cation  with  the  outer  world.  On  the  ocean  side  the  blockading  division,  con 
sisting  of  the  steamers  Dayliylit,  State  of  Georgia,  and  Chippewa,  and  the  bark 
Gemsbok,  under  the  command  of  Commander  Samuel  Lockwood,  prevented 
all  intercourse  from  that  direction.  General  Parke  announced  the  works  com 
pleted,  and  his  readiness  for  an  attack,  and  Colonel  White  was  again  sum 
moned,  and  again,  in  the  tersest  possible  terms,  declined  to  surrender. 

The  preparations  for  the  reduction  of  the  fort  consisted  of  a  battery  of  3 
rifled  30-pounder  guns,  under  Captain  L.  O.  Morris;  another  of  4  8-inch 
mortars,  under  Lieutenant  D.  W.  Flagler ;  and  a  third  of  4  10-inch  mortars, 
commanded  by  Lieutenant  M.  F.  Prouty,  of  the  25th  Massachusetts.  From 
these  works  the  bombardment  commenced  on  the  morning  of  the  25th, 
and  continued  for  ten  hours.  The  fire  from  the  Union  batteries  was  not 
only  vigorous,  but  also  accurate  and  effective.  Shell  after  shell  dropped 
into  the  work  and  exploded.  Many  breaches  were  made,  the  ramparts 
were  swept  clean  of  gunners,  and  seventeen  guns  were  disabled  and  dis 
mounted.  The  naval  forces,  owing  to  the  sudden  coming  on  of  a  gale,  after 
participating  in  the  early  part  of  the  bombardment,  were  compelled  to  seek 
deeper  water.  On  the  morning  of  the  26th  Colonel  White,  by  the  hanging 
out  of  a  white  flag,  indicated  his  willingness  to  surrender.  He  and  his  troops 
received  honorable  terms  and  marched  out  of  the  fort  as  the  5th  Rhode  Island 
marched  in,  and  so  ended,  in  a  comparatively  bloodless  victory,  the  siege  of 
Fort  Macon,  the  combined  losses  of  both  sides  being  only  9  killed  and  25 
wounded.  •& 

During  the  bombardment  a  detachment  of  the  Signal  Corps  under  Lieuten 
ant  Andrews  rendered  most  important  assistance  to  the  commanders  of  the 
batteries.  His  position  on  the  Bogue  banks  was  nearly  at  right  angles  with 
the  line  of  fire.  Early  in  the  action  he  saw  that  the  10-inch  shells  were  going 
three  hundred  yards  beyond  the  fort,  and  that  the  8-inch  shells  were  falling 
short.  By  signaling  his  observations,  the  elevations  of  the  pieces  were  corrected, 
so  that  after  12  o'clock  every  projectile  from  the  mortars  fell  inside  the  fort. 
This  was  not  only  one  of  the  first,  but  among  the  better,  of  the  achievements 
of  the  Signal  Corps,  proving  its  usefulness  in  war  operations. 

SOUTH  MILLS  AND  OTHER  OPERATIONS. 

SOON  after  the  capture  of  Roanoke  Island  rumors  reached  us  of  the  build 
ing  of  rebel  iron-clads  which  were  to  enter  Albemarle  Sound  via  the  Dismal 
Swamp  Canal  and  Roanoke  River.  Commander  Rowan  and  I  were  equally 

•fe  Colonel  Moses  J.  White  says  in  his  report :  up  with  great  vigor,  the  enemy  having  immense  advan 
tage  from  their  superior  force,  being  able  to  relieve  their 

"  At  6  A.  M.,  on  the  25th,  the  enemy's  land  batteries  men  at  the  guns,  while  our  morning  reports  showed 
opened  upon  the  fort,  and  at  6:30  A.  M.  their  vessels,  only  263  men  for  duty.  Our  guns  were  well  managed, 
consisting  of  three  war  steamers  and  one  sailing  vessel,  but  being  able  to  do  little  damage  to  water  batteries  and 
commenced  a  cross-fire  with  rifle  and  11-inch  shell.  The  siege  guns,  firing  through  very  narrow  embrasures, 
tire  from  both  directions  was  immediately  returned,  The  enemy  kept  up  a  very  vigorous  and  accurate  fire 
and  at  7  A.  M.  the  ships  retired  —  one  disabled  and  two  from  both  rifles  and  mortars,  dismounting  guns,  (lisa- 
others  in  a  damaged  condition.  fiSTo  such  damage  is  re-  bling  men,  and  tearing  the  parade,  parapet,  and  walls  of 
ported  by  the  commanders  of  the  Union  vessels.  Com-  the  fort.  At  6 :  30  P.  M.,  finding  that  our  loss  had  been 
maiider  Lockwood,  of  the  D(t>/H(/J>t,  the  senior  naval  very  great,  and  from  the  fatigue  of  our  men  being  unable 
officer,  attributed  the  withdrawal  to  the  rolling  of  the  to  keep  up  the  fire  with  but  two  guns,  a  proposition 
sea.  He  speaks,  however,  of  the  excellence  of  the  Con-  was  made  to  General  Parke  for  the  surrender  of  Fort 
federate  aim.—  EDITORS.]  The  attack  from  land  was  kept  Macon." 


EARLY  COAST  OPERATIONS   IN  NORTH  CAROLINA.  635 

anxious  to  protect  the  "pasteboard"  vessels  composing  his  fleet.  We  decided 
it  would  be  feasible  to  land  a  considerable  force  at  Elizabeth  City,  make  a 
forced  march  to  the  south  end  of  the  Dismal  Swamp  Canal,  and  destroy  the 
lock  that  connected  it  with  the  river.  In  an  interview  with  General  Burn- 
side  the  plan  was  submitted  and  approved ;  he  agreed  to  detail  a  necessary 
additional  force  from  Xew  Berne  to  take  part  in  the  movement,  and  I  was 
ordered  to  have  my  entire  command  ready  for  April  14th.  On  the  17th  I 
received  a  personal  letter  from  him,  saying  he  had  detailed  the  21st  Massachu 
setts  and  the  51st  Pennsylvania,  and  ordering  me  to  embark  immediately  with 
at  least  eighteen  hundred  men,  and  closed  by  saying  he  would  be  up  at  once 
or  send  orders.  The  morning  of  the  18th  I  was  greatly  surprised  to  receive  a 
call  from  General  Reno,  who  stated  that  he  had  with  him  two  regiments  and 
was  in  command  of  the  expedition. 

The  transports  were  soon  under  way,  and  reached  the  point  of  debarkation 
at  about  1  o'clock  the  next  morning.  My  brigade,  consisting  of  the  9th  New 
York,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Kimball ;  the  89th  Xew  York,  Colonel  H.  S.  Fair- 
child  ;  and  the  6th  Xew  Hampshire,  Colonel  S.  G.  Griffin,  was  landed  and  on 
the  march  by  3  o'clock.  A  light  mulatto  man  for  a  guide  came  to  me  from 
one  of  the  gun-boats  and  by  a  circuitous  route  took  us  far  out  of  the  way, 
so  that  we  marched  30  miles  to  get  at  the  rebel  position,  instead  of  16  by 
the  direct  road.  J  This  detour  led  to  the  meeting  of  the  Union  commands 
where  two  roads  joined,  about  three  or  four  miles  from  the  enemy's  position. 
It  was  decided  that  General  Reno  should  take  the  advance,  and  that  I  should 
follow  as  rapidly  as  the  fatigued  condition  of  my  men  would  permit. 

Soon  after  1  o'clock  the  rebels  were  discovered  with  a  small  detachment  of 
cavalry  thrown  to  the  front,  their  infantry  and  artillery  in  a  concealed  line 
along  the  edge  of  a  wood,  facing  an  open  field.  The  action  was  commenced 
by  rapid  shell-firing  from  the  enemy's  guns,  which  was  vigorously  answered 
by  the  four  rifled  pieces  (two  belonging  to  Company  K,  9th  Xew  York),  com 
manded  by  Colonel  "William  A.  Howard,  of  the  Marine  Artillery.  The  21st 
Massachusetts  and  the  51st  Pennsylvania,  coming  in  range,  were  deflected  out 
of  a  road,  through  a  field,  to  a  wood  on  the  right.  My  command  soon  arrived, 
when  the  6th  Xew  Hampshire  was  ordered  to  the  left,  and  the  two  other  regi 
ments  followed  those  on  the  right.  The  action  had  continued  for  about  an 
hour  (chiefly  artillery),  when  I  concluded  to  make  an  observation  in  an  open 
corn-field,  directly  in  front  of  the  rebel  center.  I  proceeded  to  a  fence  within 
a  hundred  yards  of  the  edge  of  the  clearing,  heard  no  firing  of  infantry, 
concluded  the  rebels  had  been  silently  outflanked  on  their  left  by  the  21st 
Massachusetts  and  the  51st  Pennsylvania,  and  thought  my  regiment  might 
get  across  the  corn-field  and  capture  the  battery  which  still  continued  the 
action. 

I  returned,  and  described  what  I  proposed  to  do,  and  asked  the  men  if 
they  thought  they  were  equal  to  the  undertaking.  Although  greatly  fatigued, 

I  When  it  was  discovered  that  the  guide  had  and  shot.  A  few  days  after,  we  heard  that  he  had 
led  my  brigade  ten  miles  out  of  the  way,  he  was  been  sent  to  us  by  the  enemy  for  the  purpose  of 
quietly  taken  to  a  wood  out  of  sight  of  the  troops  leading  our  troops  astray.— R.  C.  H. 


EARLY  COAST  OPERATIONS  IN  NORTH  CAROLINA. 


INTRENCHMENT 

RICHARDSONS* 

MILLS 


MAP    OF   THE    ENGAGEMENT    AT    SOUTH    MILLS,  N.   C.,  BASED    ON    THE 
MAP    ACCOMPANYING    GENERAL    HUGEK'S    REPORT. 

ley,  which  caused  their  artillery  to  retreat,  and  so 
Mills,  or  Camden,^  as  it  is  now  known. 


they  answered,  "We  will 
try."  Arriving  at  the 
fence,  the  regiment  was 
formed  in  line  of  battle, 
and  commenced  to  move 
over  the  field.  When 
within  fifty  yards  of  the 
edge  of  the  clearing,  the 
right  companies  received 
the  concentrated  fire  of 
the  whole  of  the  enemy's 
infantry  and  artillery, 
and  in  less  than  two  min 
utes  lost  9  killed  and  58 
wounded.  I  immediately 
ordered  a  deflection  to 
the  right,  when  suddenly 
the  rebels  ceased  firing, 
and  fell  back  to  avoid 
being  outflanked  by  our 
force  that  entered  the 
wood  on  their  left.  The 
6th  New  Hampshire 
gave  them  a  parting  vol- 
ended  the  battle  of  South 


&  In  his  report  of  the  fight  fit  South  Mills  General 
Huger  thus  describes  the  Confederate  position : 

"  On  the  19th,  the  enemy  approaching.  .  .  Col 
onel  Wright  moved  forward  with  his  throe  companies, 
and  at  9:  30  o'clock  was  met  hy  Colonel  McComas  with 
his  battery  (1  rifled  piece  and  3  bronze  6-pounders). 
After  advancing  3  miles  from  South  Mills  the  road 
emerged  from  the  woods,  and  the  field  on  the  right  and 
the  left  extended  160  to  180  yards  to  thick  woods  and 
swamp.  On  the  edge  of  the  woods,  on  both  sides  of  the 
road  and  perpendicular  to  it,  was  a  small  ditch,  the 
earth  from  which  was  thrown  up  on  the  south  side  in  a 
ridge,  upon  which  was  a  heavy  rail  fence.  From  this 
point  the  road  led  through  a  narrow  lane  for  one  mile  with 
cleared  land  on  both  sides  of  it.  Here  he  determined  to 
make  his  stand.  About  three  hundred  yards  from  the 
woods  ran  a  deep  wide  ditch  parallel  with  the  one  first 
mentioned  and  extending  to  the  woods  on  either  side  of 
the  road,  and  a  short  distance  beyond  it  were  dwellings 
and  outhouses  which  would  give  cover  for  the  enemy. 
Colonel  Wright  therefore  ordered  them  burned.  The 
large  ditch  in  his  front  he  filled  with  fence  rails  and  set 
them  on  fire,  his  object  being  to  have  this  ditch  so  hot 
by  the  time  the  enemy  came  up  they  could  not  occupy 
it.  (This  ditch  is  marked  on  sketch  as '  Boasted  Ditch.') 
Two  pieces  of  artillery  (the  road  was  too  narrow  for 
more)  were  placed  in  the  road  just  where  it  emerged 
from  the  woods,  which  commanded  the  road  —  the  range 
of  the  guns.  He  also  threw  down  the  fences  for  three 
hundred  yards  on  each  side  of  the  road  for  three 
hundred  yards  in  front  of  the  guns,  and  tossed  the  rails 
into  the  road  to  destroy  the  effect  of  the  enemy's  ricochet 
firing,  and  to  deprive  him  of  the  cover  of  the  fences.  The 


fences  on  the  sides  of  the  woods  were  taken  down  and 
laid  in  heaps  on  the  embankment  in  front  of  his  men. 
The  smoke  from  the  burning  buildings  and 
fences  rolled  toward  the  enemy,  thus  masking  the  posi 
tion.  .  .  ." 

General  Huger  speaks  of  four  repulses  of  the  Union 
troops  between  12  and  3:35  P.  M.,  and  continues  : 

"  They  soon  advanced  again,  two  regiments  skirting 
the  woods  on  our  left,  and  approached  near  enough  to 
engage  the  skirmishers.  One  company  from  the  right 
was  moved  over,  and  Colonel  Reid  ordered  to  send  one 
company  from  the  reserve.  The  enemy  deployed  in  the 
open  field  and  bore  down  rapidly,  but  the  heavy  fire  of 
musketry  caused  them  to  waver,  and  they  fell  back  to 
the  fence.  Three  regiments  and  a  field-piece  were  in  the 
center  and  the  9th  New  York  regiment  on  the  right. 
The  fire  was  now  brisk  from  one  end  of  the  line  to  the 
other,  and  the  enemy  were  held  in  check,  when  just  at 
this  moment  Captain  McComas  was  killed  by  a  minio- 
ball,  and  his  men,  who  for  four  hours  had  fought  with 
most  indomitable  courage,  became  panic-stricken  :md 
left  the  field,  taking  their  pieces  with  them.  Colonel 
Wright  succeeded  in  rnllying  them  and  getting  two  pieces 
and  a  few  men  in  position,  and  the  enemy  had  advanced 
so  close  that  canister  was  fired  on  them  with  effect,  and 
they  again  fell  back.  The  ammunition  in  the  limber- 
boxes  was  exhausted,  and  during  the  temporary  absence 
of  Colonel  Wright  the  artillery  left  the  field.  The  enemy 
made  a  charge  upon  our  line,  but  the  steady  fire  at  close 
distance  .  .  .  caused  them  to  break  in  confusion,  and 
they  fell  back." 

The  Confederate  forces  were  the  3d  Georgia, 


EARLY  COAST  OPERATIONS  IN  NORTH  CAROLINA.  657 

I  was  helped  off  the  field  to  a  negro  cabin,  and  heard  nothing  from  General 
Eeno  until  about  9  o'clock,  when  he  came  to  me  with  the  information  that  he 
had  learned  that  reinforcements  were  coming  from  Norfolk;  and  we  agreed, 
under  the  circumstances,  that  it  would  be  better  to  return  to  the  gun-boats. 
The  command  moved  at  once  through  the  mud  and  rain,  reached  the  point 
of  debarkation  about  4  o'clock  the  next  morning,  and  returned  to  Roanoke  Isl 
and.  My  brigade  had  marched  about  46  miles  in  a  little  less  than  26  hours, 
besides  taking  part  in  a  severe  action.  Our  entire  loss  was  14  killed  and 
100  wounded  and  missing.  Among  the  former  was  Lieutenant  Charles  A. 
Gadsden,  adjutant  of  the  9th  New  York,  an  Americanized  Englishman,  who 
had  been  with  his  command  less  than  a  week.  He  fell  most  gallantly  at  the 
head  of  the  first  company  that  came  under  fire,  where  he  had  no  right  to  be. 

Chaplain  Thomas  W.  Conway,  of  the  9th  New  York,  who  with  Surgeon 
George  H.  Humphreys  remained  behind  with  the  wounded,  discovered  that  the 
rebel  infantry,  which  gave  us  such  a  warm  reception,  were  concealed  in  a 
broad,  deep  drain  which  conformed  to  the  edge  of  the  wood,  and  was  parallel 
to  my  line  of  attack.  The  lock  the  expedition  was  sent  to  destroy  remains 
to  this  day  intact,  and  no  iron-clad  has  ever  passed  through  it,  and  for  the 
best  of  all  reasons,  that  none  was  ever  built  for  that  purpose. 

May  7th,  Captain  O.  W.  Parisen,  with  Company  C,  9th  Xew  York,  embarked 
on  the  gun-boat  Shaicsheen,  proceeded  to  Catharine's  Creek,  which  empties 
into  Chowan  River,  landed  his  command  with  a  part  of  the  gun-boat's  crew, 
marched  about  two  miles  back  from  the  creek  and  destroyed  a  large  store 
house  filled  with  $50,000  worth  of  commissary  supplies  for  the  rebel  army. 
While  returning  to  the  gun-boat,  Captain  Parisen  repelled  an  attack  of  rebel 
cavalry,  which  after  one  volley  retreated,  with  the  commanding  officer 
mortally  wounded. 

Immediately  after  the  first  occupation  of  the  inland  waters  of  North  Caro 
lina  by  the  Union  forces,  great  inconvenience  had  been  experienced,  and  in 
several  instances  movements  had  been  retarded,  because  the  only  way  of  com 
munication  with  Washington  was  through  the  sometimes  dangerous  and  always 
unreliable  channel  of  Hatteras  Inlet.  Knowing  this,  I  had  constantly  urged 
upon  General  Burnside  the  importance  of  opening  connection  with  Norfolk 
through  the  Currituck  Sound  and  Dismal  Swamp  Canal,  and,  as  a  preliminary 
to  such  an  undertaking,  had  commenced  blowing  up  the  obstructions  placed 
by  the  enemy  in  the  Currituek  Canal.  May  28th,  I  received  pel-mission  from 
General  Burnside  to  make  an  attempt  to  get  to  Fort  Monroe  through  my 
proposed  route,  for  the  purpose  of  having  an  important  conference  with 
General  Wool.  I  embarked  Company  K  of  the  9th  New  York,  with  its 
battery  of  rifled  naval  boat-guns,  on  board  the  small  side-wheel  steamer 
Port  Royal.  All  the  canal  obstructions  not  being  removed,  I  decided  to 

some  drafted  militia  under  Colonel  Ferebee,  Me-  York  Marine  Artillery  (4  pieces) ;  and  the  losses 

Comas's  battery,  and  Gillette's  company  of  cavalry,  were  :  killed,  13  ;  wounded,  101  ;  captured,  13,— 

The  Confederate  loss  was  6  killed,  19  wounded,  total,  127.     GeneralJeWe  L.  Reno  says  in  hisre- 

and  3  prisoners.     The  Union  forces  were  the  6th  port  that  the  object  of  his  expedition  was  to  convey 

New   Hampshire,    21st   Massachusetts,    9th   and  the  idea  that  the  entire  Burnside  expedition  was 

89th  New  York,  51st  Pennsylvania,  and  1st  New  marching  upon  Norfolk.— EDITORS. 


VOL.  I.     42 


658 


EARLY  COAST  OPERATIONS  IN  NORTH  CAROLINA. 


PASSAGE    OF  UNION    BOATS  THROUGH    THE  DISMAL   SWAMP  CANAL.      (SEE   MAP,   PAGE    634.) 
FROM   A  WAR-TIME    SKETCH. 

pick  my  way  outside  in  Currituck  Sound  through  a  narrow,  crooked  chan 
nel.  The  result  can  best  be  told  by  a  dispatch  to  the  New  York  "  Tribune  " 
from  Fort  Monroe : 

"  May  30th,  1862.  This  morning  the  side-wheel  steamer  Port  Eoyal  arrived  here  from  Roanoke 
Island,  via  the  Currituck  Sound  and  Dismal  Swamp  Canal.  Colonel  Hawkins  and  a  company 
of  his  gallant  Zouaves  are  the  first  to  open  communication  between  Generals  Wood  and  Burn- 
side.  By  this  movement  we  can  dispense  with  all  seaward  transportation,  and  forward  supplies, 
etc.,  in  a  safe  and  rapid  manner  to  our  troops  in  that  vicinity." 

When  I  was  left  in  charge  of  Roanoke  Island,  Commander  Rowan  assigned 
to  the  command  of  the  naval  division  in  Albemarle  and  Croatan  sounds 
Lieutenant  Charles  W.  Flusser,  who  had  been  conspicuous  for  his  efficiency 
upon  many  occasions.  A  finer  character  than  this  officer  possessed  it  is 
impossible  to  imagine, — patriotic,  sincere,  manly,  modest,  considerate,  and 
truthful  to  an  extent  almost  beyond  description;  and  a  braver  man  never 
lived.  Early  in  June  he  took  possession  of  the  town  of  Plymouth,  situated 
a  short  distance  above  the  mouth  of  the  Roanoke  River,  and  held  it  unaided 
by  land  forces  until  June  15th,  when  Company  F  of  the  9th  New  York  was 
detailed  for  guard  and  observation  duty  at  that  post.  It  did  not  take  a  long 
time  for  us  to  ascertain  that  there  were  among  the  non-slaveholdiiig  popula 
tion  many  who  professed  sentiments  not  hostile  to  the  Union,  and  that  they 
had  expressed  a  determination  never  to  serve  in  the  ranks  of  the  rebel  army. 
Lieutenant-Commander  Flusser  constantly  urged  upon  me  the  importance 
of  enlisting  these  men  in  the  cause  of  the  United  States.  Nearly  all  of  the 
poorer  class  of  inhabitants  were  still  devoted  to  the  old  government ;  and 
many  had  successfully  resisted  rebel  conscription,  and  had  never  given  their 
allegiance  to  the  rebel  government. 

Very  few  of  them  were  slave-owners,  and  consequently  had  little  interest  in 
aiding  the  rebellion.  They  worked  in  their  fields  in  groups,  with  arms  near 
at  hand  during  the  day,  and  at  night  resorted  to  the  swamps  for  shelter 


EARLY  COAST  OPERATIONS   IN   NORTH  CAROLINA.  6  =,9 

against  conscripting  parties  of  rebel  soldiers ;  and  by  thus  constantly  being 
on  the  alert,  they  succeeded  in  rendering  unavailing  all  efforts  to  force  them 
into  the  ranks  of  the  Confederate  army.  In  several  interviews  which  I  had 
with  Commander  Flusser,  he  urged  me  in  the  strongest  manner  to  occupy 
the  town  of  Plymouth,  and  to  organize  the  Union  men  of  that  vicinity  into 
a  regiment  of  soldiers. 

I  had  several  conversations  with  General  Burnside  in  relation  to  this  matter, 
and  the  final  result  was  that  he  placed  the  affair  entirely  in  my  hands.  Accord 
ingly,  by  appointment,  Commodore  Rowan  and  I  met  some  two  hundred  and 
fifty  Union  men ;  and  a  free  interchange  of  views  in  relation  to  the  affairs  of 
the  country  took  place.  The  matter  of  great  concern  with  them  was,  "  What 
will  become  of  us  in  case  we  are  captured  by  the  rebels  ? "  We  assured  them 
that  the  Government  of  the  United  States  would  protect  them  and  their 
families  to  the  last  extreme,  and  that  any  outrage  perpetrated  upon  them  or 
upon  their  families  would  be  severely  punished.  An  enlistment-roll  was 
accordingly  made  out,  and  about  one  hundred  men  signed  their  names  at 
once.  Too  much  cannot  be  said  of  the  devotion  of  these  men  under  peculiar 
dangers  —  of  these  men  of  the  1st  North  Carolina.  | 

Things  remained  in  this  condition  until  July,  1862,  when  General  Bum- 
side,  with  the  Ninth  Corps,  of  which  my  command  was  part,  was  ordered  to 
join  the  Army  of  the  Potomac. 

4. On  the  1st  of  February,  1864,  a  large  Con-  me  that  the  parole  given  by  the  armies  laying 
federate  force,  under  the  command  of  Major-Gen-  down  their  arms  protects  them  against  punish- 
eral  G.  E.  Pickett,  made  an  advance  upon  New  ments  for  acts  lawful  for  any  other  belligerents. 
Berne,  N.  C.,  and  after  destroying  the  United  In  this  case  I  know  it  is  claimed  that  the  men  tried 
States  gun-boat  Underwriter,  burning  a  bridge  or  and  convicted  for  the  crime  of  desertion  were 
two,  and  capturing  some  prisoners,  withdrew  to  Union  men  from  North  Carolina,  who  had  found 
Kinston.  Among  the  prisoners  captured  were  refuge  within  our  lines  and  in  our  service.  The 
several  natives  of  North  Carolina,  who  had  en-  punishment  was  a  harsh  one,  but  it  was  in  time 
listed  in  our  service.  A  court-martial  was  con-  of  war,  and  when  the  enemy  no  doubt  felt  it  neces- 
vened,  composed  of  Virginians,  and  twenty-two  sary  to  retain  by  some  power  the  services  of  every 
of  these  loyal  North  Carolinians  were  convicted  of  man  within  their  reach.  General  Pickett  I  know 
and  executed  for  (constructive)  desertion.  June  personally  to  be  an  honorable  man,  but  in  this 
1st,  1865,  Pickett  applied  to  President  John-  case  his  judgment  prompted  him  to  do  what  can- 
sou  for  a  pardon.  Secretary  Stanton  and  Judge  not  well  be  sustained,  though  I  do  not  see  how 
Advocate-General  Holt  were  for  trying  him,  and  good,  either  to  friends  of  the  deceased  or  by  fixing 
his  application  hung  fire.  March  12th,  1866,  he  an  example  for  the  future,  can  bfe  secured  by  his 
wrote  to  Lieutenant-General  Grant,  stating  his  trial  now.  It  would  only  open  up  the  question 
grievances  and  again  setting  forth  his  claim  for  a  whether  or  not  the  Government  did  not  disregard 
pardon.  Upon  the  back  of  that  letter  General  its  contract  entered  into  to  secure  the  surrender 
Grant  made  this  singular  indorsement :  "During  of  an  armed  enemy."  And  the  whole  was  referred  to 
the  rebellion  belligerent  rights  were  acknowledged  the  President.  The  indorsement  of  General  Grant 
to  the  enemies  of  our  country,  and  it  is  clear  to  was  all-powerful,  and  nothing  was  done. — R.  C.  H. 


THE   BURNSIDE   EXPEDITION J 


LOOKOUT,     HATTERAS    BEACH. 
:OM    A    WAR-TIME     SKETCH. 


BY  AMBROSE   E.    BURNSIDE,   MAJOR-GENERAL,   U.   S.   A. 

OON  after  the  1st  Rhode  Island  regiment  was  mus 
tered  out  of  service,  I  was  appointed  by  President 
Lincoln  to  the  office  of  brigadier-general.  My  com 
mission  was  given  to  me  on  the  6th  of  August,  1861, 
and  I  was  ordered  to  report  to  General  McClellan, 
who  placed  me  in  charge  of  the  division  and  bri 
gades  which  were  formed  of  the  new  troops  as  they 
arrived  in  Washington.  My  duty  was  to  look  after 
the  drill  and  discipline  of  these  brigades,  with  a  view 
to  giving  the  men  the  efficiency  necessary  for  assign 
ment  to  the  older  divisions  of  the  army,  which  were 
then  organizing  in  Washington  under  the  name  of 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  The  duty  was  interesting  in  some  respects, 
but  was  in  the  main  somewhat  tame,  so  that  I  very  naturally  desired  more 
active  duty. 

One  evening  in  the  following  October,  General  McClellan  and  I  were  chat 
ting  together  over  the  affairs  of  the  war,  when  I  mentioned  to  him  a  plan  for 
the  formation  of  a  coast  division  to  which  I  had  given  some  thought.  After 
giving  him  a  somewhat  detailed  account  of  the  plan, 
he  asked  me  to  put  it  in  writing  as  soon  as  possible, 
which  was  done.  The  next  day  it  was  presented 
to  him,  and  it  met  his  approval.  He  laid  it  before 
the  Secretary  of  War,  by  whom  it  was  also  ap 
proved.  The  general  details  of  the  plan  were  briefly 
as  follows:  To  organize  a  division  of  from  12,000 
to  15,000  men,  mainly  from  States  bordering  on  the 
Northern  sea-coast,  many  of  whom  would  be  famil 
iar  with  the  coasting  trade,  and  among  whom  would 
be  found  a  goodly  number  of  mechanics ;  and  to  fit 
out  a  fleet  of  light-draught  steamers,  sailing  vessels, 
and  barges,  large  enough  to  transport  the  division, 
its  armament  and  supplies,  so  that  it  could  be  rap 
idly  thrown  from  point  to  point  on  the  coast  with 
a  view  to  establishing  lodgments  on  the  Southern 
coast,  landing  troops,  and  penetrating  into  the 
interior,  thereby  threatening  the  lines  of  trans 
portation  in  the  rear  of  the  main  army  then 

J  This  paper  was  read  by  General  Burnside  before  the  Soldiers'  and 
Sailors'  Historical  Society  of  Ehode  Island,  July  7th,  1880,  and  is 
included  here  by  permission  of  the  Society,  the  text  being  somewhat 
abridged  to  conform  to  the  plan  of  this  work. — EDITORS. 


SERVED  AT  THE  BATTLE  OF 
BULL  RUN.   (SEE  ABOVE.) 


GCO 


THE  BURNS/DE  EXPEDITION.  66 1 

concentrating  in  Virginia,  and  holding  possession  of  the  inland  waters  on  the 
Atlantic  coast. 

After  the  approval  of  the  plan,  I  was  ordered  to  Xew  York  to  fit  out  the 
fleet ;  and  on  the  23d  of  October  orders  were  issued  establishing  my  head 
quarters  for  the  concentration  of  the  troops  of  the  division  at  Annapolis. 
Troops  arrived  from  time  to  time  at  Annapolis,  and  all  went  well  in  the 
camp,  which  was  established  on  beautiful  grounds  just  outside  the  town. 
The  improvement  in  drill  and  discipline  was  very  rapid,  but  affairs  did  not 
progress  so  smoothly  at  the  headquarters  in  Xew  York.  There  was  great 
difficulty  in  procuring  vessels  of  a  light  draught,  almost  everything  of  that 
sort  having  already  been  called  into  service ;  but  after  much  difficulty  I  was 
enabled  to  report  to  General  McClellan  on  the  12th  of  December  that  a  suf 
ficient  amount  of  transportation  and  armament  had  been  secured  for  the 
division.  It  was  a  motley  fleet.  Xorth  River  barges  and  propellers  had  been 
strengthened  from  deck  to  keelson  by  heavy  oak  planks,  and  water-tight 
compartments  had  been  built  in  them :  they  were  so  arranged  that  parapets 
of  sand-bags  or  bales  of  hay  could  be  built  upon  their  decks,  and  each  one 
carried  from  four  to  six  guns.  Sailing  vessels,  formerly  belonging  to  the  coast 
ing  trade,  had  been  fitted  up  in  the  same  manner.  Several  large  passenger 
steamers,  which  were  guaranteed  to  draw  less  than  eight  feet  of  water,  together 
with  tug  and  ferry  boats,  served  to  make  up  the  fleet,  which  gave  a  capacity 
to  transport  15,000  troops,  with  baggage,  camp-equipage,  rations,  etc.  Light- 
draught  sailing  vessels  were  also  added  to  the  fleet,  on  which  were  stored 
building  material  for  bridges,  rafts,  scows,  intrenching  implements,  quarter 
masters'  stores,  tools,  extra  ordnance  stores,  etc.  All  of  these  vessels  were 
ordered  to  rendezvous  at  Fort  Monroe.  Coal  and  water  vessels  were  chartered 
in  Baltimore,  and  ordered  to  rendezvous  at  the  same  place.  The  trans 
ports  were  ordered  to  Annapolis  Harbor,  at  which  point,  after  most  morti 
fying  and  vexatious  delays,  they  all  arrived  by  the  4th  of  January,  1862, 
and  on  this  day  were  promulgated  the  orders  for  embarkation,  which  were 
received  with  most  enthusiastic  cheers  from  one  end  of  the  camp  to  the  other. 

I  had  organized  the  division  into  three  brigades,  which  were  placed  in  com 
mand  of  General  J.  G.  Foster,  General  Jesse  L.  Eeno,  and  General  John  G. 
Parke,  three  of  my  most  trusted  friends.  We  had  been  cadets  together  at 
West  Point,  and  I  had  always  entertained  for  them  the  greatest  confidence  and 
esteem.  In  all  future  operations  in  the  expedition,  our  close  friendly  relations 
were  maintained,  and  I  was  never  disappointed  in  any  reliance  which  I  placed 
on  their  gallantry,  skill,  and  integrity.  I  had  been  notified  by  General  McClel 
lan  that  our  destination  would  be  Hatteras  Inlet,  with  a  view  to  operations  in 
the  inland  waters  of  ISTorth  Carolina. 

On  the  5th  of  January  the  troops  began  to  embark.  During  that  day  there 
were  some  delays,  which  resulted  from  inexperience  in  the  manoeuvring  of  the 
vessels  and  in  the  new  work  to  which  they  were  unaccustomed.  On  that 
night,  snow  to  the  depth  of  from  two  to  three  inches  fell,  which  gave  to  the 
camp  and  surrounding  country,  on  the  morning  wf  the  6th,  a  most  picturesque 
appearance.  Regiment  after  regiment  struck  their  tents  and  marched  to  the 


662 


THE  BURNSIDE  EXPEDITION. 


point  of  embarkation,  with  bands  playing,  colors  flying,  and  the  men  cheering 
and  singing  from  lightness  of  heart.  As  they  passed  through  the  quaint  old 
town  of  Annapolis,  the  lines  of  troops,  with  their  dark  uniforms  and  glitter 
ing  bayonets,  contrasted  markedly  with  the  snow-clad  fields  and  trees.  The 
men  were  not  cheered  and  encouraged  by  many  friendly  voices,  such  as  they 
had  heard  whilst  coming  from  their  homes  to  the  seat  of  war ;  but  they  were 
____  not  at  all  chilled  by  the  reception, 

and  cheerfully  marched  on  to  the 
work  before  them.  Embarkation 
had  become  more  easy  to  each  regi 
ment  than  it  was  to  the  preceding 
one,  owing  to  the  greater  facility 
with  which  the  vessels  were  handled. 
The  order  to  break  camp  had  been 
obeyed  with  joyful  alacrity,  and 
more  troops  poured  into  the  Acad 
emy  grounds  during  the  day  than 
could  be  embarked,  so  that  large 
numbers  remained  there  for  the 
night.  This  bivouac  was  one  of  the 
most  enlivening  and  beautiful  that 
I  saw  during  the  war.  There  was 
very  little  sleep,  but  great  joyous- 
ness.  Wednesday  morning  every 
regiment  was  on  board  except  the 
6th  New  Hampshire,  which  arrived 
late  on  the  night  of  the  7th,  and  was 
embarked  on  the  next  morning.  The 
scene  in  the  harbor  was  inspiring 
beyond  description.  The  vessels,  as 
they  passed  each  other  from  time  to  time,  saluted  with  their  steam- whistles, 
while  the  bands  played  and  the  troops  cheered,  the  decks  being  covered  with 
blue-coats,  some  chattering,  some  sleeping,  others  writing  their  last  letters  to 
their  loved  ones  at  home.  The  whole  fleet  seemed  to  be  under  a  mixed  influ 
ence  of  excitement  and  contentment. 

On  the  morning  of  the  9th,  each  vessel  set  sail,  under  orders  to  rendezvous 
at  Fort  Monroe,  and  there,  by  the  night  of  the  10th,  all  had  joined  the  Supply 
and  other  vessels,  making  altogether  a  fleet  of  more  than  eighty.  The  harbor 
probably  never  presented  a  finer  appearance  than  on  that  night.  All  the  ves 
sels  were  illuminated,  and  the  air  was  filled  with  the  strains  of  martial  music 
and  the  voices  of  brave  men.  Not  a  man  in  the  fleet  knew  his  destination, 
except  myself,  the  brigade  commanders,  and  two  or  three  staff-officers,  yet 
there  was  no  complaint  or  inquisitiveness,  but  all  seemed  ready  for  whatever 
duty  was  before  them. 

Sealed  orders  were  given  to  the  commanders  of  each  vessel,  to  be  opened  at 
sea.  Much  discouragement  was  expressed  by  nautical  men  and  by  men  high 


BREVET    BRIGADIER-GENERAL  RUSH    C.    HAWKINS. 
FROM  A  PHOTOGRAPH. 


THE  BURNSIDE  EXPEDITION.  663 

in  military  authority  as  to  the  success  of  the  expedition.  The  President  and 
General  McClellan  were  both  approached,  and  the  President  was  frequently 
warned  that  the  vessels  were  unfit  for  sea,  and  that  the  expedition  would  be 
a  total  failure.  Great  anxiety  was  manifested  to  know  its  destination,  but 
the  secret  had  been  well  kept  at  Washington  and  at  our  headquarters.  As 
Mr.  Lincoln  afterward  told  me,  one  public  man  was  very  importunate,  and, 
in  fact,  almost  demanded  that  the  President  should  tell  him  where  we  were 
going.  Finally,  the  President  said  to  him,  "Now,  I  will  tell  you  in  great  con 
fidence  where  they  are  going,  if  you  will  promise  not  to  speak  of  it  to  any 
one."  The  promise  was  given,  and  Mr.  Lincoln  said,  "  Well,  now,  my  friend, 
the  expedition  is  going  to  sea!"  The  inquirer  left  him  without  receiving  any 
further  information.  In  this  jocular  manner  Mr.  Lincoln  was  in  the  habit  of 
throwing  off  the  cares  of  state ;  and  it  often  occurs  to  me  that  but  for  that 
habit  he  would  have  broken  down  under  the  great  weight  of  public  responsi 
bility  which  rested  upon  him  from  the  first  day  of  the  war  to  the  termination 
of  his  noble  life.  In  my  opinion,  no  man  has  ever  lived  who  could  have 
gone  through  that  struggle  as  he  did.  At  no  period  of  his  life,  I  believe,  was 
his  heart  ever  stirred  with  a  feeling  of  enmity  or  resentment  against  any  one. 
He  was  actuated  by  the  simple  desire  and  determination  to  maintain  the 
authority  of  the  Government  at  all  hazards. 

On  the  night  of  the  llth  the  signal  for  'sailing  was  given,  and  very  soon 
the  fleet  was  under  way.  My  headquarters  were  on  board  a  large  steamer, 
the  Georf/e  Peabody ;  but,  with  two  or  three  of  my  staff-officers,  I  took  for  my 
headquarters  during  the  voyage  a  small  propeller  called  the  Picket,  in  reality 
the  smallest  vessel  in  the  fleet.  I  was  moved  to  do  this  because  of  the  great 
criticism  which  had  been  made  as  to  the  unseaworthiness  of  the  vessels  of 
the  fleet,  and  because  of  a  desire  to  show  my  faith  in  their  adaptability  to  the 
service.  Their  weaknesses  were  known  to  me,  but  they  were  the  best  that 
could  be  procured,  and  it  was  necessary  that  the  service  should  be  performed 
even  at  the  risk  of  losing  life  by  shipwreck.  The  weather  was  threatening, 
but  I  did  not  foresee  the  storm  by  which  we  were  afterward  overtaken.  At 
that  time  we  had  no  weather  signal  reports ;  but,  in  any  event,  the  sailing 
would  not  have  been  delayed,  because  the  orders  to  proceed  to  our  work  were 
imperative.  It  was,  of  course,  learned  by  all,  after  reaching  the  sea,  that  the 
destination  of  the  fleet  was  Hatteras  Inlet. 

Just  before  midnight  the  Picket  weighed  anchor,  and  we  were  soon  at  sea, 
and  it  was  not  long  before  the  little  vessel  was  called  upon  to  test  her  sea 
going  ability.  On  rounding  Cape  Hatteras  we  met  a  very  strong  breeze,  and 
the  little  vessel  got  into  the  trough  of  the  sea.  It  seemed  for  a  time  as  if  she 
would  surely  be  swamped ;  but  by  skillful  management  the  captain  brought 
her  head-to,  after  which  she  behaved  better.  We  passed  a  most  uncomfortable 
night.  Everything  on  the  deck  that  was  not  lashed  was  swept  overboard  ; 
and  the  men,  furniture,  and  crockery  below  decks  were  thrown  about  in  a 
most  promiscuous  manner.  The  breeze  died  away  toward  morning,  soon 
after  which  a  heaVy  fog  arose,  which  continued  the  greater  part  of  the  day. 
The  ocean's  swell  kept  one  in  constant  thought  that  the  little  vessel  was  in 


664 


THE  BURNSIDE  EXPEDITION. 


momentary  danger  of  going 
under.  Toward  night  the  wind 
arose,  and  within  a  short  time 
it  increased  to  a  terrible  gale, 
and  we  experienced  more  dis 
comfort  and  dread,  if  possible, 
than  on  the  preceding  night. 
At  times,  it  seemed  as  if  the 
waves,  which  appeared  to  us 
mountain  high,  would  ingulf 
us,  but  then  the  little  vessel 
would  ride  them  and  stagger 
forward  in  her  course. 

During  the  day  before  (the 
12th),  the  fog  had  hidden  the 
fleet,  but  at  about  midnight 
we  discovered  a  large  steamer 
upon  our  port  bow.  We  fired 
a  shot  astern  of  her,  which 
she  answered  by  approaching 
us.  It  was  the  Eastern  Queen; 
but  we  dared  not  go  near  her, 
for  fear  of  being  crushed.  She 
seemed  to  us  enormous,  and 
we  were  all  delighted  when 
she  answered  the  signal  to  lay 
by  us  until  daylight,  but  to 
keep  off.  In  the  morning  more  vessels  were  found  to  be  in  sight,  and  just 
before  noon  of  the  13th  we  hove  to,  off  Hatteras  Inlet.  Soon  after,  a  tug-boat 
came  out  from  the  inlet,  which,  it  will  be  remembered,  had  been  occupied  by 
General  Butler  and  Commodore  Stringham.  [See  map,  p.  634.]  The  little 
boat  undertook  to  do  the  duty  of  piloting  the  fleet  over  the  bar.  The  Picket 
led  the  way,  and  bravely  fought  the  breakers  until  she  was  safely  anchored 
inside  the  harbor.  Vessel  after  vessel  followed  us  in,  until  we  wTere  ready 
to  wish  that  the  fleet  were  not  so  large.  At  one  time  it  seemed  as  if  our 
little  boat  would  be  crushed  between  two  of  the  larger  vessels  which  had 
dragged  their  anchors  and  were  coming  down  upon  her.  Fortunately,  the 
commanders  of  the  vessels  succeeded  in  checking  them  just  as  they  came 
in  contact  with  us.  Most  of  the  fleet  arrived  inside  the  bar  during  the 
afternoon. 

The  propeller  City  of  Xew  York,  which  was  laden  with  supplies  and  ord 
nance  stores,  grounded  on  the  bar,  and  proved  a  total  loss.  Her  officers 
and  crew  clung  to  the  rigging  until  the  next  day,  when  they  were  rescued  by 
surf -boats  sent  to  their  assistance.  One  of  the  troop-vessels  also  grounded 
on  the  bar,  after  nightfall,  and  it  seemed  for  a  time  as  if  she  and  her  precious 
cargo  would  be  lost.  Some  gallant  volunteers  went  to  her  relief  with  a  tug- 


REAR-ADMIRAL    GOLDSBOROUGH.       FROM  A    PHOTOGRAPH. 


THE  BURNS1DE  EXPEDITION.  665 

boat,  which  succeeded  in  getting  her  off  the  bar  and  into  the  harbor.  The  water 
and  coal  vessels  did  not  approach  the  inlet,  but  went  to  sea  as  a  matter  of  safety. 
Such  of  the  vessels  as  were  of  too  heavy  draught  to  pass  over  the  bar  anchored 
under  the  protection  of  the  cape.  From  one  of  these  vessels,  two  officers,  Col 
onel  Joseph  W.  Allen  and  Surgeon  Frederick  A.  Weller,  of  the  9th  New  Jersey, 
started  in  a  surf -boat  to  report  to  me.  They  succeeded  in  reaching  my  headquar 
ters,  but  on  their  return  the  boat  was  swamped  by  the  breakers  on  the  bar,  and 
they  were  lost.  ^  The  crew,  who  were  more  skilled  in  such  service,  clung  to  the 
boat  and  were  rescued.  Strange  to  say,  these  were  the  only  two  of  our  force  lost 
during  the  entire  voyage  and  entrance  into  the  inlet,  notwithstanding  the 
gloomy  prognostications  touching  the  seaworthiness  of  the  vessels  of  the  fleet. 
Besides  the  propeller,  we  lost  the  ship  Pocakontas,  with  over  a  hundred  horses 
on  board.  The  gun-boat  Zouave  was  sunk  in  the  inlet  after  she  crossed  the  bar, 
and  proved  a  total  loss,  but  no  lives  were  lost.  From  the  14th  until  the  26th 
we  had  terrific  weather,  and  it  required  the  utmost  care  on  the  part  of  the 
commanders  of  the  vessels  to  prevent  a  general  disaster.  Many  of  the  vessels 
were  driven  from  their  anchors  and  grounded  on  the  swash  and  the  bar.  Many 
collisions  occurred,  which  caused  great  damage  to  the  fleet.  At  times  it 
seemed  as  if  nothing  could  prevent  general  disaster.  As  I  before  said,  the 
water  and  most  of  the  coal  vessels  were  driven  to  sea  by  the  stress  of  the 
weather,  and  the  entire  fleet  was  for  many  days  on  short  rations  of  water. 
Much  suffering  resulted  from  this,  and  at  one  time  a  flag  of  distress  was 
hoisted  011  many  of  the  vessels  in  consequence  of  the  want  of  water.  On  one 
of  these  dreary  days  I  for  a  time  gave  up  all  hope,  and  walked  to  the  bow  of 
the  vessel  that  I  might  be  alone.  Soon  after,  a  small  black  cloud  appeared  in 
the  angry  gray  sky,  just  above  the  horizon,  and  very  soon  spread  so  as  to  cover 
the  entire  canopy,  and  in  a  few  moments  a  most  copious  fall  of  rain  came  to 
our  relief.  Signals  were  given  to  spread  sails  to  catch  the  water,  and  in  a 
short  time  an  abundance  was  secured  for  the  entire  fleet.  I  was  at  once 
cheered  up,  but  was  very  much  ashamed  of  the  distrust  which  I  had  allowed 
to  get  the  mastery  of  me. 

From  time  to  time  we  made  efforts  to  cross  the  fleet  from  the  inlet  into 
Pamlico  Sound,  over  what  was  called  the  swash,  which  separated  it  from  the 
inlet.  We  had  been  led  to  believe  that  there  were  eight  feet  of  water  upon 
the  swash,  but  when  we  arrived  we  discovered  to  our  sorrow  that  there  were 
but  six  feet ;  and  as  most  of  our  vessels,  as  well  as  the  vessels  of  the  naval 

&  The  loss  of  these  officers  occasioned  profound  Deputy  Quartermaster-General,  where  his  energies 

gloom  throughout  New  Jersey,  and  especially  at  were  devoted  to  the  forwarding  of  troops.     When 

Trenton,  where  the  colonel  was  widely  known  and  asked  if  he  could  look  at  his  family  and  still  say, 

esteemed.     Colonel  Joseph  W.  Allen  was  born  in  "  Country  first,"  he  replied  :  "  In  these  times  every 

Bristol    Pa.,  in  1811.     He   had   been  for  many  man  must  say,  'Country  first,'  and  that  for  the 

years  a  citizen  of  New  Jersey,  residing  at  Bordeii-  sake  of  his  family."  An  evidence  of  the  attachment 

town.    Educated  as  a  civil  engineer,  he  had  exe-  and  respect  of  his  comrades  is  furnished  in  the 

cuted  with  signal  ability  many  important  works,  monument  erected  to  his  memory  by  the  officers 

including  numerous  railroad  enterprises.     He  had  of  his  regiment  two  years  after  his  death.     Sur- 

been  prominently  identified  with  political  affairs,  geon  Weller  was  born  at  Paterson  in  1817,  and  was 

and  for  six  years  had  represented  his  county  in  a  gentleman  of  great  intelligence  and  private  worth, 

the   State   Senate.      From  the   firing  upon   Fort  and  his  death  was  widely  mourned.— Condensed 

Surnter  he  gave  all  his  thoughts  and  his  time  to  the  from  "New  Jersey  and  the  Rebellion,"  by  John 

cause   of  the  Union,  at  first   in  the   position   of  Y.  Foster. 


666 


THE  BURNSIDE  EXPEDITION. 


fleet  which  we  found  at  Hatteras  Inlet  on  our  arrival,  drew  more  water  than 
that,  it  was  necessary  to  deepen  the  channel  by  some  process.  The  current 
upon  the  swash  was  very  swift,  a  circumstance  which  proved  to  be  much  in 
our  favor.  Large  vessels  were  sent  ahead,  under  full  steam,  on  the  bar  when 
the  tide  was  running  out,  and  then  anchors  were  carried  out  by  boats  in 
advance,  so  as  to  hold  the  vessels  in  position.  The  swift  current  would  wash 


.,__ 


• ._ 


GKNERAL    BURNSIDE'S    HEADQUARTERS,    ROAXOKE   ISLAND.     FROM  A    WAR-TIME    SKETCH. 

the  sand  from  under  them  and  allow  them  to  float,  after  which  they  were 
driven  farther  on  by  steam  and  anchored  again,  when  the  sand  would  again 
wash  out  from  under  them.  This  process  was  continued  for  days,  until  a 
broad  channel  of  over  eight  feet  was  made,  deep  enough  to  allow  the  passage 
of  the  fleet  into  the  sound.  On  the  26th,  one  of  our  largest  steamers  got 
safely  over  the  swash  and  anchored  in  the  sound,  where  some  of  the  gun-boats 
had  preceded  them.  By  the  4th  of  February  the  entire  fleet  had  anchored 
and  had  passed  into  the  sound,  and  orders  were  given  for  the  advance  on 
Eoaiioke  Island.  Detailed  instructions  were  given  for  the  landing  of  the 
troops  and  the  mode  of  attack. 

At  an  early  hour  on  the  morning  of  the  5th  the  start  was  made.  The  naval 
vessels,  under  Commodore  Goldsborough,  were  in  advance  and  on  the  flanks. 
The  sailing  vessels  containing  troops  were  taken  in  tow  by  the  steamers. 
There  were  in  all  sixty-five  vessels.  The  fleet  presented  an  imposing  appear 
ance  as  it  started  up  the  sound.  The  day  was  most  beautiful,  and  the  sail 
was  enjoyed  beyond  measure  by  the  soldiers,  who  had  long  been  so  penned 
up  in  the  desolate  inlet.  At  sundown,  signal  was  given  to  come  to  anchor 
within  ten  miles  of  Roanoke  Island.  At  8  o'clock  the  next  morning  the 
signal  to  weigh  anchor  was  given,  but  our  progress  was  very  much  retarded 
by  a  gale  that  sprung  up ;  so  we  anchored,  but  very  little  in  advance  of  our 
position  of  the  night  before.  During  that  night  all  lights  were  carefully 
concealed.  The  naval  vessels  were  well  out  in  advance  to  protect  the  trans 
ports  from  the  inroads  of  the  rebel  gun-boats. 


THE    BURNSIDE  EXPEDITION. 


667 


GENERAL    BURNSIDE    AT    THE    CONFEDERATE    COTTON    BATTERY    OS    THE    WHARF,    NEW    BERNE. 

FROM   A  WAR-TIME  SKETCH. 

On  the  morning  of  the  7th  the  gun-boats  passed  inside  the  narrow  passage 
known  as  Roanoke  Sound,  and  were  soon  abreast  of  the  lower  part  of  Roa- 
iioke  Island.  Soon  after  the  naval  fleet  had  passed  through,  the  transport 
fleet  began  its  passage.  The  rebel  gun-boats  were  seen  close  inshore  under 
the  batteries  of  the  island.  At  half -past  10  o'clock  a  signal  gun  was  fired 
from  one  of  the  forts,  announcing  our  approach.  At  half-past  11,  one  of 
the  naval  vessels  opened  fire,  which  was  replied  to  by  the  rebels.  Signals 
were  given  by  the  commodore  of  the  fleet  to  begin  the  action.  By  noon 
the  firing  became  rapid,  and  soon  after,  the  engagement  became  general.  The 
rebels  had  driven  a  line  of  piles  across  the  main  channel  to  obstruct  the 
progress  of  our  vessels,  leaving  a  narrow  space  for  themselves  to  retreat 
through ;  and  as  our  naval  vessels  pressed  them,  they  availed  themselves  of 
this  means  of  safety.  Our  guns  soon  got  the  range  of  their  batteries,  and,  by 
most  extraordinary  skill  and  rapidity  of  firing,  almost  silenced  them.  Just 
before  noon  I  ordered  a  reconnoissance  by  a  small  boat,  with  the  view  of 
ascertaining  a  point  of  landing.  A  young  negro,  who  had  escaped  from  the 
island  011  our  arrival  at  Hatteras  Inlet,  had  given  me  most  valuable  informa 
tion  as  to  the  nature  of  the  shore  of  the  island,  from  which  I  had  determined 
that  our  point  of  landing  should  be  at  Ashby's  Harbor,  which  was  nearly 
midway  up  the  shore.  [See  map,  p.  641.] 

At  1  o'clock,  the  quarters  of  the  garrison  in  one  of  the  forts  were  fired  by 
one  of  our  shells.  The  rebel  gun-boats  retired  up  the  sound,  but  still  contin 
ued  a  brisk  fire  as  they  were  followed  by  our  vessels.  Orders  were  given  for 
the  troops  to  land  at  3  o'clock.  The  ground  in  the  rear  of  Ashby's  Harbor 
was  cleared  by  shells  from  the  naval  vessels,  and  our  large  surf -boats  were 


668  THE  BURNSIDE  EXPEDITION. 

lowered,  rapidly  filled  with  troops,  and  towed  up  in  long  lines  by  light-draught 
vessels  until  they  came  near  to  the  shore  of  the  harbor,  when  each  of  the 
surf-boats  was  cut  loose  and  steered  for  the  shore.  There  was  no  obstruction 
to  their  landing.  In  less  than  an  hour  4000  troops  were  ashore,  and  before 
midnight  the  entire  force  was  landed,  with  the  exception  of  one  regiment, 
which  was  landed  on  the  morning  of  the  8th.  The  advance  of  our  troops 
was  ordered  on  this  morning,  General  Foster  being  in  the  advance  and 
center,  General  Reno  on  the  left,  and  Greneral  Parke  on  the  right.  Just  above 
Ashby's  Harbor  the  island  from  shore  to  shore  was  marshy,  swampy  ground. 
A  causeway  had  been  built  up  the  center  of  the  island,  and  on  this,  about 
one  mile  and  a  half  from  the  harbor,  was  a  fort,  which  was  flanked  by  what 
seemed  to  be  impassable  ground ;  but  it  did  not  prove  to  be  so  to  our  troops. 
General  Foster  pressed  the  rebels  in  front,  General  Reno  passed  around  the  left 
with  his  brigade,  often  waist-deep  in  the  marsh,  through  almost  impenetrable 
thickets,  until  he  gained  the  right  flank  of  the  enemy's  line.  General  Parke 
performed  equally  good  service  on  the  right,  and  after  advantageous  positions 
had  been  obtained,  the  work  was  carried  by  a  simultaneous  assault,  and 
from  that  time  there  was  no  hindrance  to  the  march  of  our  troops  to  the 
head  of  the  island  and  to  the  forts  on  the  shore,  where  the  entire  garrison 
was  captured.  The  naval  fleet  pursued  the  rebel  gun-boats,  nearly  all  of 
which,  however,  were  destroyed  by  their  crews,  to  prevent  capture.  The 
results  of  this  important  victory  were  great,  particularly  in  inspiring  the 
confidence  of  the  country  in  the  efficiency  of  its  armies  in  the  field. 

The  troops  enjoyed  their  rest  at  Roanoke  Island,  but  were  not  allowed  to 
remain  idle  long.  On  the  26th  of  February,  orders  were  given  to  make 
arrangements  to  embark  for  New  Berne,  and  within  four  days  they  were  all  on 
board.  On  the  12th  of  March,  the  entire  command  was  anchored  off  the  mouth 
of  Slocum's  Creek,  and  about  fourteen  miles  from  New  Berne.  The  approach 
to  the  city  had  been  obstructed  by  piles  and  sunken  vessels.  About  four 
miles  from  New  Berne  a  large  fort  on  the  shore  had  been  built,  with  a  heavy 
armament,  and  a  line  of  earth- works  extended  from  the  fort  inland  a  distance 
of  some  two  miles,  where  it  ended  in  almost  impassable  ground. 

On  the  night  of  the  12th,  orders  were  given  for  landing,  and  on  the  morn 
ing  of  the  13th  the  troops  were  put  ashore,  in  very  much  the  same  way  that' 
they  had  been  at  Roanoke.  By  1  o'clock  the  debarkation  was  finished,  and 
the  troops  were  put  in  line  of  march.  About  this  time  the  rain  began  to  fall, 
and  the  road  became  almost  impassable.  No  ammunition  could  be  carried 
except  what  the  men  themselves  could  carry.  No  artillery  could  be  taken 
except  the  small  howitzers,  which  were  hauled  by  the  troops  with  drag-ropes. 
This  was  one  of  the  most  disagreeable  and  difficult  marches  that  I  witnessed 
during  the  war.  We  came  in  contact  with  the  enemy's  pickets  just  before 
dark,  when  it  was  decided  to  delay  the  attack  until  morning.  That  night  a 
most  dreary  bivouac  followed.  Early  the  next  morning,  notwithstanding  the 
fog,  the  disposition  for  the  attack  was  made.  General  Foster  was  ordered  to 
engage  the  enemy  on  the  right,  General  Reno  to  pass  around  on  the  extreme 
left,  and  General  Parke  to  occupy  the  center.  We  were  much  nearer  to  the 


THE  BURNSIDE  EXPEDITION. 


669 


enemy  than  we  expected,  and  were  soon  in  contact  with  them.  General  Fos 
ter  rapidly  closed  with  them,  and  met  with  severe  resistance.  He  asked  for 
reinforcements,  but  was  told  that  every  man  had  been  ordered  into  action, 
and  that  there  were  no  reserves.  The  contest  was  sharp,  but  brief.  The  4th 
Rhode  Island  broke  the  enemy's  line,  near  where  it  crossed  the  railroad,  after 

which  the  enemy  wavered,  and  a  general 
advance  of  our  whole  line  placed  us  in 
possession  of  the  works.  The  enemy 
fled  to  New  Berne,  burning  the  bridge 
behind  them.  Our  troops  rapidly  pur 
sued,  but  the  fact  that  they  had  to  cross 
the  river  in  boats  prevented  them  from 
capturing  the  main  body  of  the  enemy. 
As  it  was,  large  numbers  of  prisoners 
and  munitions  fell  into  our  hands.  In 
the  meantime  the  naval  vessels  had 
worked  their  way  up  to  the  city  and 
aided  in  the  transportation  of  the  troops 
across,  and  New  Berne  was  occupied  on 
the  afternoon  of  the  14th. 

It  still  remained  for  us  to  reduce  Fort 
Macon,  Beaufort.  To  this  work  General 
Parke's  brigade  was  ordered.  The  coun 
try  between  New  Berne  and  Beaufort 
was  immediately  occupied,  and  a  pas 
sage  by  hand-car  was  made  between  the 
two  places,  all  the  rolling-stock  having 
been  run  off  the  road.  By  the  morning 
of  the  llth  of  April  regular  siege  operations  had  been  begun  by  General 
Parke  and  were  pressed  rapidly  forward,  and  by  the  26th  of  April  the  garri 
son  at  Beaufort  had  been  forced  to  surrender. 

Thus  another  victory  was  to  be  inscribed  upon  our  banner.  The  Ehode 
Island  troops  bore  a  most  honorable  part  in  this  conflict.  After  that,  sev 
eral  small  expeditions  were  sent  into  the  interior  of  the  country,  all  of  which 
were  successful. 

Much  to  my  sorrow,  on  the  3d  of  the  following  July  I  was  ordered  to  go  to 
the  Peninsula  to  consult  with  General  McClellan,  and  after  that  my  duties  as 
commanding  officer  in  North  Carolina  ended  ;  but  a  large  proportion  of  the 
troops  of  the  expedition  served  under  me  during  the  remainder  of  the  war,  as 
members  of  the  gallant  Ninth  Corps. 

The  Burnside  expedition  has  passed  into  history;  its  record  we  can  be 
proud  of.  No  body  of  troops  ever  had  more  difficulties  to  overcome  in  the 
same  space  of  time.  Its  perils  were  both  by  land  and  water.  Defeat  never 
befell  it.  No  gun  was  lost  by  it.  Its  experience  was  a  succession  of  honor 
able  victories. 


BRIGADIER-GENERAL    ROBERT    B.    VANCE,  C.   S.  A. 
FROM    A    TINTYPE. 

General  Vance's  portrait  ought  properly  to  have 
been  used  with  the  papers  on  the  battle  of  Stone's 
River,  in  which  he  commanded  a  brigade.  On 
November  17,  1861,  his  regiment,  the  29th  North 
Carolina,  was  sent  to  Tennessee ;  he  took  no  part, 
therefore,  in  the  resistance  to  Burnside  in  North 
C';i  rolina. —  EDITORS. 


THE   OPPOSING    FORCES   AT   ROANOKE    ISLAND    AND 

NEW    BERNE,  N.  C. 

The  composition,  losses,  aud  strength  of  eacli  army  as  here  stated  give  the  gist  of  all  tlie  data  obtainable  in  the  Official 
Kecords.    K  stands  for  killed  ;  w  for  wounded ;  in  w  for  mortally  wounded ;  111  for  captured  or  missing  ;  c  for  captured. 


THE   UNION   FORCES. 

ARMY.-—  Major-General  Ambrose  E.  Burn  side. 
NAVY.— Flag-Officer  L.  M.*GolrtsborougK 


TROOPS. — First  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  John  G.  Foster : 
lOtli  Conn.,  Col.  Charles  K  Russell  (k  at  Roanoke),  Lieut. - 
Col.  Albert  W.  Drake;  23d  Mass.,  Col.  John  Kurtz;  24th 
Mass.,  Col.  Thomas  G.  Stevenson ;  25th  Mass.,  Col.  Edwin 
Upton;  27th  Mass.,  Col.  Horace  C.  Lee.  Brigade  loss: 
Roaiioke,  k,  19;  w,  113  =  132.  New  Berne,  k,  37;  w,  145  = 
182.  Second  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  Jesse  L.  Reno:  21st 
Mass.,  Lieut. -Col.  Alberto  C.  Maggi  (at  Roanoke),  Lieut. - 
Col.  William  8.  Clark  (at  New  Berne);  9th  N.  J.,  Lieut.- 
Col.  Charles  A.  Heckman;  51st  N.  Y.,  Col.  Edward  Fer- 
rero;  51st  Pa.,  Col.  John  F.  Hartranft.  Brigade  loss: 
Roauoke,  k,  15 ;  w,  79 ;  in,  13  =  107.  New  Berne,  k,  30 ;  w, 
169  =  199.  Third  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  John  G.  Parke:  8th 
Conn.,  Col.  Edward  Harland;  llth  Conn,  (not  at  Roa 
noke),  Lieut.-Col.  Charles  Mathewson  ;  9th  N.  Y.  (not  at 
New  Berne),  Col.  Rush  C.  Hawkins;  4th  R.  I.,  Col.  Isaac 
P.  Rodman;  5th  R.  I.  (1st  Battalion),  Maj.  John  Wright. 
Brigade  loss  :  Roanoke,  w,  17.  New  Berne,  k,  21 ;  w,  58  = 
79.  Unassigned :  Detachment  1st  N.  Y.  Marine  Artillery, 
Col.  William  A.  Howard;  Co.  B,  99th  N.  Y.  (Union  Coast 
Guard),  Lieut.  Charles  W.  Tillotson  (c  at  New  Berne). 
Unassigned  loss:  Roanoke  Island,  k,  2;  w,  5  =  7. 
New  Berne,  k,  2;  w,  8;  in,  1  =11. 
DIVISION  OF  ARMED  VESSELS,  Capt.  8.  F.  Hazard : 

Picket,  Capt.  T.  P.  Ives;  Videlle,  Capt,  John  L.  Foster ; 
Hussar,  Capt.  Frederick  Crocker  ;  Lancer,  Capt.  M. 
B.  Morley  ;  Ranger,  Capt.  Samuel  Emerson  ;  Chasseur, 
Capt.  John  \Vest  ;  Pioneer,  Capt.  Charles  E.  Baker. 
[Only  the  Picket  appears  to  have  been  used  offensively 
in  the  attack  on  New  Berne.] 
NAVAL  DIVISION,  Commander S.  C.  Rowan: 

Philadelphia  (flag-steamer).  Acting  Master  Com.  Silas 
Reynolds;  Stars  and  Stripes,  Lieut.-Com.  Reed  Werdeii ; 
Louisiana,  Lieut.-Com.  A.  Murray ;  Hetzel,  Lieut.-Com. 
H.  K.  Davenport  ;  Underwriter,  Lieut.-Com.  William  N. 
Jeffers  (at  Roanoke),  Lieut.-Com.  A.  Hopkins  (at  New 
Berne) ;  Delaware,  Lieut.-Com.  S.  P.  Quackenlmsh ;  Com 
modore  Perry,  Lieut. -Com.  C.  W.  Flusser;  Valley  City, 
Lieut.-Com.  J.  C.  Chaplin;  Commodore  Barneij,  Acting 


Lieut.-Com.  R.  T.  Renshaw  ;  Hunchback,  Acting  Vol. 
Lieut  .-Com.  E.  R.  Colhouu  ;  Southficld  (nag-steamer  tem 
porarily  at  Roanoke),  Acting  Vol.  Lieut.  Com.  C.  F.  W. 
Behni;  Morse,  Acting  Master  Com.  Peter  Hayes  ;  White- 
head  (at  Roauoke),  Acting  Master  Com.  Charles  A. 
French ;  Lockwood,  Acting  Master  Com.  G.  W.  Graves ; 
Brinker,  Acting  Master  Com.  John  E.  Giddiugs;  Sey 
mour  (at  Roanoke),  Acting  Master  Com.  F.  S.  Wells; 
Ceres  (at  Roanoke),  Acting  Master  Com.  John  McDiar- 
mid ;  Putnam  (at  Roanoke),  Acting  Master  Com.  W.  J. 
Hotehkiss ;  Shawsheen  (at  Roauoke),  Acting  Master 
Com.  Thomas  J.  Woodward  ;  Granite  (at  Roauoke),  Act 
ing  Master's  Mate  Com.  E.  Boomer. 

The  batteries  of  the  Union  vessels  at  Roanoke  Island 
and  New  Berne  were  as  follows:  Philadelphia,  2  twelve- 
pounders  ;  Stars  and  Stripes,  4  eight-inch,  1  twenty- 
pounder  rifle,  2  twelve-pounders;  Louisiana,  1  eight- 
inch,  3  thirty-two-pounders,  1  twelve-pounder  ;  Jletsel, 
1  nine-inch,  1  eighty-pounder  rifle ;  Underwriter,  1 
eight-inch,  1  eighty-pounder  rifle,  2  twelve-pounders ; 
Delaware,  1  nine-inch,  1  thirty-two  pounder,  1  twelve- 
pounder;  Commodore  Perry,  1  oue-huiidred-pounder 
rifle,  4  nine-inch,  1  twelve-pounder ;  Valley  City,  4  thirty- 
two-pounders,  1  twelve-pounder  ;  Commodore  Barney 
4  nine-inch,  1  thirty-two-pouiider,  1  twelve-pounder 
Hunchback,  3  nine-inch,  1  one-hundred-pounder  rifle 
Soulhfield,  3  nine-inch,  1  one-hundred-pounder  rifle 
Morse,  2  nine-inch  ;  Wfiitehcad,  1  nine-inch  ;  Lockwood, 
1  eighty-pounder  rifle,  2  twelve-pounders;  Henry 
Brinker,  1  thirty-pounder  rifle;  Seymour,  1  thirty- 
pounder  rifle,  1  twelve-pounder ;  Ceres,  I  thirty-pounder 
rifle,  1  thirty -two-pounder ;  Putnam,  1  twenty-pounder 
rifle,  1  thirty-two-pounder ;  Sliawshcen,  2  twenty-pounder 
rifles;  Granite,  1  thirty-two-pounder. 

The  total  Union  loss  at  Roanoke  Island  was  37  killed, 
214  wounded,  and  13  missing  =  264 ;  and  at  New  Berne  90 
killed,  380  wounded,  and  1  missing  =  471.  At  the  former 
place  the  navy  lost  (exclusive  of  details  from  the  army)  3 
killed  aud  11  wounded,  and  at  the  latter  place  4  wounded. 


THE   CONFEDERATE   FORCES. 


ROANOKE  ISLAND,  Brig.-Gen.  HiyirvA._JVjse,  Col.  H. 
M.  Shaw  (c),  second  in  cominantT 

Troops:  2d  N.  C.  Battalion,  Lieut.-Col.  Wharton  J. 
Green;  8th  N.  C.,  Col.  H.  M.  Shaw;  17th  N.  C.  (3  co's), 
Maj.  G.  H.  Hill;  31st  N.  C.,  Col.  John  V.  Jordan;  46th 
Va.,  Maj.  H.  W.  Fry;  59th  Va.,  Lieut.-Col.  Frank  P. 
Anderson. 
NAVAL  FORCES,  Flag-Officer  William  F.  Lynch : 

Sea-Bird  (flag-steamer),  Lieut.-Com.  Patrick  McCar- 
rick;  Otirlew,  Com.  Thomas  T.  Hunter;  Ellis,  Lieut.- 
Com.  J.  W.  Cooke;  Beaufort,  Lieut.-Com.  W.  H.  Parker; 
Raleigh,  Lieut.-Com.  J.  W.  Alexander;  Fanny,  Mid 
shipman  Tayloe  ;  Forrest,  Lieut.-Com.  James  L.  Hoole 
(w).  The  Sea-Bird  was  armed  with  1  thirty-two-pounder 
smooth-bore  and  1  thirty-pounder  rifle.  The  other  vessels 
carried  each  1  thirty-two-pounder  rifle. 

The  total  loss  of  the  Confederate  army  is  reported  at 


23  killed,  58  wounded,  62  missing,  and  about  2500  cap 
tured.    The  loss  of  the  navy  was  6  wounded. 
NEW  BEKNE,  Brig.-Gen.  L.  O'B.  Branch. 

Troops :  7th  N.  C.,  Col.  R  P.  Campbell  (commanded 
the  right  wing),  Lieut.-Col.  E.  G.  Haywood ;  19th  N.  C. 
(cavalry),  Col.  S.  B.  Spruill;  26th  N.  C.,  Col.  Zebulon  B. 
Vance;  27th  N.  C.,  Maj.  John  A.  Gilrner,  Jr.  ;  28th  N.  C., 
Lieut.-Col.  Thomas  L.  Lowe;  33d  N.  C.,  Col.  Clark  M. 
Avery  (c),  Lieut.-Col.  R.  F.  Hoke ;  35th  N.  C.,  Col.  James 
Sinclair;  37th  N.  C.,  Col.  Charles  C.  Let*  (commanded  the 
left  wing),  Lieut.-Col.  William  M.  Barbour ;  Company  N. 
C.  Heavy  Artillery,  Captain  C.  C.  Whitehurst;  Special 
Battalion  N.  C.  Militia,  Col.  H.  J.  B.  Clark;  N.  C. 
Batteries,  Capts.  T.  H.  Brem  and  A.  C.  Latham. 

The  total  Confederate  loss  was  64  killed,  101  wounded, 
413  captured  or  missing  =578.  Branch  says  of  the  missing, 
"  About  200  are  prisoners  aud  the  remainder  at  home." 


There  is  no  definite  statement  in  the  Official  Records  of  the  numbers  engaged  on  either  side,  and  the  returns 
furnish  no  satisfactory  basis  for  an  estimate. 


670 


POPE'S  HOUSE     OLD     HEADOUARTERS. 


POST-OFFICE,     HILTON     HEAD. 
3M    A    WAR-TIME    SKETCH. 


DU  PONT  AND  THE  PORT  ROYAL  EXPEDITIONS 

BY    DANIEL    AMMEN,    REAR-ADMIRAL,  U.  S.  X. 

FTER  the  inauguration  of  Mr.  Lincoln  as  Presi- 
dent  of  the  United  States,  in  March,  1861,  a 
painful  lethargy  seemed  to  pervade  every  branch  of 
the  Administration,  while  the  South  was  arming  and 
organizing  with  extraordinary  activity  for  the  avowed 
purpose  of  destroying  the  Government,  which  appar 
ently  supinely  awaited  that  event.  The  attack  on 
Fort  Sumter  broke  the  spell,  after  which  an  almost  frantic  energy  mani 
fested  itself  at  the  Xorth  in  raising  troops  and  in  the  purchase  and  arma 
ment  of  vessels  to  blockade  the  thousands  of  miles  of  Southern  coasts, 
Naturally,  the  Navy  Department  sought  the  advice  of  Professor  Alexander 
D.  Bache,  Superintendent  of  the  Coast  Survey,  and  it  was  at  his  suggestion 
that  the  department  secured  a  board  of  conference  composed  of  Captain  S.  F. 
Du  Pont,  of  the  Navy,  as  President,  and  Major  J.  Gr.  Barnard,  U.  S.  Engi 
neers,  Professor  Bache,and  Commander  Charles  H.  Davis,  U.  S.  Navy,  as 
members. 

In  a  private  letter  Captain  Du  Pont  wrote,  on  the  1st  of  June :  "  It  may  be 
that  I  shall  be  ordered  to  Washington  on  some  temporary  duty,  on  a  board 
to  arrange  a  programme  of  blockade — first  suggested  by  Professor  Bache." 
The  first  memoir  of  the  conference  in  the  confidential  letter-book  of  the  Navy 
Department  is  written  in  pencil,  has  many  erasures  and  interlineations,  and 
is  evidently  the  original  draft  of  a  paper,  probably  referred  and  never 
returned.  It  closes  as  follows : 

"  Finally,  we  will  repeat  the  remark  made  in  the  beginning  of  this  report,  that  we  think  the 
expedition  to  Fernandina  should  be  undertaken  simultaneously  with  a  similar  expedition  having 
a  purely  military  character.  "We  are  preparing  a  brief  report  on  the  latter,  which  we  shall  have 
the  honor  to  submit  in  a  few  da  vs." 


^  Recently,  the  private  correspondence  of  Ad 
miral  Du  Pont  has  been  kindly  put  within  the 
scope  of  my  researches,  and  his  very  clear  and 
precise  reports  of  the  Port  Royal  expedition  have 
been  carefully  examined,  together  with  the  reports 
of  officers  commanding  vessels,  the  log-books  of 


most  of  the  ships  engaged,  and  other  documentary 
evidence.  No  labor  has  been  spared  in  verifying 
the  events  narrated,  notwithstanding  that  my 
presence  throughout  our  operations,  in  command  of 
the  gun-boat  Seneca,  gave  me  an  intelligent  per 
sonal  view  of  the  whole  subject. —  D.  A. 


671 


672 


DU  PONT  AND   THE  PORT  ROYAL  EXPEDITION. 


A  carefully  prepared  memoir,  evidently  the  third,  dated  July  16th,  discusses 
the  question  of  blockade  of  the  coast  from  Cape  Henry  to  Cape  Romain  in 
one  section,  and  from  thence  to  Cape  Florida  in  another  section.  These  were 
afterward  the  limits  of  the  North  and  South  Atlantic  blockading  squadrons. 
A  fourth  report,  dated  July  26th,  in  treating  of  the  methods  to  be  employed 
in  carrying  out  the  blockade,  states : 

"  Our  second  memoir,  in  which  we  discussed  the  occupation  of  Bull's  Bay,  St.  Helena  Sound, 
and  Port  Royal  Bay,  has  left  us  little  to  say  on  the  first  of  those  subsections.  When  the  three 
anchorages  above  mentioned  are  secured,  the  whole  of  this  part  of  our  coast  will  be  under  com 
plete  control.  But  you  are  better  aware 
than  ourselves  of  the  favorable  manner  in 
which  our  foreign  political  relations  would 
be  affected  by  the  possession  of  one  or  more 
of  the  three  points,  the  seizure  of  which  was 
the  topic  of  the  second  memoir.  3)  A  pre 
ceding  discussion  would  be  incomplete,  if  we 
were  not  to  repeat  at  the  conclusion  that  an 
inland  passage  from  Savannah  to  Fernan- 
dina,  long  used  by  steamboats  drawing  five 
feet  of  water,  unites  in  one  common  interest 
and  intercourse  all  the  bays,  sounds,  rivers, 
and  inlets  of  which  we  have  given  little  more 
than  the  names.  A  superior  naval  force 
must  command  the  whole  of  this  division  of 
the  coast." 

On  July  25th,  Captain  Du  Pont 
wrote  : 

u  They  have  our  memoirs,  and,  Mr.  Fox 
tells  me,  are  at  them.  We  are  to  see  the 
Secretary,  Mr.  Welles,  to-night,  at  our  re 
quest,  to  talk  over  our  labors."  .  .  .  [July 
26th.]  "  Last  night  our  conference  had  a 
meeting  with  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  and 
Mr.  Fox,  when  the  subject  of  the  expeditions 
was  entered  into.  The  Cabinet  had  our  papers  again."  [July  28th.]  "  I  sat  up  last  night  in  the 
Navy  Department  until  eleven,  with  Charles  Davis,  to  prepare  for  this  meeting,  by  condensing 
into  notes  the  pith  of  our  reports,  and  to  read  them  to  the  board  when  called  upon  ;  but  General 
Meigs  seemed  to  desire  that  our  full  reports  should  be  read,  which  I  could  not,  of  course, 
ask  to  be  done,  without  seeming  to  attach  too  much  importance  to  them.  General  Scott  said 
at  the  conclusion,  they  were  of  singular  ability,  and  he  adopted  every  word  of  them ;  and 
General  Totten  told  me  there  was  not  a  criticism  made.  The  meeting  consisted  of  General 
Scott,  General  Totten,  General  Meigs,  Colonel  T.  W.  Sherman,  Captain  H.  G.  Wright,  of  the 
Engineers,  and  Colonel  Cullum,  aide-de-camp  to  the  general." 

Memoirs  dated  August  9th,  September  2d  and  3d,  follow,  giving  a  discus 
sion  of  the  blockade  on  the  west  coast  of  Florida,  and  to  the  border  of  Mexico. 

A  memoir  dated  September  12th  discusses  a  proposition  submitted  from  the 
department  in  relation  to  the  taking  of  Fort  Macon,  which  closes  as  follows : 

"  We  beg  leave  to  observe  that  here,  and  in  all  our  previous  reports  and  memoirs,  we  have 
confined  ourselves  to  the  treatment  of  cases,  more  or  less  special  or  general,  connected  with,  and 

&  As  it  referred  to  a  purely  military  expedition,  this  memoir  was  probably  referred  to  the  War 
Department,  since  it  is  not  in  the  confidential  files  of  the  Navy  Department.—  D.  A. 


BREVET    MAJOR-GENERAL    THOMAS   W.    SHERMAN 
FKOM   A  PHOTOGRAPH. 


DU  PONT  AND    THE  PORT  ROYAL  EXPEDITION. 


673 


V      < 


tending  to  promote,   the  efficiency  and  activity  of  the  blockade  of  the 
Southern  shores.     We  have  not  entered  upon  the  exclusive  considera 
tion  of  the  great  military  expeditions  alone  5  we  have  treated  mixed 
expeditions  compounded  of  military  and  naval  operations,  and  re 
quiring  combined  naval  and  military  action." 

In  the  above  extracts  we  can  note  the  inception 
of  the  Port  Royal  expedition,  so  ably  executed  and 
so  important  in  its  results,  as  well  as  the  crea 
tion  of  a  systematic  plan  of  blockade,  practi 
cally  extending  from  Cape  Hatteras  to  the 
Rio  Grande.    It  seems  just  to  the  memory 
of  the  late  Rear- Admiral  Du  Pont  and 
his  associates  in  the  conference,  all  of 
whom  have  passed  away,  to  present 
these  important  facts  in  a  substan 
tial  and  reliable  form. 

The  early  attempts  at  blockad- 
coast  from  Hatteras  to  Florida 
the  necessity  of  the  occupa- 
many   Southern    ports    as 
blockade  from  within  a 
made  effective  by  one 
without    the   fatigue 
attendant   upon  an 
which     must     be 
the  range  of  the 
possession    of 
thirty  vessels 
trances   to 
unable  to 
and  de- 


T 


/  • 


ing   the 

revealed 

tion  of    as 

possible.     A 

harbor  may  be 

or     more    ships 

and     uncertainty 

exterior      blockade, 

maintained      beyond 

guns    of   an  enemy  in 

the  adjacent  coasts.  Even 

blockading    the    two     en- 

the  Cape   Fear  River  were 

prevent  the  frequent  arrival 

parture  of  blockade-runners. 

The  only  possible  policy  for  the 
Navy  Department  was  to  secure  the 
cooperation  of  the  army.     And  after 
a  well-outlined  preliminary  agreement, 
General  Thomas  W.  Sherman,  on  the  2d 
of  August,  1861,  was  directed  "to  proceed 
immediately  to  New  York  and  organize,  in 
connection  with  Captain  Du  Pont,  of  the  navy, 
an  expedition  of  twelve  thousand  men.     Its  des 
tination,"  said  his  orders,  "you  and  the  naval  com 
mander  will  determine  after  you  have  sailed." 

A  dozen  or  more  small  gun-boats  were  then  under 
construction  in  the  Northern  States  on  contract,  and 
vessels   of  every  size,   from  a  canal  steamboat  to  the 

VOL.  I.     43 


V  l 


674  DU  PONT  AND   THE  PORT  ROYAL  EXPEDITION. 

largest  coasting  steamers,  were  purchased  and  fitted  with,  batteries,  shell- 
rooms,  and  magazines,  both  for  this  expedition  and  to  supply  the  general 
wants  of  the  service  in  establishing  and  maintaining  the  most  extended  and 
effective  blockade  ever  known  in  history.  Under  date  of  August  22d,  1861, 
Captain  Du  Pont  wrote  from  New  York : 

"  We  drove  where  several  of  the  purchased  vessels  were  being  altered,  and  examined  the 
Alabama,  Augusta,  and  Stars  and  Stripes.  But,  alas  !  it  is  like  altering  a  vest  into  a  shirt  to  con 
vert  a  trading  steamer  into  a  man-of-war.  Except  that  there  is  a  vessel  and  a  steam-engine,  all 
else  is  inadaptable ;  but  there  is  no  help  for  it  —  the  exigency  of  the  blockade  demands  it." 
[August  23d.]  "  The  Tuscarora  (new  steam  sloop-of-war)  was  launched  at  Philadelphia  yester 
day.  She  was  built  in  fifty-eight  days,  and  thoroughly  built  too.  Her  keel  was  growing  in 
Sussex  county,  Delaware,  seventy  days  ago." 

On  the  19th  of  October,  1861,  eighty  days  after  the  date  of  the  order  to 
General  Sherman  above  quoted,  Flag-Officer  Du  Pont  (as  officers  in  command 
of  squadrons  were  then  styled)  left  New  York  on  board  of  the  steam-frigate 
Wabash,  followed  by  numerous  men-of-war,  among  which  were  four  small 
vessels,  the  Unadilla,  Ottawa,  Pembina,  and  Seneca,  built  in  great  haste  and 
called  "  ninety-day  gun-boats,"  as  the  contract  had  required  their  completion 
within  that  time.  Other  vessels  purchased"  and  improvised  for  war  purposes 
proceeded  when  ready  to  Hampton  Roads,  where  the  large  troop  transports 
had  already  congregated,  as  well  as  war  vessels,  regular,  irregular,  and  defective. 
Among  them  were  ferry-boats  and  the  old  steamer  Governor,  never  in  her  best 
days  adapted  to  a  sea  voyage,  on  board  of  which  were  six  hundred  marines, 
sent  as  a  force  to  operate  speedily  and  without  embarrassment  in  conjunction 
with  naval  vessels.  Twenty-five  chartered  schooners,  laden  with  coal,  were 
also  on  hand,  and,  after  being  partially  lightened  by  filling  the  bunkers  of  the 
squadron,  were  sent  to  sea  under  convoy  of  the  sailing  sloop  Vandalia  the 
day  before  the  departure  of  the  fleet. 

On  the  morning  of  the  29th  of  October,  the  vessels  of  war  and  the  army 
transports  of  all  classes  steamed  outside  and  formed  in  order  of  sailing, 
which  was  the  double  echelon.  The  reader  may  know  that  this  is  in  the 
shape  of  an  inverted  V,  the  leading  vessel  being  the  point,  and  the  other 
vessels  stretching  out  in  lines  but  heading  in  a  common  direction.  Our  proc 
ess  of  formation  was  not  complete  when  the  gun-boat  Unadilla  became  dis 
abled,  and  the  signal  was  made  to  take  her  in  tow.  Our  rate  of  speed  was 
quite  slow,  due  to  a  head-wind,  and  to  the  varied  character  of  the  vessels 
composing  the  fleet,  which  was  larger  than  was  ever  before  commanded  by 
an  American  officer.  Cape  Hatteras,  little  more  than  a  hundred  miles  from 
Cape  Henry,  was  not  reached  until  1  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  the  31st, 
when  two  of  the  heavier  transports  struck  slightly  on  the  shoals,  which 
caused  all  of  us  to  make  for  the  south-east ;  and  soon  after,  when  south  of 
the  cape,  we  bore  away.  The  wind  had  hauled  more  to  the  eastward  before 
we  reached  Hatteras,  and  that,  with  a  rough  sea,  had  caused  considerable 
indraught ;  and  the  drift  from  the  action  of  the  wind  on  the  large  hulls,  added 
to  our  low  speed,  had  set  us  considerably  to  leeward. 

Hatteras  is  known  to  navigators  as  being  subject  to  great  and  sudden 


DU  PONT  AND    THE  PORT  ROYAL  EXPEDITION. 


675 


changes  in  the  weather :  there  are  few  nights  in  the  year  when  lightning 

cannot  be  seen  from  the  top  of  the  light-house,  usually  to  seaward,  over  the 

Gulf  Stream,  which  here  approaches  nearer  to  the  coast  than  at  any  other 

point.     An  ocean  depth  of  2000  fathoms  or  more  stretches  almost  in  a  direct 

line  from  the  low  sand  islands  east  of  Nassau  to  within  a  distance  of  12  miles 

of  the  cape ;  from  the  shore  the 

water  deepens  very  rapidly  to  100 

fathoms,  and  then  falls  abruptly 

to  a  depth  of  2500  fathoms.  This 

great   depth,    so   near  the  land, 

and  the  Gulf  Stream  sweeping 

even   nearer,   are   the    probable 

causes  of  the  sudden  and  violent 

changes    of   the    weather    there 

prevailing,  which  were  discussed 

in   one   of   the   memoirs  of   the 

conference. 

On  rounding  the  cape,  the  wind 
gradually  rose,  the  sea  became 
heavy,  a  dull  leaden  sky  shut 
out  the  light,  and  not  long  after 
midday  there  were  assurances  of 
a  south-east  gale.  About  2:30 
p.  M.  the  weather  was  so  rough 
that  signal  was  made  from  the 
flag-ship  to  commanders  of  ves 
sels  to  disregard  the  order  of  sailing  and  take  care  of  their  individual 
commands. 

In  order  to  make  the  best  of  our  way,  and  the  better  to  avoid  collisions 
with  other  vessels  of  the  fleet,  the  Seneca  was  kept  on  the  port  tack,  and 
"  hove  to,"  barely  turning  the  engines,  the  vessel  being  under  close-reefed 
fore  and  main  sails.  Had  she  been  square-rigged,  the  other  tack  would  have 
been  necessary  to  her  safety.  In  the  drifting  mists  and  rain,  it  soon  grew 
dark.  The  greater  part  of  that  night  I  stood  under  the  lee  of  the  weather 
bulwark,  near  the  wheel,  casting  glances  to  windward,  to  be  in  readiness  to 
bear  away  should  a  vessel  be  seen  coming  down  upon  us.  It  was  a  long, 
weary,  and  anxious  night.  On  peering  to  windward,  the  rain-drops  pelted  the 
face  like  sleet,  and  the  phosphorescent  spray  broke  over  us  in  superlative 
grandeur.  At  3  o'clock  I  observed  what  had  been  an  object  of  watchfulness — 
an  arch  rising  in  the  west,  precursor  of  a  sudden  change  of  wind.  The 
mainsail  was  lowered,  and  when  the  squall  struck  us  the  foresheet  was  shifted 
over.  At  9  or  10  A.  M.  the  gale  had  abated  greatly,  and  the  flag-ship  was  well 
under  our  lee  ;  we  then  wore  ship  and  were  soon  in  her  wake.  Later  in  the 
day  several  other  vessels  fell  into  line. 

We  will  now  note  the  actual  losses  from  the  gale,  that  became  known  to  us 
some  davs  later.  The  Isaac  Smith  was  disabled  and  her  commander  forced 


REAR-ADMIRAL    SAMUEL    F.    DU    POST.     FROM  A  PHOTOGRAPH. 


676 


DU  PONT  AND   THE  PORT  ROYAL  EXPEDITION. 


UNION*     GUN-BOAT   "  SENECA,"  CAPTAIN    DANIEL    AMMEN'S   VESSEL    AT    PORT    ROYAL.      FROM   A  WAR-TIME  SKETCH. 

to  throw  his  battery  overboard,  with  the  exception  of  one  30-pounder  rifle,  to 
enable  him  to  go  to  the  assistance  of  the  Governor,  which  foundered  at  sea. 
The  Young  Hover,  fortunately  coming  up,  was  able  to  signal  to  the  sailing 
frigate  Sabine  in  the  distance,  and,  after  most  strenuous  exertions,  the  marine 
battalion  and  crew  of  the  Governor,  with  the  exception  of  seven  who  were  lost, 
were  transferred  to  the  /Saline.  Of  the  army  transports,  the  Peerless,  laden 
with  stores,  went  down,  the  crew  being  rescued  by  the  Mohican.  The  steamers 
Belvidere,  Union,  and  Osceola,  having  army  stores  011  board,  but  110  troops, 
either  sank  or  never  reached  their  destination.  The  large  army  transport  Win- 
field  Scott  was  so  disabled  that  she  never  left  Port  Royal  harbor  after  entering. 
The  morning  of  November  3d  was  a  bright  Sunday,  with  a  moderate  breeze 
and  a  smooth  sea.  Several  others  of  the  small  steamers  with  the  Seneca  were 
following  in  the  wake  of  the  flag-ship.  In  obedience  to  signal,  I  went  on  board 
that  vessel,  and  received  orders  to  be  delivered  to  Captain  Lardner  of  the  Sus- 
quchanna,  the  senior  officer  blockading  Charleston,  distant  about  thirty  miles. 
These  directed  certain  vessels  to  rendezvous  off  Port  Royal  entrance,  but  not 
to  leave  the  line  of  blockade  until  after  nightfall.  No  sooner  was  the  Seneca 
fairly  in  sight  of  Sumter  than  the  signal  guns  were  fired,  to  announce  the 
arrival  of  the  avant-courier  of  the  fleet  that  they  knew  was  intended  for 
the  attack  of  Port  Royal.  After  passing  Bull's  Bay,  I  had  the  belief  that  we 
were  bound  for  Port  Royal,  but  no  actual  knowledge  of  the  fact  until  going 
on  board  of  the  Wabasli,  as  my  orders  were  marked  "Confidential  —  not  to 
be  opened  unless  separated  from  the  flag-ship."  At  the  very  time  we  were 
weathering  the  gale,  the  following  telegram  was  sent : 

"  Richmond,  Nov.  1,  '61.  Gov.  Pickens,  Columbia,  S.  C.  I  have  just  received  information, 
which  I  consider  entirely  reliable,  that  the  enemy's  expedition  is  intended  for  Port  Royal. 
J.  P.  Benjamin,  Acting  Secretary  of  War." 

The  same  telegram  was  sent  to  Generals  Drayton  and  Ripley,  command 
ing  respectively  at  Port  Royal  and  Charleston. 

It  was  a  charming  mild  afternoon  when  I  stepped  on  the  deck  of  the  Sus- 
queJianna.  Captain  Lardner  was  delighted  with  his  orders,  and,  after  giving 


DU  PONT  AND   THE  PORT  ROYAL  EXPEDITION. 


677 


him  such  information  as  would  be  of  interest,  I  obtained  permission  to 
go  up  to  the  entrance  to  the  swash  channel,  which  was  well  known  to 
me  previously,  when  sounding  out  the  bar  on  Coast  Survey  duty.  After 
the  sun  went  down,  all  the  vessels  designated  left  the  line  of  blockade, 
proceeding,  like  ourselves,  to  the.  entrance  of  Port  Royal  harbor,  some 
sixty  miles  away.  Following  the  seven-fathom  curve,  the  Seneca  rounded 
the  shoal  lying  east  of  the  main  channel,  known  as  "  Martin's  Industry,"  at 
early  daylight,  and  soon  after  found  a  small  black  barrel-buoy,  which,  we 
rightly  conjectured,  had  been  put  there  by  the  enemy.  An  hour  after  sunrise, 
aided  by  the  refraction,  the  tops  of  the  pine-trees  on  both  sides  of  the  head 
lands  were  plainly  in  sight,  although  twelve  miles  off.  At  that  hour  the 
flag-ship  Walash  was  at  anchor  with  several  other  vessels  about  two  miles 
distant,  and  the  eastern  horizon  was  flecked 
with  approaching  vessels.  We  steamed 
out  to  the  flag-ship  at  a  later  hour,  re 
ported  the  finding  of  the  barrel-buoy,  and 
were  informed  that  the  entrance  would 
soon  be  sounded  out.  About  noon,  Cap 
tain  C.  O.  Boutelle,  in  the  Coast  Survey 
steamer  Vixen,  with  the  gun-boats  Paw 
nee,  Ottawa,  Peinbina,  Curlew,  and  Seneca, 
crossed  the  bar  and  went  far  enough  in 
to  have  a  good  view  of  the  faces  and 
embrasures  of  the  earth-works  that  we 
were  soon  to  engage,  the  one  on  Hilton 
Head  known  as  Fort  Walker  and  the 
other  011  Bay  Point  as  Fort  Beauregard.  •£ 

After  the  surveying  steamer  had  planted 
some  buoys,  to  serve  as  general  guides, 

the  four  gun-boats  last  named  anchored  SLOOP  OF  WAR  ,VANDALIA>,,  KEAR  SHIP  OF  THE 
in  the  channel  some  distance  apart,  as 
additional  guides,  the  one  farthest  in  being 
some  three  miles  from  Fort  Beauregard,  the  Vixen  and  the  Pawnee  going  out 
to  pilot  the  vessels  across  the  bar.  This  was  done  without  delay ;  all  of 
them  that  came  in  had  no  more  than  eighteen  feet  draught.  They  anchored 
a  mile  or  so  outside  of  the  gun-boats,  and  from  the  shoal  ground  to  seaward. 

Near  sunset  three  steamers  came  outside  of  the  headlands  and  fired  at  our 
gun-boats  at  long  range.  The  steamers  were  under  the  command  of  Josiah 
Tattnall,  a  commodore  in  the  Confederate  service,  who  had  been  a  distinguished 
officer  of  our  navy,  and  had  resigned  some  time  before,  on  the  secession  of 
Georgia,  of  which  State  he  was  a  citizen.  His  vessels  were  river  boats ;  as 
men-of-war  they  were  in  every  respect  of  the  most  vulnerable  class.  The  four 
advanced  gun-boats  of  our  squadron  got  under  way,  pivoted  their  heavy 
shell-guns  over  the  starboard  bow,  and  headed  to  the  westward  so  as  to  bring 

£•  On  Nov.  15th,  1861,  General  T.  W.  Sherman  changed  the  name  of  Fort  Walker  to  Fort  Welles 
(after  Secretary  Welles),  and  of  Fort  Beauregard  to  Fort  Seward  (after  the  Secretary  of  State). 


LINE  AT  PORT  ROVAL. 
FROM  A  WAR-TIME   SKETCH. 


678 


DU  PONT  AND    THE  PORT  ROYAL  EXPEDITION. 


their  guns  to  bear.  This  course 
with  that  of  the  enemy  would 
soon  have  brought  Tattnall's 
steamers  in  unpleasant  proxim 
ity,  and  in  consequence  they 
turned  abruptly,  passed  between 
the  headlands,  and  disappeared 
in  the  distance. 

Soon  after  sunrise  the  next 
day,  three  steamers  commanded 
by  Tattnall  made  their  appear 
ance  in  like  manner.  It  so  hap 
pened  that  General  H.  Gr.  Wright, 
of  the  army,  and  Captain  John 
Eodgers,  of  the  navy,  had  gone 
on  board  of  the  Ottawa,  under 
the  instructions  of  their  com 
manding  officers,  to  make  a 
reconnoissance  of  the  forts,  and 
had  brought  within  supporting 
distance  the  Pawnee,  carrying 
a  heavy  battery,  and  the  Isaac 
Smith,  carrying  one  30-pounder 
rifle.  They  were  approaching 
w^hen  Tattnall  was  pretty  well 
out,  and  had  opened  fire  on  the 
smaller  gun-boats.  Signal  was 
made  to  the  Seneca,  Pemlina, 
and  Curlew  to  follow  the  movements  of  the  Ottawa,  and  we  went  in,  follow 
ing  Tattnall's  steamers,  then  in  retreat,  and  firing  on  them,  until  we  were 
nearly  on  an  air-line  between  the  two  earth-works  before  named.  They 
opened  fire  on  us,  at  rather  too  long  a  range  for  effective  work,  with  smooth 
bore  guns ;  several  rifles  were  also  used  by  the  forts,  as  well  as  by  the  Con 
federate  vessels.  One  of  our  shells  blew  up  a  caisson  in  Fort  Beauregard, 
and  we  soon  became  fairly  informed  of  the  number  of  the  enemy's  guns  bear 
ing  on  the  entrance,  and  in  a  measure  as  to  their  caliber.  On  signal,  we  went 
out  of  action  and  anchored,  without  having  received  any  material  damage  ;  the 
rigging  of  all  of  the  vessels  was  cut  more  or  less.  After  seven  bells,  "  when  the 
sun  is  over  the  foreyard,"  Tattnall's  flag-ship  Savannah,  accompanied  by  a 
steamer,  came  out  on  the  flats,  or  shoaler  waters,  to  the  westward  of  the 
channel.  They  flew  about  somewhat  wildly,  had  considerable  headway,  and 
threw  a  rifle-shell  occasionally,  firing  "  promiscuously,"  but  mostly  at  the 
nearest  vessel,  which  was  the  Seneca.  Her  executive  officer  was  directed  to 
call  the  eleven-inch  pivot  gun's  crew  to  quarters  and  fire  a  shell  at  ricochet, 
the  distance  supposed  to  be  about  2500  yards.  The  gun  was  at  once  reported 
ready,  and  the  request  made  to  fire  at  an  elevation.  Appreciating  the  fact  that 


3    \falas 

2 

3    Moh 

Seminole 

5  Ftvtrnee 

6  VnadiLUt 

7  Ottawa, 
fam-bina 

9    Tetndalict 


MAP    OF    THE    NAVAL    ATTACK    AT    HILTON    HEAD,   NOV.  7,  1801. 


DU  PONT  AND    THE  PORT  ROYAL  EXPEDITION. 


one  rarely  does  well  when  not  doing  what  he  thinks  best,  I  took  the  matter  per 
sonally  in  hand,  had  the  gun  leveled  and  trained  as  desired,  and  pulled  the 
lanyard.  The  huge  shell  skipped  along  the  surface  of  a  glassy  sea,  and,  as 
reported  from  aloft,  struck  the  vessel  abaft  the  starboard  wheel-house.  In  a 
moment  the  head  of  the  flag-ship  was  turned  for  the  harbor,  and  she  lost  no 
time  in  entering,  followed  by  her  consort.  It  was  soon  afterward  known  that 
the  captain  of  the  vessel  had  availed  himself  of  the  temporary  absence  of 
Tattnall,  and  had  sallied  out  to  have  a  little  diversion,  which  would  have 
proved  serious  had  the  shell  exploded  that  lodged  in  the  hog-braces. 

About  the  time  of  this  occurrence,  the  flag-ship  Wabasli  crossed  the  bar, 
followed  by  all  of 
the  heavy  vessels, 
including  the  trans 
ports,  and  anchored 
some  two  miles  out 
side  of  Fishing  Rip 
Shoal,  some  five 
miles  from  the  forts, 
the  bar  being  about 
twelve  miles  outside  - 
of  the  headlands. 
Very  soon  after  the 
flag-ship  anchored, 
signal  was  made  for 
officers  commanding 
vessels  to  come  aboard.  On  their  arrival,  those  who  commanded  vessels  detailed 
for  the  main  line  were  invited  into  the  cabin,  and  instructions  were  given  as 
to  position  and  plan  of  battle ;  and  afterward  those  commanding  vessels  in 
the  flanking  line  received  their  instructions,  which  differed  as  to  the  duties  to 
be  performed  after  passing  within  and  beyond  the  earth-works.  It  was  the 
intention  of  the  flag-officer  at  that  time  to  go  at  once  into  action,  although 
the  hour  would  of  necessity  be  late. 

The  main  line  was  to  be  on  the  west  or  Hilton  Head  side,  in  line  ahead,  and 
the  vessels  one  ship's-length  apart.  The  report  of  the  flag-officer  states  :  "  The 
order  of  battle  comprised  a  main  squadron  ranged  in  line  ahead,  and  a  flank 
ing  squadron,  which  was  to  be  thrown  off  on  the  northern  section  of  the 
harbor  to  engage  the  enemy's  flotilla,  and  prevent  their  raking  the  rear  ships 
of  the  line  when  it  turned  to  the  southward,  or  cutting  off  a  disabled  vessel." 

The  leading  ship  of  the  main  squadron  was  the  frigate  WabasJi,  Commander 
C.  R.  P.  Rodgers,  followed  by  the  frigate  Susquehanna,  Captain  J.  L.  Lardner ; 
sloop  Mohican,  Commander  S.  W.  Godon ;  sloop  Seminole,  Commander  J.  P. 
Gillis  ;  sloop  Painiee,  Lieutenant  Commanding  R.  H.  Wyman  ;  gun-boat 
Unadilla,  Lieutenant  Commanding  X.  Collins;  gun-boat  Ottawa,  Lieutenant 
Commanding  T.  H.  Stevens;  gun-boat  Pembhia,  Lieutenant  Commanding  J. 
P.  Bankhead ;  and  the  sailing  sloop  Vandalla,  Commander  F.  S.  Haggerty, 
towed  bv  the  Isaac  Smith,  Lieutenant  Commanding  J.  W.  A.  Nicholson.  The 


GUN-BOAT   "MOHAWK,"  THE    GUARD-SHIP    AT    PORT    ROYAL. 
FROM    A  WAR-TIME    SKETCH. 


68o 


DU  PONT  AND  THE  PORT  ROYAL  EXPEDITION. 


flanking  squadron  was  led 
by  the  gun-boat  Bienville, 
Commander  Charles  Steed- 
man,  followed  by  the  Seneca, 
Lieutenant  Commanding 
Daniel  Ammen ;  gun-boat 
Curlew,  Lieutenant  Com 
manding  P.  G.  Watmough  ; 
gun-boat  Petit/ id  n,  Lieuten 
ant  Commanding  T.  A. 
Budd ;  and  the  gun-boat 
Auyusta,  Commander  E.  G. 
Parrott. 

The  plan  of  attack  was 
to  pass  up  midway  between 
Forts  Walker  and  Beaure- 
gard,  receiving  and  return 
ing  the  fire  of  both,  to  about 
two  and  one-half  miles  north 
of  the  forts,  then  to  turn  to 
ward  and  close  in  with  Fort 
Walker,  encountering  it  on 
its  weakest  flank,  and  at  the 
same  time  enfilading  its  two 
water  faces.  While  stand 
ing  to  the  southward  the 
vessels  would  be  head  to 
tide,  with  just  enough  head 
way  to  preserve  the  order 
of  battle  in  passing  the  bat 
teries  in  slow  succession, 
and  to  avoid  becoming  a 
fixed  mark  for  the  enemy's 
fire.  On  reaching  the  ex 
tremity  of  Hilton  Head  and 
the  shoal  ground  making  oft' 
from  it,  the  line  was  to  turn 
to  the  north  by  the  east, 
and,  passing  northward,  to 
engage  Fort  Walker  with 
the  port  battery,  but  nearer 
than  on  entering.  These 
evolutions  were  to  be  re 
peated.  A  plan  of  battle 
was  sent  to  the  Navy  De 
partment.  The  "  New  York 


DU  PONT  AND    THE  PORT  ROYAL  EXPEDITION. 


681 


Herald"  of  November  20th,   1861,  contains  a  diagram  in  accord  with  the 
above  statement,  and  was  probably  taken  from  the  official  one.     There  was 
another  point  in  the  instructions  given  by  the  flag-officer  to  officers  com 
manding  vessels  in  the  flanking  line  that  is  not  mentioned  in  his  report. 
He  said  in  substance,  if  not  in  words,  that,  in  passing  in,  the  flanking  line 
was  to  deliver  its  fire  against  the  fort  on  Bay  Point,  and  then  to  guard  the 
fleet  of  transports  within  the  bar  from  any  attempts  of  Tattnall ;  that  he  knew 
him  well ;  that  he  had  cour 
age  and  power  to  plan,  and 
in  the  heat  of  action  might 
try  to  run  out  to  destroy  the 
transports  which  it  was  the 
special  duty  of  the  flanking 
squadron  to   protect ;    and 
that  when  Tattnall  was  dis 
posed  of,  the  vessels  would 
take  an  enfilading  position 
somewhere    to    the    north 
ward  of  the  Hilton  Head  fort. 
After   receiving    our    in- 


TEN-INCH    SHELL    GUN    WHICH    THREW    THE    OPENING    SHOT    FROM 
THE    FLAG-SHIP  "  WABASH."     FROM  A  WAR-TIME  SKETCH. 


structions,  the  officers  com 
manding  vessels  returned  without  delay  to  their  commands,  and  made  prep 
arations  for  immediate  movement.  Soon  after,  the  flag-ship  made  signal  and 
got  under  way,  as  did  all  of  the  men-of-war.  The  Wabask  stood  in  toward 
the  forts,  and  got  aground.  "  In  our  anxiety  to  get  the  outline  of  the  forts 
before  dark,"  the  flag-officer  reported,  "  we  stood  in  too  near  to  Fishing  Eip 
Shoal,  and  the  vessel  grounded.  By  the  time  she  was  gotten  off  it  was  too 
late,  in  my  judgment,  to  proceed,  and  I  made  signal  for  the  squadron  to 
anchor  out  of  gunshot  of  the  enemy."  The  shoal  where  the  Wabash  grounded 
was  a  little  short  of  three  miles  from  the  forts.  The  vessels  anchored  in 
convenient  positions  for  the  formation  of  the  lines  when  signaled,  and 
were  sufficiently  inside  of  the  transports  to  be  unembarrassed  by  them  in 
forming. 

The  following  day  [November  7th]  we  had  a  heavy  westerly  wind.  The 
report  of  General  Thomas  F.  Drayton,  the  Confederate  commander,  states: 
"On  the  6th,  the  fleet  and  transports,  which  had  increased  to  about  forty-five 
sail,  would  probably  have  attacked  us  had  not  the  weather  been  very  boister 
ous."  This  conjecture  was  quite  right.  The  flag-officer  was  impatiently  await 
ing  the  abatement  of  the  wind,  and  about  noon  was  almost  on  the  point  of 
going  in,  but  wisely  deferred  the  attack  until  we  could  make  it  without  dis 
advantage.  Drayton's  picturesque  report  of  the  engagement  continues:  "At 
last  the  memorable  7th  dawned  upon  us,  bright  and  serene ;  not  a  ripple  upon 
the  broad  expanse  of  water  to  disturb  the  accuracy  of  fire  from  the  broad 
decks  of  that  magnificent  armada  about  advancing,  in  battle  array,  to  vomit 
forth  its  iron  hail,  with  all  the  spiteful  energy  of  long-suppressed  rage  and 
conscious  strength." 


682 


DU  PONT  AND   THE  PORT  ROYAL  EXPEDITION. 


LUNETTE  BATTERY.  LUNETTE  BATTERY.  FORT   BEAUREGARD. 

BAY  POINT  AND  FOBT  BEAUREGARD,  AFTER  CAPTURE.   FROM  A  WAR-TIME  SKETCH. 

On  the  7th,  as  soon  as  the  morning  light  permitted,  signals  were  made 
indicating  that  we  would  soon  move.  The  flag-ship  was  then  at  anchor  near 
where  she  had  grounded,  nearly  three  miles  from  the  forts.  In  consequence 
of  a  hawser  fouling  her  propeller,  some  delay  occurred  in  forming  after  the 
vessels  were  under  way,  and  it  was  9  o'clock  when  signal  was  made  for 
close  order.  Tattnall's  flotilla  at  that  time  was  nearly  in  line  between  the 
forts.  |  As  we  advanced,  at  9:26,  the  forts,  as  well  as  the  enemy's  vessels, 
lying  right  ahead,  opened  fire  on  the  foremost  ships.  Soon  after,  the  flag-ship 
yawed  sufficiently  to  bring  a  heavy  pivot  gun  on  her  bow  to  bear  on  Tattnall's 
command,  which  forced  him  to  retreat,  as  his  vessels  would  soon  have  been 
within  reach  of  our  broadside  guns.  At  that  time  our  rate  of  speed  was 
about  six  miles,  and  we  were  soon  making  good  use  of  our  batteries ;  the 
enemy  on  both  sides  of  the  bay  had  the  full  benefit  of  all  the  shells  that  both 
lines  could  send  with  precision.  So  great  was  the  cannons'  roar  that  it  was 
distinctly  heard  at  Fernandina,  seventy  miles  away.  There  was  deafening 
music  in  the  air,  which  came  from  far  and  near  and  all  around;  heavy 
clouds  of  dust  and  smoke,  due  to  our  bursting  shells  and  the  enemy's  fire, 
partly  obscured  the  earth-works,  while  our  vessels  were  but  dimly  seen 
through  the  smoke  from  their  own  guns  which  hung  over  the  water.  The  log 
book  of  the  flag-ship  states :  "At  9:45  the  Bienville  ranged  alongside  our  star 
board  beam."  This  was  eighteen  minutes  after  the  enemy  had  opened  fire  on 
the  fleet,  and  eight  minutes  before  the  flag-ship  ceased  firing  and  turned  toward 
Hilton  Head  to  repass  the  fort  in  heading  toward  the  sea.  This  was  the  oppor 
tunity  for  the  Bienville  to  open  wide  her  throttles :  with  her  great  speed,  pos 
sibly  she  might  have  run  down  Tattnall's  vessels  before  they  could  have  been 
pointed  fairly  and  reached  the  entrance  to  Scull  Creek.  The  log-book  of  the 
Bienville  states:  "At  10:30  the  flag-ship  winded  the  line,  turning  to  the 
southward,  when  we  engaged  for  a  few  minutes  three  steamers  that  were 
within  long  range  up  the  river.  We  soon  put  them  to  flight,  and  then  followed 
the  line  in  the  order  of  battle,  down  within  close  range  of  the  large  battery 

4  A  friend  of  many  years,  who  was  in  command  of  his  fire,  lie  said  to  the  signal  quartermaster  :  '  Dip 

one  of  Tattnall's  vessels,  writes  as  follows:  "There  my  broad  pennant  to  my  old   messmate,'  and   it 

is  one  touching  incident  that  I  think  deserves  rec-  was  dipped  thrice.     In  the  confusion  it  was  not 

ord.     When  the  old  hero  Tattnall  got  in  good  range  noticed  by  Du  Pont,  which  I  am  sure  he  would 

of  Du  Font's  flag-ship,  and  was  about  to  receive  have  regretted  had  he  known  it."— D.  A. 


DU  PONT  AND    THE  PORT  ROYAL  EXPEDITION. 


683 


on  Hilton  Head.     .     .     ."     The  same  authority  establishes  the  fact  that  the 
Bienville  thereafter,  during  the  engagement,  followed  in  the  main  line.  ^ 
The  report  of  the  Seneca  states: 

"  On  the  morning  of  the  7th  we  took  position  assigned  us  in  the  line,  and,  passing  up,  deliv 
ered  our  fire  at  Bay  Point,  and  on  arriving  qut  of  the  fire  of  the  enemy's  batteries,  made  chase, 
as  directed  by  instructions,  on  the  rebel  steamers.  They,  being  river  boats,  soon  left  us." 

The  log-book  of  the  same  vessel  states  that  when  she  turned  to  join  in  the 
attack  on  Hilton  Head,  Tattnall's  steamers  turned  also  and  came  toward  the 
fleet,  only  retreating  when  she  again  steamed  toward  them,  so  as  to  make  an 
engagement  unavoidable  should  they  advance  farther.     They  then  entered 
the  intricate  channel  to  Scull  Creek  and  disappeared  behind  a  wooded  point, 
after  which  the  Seneca,  with  other  vessels  of  the  flanking  line,  took  up  an 
enfilading  position  to  the  northward  of  Fort  Walker,  as  previously  instructed. 
Several  vessels  of  the  main  line  were  also  delivering  an  enfilading  fire,  among 
others  the  Mohican,  properly  next  in  the  main  line  to  the  Susquehanna.  Godon, 
who  commanded  her,  was  very  excitable,  and  it  may  be  on  seeing  a  strange 
vessel    ahead   in  his 
line,    imagined    that 
the  well-planned  at 
tack  had  been  trans 
formed  into  a  "free 
fight,"  and   the   best 
he  could   do  was  to 
serve  his  battery  well 
from  the  most  effect 


ive    point    he    could 
take  up. 

As  an  exhibition 
of  physical  force,  al 
lied  to  human  action, 


RIFLE-OCX  AT  FORT  BEACREGARD.      FROM  A  WAR-TIME   SKETCH. 


|  Rear-Admiral  Stoedman  sends  to  the  editors  the 
following  explanation  of  the  movements  of  his  ves 
sel:  "  The  Bienville  was  the  leading  ship  in  the  flank 
ing  or  starboard  column.  After  the  fleet  had 
passed  into  Port  Royal  Sound,  and  as  the  Wabaslt 
was  turning  to  pass  out,  Tattnall's  gun-boats  were 
seen  approaching  from  the  mouth  of  Scull  Creek. 
The  Bienville  was  at  once  pointed  in  that  direction, 
and  opened  fire  from  the  30-pounder  Parrott  on 
the  forecastle.  The  gun-boats  replied  with  an  in 
effectual  fire  at  long  range.  None  of  the  shots 
reached  her.  A  brisk  fire  was  kept  up  from  the 
Parrott  gun,  and  as  the  shells  began  to  fall  among 
the  gun-boats  they  turned  and  stood  up  toward 
Scull  Creek.  Here  the  Bienville  could  not  safely 
follow  them,  as  she  drew  over  sixteen  feet  and  had 
neither  chart  nor  pilot  for  the  channel;  while 
Tattnall's  river  steamers,  with  their  light  draught 
and  the  familiarity  of  the  officers  with  the  waters, 
could  retreat  to  a  position  where  the  Bienville,  in 


following  them,  would  almost  certainly  have  taken 
the  ground.  Moreover,  the  Bienville  was  within 
hail  of  the  flag-ship,  and  a  word  from  the  flag- 
officer  would  have  sent  her  up  Broad  River  had 
he  desired  her  to  assume  the  risk.  After  the  sec 
ond  turn  within  the  forts,  the  Wabash  was  proceed 
ing  slowly  down,  followed  by  the  Susquehanna, 
when  the  Mohican  and  the  vessels  astern  of  her 
left  the  line  and  took  up  a  position  above  Fort 
Walker.  The  position  enabled  these  ships  to  en 
filade  the  works  ;  but  the  movement  was  a  depart 
ure  from  the  order  of  battle,  and  it  continued,  not 
withstanding  signals  to  close  up  from  the  flag-ship. 
The  Bienville  took  her  position  astern  of  the  Susque 
hanna,  and  these  two  were  the  only  vessels  that  fol 
lowed  the  Wabash  on  her  third  circuit ;  or,  to  speak 
more  precisely,  on  her  second  passage  out  and  her 
third  passage  in,  under  the  fire  of  the  forts. 
"  CHARLES  STEEDMAN, 

"  Rear-Admiral,  Retired." 


DU  PONT  AND   THE  PORT  ROYAL  EXPEDITION. 


1.— BATTLE    OF  THE    UNION    FLEET    WITH    FORTS    WALKER    AND    BEAUREGARI).      2.— HOISTING    THE    STARS 
AND    STRIPES    OVER    FORT  WALKER.       FROM    WAR-TIME    SKETCHES. 

I  can  conceive  nothing  more  grand  than  a  view  of  the  main  deck  of  the 
Wabasli  on  this  occasion.  The  hatches  being  battened  down,  a  faint  light 
only  came  through  the  ports,  as  did  the  flashes  from  the  discharged  guns, 
which  recoiled  violently  with  a  heavy  thud.  As  far  as  the  smoke  would 


DU  PONT  AND    THE  PORT  ROYAL  EXPEDITION.  685 

permit,  hundreds  of  men  were  visible  in  very  rapid  motion,  loading  and 
running  out  the  guns  with  the  greatest  energy.  Such  a  view,  accompanied 
by  the  noise  of  battle,  is  weird  and  impressive  to  the  highest  degree. 

The  vessels  in  the  main  line  slowly  passed  toward  the  sea,  throwing  their 
shells  into  the  earth-work  with  the  utmost  precision,  and  this  destruction 
was  supplemented  by  the  fire  of  ten  of  the  vessels  from  an  enfilading  position. 
As  the  main  line  headed  seaward,  the  enemy  may  have  had  an  idea  that  his 
fire  was  so  destructive  that  the  vessels  were  retreating,  and  Tattnall,  with  his 
three  weak  vessels,  was  then  disposed  to  swoop  down  and  pick  up  "  lame 
ducks  " ;  but,  being  confronted  by  one  small  gun-boat,  he  thought  it  best  to 
enter  Scull  Creek,  where  at  least  he  would  be  available  for  carrying  off  the 
Southern  troops,  if  they  were  defeated.  Though  Tattnall  was  a  brave  and 
skillful  seaman,  the  law  of  force  was  inexorable ;  and  when  an  officer  is  a  free 
agent,  looking  only  to  the  success  of  his  cause,  he  should  not  lead  his  command 
into  destruction  without  being  able  to  secure  a  commensurate  advantage. 

Arriving  at  the  shoal  ground  off  Hilton  Head,  the  flag-ship  and  her  follow 
ers  turned  again  within  the  harbor,  and  in  passing  northward  availed  them 
selves  of  the  occasion  to  give  Fort  Beauregard  the  benefit  of  their  broadsides. 
Meantime  the  enfilading  vessels  had  been  steadily  throwing  their  shells  into 
Fort  Walker.  In  relation  to  this  hour  [about  10  A.  M.],  General  Drayton  states : 

"  Besides  this  moving  battery,  the  fort  was  enfiladed  by  two  gun-boats  anchored  to  the  north, 
off  the  mouth  of  Fish  Hall  Creek,  and  another  at  a  point  on  the  edge  of  the  shoals  to  the  south. 
This  enfilading  fire,  on  so  still  a  sea,  annoyed  and  damaged  us  excessively,  particularly  as  we 
had  no  gun  on  either  flank  of  the  bastion  to  reply  with." 

The  vessel  near  the  shoal,  to  the  south,  was  probably  the  Pocahontas,  com 
manded  by  Percival  Drayton,  brother  of  the  general  in  command  of  the  Con 
federate  forces ;  she  only  crossed  the  bar  about  noon,  having  been  delayed  by 
deranged  machinery. 

The  main  line  passed  nearer  Fort  Walker  than  on  entering,  and  delivered 
its  fire  "  with  all  the  spiteful  energy  of  long-suppressed  rage  and  conscious 
strength."  Arriving  at  the  turning-point,  signal  was  again  made  to  its  vessels 
to  take  position,  when  the  Walash  led  once  more,  and  to  within  six  hundred 
yards  of  the  fort.  The  nearness  of  the  ships  was  the  probable  cause  of  their 
suffering  so  little  damage,  the  enemy's  shots  passing  over  the  hulls.  The  flag 
ship  was  naturally  the  most  conspicuous  target,  but  the  shots  received  by  her 
were  high  up,  the  enemy  presumably  delivering  his  fire  for  a  distance  of  a 
thousand  yards  or  more.  At  this  time  a  shell  was  seen  to  pass  between  the 
flag-officer  and  the  captain  of  the  vessel,  who  were  standing  on  the  "bridge" 
extending  across  the  vessel,  just  forward  of  the  mainmast. 

The  flag-officer  expressed  officially  his  great  admiration  of  the  firing  of  the 
batteries  of  the  Wabash  and  of  the  Susqueluuma,  which  was  next  in  line. 
In  a  private  letter,  written  just  after  the  engagement,  he  said  of  the  former : 

"Iii  our  first  attack  I  was  not  satisfied  with  the  execution  of  this  ship,  though  the  effect 
turned  out  to  be  much  greater  than  I  thought,  but  in  the  second  attack  I  can  remember  nol 
in  naval  history  that  came  up  to  this  ship  in  the  terrific  repetitions  of  her  broadsides,  and,  tc 
use  the  illustration  of  the  reporter  of  the  <  London  News,'  '  the  rising  of  the  dust  on  shore  m 
perpendicular  columns  looked  as  if  we  had  suddenly  raised  from  the  dust  a  grove  of  poplars. 


686 


At  1:15  the  Ottawa  signaled  that  the  enemy  was  leaving  the  fort,  and 
fifteen  minutes  later  the  same  signal  was  made  by  the  Penibina.  At  this 
time  the  flag-ship  and  her  followers  had  returned  from  their  tour,  and  were 
again  ready  to  swoop  down  and  deliver  other  broadsides.  Two  pivot  guns 
fired  from  the  flag-ship  received  no  response,  and  signal  was  made  to  cease 
firing.  Captain  John  Rodgers,  who  was  serving  as  aide  to  the  flag-officer,  was 
sent  on  shore  with  a  flag  of  truce.  On  landing  he  found  110  garrison,  and 

at  2:20  P.  M.  hoisted  the  Union  flag 
over  the  fort.  When  that  honored 
emblem  appeared,  the  rigging  w^as 
manned  in  an  instant  on  board  the 
flag-ship  and  on  all  of  the  vessels 
of  war  at  anchor ;  three  cheers  were 
wafted  over  the  waters,  so  loud  that 
they  startled  the  defenders  of  Fort 
Beauregard.  \  Commander  C.  R.  P. 
Rodgers,  with  the  marines  of  the 
flag-ship  and  a  division  of  small-arm 
men,  landed  and  threw  out  pickets. 
The  transports  at  once  steamed  in. 
Soon  after  sunset  the  fort  was  de 
livered  by  the  naval  force  to  General 
H.  G.  Wright,  wrho  now  held  watch 
and  ward  as  far  as  the  pine-trees 
some  hundreds  of  yards  distant. 

Soon  after  the  hoisting  of  our  flag, 
a  vessel  was  directed  to  make  a  re- 
connoissance  of  Bay  Point,  but  at 
nightfall,  as  nothing  had  been  heard  from  her,  the  Seneca  was  sent  to 
ascertain  the  situation.  When  we  arrived  in  front  of  Fort  Beauregard, 
it  was  so  dark  that  the  bow  of  the  vessel  was  run  up  on  the  low  beach. 
There,  outlined  on  the  horizon,  was  the  earth-work  lying  in  grim  repose,  the 
embrasures  being  plainly  visible.  The  silence  was  unbroken ;  the  work  had 
evidently  been  abandoned.  The  flood-tide  was  setting  in  strongly.  The  crew 
of  one  hundred  men  were  sent  as  far  aft  as  possible  and  the  engines  backed.  We 
at  once  slid  off,  and  the  flag-officer  was  fully  informed  as  soon  as  we  could  steam 
over.  Orders  were  then  given  to  return  to  Bay  Point  at  early  daylight  to 
reconnoiter,  and,  if  we  were  not  met  by  force,  to  hoist  our  flag  at  sunrise.  This 
was  duly  executed,  and  at  noon  the  fort  was  turned  over  to  General  Isaac  I.  Ste- 


BRIG.-GEN.  THOMAS  F.  DRAYTON,  C.  S.  A.,  COMMANDER 

OF  THE  CONFEDERATE  FORCES  AT  PORT  ROYAL. 

FROM  A  PHOTOGRAPH. 


\  Captain  Stephen  Elliott,  Jr.,  who  was  at  Fort 
Beauregard,  reported:  "Colonel  Dunovaut  [who 
commanded  the  forces]  entered  the  fort,  and  said 
to  me :  '  Captain  Elliott,  what  is  the  condition  of 
things  over  the  river  ? '  I  replied,  '  Fort  Walker 
has  been  silenced,  sir.' — 'By  what  do  you  judge  ?' 
'  By  the  facts  that  the  fort  has  been  subjected  to  a 
heavy  enfilade  and  direct  fire,  to  which  it  has  ceased 
to  reply ;  that  the  vessels  having  terminated  their 


fire,  the  flag-ship  has  steamed  up  and  delivered  a 
single  shot,  which  was  unanswered,  and  that  there 
upon  cheering  was  heard  from  the  fleet.' — 'Then, 
sir,  it  having  been  proved  that  these  works  cannot 
accomplish  the  end  for  which  they  were  designed 
(that  of  protecting  the  harbor)  you  will  prepare 
to  retire  from  a  position  from  which  our  retreat 
may  readily  be  cut  off,  and  which  our  small  force 
will  not  enable  us  to  hold  against  a  land  attack.'" 


DU  PONT  AND   THE  PORT  ROYAL  EXPEDITION. 


687 


vens,  of  the  army.  The  flag- staff  was  on  the  gable  of  a  small  frame-house  fifty 
yards  from  the  fort.  I  went  within,  saw  some  books  lying  on  a  table,  and 
went  out  and  toward  some  tents  in  the  distance.  In  a  few  minutes  an 
explosion  was  heard,  and,  on  turning,  I  saw  a  cloud  of  smoke  where  the 
house  had  stood.  A  quantity  of  powder  had  been  put  under  it,  arranged  so 
as  to  ignite  from  a  friction-tube,  and  a  sailor,  in  passing  along  outside,  had 
struck  his  foot  against  a  small  wire  attached  to  the  tube,  thus  causing  the 
explosion.  He  was  knocked  over,  and  partially  stunned,  but  soon  revived.  It 
may  be  said  that  it  is  natural  in  warfare  to  harm  your  enemy  as  much  as 
possible,  but  it  strikes  the  man  who  has  escaped  being  blown  up  that  such 
devices  are  essentially  mean. 

The  armament  found  on  Fort  Walker  was  as  follows :  on  the  right  angle 
of  the  sea-face,  a  6-inch  rifled-gun,  six  32-pounders  (three  dismounted  and 
with  carriages  ruined  and  another  with  the  cascabel  knocked  off),  one  10-inch 
and  one  8-iuch  Columbiad,  three  sea-coast  7-inch  howitzers;  on  the  left 
angle  of  the  sea-front,  a  6-inch  rifle ;  on  the  left  wing,  one  32-pounder  and  one 
sea-coast  howitzer ;  on  the  outer  work,  in  rear,  two  32-pounders,  one  8-inch 
heavy  howitzer,  and  two  English  siege  12-pounders  ;  on  the  right  wing,  three 
32-pounders, — total,  23  guns.  Twenty  guns  were  found  in  Fort  Beauregard, 
one  of  which  was  a  6-inch  rifle,  burst, 
and  the  carriage  entirely  destroyed. 
The  heaviest  guns  were  a  10-inch  and 
an  8-inch  Columbiad ;  the  other  guns 
mostly  32-pounders.  iz  The  armaments 
of  the  attacking  vessels,  and  the  losses  on 
both  sides,  will  be  found  on  page  691. 

In  his  report  General  T.  W.  Sherman 
states : 

"  The  beautifully  constructed  work  on  Hilton 
Head  was  severely  crippled  and  many  of  the 
guns  dismounted.  Much  slaughter  had  evi 
dently  been  made  there,  many  bodies  having 
been  buried  in  the  fort,  and  some  twenty  or 
thirty  were  found  some  half-mile  distant.  .  .  . 
The  number  of  pieces  of  ordnance  that  have 
fallen  into  our  hands  is  fifty-two,  the  bulk  of 
which  is  of  the  largest  caliber,  all  with  fine  car 
riages,  etc.,  except  eight  or  nine,  that  were 
ruined  by  our  fire,  which  dismounted  their 
pieces." 

On  the  afternoon  of  the  8th  General 
Sherman  made  a  reconnoissance,  on 

•fe  General  Draytoii  thus  describes  the  resistance 
made  to  the  attack  of  the  Union  fleet,  referring  at 
the  outset  to  the  first  shot  from  Fort  Walker : 

"  The  shell  from  the  Dahlgren  exploded  near  the 
muzzle,  and  was  harmless.  Other  shots  followed  from 
both  forts,  and  soon  the  fire  became  general  on  laud  and 
•water.  In  spite  of  our  fire,  directed  with  deliberation 


CAPTAIN'    PEECIVAL    DR.YYTON,     COMMANDER    OF     THE 
U.  S.  STEAMER  " POCAHONTA8 "  AT  PORT  ROYAL  — 
BROTHER  OF  THE  COMMANDER  OF  THE  CON 
FEDERATE  FORCES.      FROM  A  PHOTOGRAPH. 

and  coolness,  the  fleet  soon  passed  both  batteries  appar 
ently  unharmed,  and,  then  returning,  delivered  in  their 
changing  rounds  a  terrific  shower  of  shot  and  shell  in 
flank  and  front.  Besides  this  moving  battery,  the  fort 
was  enfiladed  by  two  gun-boats  anchored  to  the  north,  off 
the  mouth  of  Fish  Hall  Creek,  and  another  at  a  point  on 
the  edge  of  the  shoals  to  the  south.  This  enfilading  fire, 
on  so  still  a  sea,  annoyed  and  damaged  us  excessively, 


688 


DU  PONT  AND  THE  PORT  ROYAL  EXPEDITION. 


THE    OLD    IIEADQUAKTEUS,    HILTON   HEAD.      FROM   A  WAR-TIME    SKETCH. 

board  of  the  Seneca,  several  miles  up  the  Beaufort  River.  On  the  following 
day  that  vessel  was  sent  to  Beaufort,  supported  by  two  gun-boats.  This  visit 
brought  to  view  an  extraordinary  scene.  On  the  wharves  were  hundreds  of 
negroes,  wild  with  excitement,  engaged  in  carrying  movables  of  every  char 
acter,  and  packing  them  in  scows.  As  the  gun-boats  appeared,  a  few  mounted 
white  men  rode  away  rapidly.  A  very  beautiful  rural  town  had  been  abandoned 
by  all  of  the  white  inhabitants,  guite  as  though  fire  and  sword  awaited  them  had 
they  remained.  Instead  of  that,  I  was  directed  by  the  flag-officer  to  assure  the 
peaceable  inhabitants  that  they  would  be  protected  in  life  and  property.  This 


particularly  as  we  had  no  gun  on  either  flank  of  the 
bastion  to  reply  with,  for  the  32-pounder  on  the  right 
flank  was  shattered  very  early  by  a  round  shot,  and  on 
the  north  flank  for  want  of  a  carriage  no  gun  had  been 
mount ed.  After  the  fourth  fire  the  10-inch  Columbiad 
bounded  over  the  limber  and  became  useless.  The  24- 
pounder  rifled  cannon  was  choked  while  ramming  down 
a  shell,  and  lay  idle  during  nearly  the  whole  engage 
ment.  The  shells  for  the  9-inch  Dahlgren  were  also  too 
large.  The  fourth  shell  attempted  to  be  rammed  home 
could  not  be  driven  below  the  trunnions,  and  was  then 
at  great  risk  discharged.  Thus  far  the  tire  of  the  enemy 
had  been  endured  and  replied  to  with  the  unruffled 
courage  of  veterans.  At  10:30  our  gunners  became  so 
fatigued  that  I  left  the  fort,  accompanied  by  one  of  my 
volunteer  aides,  Captain  H.  Rose,  and  went  back  to  Cap 
tain  Read's  battery  (one  and  three-quarter  miles  to  the 
rear  of  the  fort)  and  brought  the  greater  part  of  his  men 
back  to  take  the  places  of  our  exhausted  men  inside  the 
fort.  .  .  .  Two  o'clock  had  now  arrived,  when  I  noticed 
our  men  coining  out  of  the  fort,  which  they  had  bravely 
defended  for  four  and  a  half  hours  against  fearful  odds, 
and  then  only  retiring  when  all  but  three  of  the  guns  on 
the  water-front  had  been  disabled,  and  only  500  pounds 
of  powder  in  the  magazine ;  commencing  the  action 
with  220  men  inside  the  fort,  afterward  increased  to  255 
by  the  accession  from  Read's  battery.  These  heroic  men 


retired  slowly  and  sadly  from  their  well-fought  guns, 
which  to  have  defended  longer  would  have  exhibited 
the  energy  of  despair  rather  than  the  manly  pluck  of 
the  true  soldier." 

Of  the  attack  upon  Fort  Beauregard,  General 
Drayton  says : 

"  The  attack  upon  the  fort,  though  not  so  concentrated 
and  heavy  as  that  upon  Walker,  was  nevertheless  very 
severe.  Its  armament  was  19  guns,  of  which  the  follow 
ing,  viz.,  1  8-inch  Rodman,  bored  to  24-pounder  and 
rifled,  2  42-pounders,  1  10-inch  Columbiad,  2  42-pounders, 
reamed  to  eight  inches,  and  1  32-pounder  in  hot-shot 
battery,  were  the  only  guns  capable  of  beingused  against 
the  fleet.  The  force  on  Bay  Point  was  640  men,  com- 
maded  by  Col.  R.  G.  M.  Dunovant,  12th  Regiment  South 
Carolina  Volunteers.  Of  the  above,  149  garrisoned  Fort 
Beauregard,  under  the  immediate  command  of  Capt. 
Stephen  Elliott,  Jr.,  Beaufort  Volunteer  Artillery,  Com 
pany  A  9th  Regiment  South  Carolina  Volunteers.  The 
infantry  force  of  Colonel  Dunovant's  regiment  was 
intrusted  with  the  protection  of  the  eastern  part  of  the 
island,  and  of  the  defense  of  the  bastion  line  at  the 
Island  Narrows,  where  an  attack  was  expected  from  the 
enemy. " 

EDITORS. 


DU  PONT  AND    THE  PORT  ROYAL  EXPEDITION. 


689 


message  was  delivered  to  the  only  white  man  found,  who  sat  in  the  post-office 
and  seemed  quite  dazed.  At  General  Drayton's  headquarters  was  found  a 
chart  of  the  coast,  and,  in  red-pencil  marks,  a  very  valuable  addition,  no  less 
than  the  position  of  all  the  earth-works  within  his  command,  the  number  of 
guns  being  shown  by  the  number  6f  red  marks  in  each  locality.  All  of  the 
batteries  indicated  from  North  Edisto 
south  to  Tybee  were  found  to  be  aban 
doned;  the  guns,  however,  had  been 
removed,  with  the  exception  of  some 
inferior  pieces.  Wherever  the  gun 
boats  penetrated,  into  harbors  or 
rivers,  huge  columns  of  white  smoke 
were  seen  011  all  sides  from  the  burn 
ing  cotton,  far  out  of  our  reach,  had 
it  been  the  special  object  of  our  visit 
to  secure  it.  Thus  the  enem  inflicted 


POPE'S    HOUSE,    HILTON    HEAD,   USED    BY    THE    UNION 
ARMY    AS    A    SIGNAL-STATION.      FROM    A 
WAR-TIME    SKETCH. 


upon   the    inhabitants    injuries    they 

would  otherwise  have  escaped,  even  had  it  been  within  the  power  of  the 

crews  of  the  gun-boats  to  inflict  them. 

On  the  10th,  on  board  the  Seneca,  the  flag-officer  paid  a  visit  to  Beaufort 
and  endeavored,  by  proclamation  printed  and  distributed,  to  assure  peaceable 
inhabitants  of  his  protection.  A  planter  whose  house  was  on  Paris  Island, 
plainly  in  view  from  the  anchorage  at  Port  Royal,  remained  without  molesta 
tion  for  weeks,  and  was  then  constrained  to  leave  only  under  threats  of  dire 
penalties  from,  his  Confederate  friends. 

After  abandoning  his  works  on  Hilton  Head,  the  enemy  did  not  succeed  in 
getting  off  the  island,  at  Seabrook  Landing,  only  six  miles  from  the  fort,  until 
2  A.  M.  of  the  8th.  On  the  Bay  Point  side,  owing  to  a  much  longer  march  and 
the  indifferent  means  of  crossing  a  small  stream,  it  was  not  until  the  follow 
ing  afternoon  that  the  force  reached  an  adjacent  island  or  the  mainland.  J 
Every  man  of  them,  whether  in  the  one  fort  or  the  other,  was  doubtless  greatly 
impressed  with  the  power  of  gun-boats  when  brought  face  to  face  with  those 
batteries  which  only  a  few  hours  before  they  had  regarded  as  quite  capable 
of  sinking  or  driving  off  any  force  that  would  be  brought  against  them. 

The  battle  of  Port  Royal,  occurring  a  little  less  than  seven  months  after 
the  fall  of  Fort  Sumter,  was  of  surpassing  value  in  its  moral  and  political 
effect,  both  at  home  and  abroad.  It  gave  us  one  of  the  finest  harbors  on  the 
Atlantic  sea-board,  affording  an  admirable  base  for  future  operations ;  and,  by 
the  establishment  of  coaling  stations,  shops,  and  supply  depots,  made  it  pos 
sible  to  maintain  an  effective  blockade  within  the  entrances  of  the  whole 
coast  from  Charleston  to  Cape  Florida,  except  at  Fernandina.  Although 


^  General  T.  F.  Drayton  says,  in  his  report : 
'•Notwithstanding  the  prompt  measures  adopted 
by  Colonel  Dunovant  to  effect  his  retreat  in  the 
direction  of  the  Narrows,  it  is  surprising  that,  with 
the  knowledge  possessed  by  the  enemy  (through 
Mr.  [C.  A.]  Boutelle  and  others  connected  with 
VOL.  i.  44 


the  Coast  Survey),  his  retreat  had  not  been  inter 
cepted  by  gun-boats  passing  up  toward  Beaufort, 
and  mine  by  other  steamers  taking  the  passage 
through  Scull  Creek  toward  the  ferry  landing. 
Why  they  did  not  adopt  this  course  must  be  left 
to  time  to  explain.''  EDITORS. 


690 


DU  PONT  AND   THE   PORT  ROYAL    EXPEDITION. 


the  casualties  during  the  engagement  were  inconsiderable,  military  men 
and  readers  who  note  results  will  not  measure  its  importance  by  the  small 
number  of  the  killed  and  wounded,  indicative,  in  this  case,  of  the  profes 
sional  ability  and  tactical  skill  with  which  the  victory  was  won.  The  capture 
of  the  forts  at  Hatteras  Inlet,  August  28th,  1861,  was  the  result  of  a  bombard 
ment  rather  than  of  a  battle  ;  owing  to  shoal  water,  extending  far  to  seaward, 
the  heavy  vessels  were  held  at  so  long  a  range  that  not  a  single  projectile  of 

the  enemy  reached  them.  Al 
though  9-inch  shells  were 
fired  from  the  broadside  guns 
of  the  squadron  the  first  day 
of  the  bombardment,  it  is 
doubtful  if  they  reached  the 
forts  :  the  pivot-guns,  being  of 


UNION  SIGNAL-STATION,  BEAUFORT,   S.  C.,—  HOME  OF 
,T.  G.   HARNWEI.L.      FROM   PHOTOGRAPHS. 


FULLER'S    HOUSE,  BEAUFORT,   S.  C. 


larger  caliber  and  having  more  ele 
vation,  dropped  heavy  shells  on  weak 
bomb-proofs  and  on  insufficient  cov 
erings  to  the  magazine,  and  compelled 
the  surrender  of  the  garrison.  Nevertheless,  the  capture  of  Hatteras  Inlet 
was  an  event  of  great  military  importance. 

So  far  as  the  relative  merits  of  ships  and  earth-works  were  concerned,  the  bat 
tle  of  Port  Royal  asserted  in  such  positive  terms  the  power  of  shell-guns  afloat 
that  the  enemy  at  once  abandoned  all  minor  points  of  defense  along  the  coast 
not  covered  by  difficult  water  approaches,  and  ever  after  seemed  to  regard  the 
obstruction  of  channels  as  the  main  element  in  successful  defense. 

The  establishment  and  maintenance  of  our  most  efficient  system  of  block 
ade  along  all  the  Southern  coasts  was  largely  due  to  the  intelligence  and 
ability  with  which  Rear-Admiral  Du  Pont  and  his  co-laborers  formulated 
the  principles  involved  at  the  very  outset  of  the  contest.  His  long  experience 
in  blockade  duty  during  the  Mexican  war  was  of  the  greatest  value  to  the 
conference,  and  indeed  prompted  his  selection  as  its  president. 

In  a  private  letter,  dated  on  board  the  Cyane,  July  27th,  1847,  Du  Pont 
stated,  quite  prophetically,  the  value  of  his  study  of  the  subject  of  blockades: 

"  I  have  exhausted  Kent,Wheaton,  and  Vattel  on  the  subject, —  a  right  good  piece  of  profes 
sional  work  and  study,  which  may  be  invaluable  in  the  future.  Three  or  four  issues  have  been 
started  not  covered  at  all  by  those  authorities,  of  which  I  have  made  notes." 


THE  OPPOSING  FORCES  AT  PORT  ROYAL.  691 

Previous  to  our  civil  war  no  higher  rank  was  known  in  the  American 
navy  than  that  of  captain,  although  the  law  accorded  the  title  of  flag-officer, 
with  additional  pay,  to  captains  in  command  of  recognized  naval  stations. 
The  engagement  at  Port  Royal,  the  taking  of  New  Orleans,  and  other  suc 
cessful  operations  of  our  navy  dolibtless  led  to  the  creation  of  the  higher 
grades  of  commodore  and  rear-admiral,  July  16th,  1862,  on  which  date  Flag- 
Officer  Du  Pont  became  a  rear-admiral,  ranking  second  on  the  list. 

Eminently  adapted  to  command,  he  knew  well  how  to  secure  the  best 
services  of  his  subordinates.  Intelligent,  cheerful  in  manner,  of  tall  and 
commanding  mien,  he  naturally  invited  and  obtained  the  confidence  of  those 
who  were  fortunate  enough  to  serve  under  his  orders.  During  the  past  half 
century  the  navy  of  the  United  States  has  not  had  an  officer  of  more  dis 
tinguished  appearance,  or  endowed  with  more  manly  virtues.  Though  fitted 
by  nature  to  be  a  leader  among  men,  he  thoroughly  appreciated  the  necessity 
for  study  to  make  himself  equal  to  every  professional  requirement.  It  is  not 
given  to  man  to  be  preeminent  without  an  earnest  exertion  to  that  end,  how 
ever  much  nature  may  have  done  in  his  behalf. 

In  the  erection  of  a  statue  at  Washington,  and  in  the  naming  of  Du  Pont 
Circle,  in  which  it  stands,  the  American  people,  through  Congress,  have  paid  a 
proper  tribute  to  the  memory  of  this  worthy  representative  of  the  naval  service. 

AMMENDALE,  MD.,  September,  1887. 


THE   OPPOSING  FORCES  AT   PORT   ROYAL,  NOVEMBER    TTH,  1861. 

THE  UNION  FLEET,  Flag-Officer  S.  F.  DuPout,  command-  UNION  LAND  FORCES,  Brig. -Gen.  Thomas  W.  Sherman, 

ing.     Captain  Charles  Henry  Davis,  Fleet-Captain.  First  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  Egbert  L.  Viele:  8th  Me., 

Flag-ship :  frigate  Wabash  (2  10-inch,  28  9-inch,  14  8-inch,  Col.  Lee  Strickland;  3d  N.  H.,  Col.  Enoch  Q.  Fellows; 

2    12-pounders),    Commander   C.  R.  P.    Rodgers;   side-  46th  N.  Y.,  Col.  Rudolph  Rosa;  47th  N.  Y.,  Col.  Henry 

•wheel  steamer  Susquehanna  (15  8-iuch,  1  24-pounder,  2  Moore;  48th  N.  Y.,  Col.  James  H.  Perry.     Second  Bri- 

12-poundern),  Captain  J.  L.  Lardner ;  sloop  Mohican  (2  gade,   Brig.-Gen.   Isaac    I.    Stevens :    8th    Mich.,    CoL 

11-inch,  4  32-pounders,  1  12-pounder),  Commander  S.  W.  William  M.  Fenton ;  79th  N.  Y.,  Lieut.-Col.  William  H. 

Godon;  Seminole  il  11-inch,  4  32-pouudersi,  Commander  Nobles;   50th  Pa.,  Col.  Benjamin  C.  Christ;  100th  Pa., 

J.  P.  Gillis;  Pocahontas  (1  10-inch,  4  32-pounders),  Com-  Col.  Daniel  Leasure.     Third  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  Hora- 

mander   Percival    Drayton  ;    Pan-nee    (8   9-inch,   2   12-  tio  G.  Wright:  6th  Conn.,  Col.  John  L.  Chatfleld;  7th 

pounders),  Lieutenant  R.   H.  Wynian;  gun-boats  Una-  Conn.,  Col.  Alfred  H.Terry;  9th  Me.,  Col.    Rishworth 

dilla,  Lieutenant  Napoleon  Collins;  Seneca,  Lieutenant  Rich;  4th  N.  H.,  Col.  Thomas  J.  Whipple.     Unattached: 

Daniel  Ammen;    Ottawa,   Lieutenant  T.    H.    Stevens;  3d  R.  L,  Col.  Nathaniel  W.  Brown  ;  1st  N.  Y.  Engineers, 

Pembina,  Lieutenant  J.  P.    Baukhead  (each  of  the  four  Col.  Edward  W.  Serrell ;  Battery  E,  3d  U.  S.  Art'y,  Capt. 

latter  carried  1    11-inch,  1   20-pounder    rifle,    and  2  24-  John  Hamilton, 
pounders) ;    sailing    sloop    Yandalia    (4    8-inch,    16    32- 

pounders/1   12-pounder),  Commander  F.  S.  Haggerty;  CONFEDERATE  LAND  FORCES    Bng.-Gen.   Thomas  F_ 

steamer   BienviUe    (8  32-pouudore,  1    30-pounder  rifle),  ^^^''^^^^°^U£^^-S^1^'^ 

Commander  Charles  Steedman ;  An^a  (8  32-pounders  t*  ttS^TffA'SZ^k'S  SaSsn^ 

1   12-poundcn,    Commander    E    G.  Parrott;    t,nlc,c    6  B       f  rt    ^  Q     Guerrillas,  Capt.  J.  H.  Screven;   Ga. 

32-poumlers,  1  20-pounder  nfle),  Lieutenant  P.  a  Wat-  <                                              Mmti;i  Art,            , 

mough;    Pentium  (4  32-pounders,  1  12-pounder >,  Lieuten-  •'       '  w                  Lo<8  .  k  n  .  w  48.  m  7  =  66 
ant  T.  A.  Budd  ;  K.  B.  Forbes  <1  32-pounders),  Lieutenant 

H.  S.  Newcomb;  Isaac  Smith   (8  8-inch,  1  30-pounder  CONFEDERATE    NAVAL    FORCES,    Flag-Officer  Josiah 

rifle,  originally,  but  the  broadside  battery  was  thrown  Tattnall:  Savannah  (flag-ship),  Lieut.  John  N.   Maffltt; 

overboard   on' the  way  down  from   Hampton   Roads),  Sampson,  Lieut.    J.    S.   Kennard;    Jtesolnte,    Lieut.    J. 

Lieutenant  J  W    A..  Nicholson.  Pembroke  Jones.    They  were  small  side-wheel  steamers, 

The  loss  in  the  Union  fleet,  as  officially  reported,  was  and  each  carried  2  32-pounders   (smooth-bore).    There 

8  killed,  and  23  wounded.    Total,  31.  were  no  casualties. 


THE    FIRST   FIGHT   OF   IRON-GLADS. 

BY   JOHN  TAYLOR  WOOD,   COLONEL,  C1.  S.  A. 

THE  engagement  in  Hampton  Roads  on  the  8th  of  March,  1862,  between 
the  Confederate  iron-clad  Virginia,  or  the  Merrimac  (as  she  is  known  at 
the  North),  and  the  United  States  wooden  fleet,  and  that  on  the  9th  between 
the  Virginia  and  the  Monitor,  was,  in  its  results,  in  some  respects  the  most 
momentous  naval  conflict  ever  witnessed.  No  battle  was  ever  more  widely 
discussed  or  produced  a  greater  sensation.  It  revolutionized  the  navies  of  the 
world.  Line-of -battle  ships,  those  huge,  overgrown  craft,  carrying  from  eighty 
to  one  hundred  and  twenty  guns  and  from  five  hundred  to  twelve  hundred 
men,  which,  from  the  destruction  of  the  Spanish  Armada  to  our  time,  had 
done  most  of  the  fighting,  deciding  the  fate  of  empires,  were  at  once  univer 
sally  condemned  as  out  of  date.  Rams  and  iron-clads  were  in  future  to  decide 
all  naval  warfare.  In  this  battle  old  things  passed  away,  and  the  experience 
of  a  thousand  years  of  battle  and  breeze  was  forgotten.  The  naval  supremacy 
of  England  vanished  in  the  smoke  of  this  fight,  it  is  true,  only  to  reappear 
some  years  later  more  commanding  than  ever.  The  effect  of  the  news  was 
best  described  by  the  London  "  Times,"  which  said :  "  Whereas  we  had  avail 
able  for  immediate  purposes  one  hundred  and  forty-nine  first-class  war-ships, 
we  have  now  two,  these  two  being  the  Warrior  and  her  sister  Ironside.  There 
is  not  now  a  ship  in  the  English  navy  apart  from  these  two  that  it  would 
not  be  madness  to  trust  to  an  engagement  with  that  little  Monitor."  The 
Admiralty  at  once  proceeded  to  reconstruct  the  navy,  cutting  down  a  num 
ber  of  their  largest  ships  and  converting  them  into  turret  or  broadside 
iron-clads. 

The  same  results  were  produced  in  France,  which  had  but  one  sea-going  iron 
clad,  La  Gloire,  and  this  one,  like  the  Warrior,  was  only  protected  amidships. 
The  Emperor  Napoleon  promptly  appointed  a  commission  to  devise  plans  for 
rebuilding  his  navy.  And  so  with  all  the  maritime  powers.  In  this  race  the 
United  States  took  the  lead,  and  at  the  close  of  the  war  led  all  the  others  in 
the  numbers  and  efficiency  of  its  iron-clad  fleet.  It  is  true  that  all  the  great 
powers  had  already  experimented  with  vessels  partly  armored,  but  very  few 
were  convinced  of  their  utility,  and  none  had  been  tried  by  the  test  of  battle, 
if  we  except  a  few  floating  batteries,  thinly  clad,  used  in  the  Crimean  War. 


THE  FIRST  FIGHT  OF  IRON -CL ADS. 


693 


ILL  the  spring  of  1861  Norfolk  and  its  large  naval  establishment  had  been 
hurriedly  abandoned  by  the  Federals,  why  no  one  could  tell.  It  is  about 
twelve  miles  from  Fort  Monroe,  which  was  then  held  by  a  large  force  of 
regulars.  A  few  companies  of  these,  with  a  single  frigate,  could  have 
occupied  and  commanded  the  town  and  navy  yard  and  kept  the  channel 
open.  However,  a  year  later,  it  was  as  quickly  evacuated  by  the  Confed 
erates,  and  almost  with  as  little  reason.  But  of  this  I  will  speak  later. 

The  yard  was  abandoned  to  a  few  volunteers,  after  it  was  partly  destroyed, 
and  a  large  number  of  ships  were  burnt.  Among  the  spoils  were  upward  of 
twelve  hundred  heavy  guns,  which  were  scattered  among  Confederate  fortifi 
cations  from  the  Potomac  to  the  Mississippi.  [See  foot-note,  p.  712.]  Among 
the  ships  burnt  and  sunk  was  the  frigate  Mcrrimac  of  3500  tons  and  40  guns, 
afterward  rechristened  the  Virginia,  and  so  I  will  call  her.  During  the  summer 
of  1861  Lieutenant  John  M.  Brooke,  an  accomplished  officer  of  the  old  navy, 
who  with  many  others  had  resigned,  proposed  to  Secretary  Mallory  to  raise  and 
rebuild  this  ship  as  an  iron-clad.  His  plans  were  approved,  and  orders  were 
given  to  carry  them  out.  She  was  raised  and  cut  down  to  the  old  berth-deck. 
Both  ends  for  seventy  feet  were  covered  over,  and  when  the  ship  was  in  fight 
ing  trim  were  just  awash.  On  the  midship  section,  170  feet  in  length,  was  built 
at  an  angle  of  45  degrees  a  roof  of  pitch-pine  and  oak  24  inches  thick,  extend 
ing  from  the  water-line  to  a  height  over  the  gun-deck  of  7  feet.  [See  pp.  715- 
717.]  Both  ends  of  the  shield  were  rounded  so  that  the  pivot-guns  could  be 


THE    BURNING    OF    THE    FRIGATE   "MERRIMAC"   AND    OF  THE    GOSPORT  NAVY   YARD.      (SEE   FOOT-NOTE,  P.   712.) 


694 


THE  FIRST  FIGHT  OF  I  RON -CL  ADS. 


REMODKLING  THE 

"  MERRIMAC  "  AT  THE  GO8PORT 

NAVY  YARD. 

[For  a  statement  of  the  details  of  the 
vessel  differing  from  them  as  shown  in 
this  picture,  see  p.  717.] 

used  as  bow  and  stern  chasers  or  quartering.  Over  the  gun-deck  was  a  light 
grating,  making  a  promenade  about  twenty  feet  wide.  The  wood  backing  was 
covered  with  iron  plates,  rolled  at  the  Tredegar  works,  two  inches  thick  and 
eight  wide.  The  first  tier  was  put  on  horizontally,  the  second  up  and  down,— 
in  all  to  the  thickness  of  four  inches,  bolted  through  the  wood-work  and 
clinched.  The  prow  was  of  cast-iron,  projecting  four  feet,  and  badly  secured, 
as  events  proved.  The  rudder  and  propeller  were  entirely  unprotected.  The 
pilot-house  was  forward  of  the  smoke-stack,  and  covered  with  the  same  thick 
ness  of  iron  as  the  sides.  The  motive  power  was  the  same  that  had  always 
been  in  the  ship.  Both  of  the  engines  and  boilers  had  been  condemned  on  her 
return  from  her  last  cruise,  and  were  radically  defective.  Of  course,  the  fire 
and  sinking  had  not  improved  them.  We  could  not  depend  upon  them  for 
six  hours  at  a  time.  A  more  ill-contrived  or  unreliable  pair  of  engines  could 
only  have  been  found  in  some  vessels  of  the  United  States  navy. 

Lieutenant  Catesby  ap  R.  Jones  was  ordered  to  superintend  the  armament, 
and  no  more  thoroughly  competent  officer  could  have  been  selected.  To  his 
experience  and  skill  as  her  ordnance  and  executive  officer  was  due  the  charac 
ter  of  her  battery,  which  proved  so  efficient.  It  consisted  of  2  7-inch  rifles, 
heavily  reenforced  around  the  breech  with  3-inch  steel  bands,  shrunk  on. 
These  were  the  first  heavy  guns  so  made,  and  were  the  bow  and  stern  pivots. 
There  were  also  2  6-inch  rifles  of  the  same  make,  and  6  9-inch  smooth-bore 
broadside, — 10  guns  in  all. 

During  the  summer  and  fall  of  1861  I  had  been  stationed  at  the  batteries 
on  the  Potomac  at  Evansport  and  Aquia  Creek,  blockading  the  river  as  far 
as  possible.  In  January,  1862,  I  was  ordered  to  the  Virginia  as  one  of  the 
lieutenants,  reporting  to  Commodore  French  Forrest,  who  then  commanded 
the  navy  yard  at  Norfolk.  Commodore  Franklin  Buchanan  was  appointed 
to  the  command, —  an  energetic  and  high-toned  officer,  who  combined  with 
daring  courage  great  professional  ability,  standing  deservedly  at  the  head  of 
his  profession.  In  1845  he  had  been  selected  by  Mr.  Bancroft,  Secretary  of 


THE  FIRST  FIGHT  OF  IRON-CLADS.  695 

the  Navy,  to  locate  and  organize  the  Naval  Academy,  and  he  launched  that 
institution  upon  its  successful  career.  Under  him  were  as  capable  a  set  of 
officers  as  ever  were  brought  together  in  one  ship.  But  of  man-of-war's  men 
or  sailors  we  had  scarcely  any.  The  South  was  almost  without  a  maritime 
population.  In  the  old  service  the 'majority  of  officers  were  from  the  South, 
and  all  the  seamen  from  the  North.  ^ 

Every  one  had  flocked  to  the  army,  and  to  it  we  had  to  look  for  a  crew. 
Some  few  seamen  were  found  in  Norfolk,  who  had  escaped  from  the  gun-boat 
flotilla  in  the  waters  of  North  Carolina,  on  their  occupation  by  Admiral  Golds- 
borough  and  General  Burnside.  In  hopes  of  securing  some  men  from  the  army, 
I  was  sent  to  the  headquarters  of  General  Magruder  at  Yorktown,  who  was 
known  to  have  under  his  command  two  battalions  from  New  Orleans,  among 
whom  might  be  found  a  number  of  seamen.  The  general,  though  pressed 
for  want  of  men,  holding  a  long  line  with  scarcely  a  brigade,  gave  me  every 
facility  to  secure  volunteers.  With  one  of  his  staff  I  visited  every  camp,  and 
the  commanding  officers  were  ordered  to  parade  their  men,  and  I  explained 
to  them  what  I  wanted.  About  200  volunteered,  and  of  this  number  I 
selected  80  who  had  had  some  experience  as  seamen  or  gunners.  Other 
commands  at  Richmond  and  Petersburg  were  visited,  and  so  our  crew  of 
three  hundred  was  made  up.  They  proved  themselves  to  be  as  gallant  and 
trusty  a  body  of  men  as  any  one  would  wish  to  command,  not  only  in  battle, 
but  in  reverse  and  retreat. 

Notwithstanding  every  exertion  to  hasten  the  fitting  out  of  the  ship,  the  work 
during  the  winter  progressed  but  slowly,  owing  to  delay  in  sending  the  iron 
sheathing  from  Richmond.  At  this  time  the  only  establishment  in  the  South 
capable  of  rolling  iron  plates  was  the  Tredegar  foundry.  Its  resources  were 

&  The  officers  of  the  Merrimac  were  :  Flag-Officer,  Algernon  S.  Garnett ;  Captain  of  Marines,  Reuben 
Franklin  Buchanan;  Lieutenants,  Catesby  ap  R.  Thorn;  Engineers,  H.  A.  Ramsey,  acting  chief; 
Jones  (executive  and  ordnance  officer),  Charles  C.  Assistants,  Tynan,  Campbell,  Herring,  Jack,  and 
Simms,  R.  D.  Minor  (flag),  Hunter  Davidson,  John  White;  Boatswain,  Hasker;  Gunner,  Oliver;  Car- 
Taylor  Wood,  J.  R.  Eggleston,  Walter  Butt ;  Mid-  penter,  Liudsey ;  Clerk,  Arthur  Sinclair,  Jr. ;  Vol- 
shipmen,  Foute,  Mannaduke,  Littlepage,  Craig,  nnteer  Aides,  Lieutenant  Douglas  Forrest,  C.  S.  A., 
Long,  and  Rootes ;  Paymaster,  James  Semple ;  Captain  Thomas  Kevill,  detachment  of  Norfolk 
Surgeon,  Dimviddie  B.  Phillips;  Assistant-Surgeon,  United  Artillery;  Signal  Corps,  Sergeant  Tabb. 


/./.  B.  L.  Blackford.  del.  March  7,  1862. 

*  woTDErBuLwwK.  THE  "MERRIMAC,"  FROM   A   SKETCH  MADE    THE    DAY    BEFORE  dd  ,RON  UNDER  WATER. 

h  PILOT-HOUSE.  THE    FIGHT.  /  ™°PEU.ER. 


THE  FIRST  FIGHT  OF  IRON-CLADS. 


limited,  and  the  demand  for  all  kinds  of  war  material  most  pressing.  And 
when  we  reflect  upon  the  scarcity  and  inexperience  of  the  workmen,  and  the 
great  changes  necessary  in  transforming  an  ordinary  iron  workshop  into 
an  arsenal  in  which  all  the  machinery  and  tools  had  to  be  improvised,  it  is 
astonishing  that  so  much  was  accomplished.  The  unfinished  state  of  the 
vessel  interfered  so  with  the  drills  and  exercises  that  we  had  but  little  oppor 
tunity  of  getting  things  into  shape. 
It  should  be  remembered  that  the  ship 
was  an  experiment  in  naval  archi 
tecture,  differing  in  every  respect 
from  any  then  afloat.  The  officers 
and  the  crew  were  strangers  to  the 
ship  and  to  each  other.  Up  to  the 
hour  of  sailing  she  was  crowded  with 
workmen.  Not  a  gun  had  been  fired, 
hardly  a  revolution  of  the  engines 
had  been  made,  when  we  cast  off 
from  the  dock  and  started  on  what 
many  thought  was  an  ordinary  trial 
trip,  but  which  proved  to  be  a  trial 
such  as  no  vessel  that  ever  floated 
had  undergone  up  to  that  time. 
From  the  start  we  saw  that  she  was 
slow,  not  over  five  knots ;  she  steered 
so  badly  that,  with  her  great  length, 
it  took  from  thirty  to  forty  minutes 
to  turn.  She  drew  twenty-two  feet, 
which  confined  us  to  a  comparatively 


LIEUTENANT    CATESBY    AP    R.  JONES. 
FROM   A  PHOTOGRAPH. 


narrow  channel  in  the  Roads ;  and, 
as  I  have  before  said,  the  engines  were  our  weak  point.  She  was  as  unman 
ageable  as  a  water-logged  vessel. 

It  was  at  noon  on  the  8th  of  March  that  we  steamed  down  the  Elizabeth 
River.  Passing  by  our  batteries,  lined  with  troops,  who  cheered  us  as  we 
passed,  and  through  the  obstructions  at  Craney  Island,  we  took  the  south 
channel  and  headed  for  Newport  News.  At  anchor  at  this  time  off  Fort 
Monroe  were  the  frigates  Minnesota,  Roanoke,  and  St.  Lawrence,  and  several 
gun-boats.  The  first  two  were  sister  ships  of  the  Virginia  before  the  war; 
the  last  was  a  sailing  frigate  of  fifty  guns.  Off  Newport  News,  seven  miles 
above,  which  was  strongly  fortified  and  held  by  a  large  Federal  garrison, 
were  anchored  the  frigate  Congress,  50  guns,  and  the  sloop  Cumberland,  30. 
The  day  was  calm,  and  the  last  two  ships  were  swinging  lazily  by  their  anchors. 
[The  tide  was  at  its  height  about  1 : 40  P.  M.]  Boats  were  hanging  to  the 
lower  booms,  washed  clothes  in  the  rigging.  Nothing  indicated  that  we  were 
expected ;  but  when  we  came  within  three-quarters  of  a  mile,  the  boats  were 
dropped  astern,  booms  got  alongside,  and  the  Cumberland  opened  with  her 
heavy  pivots,  followed  by  the  Congress,  the  gun-boats,  and  the  shore  batteries. 


FRAXKLIX    BUCHANAN,    ADMIRAL,    C.  S.  N.  JOSIAH    TATTXALL,    COMMODORE,    C.  S.  >. 

COMMANDERS    OF    THE    "VIRGINIA"    (OR   "MERRIMAC").     FROM    A    PHOTOGRAPH. 


698 


THE  FIRST  FIGHT  OF  IR.ON-CLADS. 


We  reserved  our  fire  until 
within  easy  range,  when  the 
forward  pivot  was  pointed  and 
fired  by  Lieutenant  Charles 
Simms,  killing  and  wounding 
most  of  the  crew  of  the  after 
pivot-gun  of  the  Cumberland. 
Passing  close  to  the  Congress, 
which  received  our  starboard 
broadside,  and  returned  it 
with  spirit,  we  steered  direct 
for  the  Cumberland,  striking 
her  almost  at  right  angles, 
under  the  fore-rigging  on  the 
starboard  side.  The  blow  was 
hardly  perceptible  on  board 
the  Virginia,  Backing  clear 
of  her,  we  w^ent  ahead  again, 
heading  up  the  river,  helm 
hard-a-starboard,  and  turned 
slowly.  As  we  did  so,  for  the 
first  time  I  had  an  opportu 
nity  of  using  the  after-pivot, 
of  which  I  had  charge.  As  we 
swung,  the  Congress  came  in  range,  nearly  stern  on,  and  we  got  in  three 
raking  shells.  She  had  slipped  her  anchor,  loosed  her  foretop-sail,  run  up 
the  jib,  and  tried  to  escape,  but  grounded.  Turning,  we  headed  for  her 
and  took  a  position  within  two  hundred  yards,  where  every  shot  told.  In  the 
meantime  the  Cumberland  continued  the  fight,  though  our  ram  had  opened 
her  side  wide  enough  to  drive  in  a  horse  and  cart.  Soon  she  listed  to  port 
and  filled  rapidly.  The  crew  were  driven  by  the  advancing  water  to  the  spar- 
deck,  and  there  worked  her  pivot-guns  until  she  went  down  with  a  roar,  the 
colors  still  flying.  No  ship  was  ever  fought  more  gallantly.!  The  Con 
gress  continued  the  unequal  contest  for  more  than  an  hour  after  the  sinking 
of  the  Cumberland.  Her  losses  were  terrible,  and  finally  she  ran  up  the 
white  flag. 

As  soon  as  we  had  hove  in  sight,  coming  down  the  harbor,  the  Roanoke,  St. 
Lawrence,  and  Minnesota,  assisted  by  tugs,  had  got  under  way,  and  started  up 
from  Old  Point  Comfort  to  join  their  consorts.  They  were  under  fire  from 
the  batteries  at  Sewell's  Point,  but  the  distance  was  too  great  to  effect  much. 
The  first  two,  however,  ran  aground  not  far  above  Fort  Monroe,  and  took 

4.  According  to  the  pilot  of  the  Cumberland,  A.  B.  two.   .    .    .    Finally,  after  about  three-fourths  of  an 

Smith:  "Near  the  middle  of  the  fight,  when  the  hour  of  the  most  severe  fighting,  our  vessel  sank,  the 

berth-deck   of  the    Cumberland  had   sunk   below  Stars  and  Stripes   still  waving.     That  flag  was  fi- 

water,  one  of  the  crew  of  the  Merrimac  came  out  nally  submerged,  but  after  the  hull  grounded  on  the 

of  a  port  to  the  outside  of  her  iron-plate  roof,  and  sands,  fifty-four  feet  below,  .    .    .    our  pennant  was 

a  ball  from  one  of  our  guns  instantly  cut  him  in  still  flying  from  the  top-mast  above  the  waves." 


COLONEL  JOHN    TAYLOR    WOOD,   LIEUTENANT    ON    THE 
"  MERRIMAC."     FROM  AN  OIL  PORTRAIT. 


THE  FIRST  FIGHT  OF  IRON-CLADS. 


699 


MAP    OF    HAMPTON    ROADS    AND    ADJACENT    SHOKLS. 


but  little  part  in  the  fight.  The  Min 
nesota,  taking  the  middle  or  swash 
channel,  steamed  up  half-way  be 
tween  Old  Point  Comfort  and  New 
port  News,  when  she  grounded,  but  in  a  position  to  be  actively  engaged. 

Previous  to  this  we  had  been  joined  by  the  James  Elver  squadron,  which 
had  been  at  anchor  a  few  miles  above,  and  came  into  action  most  gallantly, 
passing  the  shore  batteries  at  Newport  News  under  a  heavy  fire,  and  with 
some  loss.  It  consisted  of  the  Yorktown  (or  Patrick  Henry),  12  guns,  Captain 
John  E.  Tucker;  Jamestown,  2  guns,  Lieut-Commander  J.  N.  Barney;  and 
Teaser,  1  gun,  Lieut.-Commander  W.  A.  Webb. 

As  soon  as  the  Congress  surrendered,  Commander  Buchanan  ordered  the 
gun-boats  Beaufort,  Lieut.-Commander  W.  H.  Parker,  and  Raleigh,  Lieut.- 
Commander  J.  W.  Alexander,  to  steam  alongside,  take  off  her  crew,  and  set 
fire  to  the  ship.  Lieutenant  Pendergrast,  who  had  succeeded  Lieutenant 
Smith,  who  had  been  killed,  surrendered  to  Lieutenant  Parker,  of  the  Beau 
fort.  Delivering  his  sword  and  colors,  he  was  directed  by  Lieutenant  Parker 
to  return  to  his  ship  and  have  the  wounded  transferred  as  rapidly  as  possible. 
All  this  time  the  shore  batteries  and  small-arm  men  were  keeping  up  an  inces 
sant  fire  on  our  vessels.  Two  of  the  officers  of  the  Ealeiyli,  Lieutenant  Tayloe 


yoo 


THE  FIRST  FIGHT  OF  I  RON -CL  ADS. 


THE    "  MERRIMAC  "    RAMMING    THE    "  CUMBERLAND." 

and  Midshipman  Hutter,  were  killed  while  assisting  the  Union  wounded  out 
of  the  Congress.  A  number  of  the  enemy's  men  were  killed  by  the  same  fire. 
Finally  it  became  so  hot  that  the  gun-boats  were  obliged  to  haul  off  with  only 
thirty  prisoners,  leaving  Lieutenant  Pendergrast  and  most  of  his  crew  011 
board,  and  they  all  afterward  escaped  to  the  shore  by  swimming  or  in  small 
boats.  While  this  was  going  on,  the  white  flag  was  flying  at  her  mainmast- 
head.  Not  being  able  to  take  possession  of  his  prize,  the  commodore  ordered 
hot  shot  to  be  used,  and  in  a  short  time  she  was  in  flames  fore  and  aft. 
While  directing  this,  both  himself  and  his  flag-lieutenant,  Minor,  were 
severely  wounded.  The  command  then  devolved  upon  Lieutenant  Catesby 
Jones. 

It  was  now  5  o'clock,  nearly  two  hours  of  daylight,  and  the  Minnesota  only 
remained.  She  was  aground  and  at  our  mercy.  But  the  pilots  would  not 
attempt  the  middle  channel  with  the  ebb  tide  and  approaching  night.  So  we 
returned  by  the  south  channel  to  Sewell's  Point  and  anchored,  the  Minnesota 
escaping,  as  we  thought,  only  until  morning. 

Our  loss  in  killed  and  wounded  was  twenty-one.  The  armor  was  hardly 
damaged,  though  at  one  time  our  ship  was  the  focus  on  which  were  directed 
at  least  one  hundred  heavy  guns,  afloat  and  ashore.  But  nothing  outside 
escaped.  Two  guns  were  disabled  by  having  their  muzzles  shot  off.  The  ram 
was  left  in  the  side  of  the  Cumberland.  One  anchor,  the  smoke-stack,  and  the 
steam-pipes  were  shot  away.  Railings,  stanchions,  boat-davits,  everything 
was  swept  clean.  The  flag- staff  was  repeatedly  knocked  over,  and  finally  a 


THE  FIRST  FIGHT  OF  IRON-CLADS. 


701 


boarding-pike  was  used.  Commodore  Buchanan  and  the  other  wounded  were 
sent  to  the  Naval  Hospital,  and  after  making  preparations  for  the  next  day's 
fight,  we  slept  at  our  guns,  dreaming  of  other  victories  in  the  morning.  |) 

But  at  daybreak  we  discovered,  lying  between  us  and  the  Minnesota,  a 
strange-looking  craft,  which  we  knew  at  once  to  be  Ericsson's  Monitor,  which 
had  long  been  expected  in  Hampton 
Roads,  and  of  which,  from  different 
sources,  we  had  a  good  idea.  She  could 
not  possibly  have  made  her  appearance 
at  a  more  inopportune  time  for  us, 
changing  our  plaiss,  which  were  to 
destroy  the  Minnesota,  and  then  the 
remainder  of  the  fleet  below  Fort  Mon 
roe.  She  appeared  but  a  pigmy  com 
pared  with  the  lofty  frigate  which  she 
guarded.  But  in  her  size  was  one 
great  element  of  her  success.  I  will 
not  attempt  a  description  of  the  Moni 
tor  ;  her  build  and  peculiarities  are  well 
known. 

After  an  early  breakfast,  we  got  un 
der  way  and  steamed  out  toward  the 
enemy,  opening  fire  from  our  bow 
pivot,  and  closing  in  to  deliver  our 
starboard  broadside  at  short  range, 
which  was  returned  promptly  from 
her  11-inch  guns.  Both  vessels  then 
turned  and  passed  again  still  closer. 
The  Monitor  was  firing  every  seven  or 
eight  minutes,  and  nearly  every  shot 
struck.  Our  ship  was  working  worse 
and  worse,  and  after  the  loss  of  the 
smoke-stack,  Mr.  Ramsey,  chief  engi 
neer,  reported  that  the  draught  was 
so  poor  that  it  was  with  great  diffi 
culty  he  could  keep  up  steam.  Once 
or  twice  the  ship  was  on  the  bottom. 
Drawing  22  feet  of  water,  we  were 
confined  to  a  narrow  channel,  while 
the  Monitor,  with  only  12  feet  immer 
sion,  could  take  any  position,  and  al 
ways  have  us  in  range  of  her  guns.  Orders  were  given  to  concentrate  our 
fire  on  the  pilot-house,  and  with  good  result,  as  we  afterward  learned.  More 
than  two  hours  had  passed,  and  we  had  made  no  impression  on  the  enemy 

|  Lieutenant  Jones  reported  :   "  It  was  not  easy  to  keep  a  flag  flying.     The  flag-staffs  were  repeatedly 
shot  away.     The  colors  were  hoisted  to  the  smoke-stack  and  several  times  cut  down  from  it."—  EDITORS. 


LIEUTENANT  GEORGE   U.   MORRIS,  ACTING  COMMANDER 
OF  THE     "CUMBERLAND." 

lu  the  absence  of  Captain  Radford,  tlie  command  of 
the  Cumberland  devolved  upon  the  executive  officer. 
Lieutenant  Morris,  from  whose  official  report  we  quote 
the  following  :  "At  thirty  minutes  past  three  the  wa 
ter  had  Drained  upon  us,  notwithstanding  the  pumps 
were  kept  actively  employed  to  a  degree  that,  the  for 
ward-magazine  being  drowned,  we  had  to  take  powder 
from  the  after-magazine  for  the  ten-inch  gun.  At 
thirty-five  minutes  past  three  the  water  had  risen  to 
the  main  hatchway,  and  the  ship  canted  to  port,  and 
•we  delivered  a  parting  fire  — each  man  trying  to  save 
himself  by  jumping  overboard.  Timely  notice  was 
given,  and  all  the  wounded  who  could  walk  were  or 
dered  out  of  the  cockpit ;  but  those  of  the  wounded 
who  had  been  carried  into  the  sick-bay  and  on  the 
berth-deck  were  so  mangled  that  it  was  impossible  to 
save  them.  ...  I  should  judge  we  have  lost  up 
ward  of  one  hundred  men.  I  can  only  say,  in  conclu 
sion,  that  all  did  their  duty,  and  we  sack  with  the 
American  flag  flying  at  the  peak."  When  summoned 
to  surrender,  Morris  replied.  "Never!  I'll  sink  along 
side!  "—EDITORS. 


702 


THE  FIRST  FIGHT  OF  I  RON -CL  ADS. 


THE    "  MEKRIMAC  "    DRIVING    THE    "  CONGRESS  "    FROM    HER    ANCHORAGE. 

so  far  as  we  could  discover,  while  our  wounds  were  slight.  Several  times 
the  Monitor  ceased  firing,  and  we  were  in  hopes  she  was  disabled,  but  the 
revolution  again  of  her  turret  and  the  heavy  blows  of  her  11-inch  shot  on 
our  sides  soon  undeceived  us. 

Coming  down  from  the  spar-deck,  and  observing  a  division  standing  "  at 
ease,"  Lieutenant  Jones  inquired: 

"  Why  are  you  not  firing,  Mr.  Eggleston  f  " 

"  Why,  our  powder  is  very  precious,"  replied  the  lieutenant ;  "  and  after  two 
hours'  incessant  firing  I  find  that  I  can  do  her  about  as  much  damage  by 
snapping  my  thumb  at  her  every  two  minutes  and  a  half." 

Lieutenant  Jones  now  determined  to  run  her  down  or  board  her.  For  nearly 
an  hour  we  manoeuvred  for  a  position.  Now  "  Gro  ahead ! "  now  "  Stop  ! "  now 
"Astern !"  The  ship  was  as  unwieldy  as  Noah's  ark.  At  last  an  opportunity 
offered.  "  Go  ahead,  full  speed ! "  But  before  the  ship  gathered  headway,  the 
Monitor  turned,  and  our  disabled  ram  only  gave  a  glancing  blow,  effecting 
nothing.  Again  she  came  up  on  our  quarter,  her  bow  against  our  side,  and 
at  this  distance  fired  twice.  Both  shots  struck  about  half-way  up  the  shield, 
abreast  of  the  after  pivot,  and  the  impact  forced  the  side  in  bodily  two  or  three 
inches.  All  the  crews  of  the  after  guns  were  knocked  over  by  the  concussion, 
and  bled  from  the  nose  or  ears.  Another  shot  at  the  same  place  would  have 
penetrated.  While  alongside,  boarders  were  called  away ;  but  she  dropped 
astern  before  they  could  get  on  board.  And  so,  for  six  or  more  hours,  the 
struggle  was  kept  up.  At  length,  the  Monitor  withdrew  over  the  middle 
ground  where  we  could  not  follow,  but  always  maintaining  a  position  tcL 


THE  FIRST  FIGHT  OF  IRON-CLADS.  703 

protect  the  Minnesota.\  To  have  run  our  ship  ashore  on  a  falling  tide  would 
have  been  ruin.  We  awaited  her  return  for  an  hour ;  and  at  2  o'clock  p.  M. 
steamed  to  Sewell's  Point,  and  thence  to  the  dockyard  at  Norfolk,  our  crew 
thoroughly  worn  out  from  the  two  days'  fight.  Although  there  is  no  doubt 
that  the  Monitor  first  retired, —  for  Captain  Van  Brunt,  commanding  the 
Minnesota,  so  states  in  his  official  report, —  the  battle  was  a  drawn  one,  so  far 
as  the  two  vessels  engaged  were  concerned.  But  in  its  general  results  the 
advantage  was  with  the  Monitor.  Our  casualties  in  the  second  day's  fight 
were  only  a  few  wounded. 

This  action  demonstrated  for  the  first  time  the  power  and  efficiency  of  the 
rain  as  a  means  of  offense.  The  side  of  the  Cumberland  was  crushed  like  an 
egg-shell.  The  Congress  and  Minnesota,  even  with  our  disabled  bow,  would 
have  shared  the  same  fate  but  that  we  could  not  reach  them  on  account  of 
our  great  draught. 

It  also  showed  the  power  of  resistance  of  two  iron-clads,  widely  differing 
in  construction,  model,  and  armament,  under  a  fire  which  in  a  short  time 
would  have  sunk  any  other  vessel  then  afloat. 

The  Monitor  was  well  handled,  and  saved  the  Minnesota  and  the  remainder 
of  the  fleet  at  Fort  Monroe.  But  her  gunnery  was  poor.  Not  a  single  shot 
struck  us  at  the  water-line,  where  the  ship  was  utterly  unprotected  [see  p. 
717],  and  where  one  would  have  been  fatal.  Or  had  the  fire  been  concentrated 
on  any  one  spot,  the  shield  would  have  been  pierced ;  or  had  larger  charges 
been  used,  the  result  would  have  been  the  same.  Most  of  her  shot  struck  us 
obliquely,  breaking  the  iron  of  both  courses,  but  not  injuring  the  wood  back 
ing.  When  struck  at  right  angles,  the  backing  would  be  broken,  but  not 
penetrated.  We  had  no  solid  projectiles,  except  a  few  of  large  windage,  to 
be  used  as  hot  shot,  and,  of  course,  made  no  impression  on  the  turret.  But 
in  all  this  it  should  be  borne  in  mind  that  both  vessels  were  on  their  trial 
trip,  both  were  experimental,  and  both  were  receiving  their  baptism  of  fire. 

On  our  arrival  at  Norfolk,  Commodore  Buchanan  sent  for  me.  I  found  him 
at  the  Naval  Hospital,  badly  wounded  and  suffering  greatly.  He  dictated  a 
short  dispatch  to  Mr.  Mallory,  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  stating  the  return  of 
the  ship  and  the  result  of  the  two  days'  fight,  and  directed  me  to  proceed  to 
Richmond  with  it  and  the  flag  of  the  Congress,  and  make  a  verbal  report  of 
the  action,  condition  of  the  Virginia,  etc. 

I  took  the  first  train  for  Petersburg  and  the  capital.     The  news  had  pre- 

<\  In  his  official  report,  Captain  Van  Brunt  says  was  fired  by  the  Monitor,  which  was  returned  with 

T  „  *-  "IT      ^.r-  whole  broadsides  from  the  Rebels,  with  no  more  effect, 

of  the  fight,  as  viewed  from  the  Minnesota  :  apparently,  than  so  many  pebble-stones  thrown  by  a 

"At  6  A.  M.  the  enemy  again  appeared,  .  .  .  and  I  child.  ...  The  Merrimac,  finding  that  she  could  make 

beat  to  quarters  ;  but  they  ran  past  my  ship  and  were  nothing  of  the  Monitor,  turned  her  attention  once  more 

heading  for  Fortress  Monroe,  and  the  retreat  was  beaten  to  me.  In  the  morning  she  had  put  one  eleven-inch  shot 

to  eiiubie  my  men  to  get  something  to  eat.  The  Merri-  under  my  counter,  near  the  water-line,  and  now,  on  her 

mac  ran  down  near  the  Rip-Raps  and  then  turned  into  second  approach,  I  opened  upon  her  with  all  my  broad- 

the  channel  through  which  I  had  come.  Again  all  hands  side-guns  and  ten-inch  pivot  —  a  broadside  which  would 

were  called  to  quarters,  and  opened  upon  her  with  my  have  blown  out  of  water  any  timber-built  ship  in  the 

stern-guns,  and  made  signal  to  the  Monitor  to  attack  world.  She  returned  my  fire  with  her  rifled  bow-gun, 

the  enemy.  She  immediately  ran  down  in  my  wake,  with  a  shell  which  passed  through  the  chief  engineer's 

right  within  the  range  of  the  Merrimac,  completely  state-room,  through  the  engineers'  mess-room  amid- 

co~vering  my  ship,  as  far  as  was  possible  with  her  ships,  and  burst  in  the  boatswain's  room,  tearing  four 

diminutive  dimensions,  and,  much  to  my  astonishment,  rooms  all  into  one,  in  its  passage  exploding  two  charges 

laid  herself  right  alongside  of  the  Merrimac,  and  the  of  powder,  which  set  the  ship  on  lire,  but  it  was  promptly 

contrast  was  that  of  a  pigmy  to  a  giant.  Gun  after  gun  extinguished  by  a  party  headed  by  my  first  lieutenant." 


ESCAPE    OF    PART    OF    THE    CREW    OF    THE    "  CONGRESS." 


704 


THE  FIRST  FIGHT  OF  IRON-CLADS.  705 

ceded  me,  and  at  every  station  I  was  warmly  received,  and  to  listening  crowds 
was  forced  to  repeat  the  story  of  the  fight.  Arriving  at  Richmond,  I  drove  to 
Mr.  Mallory's  office  and  with  him  went  to  President  Davis's,  where  we  met  Mr. 
Benjamin,  who,  a  few  days  afterward,  became  Secretary  of  State,  Mr.  Seddon, 
afterward  Secretary  of  War,  General  Cooper,  Adjutant-G-eneral,  and  a  num 
ber  of  others.  I  told  at  length  what  had  occurred  on  the  previous  two  days, 
and  what  changes  and  repairs  were  necessary  to  the  Virginia.  As  to  the 
future,  I  said  that  in  the  ILonitor  we  had  met  our  equal,  and  that  the  result 
of  another  engagement  would  be  very  doubtful.  Mr.  Davis  made  many  in 
quiries  as  regarded  the  ship's  draught,  speed,  and  capabilities,  and  urged  the 
completion  of  the  repairs  at  as  early  a  day  as  possible.  The  conversation 
lasted  until  near  midnight.  During  the  evening  the  flag  of  the  Congress, 
which  was  a  very  large  one,  was  brought  in,  and  to  our  surprise,  in  unfold 
ing  it,  we  found  it  in  some  places  saturated  with  blood.  On  this  discovery 
it  was  quickly  rolled  up  and  sent  to  the  Navy  Department,  where  it  remained 
during  the  war ;  it  doubtless  burned  with  that  building  when  Richmond  was 
evacuated. 

The  news  of  our  victory  was  received  everywhere  in  the  South  with  the 
most  enthusiastic  rejoicing.  Coming,  as  it  did,  after  a  number  of  disasters  in 
the  south  and  west,  it  was  particularly  grateful.  Then  again,  under  the  cir 
cumstances,  so  little  was  expected  from  the  navy  that  this  success  was  entirely 
unlocked  for.  So,  from  one  extreme  to  the  other,  the  most  extravagant 
anticipations  were  formed  of  what  the  ship  could  do.  For  instance:  the 
blockade  could  be  raised,  Washington  leveled  to  the  ground,  New  York  laid 
under  contribution,  and  so  on.  At  the  North,  equally  groundless  alarm  was 
felt.  As  an  example  of  this,  Secretary  Welles  relates  what  took  place  at  a 
Cabinet  meeting  called  by  Mr.  Lincoln  on  the  receipt  of  the  news.-fr  " '  The 
MerrimacJ  said  Staiiton,  '  will  change  the  whole  character  of  the  war ;  she  will 
destroy,  seriatim,  every  naval  vessel ;  she  will  lay  all  the  cities  on  the  sea 
board  under  contribution.  I  shall  immediately  recall  Burnside ;  Port  Royal 
must  be  abandoned.  I  will  notify  the  governors  and  municipal  authorities  in 
the  North  to  take  instant  measures  to  protect  their  harbors.'  He  had  no 
doubt,  he  said,  that  the  monster  was  at  this  moment  on  her  way  to  Washing 
ton  ;  and,  looking  out  of  the  window,  which  commanded  a  view  of  the  Poto 
mac  for  many  miles,  i  Not  unlikely,  we  shall  have  a  shell  or  cannon-ball  from 
one  of  her  guns  in  the  White  House  before  we  leave  this  room.'  Mr.  Seward, 
usually  buoyant  and  self-reliant,  overwhelmed  with  the  intelligence,  listened 
in  responsive  sympathy  to  Stauton,  and  was  greatly  depressed,  as,  indeed, 
were  all  the  members." 

I  returned  the  next  day  to  Norfolk,  and  informed  Commodore  Buchanan 
that  he  would  be  promoted  to  be  admiral,  and  that,  owing  to  his  wound,  he  would 
be  retired  from  the  command  of  the  Virginia.  Lieutenant  Jones  should  have 
been  promoted,  and  should  have  succeeded  him.  He  had  fitted  out  the  ship 
and  armed  her,  and  had  commanded  during  the  second  day's  fight.  However, 
the  department  thought  otherwise,  and  selected  Commodore  Josiah  Tattnall ; 

&The  "  news  "  was  of  the  first  day's  battle  before  the  Monitor  had  arrived.— EDITORS. 

VOL.  I.    45 


706 


THE  FIRST  FIGHT  OF  I  RON -CL  ADS. 


THE    EXPLOSION    OX    THE    BURNING    "  CONGRESS." 

except  Lieutenant  Jones  he  was  the  best  man.  He  had  distinguished  him 
self  in  the  wars  of  1812  and  with  Mexico.  No  one  stood  higher  as  an  ac 
complished  and  chivalrous  officer.  While  in  command  of  the  United  States 
squadron  in  the  East  Indies,  he  was  present  as  a  neutral  at  the  desperate  fight 
at  the  Peiho  Forts,  below  Pekin,  between  the  English  fleet  and  the  Chinese, 
when  the  former  lost  nearly  one-half  of  a  force  of  twelve  hundred  engaged. 
Seeing  his  old  friend  Sir  James  Hope  hard  pressed  and  in  need  of  assistance, 
having  had  four  vessels  sunk  under  him,  he  had  his  barge  manned,  and  with 
his  flag-lieutenant,  S.  D.  Trenchard,  pulled  alongside  the  flag-ship,  through 
the  midst  of  a  tremendous  fire,  in  which  his  coxswain  was  killed  and  several 
of  his  boat's  crew  were  wounded.  He  found  the  gallant  admiral  desperately 
wounded,  and  all  his  crew  killed  or  disabled  but  six.  When  he  offered  his 
services,  surprise  was  expressed  at  his  action.  His  reply  was,  "Blood  is 
thicker  than  water." 

Tattnall  took  command  on  the  29th  of  March.  In  the  meantime  the  Virginia 
was  in  the  dry  dock  under  repairs.  The  hull  four  feet  below  the  shield  was 
covered  with  2-inch  iron.  A  new  and  heavier  ram  was  strongly  secured  to  the 
bow.  The  damage  to  the  armor  was  repaired  [see  p.  717],  wrought-iron  port- 
shutters  were  fitted,  and  the  rifle-guns  were  supplied  with  steel-pointed  solid 
shot.  These  changes,  with  100  tons  more  of  ballast  on  her  fan-tails,  increased 
her  draught  to  23  feet,  improving  her  resisting  powers,  but  correspondingly 
decreasing  her  mobility  and  reducing  her  speed  to  4  knots.  The  repairs  were 
not  completed  until  the  4th  of  April,  owing  to  our  want  of  resources  and  the 
difficulty  of  securing  workmen.  On  the  llth  we  steamed  down  the  harbor 
to  the  Roads  with  six  gun-boats,  fully  expecting  to  meet  the  Monitor  again 
and  other  vessels ;  for  we  knew  their  fleet  had  been  largely  ree'nf orced,  by 


THE  FIRST  FIGHT  OF  IRON-CLADS.  707 

the  VanderMlt,  among  other  vessels,  a  powerful  side-wheel  steamer  fitted  as 
a  ram.  We  were  primed  for  a  desperate  tussle;  but  to  our  surprise  we  had 
the  Roads  to  ourselves.  We  exchanged  a  few  shots  with  the  Rip-Raps  bat 
teries,  but  the  Monitor  with  the  other  vessels  of  the  fleet  remained  below  Fort 
Monroe,  in  Chesapeake  Bay,  where 'we  could  not  get  at  them  except  by  pass 
ing  between  the  forts. 

The  day  before  going  down,  Commodore  Tattnall  had  written  to  Secretary 
Mallory,  "  I  see  no  chance  for  me  but  to  pass  the  forts  and  strike  elsewhere 
and  I  shall  be  gratified  by  your 
authority  to  do  so."     This  freedom 
of  action  was  never  granted,  and 
probably  wisely,  for  the  result  of 
an   action  with   the   Monitor  and 
fleet,  even  if  we  ran  the  gauntlet 
of  the  fire  of  the  forts  successfully, 
was  more  than  doubtful,  and  any 
disaster  would  have  exposed  Nor 
folk  and  James  River,  and  prob 
ably  would  have   resulted  in  the 
loss   of   Richmond.      For  equally 
good  reasons  the  Monitor  acted  on 
the  defensive ;  for  if  she  had  been 
out  of  the  way,   General  McClel- 
lan's  base  and  fleet  of  transports 
in  York  River  would   have   been 
endangered.    Observing  three  mer 
chant  vessels  at   anchor  close  in 
shore  and  within  the  bar  at  Hamp 
ton,  the  commodore  ordered  Lieu 
tenant  Barney  in  the  Jamestown  to 
go  in  and  bring  them  out.     This 
was  promptly  and  successfully  ac 
complished,  under  a  fire  from  the 
forts.    Two  were  brigs  loaded  with 
supplies  for  the  army.  The  capture 
of  these  vessels,  within  gun-shot  of 
their  fleet,  did  not  affect  its  movements.     As  the  Jamestown  towed  her  prizes 
under  the  stern  of  the  English  corvette  Rinaldo,  Captain  Hewett  (now  [1887] 
Vice- Admiral  Sir  William  Hewett,  commanding  the  Channel  Squadron),  then 
at  anchor  in  the  Roads,  she  was  enthusiastically  cheered.     We  remained  below 
all  day,  and  at  night  returned  and  anchored  off.  Sewell's  Point. 

A  few  days  later  we  went  down  again  to  within  gun-shot  of  the  Rip-Raps, 
and  exchanged  a  few  rounds  with  the  fort,  hoping  that  the  Monitor  would 
come  out  from  her  lair  into  open  water.  Had  she  done  so,  a  determined  effort 
would  have  been  made  to  carry  her  by  boarding.  Four  small  gun-boats  were 
ready,  each  of  which  had  its  crew  divided  into  parties  for  the  performance  of 


LIEUTENANT  JOSEPH    B.    SMITH,   ACTING  COMMANDER  OF  THE 
"CONGRESS."     FROM  A  PHOTOGRAPH. 

According  to  the  pilot  of  the  Cumberland,  Lieutenant 
Smith  was  killed  by  a  shot.  His*  death  was  fixed  at  4: 20 
r.  M.  by  Lieutenant  Pendergrast,  next  in  command,  who  did 
not  hear  of  it  until  ten  minutes  later.  When  his  father, 
Commodore  Joseph  Smith,  who  was  on  duty  at  Washing 
ton,  saw  by  the  first  dispatch  from  Fort  Monroe  that  the 
Congress  had  shown  the  white  flag,  he  said,  quietly,  "Joe's 
dead ! "  After  speaking  of  the  death  of  Lieutenant  Smith, 
Lieutenant  Pendergrast  says,  in  his  official  report :  "  Seeing 
that  our  men  were  being  killed  without  the  prospect  of  any 
relief  from  the  Minnesota,  .  .  .  not  being  able  to  get  a 
single  gun  to  bear  upon  the  enemy,  and  the  ship  being  on 
fire  in  several  places,  upon  consultation  with  Commander 
William  Smith  we  deemed  it  proper  to  haul  down  our  col 
ors."  Lieutenant  Smith's  sword  was  sent  to  his  father  by 
the  enemy  under  a  flag  of  truce. —  EDITORS. 


THE  FIRST  FIGHT  OF  IRON-CLADS.  709 

certain  duties  after  getting  on  board.  Some  were  to  try  to  wedge  the  turret, 
some  to  cover  the  pilot-house  and  all  the  openings  with  tarpaulins,  others  to 
scale  with  ladders  the  turret  and  smoke-stack,  using  shells,  hand-grenades, 
etc.  Even  if  but  two  of  the  gun-boats  should  succeed  in  grappling  her,  we 
were  confident  of  success.  Talking'this  over  since  with  Captain  S.  D.  Greene, 
who  was  the  first  lieutenant  of  the  Monitor,  and  in  command  after  Captain 
Wordeii  was  wounded  in  the  pilot-house,  he  said  they  were  prepared  for  any 
thing  of  this  kind  and  that  it  would  have  failed.  Certain  it  is,  if  an  oppor 
tunity  had  been  given,  the  attempt  would  have  been  made. 

A  break-down  of  the  engines  forced  us  to  return  to  Norfolk.  Having  com 
pleted  our  repairs  on  May  8th,  and  while  returning  to  our  old  anchorage,  we 
heard  heavy  firing,  and,  going  down  the  harbor,  found  the  Monitor,  with  the 
iron-clads  Galena,  Naugatuck,  and  a  number  of  heavy  ships,  shelling  our  bat 
teries  at  Sewell's  Point.  We  stood  directly  for  the  Monitor,  but  as  we 
approached  they  all  ceased  firing  and  retreated  below  the  forts.  We  followed 
close  down  to  the  Rip-Raps,  whose  shot  passed  over  us,  striking  a  mile  or 
more  beyond  the  ship.  We  remained  for  some  hours  in  the  Roads,  and  finally 
the  commodore,  in  a  tone  of  deepest  disgust,  gave  the  order :  "  Mr.  Jones, 
fire  a  gun  to  windward,  and  take  the  ship  back  to  her  buoy." 

During  the  month  of  April,  1862,  our  forces,  under  General  J.  E.  Johnston, 
had  retired  from  the  Peninsula  to  the  neighborhood  of  Richmond,  to  defend 
the  city  against  McClellan's  advance  by  way  of  the  Peninsula,  and  from  time 
to  time  rumors  of  the  possible  evacuation  of  Norfolk  reached  us.  On  the  9th 
of  May,  while  at  anchor  off  Sewell's  Point,  we  noticed  at  sunrise  that  our 
flag  was  not  flying  over  the  batteries.  A  boat  was  sent  ashore  and  found 
them  abandoned.  Lieutenant  Pembroke  Jones  was  then  dispatched  to  Nor 
folk,  some  miles  distant,  to  call  upon  General  Huger,  who  was  in  command, 
and  learn  the  condition  of  affairs.  He  returned  during  the  afternoon,  report 
ing,  to  our  great  surprise,  the  town  deserted  by  our  troops  and  the  navy  yard 
on  fire.  This  precipitate  retreat  was  entirely  unnecessary,  for  while  the  Vir 
ginia  remained  afloat,  Norfolk  was  safe,  or,  at  all  events,  was  not  tenable  by 
the  enemy,  and  James  River  was  partly  guarded,  for  we  could  have  retired 
behind  the  obstructions  in  the  channel  at  Craney  Island,  and,  with  the  bat 
teries  at  that  point,  could  have  held  the  place,  certainly  until  all  the  valuable 
stores  and  machinery  had  been  removed  from  the  navy  yard.  Moreover,  had 
the  Virginia  been  afloat  at  the  time  of  the  battles  around  Richmond,  General 
McClellan  would  hardly  have  retreated  to  James  River ;  for,  had  he  done  so, 
we  could  at  any  time  have  closed  it  and  rendered  any  position  on  it  untenable. 

Norfolk  evacuated,  our  occupation  was  gone,  and  the  next  thing  to  be 
decided  upon  was  what  should  be  done  with  the  ship.  Two  courses  of  action 
were  open  to  us :  we  might  have  run  the  blockade  of  the  forts  and  done  some 
damage  to  the  shipping  there  and  at  the  mouth  of  the  York  River,  provided 
they  did  not  get  out  of  our  way,— for,  with  our  great  draught  and  low  rate  of 
speed,  the  enemy's  transports  would  have  gone  where  we  could  not  have  fol 
lowed  them ;  and  the  Monitor  and  other  iron-clads  would  have  engaged  us  with 
every  advantage,  playing  around  us  as  rabbits  around  a  sloth,  and  the  end 


yio 


THE  FIRST  FIGHT  OF  I  RON- CL  ADS. 


would  have  been  the  certain  loss  of  the  vessel.  On  the  other  hand,  the  pilots 
said  repeatedly,  if  the  ship  were  lightened  to  eighteen  feet,  they  conld  take  her 
up  James  Eiver  to  Harrison's  Landing  or  City  Point,  where  she  could  have  been 
put  in  fighting  trim  again,  and  have  been  in  a  position  to  assist  in  the  defense 
of  Richmond.  The  commodore  decided  upon  this  course.  Calling  all  hands  011 

deck,  he  told  them  what  he  wished  done. 
Sharp  and  quick  work  was  necessary ; 
for,  to  be  successful,  the  ship  must  be 
lightened  five  feet,  and  we  must  pass  the 
batteries  at  Newport  News  and  the  fleet 
below  before  daylight  next  morning. 
The  crew  gave  three  cheers,  and  went  to 
work  with  a  will,  throwing  overboard  the 
ballast  from  the  fan-tails,  as  well  as  that 
below, — all  spare  stores,  water,  indeed 
everything  but  our  powder  and  shot. 
By  midnight  the  ship  had  been  light 
ened  three  feet,  when,  to  our  amaze 
ment,  the  pilots  said  it  was  useless  to 
do  more,  that  with  the  westerly  wind 
blowing,  the  tide  would  be  cut  down  so 
that  the  ship  would  not  go  up  even  to 
Jamestown  Flats  ;  indeed,  they  would 
not  take  the  responsibility  of  taking  her 
up  the  river  at  all.  This  extraordinary 
conduct  of  the  pilots  rendered  some  other  plan  immediately  necessary. 
Moral :  All  officers,  as  far  as  possible,  should  learn  to  do  their  own  piloting. 

The  ship  had  been  so  lifted  as  to  be  unfit  for  action ;  two  feet  of  her  hull 
below  the  shield  was  exposed.  She  could  not  be  sunk  again  by  letting  in 
water  without  putting  out  the  furnace  fires  and  flooding  the  magazines. 
Never  was  a  commander  forced  by  circumstances  over  w^hich  he  had  no 
control  into  a  more  painful  position  than  was  Commodore  Tattnall.  But 
coolly  and  calmly  he  decided,  and  gave  orders  to  destroy  the  ship ;  deter 
mining  if  he  could  not  save  his  vessel,  at  all  events  not  to  sacrifice  three 
hundred  brave  and  faithful  men ;  and  that  he  acted  wisely,  the  fight  at  Drew- 
ry's  Bluff,  which  was  the  salvation  of  Richmond,  soon  after  proved.  She  was 
run  ashore  near  Craney  Island,  and  the  crew  landed  with  their  small-arms 
and  two  days'  provisions.  Having  only  two  boats,  it  took  three  hours  to  dis 
embark.  Lieutenant  Catesby  Jones  and  myself  were  the  last  to  leave.  Set 
ting  her  on  fire  fore  and  aft,  she  was  soon  in  a  blaze,  and  by  the  light  of 
our  burning  ship  we  pulled  for  the  shore,  landing  at  daybreak.  We  marched 
22  miles  to  Suffolk  and  took  the  cars  for  Richmond. 

The  news  of  the  destruction  of  the  Virginia  caused  a  most  profound  feeling 
of  disappointment  and  indignation  throughout  the  South,  particularly  as  so 
much  was  expected  of  the  ship  after  our  first  success.  On  Commodore  Tattnall 
the  most  unsparing  and  cruel  aspersions  were  cast.  He  promptly  demanded 


CAPTAIN  G.  J.  VAN    BRUNT,  COMMANDER  OF  THE 
"MINNESOTA."     FROM  A  PHOTOGRAPH. 


THE  FIRST  FIGHT  OF  I  RON -CL  ADS.  711 

a  court  of  inquiry,  and,  not  satisfied  with  this,  a  court-martial,  whose  unani 
mous  finding,  after  considering  the  facts  and  circumstances,  was :  "  Being 
thus  situated,  the  only  alternative,  in  the  opinion  of  the  court,  was  to  aban 
don  and  burn  the  ship  then  and  there ;  which,  in  the  judgment  of  the 
court,  was  deliberately  and  wisely  -done  by  order  of  the  accused.  Where 
fore,  the  court  do  award  the  said  Captain  Josiah  Tattnall  an  honorable 
acquittal." 

It  only  remains  now  to  speak  of  our  last  meeting  with  the  Monitor.  Arriv 
ing  at  Richmond,  we  heard  that  the  enemy's  fleet  was  ascending  James 
River,  and  the  result  was  great  alarm ;  for,  relying  upon  the  Virginia,  not  a 
gun  had  been  mounted  to  protect  the  city  from  a  water  attack.  We  were 
hurried  to  Drewry's  Bluff,  the  first  high  ground  below  the  city,  seven  miles 
distant.  Here,  for  two  days,  exposed  to  constant  rain,  in  bottomless  mud  and 
without  shelter,  011  scant  provisions,  we  worked  unceasingly,  mounting  guns 
and  obstructing  the  river.  In  this  we  were  aided  by  the  crews  of  small  vessels 
which  had  escaped  up  the  river  before  Norfolk  was  abandoned.  The  Jamestown 
and  some  small  sailing-vessels  were  sunk  in  the  channel,  but,  owing  to  the  high 
water  occasioned  by  a  freshet,  the  obstructions  were  only  partial.  We  had 
only  succeeded  in  getting  into  position  three  thirty-twos  and  two  sixty-fours 
(shell  guns)  and  were  without  sufficient  supply  of  ammunition,  when  on  the 
15th  of  May  the  iron-clad  Galena,  Commander  John  Rodgers,  followed  by 
the  Monitor  and  three  others,  hove  in  sight.  We  opened  fire  as  soon  as  they 
came  within  range,  directing  most  of  it  on  the  Galena.  This  vessel  was 
handled  very  skillfully.  Coming  up  within  six  hundred  yards  of  the  battery, 
she  anchored,  and,  with  a  spring  from  her  quarter,  presented  her  broadside ; 
this  under  a  heavy  fire,  and  in  a  narrow  river  with  a  strong  current.  The 
Monitor,  and  others  anchored  just  below,  answered  our  fire  deliberately ;  but, 
owing  to  the  great  elevation  of  the  battery,  their  fire  was  in  a  great  measure 
ineffectual,  though  two  guns  were  dismounted  and  several  men  were  killed 
and  wounded.  While  this  was  going  on,  our  sharp-shooters  were  at  work  on 
both  banks.  Lieutenant  Catesby  Jones,  in  his  report,  speaks  of  this  service : 
"  Lieutenant  Wood,  with  a  portion  of  the  men,  did  good  service  as  sharp 
shooters.  The  enemy  were  excessively  annoyed  by  their  fire.  His  position 
was  well  chosen  and  gallantly  maintained  in  spite  of  the  shell,  shrapnel,  grape, 
and  canister  fired  at  them."  Finding  they  could  make  no  impression  on  our 
works,  the  Galena,  after  an  action  of  four  hours,  returned  down  the  river  with 
her  consorts.  Her  loss  was  about  forty  killed  and  wounded. ,) 

This  was  one  of  the  boldest  and  best-conducted  operations  of  the  war,  and 
one  of  which  very  little  notice  has  been  taken.  Had  Commander  Rodgers 
been  supported  by  a  few  brigades,  landed  at  City  Point  or  above  on  the  south 
side,  Richmond  would  have  been  evacuated.  The  Virginia's  crew  alone  barred 
his  way  to  Richmond ;  otherwise  the  obstructions  would  not  have  prevented 
his  steaming  up  to  the  city,  which  would  have  been  as  much  at  his  mercy  as 
was  New  Orleans  before  the  fleet  of  Farragut. 

^  According  to  the  official  report,  the  loss  on  the  Galena  was  13  killed  and  11  wounded ;  on  the  Port 
Royal,  1  wounded,  and  on  the  Naugatuck,  2  wounded.  Total,  13  killed  and  14  wounded.— EDITORS. 


THE         MONITOR' 


WATCHING   THE   "  MERRIMAC." 

BY  R.    E.    COLSTON,    BRIGADIER-GENERAL,    C.  S.  A. 


IN  March,  1862,  I  was  in  command  of  a  Confed 
erate  brigade  and  of  a  district  011  the  south  side 
of  the  James  River,  embracing  all  the  river  forts 
and  batteries  down  to  the  mouth  of  Nansemond 
River.  My  pickets  were  posted  all  along  the  shore 
opposite  Newport  News.  From  my  headquarters 
at  Smithfield  I  was  in  constant  and  rapid  commu 
nication  through  relays  of  couriers  and  signal 
stations  with  my  department  commander,  Major- 
General  Huger,  stationed  at  Norfolk.  & 

About  1  P.  M.  on  the  8th  of  March,  a  courier 
dashed  up  to  my  headquarters  with  this  brief  dis 
patch:  "The  Virginia  is  coming  up  the  river." 
Mounting  at  once,  it  took  me  but  a  very  short  time 
to  gallop  twelve  miles  down  to  Ragged  Island. 

I  had  hardly  dismounted  at  the  water's  edge 
when  I  descried  the  Merrimac  approaching.  The 
Congress  was  moored  about  a  hundred  yards  below 
the  land  batteries,  and  the  Cumberland  a  little 
above  them.  As  soon  as  the  Merrimac  came 
within  range,  the  batteries  and  war-vessels  opened 

^  "  The  situation  of  affairs,  both  Federal  and  State,  at 
Norfolk,  on  the  morning  of  the  19th  of  April  [1861],"  says 
J.  T.  Scharf  in  his  "  History  of  the  Confederate  States 
Navy,"  "  was  that  the  Federal  authorities  had  there  the 
U.  S.  frigate  Cumberland,  24  guns,  fully  manned,  ready 
for  sea,  and  under  orders  for  Vera  Cruz;  the  brig  Dol 
phin,  4  guns,  fully  manned,  and  ready  for  sea;  the  sloop 
Germantown,  22  guns,  fully  manned,  ready  for  sea ;  the 
sloop  Pit/month,  22  gnus,  ready  for  sea;  the  marines  of  the 
navy  yard,  and  the  guards  of  the  frigate  Raritan,  60  guns, 
in  ordinary;  the  frigate  Columbia,  50  guns,  in  ordinary  ; 
the  frigate  United  States,  50  guns,  in  ordinary ;  the  steam- 
frigate  Merrimac,  40  guns,  under  repairs ;  the  ship  of  the 
line  Delaware,  74  guns,  in  ordinary  ;  the  ship  of  the  line 
Columbus,  74  guns,  in  ordinary ;  and  the  ship  of  the  line 
Pennsylvania,  120  guns,  'receiving-ship';  — all  lying  at 
the  yard  or  in  the  stream.  The  yard  was  walled  around 
with  a  high  brick  iuclosure,  and  protected  by  the  Eliza 
beth  River,  and  there  were  over  800  marines  and  sailors 
with  officers.  On  the  side  of  Virginia  the  situation  was: 
that  of  General  Taliaferro  with  his  staff;  Captain  Heth 
and  Major  Tyler,  two  volunteer  companies,— the  Blues 
of  Norfolk  and  the  Grays  of  Portsmouth,—  and  Captains 
Pegram  and  Jones,  of  the  navy.  These  were  the  only 
troops  in  Norfolk,  until  after  the  evacuation  of  the  navy 
yard  and  the  departure  of  the  Federal  ships." 

Captain  H.  G.  Wright,  of  the  Engineers,  who  was  on 
the  United  States  steamer  Pawnee  that  had  been  sent  to 
secure  the  ships  and  property  at  the  Gosport  Navy 
Yard,  reached  Norfolk  after  dark  on  April  20th.  He  re 
ported  thus:  "  On  reaching  the  yard  it  was  found  that  all 
the  ships  afloat  exceptthe  Cumberland  had  been  scuttled, 
by  order  of  Commodore  McCauley,  the  commandant  of 
the  yard,  to  prevent  their  seizure  by  the  Virginia  forces, 
and  that  they  were  fast  sinking.  One  of  the  objects  of 
the  expedition—  that  of  removing  those  vessels  and  tak 
ing  them  to  sea  —was,  therefore,  frustrated.  On  report 
ing  to  the  commodore  of  the  yard,  I  found  him  disposed 
to  defend  the  yard  and  property  to  the  last,  and 
the  troops  were  accordingly  lauded  and  some  disposi- 


fire.  She  passed  on  up,  exchanging  broadsides 
with  the  Congress,  and  making  straight  for  the 
Cumberland,  at  which  she  made  a  dash,  firing  her 
bow-guns  as  she  struck  the  doomed  vessel  with  her 
prow.  I  could  hardly  believe  my  senses  when  I 
saw  the  masts  of  the  Cumberland  begin  to  sway 
wildly.  After  one  or  two  lurches,  her  hull  disap 
peared  beneath  the  water,  guns  firing  to  the  last 
moment.  Most  of  her  brave  crew  went  down  with 
their  ship,  but  not  with  their  colors,  for  the 
Union  flag  still  floated  defiantly  from  the  masts, 
which  projected  obliquely  for  about  half  their 
length  above  the  water  after  the  vessel  had  set 
tled  unevenly  upon  the  river-bottom.  This  first  act 
of  the  drama  was  over  in  about  thirty  minutes,  but 
it  seemed  to  me  only  a  moment. 

The  commander  of  the  Congress  recognized  at 
once  the  impossibility  of  resisting  the  assault  of  the 
ram  which  had  just  sunk  the  Cumberland.  With 
commendable  promptness  and  presence  of  mind, 
he  slipped  his  cables,  and  ran  her  aground  upon 

tious  for  defense  taken.  It  was  soon  determined,  how 
ever,  by  Commodore  Paulding,  who  had  come  on  the 
Pawnee  from  Washington,  to  finish  the  destruction  of  the 
scuttled  ships,  to  burn  and  otherwise  destroy,  as  far  as 
practicable,  the  property  in  the  yard,  and  withdraw  with 
the  frigate  Cumberlantl,  in  tow  of  the  Pawnee  and  a 
steam-tug  which  was  lying  at  the  yard.  To  Commander 
John  Rodgers,  of  the  navy,  and  myself  was  assigned 
the  duty  of  blowing  up  the  dry-dock,  assisted  by  forty 
men  of  the  volunteers  and  a  few  men  from  the  crew 
of  the  Pawnee."  Captain  Wright  and  Commander 
Rodgers  lighted  the  matches,  but  the  mine,  as  was  aft 
erward  learned,  did  not  explode.  The,  heat  from  the 
burning  buildings  drove  the  men  in  the  boats  from  the 
landing,  and  the.  two  officers,  alone  and  hemmed  in, 
had  to  give  themselves  up  to  the  commander  of  the 
Virginia  forces.  They  were  taken  to  Richmond,  and 
released  on  April  24th. 

In  his  "Recollections,"  Captain  WT.  H.  Parker,  C.  S. 
N.,  says:  "The  evacuation  of  Norfolk  by  the  Federals 
was  a  most  fortunate  thing  for  the  Confederates.  Why 
the  Federal  authorities  did  this  was  always  beyond  my 
comprehension.  They  had  the  place,  and  with  the  force 
at  their  command  could  not  have  been  driven  out.  No 
batteries  could  have  been  put  up  by  the  Confederates 
in  the  face  of  the  broadsides  of  their  ships,  and  it 
being  only  twelve  miles  from  Fort  Monroe  (Old  Point 
Comfort)  it  could  have  been  reenforced  to  any  extent. 
But  they  did  give  it  up,  and  had  hardly  done  so  when 
they  commenced  making  preparations  to  retake  it.  The 
navy  yard  contained  a  large  number  of  heavy  cannon, 
and  these  guns  were  used  not  only  to  fortify  Norfolk  and 
the  batteries  on  the  York,  Potomac,  James,  and  Rappa- 
hannock  rivers,  but  were  sent  to  North  and  South 
Carolina,  Georgia,  Florida,  Alabama,  Mississippi,  and 
Louisiana.  They  were  to  be  found  at  Roanoke  Island, 
Wilmington,  Charleston,  Mobile,  New  Orleans,  Vicks- 
burg,  and  many  other  places.  These  guns,  according 
to  J.  T.  Scharf,  numbered  1198,  of  which  52  were  nine- 
inch  Dahlgreus."  EDITORS. 


WATCHING   THE  "MERRIMAC." 


7*3 


THE   "  MEBRIMAC  ' 


PASSING    THE    CONFEDERATE    BATTERY"    ON    CRAXEY    ISLAND,    ON    HER   WAT 
TO    ATTACK   THE    FEDERAL    FLEET. 


the  shallows,  where  the  Merrimac,  at  that  time 
drawing  twenty-three  feet  of  water,  was  unable  to 
approach  her,  and  could  attack  her  with  artillery 
alone.  But,  although  the  Congress  had  more  guns 
than  the  Merrimac,  and  was  also  supported  by  the 
land  batteries,  it  was  an  unequal  conflict,  for  the 
projectiles  hurled  at  the  Merrimac  glanced  harm 
lessly  frorn  her  iron-covered  roof,  while  her  rifled 
guns  raked  the  Congress  from  end  to  end. 

A  curious  incident  must  be  noted  here.  Great 
numbers  of  people  from  the  neighborhood  of  Rag 
ged  Island,  as  well  as  soldiers  from  the  nearest 
posts,  had  rushed  to  the  shore  to  behold  the  spec 
tacle.  The  cannonade  was  visibly  raging  with 
redoubled  intensity ;  but,  to  our  amazement,  not 
a  sound  was  heard  by  us  from  the  commencement 
of  the  battle.  A  strong  March  wind  was  blowing 
direct  from  us  toward  Newport  News.  We  could 
see  every  flash  of  the  guns  and  the  clouds  of  white 
smoke,  but  not  a  single  report  was  audible. 

The  Merrimac,  taking  no  notice  of  the  land  bat 
teries,  concentrated  her  fire  upon  the  ill-fated  Con 
gress.  The  latter  replied  gallantly  until  her 
commander,  Joseph  B.  Smith,  was  killed  and  her 
decks  were  reeking  with  slaughter.  Then  her 
colors  were  hauled  down  and  white  flags  appeared 
at  the  gaff  and  mainmast.  Meanwhile,  the  James 
River  gun-boat  flotilla  had  joined  the  Merrimac. 

Through  my  field-glass  I  could  see  the  crew  of 
the  Congress  making  their  escape  to  the  shore  over 
the  bow.  Unable  to  secure  her  prize,  the  Merri 
mac  set  her  on  fire  with  hot  shot,  and  turned  to 
face  new  adversaries  just  appearing  upon  the 
scene  of  conflict. 

As  soon  as  it  was  known  at  Fort  Monroe  that 
the  Merrimac  had  come  out,  the  frigates  Min 
nesota,  Boanoke,  and  St.  Lawrence  were  ordered  to 
the  assistance  of  the  blockading  squadron.  The 
Minnesota,  assisted  by  two  tugs,  was  the  first  to 
reach  the  scene,  but  the  Cumberland  and  the  Con 
gress  were  already  past  help.  As  soon  as  she  came 
within  range,  a  rapid  cannonade  commenced  be 
tween  her  and  the  Merrimac,  aided  by  the  Patrick 


Henry  and.  the  Jamestown,  side-wheel  river  steamers 
transformed  into  gun-boats.  The  Minnesota,  draw 
ing  nearly  as  much  water  as  the  Merrimac,  grounded 
upon  a  shoal  in  the  North  Channel.  This  at  once 
put  an  end  to  any  further  attacks  by  ramming; 
but  the  lofty  frigate,  towering  above  the  water, 
now  offered  an  easy  target  to  the  rifled  guns  of 
the  Merrimac  and  the  lighter  artillery  of  the  gun 
boats.  A  shot  from  her  exploded  the  Patrick  Henry's 
boiler,  causing  much  loss  of  life  and  disabling  that 
vessel  for  a  considerable  time. 

In  the  meantime  the  Roanoke  and  St.  Lawrence 
were  approaching,  aided  by  steam-tugs.  As  they 
passed  Sewell's  Point,  its  batteries  opened  fire 
upon  them,  andthey  replied  with  broadsides.  Just 
at  that  moment  the  scene  was  one  of  unsurpassed 
magnificence.  The  bright  afternoon  sun  shone 
upon  the  glancing  waters.  The  fortifications  of 
Newport  News  were  seen  swarming  with  soldiers, 
now  idle  spectators  of  a  conflict  far  beyond  the 
range  of  their  batteries,  and  the  flames  were  just 
bursting  from  the  abandoned  Congress.  The 
stranded  Minnesota  seemed  a  huge  monster  at  bay, 
surrounded  by  the  Merrimac  and  the  gun-boats. 
The  entire  horizon  was  lighted  up  by  the  continual 
flashes  of  the  artillery  of  these  combatants,  the 
broadsides  of  the  Soanoke  and  St.  Lawrence  and 
the  Sewell's  Point  batteries;  clouds  of  white  smoke 
rose  in  spiral  columns  to  the  skies,  illumined  by 
the  evening  sunlight,  while  land  and  water  seemed 
to  tremble  under  the  thunders  of  the  cannonade. 

The  Minnesota  was  now  in  a  desperate  situation. 
It  is  true  that,  being  aground,  she  could  not  sink, 
but,  looking  through  the  glass,  I  could  see  a  hole  in 
her  side,  made  by  the  Merrimac's  rifle  shells.  She 
had  lost  a  number  of  men,  and  had  once  been  set 
on  fire.  Her  destruction  or  surrender  seemed  inev 
itable,  since  all  efforts  to  get  her  afloat  had  failed. 
But  just  then  the  Merrimac  turned  away  from  her 
toward  the  Roanoke  and  the  St.  Lawrence.  These 
vessels  had  suffered  but  little  from  the  distant  fire 
of  the  Sewell's  Point  batteries,  but  both  had  run 
aground,  and  had  not  been  floated  off  again  with- 


7i 4       HOW  THE  GUN-BOAT  "ZOUAVE"  AIDED    THE  "CONGRESS." 


out  great  difficulty,  for  it  was  very  hazardous  for 
vessels  of  deep  draught  to  manoeuvre  over  these 
comparatively  shallow  waters.  When  the  Merri- 
mac  approached,  they  delivered  broadsides  and 
were  then  towed  back  with  promptness.  The 
Merrimac  pursued  them  but  a  short  distance  (for 
by  this  time  darkness  was  falling  upon  the  scene 
of  action,  the  tide  was  ebbing,  and  there  was  great 
risk  of  running  aground),  and  then  steamed  toward 
Norfolk  with  the  Beaufort,  leaving  her  wounded  at 
the  Marine  Hospital. 

And  now  followed  one  of  the  grandest  episodes 
of  this  splendid  yet  somber  drama.  The  moon  in 
her  second  quarter  was  just  rising  over  the  waters, 
but  her  silvery  light  was  soon  paled  by  the  con 
flagration  of  the  Congress,  whose  glare  was  reflected 
in  the  river.  The  burning  frigate  four  miles  away 
seemed  much  nearer.  As  the  flames  crept  up  the 
rigging,  every  mast,  spar,  and  rope  glittered  against 
the  dark  sky  in  dazzling  lines  of  fire.  The  hull, 
aground  upon  the  shoal,  was  plainly  visible,  and 
upon  its  black  surface  each  port-hole  seemed  the 
mouth  of  a  fiery  furnace.  For  hours  the  flames 
raged,  with  hardly  a  perceptible  change  in  the 
wondrous  picture.  At  irregular  intervals,  loaded 
guns  and  shells,  exploding  as  the  fire  reached  them, 
sent  forth  their  deep  reverberations.  The  masts 
and  rigging  were  still  standing,  apparently  almost 
intact,  when,  about  2  o'clock  in  the  morning,  a 
monstrous  sheaf  of  flame  rose  from  the  vessel  to 
an  immense  height.  A  deep  report  announced  the 
explosion  of  the  ship's  powder-magazine.  Appar 
ently  all  the  force  of  the  explosion  had  been  up 
ward.  The  rigging  had  vanished  entirely,  but  the 
hull  seemed  hardly  shattered ;  the  only  apparent 
change  in  it  was  that  in  two  places  two  or  three 
of  the  port-holes  had  been  blown  into  one  great 
gap.  It  continued  to  burn  until  the  brightness  of 
its  blaze  was  effaced  by  the  morning  sun. 

During  the  night  I  had  sent  an  order  to  bring 
down  from  Smithfield  to  Eagged  Island  the  twelve- 
oared  barge  that  I  used  when  inspecting  the  river 
batteries,  and  at  the  first  dawn  of  day  I  embarked 
with  some  of  my  staff,  and  rowed  in  the  direction 
of  the  Minnesota,  confident  of  witnessing  her  de 
struction  or  surrender  ;  and,  in  fact,  nothing  could 
have  saved  her  but  the  timely  arrival  of  the  anx 
iously  expected  Monitor. 

The  sun  was  just  rising  when  the  Merrimac, 
having  anchored  for  the  night  at  Sewell's  Point, 
headed  toward  the  Minnesota.  But  a  most  impor 
tant  incident  had  taken  place  during  the  night.  The 
Monitor  had  reached  Old  Point  about  10  o'clock  ; 


her  commander  had  been  informed  of  the  events 
of  the  day,  and  ordered  to  proceed  at  once  to  the 
relief  of  the  Minnesota. 

As  soon  as  the  Merrimac  approached  her  old 
adversary,  the  Monitor  darted  out  from  behind  the 
Minnesota,  whose  immense  bulk  had  effectually 
concealed  her  from  viewA  No  words  can  express 
the  surprise  with  which  we  beheld  this  strange 
craft,  whose  appearance  was  tersely  and  graphic 
ally  described  by  the  exclamation  of  one  of  my 
oarsmen,  "A  tin  can  on  a  shingle ! "  JYet  this  insig 
nificant-looking  object  was  at  that  moment  the  most 
powerful  war-ship  in  the  world.  )  The  first  shots 
of  the  Merrimac  were  directed  at  the  Minnesota, 
which  was  again  set  on  fire,  while  one  of  the  tugs 
alongside  of  her  was  blown  up,  creating  great  havoc 
and  consternation;  but  the  Monitor,  having  the 
advantage  of  light  draught,  placed  herself  between 
the  Merrimac  and  her  intended  victim,  and  from 
that  moment  the  conflict  became  a  heroic  single 
combat  between  the  two  iron-clads.  For  an  in 
stant  they  seemed  to  pause,  as  if  to  survey  each 
other.  Then  advancing  cautiously,  the  two  vessels 
opened  fire  as  soon  as  they  came  within  range, 
and  a  fierce  artillery  duel  raged  between  them 
without  perceptible  effect,  although  the  entire  fight 
was  within  close  range,  from  half  a  mile  at  the  far 
thest  down  to  a  few  yards.  For  four  hours,  from 
8  to  12  (which  seemed  three  times  as  long),  the 
cannonading  continued  with  hardly  a  moment's 
intermission.  I  was  now  within  three-quarters  of 
a  mile  of  them,  and  more  than  once  stray  shots 
came  near  enough  to  dash  the  spray  over  my  barge, 
but  the  grandeur  of  the  spectacle  was  so  fascinat 
ing  that  they  passed  by  unheeded.  During  the  evo 
lutions,  in  which  the  Monitor  had  the  advantage 
of  light  draught,  the  Merrimac  ran  aground.  After 
much  delay  and  difficulty  she  was  floated  off.  Find 
ing  that  her  shot  made  no  impression  whatever 
upon  the  Monitor,  the  Merrimac,  seizing  a  favorable 
chance,  succeeded  in  striking  her  foe  with  her  stem. 
Soon  afterward  they  ceased  firing  and  separated  as 
if  by  common  consent.  The  Monitor  steamed  away 
toward  Old  Point.  Captain  Van  Brunt,  commander 
of  the  Minnesota,  states  in  his  official  report  that 
when  he  saw  the  Monitor  disappear,  he  lost  all 
hope  of  saving  his  ship.  But,  fortunately  for  him, 
the  Merrimac  steamed  slowly  toward  Norfolk, 
evidently  disabled  in  her  motive  power.  The 
Monitor,  accompanied  by  several  tugs,  returned 
late  in  the  afternoon,  and  they  succeeded  in  float 
ing  off  the  Minnesota  and  conveying  her  to  Old 
Point. 


HOW  THE   GUN-BOAT    "ZOUAVE"  AIDED   THE    "CONGRESS." 

BY  HENRY  REANEY,  ACTING  MASTER,  U.  S.  N. 


THE  Zouave  was  a  tug-boat  built  in  Albany, 
N.  Y.,  for  service  on  the  Hudson  River,  of 
great  power  and  speed  for  that  class  of  vessel. 
On  her  purchase  by  the  Government,  she  was 
delivered  at  Hampton  Roads  by  her  original 
owners  to  Admiral  Goldsborough,  at  that  time  in 
command  of  the  North  Atlantic  Squadron.  The  en 


gineers  and  firemen  who  brought  her  from  Albany 
entered  the  naval  service,  both  the  former  being 
appointed  acting  second-assistant  engineers,  and 
the  latter  first-class  firemen.  I  was  ordered  to  her 
February  1st,  1862,  and  took  with  me  from  the 
store-ship  William  Badger,  of  which  I  was  execu 
tive,  ten  men,  who,  with  the  pilot,  H.  J.  Phillips, 


THE  PLAN  AND  CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  "  MERRIMAC." 


who  had  been  previously  ordered,  comprised  the 
crew.  She  had  for  armament  a  30-pounder  Par- 
rott  rifle  forward  and  a  24-pounder  howitzer  aft. 
We  were  ready  for  service  early  in  February  and 
were  assigned  to  picket  duty  in  the  James  Eiver, 
which  employed  us  only  from  sunset  to  sunrise. 
During  the  daytime  we  acted  as  a  tender  for  the 
Cumberland  and  Congress.  On  the  8th  of  March, 
after  coining  in  from  picket  duty,  we  went  to  Fort 
Monroe  for  the  mail  and  fresh  provisions,  which  we 
got  on  the  arrival  of  the  mail-boat  from  Baltimore. 
We  returned  to  Newport  News  about  10  o'clock. 
After  delivering  the  stores  belonging  to  the  Congress 
and  Cumberland,  we  went  to  the  wharf  to  lie  until 
wanted.  A  little  after  dinner,  about  12:30,  the 
quartermaster  on  watch  called  my  attention  to 
black  smoke  in  the  Elizabeth  River,  close  to 
Crauey  Island.  We  let  go  from  the  wharf  and  ran 
alongside  the  Cumberland.  The  officer  of  the  deck 
ordered  us  to  run  down  toward  Pig  Point  and  find 
out  what  was  coming  down  from  Norfolk.  It 
did  not  take  us  long  to  find  out,  for  we  had  not 
gone  over  two  miles  when  we  saw  what  to  all  ap 
pearances  looked  like  the  roof  of  a  very  big  barn 
belching  forth  smoke  as  from  a  chimney  on  fire.  We 
were  all  divided  in  opinion  as  to  what  was  coming. 
The  boatswain's  mate  was  the  first  to  make  out 
the  Confederate  flag,  and  then  we  all  guessed  it  was 
the  Merrimac  come  at  last.  When  we  were  satisfied 
it  was  the  enemy,  we  went  to  quarters  and  fired 
our  30-pounder  Parrott,  which  was  not  answered. 
We  fired  again,  taking  deliberate  aim,  and  were 
rather  surprised  that  it  was  unnoticed  ;  we  fired,  I 
think,  about  six  shots  when  our  recall  signal  was 
hoisted  on  the  Cumberland.  By  this  time  the  bat 
teries  at  Newport  News  had  commenced  firing,  the 
Congress  had  gone  to  quarters  and  opened  fire ; 
when  we  got  close  to  the  Cumberland  she  also  be 
gan  firing.  The  Merrimac  kept  on  until  abreast  the 
Congress,  when  she  opened  fire,  pouring  a  broadside 
in  passing,  and  came  right  on  for  the  Cumberland, 
which  vessel  was  using  her  guns  as  fast  as  they 
could  be  fired.  We  were  in  rather  a  tight  place, 
being  between  the  fire  of  the  gun-boats  from  Nor 
folk  and  the  Patrick  Henry  and  Jamestown  from 
Richmond,  and  our  own  batteries  on  shore,  the  shot 
from  which  were  falling  all  round  us.  However, 
we  kept  loading  and  firing  as  fast  as  we  were  able, 
until,  seeing  that  the  Congress  had  loosed  her  fore- 
topsail  and  made  signal  for  us  to  come  alongside, 
we  ran  down  to  her,  leaving  the  Cumberland  just 
as  the  Merrimac  was  passing  her  bows.  We  made 
fast  to  the  port  side  of  the  Congress,  passing  our 
tow-line  through  a  scupper,  and  with  our  breast- 
lines  through  a  gun-port,  she  lying  headed  toward 
Hampton  Roads.  There  was  hardly  a  breath  of 


wind,  so  that  her  topsail  and  jib  were  of  no  account 
in  moving  her.  It  took  us  some  time  to  get  our 
lines  fast,  owing  to  the  horrible  condition  of  affairs 
on  the  gun-deck,  which  was  on  fire.  The  cries  of  the 
wounded  were  terrible.  The  men  were  not  all  regu 
lar  men-of-war's-men  —  I  think  some  were  soldiers  : 
but,  anyhow,  the  tug's  crew  had  to  get  on  board  to 
make  our  lines  fast.  When  everything  was  ready, 
Lieut.  Smith  ordered  me  to  go  ahead,  with  our 
helm  hard-a-starboard  so  as  to  get  her  into  shoal 
water.  When  we  had  her  headed  toward  the  shore, 
the  Merrimac  got  right  astern  of  us  and  opened  fire, 
poiu'ing  broadside  after  broadside,  that  raked  her 
fore  and  aft,  overthrowing  several  of  the  guns  and 
killing  a  number  of  the  crew.  About  this  time  we 
were  in  rather  a  bad  plight ;  the  blood  was  running 
from  the  Congress  scuppers  on  to  our  deck,  like 
water  on  a  wash-deck  morning ;  the  tallow-cup  on 
top  of  our  cylinder,  and  the  pilot-house  and  billet- 
head  on  the  stem  were  shattered  by  shot ;  the  pilot, 
Mr.  Phillips,  was  stunned.  Our  Zouave  figure-head, 
which  was  a  fixture  on  top  of  the  pilot-house,  carried 
away  by  a  shot  on  its  way  over  the  bows,  disabled 
two  of  the  crew  of  the  rifle.  It  was  about  this  time 
that  the  Congress  grounded  and  the  white  flag  was 
hoisted.  Firing  ceased  and  a  rebel  steamer  was  mak 
ing  for  us.  I  told  Lieut.  Pendergrast  that  if  he  did 
not  want  me  any  more,  I'd  leave  and  try  to  escape. 
He  told  me  to  take  care  of  myself,  as  they  had  sur 
rendered.  We  cut  our  lines  and  backed  astern,  and, 
as  soon  as  we  got  clear,  commenced  firing,  which, 
I  think,  gave  rise  to  the  charge  of  the  Congress 
firing  after  she  had  struck  her  colors.  The  Minne 
sota  was  aground  in  the  North  Channel,  and  had 
my  recall  signal  flying.  We  headed  for  her,  keeping 
as  close  to  the  beach  on  our  side  as  possible,  when 
about  half-way,  after  passing  all  the  enemy's 
vessels,  we  were  struck  by  a  shot  which  carried 
away  our  rudder-post  and  one  of  the  blades  of 
our  propeller-wheel.  Being  then  unable  to  use  our 
rudder,  and  heading  directly  for  the  enemy,  we 
stopped  and  backed  so  as  to  get  her  head  right, 
which  we  did,  and  with  our  large  hawser  out  over 
our  port  quarter,  we  kept  her  going  in  the  right 
direction,  until  the  gun-boat  Whitehall  came  to  our 
assistance.  We  lay  that  night  alongside  the  Minne 
sota,  and  in  the  morning  were  towed  to  Fort  Monroe. 

I  claim  for  the  Zouare  that  she  fired  the  first 
shot  at  the  Merrimac,  and  that  but  for  her  assist 
ance  the  Congress  would  have  been  captured ;  in 
evidence  of  which  I  refer  to  page  64  of  Profes 
sor  Soley's  book,  "The  Blockade  and  the  Cruisers," 
also  to  the  "New  York  Herald"  of  March  10th, 
1862.  I  held  the  appointment  of  acting  master's 
mate,  and  had  been  in  the  service  from  June,  18  61. 

DETROIT,  March  9th,  1884. 


THE  PLAN  AND  CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE 

I. 


;  MERRIMAC." 


BY  JOHN  M.  BROOKE,  COMMANDER,  C.  S.  N. 


EARLY  in  June,  1861,  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy 
of  the  Confederate  States  asked  me  to  design 
an  iron-clad.   The  first  idea  presenting  itself  was  a 
shield  of  timber,  two  feet  thick,  plated  with  three 


or  more  inches  of  iron,  inclined  to  the  horizontal 
plane  at  the  least  angle  that  would  permit  work 
ing  the  guns ;  this  shield,  its  eaves  submerged  to 
the  depth  of  two  feet,  to  be  supported  by  a  hull  of 


716 


THE  PLAN  AND  CONSTRUCTION  OF   THE  "MER.RIMAC." 


equal  length.  There  was  nothing  novel  in  the  use 
of  inclined  iron-plating.  It  was  apparent  that  to 
support  such  a  shield  the  ends  of  the  vessel  would 
be  so  full  as  to  prevent  the  attainment  of  speed ; 
and  that  in  moving  end  on  even  a  small  sea  would 
prevent  working  the  bow  or  stern  gun.  It  then 
occurred  to  me  that  fineness  of  line,  protection  of 
hull,  and  buoyancy  with  light  draught,  could  be 
obtained  by  extending  the  ends  of  the  vessel  under 
water  beyond  the  shield,  provided  the  shield  were 
of  sufficient  length  to  give  the  requisite  stability. 
Considering,  then,  the  liability  to  the  banking  up 
of  water  over  these  submerged  ends,  I  erected 
upon  each  a  decked  superstructure  of  ship-iron, 
carried  up  from  the  sides  of  the  submerged  parts 
to  a  height  above  water  not  greater  than  would 
permit  free  use  of  the  guns,  and  of  the  usual  form 
of  hull  above  water.  Water  could  be  admitted  or 
taken  from  them. 

I  submitted  to  the  secretary  outline  drawings, — 
sheer,  body  and  deck  plans,  with  explanations, — 
and  he  approved  and  adopted  this  novel  form.  In 
reply  to  my  suggestion  that  Naval-Constructor  John 
L.  Porter  and  Chief-Engineer  William  P.  William 
son  should  be  called  to  Richmond,  that  we  might 
put  the  plan  in  execution,  he  replied  that  a  practi 
cal  mechanic  would  be  sent  from  the  Norfolk  yard. 
This  mechanic  —  a  master  ship-carpenter  —  came; 
but  as  he  was  lacking  in  confidence  and  energy, 
and  was  averse  to  performing  unusual  duty,  he 
was  permitted  to  return  to  the  yard. 

Messrs.  Porter  and  Williamson  were  ordered  to 
Eichmond  for  co:isultation  on  the  same  general 
subject,  and  to  aid  in  the  work.  They  met  the 
secretary  and  myself  on  the  23d  of  June,  1861. 
Mr.  Porter  brought  and  submitted  to  the  secretary 
a  model  described  by  the  latter  in  a  report  dated 
March  29th,  1862,  to  the  congress  of  the  Confed 
erate  States,  as  "  a  flat-bottomed  light-draught  pro 
peller,  casemated  battery,  with  inclined  iron  sides 
and  ends."  The  hull  of  this  model  did  not  extend 
beyond  the  shield.  The  secretary  then  called  the 
attention  of  Messrs.  Williamson  and  Porter  to  the 
plan  proposed  by  me,  which  had  been  adopted  by 
the  department.  The  drawings  were  laid  before 
them,  the  reasons  for  extending  the  hull  under 
water  beyond  the  shield  were  given,  and  both 
approved  it.  As  the  drawings  were  in  pencil,  the 
secretary  directed  me  to  make  a  clean  drawing  in 
ink  of  the  plan,  to  be  filed  in  the  department. 


Messrs.  Porter  and  Williamson  were  directed  to 
ascertain  if  suitable  engines  and  boilers  could  be 
obtained.  Mr.  Porter  offered  to  make  the  clean 
drawing,  as  "being  more  familiar  with  that  sort 
of  work."  Accepting  the  offer  I  went  with  Will 
iamson  to  the  Tredegar  works,  where  we  learned 
that  there  were  no  suitable  engines  in  the  South. 
Williamson  then  said  he  thought  the  engines  of 
the  Merrimac  could  be  used,  but  that  the  vessel 
would  necessarily  draw  as  much  water  as  the 
Mcrrimac,  and  it  would  not  be  worth  while  to  build 
a  new  hull,  as  enough  of  the  old  hull  remained  to 
carry  out  the  plan.  Mr.  Porter  and  I  thought  the 
draught  too  great,  but  that  we  could  not  do  better. 
We  so  reported  to  the  secretary,  who  concurred. 
That  there  might  be  official  record  of  results  of 
consultation,  as  there  was  of  the  original  plan,  he 
directed  us  to  consider  and  report  upon  the  best 
mode  of  making  the  Mcrrimac  useful,  which  we 
did  in  accordance  with  the  views  above  stated. 
Mr.  Williamson  and  Mr.  Porter  returned  to  Nor 
folk,  the  former  to  adapt  and  repair  the  engines, 
the  latter  to  cut  the  ship  down,  submerge  her 
ends,  etc.  To  me  was  assigned  the  preparation  of 
armor,  construction  of  guns,  etc.  On  the  llth  of 
July  Mr.  Porter  submitted  to  the  secretary  draw 
ings,  based  upon  actual  measurements  of  the  ship 
and  on  the  plan  of  submerged  extended  ends,  which 
I  had  presented,  and  which  had  been  unanimously 
approved.  Having  reference  to  this  working  plan 
and  its  details,  the  secretary  issued  the  following 
order : 

NAVY  DEPARTMENT,  RICHMOND,  July  11, 1861.  FLAG- 
OFFICER  F.  FORREST.  SIR  :  You  will  proceed  with  all 
practicable  dispatch  to  make  the  changes  in  the  form 
of  the  Merrimac,  and  to  build,  equip,  and  fit  her  in 
all  respects  according  to  the  design  and  plans  of  the 
constructor  and  engineer,  Messrs.  Porter  and  William 
son.  .  .  .  R.  S.  MALLORY,  Secretary  of  the  C.  S.  Navy. 

This  and  a  similar  order  were  construed  by  Mr. 
Porter  to  credit  him  with  the  origin  of  the  plan, 
and  served  as  a  basis  to  a  published  claim  after 
the  action  in  Hampton  Roads,  which  led  to  a  call 
bythe  Confederate  House  of  Representatives,  upon 
the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  for  information  as  to 
the  origin  of  the  plan,  and  to  the  settlement  of  the 
question  by  a  patent,  No.  100,  granted  me  by  the 
Confederate  States,  29th  July,  1862.  This  patent 
is  still  in  my  possession. 

LEXINGTON,  VA.,  October,  1887. 


II. 
BY  JOHN  L.  PORTER,  NAVAL  CONSTRUCTOR,  CONFEDERATE  STATES. 


IN  June,  1861,  I  wras  ordered  to  Richmond  by 
Secretary  Mallory,  and  carried  up  with  me  a 
model  of  an  iron-clad  for  harbor  defense.  Soon  after 
my  arrival  I  was  informed  by  the  secretary  that  I 
had  been  sent  for  to  confer  with  Chief  Engineer  W. 
P.  Williamson  and  Lieutenant  J.  M.  Brooke  in 
arranging  an  iron-clad.  We  went  into  Engineer 
Williamson's  office,  and  held  a  consultation,  the 
result  of  which  was  this  report  to  the  secretary : 

"  NAVY  DEPARTMENT,  RICHMOND,  June  25th,  1861.  SIR  : 
In  obedience  to  your  order,  we  have  carefully  examined 


and  considered  the  various  plans  and  propositions  for 
constructing  a  shot-proof  steam-battery,  and  respect 
fully  report  that  in  our  opinion  the  steam-frigate  Herri- 
mac,  which  is  in  such  condition  from  the  effect  of  fire  as 
to  be  useless  for  any  other  purpose  without  incurring  a 
very  heavy  expense  in  her  rebuilding,  can  be  made  an 
efficient  vessel  of  that  character,  mounting  10  heavy 
guns,  2  pivot  and  8  broadside  guns  of  her  original  bat 
tery,  and  from  the  further  consideration  that  we  cannot 
procure  a  suitable  engine  and  boilers  for  any  other  ves 
sel  without  building  them,  which  would  occupy  too 
much  time,  it  would  appear  that  this  is  our  only  chance 
to  get  a  suitable  vessel  in  a  short  time.  The  bottom  of 


THE  PLAN  AND  CONSTRUCTION  OF   THE  "  MERR.IMAC." 


717 


the  hull,  boilers,  and  heavy  and  costly  parts  of  the 
engine  being  but  little  injured,  reduce  the  cost  of  con 
struction  to  about  one-third  of  the  amount  which  would 
be  required  to  construct  such  a  vessel  anew. 

"  We  cannot,  without  further  examination,  make  an 
accurate  estimate  of  the  cost  of  the  proposed  work,  but 
think  it  will  be  about  one  hundred  and  ten  thousand 
dollars,  the  most  of  which  will  be  for  labor,  the  materials 
being  nearly  all  on  hand  in  the  yard,  excepting  the  iron 
plating  to  cover  the  shield.  The  plan  to  be  adopted  in 
the  arrangement  of  the  shield  for  glancing  shot,  mount 
ing  guns,  arranging  the  hull,  and  plating  to  be  in  accord 
ance  with  the  plan  submitted  for  the  approval  of  the 
department.  We  are,  with  much  respect,  your  obedient 
servants,  WILLIAM  P.  WILLIAMSON,  Chief  Engineer; 
JOHN  M.  BROOKE,  Lieutenant;  JOHN  L.  PORTER,  Naval 
Constructor." 

I  returned  immediately  to  the  Gosport  Navy 
Yard,  and  made  a  working  drawing  of  the  whole 
thing,  put  my  shield  on  it,  which  I  had  in  my 
model,  and  returned  to  the  secretary,  July  llth, 
1861,  who  had  the  following  order  made  out,  and 
placed  in  my  hands  by  himself: 

"  NAVY  DEPARTMENT,  RICHMOND,  July  llth,  1861.  FLAG- 
OFFICER  F.  FORREST.  SIR  :  You  will  proceed,  with  all 
practicable  dispatch,  to  make  the  changes  in  the  Merri- 
mac,  and  to  build,  equip,  and  tit  her  in  all  respects 
according  to  the  designs  and  plans  of  the  constructor 
and  engineer,  Messrs.  Porter  and  Williamson.  As  time 
is  of  the  first  importance  in  the  matter,  you  will  see  that 
work  progresses  without  delay  to  completion.  S.  R. 
MALLORY,  Secretary  of  the  Confederate  States  Navy." 

I  came  immediately  back  to  the  Navy  Yard  and 
commenced  this  great  work,  unassisted  by  mortal 
man  so  far  as  the  plans  and  responsibilities  of  the 
hull  and  its  workings  were  concerned  as  an  iron 
clad.  The  second  letter  which  came  from  the  de 
partment  about  this  great  piece  of  work  is  as 
follows : 

"  CONFEDERATE  STATES  NAVY  DEPARTMENT,  RICH 
MOND,  August  18th,  1861.  FLAG-OFFICER  F.  FORREST, 
COMMANDING  NAVY  YARD,  GOSPORT.  SIR:  The  great 
importance  of  the  service  expected  from  the  Merrimac, 
and  the  urgent  necessity  of  her  speedy  completion,  in 
duce  me  to  call  upon  you  to  push  forward  the  work  with 
the  utmost  dispatch.  Chief  Engineer  Williamson  and 
Constructor  Porter,  severally  in  charge  of  the  two 
respective  branches  of  this  great  work,  and  for  which 
they  will  be  held  personally  responsible,  will  receive, 
therefore,  every  possible  facility  at  the  expense  and 
delay  of  every  other  work  on  hand  if  necessary.  SECRE 
TARY  S.  R.  MALLOUY,  Confederate  States  Navy." 

In  April.  1846,  I  had  been  stationed  in  Pitts- 
burg  superintending  an  iron  steamer,  when  I  con 
ceived  the  idea  of  an  iron-clad,  and  made  a  model 
with  the  exact  shield  which  I  placed  on  the  Herri- 
mac.  Lieutenant  Brooke  tried  for  over  a  week  to 
carry  out  the  wish  of  the  department,  but  failed 
entirely  to  produce  anything,  whereupon  I  was 
called  on  by  the  secretary. 

After  I  had  made  the  plan  of  the  Merrimac,  and 
had  submitted  it  to  the  department,  not  to  Lieuten 
ant  Brooke,  and  when  everything  was  fresh  in  the 
mind  of  the  secretary,  he  had  the  order  of  July 
llth  made  out  and  placed  in  my  hands,  to  Flag- 
Officer  Forrest,  to  proceed  with  the  work  with  all 
dispatch.  No  man  save  myself  had  anything  to 
do  with  the  converting  of  that  ship  into  an  iron 


clad, —  I  calculated  her  displacement,  weight,  etc., 
and  cut  her  down  to  suit,  and  no  man  save  myself 
knew  what  she  would  bear.  Lieutenant  Brooke 
came  to  the  yard  once  while  the  ship  was  being 
prepared,  and  stated  that  he  had  tried  experiments 
on  three  inches  of  iron  and  it  would  not  stand  the 
fire.  I  then  told  him  to  put  on  another  inch,  mak 
ing  four  inches ;  he  asked  me  if  she  would  bear  it. 
I  told  him  she  would,  and  the  armor  was  changed 
to  four  inches.  All  the  inboard  plans  and  arrange 
ments  were  made  by  myself,  and  the  whole  work 
ing  of  the  ship  ;  Lieutenant  Brooke  superintended 
the  armor  and  guns  ;  Engineer  Williamson  super 
intended  the  machinery,  and  John  L.  Porter  the 
construction  of  the  hull.  The  accompanying  draw 
ing  is  a  correct  representation  of  a  cross-section 
amidships.  She  had  only  decks,  gun  and  berth. 
Her  shield  sloped  at  an  angle  of  35  degrees ;  her 
rudder  and  propeller  were  well  protected  by  a 
heavy  fan-tail ;  her  prow  was  of  cast-iron  se 
curely  fastened  to  the  ship,  and  so  well  secured 
that  though  it  was 
broken  in  two  by 
striking  the  Cum 
berland  a  glancing 
blow,  the  fasten 
ings  to  the  vessel 
were  not  broken 
loose.  Her  deck 
ends  were  two  feet 
below  water  and 
not  awash,  and  the 
ship  was  as  strong 
and  well  protected 
at  her  center-line 
as  anywhere  else, 
as  her  knuckle  was 
two  feet  below  her 
water-line,  and  her 
plating  ran  down 
to  the  knuckle  and 
was  there  clamped.  Her  draught  of  water  was  21 
feet  forward  and  22  feet  aft. 

After  the  engagements  of  the  Sth  and  9th  of 
March,  1862,  I  put  her  in  the  dry-dock  and  found 
she  had  97  indentations  on  her  armor  from  shot, 
20  of  which  were  from  the  10-inch  guns  of  the  Mon 
itor.  Six  of  her  top  layer  of  plates  were  broken 
by  the  Monitor's  shots,  and  none  by  those  of  the 
other  vessels.  None  of  the  lower  layer  of  plates 
were  injured.  I  removed  those  plates  and  replaced 
them  by  others.  Her  wood-work  underneath  was 
not  hurt.  Her  smoke-stack  was  full  of  shot-holes. 
She  never  had  any  boat-davits.  Her  pilot-house 
was  cast  solid,  and  was  not  covered  with  plate-iron 
like  her  shield.  She  had  port  shutters  only  at  her 
four  quarter  port-holes.  It  will  thus  be  seen  that 
the  conversion  of  the  Merrimac  into  an  iron-clad 
was  merely  accidental,  and  grew  out  of  the  imprac 
ticability  of  building  an  engine  within  the  time  at 
the  disposal  of  the  Confederacy,  and  no  iron-clad, 
with  submerged  ends,  was  afterward  built. 

PORTSMOUTH,  YA.,  October,  1887. 


CROSS-SECTION    OF    "  MERRIMAC," 

FROM    A    DRAWING    BY     JOHN 

L.   PORTER,  CONSTRUCTOR. 

(i  —  4  inches  of  iron. 
b  —  22  inches  of  wood. 


NOTES   ON   THE   MONITOR  -  MEREIMAC   FIGHT.  • 


BY    DINWIDDIE    B.     PHILLIPS,    SURGEON    OF    THE   "MERRIMAC." 


rpHE  Virginia  (or  Mcrrimac),  with  which  I  was 
-L  connected  during  her  entire  career,  bore  some 
resemblance  to  a  huge  terrapin  with  a  large  round 
chimney  about  the  middle  of  its  back.  She  was  so 
built  as  not  to  suit  high  winds  and  heavy  seas,  and 
therefore  could  not  operate  outside  the  capes  of 
Virginia.  In  fact  she  was  designed  from  the  first 
as  a  defense  for  the  harbor  of  Norfolk,  and  for  that 
alone.  In  addition  to  our  guns,  we  were  armed 
with  an  iron  ram  or  prow.  The  prow,  not  being 
well  put  on,  was  twisted  off  and  lost  in  our  first 
encounter  with  the  Cumberland.  I  am  also  satisfied 
that  had  not  our  prow  been  lost,  we  should  have 
sunk  the  Monitor  when  we  rammed  her  on  the  9th 
of  March,  1862.  Admiral  Worden  is  of  contrary 
opinion.  In  a  private  letter  to  me,  dated  March 
13th,  1882,  he  says: 

"  If  tlie  prow  of  the  Mernmac  had  been  intact  at  the 
time  she  struck  the  Monitor,  she  could  not  have  damaged 
her  a  particle  more  by  the  blow  with  it  than  she  did  in 
hitting  her  with  her  stem ;  and  for  the  following  reasons : 
The  hull  of  the  Monitor  was  in  breadth,  at  her  midship 
section,  34  feet,  and  the  armored  raft  which  was  placed 
on  the  hull  was,  at  the  same  point,  41  feet  4  inches  in 
breadth,  so  that  the  raft  extended  on  either  side  3  feet  8 
inches  beyond  the  hull.  The  raft  was  6  feet  deep  and 
was  immersed  in  the  water  3*6  feet.  The  Merrimac's 
prow,  according  to  Jones,  was  2  feet  below  the  surface 
of  the  water.  The  prow,  therefore,  if  on,  would  have 
struck  the  armored  hull  l1^  feet  above  its  lowest  part, 
and  could  not  have  damaged  it.  Further,  the  prow 
extended  2  feet  forward  from  the  stem,  and  had  it  been 
low  enough  to  reach  below  the  armored  raft,  it  could  not 
have  reached  the  hull  by  1  foot  8  inches." 

Admiral  Worden's  theory,  given  above,  like  all 
untested  ones,  is  merely  speculation  ;  and  I  doubt 
not  the  commander  of  the  Cumberland,  previous 
to  a  practical  demonstration,  would  have  thought 
it  impossible  for  our  prow  to  have  first  crushed  its 
way  through  a  strongly  constructed  raft  projected 
in  front  of  that  vessel  as  a  protection  against 
torpedoes,  and  then  to  have  penetrated  her  bow — 
the  strongest  part  of  the  ship  —  and  to  have  made 
a  chasm  in  it  large  enough,  according  to  Wood,  to 
admit  a  "horse  and  cart." 

Most  of  our  crew  being  volunteers  from  the 
army  and  unused  to  ship-life,  about  twenty  per 
cent,  of  our  men  were  usually  ashore  at  the  hos 
pital,  and  our  effective  force  on  the  8th  of  March 
was  about  250  or  260  men. 

We  left  the  Norfolk  Navy  Yard  about  11  A.  M. 
of  that  day.  As  our  engines  were  very  weak  and 
defective,  having  been  condemned  just  before  the 
war  as  worthless,  we  were  fortunate  in  having 
favorable  weather  for  our  purpose.  The  day  was 
unusually  mild  and  calm  for  the  season,  and  the 
water  was  smooth  and  glassy ;  and,  except  for  the 
unusually  large  number  of  persons  upon  the  shores 
watching  our  motions,  there  was  nothing  to  indi 
cate  a  serious  movement  on  our  part.  Our  vessel 
never  having  been  tested  before,  and  her  model 
being  new  and  unheard  of,  many  of  those  who 
watched  us  predicted  failure,  and  others  suggested 
that  the  Virginia  was  an  enormous  metallic  burial- 
case,  and  that  we  wrere  conducting  our  own  funeral. 


Though  we  withdrew  on  the  first  day  of  the 
battle,  at  7  P.  M.,  and  went  to  our  anchorage  at 
Sewell's  Point,  our  duties  kept  us  so  constantly 
engaged  that  it  was  near  midnight  before  we  got 
our  supper,  the  only  meal  we  had  taken  since  8 
A.  M.  Afterward  the  attractiveness  of  the  burning 
Congress  was  such  that  we  watched  her  till  nearly 
1  A.  M.,  when  she  blew  up,  before  we  went  to  our 
rest,  so  that  when  wre  were  aroused  to  resume  the 
fight  on  Sunday  morning,  it  seemed  as  though  we 
had  scarcely  been  asleep.  After  a  hurried  break 
fast,  and  while  the  crew  were  getting  up  the 
anchor,  I  landed  Captain  Buchanan,  Lieutenant 
Minor,  and  the  seriously  wounded  men  at  Sewell's 
Point,  for  transmission  to  the  naval  hospital  at 
Norfolk.  Returning,  I  pulled  around  the  ship  be 
fore  boarding  her,  to  see  how  she  had  stood  the 
bombardment  of  Saturday  and  to  what  extent  she 
had  been  damaged.  I  found  all  her  stanchions, 
iron  railings,  and  light  work  of  every  description 
swept  away,  her  smoke-stack  cut  to  pieces,  two 
guns  without  muzzles,  and  ninety-eight  indenta 
tions  on  her  plating,  showing  where  heavy  solid 
shot  had  struck,  but  had  glanced  off  without  doing 
any  injury.  As  soon  as  I  had  got  on  deck  (about 
6:  25  A.  M.),  we  started  again  for  Hampton  Roads. 

On  our  way  to  the  Minnesota,  and  while  we  were 
still  too  far  off  to  do  her  much  damage,  the  Moni 
tor  came  out  to  meet  us.  For  some  length  of  time 
wre  devoted  our  attention  to  her,  but  having  no 
solid  shot,  and  finding  that  our  light  shell  were 
making  but  little  impression  upon  her  turret,  Jones 
ordered  the  pilot  to  disregard  the  Monitor  alto 
gether,  and  carry  out  his  first  instructions  by  plac 
ing  the  Virginia  as  near  to  the  Minnesota  as  possi 
ble.  Instead,  however,  of  taking  us  within  a  half 
mile  of  that  ship,  as  we  afterward  learned  he  could 
have  done,  he  purposely  ran  us  aground  nearly  two 
miles  off.  This  he  did  through  fear  of  passing 
under  the  Minnesota's  terrible  broadside,  as  he  con 
fessed  subsequently  to  Captain  A.  B.  Fairfax,  Con 
federate  States  navy,  from  whose  lips  I  received  it. 

After  fifteen  or  twenty  minutes  we  were  afloat 
again.  (  We  sheered  off  from  the  Monitor  in  order 
to  get  a  chance  to  turn  and  ram  her.  This  was  the 
time  when  Captain  Van  Brunt  was  under  the  im 
pression  we  were  in  retreat  and  "the  little  battery 
chasing  us."  As  soon  as  the  move  could  be 
effected,  we  turned  and  ran  into  the  Monitor,  and 
at  the  same  time  gave  her  a  shot  from  our  bow 
pivot-gun.  Had  our  iron  prow  been  intact,  as  I 
have  already  said,  we  would  have  sunk  her.  As  it 
was,  she  staggered  awhile  under  the  shock,  and, 
sheering  off  from  us  was  for  a  time  inactive  [see  p. 
725].  The  battle  was  renewed,  but  shortly  after 
noon  the  Monitor  again  withdrew  [see  p.  727]. 

We  continued  our  fire  upon  the  Minnesota,  at 
long  range,  for  about  half  an  hour  longer,  when 
we  took  advantage  of  the  flood-tide  and  returned 
slowly  to  Norfolk.  /  That  we  did  not  destroy  the 
Minnesota  was  due  solely  to  the  fact  that  our  pilot 
assured  us  we  could  get  no  nearer  to  her  than  we 
then  were  without  grounding  again. 


•&  Condensed  from  a  paper  in 


The  Southern  Bivouac ' 
718 


for  March,  1887. 


IN  THE  "MONITOR"  TURRET. 

BY  S.   DANA   GREENE,   COMMANDER,   U.  S.  N.,  EXECUTIVE   OFFICER  OF  THE    "MONITOR." 

THE  keel  of  the  most  famous  vessel  of  modern  times,  Captain  Ericsson's 
first  iron-clad,  was  laid  in  the  ship-yard  of  Thomas  F.  Rowland,  at 
Greenpoint,  Brooklyn,  in  October,  1861,  and  on  the  30th  of  January,  1862, 
the  novel  craft  was  launched.  On  the  25th  of  February  she  was  commissioned 
and  turned  over  to  the  Government,  and  nine  days  later  left  New  York  for 
Hampton  Roads,  where,  on  the  9th  of  March,  occurred  the  memorable  contest 
with  the  Merrimac.  On  her  next  venture  on  the  open  sea  she  foundered  off 
Cape  Hatteras  in  a  gale  of  wind  (December  29th).  During  her  career  of  less 
than  a  year  she  had  no  fewer  than  five  different  commanders ;  but  it  was  the 
fortune  of  the  writer  to  serve  as  her  only  executive  officer,  standing  upon  her 
deck  when  she  was  launched,  and  leaving  it  but  a  few  minutes  before  she  sank. 
So  hurried  was  the  preparation  of  the  Monitor  that  the  mechanics  worked 
upon  her  day  and  night  up  to  the  hour  of  her  departure,  and  little  oppor 
tunity  was  offered  to  drill  the  crew  at  the  guns,  to  work  the  turret,  and  to 
become  familiar  with  the  other  unusual  features  of  the  vessel.  The  crew 
was,  in  fact,  composed  of  volunteers.  Lieutenant  Worden,  having  been 
authorized  by  the  Navy  Department  to  select  his  men  from  any  ship-of-war 
in  New  York  harbor,  addressed  the  crews  of  the  Xortli  Carolina  and  Saline, 
stating  fully  to  them  the  probable  dangers  of  the  passage  to  Hampton  Roads 
and  the  certainty  of  having  important  service  to  perform  after  arriving. 
The  sailors  responded  enthusiastically,  many  more  volunteering  than  were 
required.  Of  the  crew  Captain  Worden  said,  in  his  official  report  of  the 
battle,  "A  better  one  no  naval  commander  ever  had  the  honor  to  command."  | 


4  The  Monitor'1  s  officers  were  :  Lieut.  J.  L.  Wor 
den,  commanding;  Lieut.  S.  D.  Greene,  executive 
officer ;  Acting  Master,  L.  N.  Stodder ;  Acting  Mas 
ter,  J.  N.  Webber  ;  Acting  Master's  Mate,  G.  Fred- 
erickson  ;  Acting  Assistant  Surgeon,  D.  C.  Logue ; 
Acting  Assistant  Paymaster,  W.  F.  Keeler ;  Chief 
Engineer,  A.  C.  Stimers  (inspector) ;  First  Assist 


ant  Engineer,  Isaac  Newton  (in  charge  of  steam 
machinery) ;  Second  Assist.  Engineer,  A.  B.  Camp 
bell;  Third  Assist.  Engineer,  R.  W.  Hands  ;  Fourth 
Assist.  Engineer,  M.  T.  Sunstrom  ;  Captain's  Clerk, 
D.  Toffey  ;  Quartermaster,  P.  Williams  ;  Gunner's 
Mate,  J.  Crown;  Boatswain's  Mate,  J.  Stocking; 
and  42  others,— a  total  of  58.— S.  D.  G. 


719 


720 


IN  THE  "MONITOR"   TURRET. 


REAR-ADMIRAL,  U.  8.  N 


The  sword  was  presented  to  Admiral  Worden  by  tlie  State  of  New  York  soon  after  the  engagement 

iii  Hampton  Roads. —  EDITORS. 

We  left  New  York  in  tow  of  the  tug-boat  Seth  Loiv  at  11  A.  M.  of  Thursday, 
the  6th  of  March.  On  the  following  day  a  moderate  breeze  was  encountered, 
and  it  was  at  once  evident  that  the  Monitor  was  unfit  as  a  sea-going  craft. 
Nothing  but  the  subsidence  of  the  wind  prevented  her  from  being  shipwrecked 
before  she  reached  Hampton  Eoads.  The  berth-deck  hatch  leaked  in  spite 
of  all  we  could  do,  and  the  water  came  down  under  the  turret  like  a  waterfall. 
It  would  strike  the  pilot-house  and  go  over  the  turret  in  beautiful  curves,  and 
it  came  through  the  narrow  eye-holes  in  the  pilot-house  with  such  force  as  to 
knock  the  helmsman  completely  round  from  the  wheel.  The  waves  also 
broke  over  the  blower-pipes,  and  the  water  came  down  through  them  in  such 


IN  THE  "MONITOR"   TURRET.  721 

quantities  that  the  belts  of  the  blower-engines  slipped,  and  the  engines  con 
sequently  stopped  for  lack  of  artificial  draught,  without  which,  in  such  a 
confined  place,  the  fires  could  not  get  air  for  combustion.  Newton  and  Sti- 
mers,  followed  by  the  engineer's  force,  gallantly  rushed  into  the  engine-room 
and  fire-room  to  remedy  the  evil,  but  they  were  unable  to  check  the  inflowing- 
water,  and  were  nearly  suffocated  with  escaping  gas.  They  were  dragged 
out  more  dead  than  alive,  and  carried  to  the  top  of  the  turret,  where  the 
fresh  air  gradually  revived  them.  The  water  continued  to  pour  through  the 
hawse-hole,  and  over  and  down  the  smoke-stacks  and  blower-pipes,  in  such 
quantities  that  there  was  imminent  danger  that  the  ship  would  founder.  The 
steam-pumps  could  not  be  operated  because  the  fires  had  been  nearly  extin 
guished,  and  the  engine-room  was  uninhabitable  on  account  of  the  suffocating 
gas  with  which  it  was  filled.  The  hand-pumps  were  then  rigged  and  worked, 
but  they  had  not  enough  force  to  throw  the  water  out  through  the  top  of  the 
turret, —  the  only  opening, —  and  it  was  useless  to  bail,  as  we  had  to  pass  the 
buckets  up  through  the  turret,  which  made  it  a  very  long  operation.  For 
tunately,  toward  evening  the  wind  and  the  sea  subsided,  and,  being  again  in 
smooth  water,  the  engine  was  put  in  operation.  But  at  midnight,  in  pass 
ing  over  a  shoal,  rough  water  was  again  encountered,  and  our  troubles  were 
renewed,  complicated  this  time  with  the  jamming  of  the  wheel-ropes,  so  that 
the  safety  of  the  ship  depended  entirely  on  the  strength  of  the  hawser  which 
connected  her  with  the  tug-boat.  The  hawser,  being  new,  held  fast;  but 
during  the  greater  part  of  the  night  we  were  constantly  engaged  in  fighting 
the  leaks,  until  we  reached  smooth  water  again,  just  before  daylight. 

It  was  at  the  close  of  this  dispiriting  trial  trip,  in  which  all  hands  had  been 
exhausted  in  their  efforts  to  keep  the  novel  craft  afloat,  that  the  Monitor 
passed  Cape  Henry  at  -i  p.  M.  on  Saturday,  March  8th.  At  this  point  was 
heard  the  distant  booming  of  heavy  guns,  which  our  captain  rightly  judged 
to  be  an  engagement  with  the  Merrimac,  twenty  miles  away.  He  at  once 
ordered  the  vessel  stripped  of  her  sea-rig,  the  turret  keyed  up,  and  every  prep 
aration  made  for  battle.  As  we  approached  Hampton  Roads  Ave  could  see 
the  fine  old  Congress  burning  brightly,  and  soon  a  pilot  came  on  board  and 
told  of  the  arrival  of  the  Merrimac,  the  disaster  to  the  Cumberland  and  the 
Congress,  and  the  dismay  of  the  Union  forces.  The  Monitor  was  pushed  with 
all  haste,  and  reached  the  Piomwkc  (Captain  Marston),  anchored  in  the  T 
9  P.  M.  Worden  immediately  reported  his  arrival  to  Captain  Marston,  who 
suggested  that  he  should  go  to  the  assistance  of  the  Minnesota,  then  aground 
off  Newport  News.  Ji  As  no  pilot  was  available,  Captain  Worden  accepted  the 

|  Captain  John  Marston,  of  the  Hoanoke,  who  was  Roanoke  to  report  his  arrival  at  Hampton  Roads, 
the  senior  officer  present  during  Flag-Officer  Golds-  Captain  Marston  took  upon  himself  the  responsi- 
borough's  absence  011  the  sounds  of  North  Caro-  bility  of  retaining  the  Monitor  to  protect  the  fleet, 
lina,  had  received  peremptory  orders  to  send  the  Under  the  circumstances,  it  is  hard  to  see  how  he 
Monitor  to  Washington  without  delay.  Similar  could  have  done  otherwise,  although  his  action  in- 
orders  had  been  received  by  Commodore  Pauld-  volved  him  in  a  technical  disobedience  of  orders, 
ing  in  New  York,  but  they  only  arrived  after  the  In  view  of  the  spirit  of  routine  which  pervaded 
Monitors  departure,  and  the  tug  by  which  Pauld-  the  older  branch  of  the  service  at  this  time,  Cap- 
ing  endeavored  to  communicate  with  her  failed  to  tain  Marstou's  action  showed  commendable  spirit 
overtake  her.  When  Worden  went  on  board  the  and  good  sense. —  EDITORS. 
VOL.  I.  46 


722 


IN  THE  "MONITOR"   TURRET. 


volunteer  services  of  Acting  Master  Samuel  Howard,  who  earnestly  sought 
the  duty.  An  atmosphere  of  gloom  pervaded  the  fleet,  and  the  pygmy  aspect 
of  the  new-comer  did  not  inspire  confidence  among  those  who  had  witnessed 
the  destruction  of  the  day  before.  Skillfully  piloted  by  Howard,  we  proceeded 
on  our  way,  our  path  illumined  by  the  blaze  of  the  Congress.  Reaching  the 
Minnesota,  hard  and  fast  aground,  near  midnight,  we  anchored,  and  Worden 
reported  to  Captain  Van  Brunt.  Between  1  and  2  A.  M.  the  Congress  blew  up, — 
not  instantaneously,  but  successively.  Her  powder-tanks  seemed  to  explode, 
each  shower  of  sparks  rivaling  the  other  in  its  height,  until  they  appeared  to 
reach  the  zenith, — a  grand  but  mournful  sight.  Near  us,  too,  at  the  bottom 
of  the  river,  lay  the  Cumberland,  with  her  silent  crew  of  brave  men,  who 
died  while  fighting  their  guns  to  the  water's  edge,  and  whose  colors  were  still 
flying  at  the  peak.\ 

The  dreary  night  dragged  slowly  on ;  the  officers  and  crew  were  up  and  alert, 
to  be  ready  for  any  emergency.     At  daylight  on  Sunday  the  Merrimac  and 

her  consorts  were  discovered  at 
anchor  near  Sewell's  Point.  At 
about  half -past  7  o'clock  the  ene 
my's  vessels  got  under  way  and 
steered  in  the  direction  of  the 
Minnesota.  At  the  same  time  the 
Monitor  got  under  way,  and  her 
officers  and  crew  took  their  sta 
tions  for  battle.  Captain  Van 
Brunt,  of  the  Minnesota,  officially 
reports,  "I  made  signal  to  the 
Monitor  to  attack  the  enemy," 


SIDE    EI.KVATION    AND    DECK-PLAN    OF  THE   "  MONITOR." 


but  the  signal  was  not  seen  by 
us ;  other  work  was  in  hand,  and  Commander  Worden  required  no  signal. 

The  pilot-house  of  the  Monitor  was  situated  well  forward,  near  the  bow ;  it 
was  a  wrought-iroii  structure,  built  of  logs  of  iron  nine  inches  thick,  bolted 
through  the  corners,  and  covered  with  an  iron  plate  two  inches  thick,  which 
was  not  fastened  down,  but  was  kept  in  place  merely  by  its  weight.  The 
sight-holes  or  slits  were  made  by  inserting  quarter-inch  plates  at  the  corners 
between  the  upper  set  of  logs  and  the  next  below.  The  structure  projected 
four  feet  above  the  deck,  and  was  barely  large  enough  inside  to  hold  three  men 
standing.  It  presented  a  flat  surface  on  all  sides  and  on  top.  The  steering- 
wheel  was  secured  to  one  of  the  logs  on  the  front  side.  The  position  and 
shape  of  this  structure  should  be  carefully  borne  in  mind. 

Worden  took  his  station  in  the  pilot-house,  and  by  his  side  were  Howard, 
the  pilot,  and  Peter  Williams,  quartermaster,  who  steered  the  vessel  through- 


\The  fortune  of  civil  war  was  illustrated  in  the 
ease  of  the  Merrimac.  Commodore  Buchanan's 
brother  was  an  officer  of  the  Congress,  and  each 
knew  of  the  other's  presence.  The  first  and  fourth 
lieutenants  of  the  Mcrrimac  had  each  a  brother 
in  the  United  States  army.  The  father  of  the  fifth 


lieutenant  was  also  in  the  United  States  army. 
The  father  of  one  of  the  midshipmen  was  in  the 
United  States  navy.  Lieutenant  Butt,  of  the 
Merrimac,  had  been  the  room-mate  of  Lieutenant 
S.  Dana  Greene,  of  the  Monitor,  at  the  Naval  Acad 
emy  in  Annapolis. —  EDITORS. 


IN   THE  "MONITOR"   TURRET.  723 

out  the  engagement.  My  place  was  in  the  turret,  to  work  and  fight  the  guns ; 
with  me  were  Stockier  and  Stimers  and  sixteen  brawny  men,  eight  to  each 
gun.  John  Stocking,  boatswain's  mate,  and  Thomas  Lochrane,  seaman,  were 
gun-captains.  Newton  and  his  assistants  were  in  the  engine  and  fire  rooms, 
to  manipulate  the  boilers  and  engines,  and  most  admirably  did  they  perform 
this  important  service  from  the  beginning  to  the  close  of  the  action.  Webber 
had  charge  of  the  powder  division  on  the  berth-deck,  and  Joseph  Crown, 
gunner's-mate,  rendered  valuable  service  in  connection  with  this  duty. 

The  physical  condition  of  the  officers  and  men  of  the  two  ships  at  this  time 
was  in  striking  contrast.  The  Merrimac  had  passed  the  night  quietly  near 
Sewell's  Point,  her  people  enjoying  rest  and  sleep,  elated  by  thoughts  of  the 
victory  they  had  achieved  that  day,  and  cheered  by  the  prospects  of  another 
easy  victory  on  the  morrow.  The  Monitor  had  barely  escaped  shipwreck  twice 
within  the  last  thirty-six  hours,  and  since  Friday  morning,  forty-eight  hours 
before,  few  if  any  of  those  on  board  had  closed  their  eyes  in  sleep  or  had  any 
thing  to  eat  but  hard  bread,  as  cooking  was  impossible.  She  was  surrounded 
by  wrecks  and  disaster,  and  her  efficiency  in  action  had  yet  to  be  proved. 

Worden  lost  no  time  in  bringing  it  to  test.  Getting  his  ship  under  way,  he 
steered  direct  for  the  enemy's  vessels,  in  order  to  meet  and  engage  them  as 
far  as  possible  from  the  Minnesota.  As  he  approached,  the  wooden  vessels 
quickly  turned  and  left.  Our  captain,  to  the  "  astonishment "  of  Captain  Van 
Brunt  (as  he  states  in  his  official  report),  made  straight  for  the  Merrimac, 
which  had  already  commenced  firing ;  and  when  he  came  within  short  range, 
he  changed  his  course  so  as  to  come  alongside  of  her,  stopped  the  engine,  and 
gave  the  order,  "  Commence  firing ! "  I  triced  up  the  port,  ran  out  the  gun, 
and,  taking  deliberate  aim,  pulled  the  lockstring.  The  Merrimac  was  quick  to 
reply,  returning  a  rattling  broadside  (for  she  had  ten  guns  to  our  two),  and 
the  battle  fairly  began.  The  turrets  and  other  parts  of  the  ship  were  heavily 
struck,  but  the  shots  did  not  penetrate ;  the  tower  was  intact,  and  it  continued 
to  revolve.  A  look  of  confidence  passed  over  the  men's  faces,  and  we  believed 
the  Merrimac  would  not  repeat  the  work  she  had  accomplished  the  day  before. 

The  fight  continued  with  the  exchange  of  broadsides  as  fast  as  the  guns 
could  be  served  and  at  very  short  range,  the  distance  between  the  vessels 
frequently  being  not  more  than  a  few  yards.  Worden  skillfully  manoeuvred 
his  quick-turning  vessel,  trying  to  find  some  vulnerable  point  in  his  adversary. 
Once  he  made  a  dash  at  her  stern,  hoping  to  disable  her  screw,  which  he 
thinks  he  missed  by  not  more  than  two  feet.  Our  shots  ripped  the  iron  of 
the  Merrimac,  while  the  reverberation  of  her  shots  against  the  tower  caused 
anything  but  a  pleasant  sensation.  While  Stodder,  who  was  stationed  at  the 
machine  which  controlled  the  revolving  motion  of  the  turret,  was  incau 
tiously  leaning  against  the  side  of  the  tower,  a  large  shot  struck  in  the  vicinity 
and  disabled  him.  He  left  the  turret  and  went  below,  and  Stimers,  who  had 
assisted  him,  continued  to  do  the  work. 

The  drawbacks  to  the  position  of  the  pilot-house  were  soon  realized.  We 
could  not  fire  ahead  nor  within  several  points  of  the  bow,  since  the  blast 
from  our  own  guns  would  have  injured  the  people  in  the  pilot-house,  only 


724 


IN  THE  "MONITOR"   TURRET. 


a  few  yards  off.  Keeler  and  Toffey  passed 
the  captain's  orders  and  messages  to  me,  and 
my  inquiries  and  answers  to  him,  the  speaking- 
tube  from  the  pilot-house  to  the  turret  having 
been  broken  early  in  the  action.  They  per 
formed  their  work  with  zeal  and  alacrity,  but, 
both  being  landsmen,  our  technical  communi 
cations  sometimes  miscarried.  The  situation 
was  novel :  a  vessel  of  war  was  engaged  in  des 
perate  combat  with  a  powerful  foe;  the  cap 
tain,  commanding  and  guiding,  was  inclosed  in 
one  place,  and  the  executive  officer,  working 
and  fighting  the  guns,  was  shut  up  in  another, 
and  communication  between  them  was  difficult 
and  uncertain.  It  was  this  experience  which 
caused  Isaac  Newton,  immediately  after  the  en 
gagement,  to  suggest  the  clever  plan  of  putting 
the  pilot-house  on  top  of  the  turret,  and  making- 
it  cylindrical  instead  of  square;  and  his  sug 
gestions  were  subsequently  adopted  in  this  type 
of  vessel.  [But  see  p.  736. — EDITOKS.] 

As  the  engagement  continued,  the  working  of 
the  turret  was  not  altogether  satisfactory.  It 
was  difficult  to  start  it  revolving,  or,  when  once 
started,  to  stop  it,  on  account  of  the  imperfec 
tions  of  the  novel  machinery,  which  was  now 
undergoing  its  first  trial.  Stimers  was  an  active, 
.muscular  man,  and  did  his  utmost  to  control 
the  motion  of  the  turret;  but,  in  spite  of  his 
efforts,  it  was  difficult,  if  not  impossible,  to 
secure  accurate  firing.  The  conditions  were 
very  different  from  those  of  an  ordinary  broad 
side  gun,  under  which  we  had  been  trained  on 
wooden  ships.  My  only  view  of  the  world  out 
side  of  the  tower  was  over  the  muzzles  of  the 
guns,  which  cleared  the  ports  by  only  a  few 
inches.  When  the  guns  were  run  in,  the  port 
holes  were  covered  by  heavy  iron  pendulums, 
pierced  with  small  holes  to  allow  the  iron  ram 
mer  and  sponge  handles  to  protrude  while  they 
were  in  use.  To  hoist  these  pendulums  required 
the  entire  gun's  crew  and  vastly  increased  the 
work  inside  the  turret. 

The  effect  upon  one  shut  up  in  a  revolving 
drum  is  perplexing,  and  it  is  not  a  simple  matter 


IN   THE  "MONITOR"   TURRET.  725 

to  keep  the  bearings.  White  marks  had  been  placed  upon  the  stationary 
deck  immediately  below  the  turret  to  indicate  the  direction  of  the  star 
board  and  port  sides,  and  the  bow  and  stern ;  but  these  marks  were  oblit 
erated  early  in  the  action.  I  would  continually  ask  the  captain,  "How 
does  the  Merrimac  bear  ? "  He  replied,  "On  the  starboard-beam,"  or  "On 
the  port-quarter,"  as  the  case  might  be.  Then  the  difficulty  was  to  deter 
mine  the  direction  of  the  starboard-beam,  or  port-quarter,  or  any  other  bear 
ing.  It  finally  resulted,  that  when  a  gun  was  ready  for  firing,  the  turret 
would  be  started  on  its  revolving  journey  in  search  of  the  target,  and  when 
found  it  was  taken  "  on  the  fly,"  because  the  turret  could  not  be  accurately 
controlled.  Once  the  Merrimac  tried  to  ram  us;  but  "VVorden  avoided  the 
direct  impact  by  the  skillful  use  of  the  helm,  and  she  struck  a  glancing  blow, 
which  did  no  damage.  At  the  instant  of  collision  I  planted  a  solid  180- 
pound  shot  fair  and  square  upon  the  forward  part  of  her  casemate.  Had  the 
gun  been  loaded  with  thirty  pounds  of  powder,  which  was  the  charge  sub 
sequently  used  with  similar  guns,  it  is  probable  that  this  shot  would  have 
penetrated  her  armor;  but  the  charge  being  limited  to  fifteen  pounds,  in 
accordance  with  peremptory  orders  to  that  effect  from  the  Navy  Department, 
the  shot  rebounded  without  doing  any  more  damage  than  possibly  to  start 
some  of  the  beams  of  her  armor-backing. 

It  is  stated  by  Colonel  Wood,  of  the  Merrimac,  that  when  that  vessel 
rammed  the  Cumberland  her  ram,  or  beak,  was  broken  off  and  left  in  that 
vessel.  In  a  letter  to  me,  about  two  years  since,  he  described  this  ram  as  "of 
castiron,  wedge-shaped,  about  1500  pounds  in  weight,  2  feet  under  water, 
and  projecting  2%  feet  from  the  stem."  A  ram  of  this  description,  had  it  been 
intact,  would  have  struck  the  Monitor  at  that  part  of  the  upper  hull  where 
the  armor  and  backing  were  thickest.  It  is  very  doubtful  if,  under  any  head 
way  that  the  Merrimac  could  have  acquired  at  such  short  range,  this  ram 
could  have  done  any  injury  to  this  part  of  the  vessel.  That  it  could  by  no 
possibility  have  reached  the  thin  lower  hull  is  evident  from  a  glance  at  the 
drawing  of  the  Monitor,  the  overhang  or  upper  hull  being  constructed  for  the 
express  purpose  of  protecting  the  vital  part  of  the  vessel. 

The  battle  continued  at  close  quarters  without  apparent  damage  to  either 
side.  After  a  time,  the  supply  of  shot  in  the  turret  being  exhausted,  Worden 
hauled  off  for  about  fifteen  minutes  to  replenish.  The  serving  of  the  car 
tridges,  weighing  but  fifteen  pounds,  was  a  matter  of  no  difficulty ;  but  the 
hoisting  of  the  heavy  shot  was  a  slow  and  tedious  operation,  it  being  neces 
sary  that  the  turret  should  remain  stationary,  in  order  that  the  two  scuttles, 
one  in  the  deck  and  the  other  in  the  floor  of  the  turret,  should  be  in  line. 
Worden  took  advantage  of  the  lull,  and  passed  through  the  port-hole  upon 
the  deck  outside  to  get  a  better  view  of  the  situation.  He  soon  renewed  the 
attack,  and  the  contest  continued  as  before. 

Two  important  points  were  constantly  kept  in  mind :  first,  to  prevent  the 
enemy's  projectiles  from  entering  the  turret  through  the  port-holes, —  for  the 
explosion  of  a  shell  inside,  by  disabling  the  men  at  the  guns,  would  have 
ended  the  fight,  as  there  was  no  relief  gun's  crew  on  board ;  second,  not  to 


726 


IN  THE  "MONITOR."    TURRET. 


PART    OF    THE    CHEW    OF    THE    "MONITOR."^     FROM    A    PHOTOGRAPH    TAKEN    SOON    AFTER    THE    FIGHT. 

fire  into  our  own  pilot-house.  A  careless  or  impatient  hand,  during  the  con 
fusion  arising  from  the  whirligig  motion  of  the  tower,  might  let  slip  one  of 
our  big  shot  against  the  pilot-house.  For  this  and  other  reasons  I  fired  every 
gun  while  I  remained  in  the  turret. 

Soon  after  noon  a  shell  from  the  enemy's  gun,  the  muzzle  not  ten  yards 
distant,  struck  the  forward  side  of  the  pilot-house  directly  in  the  sight-hole, 
or  slit,  and  exploded,  cracking  the  second  iron  log  and  partly  lifting  the, top, 
leaving  an  opening.  "Worden  was  standing  immediately  behind  this  spot, 
and  received  in  his  face  the  force  of  the  blow,  which  partly  stunned  him,  and, 
filling  his  eyes  with  powder,  utterly  blinded  him.  The  injury  was  known  only 


•fa  The  pride  of  Worden  in  his  crew  was  warmly 
reciprocated  by  his  men,  and  found  expression  in 
the  following  letter,  written  to  him  while  he  was 
lying  in  Washingtoii  disabled  by  his  wound.  We 
take  it  from  Professor  Soley's  volume,  "The 
Blockade  and  the  Cruisers "  (Charles  Scribner's 
Sons).— EDITORS  : 

HAMPTON  ROADS,  April  24th,  1862.  U.  S.  MONITOR. 
To  OUR  DEAR  AND  HONORED  CAPTAIN.  DEAR  SIR  : 
Those  few  lines  is  from  your  own  crew  of  the  Monitor, 
with  their  kindest  Love  to  you  their  Honored  Captain, 
hoping  to  God  that  they  will  have  the  pleasure  of  wel 
coming  you  hack  to  us  again  soon,  for  we  are  all  ready 
able  and  willing  to  meet  Death  or  anything  else,  only 
give  us  hack  our  Captain  again.  Dear  Captain,  we  have 
got  your  Pilot-house  fixed  and  all  ready  for  you  when 
you  get  well  again;  and  we  all  sincerely  hope  that 
soon  we  will  have  the  pleasure  of  welcoming  you  back 
to  it.  ...  We  are  waiting  very  patiently  to  engage 


our  Antagonist  if  wo  could  only  get  a  chance  to  do  so. 
The  last  time  she  came  out  we  all  thought  we  would 
have  the  Pleasure  of  sinking  her.  But  we  all  got  dis 
appointed,  for  we  did  not  fire  one  shot,  and  the  Norfolk 
papers  says  we  are  cowards  in  the  Monitor  —  and  all 
we  want  is  a  chance  to  show  them  where  it  lies  with 
you  for  our  Captain  We  can  teach  them  who  is  cow 
ards.  But  there  is  a  great  deal  that  we  would  like  to 
write  to  you  but  we  think  you  will  soon  be  with  us 
again  yourself.  But  we  all  join  in  with  our  kindest 
love  to  you,  hoping  that  God  will  restore  you  to  us 
again  and  hoping  that  your  sufferings  is  at  an  end 
now,  and  we  are  all  so  glad  to  hear  that  your  eyesight 
will  be  spaired  to  you  again.  We  would  wish  to  write 
more  to  you  if  we  have  your  kind  Permission  to  do  so 
but  at  present  we  all  conclude  by  tendering  to  you  our 
kindest  Love  and  affection,  to  our  Dear  and  Honored 
Captain.  We  remain  untill  Death  your  Affectionate 
Crew. 

THE  MONITOR  BOYS. 
To  Captain  Worden, 


IN  THE  "MONITOR"   TURRET.  727 

to  those  in  the  pilot-house  and  its  immediate  vicinity.  The  flood  of  light 
rushing  through  the  top  of  the  pilot-house,  now  partly  open,  caused  Worden, 
blind  as  he  was,  to  believe  that  the  pilot-house  was  seriously  injured,  if  not 
destroyed ;  he  therefore  gave  orders  to  put  the  helm  to  starboard  and  "  sheer 
off."  Thus  the  Monitor  retired  temporarily  from  the  action,  in  order  to  ascer 
tain  the  extent  of  the  injuries  she  had  received.  At  the  same  time  Worden 
sent  for  me,  and  leaving  Stimers  the  only  officer  in  the  turret,  I  went  forward 
at  once,  and  found  him  standing  at  the  foot  of  the  ladder  leading  to  the  pilot 
house. 

He  was  a  ghastly  sight,  with  his  eyes  closed  and  the  blood  apparently  rush 
ing  from  every  pore  in  the  upper  part  of  his  face.  He  told  me  that  he  was 
seriously  wounded,  and  directed  me  to  take  command.  I  assisted  in  leading 
him  to  a  sofa  in  his  cabin,  where  he  was  tenderly  cared  for  by  Doctor  Logue, 
and.  then  I  assumed  command.  Blind  and  suffering  as  he  was,  Worden's  for 
titude  never  forsook  him ;  he  frequently  asked  from  his  bed  of  pain  of  the 
progress  of  affairs,  and  when  told  that  the  Minnesota  was  saved,  he  said, 
"  Then  I  can  die  happy." 

When  I  reached  my  station  in  the  pilot-house,  I  found  that  the  iron  log 
was  fractured  and  the  top  partly  open  ;  but  the  steering  gear  was  still  intact, 
and  the  pilot-house  was  not  totally  destroyed,  as  had  been  feared.  In  the 
confusion  of  the  moment  resulting  from  so  serious  an  injury  to  the  command 
ing  officer,  the  Monitor  had  been  moving  without  direction.  Exactly  how 
much  time  elapsed  from  the  moment  that  Worden  was  wounded  until  I  had 
reached  the  pilot-house  and  completed  the  examination  of  the  injury  at  that 
point,  and  determined  what  course  to  pursue  in  the  damaged  condition  of  the 
vessel,  it  is  impossible  to  state ;  but  it  could  hardly  have  exceeded  twenty 
minutes  at  the  utmost.  During  this  time  the  Merrimac,  which  was  leaking 
badly,  had  started  in  the  direction  of  the  Elizabeth  Eiver ;  and,  on  taking 
my  station  in  the  pilot-house  and  turning  the  vessel's  head  in  the  direction 
of  the  Merrimac,  I  saw  that  she  was  already  in  retreat.  A  few  shots  were 
fired  at  the  retiring  vessel,  and  she  continued  on  to  Norfolk.  I  returned  with 
the  Monitor  to  the  side  of  the  Minnesota,  where  preparations  were  being  made 
to  abandon  the  ship,  which  was  still  aground.  Shortly  afterward  Worden 
was  transferred  to  a  tug,  and  that  night  he  was  carried  to  Washington. 

The  fight  was  over.  We  of  the  Monitor  thought,  and  still  think,  that  we 
had  gained  a  great  victory.  This  the  Confederates  have  denied.  But  it  has 
never  been  denied  that  the  object  of  the  Merrimac  on  the  9th  of  March  was 
to  complete  the  destruction  of  the  Union  fleet  in  Hampton  Roads,  and  that 
she  was  completely  foiled  and  driven  off  by  the  Monitor ;  nor  has  it  been 
denied  that  at  the  close  of  the  engagement  the  Merrimac  retreated  to  Nor 
folk,  leaving  the  Monitor  in  possession  of  the  field.  J 

,!  "  My  men  and  myself  were  perfectly  black  down.  .  .  .  My  nerves  and  muscles  twitched 
with  smoke  and  powder.  All  my  underclothes  as  though  electric  shocks  were  continually  pass- 
were  perfectly  black,  and  my  person  was  in  the  ing  through  them.  ...  I  lay  down  and  tried 
same  condition.  ...  I  had  been  up  so  long,  to  sleep  —  I  might  as  well  have  tried  to  fly." 
and  been  under  such  a  state  of  excitement,  From  a  private  letter  of  Lieutenant  Greene,  writ- 
that  my  nervous  system  was  completely  run  ten  just  after  the  fight. —  EDITORS. 


728 


IN  THE  "MONITOR"   TURRET. 


In  this  engagement  Captain  Worden  displayed  the  highest  qualities  as  an 
officer  and  man.  He  was  in  his  prime  (forty-four  years  old),  and  carried  with 
him  the  ripe  experience  of  twenty-eight  years  in  the  naval  service.  He  joined 
the  ship  a  sick  man,  having  but  recently  left  a  prison  in  the  South.  He  was 
nominated  for  the  command  by  the  late  Admiral  Joseph  Smith,  and  the  result 
proved  the  wisdom  of  the  choice.  Having  accepted  his  orders  against  the 

protests  of  his  physicians  and  the  entreat 
ies  of  his  family,  nothing  would  deter  him 
from  the  enterprise.  He  arrived  on  the  bat 
tle-ground  amidst  the  disaster  and  gloom, 
almost  despair,  of  the  Union  people,  who 
had  little  faith  that  he  could  beat  back  the 
powerful  MerrimaCj  after  her  experience 
with  the  Cumberland  and  ConyresH.  Without 
encouragement,  single-handed,  and  with 
out  specific  orders  from  any  source,  he  rose 
above  the  atmosphere  of  doubt  and  de- 
preosion  which  surrounded  him,  and  with 
unflinching  nerve  and  undaunted  courage 
he  hurled  his  little  untried  vessel  against 
his  huge,  well-proved  antagonist,  and  won 
the  battle.  He  was  victor  in  the  first  iron 
clad  battle  of  the  world's  history. 

The   subsequent    career   of    the   Monitor 
needs  but  a  few  words. 
On  the  day  after  the  fight  I  received  the  following  letter  from  Mr.  Foxr 
Assistant  Secretary  of  the  Navy : 

"  U.  S.  STEAMER  Roanoke,  OLD  POINT,  March  10th,  1862. 

"My  DEAR  MR.  GREENE:  Under  the  extraordinary  circumstances  of  the  contest  of  yester 
day,  and  the  responsibilities  devolving  upon  me,  and  your  extreme  youth,  &  I  have  suggested 
to  Captain  Marston  to  send  on  board  the  Monitor,  as  temporary  commanding,  Lieutenant  Sel- 
fridge,  until  the  arrival  of  Commodore  Goldsborough,  which  will  be  in  a  few  days.  I  appre 
ciate  your  position,  and  you  must  appreciate  mine,  and  serve  with  the  same  zeal  and  fidelity. 
With  the  kindest  wishes  for  you  all,  most  truly,  G.  V.  Fox." 

For  the  next  two  months  we  lay  at  Hampton  Roads.  Twice  the  Merrlmao 
came  out  of  the  Elizabeth  River,  but  did  not  attack.  We,  on  our  side,  had 
received  positive  orders  not  to  attack  in  the  comparatively  shoal  waters 
above  Hampton  Roads,  where  the  Union  fleet  could  not  manoeuvre.  The 
Merrimac  protected  the  James  River,  and  the  Monitor  protected  the  Chesa 
peake.  Neither  side  had  an  iron-clad  in  reserve,  and  neither  wished  to 
bring  on  an  engagement  which  might  disable  its  only  armored  vessel  in 
those  waters. 

With  the  evacuation  of  Norfolk  and  the  destruction  of  the  Merrimac,  the 
Monitor  moved  up  the  James  River  with  the  squadron  under  the  command 

&  I  was  twenty-two  years  of  age,  and  previous  to  joining  the  Monitor  had  seen  less  than  three- 
years  of  active  service,  with  the  rank  of  midshipman.— S.  D.  G. 


COMMANDKU  SAMUEL  DANA  GREENE,  EXECUTIVE 

OFFICER  OF  THE   "MONITOR."     FROM  A 

WAR-TIME  PHOTOGRAPH. 


IN   THE  "MONITOR"   TURRET.  729 

of  Commander  John  Rodgers,  in  connection  with  McClellan's  advance  upon 
Richmond  by  the  Peninsula.  We  were  engaged  for  four  hours  at  Fort  Dar 
ling,  but  were  unable  to  silence  the  guns  or  destroy  the  earth-works. 

Probably  110  ship  was  ever  devised  which  was  so  uncomfortable  for  her 
crew,  and  certainly  no  sailor  ever  led  a  more  disagreeable  life  than  we  did 
on  the  James  River,  suffocated  with  heat  and  bad  air  if  we  remained  below, 
and  a  target  for  sharp-shooters  if  we  came  on  deck. 

With  the  withdrawal  of  McClellan's  army,  we  returned  to  Hampton  Roads, 
and  in  the  autumn  were  ordered  to  Washington,  where  the  vessel  was 
repaired.  We  returned  to  Hampton  Roads  in  November,  and  sailed  thence 
(December  29th)  in  tow  of  the  steamer  Rhode  Island,  bound  for  Beaufort, 
X.  C.  Between  11  p.  M.  and  midnight  on  the  following  night  the  Monitor  went 
down  in  a  gale,  a  few  miles  south  of  Cape  Hatteras.  Four  officers  and  twelve 
men  were  drowned,  forty-nine  people  being  saved  by  the  boats  of  the 
steamer.  It  was  impossible  to  keep  the  vessel  free  of  water,  and  we  presumed 
that  the  upper  and  lower  hulls  thumped  themselves  apart. 

Xo  ship  in  the  world's  history  has  a  more  imperishable  place  in  naval 
annals  than  the  Monitor.  Not  only  by  her  providential  arrival  at  the  right 
moment  did  she  secure  the  safety  of  Hampton  Roads  and  all  that  depended 
on  it,  but  the  idea  which  she  embodied  revolutionized  the  system  of  naval 
warfare  which  had  existed  from  the  earliest  recorded  history.  The  name  of 
the  Monitor  became  generic,  representing  a  new  type;  and,  crude  and  defec 
tive  as  was  her  construction  in  some  of  its  details,  she  yet  contained  the 
idea  of  the  turret,  which  is  to-day  the  central  idea  of  the  most  powerful 
armored  vessels.  | 

\  On  account  of  the  death  of  the  writer  of  this  officers  and  officers  of  the  mercantile  marine  as  to  the 

paper,  which  occurred  December  llth.  1884,  soon  8«*t  probability  of  her  sinking  at  sea,  volunteered  to 

„.        .,                      ,.          ..                ,,      ,.  -.                    .  so  in  her,  and,  at  my  request,  was  ordered.    From  the 

after  its  preparation,   the  proofs  did  not  receive  ^  Qf  ^  ordew  he*applled  him8elf  uuremittingly  and 

the  benefit  of  his  revision.     The   article  appears  intelligently  to  the  study  of  her  peculiar  qualities  and  to 

substantially  in    the  form   in   which  it  was  writ-  her  fitting  and  equipment.    .    .    .    Lieutenant  Greene, 

ten,  without  changes   other  than  verbal  ones  and  after  taking  his  place  in  the  pilot-house  and  finding  the 

.  slight  rea,,,,,geT,,,  of  p,,,,^.  t£f£ZSl  ySf^S^SfSSA  £ 

Of  the  services  of  Mr.  Greene  in  connection  with  eneiuy  to  contmue  the  engagement ;  but  before  he  could 

the  Monitor,  Captain  Worden  made  the  following  get  at  close  quarters  with  her  she  retired.    He  therefore 

official  record  in  a  letter  to  the  Secretary  of  the  very  properly  returned  to  the  Minnesota  and  lay  by  her 

Navv  .  until  she  floated.    .    .    .     Lieutenant  Greene,  the  execu 
tive  officer,  had  charge  in  the  turret,  and  handled  the 

"  I  was  ordered  to  her  (the  Monitor/  on  the  13th  of  Jan-  guns   with   great   courage,    coolness,    and    skill;    and 

uary,  1862,  when  she  was  still  on  stocks.    Prior  to  that  throughout  the  engagement,  as  in  the  equipment  of  the 

date  Lieutenant  S.  D.  Greene  had  interested  himself  in  vessel  and  on  her  passage  to  Hampton  Roads,  he  ex- 

her  and   thoroughly  examined   her  construction   and  hibited  an  earnest  devotion  to  duty  unsurpassed  in  my 

design  and  informed  himself  as  to  her  qualities,  and,  experience." 
notwithstanding  the  many  gloomy  predictions  of  naval  EDITORS. 


THE   BUILDING   OF  THE    'MONITOR." 

BY    CAPTAIN    JOHN    ERICSSON,   INVENTOR    OF  THE   "MONITOR." 

THE  introduction  of  General  Paixhans's  brill 
iant  invention,  the  shell-gun,  in  1824,  fol 
lowed,  in  1858,  by  the  successful  application  of 
armor-plating  to  the  steam-frigate  La  Gloire, 
under  Napoleon  III.,  compelled  an  immediate 
change  in  naval  construction  which  startled 
the  maritime  countries  of  Europe,  especially 
England,  whose  boasted  security  behind  her 
"  wooden  walls "  was  shown  to  be  a  complete 
delusion.  The  English  naval  architects,  how 
ever,  did  not  overlook  the  fact  that  their  French 
rivals,  while  producing  a  gun  which  rendered 
wooden  navies  almost  useless,  had  also  by  their 
armor-plating  provided  an  efficient  protection 

CAPTAIN    JOHN    ERICSSON.         FROM    A    PHOTOGRAPH.  .  1  •  Tt       •        1  111 

against  the  destructive  1 aixnans  shell. 

Accordingly,  the  Admiralty  without  loss  of  time  laid  the  keel  of  the 
Warrior,  an  armored  iron  steam-frigate  380  feet  long,  58  feet  beam,  26  feet 
draught,  and  9200  tons  displacement.  The  work  being  pushed  with  extraor 
dinary  vigor,  this  iron-clad  ship  was  speedily  launched  and  equipped,  the 
admiration  of  the  naval  world. 

Shortly  after  the  adoption  of  armor-plating  as  an  essential  feature  in  the 
construction  of  vessels  of  war,  the  Southern  States  seceded  from  the  Union, 
some  of  the  most  efficient  of  the  United  States  naval  officers  resigning  then- 
commissions.  Their  loss  was  severely  felt  by  the  Navy  Department  at  Wash 
ington  ;  nor  was  it  long  before  the  presence  of  great  professional  skill  among 
the  officers  of  the  naval  administration  of  the  Confederate  States  became 
manifest.  Indeed,  the  utility  of  the  armor-plating  adopted  by  France  and 
England  proved  to  be  better  understood  at  Richmond  than  at  Washington. 
While  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  Mr.  Welles,  and  his  advisers  were  discuss 
ing  the  question  of  armor,  news  reached  Washington  that  the  partly  burnt 
and  scuttle.d  steam-frigate  Merrimac,  at  the  Norfolk  Navy  Yard,  had  been 
raised  and  cut  down  to  her  berth-deck,  and  that  a  very  substantial  structure 
of  timber,  resembling  a  citadel  with  inclined  sides,  was  being  erected  on  that 
deck. 

The  Navy  Department  at  Washington  early  in  August  advertised  for  plans 
and  offers  for  iron-clad  steam-batteries  to  be  built  within  a  stipulated  time. 
My  attention  having  been  thus  called  to  a  subject  which  I  had  thoroughly 
considered  during  a  series  of  years,  I  was  fully  prepared  to  present  plans  of 
an  impregnable  steam-battery  of  light  draught,  suitable  to  navigate  the  shal 
low  rivers  and  harbors  of  the  Confederate  States.  Availing  myself  of  the 
services  of  a  friend  who  chanced  to  be  in  Washington  at  the  time,  proposals 


THE  BUILDING   OF  THE  "MONITOR."  731 

were  at  once  submitted  to  a  board  of  naval  officers  appointed  by  the  Presi 
dent  ;  and  the  plans  presented  by  my  friend  being  rejected  by  the  board,  I 
immediately  set  out  for  Washington  and  laid  the  matter  personally  before 
its  members,  all  of  whom  proved  to  be  well-informed  and  experienced  naval 
experts.  Contrary  to  anticipation;  the  board  permitted  me  to  present  a  theo 
retical  demonstration  concerning  the  stability  of  the  new  structure,  doubt  of 
which  was  the  principal  consideration  w^hich  had  caused  the  rejection  of  the 
plan  presented.  In  less  than  an  hour  I  succeeded  in  demonstrating  to  the 
entire  satisfaction  of  the  board  appointed  by  President  Lincoln  that  the 
design  was  thoroughly  practical,  and  based  on  sound  theory.  The  Secretary 
of  the  Xavy  accordingly  accepted  my  proposal  to  build  an  iron-clad  steam- 
battery,  and  instructed  me  verbally  to  commence  the  construction  forthwith. 
Returning  immediately  to  New  York,  I  divided  the  work  among  three 
leading  mechanical  establishments,  furnishing  each  with  detailed  drawings  of 
every  part  of  the  structure ;  the  understanding  being  that  the  most  skillful 
men  and  the  best  tools  should  be  employed ;  also  that  work  should  be  con 
tinued  during  night-time  when  practicable.  The  construction  of  nearly  every 
part  of  the  battery  accordingly  commenced  simultaneously,  all  hands  work 
ing  with  the  utmost  diligence,  apparently  confident  that  their  exertions  would 
result  in  something  of  great  benefit  to  the  national  cause.  Fortunately  no 
trouble  or  delay  was  met  at  any  point ;  all  progressed  satisfactorily ;  every 
part  sent  on  board  from  the  workshops  fitted  exactly  the  place  for  which 
it  was  intended.  As  a  consequence  of  these  favorable  circumstances,  the 
battery,  with  steam-machinery  complete,  was  launched  in  one  hundred  days 
from  the  laying  of  the  keel-plate.  It  should  be  mentioned  that  at  the  mo 
ment  of  starting  on  the  inclined  ways  toward  its  destined  element,  the 
novel  fighting-machine  was  named  Monitor.  J 

Before  entering  on  a  description  of  this  fighting-machine  I  propose  to 
answer  the  question  frequently  asked :  What  circumstances  dictated  its  size 
and  peculiar  construction  ? 

1.  The  work  on  the  Merrimac  had  progressed  so  far  that  no  structure  of 
large  dimensions  could  possibly  be  completed  in  time  to  meet  her. 

2.  The  well-matured  plan  of  erecting  a  citadel  of  considerable  dimensions  on 
the  ample  deck  of  the  razeed  3Ierriniac  admitted  of  a  battery  of  heavy  ord 
nance  so  formidable  that  no  vessel  of  the  ordinary  type,  of  small  dimensions, 
could  withstand  its  fire. 

?>.  The  battery  designed  by  the  naval  authorities  of  the  Confederate  States, 
in  addition  to  the  advantage  of  ample  room  and  numerous  guns,  presented  a 

J  The  origin  of  the  name  Monitor  is  given  in  the  "  The  iron-clad  intruder  will  thus  prove  a  severe  nioni- 

following   letter   to    Gustavus  V.   Fox,  Assistant  t0^ to,  tu°se  J^rs-    But  there  are  other  leaders  who 

P  V°      "  will  also  be  startled  and  admonished  by  the  booming  of 

the  guns  from  the  impregnable  iron  turret.  '  Downing 

"NEW- YORK,  January  20th,  1862.  SIR  :  In  accordance  Street'  will  hardly  view  with  indifference  this  last 

with  your  request,  I  now  submit  for  your  approbation  '  Yankee  notion,'  this  monitor.  To  the  Lords  of  the 

a  name  for  the  floating  battery  at  Green  Point.  The  Admiralty  the  new  craft  will  be  a  monitor  suggesting 

impregnable  and  aggressive  character  of  this  structure  doubts  as  to  the  propriety  of  completing  those  four 

will  admonish  the  leaders  of  the  Southern  Rebellion  steel-clad  ships  at  three-and-a-half  millions  apiece.  On 

that  the  batteries  on  the  banks  of  their  rivers  will  no  these  and  many  similar  grounds  I  propose  to  name 

longer  present  barriers  to  the  entrance  of  the  Union  the  new  battery  Monitor.  Your  obedient  servant,  J. 

forces.  ERICSSON."  EDITORS. 


732 


THE  BUILDING  OF  THE  "MONITOR." 


formidable  front  to  an  opponent's  fire  by  being  inclined  to  such  a  degree  that 
shot  would  be  readily  deflected.  Again,  the  inclined  sides,  composed  of  heavy 
timbers  well  braced,  were  covered  with  two  thicknesses  of  bar  iron,  ingen 
iously  combined,  well  calculated  to  resist  the  spherical  shot  peculiar  to  the 
Dahlgren  and  Rodman  system  of  naval  ordnance  adopted  by  the  United 
States  navy. 

•4.  The  shallow  waters  on  the  coast  of  the  Southern  States  called  for  very 
light  draught ;  hence  the  upper  circumference  of  the  propeller  of  the  battery 
would  be  exposed  to  the  enemy's  fire  unless  thoroughly  protected  against 
shot  of  heavy  caliber.  A  difficulty  was  thus  presented  which  apparently 
could  not  be  met  by  any  device  which  would  not  seriously  impair  the  effi 
ciency  of  the  propeller. 

5.  The  limited  width  of  the  navigable  parts  of  the  Southern  rivers  and 
inlets   presented  an  obstacle   rendering  manosuvring  impossible ;   hence  it 
would  not  be  practicable  at  all  times  to  turn  the  battery  so  as  to  present  a 
broadside  to  the  points  to  be  attacked. 

6.  The  accurate  knowledge  possessed  by  the  adversary  of  the  distance 
between  the  forts  on  the  river-banks  within  range  of  his  guns,  would  enable 
him  to  point  the  latter  with  such  accuracy  that  unless  every  part  of  the  sides 
of  the  battery  could  be  made   absolutely  shot-proof,  destruction  would  be 
certain.     It  may  be  observed  that  the  accurate  knowledge  of  range  was  an 
advantage  in  favor  of  the  Southern  forts  which  placed  the  attacking  steam- 
batteries  at  great  disadvantage. 

7.  The  difficulty  of  manipulating  the  anchor  within  range  of  powerful  fixed 
batteries  presented  difficulties  which  called  for  better  protection  to  the  crew 
of  the  batteries  than  any  previously  known. 

Several  minor  points  familiar  to  the  naval  artillerist  and  naval  architect 
presented  considerations  which  could  not  be  neglected  by  the  constructor  of 
the  new  battery ;  but  these  must  be  omitted  in  our  brief  statement,  while  the 
foregoing,  being  of  vital  importance,  have  demanded  special  notice. 

The  plans  on  pages  732-3  represent  a  longitudinal  section  through  the  cen 
ter  line  of  the  battery,  which,  for  want  of  space  on  the  page,  has  been  divided 
into  three  sections,  viz.,  the  aft,  central,  and  forward  sections,  which  for  ready 
reference  will  be  called  aft,  central,  and  forward. 

Referring  particularly  to  the  upper  and  lower  sections,  it  will  be  seen  that  the 
hull  consists  of  an  upper  and  lower  body  joined  together  in  the  horizontal 
plane  not  far  below  the  water-line.  The  length  of  the  upper  part  of  the  hull 
is  172  feet,  beam  41  feet ;  the  length  of  the  lower  hull  being  122  feet,  beam 


1.      AFT    SECTION.      LONGITUDINAL    PLAN    THROUGH    THE    CENTER    LINE    OF    THE    ORIGINAL    MONITOR. 


THE  BUILDING  OF  THE  "MONITOR." 


733 


.  I  .  I  .  I  .  I  .  I  .  I 


2.      CENTRAL    SECTION,    SAME    PLAN. 

?A  feet.  The  depth  from  the  underside  of  deck  to  the  keel-plate  is  11  feet 
2  inches,  draught  of  water  at  load-line  10  feet. 

Let  us  now  examine  separately  the  three  sectional  representations. 

Forward  Section.  The  anchor-well,  a  cylindrical  perforation  of  the  over 
hanging  deck,  near  the  bow,  first  claims  our  attention.  The  object  of  this 
well  being  to  protect  the  anchor  when  raised,  it  is  lined  with  plate  iron 
backed  by  heavy  timbers,  besides  being  protected  by  the  armor-plating  bolted 
to  the  outside  of  the  overhang.  It  should  be  noticed  that  this  method  proved 
so  efficient  that  in  no  instance  did  the  anchor-gear  receive  any  injury  during 
the  several  engagements  with  the  Confederate  batteries,  although  nearly  all  of 
the  monitors  of  the  Pas  sale  class  were  subjected  to  rapid  fire  at  short  range 
in  upward  of  twenty  actions.  It  will  be  remembered  that  the  unprotected 
anchor  of  the  ^lerrimac  was  shot  away  during  the  short  battle  with  the  Con 
gress  and  the  Cumberland.  Having  described  the  method  of  protecting  the 
anchors,  the  mechanism  adopted  for  manipulating  the  same  remains  to  be 
explained.  Referring  to  the  illustration,  it  will  be  seen  that  a  windlass  is 
secured  under  the  deck-beams  near  the  anchor-well.  The  men  working  the 
handles  of  this  mechanism  were  stationed  in  the  hold  of  the  vessel,  and 
hence  were  most  effectually  protected  against  the  enemy's  shot,  besides  being 
completely  out  of  sight.  The  Confederate  artillerists  were  at  first  much  sur 
prised  at  witnessing  the  novel  spectacle  of  vessels  approaching  their  batteries, 
then  stopping  and  remaining  stationary  for  an  indefinite  time  while  firing, 
and  then  again  departing,  apparently  without  any  intervention  of  anchor- 
gear.  Our  examination  of  this  gear  and  the  anchor-well  affords  a  favorable 
opportunity  of  explaining  the  cause  of  Lieutenant  Greene's  alarm,  mentioned 


FORWARD    SECTION.    SAME    PLAN. 


734  THE  BUILDING  OF  THE  "MONITOR." 

in  a  statement  recently  published  by  a  military  journal,  concerning  a  mysteri 
ous  sound  emanating  from  the  said  well  during  the  passage  of  the  Monitor 
from  New  York  to  Fort  Monroe.  Lieutenant  Greene  says  that  the  sound 
from  the  anchor- well  "  resembled  the  death-groans  of  twenty  men,  and  was 
the  most  dismal,  awful  sound  [  he  ]  ever  heard."  Let  us  endeavor  to  trace  to 
some  physical  cause  this  portentous  sound.  The  reader  will  find,  on  close 
examination,  that  the  chain  cable  which  suspends  the  anchor  passes  through 
an  aperture  ( "  hawse-pipe" )  on  the  after  side  of  the  well,  and  that  this  pipe  is 
very  near  the  water-line ;  hence  the  slightest  vertical  depression  of  the  bow 
will  occasion  a  flow  of  water  into  the  vessel.  Obviously,  any  downward 
motion  of  the  overhang  will  cause  the  air  confined  in  the  upper  part  of  the 
well,  when  covered,  to  be  blown  through  the  hawse-pipe  along  with  the  ad 
mitted  water,  thereby  producing  a  very  discordant  sound,  repeated  at  every 
rise  and  fall  of  the  bow  during  pitching.  Lieutenant  Greene  also  states  that, 
apart  from  the  reported  sound,  the  vessel  was  flooded  by  the  water  which 
entered  through  the  hawse-pipe  ;  a  statement  suggesting  that  this  flooding  was 
the  result  of  faulty  construction,  whereas  it  resulted  from  gross  oversight  on 
the  part  of  the  executive  officer, —  namely,  in  going  to  sea  without  stopping 
the  opening  round  the  chain-cable  at  the  point  where  it  passes  through  the  side 
of  the  anchor- well. 

The  pilot-house  is  the  next  important  object  represented  in  the  forward 
section  of  the  illustration  now  under  consideration.  This  structure  is  situated 
10  feet  from  the  anchor-well,  its  internal  dimensions  being  3  feet  6  inches 
long,  2  feet  8  inches  wide,  3  feet  10  inches  high  above  the  plating  of  the  deck ; 
the  sides  consisting  of  solid  blocks  of  wrought  iron,  12  inches  deep  and  9 
inches  thick,  firmly  held  down  at  the  corner  by  3-inch  bolts  passing  through 
the  iron-plated  deck  and  deck-beams.  The  wheel,  which  by  means  of  ordi 
nary  tiller-ropes  operates  the  rudder,  is  placed  within  the  pilot-house,  its  axle 
being  supported  by  a  bracket  secured  to  the  iron  blocks  as  shown  by  the  illus 
tration.  An  ordinary  ladder  resting  on  the  bottom  of  the  vessel  leads  to  the 
grated  floor  of  the  pilot-house.  In  order  to  afford  the  commanding  officer  and 
the  pilot  a  clear  view  of  objects  before  and  on  the  sides  of  the  vessel,  the 
first  and  second  iron  blocks  from  the  top  are  kept  apart  by  packing  pieces  at 
the  corners;  long  and  narrow  sight-holes  being  thereby  formed  extending 
round  the  pilot-house,  and  giving  a  clear  view  which  sweeps  round  the  entire 
horizon,  all  but  that  part  which  is  hidden  by  the  turret,  hardly  twelve  degrees 
on  each  side  of  the  line  of  keel.  Regarding  the  adequacy  of  the  elongated 
sight-hole  formed  between  the  iron  blocks  in  the  manner  described,  it  should 
be  borne  in  mind  that  an  opening  of  five-eighths  of  an  inch  affords  a  vertical 
view  80  feet  high  at  a  distance  of  only  200  yards.  More  is  not  needed,  a  fact 
established  during  trials  instituted  by  experts  before  the  constructor  delivered 
the  vessel  to  the  Government.  Unfortunately  the  sight-holes  were  subse 
quently  altered,  the  iron  blocks  being  raised  and  the  opening  between  them 
increased  to  such  an  extent  that  at  sea,  to  quote  Lieutenant  Greene's  report, 
the  water  entered  "with  such  force  as  to  knock  the  helmsman  completely 
round  from  the  wheel."  It  may  be  shown  that  but  for  the  injudicious  increase 


THE  BUILDING  OF  THE  "MONITOR." 


735 


PLAN  OF  THE  BERTH-DECK  OF  THE  ORIGINAL  MONITOR,  DRAWN  TO  SCALE. 

«,  captain's  cabin  ;  b,  his  state-room  ;  c.  state-rooms  of  the  officers  :  w,  ward- 
room  ;  d,  quarters  of  the  crew,  with  store-rooms  oil  the  sides. 


of  the  sight-holes,  the  commander  of  the  Monitor  would  not  have  been  tem 

porarily  blinded  during  the  conflict  at  Hampton  Roads,  although  he  placed 

his  vessel  in  such  an  extraordinary  position  that,  according  to  Lieutenant 

Greene's  report,  "  a  shell  from  the  enemy's  gun,  the  muzzle  not  ten  yards  dis 

tant  [from  the  side  of  the  Monitor},  struck  the  forward  side  of  the  pilot 

house."     The  size  of  the  sight-hole,  after  the  injudicious  increase,  may  be 

inferred  from  the  reported  fact  that  the  blast  caused  by  the  explosion  of 

the  Confederate  shell  on 

striking  the   outside  of 

the  pilot-house  had  the 

power  of  "  partly  lifting 

the  top."    This  "  top,"  it 

should  be  observed,  con 

sisted  of  an  iron  plate 

two    inches    thick,    let 

down    into    an    appro 

priate   groove,  but   not 

bolted  down  —  a  circum 

stance  which  called  forth 

Lieutenant  Greene's  dis- 

approbation.         The      Ob- 
i>     ,-1 

ject  of  the  constructor 
in  leaving  the  top  plate  of  the  pilot-house  loose,  so  as  to  be  readily  pushed 
up  from  below,  was  that  of  affording  egress  to  the  crew  in  case  of  acci 
dent.  Had  the  monitor  Tecumseh,  commanded  by  Captain  T.  A.  M.  Craven, 
when  struck  by  a  torpedo  during  the  conflict  in  Mobile  Bay,  August  5th, 
1864,  been  provided  with  a  similar  loose  plate  over  the  main  hatch,  the 
fearful  calamity  of  drowning  officers  and  crew  would  have  been  prevented. 
In  referring  to  this  untoward  event,  it  should  be  observed  that  means 
had  been  provided  in  all  the  sea-going  monitors  to  afford  egress  in  case  of 
injury  to  the  hull  :  an  opening  in  the  turret-floor,  when  placed  above  a  cor 
responding  opening  in  the  deck,  formed  a  free  passage  to  the  turret,  the  top 
of  which  was  provided  with  sliding  hatches.  Apparently  the  officer  in  charge 
of  the  turret-gear  of  Captain  Craven's  vessel  was  not  at  his  post,  as  he  ought 
to  have  been  during  action,  or  else  he  had  not  been  taught  the  imperative 
duty  of  placing  the  turret  in  such  a  position  that  these  openings  would 
admit  of  a  free  passage  from  below.  $ 

Lieutenant  Greene's  report  with  reference  to  the  position  of  the  pilot-house 
calls  for  particular  notice,  his  assertion  being  that  he  "  could  not  fire  ahead 
within  several  points  of  the  bow."  The  distance  between  the  center  of  the 
turret  and  the  pilot-house  being  fifty-five  feet,  while  the  extreme  breadth 
of  the  latter  is  only  five  feet,  it  will  be  found  that  by  turning  the  turret 
through  an  angle  of  only  six  decrees  from  the  center  line  of  the  vessel,  the 
shot  will  clear  the  pilot-house,  a  structure  too  substantial  to  suffer  from 

&  Under  the  circumstances  of  the  sinking  of  the  TecumscJi,  the  turret  was  no  doubt  being  worked  to 
meet  the  necessities  of  the  battle,  not  to  afford  egress  for  the  crew.  —  EDITORS. 


736 


THE  BUILDING  OF  THE  "MONITOR." 


the  mere  aerial  current  produced  by  the  flight  of  the  shot.  Considering 
that  the  Monitor,  as  reported  by  Lieutenant  Greene,  was  a  "  quick-turning 
vessel,"  the  disadvantage  of  not  being  able  to  fire  over  the  bow  within  -sv'.r 
degrees  of  the  line  of  keel  is  insignificant.  Captain  Coles  claimed  for  his 
famous  iron-clad  turret-ship  the  advantage  of  an  all-round  fire,  although  the 
axis  of  his  turret-guns  had  many  times  greater  deviation  from  the  line  of  keel 
than  that  of  the  Monitor. 

The  statement  published  by  Lieutenant  Greene,  that  the  chief  engineer  of 
the  vessel  immediately  after  the  engagement  in  Hampton  Roads  "  suggested 
the  clever  plan  of  putting  the  pilot-house  on  top  of  the  turret,"  is  incorrect  and 
calls  for  notice.  The  obvious  device  of  placing  the  pilot-house  in  the  center 
and  above  the  turret  was  carefully  considered  before  the  Monitor  turret  was 
constructed,  but  could  not  be  carried  out  for  these  reasons : 

1.  The  turret  of  the  battery  was  too  light  to  support  a  structure  large 
enough  to  accommodate  the  commanding  officer,  the  pilot,  and  the  steering- 
gear,  under  the  severe  condition  of  absolute  impregnability  against  solid  shot 
from  guns  of  10-inch  caliber  employed  by  the  Confederates. 

2.  A  central  stationary  pilot-house  connected  with  the  turret  involved  so 
much  complication  and  additional  work  (see  description  of  turret  and  pilot 
houses  further  on),  that  had  its  adoption  not  been  abandoned  the  Monitor 
would  not  have  been  ready  to  proceed  to  Hampton  Roads  until  the  beginning 
of  April,  1862.     The  damage  to  the  national  cause  which  might  have  resulted 
from  that  delay  is  beyond  computation. 

The  next  important  part  of  the  battery  delineated  on  the  forward  section 
of  the  illustration,  namely,  the  quarters  of  the  officers  arid  crew,  will  now  be 
considered ;  but  before  entering  on  a  description  it  should  be  mentioned  that 
in  a  small  turret-vessel  built  for  fighting,  only  one-half  of  the  crew  need  be 
accommodated  at  a  time,  as  the  other  half  should  be  in  and  on  the  turret,  the 
latter  being  always  covered  with  a  water-proof  awning.  Referring  again  to 
the  forward  and  to  part  of  the  central  section,  it  will  be  seen  that  the  quarters 


TRANSVERSE    SECTION    OF    THE    HULL    OF    THE    ORIGINAL    MONITOR. 

The  diagram  gives  a  front  view  of  the  boilers  and  furnaces;  also  a  side  elevation  of  the  rotating  cylindrical  turret 
which  proved  impregnable  against  ten-inch  solid  shot  tired  with  battering  charges  at  very  short  range. 


THE  BUILDING  OF   THE  "MONITOR." 


737 


VIEW  SHOWING  THE  EFFECT  OF  SHOT  ON  THE  "MONITOR"  TURRET. 
FROM  A  PHOTOGRAPH  TAKEN  SOON  AFTER  THE  ENGAGEMENT. 


The  ridges  shown  ia  the  nearer  port  are  significant  of 
the  haste  with  which  the  vessel  was  built.  An  opening 
of  this  shape  is  usually  made  by  cutting  three  circles 
one  above  another  and  intersecting,  and  then  trimming 


the  edges  to  an  oval.  In  this  instance  there  was  no  time 
for  the  trimming  process.  Originally  the  armament  was 
to  be  15-inch  guns,  but  as  these  could  not  be  had  in  time, 
the  11-inch  Dahlgrens  were  substituted.— EDITORS. 


extend  from  the  transverse  bulkhead  under  the  turret  to  within  five  feet 
of  the  pilot-house,  a  distance  of  fifty  feet ;  the  forward  portion,  twenty-four 
feet  in  length,  being  occupied  by  the  officers'  quarters  and  extending  across 
the  battery  from  side  to  side.  The  height  of  the  aft  part  of  these  quarters 
is  8  feet  6  inches  under  the  deck-beams ;  while  the  height  of  the  whole  of  the 
quarters  of  the  crew  is  8  feet  6  inches.  A  mere  glance  at  the  illustrations 
showing  a  side  elevation  [p.  733]  and  top  view  of  internal  arrangement 
[p.  735]  gives  a  correct  idea  of  the  nature  of  the  accommodations  prepared 
for  the  officers  and  crew  of  the  vessel  which  Lieutenant  Greene  regards 
as  a  "crude"  structure,  and  of  which  he  says:  "Probably  no  ship  was  ever 
devised  which  was  so  uncomfortable  for  the  crew."  If  this  opinion  were 
well  founded,  it  would  prove  that  submerged  vessels  like  the  monitors  are 
unfit  to  live  in. 

Fortunately,  the  important  question  whether  crews  can  live  permanently 
below  water-line  has  been  set  at  rest  by  the  report  of  the  chief  of  the  Bureau 
of  Medicine  and  Surgery  to  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  1864.  This  minute 
and  carefully  considered  report  enabled  the  naval  administration,  organized 
by  President  Lincoln,  to  prove  the  healthfulness  of  the  monitors,  by  the  fol 
lowing  clear  presentation  of  the  subject :  "  The  monitor  class  of  vessels,  it  is 
well  known,  have  but  a  few  inches  of  their  hulls  above  the  water-line,  and  in 
a  heavy  sea  are  entirely  submerged.  It  has  been  doubted  whether  under  such 
circumstances  it  would  be  possible  long  to  preserve  the  health  of  the  men  on 
board,  and  consequently  maintain  the  fighting  material  in  a  condition  for 
effective  service.  It  is  gratifying,  therefore,  to  know  that  an  examination  of 
the  sick-reports,  covering  a  period  of  over  thirty  months,  shows  that,  so  far 
from  being  unhealthy,  there  was  less  sickness  on  board  the  monitors  than 
on  the  same  number  of  wooden  ships  with  an  equal  number  of  men  and  in 


VOL.  I.     4' 


758  '  THE  BUILDING  OF  THE  "MONITOR." 

similar  exposed  positions.  The  exemption  from  sickness  upon  the  iron-clads 
in  some  instances  is  remarkable.  There  were  on  board  the  Sauyus,  from 
November  25th,  1864,  to  April  1st,  1865,  a  period  of  over  four  months,  but 
four  cases  of  sickness  (excluding  accidental  injuries),  and  of  these  two  were 
diseases  with  which  the  patients  had  suffered  for  years.  On  the  Montmtk,  for 
a  period  of  one  hundred  and  sixty-five  days  prior  to  the  29th  of  May,  1865, 
there  was  but  one  case  of  disease  on  board.  Other  vessels  of  the  class  exhibit 
equally  remarkable  results,  and  the  conclusion  is  reached  that  no  wooden  ves 
sels  in  any  squadron  throughout  the  world  can  show  an  equal  immunity  from 
disease." 

Apart  from  the  ample  size  of  the  quarters  on  board  the  vessel,  shown  by 
the  illustration,  it  should  be  mentioned  that  the  system  adopted  for  ventilat 
ing  those  quarters  furnishes  an  abundant  supply  of  fresh  air  by  the  following 
means.  Two  centrifugal  blowers,  driven  by  separate  steam-engines,  furnished 
seven  thousand  cubic  feet  of  atmospheric  air  per  minute  by  the  process  of 
suction  through  standing  pipes  on  deck.  Part  of  the  air  thus  drawn  in  sup 
ported  the  combustion  of  the  boiler  furnaces,  the  remainder  entering  the 
lower  part  of  the  hull,  gradually  expelling  the  heated  and  vitiated  air  within 
the  vessel.  It  has  been  imagined  that  the  fresh  air  supplied  by  the  blowers 
ought  to  have  been  conveyed  to  the  quarters  at  the  forward  end  of  the  vessel, 
by  a  system  of  conducting  pipes.  The  laws  of  static  balance,  however,  ren 
der  the  adoption  of  such  a  method  unnecessary,  since  agreeably  to  those  laws 
the  fresh  cold  air,  unless  it  be  stopped  by  closed  doors  in  the  bulkheads,  will 
find  its  way  to  every  part  of  the  bottom  of  the  hull,  gradually  rising  and 
expelling  the  upper  heated  strata  through  the  hatches,  and  lastly  through  the 
grated  top  of  the  turret.  Naval  constructors  who  speculate  on  the  cause 
of  the  extraordinary  healthfulness  of  the  monitors  need  not  extend  their 
researches  beyond  a  thorough  investigation  of  the  system  of  ventilation  just 
described. 

Turret  Department.  The  most  important  object  delineated  on  the  central 
section  of  the  illustration,  namely,  the  rotating  turret,  will  now  be  considered ; 
but  before  describing  this  essential  part  of  the  monitor  system,  it  will  be  well 
to  observe  that  the  general  belief  is  quite  erroneous  that  a  revolving  platform, 
open  or  covered,  is  a  novel  design.  So  far  from  that  being  the  case,  this 
obvious  device  dates  back  to  the  first  introduction  of  artillery.  About 
1820  the  writer  was  taught  by  an  instructor  in  fortification  and  gunnery 
that  under  certain  conditions  a  position  assailable  from  all  sides  should  be 

defended  by  placing  the  guns  on  a  turn 
table.  Long  before  building  the  Moni 
tor  I  regarded  the  employment  of  a 
revolving  structure  to  operate  guns  on 
board  ships  as  a  device  familiar  to  all 
well-informed  naval  artillerists.  But 
although  constructors  of  revolving 
E  ELEVATION  OF  A  FLOATING  REVOLVING  cm-  circular  gun-platf  orms  f  or  naval  pur- 

CULAR  TOWER,   PUBLISHED   BY  ABRAHA3I  ,      ,  .      -. 

BLOODGOOD  IN  1807.  poses,  open  or  covered,  have  a  right  to 


THE  BUILDING  OF  THE  "MONITOR. 


739 


FLOATING    CIRCULAR    CITADEL,    SUBMITTED    TO    THE    FRENCH    DIRECTORY    IN    1798. 

employ  this  ancient  device,  it  will  be  demonstrated  further  011  that  the  tur 
ret  of  the  monitors  is  a  distinct  mechanical  combination  differing  from 
previous  inventions.  The  correctness  of  the  assumption  that  revolving 
batteries  for  manipulating  guns  on  board  floating  structures  had  been 
constructed  nearly  a  century  ago  will  be  seen  by  the  following  reference  to 
printed  publications. 

The  "  Nautical  Chronicle  "  for  1805  contains  an  account  of  a  "  movable 
turning  impregnable  battery,  invented  by  a  Mr.  Grillespie,  a  native  of  Scot 
land,  who  completed  the  model  of  a  movable  impregnable  castle  or  battery, 
impervious  to  shot  or  bombs,  provided  with  a  cannon  and  carriage  calculated 
to  take  a  sure  aim  at  any  object."  It  is  further  stated  that  "  the  invention 
proposed  will  be  found  equally  serviceable  in  floating  batteries.  Its  machin 
ery  is  adapted  to  turn  the  most  ponderous  mortars  with  the  greatest  ease, 
according  to  the  position  of  the  enemy."  Again,  the  Transactions  of  the 
Society  for  the  Promotion  of  Useful  Arts  in  the  State  of  New  York,  1807, 
contains  an  illustration  representing  a  side  elevation  of  a  circular  revolving 
floating  battery  constructed  by  Abraham  Bloodgood.  The  guns  of  this  bat 
tery,  as  the  inventor  points  out,  "  would  be  more  easily  worked  than  is  com 
mon,  as  they  would  not  require  any  lateral  movement."  It  is  also  stated,  as 
a  peculiar  feature  of  this  floating  battery,  that  "  its  rotary  motion  would 
bring  all  its  cannon  to  bear  successively,  as  fast  as  they  could  be  loaded,  on 
objectsT.il  any  direction  ";  and  that  "  its  circular  form,  would  cause  every  shot 
that  might  strike  it,  not  near  the  center,  to  glance."  Thirty-five  years  after 
the  publication  of  the  illustration  and  description  of  the  circular  floating 
revolving  tower  of  Abraham  Bloodgood,  Theodore  R.  Timby  proposed  to  build 
a  tower  on  land  for  coast  defense,  to  be  composed  of  iron,  with  several  floors 


740 


THE  BUILDING  OF  THE  "MONITOR.." 


SIDE    ELEVATION    AND     TRANSVERSE    SECTION     (THROUGH     THE    CENTER    LINE    OF    ITS    REVOLVING    SEMI-SPHERICAL 

TURRET)    OF    AN    IRON-CLAD    STEAM-BATTERY,  PLANS    OF    WHICH    WERE    SUBMITTED 

BY    CAPTAIN    ERICSSON    TO    NAPOLEON    III.    IN    SEPTEMBER,    18!>4. 

and  tiers  of  guns,  the  tower  to  turn  on.  a  series  of  friction-rollers  under  its 
base.  The  principal  feature  of  Timby's  "  invention  "  was  that  of  arranging 
the  guns  radially  within  the  tower,  and  firing  each  gun  at  the  instant  of  its 
coming  in  line  with  the  object  aimed  at  during  the  rotary  motion  of  the 
tower,  precisely  as  invented  by  Bloodgood.  About  1865  certain  influential 
citizens  presented  drawings  of  Timby's  revolving  tower  to  the  authorities 
at  Washington,  with  a  view  of  obtaining  orders  to  build  such  towers  for 
coast  defense;  but  the  plan  was  found  to  be  not  only  very  expensive, 
but  radically  defective  in  principle.  The  slides  of  the  gun-carriages  being 
fixed  permanently  in  a  radial  direction  within  the  tower,  the  guns,  of 
course,  are  directed  to  all  points  of  the  compass.  Hence,  during  an  attack 
by  a  hostile  fleet,  with  many  ships  abreast,  only  one  assailant  can  be  fired  at, 
its  companions  being  scot-free  in  the  dead  angle  formed  between  the  effec 
tive  gun  and  the  guns  on  either  side.  In  the  meantime  the  numerous 
guns,  distributed  round  the  tower  on  the  several  floors,  cannot  be  fired  until 
their  time  comes  during  the  revolution  of  the  tower.  The  enemy's  fleet  con 
tinuing  its  advance,  of  course,  calls  for  a  change  of  elevation  of  the  pieces, 
which,  considering  the  constant  revolution  of  the  tower  and  the  different 
altitudes  above  the  sea  of  the  several  tiers,  presents  perplexing  difficulties. 
Nothing  further  need  be  said  to  explain  why  the  Government  did  not  accept 
the  plans  for  Timby's  revolving  towers. 

The  origin  of  rotating  circular  gun-platforms  being  disposed  of,  the  con 
sideration  of  the  central  section  of  the  illustration  will  now  be  resumed.  It 
will  be  seen  that  the  turret  which  protects  the  guns  and  gunners  of  the 
Monitor  consists  simply  of  a  short  cylinder  resting  on  the  deck,  covered  with 
a  grated  iron  roof  provided  with  sliding  hatches.  This  cylinder  is  composed  of 
eight  thicknesses  of  wrought-iron  plates,  each  one  inch  thick,  firmly  riveted 
together,  the  inside  course,  which  extends  below  the  rest,  being  accurately 
faced  underneath.  A  flat,  broad  ring  of  bronze  is  let  into  the  deck,  its  upper 


THE  BUILDING  OF  THE  "MONITOR." 


face  being  very  smooth  in  order  to  form  a  water-tight  joint  with  the  base  of 
the  turret  without  the  employment  of  any  elastic  packing,  a  peculiar  feature 
of  the  turrets  of  the  monitors,  as  will  be  seen  further  on.  Unfortunately, 
before  the  Monitor  left  New  York  for  Hampton  Roads,  it  was  suggested  at  the 
Navy  Yard  to  insert  a  plaited  hemp  rope  between  the  base  of  the  turret  and 
the  bronze  ring,  for  the  purpose  of  making  the  joint  perfectly  water-tight. 
As  might  have  been  supposed,  the  rough  and  uneven  hemp  rope  did  not 
form  a  perfect  joint ;  hence  during  the  passage  a  great 
leak  was  observed  at  intervals  as  the  sea  washed  over 
the  decks.  "  The  water  came  down  under  the  turret 
like  a  waterfall,"  says  Lieutenant  Greene  in  his  report. 
It  will  be  proper  to  observe  in  this  place  that  the 
"  foundering  "  of  the  Monitor  on  its  way  to  Charleston 
was  not  caused  by  the  "  separation  of  the  upper  and 
lower  part  of  the  hull,"  as  was  imagined  by  persons 
who  possessed  no  knowledge  of  the  method  adopted 
by  the  builders  in  joining  the  upper  and  lower  hulls. 
Again,  those  who  asserted  that  the  plates  had  been 
torn  asunder  at  the  junction  of  the  hulls  did  not 
consider  that  severe  strain  cannot  take  place  in  a 
structure  nearly  submerged.  The  easy  motion  at  sea, 
peculiar  to  the  monitors,  was  pointed  out  by  several 
of  their  commanders.  Lieutenant  Greene  in  his  report 
to  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  dated  on  board  the  Moni 
tor,  March  27th,  1862,  says  with  reference  to  sea-going 
qualities : 

"  During  her  passage  from  New  York  her  roll  was  very  easy  and 
slow  and  not  at  all  deep.  She  pitched  very  little  and  with  no 
strain  whatever." 


ISAAC    NEWTON,    FIRST    ASSIST 
ANT-ENGINEER  OF  THE  "  MON 
ITOR."     FROM  A  MEDALLION 
PORTRAIT    BY   LAUNT 
THOMPSON. 

At  the  time  of  Mr.  Newton's 
death  (September  25,  1884)  lie 
had  been  for  several  years 
Chief  Engineer  of  the  Croton 
Aqueduct.  The  plans  which 
have  been  adopted  for  the  new 
aqueduct  were  his,  both  in  the 
general  features  and  the  de 
tails.— EDITORS. 


Captain  John  Rodgers's  report  to  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  dated  on 
board  of  the  monitor  Weekawken,  January  22d,  1863,  refers  specially  to  the 
easy  motion  of  his  vessel : 

"  On  Tuesday  night,  when  off  Chincoteague  shoals,  we  had  a  very  heavy  gale  from  the  E.  N. 
E.  with,  a  very  heavy  sea,  made  confused  and  dangerous  by  the  proximity  of  the  land.  The 
waves  I  measured  after  the  sea  abated  ;  I  found  them  twenty-three  feet  high.  They  were  cer 
tainly  seven  feet  higher  in  the  midst  of  the  storm.  During  the  heaviest  of  the  gale  I  stood  upon 
the  turret  and  admired  the  behavior  of  the  vessel.  She  rose  and  fell  to  the  waves,  and  I  con 
cluded  that  the  monitor  form  had  great  sea-going  qualities.  If  leaks  were  prevented  no  hur 
ricane  coiild  injure  her." 

The  true  cause  of  the  foundering  of  the  Monitor  was  minutely  explained  to 
the  writer  some  time  after  the  occurrence  by  the  engineer,  a  very  intelligent 
person,  who  operated  the  centrifugal  pumping-engine  of  the  vessel  at  the 
time.  According  to  his  statement,  oakum  was  packed  under  the  base  of  the 
turret  before  going  to  sea,  in  order  to  make  sure  of  a  water-tight  joint ;  but 
this  expedient  failed  altogether,  the  sea  gradually  washing  out  the  oakum  in 
those  places  where  it  had  been  loosely  packed,  thereby  permitting  so  large  a 


THE  BUILDING  OF  THE  "MONITOR." 


TRANSVERSE  SECTION  OF  THE  "MONITOR"  THROUGH  THE  CENTER  OF  THE  TURRET. 

quantity  of  water  to  enter  under  the  turret,  fully  sixty-three  feet  in  circum 
ference,  that  the  centrifugal  pumping- engine  had  not  sufficient  power  to  expel 
it.  The  hull  consequently  filled  gradually  and  settled,  until  at  the  expiration 
of  about  four  hours  the  Monitor  went  to  the  bottom.  It  will  be  asked,  in  view 
of  the  preceding  explanation  of  the  construction  of  the  monitor  turrets, 
namely,  that  the  smooth  base  of  the  turret  forms  a  water-tight  joint  with  the 
ring  on  the  deck,  why  was  oakum  packed  under  the  turret  before  going  to 
Charleston  I  The  commander  of  the  vessel,  Captain  Bankhead,  in  his  report 
of  the  foundering,  adverts  to  the  admission  of  water  under  the  turret,  but 
does  not  duly  consider  the  serious  character  of  the  leak,  sixty-three  feet  in 
length.  Captain  Bankhead  evidently  had  not  carefully  investigated  the  mat 
ter  when  he  attributed  the  accident  to  an  imaginary  separation  of  the  upper 
and  lower  hull.|  It  should  be  observed,  in  justice  to  this  officer,  that  having 
commanded  the  Monitor  only  during  a  brief  period  he  possessed  but  an  imper 
fect  knowledge  of  his  vessel,  and  probably  knew  nothing  regarding  the  con 
sequence  of  employing  packing, —  namely,  that  it  might  cause  "water  to 
come  down  under  the  turret  like  a  waterfall,"  as  previously  reported  by  the 
second  officer  in  command.  It  is  proper  to  mention  as  a  mitigating  circum 
stance  in  favor  of  the  second  officer,  Lieutenant  Greene,  that  previous  to  the 
battle  in  Hampton  Roads  he  had  "never  performed  any  but  midshipman 
duty."  The  important  question,  therefore,  must  remain  unanswered,  whether 
in  the  hands  of  an  older  and  more  experienced  executive  officer  the  Monitor, 
like  the  other  vessels  of  her  type,  might  not  have  reached  Charleston  in 
safety. 

Referring  again  to  the  central  part  of  the  illustration  [p.  733]  and  the  sec 
tional  representation  of  the  turret  [above],  it  will  be  found  that  the  guns  are 


J.  Captain  J.  P.  Bankhead  says  in  his  report : 

"  Found  [in  the  morning]  that  the  packing  of  oakum 
underaud  around  the  base  had  loosened  somewhat  from 
the  working  of  the  tower  as  the  vessel  pitched  and  rolled 
.  .  .  towards  evening  the  swell  somewhat  decreased, 
the  bilge-pumps  being  found  amply  sufficient  to  keep 
her  clear  of  the  water  that  penetrated  through  the  sight- 
hole  of  the  pilot-house,  hawse-hole,  and  base  of  tower 
(all  of  which  had  been  well  calked  previous  to  leaving). 
At  7 : 30  the  wind  hauled  more  to  the  south  .  .  .  Found 
the  vessel  towed  badly,  yawing  very  much,  and  with 
the  increased  motion  making  somewhat  more  water 
around  the  base  of  the  tower.  .  .  8  P.  M. ;  the  sea 


about  this  time  commenced  to  rise  very  rapidly,  causing 
the  vessel  to  plunge  heavily,  completely  submerging  the 
pilot-house,  and  washing  over  and  into  the  turret,  and 
at  times  into  the  blower-pipes.  Observed  that  when  she 
rose  to  the  swell,  the  flat  under-surf  ace  of  the  projecting 
armor  would  come  down  with  great  force,  causing  a 
considerable  shock  to  the  vessel  and  turret,  thereby 
loosening  still  more  the  packing  around  its  base.  .  .  . 
T  am  firmly  of  the  opinion  that  the  Monitor  must  have 
sprung  a  leak  somewhere  in  the  forward  part,  where  the 
hull  joins  on  to  the  armor,  and  that  it  was  caused  by 
the  heavy  shocks  received  as  she  came  down  upon  the 
sea."  EDITORS. 


THE  BUILDING  OF  THE  "MONITOR."  743 

placed  across  the  vessel ;  consequently  only  the  end  of  the  breech  and  upper 
part  of  the  port-hole  are  seen.  The  object  of  the  pendulum  port-stoppers 
suspended  under  the  roof  is  to  afford  protection  to  the  turret  crew  while 
loading  the  guns.  Generally,  however,  the  turret  should  be  moved,  and  the 
port-holes  thereby  turned  away  from  the  enemy.  Much  time  was  lost  during 
the  conflict  with  the  Merrimac  by  closing  the  port-stoppers  in  place  of  merely 
moving  the  turret,  the  latter  operation  being  performed  by  a  small  steam- 
engine  controlled  by  a  single  hand;  while  opening  and  closing  the  port- 
stoppers,  as  reported  by  Lieutenant  Greene,  required  the  entire  gun-crew. 
The  slow  fire  of  the  Monitor  during  the  action,  complained  of  by  critics,  was 
no  doubt  occasioned  by  an  injudicious  manipulation  of  the  port-stoppers. 
There  are  occasions,  however,  when  the  turret  should  not  be  turned,  in  which 
case  the  port-stoppers  are  indispensable.  The  method  adopted  for  turning 
the  turret  will  be  readily  understood.  The  small  steam-engine  controlled  by 
one  man,  before  referred  to,  drives  a  double  train  of  cog-wheels  connected 
with  the  vertical  axle  of  the  turret,  this  axle  being  stepped  in  a  bronze  bear 
ing  secured  to  the  central  bulkhead  of  the  vessel.  The  mechanism  thus 
described  wTas  carefully  tested  before  the  Monitor  left  New  York  for  Hamp 
ton  Roads,  and  was  found  to  move  very  freely,  the  turret  being  turned  and 
the  guns  accurately  pointed  by  the  sailing-master  without  aid.  The  trouble 
reported  by  Lieutenant  Greene  regarding  the  manipulation  of  the  turret 
was  caused  by  inattention  during  the  passage  from  New  York,  the  working- 
gear  having  been  permitted  to  rust  for  want  of  proper  cleaning  and  oiling 
while  exposed  to  the  action  of  salt-water  entering  under  the  turret,  from 
causes  already  explained, 

Having  thus  briefly  described  the  turret  and  its  mechanism,  our  investiga 
tion  of  the  central  part  of  the  sectional  view  of  the  battery  will  be  completed 
by  a  mere  reference  to  the  steam-boilers  placed  aft  of  the  turret.  There  are 
two  of  these  boilers  placed  side  by  side,  as  shown  in  the  cut  on  page  736. 
Two  views  being  thus  presented,  the  nature  of  the  boilers  will  be  understood 
without  further  explanation.  It  should  be  mentioned,  however,  that  they 
proved  very  economical  and  efficient. 

Aft  Section.  The  following  brief  reference  to  this  section  of  the  sectional 
illustration,  showing  the  motive  engine,  propeller,  and  rudder,  will  complete 
our  description : 

1.  The  motive  engine,  the   construction  of  which  is  somewhat  peculiar, 
consists  of  only  one  steam-cylinder  with  pistons  applied  at  opposite  ends,  a 
steam-tight  partition  being  introduced  in  the  middle.     The  propeller-shaft 
has  only  one  crank  and  one  crank-pin,  the  difficulty  of  "  passing  the  centers  " 
being  overcome  by  the  expedient  of  placing  the  connecting-rods,  actuated  by 
the  steam-pistons,  at  right  angles  to  each  other.    Much  space  is  saved  within 
the  vessel  by  employing   only  one   steam-cylinder,  an  advantage  of   such 
importance  in  the  short  hulls  of  the  monitors  that  the  entire  fleet  built  during 
the  war  was  provided  with  engines  of  the  stated  type. 

2.  The  propeller,  being  of  the  ordinary  four-bladed  type,  needs  no  descrip 
tion  ;  but  the  mode  of  protecting  it  against  shot  demands  full  explanation. 


744 


THE  BUILDING  OF  THE  "MONITOR." 


Referring  to  the  illustration,  it  will  be  seen  that  the  under  side  of  the  over 
hang  near  the  stern  is  cut  out  in  the  middle,  forming  a  cavity  needed  to 
give  free  sweep  to  the  propeller-blades ;  the  slope  of  the  cavity  on  either  side 
of  the  propeller  being  considerably  inclined  in  order  to  favor  a  free  passage 
of  the  water  to  and  from  the  propeller-blades. 

3.  The  extreme  beam  at  the  forward  side  of  the  propeller-well  is  81  feet, 
while  the  diameter  of  the  propeller  is  only  9  feet;  it  will  therefore  be 
seen  that  the  deck  and  side  armor  projects  11  feet  on  each  side,  thus  pro 
tecting  most  effectually  the  propelling  instrument  as  well  as  the  equipoise 
rudder  applied  aft  of  the  same.  It  will  be  readily  admitted  that  no  other 
vessel  constructed  here  or  elsewhere  has  such  thorough  protection  to  rudder 
and  propeller  as  that  just  described. 

THE  foregoing  description  of  the  hastily  constructed  steam-battery  proves 
that,  so  far  from  being,  as  generally  supposed,  a  rude  specimen  of  naval  con 
struction,  the  Monitor  displayed  careful  planning,  besides  workmanship  of 
superior  quality.  Experts  who  examined  the  vessel  and  machinery  after  com 
pletion  pronounced  the  entire  structure  a  fine  specimen  of  naval  engineering. 

The  conflict  in  Hampton  Roads,  and  the  immediate  building  of  a  fleet  of 
sea-going  monitors  by  the  United  States  Government,  attracted  great  atten 
tion  in  all  maritime  countries,  especially  in  the  north  of  Europe.  Admiral 
Lessoff  sky,  of  the  Russian  navy,  was  at  once  ordered  to  be  present  during  the 
completion  and  trial  of  our  sea-going  monitors.  The  report  of  this  talented 
officer  to  his  government  being  favorable,  the  Emperor  immediately  ordered  a 
fleet  of  twelve  vessels  on  the  new  system,  to  be  constructed  according  to  copies 
of  the  working-drawings  from  which  the  American  sea-going  monitors  had 
been  built.  Sweden  and  Norway  also  forthwith  laid  the  keels  of  a  fleet  of 
seven  vessels  of  the  new  type,  Turkey  rapidly  following  the  example  of  the 
northern  European  nations.  It  will  be  remembered  that  during  the  naval 
contest  on  the  Danube  the  Russian  batteries  and  torpedo-boats  subjected  the 
Turkish  monitors  to  severe  tests.  England,  in  due  course,  adopted  our  turret 
system,  discarding  the  turn -table  and  cupola. 


SINKING    OF    THE   "MONITOR,"  DECEMBER    29,   1862. 


THE  LOSS  OF  THE  " MONITOR."! 

BY  FRANCIS  B.  BUTTS,  A  SURVIVOR  OF  THE  "MONITOR'S1'  CREW. 


T  daybreak  on  the  29th  of  December,  1862, 
at  Fort  Monroe,  the  Monitor  hove  short  her 
anchor,  and  by  10  o'clock  in  the  forenoon  she  was 
under  way  for  Charleston,  South  Carolina,  in 
charge  of  Commander  J.  P.  Bankhead.  The  Ithodc 
Island,  a  powerful  side-wheel  steamer,  was  to  be 
our  convoy,  and  to  hasten  our  speed  she  took  us 
in  tow  with  two  long  12-inch  hawsers.  The 
weather  was  heavy  with  dark,  stormy-looking 
clouds  and  a  westerly  wind.  We  passed  out  of  the 
Roads  and  rounded  Cape  Henry,  proceeding  on  our 
course  with  but  little  change  in  the  weather  up 
to  the  next  day  at  noon,  when  the  wind  shifted  to 
the  south-south-west  and  increased  to  a  gale.  At 
12  o'clock  it  was  my  trick  at  the  lee  wheel,  and 
being  a  good  hand  I  was  kept  there.  At  dark  we 
were  about  seventy  miles  at  sea,  and  directly  off 
Cape  Hatteras.  The  sea  rolled  high  and  pitched 
together  in  the  peculiar  manner  only  seen  at  Hat 
teras.  The  Rhode  Island  steamed  slowly  and 
steadily  ahead.  The  sea  rolled  over  us  as  if  our 
vessel  were  a  rock  in  the  ocean  only  a  few  inches 
above  the  water,  and  men  who  stood  abaft  on  the 
deck  of  the  Rhode  Island  have  told  me  that  several 
times  we  were  thought  to  have  gone  down.  It 
seemed  that  for  minutes  we  were  out  of  sight,  as 
the  heavy  seas  entirely  submerged  the  vessel.  The 
wheel  had  been  temporarily  rigged  on  top  of  the 
turret,  where  all  the  officers,  except  those  on  duty 
in  the  engine-room,  now  were.  I  heard  their 
remarks,  and  watched  closely  the  movements  of 
the  vessel,  so  that  I  exactly  understood  our  condi 
tion.  The  vessel  was  making  very  heavy  weather, 
riding  one  huge  wave,  plunging  through  the  next 
as  if  shooting  straight  for  the  bottom  of  the  ocean, 
and  splashing  down  upon  another  with  such  force 
that  her  hull  would  tremble,  and  with  a  shock  that 
would  sometimes  take  us  off  our  feet,  while  a 
fourth  would  leap  upon  us  and  break  far  above 
the  turret,  so  that  if  we  had  not  been  protected  by 
a  rifle-armor  that  was  securely  fastened  and  rose 
to  the  height  of  a  man's  chest,  we  should  have 
been  washed  away.  I  had  volunteered  for  service 
on  the  Monitor  while  she  lay  at  the  Washington 
Navy  Yard  in  November.  This  going  to  sea  in  an 
iron-clad  I  began  to  think  was  the  dearest  part  of 
my  bargain.  I  thought  of  what  I  had  been  taught 
in  the  service,  that  a  7nan  always  gets  into  trouble 
if  he  volunteers. 

About  8  o'clock,  while  I  was  taking  a  mes 
sage  from  the  captain  to  the  engineer,  I  saw  the 
water  pouring  in  through  the  coal-bunkers  in  sud 
den  volumes  as  it  swept  over  the  deck.  About 
that  time  the  engineer  reported  that  the  coal  was 
too  wet  to  keep  up  steam,  which  had  run  down 
from  its  usual  pressure  of  80  pounds  to  20.  The 

])  By  the  courtesy  of  the  Soldiers'  and  Sailors'  Histori 
cal  Society,  of  Rhode  Island,  we  are  permitted  to  print 
the  following  interesting  paper  condensed  from  one  of 
its  pamphlets.  EDITORS. 

\  The  method  of  communication  from  the  Monitor 


water  in  the  vessel  was  gaining  rapidly  over  the 
small  pumps,  and  I  heard  the  captain  order  the 
chief  engineer  to  start  the  main  pump,  a  very 
powerful  one  of  new  invention.  This  was  done, 
and  I  saw  a  stream  of  water  eight  inches  in  diame 
ter  spouting  up  from  beneath  the  waves. 

About  half-past  8  the  first  signals  of  distress  to 
the  Rhode  Island  were  burned.  She  lay  to,  and  we 
rode  the  sea  more  comfortably  than  when  we  were 
being  towed.  The  Rhode  Island  was  obliged  to 
turn  slowly  ahead  to  keep  from  drifting  upon  us 
and  to  prevent  the  tow-lines  from  being  caught  in 
her  wheels.  At  one  time,  when  she  drifted  close 
alongside,  our  captain  shouted  through  his  trum 
pet  that  we  were  sinking,  and  asking  the  steamer 
to  send  us  her  boats.  The  Monitor  steamed  ahead 
again  with  renewed  difficulties,  and  I  was  ordered 
to  leave  the  wheel  and  was  kept  employed  as  mes 
senger  by  the  captain.  The  chief  engineer  re 
ported  that  the  coal  was  so  wet  that  he  could  not 
keep  up  steam,  and  I  heard  the  captain  order  him 
to  slow  down  and  put  all  steam  that  could  be 
spared  upon  the  pumps.  As  there  was  danger  of 
being  towed  under  by  our  consort,  the  tow-lines 
were  ordered  to  be  cut,  and  I  saw  James  Fenwiek, 
quarter-gunner,  swept  from  the  deck  and  carried 
by  a  heavy  sea  leeward  and  out  of  sight  in  attempt 
ing  to  obey  the  order.  Our  daring  boatswain's  mate, 
John  Stocking,  then  succeeded  in  reaching  the 
bows  of  the  vessel,  and  I  saw  him  swept  by  a  heavy 
sea  far  away  into  the  darkness. 

About  half-past  10  o'clock  our  anchor  was  let 
go  with  all  the  cable,  and  struck  bottom  in  about 
sixty  fathoms  of  water ;  this  brought  us  out  of  the 
trough  of  the  sea,  and  we  rode  it  more  comfortably. 
The  fires  could  no  longer  be  kept  up  with  the  wet 
coal.  The  small  pumps  were  choked  up  with  water, 
or,  as  tho  engineer  reported,  were  drowned,  and 
the  main  pump  had  almost  stopped  working  from 
lack  of  power.  This  was  reported  to  the  captain, 
and  he  ordered  me  to  see  if  there  was  any  water 
in  the  ward-room.  This  was  the  first  time  I  had 
been  below  the  berth-deck.  I  went  forward,  and 
saw  the  water  running  in  through  the  hawse-pipe, 
an  8-inch  hole,  in  full  force,  as  in  dropping  the 
anchor  the  cable  had  torn  away  the  packing  that 
had  kept  this  place  tight.  I  reported  my  observa 
tions,  and  at  the  same  time  heard  the  chief  engineer 
report  that  the  water  had  reached  the  ash-pits  and 
was  gaining  very  rapidly.  The  captain  ordered  him 
to  stop  the  main  engine  and  turn  all  steam  on  the 
pumps,  which  I  noticed  soon  worked  again. 

The  clouds  now  began  to  separate,  a  moon  of 
about  half-size  beamed  out  upon  the  sea,  and  the 
Rhode  Island,  now  a  mile  away,  became  visible. 
Signals  were  being  exchanged,  \  and  I  felt  that 

was  by  writing  in  chalk  ou  a  black-board  which  was 
held  up  to  view;  the  Monitor  had  no  mast  on  which  to 
hoist  the  regular  naval  code  used  by  the  Rhode  Island. 
As  night  approached,  the  captain  of  the  Monitor  wrote, 
while  we  could  yet  see,  that  if  they  were  forced  to 


745 


746 


THE  LOSS  OF  THE  "MONITOR." 


the  Monitor  would  be  saved,  or  at  least  that  the 
captain  would  not  leave  his  ship  until  there  was 
no  hope  of  saving  her.  I  was  sent  below  again  to 
see  how  the  water  stood  in  the  ward-room.  I  went 
forward  to  the  cabin  and  found  the  water  just 
above  the  soles  of  my  shoes,  which  indicated  that 
there  must  be  more  than  a  foot  in  the  vessel.  I  re 
ported  this  to  the  captain,  and  all  hands  were  set 
to  bailing, —  bailing  out  the  ocean  as  it  seemed, — 
but  the  object  was  to  employ  the  men,  as  there 
now  seemed  to  be  danger  of  excitement  among 
them.  I  kept  employed  most  of  the  time,  taking 
the  buckets  from  them  through  the  hatchway  011  top 
of  the  turret.  They  seldom  would  have  more  than 
a  pint  of  water  in  them,  however,  the  remainder 
having  been  spilled  in  passing  from  one  man  to 
another  [see  foot-note,  p.  742]. 

The  weather  was  clear,  but  the  sea  did  not  cease 
rolling  in  the  least,  and  the  Khodc  Island,  with  the 
two  lines  wound  up  in  her  wheel,  was  tossing  at 
the  mercy  of  the  sea,  and  came  drifting  against 
our  sides.  A  boat  that  had  been  lowered  was 
caught  between  the  vessels  and  crushed  and  lost. 
Some  of  our  seamen  bravely  leaped  down  on  deck 
to  guard  our  sides,  and  lines  were  thrown  to  them 
from  the  deck  of  the  Ehodc  Island,  which  now  lay 
her  whole  length  against  us,  -fa  floating  off  astern, 
but  not  a  man  would  be  the  first  to  leave  his  ship, 
although  the  captain  gave  orders  to  do  so.  I  was 
again  sent  to  examine  the  water  in  the  ward-room, 
which  I  found  to  be  more  than  two  feet  above  the 
deck ;  and  I  think  I  was  the  last  person  who  saw 
Engineer  G.  H.  Lewis  as  he  lay  seasick  in  his  bunk, 
apparently  watching  the  water  as  it  grew  deeper 
and  deeper,  and  aware  what  his  fate  must  be.  He 
called  me  as  I  passed  his  door,  and  asked  if  the 
pumps  were  working.  I  replied  that  they  were. 
"  Is  there  any  hope  ?  "  he  asked  ;  and  feeling  a  lit 
tle  moved  at  the  scene,  and  knowing  certainly 
what  must  be  his  end,  and  the  darkness  that  stared 
at  us  all,  I  replied,  "As  long  as  there  is  life  there 
is  hope."  "Hope  and  hang  on  when  you  are 
wrecked "  is  an  old  saying  among  sailors.  I  left 
the  ward-room,  and  learned  that  the  water  had 
gained  so  as  to  choke  up  the  main  pump.  As  I 
was  crossing  the  berth-deck  I  saw  our  ensign, 
Mr.  Frederickson,  hand  a  watch  to  Master's  Mate 
Williams,  saying,  "Here,  this  is  yours;  I  may 
be  lost  " — which,  in  fact,  was  his  fate.  The  watch 
and  chain  were  both  of  unusual  value.  Williams 

abandon  their  ship,  they  would  bum  a  rod  light  as  a  sig 
nal.  About  10  o'clock  the  signal  was  given.  When  the 
steamer  stopped  to  allow  the  hawsers  to  be  cast  oft", 
the  Monitor  forged  ahead  under  the  impetus  of  her 
headway,  and  came  so  close  up  under  the  steamer's 
stern,  that  there  was  great  danger  of  her  running  into 
and  cutting  the  steamer  down.  When  the  engines  of 
the  Rhode  Island  were  started  to  go  ahead  to  get  out 
of  the  way,  it  was  discovered  that  the  hawser  had  got 
afoul  of  the  paddle-wheel,  and  when  they  were  put  in 
motion,  instead  of  getting  clear  of  her,  the  rope  wound 
up  on  the  wheel  and  drew  the  vessels  together.  This 
was  an  extremely  dangerous  position,  for  they  were  be 
ing  pitched  and  tossed  about  so  much  by  the  heavy  seas 
that  if  the  iron-clad  had  once  struck  the  steamer  they 
must  both  have  gone  down  together.  However,  a  fire 
man  went  into  the  wheel  at  the  risk  of  his  life,  and  with 
an  axe  cut  the  hawser  away  so  that  the  steamer  was 


received  them  into  his  hand,  then  with  a  hesitat 
ing  glance  at  the  time-piece  said,  "  This  thing  may 
be  the  means  of  sinking  me,"  and  threw  it  upon  the 
deck.  There  were  three  or  four  cabin-boys  pale 
and  prostrate  with  seasickness,  and  the  cabin-cook, 
an  old  African  negro,  under  great  excitement,  was 
scolding  them  most  profanely. 

As  I  ascended  the  turret-ladder  the  sea  broke 
over  the  ship,  and  came  pouring  down  the  hatch 
way  with  so  much  force  that  it  took  me  off  my 
feet ;  and  at  the  same  time  the  steam  broke  from 
the  boiler-room,  as  the  water  had  reached  the 
fires,  and  for  an  instant  I  seemed  to  realize  that 
wo  had  gone  down.  Our  fires  were  out,  and  I 
heard  the  water  blowing  out  of  the  boilers.  I  re 
ported  my  observations  to  the  captain,  and  at  the 
same  time  saw  a  boat  alongside.  The  captain 
again  gave  orders  for  the  men  to  leave  the  ship, 
and  fifteen,  all  of  whom  were  seamen  and  men 
whom  I  had  placed  my  confidence  upon,  were  the 
ones  who  crowded  the  first  boat  to  leave  the  ship. 
I  was  disgusted  at  witnessing  the  scramble,  and, 
not  feeling  in  the  least  alarmed  about  myself,  re 
solved  that  I,  an  "old  haymaker,"  as  landsmen 
are  called,  would  stick  to  the  ship  as  long  as  my 
officers.  I  saw  three  of  these  men  swept  from  the 
deck  and  carried  leeward  on  the  swift  current. 

Bailing  was  now  resumed.  I  occupied  the  turret 
all  alone,  and  passed  buckets  from  the  lower 
hatchway  to  the  man  on  the  top  of  the  turret.  .1 
took  off  my  coat — one  that  I  had  received  from 
home  only  a  few  days  before  (I  could  not  feel  that 
our  noble  little  ship  was  yet  lost)  —  and,  rolling  it 
up  with  my  boots,  drew  the  tompien  from  one  of 
the  guns,  placed  them  inside,  and  replaced  the 
tompion.  A  black  cat  was  sitting  on  the  breech 
of  one  of  the  guns,  howling  one  of  those  hoarse 
and  solemn  tunes  which  no  one  can  appreciate 
who  is  not  filled  with  the  superstitions  which  I 
had  been  taught  by  the  sailors,  who  are  always 
afraid  to  kill  a  cat.  I  would  almost  as  soon  have 
touched  a  ghost,  but  I  caught  her,  and,  placing  her 
in  another  gun,  replaced  the  wad  and  tompion  ; 
but  I  could  still  hear  that  distressing  howl.  As  I 
raised  my  last  bucket  to  the  upper  hatchway  no 
one  was  there  to  take  it.  I  scrambled  up  the  lad 
der  and  found  that  we  below  had  been  deserted.  I 
shouted  to  those  on  the  berth-deck,  "Come  up ;  the 
officers  have  left  the  ship,  and  a  boat  is  alongside." 

As  I  reached  the  top  of  the  turret  I  saw  a  boat 

enabled  to  get  away  at  a  safe  distance.—  From  a  letter  to 
the  Editors  from  II.  E.  SMITH,  then  of  the  Rhode  Island. 
•jSf  The  boat  lowered  was  not  lost,  as  I  well  know, 
since  I  was  in  command  of  her.  The  gunwale  on  the 
starboard  side  was  crushed  by  the  Rhode  Island  as  she 
tossed  helplessly  about  with  two  lines  wound  up  in  her 
wheel,  but  the  boat  kept  above  water,  and  brought  off 
sixteen  men,  among  them  Surgeon  Weeks.  The  men  did 
not  leap  down  upon  the  deck  to  guard  the  side,  which 
would  have  been  sheer  folly,  but  remained  in  the  turret, 
and  were  with  difficulty  urged  to  come  on  deck  and  be 
taken  off.  The  stern  of  the  Monitor  lay  under  the  Rhode 
Island's  quarter — at  no  time  were  the  vessels  parallel. 
The  Monitor  should  not  have  been  lost.  She  was  going 
against  a  head-sea.  Had  she  turned  back  before  dnrk 
she  would  have  had  no  difficulty,  as  all  the  officers  of  the 
Rhode  Inland  thought.  —  A.  O.  TAYLOR,  Acting  Ensign 
of  the  Rhode  Island. 


THE  LOSS  OF  THE  "MONITOR.." 


747 


inade  fast  on  the  weather  quarter  filled  with  men. 
Three  others  were  standing  on  deck  tryiug  to  get 
011  board.  One  man  was  floating  leeward,  shout 
ing  in  vain  for  help ;  another,  who  hurriedly  passed 
me  and  jumped  down  from  the  turret,  was  swept 
off  by  a  breaking  wave  and  never  rose.  \  was 
excited,  feeling  that  it  was  the  only  chance  to  be 
saved.  I  made  a  loose  line  fast  to  one  of  the 
stanchions,  and  let  myself  down  from  the  turret, 
the  ladder  having  been  washed  away.  The  mo 
ment  I  struck  the  deck  the  sea  broke  over  it  and 
swept  me  as  I  had  seen  it  sweep  my  shipmates.  I 
grasped  one  of  the  smoke-stack  braces  and,  hand 
over-hand,  ascended,  to  keep  my  head  above  water. 
It  required  all  my  strength  to  keep  the  sea  from 
tearing  me  away.  As  it  swept  from  the  vessel  I 
found  myself  dangling  in  the  air  nearly  at  the  top 
of  the  smoke-stack.  I  let  myself  fall,  and  suc 
ceeded  in  reaching  a  life-line  that  encircled  the 
deck  by  means  of  short  stanchions,  and  to  which 
the  boat  was  attached.  The  sea  again  broke  over 
us,  lifting  me  feet  upward  as  I  still  clung  to  the 
life-line.  I  thought  I  had  nearly  measured  the 
depth  of  the  ocean,  when  I  felt  the  turn,  and  as  my 
head  rose  above  the  water  I  was  somewhat  dazed 
from  being  so  nearly  drowned,  and  spouted  up,  it 
seemed,  more  than  a  gallon  of  water  that  had 
found  its  way  into  my  lungs.  I  was  then  about 
twenty  feet  from  the  other  men,  whom  I  found  to 
be  the  captain  and  one  seaman;  the  other  had 
been  washed  overboard  and  was  now  struggling  in 
the  water.  The  men  in  the  boat  were  pushing 
back  on  their  oars  to  keep  the  boat  from  being 
washed  on  to  the  Monitor's  deck,  so  that  the  boat 
had  to  be  hauled  in  by  the  painter  about  ten  or 
twelve  feet.  The  first  lieutenant,  S.  D.  Greene,  and 
other  officers  in  the  boat  were  shouting,  "Is  the 
captain  on  board?"  and,  with  severe  struggles  to 
have  our  voices  heard  above  the  roar  of  the  wind 
and  sea,  we  were  shouting,  "No,"  and  trying  to 
haul  in  the  boat,  which  we  at  last  succeeded  in 
doing.  The  captain,  ever  caring  for  his  men, 
requested  us  to  get  in,  but  we  both,  in  the  same 
voice,  told  him  to  get  in  first.  The  moment  he  was 
over  the  bows  of  the  boat  Lieutenant  Greene 
cried,  "Cut  the  painter!  cut  the  painter!"  I 
thought,  "Now  or  lost,"  and  in  less  time  than  I 
can  explain  it,  exerting  my  strength  beyond  im 
agination,  I  hauled  in  the  boat,  sprang,  caught  on 
the  gunwale,  was  pulled  into  the  boat  with  a  boat- 
hook  in  the  hands  of  one  of  the  men,  and  took  my 
seat  with  one  of  the  oarsmen.  The  other  man, 
named  Thomas  Joice,  managed  to  get  into  the 
boat  in  some  way,  I  cannot  tell  how,  and  he  was 
the  last  man  saved  from  that  ill-fated  ship.  As  we 
were  cut  loose  I  saw  several  men  standing  on  top 
of  the  turret,  apparently  afraid  to  venture  down 
upon  deck,  and  it  may  have  been  that  they  were 
deterred  by  seeing  others  washed  overboard  while 
I  was  getting  into  the  boat. ,! 

After  a  fearful  and  dangerous  passage  over  the 
frantic  seas,  we  reached  the  Rhode  Island,  which 
still  had  the  tow-line  caught  in  her  wheel  and  had 
drifted  perhaps  two  miles  to  leeward.  We  came 


alongside  under  the  lee  bows,  where  the  first  boat, 
that  had  left  the  Monitor  nearly  an  hour  before, 
had  just  discharged  its  men;  but  we  found  that 
getting  on  board  the  Rhode  Island  was  a  harder 
task  than  getting  from  the  Monitor.  We  were  car 
ried  by  the  sea  from  stem  to  stern,  for  to  have 
made  fast  would  have  been  fatal ;  the  boat  was 
bounding  against  the  ship's  sides ;  sometimes  it 
was  below  the  wheel,  and  then,  on  the  summit  of 
a  huge  wave,  far  above  the  decks ;  then  the  two 
boats  would  crash  together ;  and  once,  while  Sur 
geon  Weeks  was  holding  on  to  the  rail,  he  lost  his 
fingers  by  a  collision  which  swamped  the  other 
boat.  Lines  were  thrown  to  us  from  the  deck  of 
the  Rhode  Island,  which  were  of  no  assistance,  for 
not  one  of  us  could  climb  a  small  rope  ;  and  besides, 
the  men  who  threw  them  would  immediately  let 
go  their  holds,  in  their  excitement,  to  throw  an 
other —  which  I  found  to  be  the  case  when  I  kept 
hauling  in  rope  instead  of  climbing. 

It  must  be  understood  that  two  vessels  lying  side 
by  side,  when  there  is  any  motion  to  the  sea,  move 
alternately  ;  or,  in  other  words,  one  is  constantly 
passing  the  other  up  or  down.  At  one  time,  when 
our  boat  was  near  the  bows  of  the  steamer,  we 
would  rise  upon  the  sea  until  we  could  touch 
her  rail ;  then  in  an  instant,  by  a  very  rapid  de 
scent,  we  could  touch  her  keel.  While  we  were 
thus  rising  and  falling  upon  the  sea,  I  caught  a 
rope,  and,  rising  with  the  boat,  managed  to  reach 
within  a  foot  or  two  of  the  rail,  when  a  man,  if 
there  had  been  one,  could  easily  have  hauled  me  on 
board.  But  they  had  all  followed  after  the  boat, 
which  at  that  instant  was  washed  astern,  and  I 
hung  dangling  in  the  air  over  the  bow  of  the  Rhode 
Island,  with  Ensign  Norman  Atwater  hanging  to 
the  cat-head,  three  or  four  feet  from  me,  like  my 
self,  with  both  hands  clinching  a  rope  and  shout 
ing  for  some  one  to  save  him.  Our  hands  grew 
painful  and  all  the  time  weaker,  until  I  saw  his 
strength  give  way.  He  slipped  a  foot,  caught 
again,  and  with  his  last  prayer,  "  O  God ! "  I  saw 
him  fall  and  sink,  to  rise  no  more.  The  ship  rolled, 
and  rose  upon  the  sea,  sometimes  with  her  keel  out 
of  water,  so  that  I  was  hanging  thirty  feet  above 
the  sea,  and  with  the  fate  in  view  that  had  befallen 
our  much-beloved  companion,  which  no  one  had 
witnessed  but  myself.  I  still  clung  to  the  rope  with 
aching  hands,  calling  in  vain  for  help.  But  I  could 
not  be  heard,  for  the  wind  shrieked  far  above  my 
voice.  My  heart  here,  for  the  only  time  in  my  life, 
gave  up  hope,  and  home  and  friends  were  most 
tenderly  thought  of.  While  I  was  in  this  state, 
within  a  few  seconds  of  giving  up,  the  sea  rolled 
forward,  bringing  with  it  the  boat,  and  when  I  would 
have  fallen  into  the  sea,  it  was  there.  I  can  only 
recollect  hearing  an  old  sailor  say,  as  I  fell  into 

the  bottom  of  the  boat,  "Where  in did  he 

come  from  ?  " 

When  I  became  aware  of  what  was  going  on,  no 
one  had  succeeded  in  getting  out  of  the  boat,  which 
then  lay  just  forward  of  the  wheel-house.  Our 
captain  ordered  them  to  throw  bow-lines,  which 
was  immediately  done.  The  second  one  I  caught, 


Commander  Bankhead  reports  Thomas  Joice  among  the  missing. —  EDITORS. 


748 


NEGOTIATIONS  FOR.  THE  BUILDING  OF  THE  "MONITOR." 


arid,  placing  myself  within  the  loop,  was  hauled  on 
board.  I  assisted  in  helping  the  others  out  of  the 
boat,  when  it  again  went  back  to  the  Monitor ;  it 
did  not  reach  it,  however,  and  after  drifting  about 
on  the  ocean  several  days  it  was  picked  up  by 
a  passing  vessel  and  carried  to  Philadelphia.  & 

It  was  half -past  12,  the  night  of  the  31st  of 
December,  1862,  when  I  stood  on  the  forecastle  of 
the  lUiodc  Island,  watching  the  red  and  white  lights 
that  hung  from  the  pennant-staff  above  the  turret, 

3j  After  making  two  trips  there  were  still  four  offi 
cers  and  twelve  men  on  the  Monitor,  and  the  gallant 
boat's  crew,  although  well-nigh  exhausted  by  their 
labors,  started  for  the  third  time  ou  its  perilous  trip,  but 
it  never  reached  them,  for  while  all  ou  board  the  steamer 
were  anxiously  watching  the  light  in  the  turret  and 
vaiuly  peering  into  the  darkness  for  a  glimpse  of  the 


and  which  now  and  then  were  seen  as  we  would 
perhaps  both  rise  on  the  sea  together,  until  at  last, 
just  as  the  moon  had  passed  below  the  horizon, 
they  were  lost,  and  the  Monitor,  whose  history  is 
familiar  to  us  all,  was  seen  no  more. 

The  Rhode  Island  cruised  about  the  scene  of  the 
disaster  the  remainder  of  the  night  and  the  next 
forenoon  in  hope  of  finding  the  boat  that  had  been 
lost ;  then  she  returned  direct  to  Fort  Monroe, 
where  we  arrived  the  next  day. 

rescuiug  boat,  the  light  suddenly  disappeared  and  for 
ever,  for  after  watching  for  a  loug  time  to  try  and  timl 
it  again,  they  were  forced  to  the  conclusion  that  the 
Monitor  had  goue  to  the  bottom  with  all  that  remained 
on  board.  The  position  of  the  Rhode  Island  at  this 
time  was  about  eight  or  ten  miles  off  the  coast  directly 
east  of  Cape  Hatteras. — H.  K.  SMITH. 


NEGOTIATIONS   FOR   THE    BUILDING    OF   THE  "MONITOR," 


IN  1877,  at  the  request  of  ex-Secretary  Gideon 
Welles,  C.  S.  Bushnell,  of  New  Haven,  one  of 
the  associate  owners  of  the  Monitor,  embodied,  in 
a  letter  to  the  former,  his  recollections  of  the 
negotiations  which  led  to  the  building  of  that  ves 
sel.  That  letter  immediately  following,  and  letters 
of  comment  by  Captain  Ericsson  and  ex-Secretary 
Welles,  have  been  sent  to  the  editors  for  publica 
tion,  by  the  Reverend  Samuel  C.  Bushnell,  son 
of  the  builder: 

"  HONORABLE  GIDEON  WELLES.  DEAR  SIR  :  Some 
time  since,  during  a  short  conversation  in  regard  to  the 
little  h'rst  Monitor,  you  expressed  a  desire  to  learn  from 
me  some  of  the  unwritten  details  of  her  history ;  par 
ticularly,  how  the,  plan  of  the  boat  came  to  be  pre 
sented  to  the  Government  and  the  manner  in  which  the 
contract  for  her  construction  was  secured. 

"  Youdoubtless  remember  haudiugme  in  August,  1861,4 
at  Willard's  Hotel  in  Washington,  D.  C.,  the  draft  of  a 
bill  which  you  desired  Congress  should  pass,  in  ref 
erence  to  obtaining  some  kind  of  iron-clad  vessels  to 
meet  the  formidable  preparations  the  Rebels  were  mak 
ing  at  Norfolk,  Mobile,  and  New  Orleans.  At  that  time 
you  stated  that  you  had  already  called  the  attention  of 
Congress  to  this  matter,  but  without  effect. 

"  I  presented  this  bill  to  the  Honorable  James  E.  Eng 
lish,  member  of  Congress  from  my  district,  who  fortu 
nately  was  on  the  Naval  Committee  and  untiringly  urged 
the  matter  on  their  attention.  The  chairman  of  the 
committee,  A.  H.  Rice,  of  Massachusetts,  j)  also  cooper 
ated  most  heartily,  so  that  in  about  thirty  days,\  if  I 
remember  correctly,  the  bill  passed  both  Houses,  and 
was  immediately  signed  by  President  Lincoln.  The  bill 
required  all  plans  of  iron-clad  vessels  to  be  submitted  to 
a  board  of  naval  officers  appointed  by  yourself.  The 
board  consisted  of  Admirals  Smith  and  Paulding  and 
Captain  Davis,  who  examined  hundreds  of  plans,  good 
and  bad,  and  among  others  that  of  a  plated  iron  gun 
boat  called  the  Galena,  contrived  by  Samuel  H.  Pook. 
now  a  constructor  in  the  Navy  Department.  The  partial 
protection  of  iron  bars  proposed  for  her  seemed  so  bur 
densome  that  many  naval  officers  warned  me  against 
the  possibility  of  the  Galena's  being  able  to  carry  the 
additional  weight  of  her  armament. 

C.  H.  Delamater,  of  New  York,  advised  me  to  consult 
with  the  engineer,  Captain  John  Ericsson,  on  the  matter. 

•&•  Mr.  Buslmell's  recollection  of  the  dates  is  inexact.  Tlie 
bill  (Senate,  36)  was  introduced  July  19tli,  in  the  Senate,  by 
Mr.  Grimes  of  Iowa,  "at  the  instance  of  the  Department." 
(Congressional  Globe,  1st  Session,  37th  Congress,  pp.  205, 
344).  It  became  a  law  August  3d.—  EDITORS. 

I  As  Mr.  Welles  points  out  in  his  letter  (see  below),  this 


This  I  proceeded  at  once  to  do,  and  on  supplying  him 
with  the  data  necessary  for  his  calculations  promptly 
gained  the  answer,  '  She  will  easily  carry  the  load  you 
propose,  and  stand  a  6-inch  shot  —  if  fired  from  a 
respectable  distance.'  At  the  close  of  this  interview. 
Captain  Ericsson  asked  if  I  had  time  just  then  to  ex 
amine  the  plan  of  a  floating  battery  absolutely  impreg 
nable  to  the  heaviest  shot  or  shell.  I  replied  that  the 
problem  had  been  occupying  mo  for  the  last  three 
months,  and  that,  considering  the  time  required  for  con 
struction,  the  Galena  was  the  best  result  that  I  had  been 
able  to  attain.  He  then  placed  before  me  the  plan  of  the 
Monitor,  explained  how  quickly  and  powerfully  she 
could  be  built,  and  exhibited  with  characteristic  pride 
a  medal  and  letter  of  thanks  received  from  Napoleon  III. 
For  it  appears  that  Ericsson  had  invented  the  bajttery 
when  France  and  Russia  were  at  war,  and  out  of  hos 
tility  to  Russia  had  presented  it  to  France,  hoping 
thereby  to  aid  the  defeat  of  Sweden's  hereditary  foe. 
The  invention,  however,  came  too  late  to  be  of  service, 
and  was  preserved  for  another  issue. 

"  You  no  doubt  remember  my  delight  with  the  plan  of 
the  Monitor  when  first  Captain  Ericsson  intrusted  it  to 
my  care ;  how  I  followed  you  to  Hartford  and  astounded 
you  by  saying  that  the  country  was  safe  because  1  had 
found  a  battery  which  would  make  us  master  of  the 
situation  so  far  as  the  ocean  was  concerned.  You  were 
much  pleased,  and  urged  me  to  lose  no  time  in  present 
ing  the  plan  to  the  Naval  Board  at  Washington.  I  se 
cured  at  once  the  cooperation  of  wise  and  able  associates 
in  the  person  of  the  late  Honorable  John  A.  Griswold  of 
[Troy]  N.  Y.,  and  John  F.  Winslow  of  Troy,  both  of 
them  friends  of  Governor  Seward  and  large  manufac 
turers  of  iron  plates,  etc.  Governor  Seward  furnished 
us  with  a  strong  letter  of  introduction  to  President 
Lincoln,  who  was  at  once  greatly  pleased  with  the  sim 
plicity  of  the  plan  and  agreed  to  accompany  us  to  the 
Navy  Department  at  11  A.  M.  the  following  day,  and  aid 
us  as  best  he  could.  He  was  on  hand  promptly  at  11 
o'clock  — the  day  before  you  returned  from  Hartford. 
Captain  Fox,  together  with  a  part  of  the  Naval  Board, 
was  present.  •&  All  were  surprised  at  the  novelty  of  the 
plan.  Some  advised  trying  it ;  others  ridiculed  it.  The 
conference  was  finally  closed  for  that  day  by  Mr.  Lin 
coln's  remarking,  'All  I  have  to  say  is  what  the  girl 
said  when  she  put  her  foot  into  the  stocking,  "  It  strikes 
me  there's  something  in  it. " '  The  following  day  Admiral 
Smith  convened  the  whole  board,  when  I  presented  as 
best  I  could  the  plan  audits  merits,  carefully  noting  the 

was  an  error  of  Mr.  Buslmell's.  The  chairman  of  the  Naval 
Committee  was  diaries  B.  Sedgwick.  of  Syracuse,  New 
York.  Mr.  Rice  came  second  on  the  committee.—  EDITORS. 

\  The  time  was  actually  fifteen  days.—  EDITORS. 

•fe  Several  naval  officers  were  also  present  unofficially.— 

EDITORS. 


NEGOTIATIONS  FOR   THE  BUILDING  OF  THE  "MONITOR." 


749 


remarks  of  each  member  of  the  board.  I  tben  went  to 
my  hotel  quite  sanguine  of  success,  but  only  to  be  disap 
pointed  on  the  following  day.  For  during  the  hours  fol 
lowing  the  last  session,  I  found  that  the  air  had  been 
thick  with  croakings  that  the  department  was  about  to 
father  another  Ericsson  failure.  Never  was  I  more 
active  than  now  in  the  effort  to  prove  that  Ericsson  had 
never  made  a  failure ;  that,  on  the  contrary,  lie  had 
built  for  the  Government  the  first  steam  war-propeller 
ever  made;  that  the  bursting  of  the  guii  was  no  fault  of 
his,  but  of  the  shell,  which  had  not  been  made  strong 
enough  to  prevent  its  flattening  up  with  the  pressure  of 
the  explosion  behind  it,  making  the  bursting  of  the  gun 
unavoidable ;  that  his  caloric  principle  was  a  triumph 
ant  success,  but  that  no  metal  had  yet  been  found  to 
utilize  it  on  a  large  scale.  I  succeeded  at  length  in  get 
ting  Admirals  Smith  and  Paulding  to  promise  to  sign  a 
report  advising  the  building  of  one  trial  battery,  pro 
vided  Captain  Davis  would  join  with  them.  On  goiugto 
him,  I  was  informed  that  I  might  '  take  the  little  thing 
home  and  worship  it,  as  it  would  not  be  idolatry,  because 
it  was  made  in  the  image  of  nothing  in  the  heaven  above 
or  on  the  earth  below  or  in  the  waters  under  the  earth.' 
One  thing  only  yet  remained  which  it  was  possible  to  do  : 
this  was  to  get  Ericsson  to  come  to  Washington  and 
plead  the  case  himself.  This  I  was  sure  would  win  the 
case,  and  so  informed  you,  for  Ericsson  is  a  full  electric 
battery  in  himself.  You  at  once  promised  to  have  a  meet 
ing  in  your  room  if  I  could  succeed  in  inducing  him  to 
come.  This  was  exceedingly  doubtful,  for  so  badly  had 
he  been  treated  and  so  unmercifully  maligned  in  regard 
to  the  Princeton  that  he  had  repeatedly  declared  that  he 
would  never  set  foot  in  Washington  again. 

"  Nevertheless  I  appeared  at  his  house  the  next  morn 
ing  precisely  at  9  o'clock,  and  heard  his  sharp  greeting: 
'  Well !  How  is  it  ? '  '  Glorious,'  said  I.  '  Go  on,  go  on,' 
said  he,  with  much  impatience.  '  What  did  they  say  i ' 
•Admiral  Smith  says  it  is  worthy  of  the  genius  of  an 
Ericsson.'  The  pride  fairly  gleamed  in  his  eyes.  -But 
Paulding — what  did  he  say  of  it  ? '  '  He  said,  "  It's  just 
the  thing  to  clear  the  'Rebs'  out  of  Charleston  with."' 
'  How  about  Davis  ? '  he  inquired,  as  I  appeared  to 
hesitate  a  moment.  '  Oh,  Davis,'  said  I,  '  he  wanted 
two  or  three  explanations  in  detail  which  I  couldn't 
give  him,  and  so  Secretary  Welles  proposed  that  I  should 
come  and  get  you  to  come  to  Washington  and  explain 
these  few  points  to  the  entire  board  in  his  room  to-mor 
row.'  '  Well,  I'll  go  —  I'll  go  to-night.' 

•' From  that  moment  I  knew  that  the  success  of  the 
affair  was  assured.  You  remember  how  he  thrilled  every 
person  present  in  your  room  with  his  vivid  description  of 
what  the  little  boat  would  be  and  what  she  could  do ; 
and  that  in  ninety  days'  time  she  could  be  built,  although 
the  Rebels  had  already  been  four  months  or  more  on  the 
Mcrrintac  with  all  the  appliances  of  the  Norfolk  Navy 
Yard  to  help  them. 

"  You  asked  him  how  much  it  would  cost  to  complete 
her.  '  Two  hundred  and  seventy-five  thousand  dollars,' 
he  said.  Then  you  promptly  turned  to  the  members 
of  the  board,  and  one  by  one  asked  them  if  they  would 
recommend  that  a  contract  be  entered  into,  for  her 
construction,  with  Captain  Ericsson  and  his  associates. 
Each  one  answered,  '  Yes,  by  all  means.'  Then  you  told 
Captain  Ericsson  to  start  her  immediately.  On  the  next 
day  in  New  York  a  large  portion  of  every  article  used 
in  her  construction  was  ordered,  and  a  contract  at  once 
entered  into  between  Captain  Ericsson  and  his  asso 
ciates  and  T.  F.  Rowland,  at  Green  Point,  for  the  ex 
peditious  construction  of  the  most  formidable  vessel 
ever  made.  It  was  arranged  that  after  a  few  days  I 
should  procure  a  formal  documentary  contract  from  the 
Naval  Board  to  be  signed  and  executed  by  the  Secre 
tary  of  the  Navy,  Captain  John  Ericsson  and  associates. 

"  I  regret  that  this  part  of  the  matter  has  been  mis 
understood,  as  though  you  had  made  terms  heavier  or 
the  risk  greater  than  you  ouirht.  The  simple  fact  was 
that  after  we  had  entered  upon  the  work  of  construction, 
and  before  the  formal  contract  had  been  awarded,  a 
great  clamor  arose,  much  of  it  due  to  interested  parties, 
to  the  effect  that  the  battery  would  prove  a  failure  and 


disgrace  the  members  of  the  board  for  their  action  in 
recommending  it.  For  their  own  protection,  therefore, 
and  out  of  their  superabundant  caution  they  insisted  on 
inserting  in  the  contract  a  clause  requiring  us  to  guaran 
tee  the  complete  success  of  the  battery,  so  that,  in  case 
she  proved  a  failure,  the  Government  might  be  refunded 
the  amounts  advanced  to  us  from  time  to  time  during 
her  construction.  To  Captain  Ericsson  and  myself,  this 
was  never  an  embarrassment ;  but  to  Mr.  Winslow,  as 
indeed  to  Mr.  Griswold  also,  it  appeared  that  the  board 
had  asked  too  much.  But  I  know  that  the  noble  old 
Admiral  Smith  never  intended  that  we  should  suffer, 
and  among  the  many  fortunate  things  for  which  the 
nation  had  occasion  to  be  grateful  —  such  as  the  provi 
dential  selection  as  President  in  those  dark  days  of  the 
immortal  Lincoln  and  his  wisely  chosen  Cabinet  —  was 
the  appointment  of  Admiral  Smith  to  the  charge  of  the 
navy  yards,  who  always  seemed  to  sleep  with  one  eye 
open,  so  constant  was  his  watchfulness  and  so  eager  his 
desire  that  the  entire  navy  should  be  always  in  readiness 
to  do  its  part  in  the  overthrow  of  the  rebellion. 

••  lam  confident  that  no  native-born  child  of  this  coun 
try  will  ever  forget  the  proud  sou  of  Sweden  who  could 
sit  in  his  own  house  and  contrive  the  three  thousand  dif 
ferent  parts  that  go  to  make  up  the  complete  hull  of  the 
steam-battery  Dictator,  so  that  when  the  mechanics  came 
to  put  the  parts  together  not  a  single  alteration  in  any 
particular  was  required  to  be  made.  What  the  little 
first  Monitor  and  the  subsequent  larger  ones  achieved  is 
a  part  of  history.  .  .  .  Very  respectfully,  C.  8. 
BCSHXELL." 

The  date  of  the  following  letter  from  Captain 
Ericsson  to  the  son  of  Mr.  C.  S.  Bushnell  indicates 
that  the  above  letter  was  submitted  to  Captain 
Ericsson  before  it  was  sent  to  Ex-Secretary  Welles : 

'•  NEW  YORK,  March  2d,  1877. 

"ERICSSON  F.  BUSHNELL,  ESQ.,  NEW  HAVEN.  MY 
DEAR  SIR  :  I  have  read  with  much  pleasure  3-0111'  father's 
statement  to  Mr.  Welles  concerning  the  construction  of 
the  original  Monitor.  I  do  not  think  any  changes  or 
additions  are  needed,  the  main  facts  being  well  stated. 
.  .  .  Yours  very  truly,  J.  ERICSSON." 

Ex-Secretary  Welles,  under  date  of  Hartford, 
19th  March,  1877,  addressed  the  following  letter 
to  Mr.  C.  S.  Bushnell : 

"  MY  DEAR  SIR  :  I  received  on  the  16th  inst.  your 
interesting  communication  without  date — relative  to 
the  construction  of  the  Monitor.  Many  of  the  incidents 
narrated  by  you  I  remember,  although  more  than  fifteen 
years  have  gone  by  since  they  transpired.  Some  errors, 
not  very  essential  and  caused  by  lapse  of  years,  occur 
—  Sedgwick,  not  Rice,  was  chairman  of  the  Naval  Com 
mittee  ;  Griswold  resided  in  Troy,  not  New  York,  and 
subsequently  represented  the  Troy  District  in  Congress, 
etc.,  etc. 

"  I  well  remember  asking  you  to  put  in  writing  the 
facts  in  your  possession  concerning  the  construction 
of  the  Monitor.  Some  statements  of  General  Butler, 
Wendell  Phillips,  and  others,  to  disparage  the  Navy 
Department,  pervert  the  truth  and  deny  us  all  credit, 
led  Admiral  Smith,  in  the  autumn  of  1868  to  address  to 
me  a  communication  reciting  the  facts,  for  he  said, 
when  we  were  gone,  those  of  us  who  took  the  responsi 
bility  and  would  have  incurred  the  disgrace  had  Erics 
son's  invention  proved  a  failure,  would  be  ignored  and 
history  misstated.  As  you  were  more  intimate  with  the 
case  at  its  inception,  were  the  first  to  bring  it  to  the 
attention  of  the  department,  it  seemed  to  me  proper 
that  your  recollection  and  knowledge  of  the  transaction 
should  be  reduced  to  writing.  I  am  greatly  obliged  to 
you  for  the  full  and  satisfactory  manner  in  which  you 
have  complied  with  my  request.  Next,  after  Ericsson 
himself,  you  are  entitled  to  bringing  his  invention  to 
the  knowledge  of  the  department.  I  would  not  know 
ingly  do  injustice  to  any  one,  and  I  am  well  aware  that 
the  official  in  civil  life,  and  who  in  administering  the 


NEGOTIATIONS  FOR   THE  BUILDING  OF  THE  "MONITOR." 


government  directs  movements  by  which  naval  aiid 
military  men  acquire  renown,  is  often  by  the  passing 
multitude  little  thought  of  and  scarcely  known ;  but  the 
truth  should  not  be  suppressed. 

"  The  civilians  of  the  Navy  Department  who  adopted 
and  pursued  through  ridicule  and  assault  the  Monitor 
experiment,  Butler  and  others  would  slight  and  defame. 
In  the  histories  of  the  war,  the  Navy  Department,  which 
originated,  planned,  and  carried  forward  the  naval 
achievements  from  Hatteras  to  New  Orleans,  and  finally 
Fort  Fisher,  is  scarcely  known  or  mentioned.  The 
heroes  who  fought  the  battles  and  periled  their  lives  to 
carry  into  effect  the  plans  which  the  department  de 
vised  have  deservedly  honorable  remembrance—  but  the 
originators  and  movers  are  little  known.  I  remember, 
niy  dear  sir,  your  earnest  efforts  in  the  early  days  of  the 
war  and  the  comfort  they  gave  me. 

"  Yours,         GIDEON  WELLES." 

Captain  Ericsson's  version  of  the  visit  to  Wash 
ington,  as  given  in  Colonel  William  C.  Church's 
paper  on  "John  Ericsson"  in  "The  Century" 
magazine  for  April,  1879,  is  as  follows: 

"  With  his  previous  experience  of  the  waste  of  time 
and  patience  required  to  accomplish  anything  at  Wash 
ington,  Captain  Ericsson,  who  is  not,  it  must  be  said, 
like  the  man  Moses,  'exceeding  meek,'  would  not  him 
self  go  to  the  capital  to  secure  attention  to  his  ideas. 
There  were  associated  with  him  three  men  of  practical 
experience,  great  energy  and  wealth,  who  had  become 
interested  in  the  Monitor  and  were  determined  that  it 
should  have  a  trial.  One  of  these  was  Mr.  C.  S.  Bushnell, 
of  Connecticut.  He  went  to  Washington,  but  failed  in 
the  attempt  to  persuade  the  iron-clad  board  that  the 
designer  of  the  Princeton  was  worthy  of  a  hearing. 
Nothing  remained  except  to  induce  Ericsson  to  visit 
Washington  in  person  and  plead  his  own  cause  with 
that  rude  but  forcible  eloquence  which  has  seldom  failed 
him  in  an  emergency.  To  move  him  was  only  less  diffi 
cult  than  to  convince  the  Navy  Department  without 
him.  At  last  a  subterfuge  was  adopted.  Ericsson  was 
given  to  understand  that  Mr.  Bushnell's  reception  at 
Washington  had  been  satisfactory  and  that  nothing  re 
mained  but  for  him  to  go  on  and  complete  the  details  of 
a  contract  for  one  of  his  vessels.  Presenting  himself 
before  the  board,  what  was  hie  astonishment  to  find 
that  he  was  not  only  an  unexpected  but  apparently  an 


unwelcome  visitor !  It  was  evident  that  the  board  were 
asking  themselves  what  could  have  brought  him  there. 
He  was  not  left  long  in  doubt  as  to  the  meaning  of  this 
reception.  To  his  indignation,  as  well  as  his  astonish 
ment,  he  was  informed  that  the  plan  of  a  vessel  submit 
ted  by  him  had  already  been  rejected.  The  first  impulse 
was  to  withdraw  at  once.  Mastering  his  anger,  how 
ever,  he  stopped  to  inquire  the  reason  for  the  deter 
mination  of  the  board.  The  vessel  had  not  sufficient 
stability,  Commodore  Smith  exclaimed  ;  in  fact,  it  would 
upset  and  place  her  crew  in  the  inconvenient  and  unde 
sirable  position  of  submarine  divers.  Now,  if  there  is 
anything  which  especially  distinguishes  the  Monitor, 
with  its  low  free-board,  it  is  the  peculiarity  which  it  has 
in  common  with  the  raft  it  resembles  —  its  inability  to 
upset.  In  a  most  earnest  and  lucid  argument,  Captain 
Ericsson  proceeded  to  explain  this.  Perceiving  that  his 
explanation  had  its  effect,  and  his  blood  being  well 
warmed  by  this  time,  he  ended  by  declaring  to  the  board 
with  great  earnestness  :  '  Gentlemen,  after  what  I  have 
said,  I  consider  it  to  be  your  duty  to  the  country  to 
give  me  an  order  to  build  the  vessel  before  I  leave  this 
room.'  Withdrawing  to  one  corner,  the  board  consulted 
together  and  invited  Captain  Ericsson  to  call  again  at 
1  o'clock.  Promptly  at  the  hour  named  he  appeared 
at  the  Navy  Department.  In  the  board-room  he  found 
Commodore  Paulding  alone.  The  commodore  received 
him  in  the  most  friendly  manner,  invited  him  into  his 
private  office,  and  asked  that  he  would  repeat  the  expla 
nation  of  the  morning  as  to  the  stability  of  the  vessel. 
Between  the  two  interviews,  Ericsson  had  found  time  to 
make  at  his  hotel  a  diagram  presenting  the  question  of 
stabilityin  a  form  easily  understood.  With  this  diagram, 
he  repeated  hiw  previous  demonstration.  Commodore 
(afterward  Admiral)  Paulding  was  thoroughly  con 
vinced,  and  with  frankness  which  did  him  great  credit 
said :  '  Sir,  I  have  leamt  more  about  the  stability  of  (a 
vessel  from  Avhat  you  have  now  said  than  all  I  knew 
before.'  This  interview  ended  with  a  request  -to  call 
again  at  3  o'clock.  Calling  at  3,  Ericsson  was  at  once 
invited  to  pass  into  the  room  of  secretary  Welles.  Here, 
without  farther  parley,  the  secretary  informed  him  that 
the  board  now  reported  favorably  upon  his  plan  of  a 
vessel,  and  wished  him  to  return  to  New  York  and  com 
mence  work  upon  it  at  once.  The  contract  would  be 
sent  on  for  signature.  Before  this  contract  was  re 
ceived,  the  keel-plates  for  the  first  Monitor  had  passed 
through  the  rolling-mill."  EDITORS. 


END    OF   VOLUME    1. 


CANDLESTICK 


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